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1 Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara Chitra Nagarajan 1 February 2020 1 This analysis was conducted by Chitra Nagarajan with assistance from Mubarak Bawa and Samira Bappa. We were assisted by Save the Children, particularly Nura Mohammed and Abubakar Aji, both of whom gave generously of their time. Saleh Momale and Umar Mohammed Maradun of Pastoral Resolve (PARE) provided valuable help by facilitating interviews with Fulbe leaders. This analysis was commissioned by the UK government but its contents do not reflect the UK government’s views in any way.
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Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara · for security to deteriorate and violence to spread. This analysis presents current conflict patterns and identifies options for promoting

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Page 1: Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara · for security to deteriorate and violence to spread. This analysis presents current conflict patterns and identifies options for promoting

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AnalysisofViolenceandInsecurityinZamfara

ChitraNagarajan1February2020

1ThisanalysiswasconductedbyChitraNagarajanwithassistancefromMubarakBawaandSamiraBappa.WewereassistedbySavetheChildren,particularlyNuraMohammedandAbubakarAji,bothofwhomgavegenerouslyoftheirtime.SalehMomaleandUmarMohammedMaradunofPastoralResolve(PARE)providedvaluablehelpbyfacilitatinginterviewswithFulbeleaders.ThisanalysiswascommissionedbytheUKgovernmentbutitscontentsdonotreflecttheUKgovernment’sviewsinanyway.

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TABLEOFCONTENTSExecutiveSummary

Acronyms

Introduction

Methodology

Whataretherootcausesofviolenceandinsecurity?Whatarethekeygrievancesheldbydifferentgroupsandhowdotheymanifestinviolentandnon-violentways?

Whatistheimpactofviolenceandsecurityonpeople(differentiatedaccordingtoage,disabilityandgender)?

What are the genderdynamics around conflict andhowdogendernormsand realitiesdriveviolenceand/orpeace?

What are the factors (including government, security force and community action) bringingpeopletogetherand/orpromotingpeaceandstability?

Whoarethekeyactorswithinfluence,meansandmotivationstomobilisegroupsandresourcesintocollectiveactionforpeaceorforviolenceandwhatarelinksbetweenthem?

Whatarethepotentialtrajectories,bothpositiveandnegative,aroundpeaceandsecurity?

Conclusions

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EXECUTIVESUMMARYBasedoninterviewswith80respondents(23womenand57men),thisanalysispresentshistorictrendsandcurrentpatterns.ROOTCAUSESChangesinlandownership,encroachmentandsalesofgrazinglandtofarmersandenvironmental factors led to largely peaceful coexistence shifting. Fulbe communities feltmarginalised by government. Criminality, perceived as perpetrated by Fulbemen, increased.Afterrenewedviolencepost2011elections,manyHausacommunitiesmobilisedyansakaioryanbanga from late 2014 onwards. In response, Fulbe communities created their ownmilitias,hostilities escalated and groups engaging in criminality made strategic alliances. Armedopposition groups (AOGs) threatened physical violence if Fulbe men did not join them.Meanwhile,aseverymantendedtobeinvolved,allHausamenwereseenaslegitimatetargets.Fulbe victims invited Fulbe people from elsewhere to take revenge. Another key factor wasincreased cross-border flow of arms. The previous state government’s support for (Hausa)communitymilitiasinflamedtensionsandsoldierstendedtoassumeallyoungFulbemenwere‘armed bandits,’ adding to grievances. Attempts to negotiate peacewere unsuccessful due tofailuretoeffectivelyaddressdriversofviolence,breakingofagreements,andascontinuedattacksandsexualviolencecausedcyclesofreprisalstorestart.Thecurrentadministrationhastakenpromisingactionbutlackscapacityandconflictsensitivity.Therelativepeacebroughtaboutbythemid-2019peacedealremainsfragile.IMPACTSTheconflicthaskilledanddisabledthousandsofpeople.Peoplewithdisabilities faceincreaseddifficultyescapingviolence.Theyaremorelikelytoremainininsecureareasasaretheirfemalecaregivers.Womenandgirlsarerapedinhomes,inthebushandwhenkidnapped.Theyenduretraumaandareoftenill-treated.Womenandmencantakedifferentapproachesonwhethertoleavewithwomenforcedtoremaininareastheyfeelareunsafe.Ofthosewholeave,manyarereliantongoodwillofhostcommunities.Duetonumbersofmenkilledormigratedforwork,womenheadmanyhouseholdsandstruggletocope.Malnutritionishighasarelevelsofsexual exploitation and abuse. The situation is worsened by diversion of humanitarian aid.DisplacedFulbepeoplefaceparticulardifficultiesastheycanbediscriminatedagainstandareunable tomigrateoutofZamfara. Ingeneral, IDPsfaceadifficultchoice: toremain insitesofdisplacementwithoutfood,shelter,waterandservicesortoreturntoareaswhereattacksandviolence are likely. The violence also has had catastrophic impacts on livelihoods. Displacedpeoplestruggletofindincomeandrebuildtheirlives.Kidnappingforransomhasreducedsavingsandcapital.Duetohighsexualviolence,manywomenandgirlshavestoppedfetchingfirewood.GENDERDYNAMICSThereisatwo-wayinteractionbetweengenderandviolence.Violentconflictprofoundlyaffectsgenderroles.Gendernormsescalateconflict.Influxbeforehand,violencehasacceleratedshiftsingenderrealities.Morementendtobedeliberatelytargetedduringfighting,viewedwithsuspicionbyopponentsand,forFulbemen,bysecurityagents.Meanwhile,womenandgirlshaveexperiencedphysicalviolence,beenrapedandforciblymarried.Themajorityofthose who survive attacks are women and children. They live with lasting physical andpsychologicalimpactsandaremorelikelytobedisplaced,headhouseholdsandprovideforthefamily.Certaingroupsofgirls,particularlyorphans,aremorelikelytobemarriedatyoungerages.Gendernormsalsodriveconflict.Womenandgirlsarethefirstandlasttoexperienceviolence.Sexual violence heightens tensions and makes violence more likely. Communities see itscontinuation as indication of insecurity. Gender norms and entrenchment of militarisedmasculinitiesgoadmenintofighting.Whileitseemsfewwomencommitdirectviolence,womenof all sides have urged violence. As dynamics developed, some women started engaging inpeacebuildingbuttheirexclusionfromformaldecision-makingprocessesrestrictstheirimpact.Asaresult,thepotentialofwomeninZamfaratocontributetopeaceremainslargelyuntappedandwomen,excludedfrompeacebuildinginterventions,acttoentrenchconflictfurther.

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FACTORSBRINGINGPEOPLETOGETHERViolencehasseverelyrupturedthesocialfabricandreducedsocialcohesionwithinandbetweengroups.Yet,someareasseepersistinggoodrelationswhileothers do not, contingent on the level, nature and quality of pre-conflict social interactions,provision of support and government action. Areas where interactions were frequent, of apositivenatureandwithsufficientdepthshowgreatestsocialcohesion.AkeyindicatorofstrongsocialcohesionisthecontinuedpracticeofintermarriagebetweenFulbeandHausaindividuals.Provisionofsupportacrossidentitylinesdeepenssocialcohesionbutcivilsocietyactorswarnedthat relationsmay deteriorate if displacement seems as itwill continue without end. Lastly,successivestategovernmentshavetriedtopromotepeacebutwhiletheseeffortsarepromising,theytendtobeatthelocalgovernmentlevel,arenotinclusiveanddonothavewidereach.KEYACTORSAlthoughmanyAOG fighters are Fulbe, a significantproportion come from otherethnicgroupsandacommonnarrativeof‘foreignersdestabilisingNigeria’wasrebutted.WhiletherehavebeenattemptsbyAOGsinnortheastNigeria(commonlyknownasBokoHaram)tocometoZamfara,noevidenceofsustainedpresenceorlinkswasfound.Thepeaceprocesshasledto increasedinterand intragroupviolencedue todifferentattitudesas towhether toputdownweapons, increasing factionalism and power tussles. The military launched OperationSharanDajiinearly2016andthepoliceareinstrumentalinfacilitatingpeacedialoguebutsomerespondentsclaimedsecurityagentsweresaidtobebenefittingfromviolence.Therearethreemain community militia groups with some mutual membership and interaction: yan banga(whichexistedbeforehand);yansakai(thosewhoactinresponsetoviolence);andCJTF(setupbythepreviousstategovernmentinresponsetoyansakaihumanrightsviolationscommittedanddisbandedby thepresentadministration).The committee for finding solutions to armedbanditryinZamfarastatelistedthenamesofcommunityleaders,securityagentsandpoliticianssuspected tobe linkedtoAOGsbutrecommendation forsanctionhasyet tobe implemented.Zamfaraisrichinnaturalresources.Manyrespondentsbelievedtheminingsectorisasignificantcontributor of insecurity through payment of protection money. The current administrationemphasisestheworkdonetobringaboutpeaceandhassetupanewMinistryofSecurityandHomeAffairs.Civilsocietyandgovernmentrespondentsalikespokeoftheneedforinstitutionalcapacitystrengthening.POTENTIAL TRAJECTORIESThere are three potential trajectories:1. A slow return to peace; 2.CriminalityandbanditrypersistinruralareasandincreasingfragmentationandfactionalisationofAOGs;and3.Atotalcollapseofpeacedealandreturntohighlevelsofviolence,proliferationofgroupsand,potentially,attemptsbyAOGsinnortheastNigeriatolinkwithAOGsinthenorthwest.ThereispotentialforcontinuedpeaceconsolidationinZamfarabutsignificantriskofcollapseofthepeaceprocessandareturntohighlevelsofviolence.Manypoliciesarebeingdesignedandimplementedinconflictinsensitivewaysandwithlittleregardtopromotingsocialcohesionandgendersensitivity.Atthesametimethereisopennessandwillingnesstoengagebymanypoliticalactors.

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ACRONYMSAFAN AllFarmersAssociationofNigeria

AOG armedoppositiongroup

CJTF CivilianJointTaskForce

GBV gender-basedviolence

JASDJ Jama’atuAhlal-Sunnali-l-Da‘wawa-l-Jihad

IDP internallydisplacedperson

ISWAP IslamicStateWestAfricanProvince

LGA localgovernmentarea

MDAs ministries,departmentsandagencies

NEMA NationalEmergencyManagementAgency

NGO non-governmentalorganisation

NSCDC NationalSecurityandCivilDefenceCorps

SEMA StateEmergencyManagementAgency

SHOA StateHouseofAssembly

SSS StateSecurityServices

UN UnitedNations

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

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INTRODUCTIONZamfarahasseenincreasedlevelsofviolenceinrecentyears.Conflicthasspreadtoneighbouringstates particularly Sokoto and Katsina but also Kebbi, Niger and Kaduna, caused death,displacement and disability, destroyed livelihoods, seen high levels of gender-based violence(GBV)anddifferentiallyimpactedpopulationsaccordingtoage,disability,genderandlocation.WhiletheNigerianstatehasresponded,mostnotablyviamilitaryoperationsandapeaceprocessinitiatedbytheGovernor,therearewidespreadallegationsofcomplicityandcollusionofsecurityagents,communityleadersandpoliticiansinperpetuatinginsecurity.Thesituationnotonlyhasgravehumanitarianandhumanrightsimpactsonconflictaffectedcommunitiesbutthepotentialforsecuritytodeteriorateandviolencetospread.Thisanalysispresentscurrentconflictpatternsandidentifiesoptionsforpromotingpeace,publicsafety and security. After outlining methodology used, it addresses the following researchquestionsinturn:1. Whataretherootcausesofviolenceandinsecurity?Whatare thekeygrievancesheldby

differentgroupsandhowdotheymanifestinviolentandnon-violentways?2. What is the impact of violence and insecurity onpeople (differentiated according to age,

disabilityandgender)?3. Whatarethegenderdynamicsaroundconflictandhowdogendernormsandrealitiesdrive

violenceand/orpeace?4. Whatarethefactors(includinggovernment,securityforceandcommunityaction)bringing

peopletogetherand/orpromotingpeaceandstability?5. Who are the key actors with influence, means and motivations to mobilise groups and

resourcesintocollectiveactionforpeaceorforviolenceandwhatarelinksbetweenthem?6. Whatarethepotentialtrajectories,bothpositiveandnegative,aroundpeaceandsecurity?AnoteonlanguageItisdifficulttoknowwhattocallthoseengagedinwhatisseenas‘banditry.’Asamalecivilsocietyactivistsaid,“Banditryisamedianame.Wearetalkingaboutneglectofthispartofthecountry.When talking about banditry, nobodywill be ready to support as they cannot be supportingcriminality…Wearetryingtoeducatepeopleaboutlanguage–wearenottalkingofcriminalityorbanditrybuttwowarringgroupstryingtodefendthemselves.”Atthesametime,therewasacommon elision between ‘bandits’ and ‘Fulbe’ even among respondentswho said therewere‘innocentFulbe’notinvolvedinthesegroups.Yansakaiwasoftenusedtodescribeallcommunitymilitias and theirmembers including thosewhowerepart of other groups andamong somepeopleassociatedwithAOGs,therewasaconflationof‘yansakai’and‘Hausa.’Inordertoavoidstereotypingandconflictinsensitivityandensureaccuracy,thetermarmedoppositiongroups(AOGs)isratherused.WherequotedrespondentsuseFulbeorbandits,thesetermsarereplacedby[AOGs].Similarly,wherequotedrespondentsuse‘Hausa’torefertocommunitymilitiasor‘yansakai’torefertoallcommunitymilitias,thesetermsarereplacedby[communitymilitias].AnoteonsourcesPresently,thereisalackofwrittensourcesonconflictdynamicsinZamfara.Asaresult,whilethispaperdrawsonwhatdoesexist,mostoftheinformationcontainedcomesfrominterviewsconductedinthestateandallquotes(exceptwhereafootnotewithreferenceisprovided)arebyrespondents.Informationcollectedfromrespondentswastriangulatedandveracityconfirmedbytwoormoreseparatesources.Thisreportclearlystateswheredoingsowasnotpossible.

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METHODOLOGYBuilding on a preliminary desk review, this analysis has been developed using qualitativemethods. The author interviewed a total of 80 people. Respondents consisted of 13representatives (1 woman, 12 men) of Zamfara state ministries, departments and agencies(MDAs),22representatives(4women,18men)ofinternationalandnationalnon-governmentalorganisationsandUNagencies.Theyalsoincluded45people(18women,27men)affectedbyviolent conflict including thosewhohad takenpart in the fightingonall sidesof the conflict.Respondentsinconflict-affectedcommunitieswereselectedtoensurediversityintermsofage,disability,genderandethnicbackgrounds.Ensuringgenderbalancewaschallengingasmostcivilservants,politicians,civilsocietymembersandpeopleinvolvedinviolencearemen.However,allwomenwereinterviewedindividually,withmoretimespentwiththem.Theteamencouragedparticipants,especiallythoseoftenexcluded,tofeelcomfortableindiscussingsensitiveissuesofpower, discrimination and additional axes of marginalisation such as ethnicity, religion,occupationalgroup,gender,ageandlocation.Theseparticipantsincludedbutwerenotlimitedtowomen,youngwomeninparticular,youngmenandpeopleofallgenderswithdisabilities.In addition to the state capital Gusau, we conducted interviews in the following towns andsurrounding villages and hamlets: Anka; Badarawa; Bakura; Birnin Magaji; Mada; Maradun;Shinkafi;andZurmi.Theselocationswerechosenforthefollowingreasons:• toensuregoodgeographicalspread(pleaseseeFigure1foramapofZamfara)• toenableexaminationofsomecross-borderdynamics• assituationinthesecommunitiesandalongtheroadsleadingtothemarecurrentlysecure• toincludecommunitiesthathaveseenimprovementinpeaceandsecurity.Figure1:MapofZamfaraState

Limitations:The12daysdatacollectionperiodrestrictedthenumberofpeopleinterviewed.Wespokewiththosewhohadparticipatedinviolencebutwereunabletoaccessgroupsstillengagedinfighting.WedeclinedinvitationstovisitvillageswherethoseassociatedwithAOGsresideforsecurity reasons given risks of kidnap and around military operations. Indeed, the securitysituationwasdynamicwithattacksonresearchcommunitiesrequiringflexibility,cancellationsandadjustments.Finally,theabsenceofagenciesandcivilsocietyorganisationsoperationalinthearealimitedthenumbersofpeoplewithknowledgeofthesituationwhomwecouldinterview.

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WHATARETHEROOTCAUSESOFVIOLENCEANDINSECURITY?WHATARETHEKEYGRIEVANCESHELDBYDIFFERENTGROUPSANDHOWDOTHEYMANIFESTINVIOLENT

ANDNON-VIOLENTWAYS?

Historically,differentgroupsinwhatisnowZamfarastate2largelycoexistedpeacefullywith relations consolidated by social activities, mutual economic dependence andintermarriage.Theysocialisedandattendedfestivitiestogether.Farmersinvitedlivestockontofarmsafterharvesttoincreasesoilfertility.Pastoralistslentorrentedcowstofarmerstoploughfields. Sedentary people asked those more migratory to look after animals while migratoryfamilies kept belongings in their houses. Inter-marriagewas common. Indeed, identity linestendednottobesharp,particularlyinurbanandperiurbanplaces,asmanyfamiliesconducteddifferentlivelihoodactivitiesconcurrentlyandintermarriagewassocommonitcouldbehardtosayifindividualswereHausaorFulbe.ManyFulbefamilieshadbeensettledfordecadeswithyounger men travelling with livestock to graze. Conflict over farmlands and grazing areashappenedbutwasmostlyresolvedbetweenindividualsanddidnotescalatetoviolence.However,changesinlandownershippractices,demographics,encroachmentontograzingroutesandenvironmentandclimatefactorsledtorelationsshifting.PopulationincreaseduetonumbersofchildrensurvivinginfancyandaspeoplecametoZamfaratosettleheightened

2Although seen as predominantly Hausa and Fulbe, Zamfara also has other ethnic groups including those fromneighbouringstatesandotherpartsofNigeria.Exactdemographicsareunknownduetolackofuptodatecensusdata.

Different groups largely coexisted peacefullywith relations consolidated by social activities,mutual economic dependence and intermarriage. However, changes in land ownership,encroachmentontograzingroutesandenvironmentandclimatefactorsledtorelationsshifting.Sale of grazing land to farmers by government officials and community leaders escalatedtensions.Fulbecommunities,particularlyinruralareas,feltmarginalisedbygovernmentandaggrieved by perceived injustice in dispute resolution. Concurrently, levels of criminality inZamfara,perceivedasperpetratedbyFulbemen,wereincreasing.Statefarmerandpastoralistleadersreducedtensionssomewhatbut,afterrenewedviolencepost2011elections,manyHausacommunities mobilised pre-existing or new local security groups known as yan sakai(volunteers)oryanbangafromlate2014onwards.Inresponse,Fulbecommunitiescreatedtheirownmilitiaswhichtheycalledyanbindiga(peoplewithguns),hostilitiesescalatedandgroupsengagingincriminalitymadestrategicallianceswitheitherofthesegroups.AOGswouldvisitFulbesettlementsanddemandamanoffightingagefromeachfamilyjointhem,threateningphysicalviolenceiftheydidnotandsoforciblyrecruitmanyyoungmenandadolescentboys.Hausacommunitiesfeltsaferasaresultofactionsof(Hausa)communitymilitiasinrepellingattacksbut,aseverymanoffightingagetendedtobeinvolved,allHausamencametobeseenas ‘yansakai’andlegitimatetargets.FulbevictimsofyansakaiviolenceinvitedFulbepeoplefromelsewheretoassist intakingrevenge.Anotherkeyfactorwasincreasedavailabilityandcrossborder flowofarms fromLibyaandothercountriesexperiencingviolence.Theconflictexpanded to neighbouring states from late 2015., In 2016, the military was deployed. Theprevious state government’s support for community militias further inflamed tensions.Moreover, soldiers tended to assume all young Fulbe men were ‘armed bandits,’ therebyengaginginharassmentatcheckpointsandfiringagainstgroupsofFulbemen,particularlyinruralareas,addingtogrievances.Anumberofstategovernmentattemptstonegotiatepeacefailedduetofailuretoeffectivelyaddressdriversofviolence,breakingofagreements,andasattackscarriedoutbythosewhodidnotjointheprocesscausedthecycleofreprisalstorestart,particularly in response to widespread sexual violence. The current administration, whichcampaignedonaplatformofreturningsecuritytoZamfara,hastakenpromisingactionsbutlackscapacityandconflictsensitivitywhichrisksinflamingtensionsoncemore.Apeacedealwassignedinthemiddleof2019buttherelativepeaceithasbroughtaboutremainsfragile.

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demand for land. Although grazing lands were demarcated with knowledge of demarcationwidespread,people started to farmon these areas.AFulbe leader interviewed inGusau saidfarmers cutdowntrees andplants to farm, thereby removingvegetation livestockwould eat,increasingheatandreducingcover,whichledtomigrationintonewareas.Astategovernmentfarmer-pastoralist dispute resolution committee was established but community leaders,politiciansandcivilservantsdidnotpreservetheintegrityofgrazingareas.InKauraNamodalocalgovernmentarea(LGA)around2008/2009,livestockbelongingtomigratoryFulbewhowere following the grazing route destroyed crops planted along it. The community leaderreportedtheincidentandsecurityagenciesweresummonedtothearea.Accordingtoonemanpresent,“Isawlotsofcattle.Atthetime,theFulaniwouldcomealongwiththeirguns[for]useinthesouthasthatareaisforestedandtherewerealotofanimalsthere–but[becauseofwhathappened], theywere forced touse their guns.Theybroughtout their gunsas the armywasshouting at them. Theymade the army go back. They were exchanging fire and some cowsscattered.Themobilepolicewerekillingcowsandaskingthelocalpeopleiftheywantedtoeat.”Themainfactorinescalatingtensionswasreductioningrazingareasaslandwasrentedorsoldtofarmersbythestategovernmentandcommunityleaders.Pastoralistshadnootheroptionbuttoencroachontofarmland.Insomeareas,beaconsthatdemarcatedgrazingroutesweredestroyed.Atthesametime,accordingtoamalecivilsocietyactivistinGusau,“Theprocessoftransferringknowledgeofgrazingroutesbrokedownastheywerenolongertakenseriously.”Asaresult,farmersencroachedongrazinglandintentionallyandmistakenly.Hausamen,nowricherthanFulbemenwhohadbecomemoreimpoverished,werenowmoreabletomarrythewomenoftheirchoice,includingfromFulbecommunities.OnecivilservantsaidsomeFulbemenwereunhappyaboutHausamentakingaway‘their’girls,addingfurthertogrievances.Fulbe communities, particularly those in rural areas, feltmarginalised in governmentinterventionsandaggrievedbyperceivedinjusticeindisputeresolution.Fulberespondentscharacterisedpastadministrationsasnotonlyshowinglessersupportwhentheircommunitieswere attacked but blaming them for violence. They said their exclusion from education inparticularmeanttheycouldnotfightfortheirrightsasHausapeoplewithbettereducationandconnections took them to thepolice so theywere judgedat fault andhad to sell cattle tobereleasedfromdetention.AccordingtooneFulbemaleleader,“Somecourtsorcommunityleaderswouldseeusasbushman,illiterate,apersonwhodoesnotknowhisrights.IfwearesupposedtopayN30,000[fordestructionofcrops],theywouldaddmoneygettingtoN100,000.Hewouldrejectandsayhewillnotpay.Ifherejected,hewillbetakentoahigherauthority,tocourtthenputinprison.Thisboostedtheissuetoworseaswefeeltheyaredoinginjustice.”Concurrently, levelsof criminality inZamfara,perceivedasperpetratedbyFulbemen,wereincreasing,startingfromthe1980slinkedtotheeconomicsituationatthetimeincludingimpacts of the structural adjustment programme.3 The mid 2000s saw armed robberies onhighwaysandroads,2009onwardssawgreater incidenceofcattle theftwhichmorphed intocattle rustling fromaround2013and culminated in village raiding from2014onwards.4Thecattlerustling,reductionofgrazingareas,stigmatisationandblameforcriminalitycoupledwithperceivedlackofgovernmentcarehasledtodeepseatedgrievances.Statefarmerandpastoralistleadersweresomewhatsuccessfulinreducingencroachmentofgrazinglandbyfarmersandpromotingmutualunderstandingbetween2008and2010.However,thingsescalatedagainfrom2011onwards.Respondentssaidgroupsofpredominantly 3LoansprovidedbytheInternationalMonetaryFundandWorldBankthatrequiredborrowingcountriestoimplementcertainpolicies.Itsemphasisonprivatisationandausterityledtoslowwagegrowth,fallinlivingstandards,reducedexpenditureonsocial infrastructure, increasedinequalityandhigh levelsofdebt:ChukwumaOgbonna, ‘StructuralAdjustmentProgram(SAP)inNigeria:AnEmpiricalAssessment,’20126(1)JournalofBanking19-40.4PastoralResolve,SearchforCommonGroundandTerredesHommes,‘ZamfaraConflictAnalysisandMultisectoralNeedsAssessment,’October2019.

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Fulbeyoungpeoplewereusedas‘politicalthugs’inthehighlycontested2011elections(pleaseseepoliticalactormappingbelow)afterwhichpoliticiansfailedtofulfiltheirpromisestothem.Inresponsetorenewedviolencelinkedtothe2011elections,manyHausacommunitiesmobilisedintopre-existingornewlocalsecuritygroupsknownasyansakai(volunteers)or yan banga from late 2014 onwards. Despite insecurity affecting people from all ethnicbackgrounds,mostcommunitymilitiascomprisedonlyHausamembers.Theemergenceofthesegroups ‘furtherheightenedtensionsandpolarisedruralcommunities.’5Thestategovernmentadministrationsupportedtheiractions,providingvehiclesandstipends.ThesegroupsviewedallFulbepeoplewithsuspicion.Theybannedthemfromenteringtowns.Menwereblockedfromtakinglivestockforsaletomarkets.Womencouldnolongersellmilk.Fulbepeopleofallgenderswereunabletobuygoodsandproduce.Thisrestrictionofmovementhadprofoundconsequencesforlivelihoodsandaccesstoservicesincludinghealthcare.Thesecommunitymilitiasattackedonruralpastoralistcommunitiesbelievedtobeharbouringfighters.NotonlyFulbepeoplebutothergroupsclosetothemsuchastheSullubawa,agroupdescendedfromintermarriagesbetweenHausaandFulbeinSokotostate,experiencedthisviolence.In response, theseFulbe communities createdtheirownmilitiaswhich they calledyanbindiga(peoplewithguns),hostilitiesbetweenthesetwogroupsescalated furtherandgroupsthathadbeenengagingincriminalitymadestrategicallianceswitheitherofthesegroups.6Acycleofvengeancewassetinmotionwiththesegroupsattacking,committingphysicalviolenceandkillingeachother.Villageswereburned,womenandgirlsrapedandabductedandpeopleof all ethnicbackgroundsdisplaced, disabled andkilled. Fulbewomenwereharassed,threatened,chasedaway,beatenandatleastthreatenedwithsexualviolence.Theywereviewedwithsuspicion.Forexample, inBadarawa,Hausamenwhohadtakenherbstopreventbulletsentering their bodies but found they did not work concluded Fulbe women were puttingsomething in themilk they sold to stop these herbs fromworking. They confronted a Fulbewoman and subsequently killed her and other Fulbe women selling milk. Fulbe men tooexperiencedphysicalviolence.InShinkafi,inanopenareaoppositethecattlemarket,18Fulbepeoplewerekilledandtheirbodiessetonfireinwhatwasknownasthe‘humanabattoir.’7Hausacommunitiesfeltsaferasaresultoftheactionsof(Hausa)communitymilitiasinrepellingattacksbut,aseverymanoffightingagetendedtobeinvolved,eveniftheydidnot wish to do so, all Hausa men came to be seen as ‘yan sakai’ and valid targets. InBadarawa,aHausawomanspokeofanincidentwhereevenyoungHausachildrenbetweentheagesoffiveandtenyearswerekilledas“theythoughttheywillbecomeyansakaimembersinthefuture so they kill them before they can do that.” This perception mirrored that of HausacommunitiesthatallFulbepeoplewere‘bandits’andsolegitimatetargetsofviolence.AOGswouldvisitFulbesettlementsanddemandamanoffightingagefromeachfamilyjointhem,threateningphysicalviolenceiftheydidnotandsoforciblyrecruitmanyyoungmen and adolescent boys. When their community was attacked by yan sakai for including‘bandits’,theseyoungmenwouldlaunchattacksagainstthosewhohadattackedtheirfamilies.Not only did these events perpetuate the cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals but it alsobondedyoungmentogroupstheyhadnotwantedtojoinasthesegroupshadassistedthemintaking revenge against those who had harmed their loved ones. According to a Fulbe maninterviewedinAnka,“Ifathiefsteals,hethengoesintothebushtore-joinhisgang.Theyansakai

5PastoralResolve,SearchforCommonGroundandTerredesHommes,‘ZamfaraConflictAnalysisandMultisectoralNeedsAssessment,’October2019,p.vi.6PastoralResolve,SearchforCommonGroundandTerredesHommes,‘ZamfaraConflictAnalysisandMultisectoralNeedsAssessment,’October2019,p.viii.7MurtalaAhmedRufa’i,‘VigilanteGroupsandRuralBanditryinZamfaraState:ExcessesandContradictions,’20187(6)InternationalJournalofHumanitiesandSocialScienceInvention65-73.

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willcometothevillageandfindhisparents.Iftheydonotseetheboy,theyburndownthevillageandkilltheparents.So,thenthegangcomesbackandtakesrevenge.”ManyFulbepeoplewhohadbeenthevictimsofyansakaiviolencefeltforcedtoactandinvitedFulbepeoplefromelsewheretoassistthemintakingrevenge.PeoplecamefromotherstatesinNigeriaandacrossnationalborders.RelationsdeterioratedfurtherwithgroupslinkedtotheFulbewhichengagedincattlerustlingsaying“allcattlebelongedtoFulbeandwhoallowedtheHausapersontoowncattle?”accordingtooneFulbemaleleader.Theystolecattlefrompeopleofallethnicbackgrounds,includingtheFulbe,andusedmoneyfromsalesofcattletobuygunsforuseinreprisalattacks.WhileFulbeleaderstriedtoreachouttothoseengaginginattacksandreasonwith themonthe importanceofpeacefulcoexistence, theseeffortsprovedunsuccessfulespeciallyinthefaceofcontinuedattacksfrompredominantlyHausacommunitymilitiasandwhatwasseenaslackofconcertedactionandcontinuedneglectbythegovernment.

AkeyfactorwastheincreasedavailabilityandcrossborderflowofarmsfromLibyaandother countries experiencing violence. Theseweaponsmeant conflict easily escalated intoviolentandcausedfatalitieswhichledtocyclesofrevengeattacks.Kidnappingforransomandprotectionmoneyfromminingsitesbecamesourcesofrevenuethatenabledtheirpurchase.Incontrast,gunsusedbyHausacommunitymilitiaswerelocallymadebyblacksmiths.TheconflictinZamfaraexpandedtoneighbouringKaduna,KatsinaandSokotostatesfromlate2015and,in2016,themilitarywasdeployed.Civilmilitaryrelationswerevariable.Somerespondentsspokeofachangeovertime,pointingtoincreasedresponsivenessanddeploymenttoareastoprotectcivilianpopulations.AdisplacedHausawomanpraisedsoldiersdeployedtoherareawhodiedwhiletryingtoprotectthecommunityandwasvisiblyupsetwhenrecountingwhatshecharacterisedastheirsacrifice.However,otherrespondentsspokeofsecurityagentsintimidatingcommunitymembersandengaginginsexualharassmentandviolence.AccordingtoamanworkingforaZamfarabasedcivilsocietyorganisationinterviewedinGusau,“Uniformmenwouldsayweneedthisgirlandshemustcome.Theyintimidatethemsotheycometothemandtheyhavesex.”Thescaleofsexualviolenceisunknownasacultureofsilencelargelyprevails.Respondentsalsospokeoflackofcoordinationbetweensecurityagencies,poorcommunicationtociviliansandcommunitiesaskingforprotectionfromattacksthatwasnotforthcoming.SoldierstendedtoassumeallyoungFulbemenwere‘armedbandits,’therebyengaginginharassmentatcheckpointsandattackinggroupsofFulbemen,particularlyinruralareas,furtherdrivinggrievances.FulberespondentsspokeabouthowdifficultitwasforFulbepeoplewhosecowshadbeenstolenthenrecoveredtogetsecurityagenciestoreleasetheircowstothem.Althoughitwasnotpossibletoverifyspecificincidents,someFulberespondentsclaimedsecurityagentshadengagedinextrajudicialkillingsofFulbe,workingtogetherwiththeyansakai.Asaresult,Fulbepeoplefeelunabletoreportthreatsofattackstosecurityagenciesandtendtohavehighlevelsofmistrustandlackofconfidenceinthem.Fulbecommunitiesareparticularlycaughtinthemiddle,facingthreatsfromsecurityagencies,HausacommunitymilitiasandAOGsalike.

“TheFulbegathered,realisedwhatthegovernmentisdoingincollaborationwithvigilanteandthattheyhaveaplantoeradicateallFulbeinZamfarasotheygatheredandprovidedthemselveswithweapons.They tookanimals toNiger,Cameroonandotherneighbouringcountries to keep there and started taking revenge. [Name redacted]’s familyhad a thiefamongstthemwhowasnotthere.[Theyansakai]instructedhimtobringthethiefandwhenherefused,theykilledhiminfrontofhisfamily...Fromthatday,theFulberesolvedtotakerevenge...Theywenthousetohouselookingfor[membersofcommunitymilitias],broughtthemoutoftheirhouseandkilledthem.Thenthe[membersofcommunitymilitias]wouldgotoonerugaofFulbeandattackthem.”–maleFulbeleaderinterviewedinGusau

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Thepreviousstategovernmentwasseenasuncaringaboutthegravityofthesecurityandhumanitarian situation. Its support for communitymilitiaswas appreciatedbymembersofthesegroupsbutseenasfurtherinflamingtensionsbyothers.Itspeaceeffortreducedviolenceforsometimebuteventuallyfailed.Allsidesagreedtoaceasefireandtoendkidnapping.Duringthistime,accordingtoaHausayansakaimember,FulbeandHausapeoplewereconnectedso“IfaHausamanwasattacked,Iknowwhotocall[hisfocalpoint among the Fulbe] and theywould take care of the issue themselves. If a Fulbe personcomplainsthataHausamanhasdonesomething,itisourresponsibilityandwewouldhandhimover[totheauthorities].”However,AOGfighterswerearrestedonreturnfromhaj.Compensationpromisedforweaponssurrenderedwasunpaid.Thegovernmentdidnotaddressrootcauses.8Attacks continued at a smaller scale, leading cycles of reprisal to restart.Widespread sexualviolenceagainstwomenandgirlswasamajorfactorinincreasingtensionsasmenvowedtotakerevenge.Notonlyviolencedidresumebutitescalatedtonewheights.

The current administration has taken promising action but lacks capacity and conflictsensitivity which risks inflaming tensions. Having campaigned on returning security toZamfaraandmaximisingtheopportunityofacleanslate,itreachedouttoAOGstofindoutanddiscusshowtoaddressgrievances.ItbannedtheactivitiesofHausacommunitymilitiasleadingtoimprovedFulbefreedomofmovement,accesstomarketsandabilitytosellmilk.Itcancelledallocationsofgrazinglandtofarmersandpromisedtoprovidemoderngrazingreservesineachsenatorial zone with housing, schools, health clinics, veterinary clinics and other services. Itencouragessurrenderofweapons.9Thestategovernmentconstitutedacommitteeforfindingsolutions to armed banditry in Zamfara state in August 2019 chaired by a former InspectorGeneralofPolicebutitsreporthasyettobemadepublicanditsrecommendationsactioned.

Apeacedealwassignedinthemiddleof2019buttherelativepeaceithasbroughtaboutremains fragile. Not surprisingly, while matters have improved somewhat, tensions andsuspicionstillpersistasexemplifiedbyasharpdecreaseinintermarriage.Currentdynamicswillbediscussedfurtheratthestartofthefuturetrajectoriessectionbelow.

8PastoralResolve,SearchforCommonGroundandTerredesHommes,‘ZamfaraConflictAnalysisandMultisectoralNeedsAssessment,’October2019.9Asofmid-January,statecivilservantssaidthatover500gunshadbeengivenupbyHausacommunitymilitiasandover80bymembersofarmedoppositiongroups–agoodstartbutonlyasmallproportionofweaponsinthestate.

“I cannot tell how things have deteriorated to this levelwherewe have no trust. I neverthoughtthisthingcouldeverhappen.HausaandFulbearenaturallylikebrotherandsisterbutthisissueofbanditryhasseparatedus.”-HausawomaninterviewedinZurmi

“Soldiersdonot trustFulbe.Anyone theysee isFulbe, theyalwaysputquestionson them,molestthemandtakeillegalactionswithoutknowingifyouaregoodorbad.WhoeverisFulbewhovisits[thenearestmarket],yansakaiwilltellsoldiersthathereisFulbeandsoldierswillholdyou,taketothebushandkillyouwithoutanyinvestigation.Evenintown,soldiershavekilled many relatives even though they are not [AOG members].” – young Fulbe maninterviewednearBirninMagaji

“Itwastherapeofpeople’swivesthatbroughtback the issue.Fulbewereblockingroads,rapingwomenonroadsortakingwomenintowns.IcalledtheFulbeleadersbutitbeyondtheirpower as theboyswerenot listening to themanymore. Thishappened3 yearsago.Everything justgotworse.Wehadalreadysurrenderedourarmsbuttheystillhad theirs.They would come, steal, kidnap, rape. The government did nothing. So, our committeeguardingthetownwentandpurchasedarmsagain.”-HausamaninterviewedinBadarawa

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WHATISTHEIMPACTOFVIOLENCEANDINSECURITYONPEOPLE(DIFFERENTIATEDACCORDINGTOAGE,DISABILITYANDGENDER)?

PHYSICALVIOLENCEThousands of people of all ethnic groups have been killed. The committee for findingsolutionstoarmedbanditryinZamfarastatereported6,319violentrelateddeathsbutthisfiguredoesnotincludeunreporteddeathsinruralareas.10Althoughpeopleofallagesandgenderswerekilled,asdescribedabove,menwereparticularlytargeted.Manyfamiliesarecopingwiththelossoflovedones.Relativeslookafterorphanedchildrenwhostruggletocopewithparticularlygivenreducedeconomiccircumstances.Somechildrenareforcedtolookafterthemselves.Manypeoplehavebecomedisabledwhenrunningawayfromattacksandduetoviolence,includingthataimingtodisable.AOGfightershavecutoffhandsofciviliansinvillagesacrossZamfara.Whilesomepeoplerecoverfrominjuries,manybecomepermanentlydisabledoftenduetoinadequateprovisionofhealthcare.AdisplacedHausawomaninBirninMagajidescribedhow,whilerunningaway,shefellandhadherwristdislocatedandarmfractured.ThehealthclinicgaveheronlypainmedicineShehasnowlosttheuseofherleftarm.Insomecases,womenarereturnedtofamiliesashusbandsdonotwanttobearhealthcarecosts.Thesedynamicsneedtobe viewed in light of pre-existing exclusion of people with disabilities, with women facingintersectingaxesofoppressionandmarginalisationduetogenderanddisability.

10AccordingtoUsmanNagogo,theCommissionerofPolice,inaJanuary2020pressbriefing:Author’snotesfrompressconference,verifiedbycopiesofhisspeechdistributedtothosepresent.

Thousands of people have been killed and disabled. People with disabilities face increaseddifficultyescapingviolence.Theyaremorelikelytoremainininsecureareasasaretheirfemalerelativeswhostaybehindtolookafterthem.Thetreatmentofthosekidnappedvarieswithmenoftenphysicallybeatenwhilewomenandgirlsare(gang)raped.Womenandgirlsarealsorapedin homes, communities andwhen collecting firewood. In addition to enduring trauma, thesewomen and girls are often ill- treated. Violent conflict has causedwidespread displacement.Women andmen can take different approaches onwhether to leave,withwomen forced toremaininareastheyfeelareunsafe.Ofthosewholeave,manyarereliantongoodwillofhostcommunitiesintheabsenceofadequatehumanitarianassistance.Duetonumbersofmenkilledormigratedforwork,manyhouseholdsareheadedbywomenwhostruggletocope.Malnutritionlevelsarehighasarelevelsofsexualexploitationandabuseandsurvivalsex.Thesituationisworsenedbydiversionofhumanitarianaid.DisplacedFulbepeoplefaceparticulardifficultiesastheycanbediscriminatedagainstbyhostcommunitiesandareunabletomigrateoutofZamfara.Insecurityhasworsenedanalreadylowlevelofaccesstoservices,particularlywhenitcomestoeducationandhealth.Manyrespondentsspokeaboutthefearunderwhichtheyliveandlastingimpactsofexperiencingviolence.Despitewidespreadnatureandhighlevelsofconflict-relatedtrauma,thereisnoagencyprovidingmentalhealthandpsychosocialsupport.Ingeneral,IDPsfaceadifficultchoice:toremaininsitesofdisplacementwheretheydonothaveadequatefood,shelter,waterandservicesortoreturntoareaswhereattacksandviolencearelikely.Zamfarahasmanyprotectionissuesbutnoprotectionactorsandverylittleprotectionmainstreaming.Theviolencehasalsohadcatastrophicimpactsonlivelihoods.Displacedpeoplestruggletofindincomeinsitesofdisplacementand,whentheyreturntotheirvillages,finditdifficulttorebuildtheirlives.Thelivelihoodsofpeopleinrelativelysafetownshavealsobeenaffectedaspeopleareunabletotraveltotradeandhavelessresources.Highlevelsofkidnappingofpeopleandcowsforransomhavereducedsavingsandcapitalinbothruralandurbanareas.Duetohighsexualviolence, women and girls in many locations have stopped fetching firewood. High levels ofkidnappingofpeopleandcowsforransomhavereducedsavingsandcapitalinbothruralandurbanareas.Peoplewithdisabilitieshavefounditparticularlydifficulttofindlivelihoods.

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Thosewithdisabilitiesbeforetheviolencefaceincreaseddifficultyescapingviolencesoaremorelikelytoremainininsecureareas..AdisplacedHausamaninterviewedinAnkasaidsixchildrenwithintellectualdisabilitiescausedbyleadpoisoningwereleftbehindwhenvillagersfledeventhoughnon-disabledchildrenweretakentosafety.Bythetimepeoplewentbacktoretrievethemtwodayslater,theywerehungry,scaredandhadhadnoideawhatwashappening.AdisplacedBusawawomaninterviewedinBakuradescribedhowshehadtowheelherelderlymother inawheelbarrowtosafety.Herbrotherwhohasmobility issuesstayedbehindwhileeveryonefled.Shesaid,“Almostallinthetownhavefled,onlyasmallnumberremain.Thosethatremainarenotupto10,mostofthemareoldpeopleincludingmybrotherwhoiscrippled.”Femalefamilymembersofdisabledmencanalsostaybehindtolookafterthemandbeatriskofharm.Whilepeoplewithdisabilitiesseemnotdirectlytargeted,theirfemalerelativescanbe at risk. In the above case, the brother’swife anddaughter remained in the village.Whenfightersreturned,theysaidtheywouldtakethebrother’sdaughterwiththemandonlyrelentedaftertheyounggirlinsistingshewouldnotgowiththemassheneededtolookafterherparents.Manypeoplehavealsobeenkidnappedforransom.Awomanrespondentsaidhercaptorapologisedforhisactionsandlookedafterherandothercaptiveswellbutgoodtreatmentdoesnotseemthenormandotherformercaptivesgavedifferentaccounts.11Womenandmenhavebeenkilledincaptivity.Thoseabductedhavedifferentexperiencesaccordingtoageandgender.Whileabductedmenexperiencemorebeating,womenandgirlsareoftenrapedbymanymen.Fighters have also come to communities and forcibly married women and girls. Fear ofpunishmentcoupledwithpotentialstigmameansmanyinthissituationdonottrytoescape.Womenandgirlsarealsorapedinhomes,communitiesandwhencollectingfirewood.AHausawomaninterviewedinBadarawaestimatedover20womenandgirlsinthetownalonehadbeenrapedwhencollectingfirewood.Shesaid,“Theychooseoneoftwothings.One,theyrapethemthenleavethemtogo.Two,theyputbatteryintheirvaginaandtellthemtogowiththatsoitcausesharmtothembeforetheycomeback.Evenifyouaskthegirls,theydonottelluswhathashappenedtothembutusuallytheyhavebeenrapedbymorethanonemanastheyoftenareunconscious.Weseethemlyinginthebushandtakethemtotheirhouses.”AllmembersofAOGsinterviewed,whenaskedwhytheyrapewomen,deniedtheirgroupdoesthis,agreedthishappenedandstated ‘their’womenarealsoraped.Whilemore informationabout therapeofHausaandFulbewomennotassociatedwithAOGswasforthcoming,thereweresomeindicationsthatwomenassociatedwithAOGsalsofacesexualviolenceasaformofcollectivepunishment.In addition to enduring trauma, thesewomen and girls are often ill-treated. Husbandsdivorcewives. Fiancésbreakoff engagements. Even if there isnodivorce, rape canbe raisedduringmaritalargumentsandusedbyothercommunitymemberstobelittleanddemeanthesesurvivors.Ifpregnant,womenandgirlsaretakenforabortions.AHausawomaninterviewedinBadarawasaid,“Itistheonlyoptionassomeofthegirlsgetpregnantfromthefirstrapeandwedonotwanttohaveanyrelationshipwith[AOGs]aswedonotknowwheretheycomefromandwedonotknowwhorapedher.”DISPLACEMENTViolentconflicthasledtowidespreaddisplacementfromruralareastotowns,thestatecapital,otherpartsofNigeriaandacrossnationalborders.AccordingtoamanworkingfortheStateEmergencyManagementAgency(SEMA),therewassomedisplacementbefore2011as

11Whenweinterviewedthosewhohadbeenkidnappedandreleased,weaskedthemtotelluswhateverinformationtheywanted to share.Whileweasked follow up questions tomen,we refrained fromdoing so forwomen givenlikelihoodofGBV.Womencivilsocietyactivistsandotherwomenintheircommunitiesprovidedinformationaboutthesexualviolencethatkidnappedwomenandgirlsoftenexperience.

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smallgroupsoffarmersongrazinglandhadtomovewhenpastoralistsreturned.MasskillingsinKizara,LangadiandGaladimain2013causeddisplacementwhichwasaugmentedbymultipleattacksfrom2017to2019.AmalerespondenttrackingdisplacementsaiddisplacementreducedslightlyfromMarchtoJuly2019duetotheactionsoftheJointTaskForce.Duringthistime,therewere5campsforinternallydisplacedpeople(IDPs)inZamfara:oneinMadainGusauLGA,twocampsinMaruLGA,onecampinAnkaandaschoolinShinkafiwhereIDPsstayedforafewweeks.Thisperiodsawnewandcyclicaldisplacement.12FromJuly toSeptember2019,somepeoplereturned to communities hoping to resume livelihoods, particularly given lack of assistance.However, as of January2020,manywhohadgonehomehadbeendisplacedoncemorewithrespondents working for humanitarian agencies attributing this to the surge in militaryoperations fromNovember2019onwards.Forexample, inmid-January2020,areported300familiescametoAnkatownastheyworriedAOGswouldattacktheirvillagesinretaliationforsoldierskillingtheirmembersastheysuspectedvillagershadpassedinformationtothemilitary.Womenandmencantakedifferentapproachesonwhethertoleave.Forexample,inaFulbe/SullubawahamletinGusauLGA,everywomaninterviewedexpressedfearofstayinganddesiretoleave.Here,3womenhadbeenabductedthenreleasedwithAOGswarningtheywouldcomeback.Theonlywomanwholeftwithherchildrenwasawidowwiththefreedomtomakethisdecision.Womencomplainedbitterlyreluctanceofmalerelativestoleaveandthat,particularlyintheabsenceoffamilymemberstowhomtheycouldgo,theyhadnooptionbuttostay.Ofthosewholeave,manyarereliantongoodwillofhostcommunitiesintheabsenceofadequatehumanitarianassistancebystateactorsandagencies.Thestategovernmenthasprovidedsomeaidandhumanitarianagenciesareoperationalinsomeareasbutthisassistance,givenweakstatecapacity,absenceofhumanitarianactorsanddiversionofhumanitarianaid,isinadequate to meet needs. Even where people plan leaving communities, the food andcommoditiestheybringrunout.AdisplacedBusamaninterviewedinBakurasaid,“Sincewehavesomanydependentsandwecouldonlytakeawaythefarmproducewecouldmove,ourfoodwillonlylastuntiltheendofthismonth.Afterthat,weareplanningtorelyonGodwhowillprovide.”Atpresent,therearethreeofficialIDPcampsinthestate(inAnka,MadaandMaradun)with many more IDPs living in unofficial and informal settlements and in hostcommunities.AccordingtoaseniorSEMAofficial,displacementcontinuestobedynamic.Latestfigures showing 87,251 people displaced in Zamfara but many IDPs are uncounted so realnumbersarehigher.Heapproximatedonly16,730peoplelivedinthethreeofficialcamps.Duetothenumbersofmenkilledormigratedforwork,manyhouseholdsareheadedbywomenwhostruggletocope.Manyrespondentssaidtheywentaroundthecommunitybeggingforfoodorlookingforwork.AccordingtoadisplacedFulbewomaninterviewedinBakura,“Weseeawheelbarrowpusherorpeopleholdingheavythingsandasktogivetoussowecanholdforthem.Wearenotfamiliarwithcityjobssowearejustlearningnow.”Malnutrition levelsarehigh.MSFSpain’srecentnutritionsurvey found levelsofsevereandacute malnutrition were at 5 percent in Zurmi and Shinkafi. A food security and nutritionassessment inAugust/September2019 foundglobalacutemalnutrition indisplacedchildrenaged6to59monthswasat31.1percent,73.1percentofdisplacedhouseholdhadinsufficientfood intake and86.7 percent of households engaged in food based coping strategies such asreducingportionsizes,skippingmealsandrestrictingadultconsumptionsochildrencaneat.13 12Therearediscrepanciesastotheextentofdisplacementduringthistime.WhileIOMreportsthat,asofAugust2019,therewere72,161displacedpeopleinZamfara,UNCHRreportsthatthisfigurewas144,996:IOM,DTMReportNorthCentral andNorthWestZonesRound1,August2019;UNHCR, JointProtectionAssessmentMission toNorthwestNigeria,25July–4August2019.13WorldFoodProgrammeandNationalBureauofStatistics,‘RapidFoodSecurityandNutritionAssessmentamongInternallyDisplacedHouseholdsinKatsina,SokotoandZamfaraStatesofNigeria,’September2019.

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Thesituationisworsenedbydiversionofhumanitarianaid.AccordingtoadisplacedBusamaninBakura,“Whentheygiveoutthings,somewillgetandotherswillnot...Anyoneclosetothesourceofsupplyistheonewhowillget.”InAnka,theIDPcampisonlandbelongingtotheEmirwhosetupacampmanagementcommitteewhichdoesnotincludeIDPs.Here,foodtrucksarrivedandIDPs,askedtooffloaditems,wereawaitingdistributiononlytofindfoodtakenawayat night. When they complained, the Emir told them they had two weeks to leave. Afterintervention by others, the Emir relented. In Shinkafi too, respondents recounted aid beingdiverted. A displaced Hausa woman interviewed there said, “The leaders assigned hijackeverything. Hardly anything reaches us. Last year, they sent items through politicians whobroughtitandsharedwithintheirownrelatives...[Once]westayedthewhiledayuntil5pm,theytookpictureswiththeitemsbehindusbuttheydidnotdistributebutpackedandwentawaywiththemaftertheytookthephotos.”Alltheserespondentsstressedtheneedforaidtodirectlyreachthemratherthanbefunnelledthroughlocalleaders,politiciansorgovernmentofficials.There are high levels of sexual exploitation and abuse and survival sex. Civil societyrepresentativesandcivilservantssaidthatwomenandgirlsoftenhadnootherchoicetofeedthemselvesandtheir familiesashomescontinue tobeunsafeandtheyhavenoother incomesources.Forexample,arespondentworkingonchildprotectiontalkedofa13-year-oldgirlrapedbyasonofapoliticianwhocontinuedtohavesexwithherafterwardsandgivehermoneythatshesubsequentlygavetohermothertolookafterthefamily.Accordingtoarespondentworkingwithdisplacedwomen,“Theyareforcedtobecomesexworkersandsexuallyexploitedbymenincludingthosehostingthem.Ihaveheardofsevencaseswheremenhostwomenandsexualexploit.”Perpetratorsincludesoldiersaswellascommunitymenwithpowerandinfluence.DisplacedFulbepeoplefaceparticulardifficultiesastheycanbediscriminatedagainstbyhostcommunities.TheytendtostayseparatelyfromHausaIDPsintheirownsettlementsoftenwithdisplacedSullubawapeople.AseniorSEMAofficialcharacterisedrelationbetweenHausahostcommunitiesandFulbeIDPsaslargelycordialbut“sometimes,thereareepisodeswherepeople lookat them,see theyareFulani,getaggrievedandstart toabuse them.”SomeFulberespondentssaidtheyhadfounditdifficulttofindshelterandthatallFulbearemistrusted.Insomeplaces,communityleadersregularlyvisitsettlementsofdisplacedFulbepeopletocountnumberswithsuspicionfallingonnewpeoplepresent.AFulbemaninterviewedinAnkasaid,“Peoplelookatusasifwearepartofthem–theysaywehavechildrenamongbandits.”Hesaid,“Ifeelshouldjustpackupthingsandmigrate.TheonlyreasonI’venotleftisI’mfromNigeria,mywholelineageisfromhereandIdon’tknowanyoneelsewhereanddon’tknowwhereelsetogo.”Duetostigmaandsuspicion,manyFulbehavealsobeenunabletomigrateoutofZamfaraeitheraspartofregularmigrationortoseeksafety.ResearchintheMiddleBeltin2019foundhighsuspicionofFulbefromZamfaraamongallethnicgroups–includingotherFulbewhorefusetopermitthemtosettlenearbyastheydonotwant‘Zamfaraproblems’intheirarea14Accordingtoacivilsocietyrespondent,thegovernmentinthepasthastoldsecurityforcesto“lockdowntheborderandpreventthemleavingaspeoplewereleavingNigeriaandmovingtoChad.”

14ChitraNagarajan,‘”NoTribeinCrime”:ChangingPastoralismandConflictinNigeria’sMiddleBelt,’(MercyCorps,forthcoming).

“Inthepast,itwascordialandtherewasnoproblem.Now,sinceallthosepeoplein[thesouth]havebeentouchedbypeopletheybelievetobeourtribe,theyarereluctanttoallowustobethere...ThecattlepathisblockedandwhentheyseeaFulbeperson,someonewillkillyouorsometimesaskforpapersandifyoudonothave[anindigeneshipcertificate],theywillkillyouandtakeyourcattleandgivetothegovernmentsayingitwasathief.Fulbefromotherplacesarenot fair touswhenwego therealso.Everywhere,you findbadeggsbuthere, theyhaveclassifiedallofustobebadeggs.”-FulbemaninterviewedinavillageinBakuraLGA

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Ingeneral,IDPsfaceadifficultchoice:toremaininsitesofdisplacementwheretheydonothaveadequatefood,shelter,waterandservicesortoreturntoareaswhereattacksand violence are likely. Due to lack of assistance, people tried to return home to restartlivelihoodsonlytohavetofleeagain.Asaresult,theydonotwanttogoback.ThisreluctancetoreturnisparticularlytrueofwomenasAOGfightersarecurrentlylesslikelytoengageinattacksbutarestillcommittingsexualviolence.AccordingtoadisplacedHausawomaninMada,“Inthevillagesnearus,[thefighters]stillgothere,takewomenandrapethem.Wearesuretheywillcontinuefromwheretheystoppedifwegoback.”REDUCEDACCESSTOSERVICESInsecurityhasworsenedalreadylowlevelsofaccesstoservices.15A2019assessmentnotedgapsinWASHserviceswith38percentofthosesurveyedhavingnonearbylatrines,58percentusingpitlatrinesand42percentpracticingopendefecation.16Childrendonotattendschoolsdueto lack of money, destruction of classrooms, fears for safety, lack of teacherswho have fledviolenceandtheneedtoearnincomes:33percentofchildrenaged5-17hadcompletelydroppedout of school and a further 29 percent had never attended school.17 Some families havewithdrawnchildrenfromIslamiyyaschoolsforthesereasons.Somealmajiraihavebeenrecalledbyfamiliesduetofearsforsafetywhileothershavecontinuedasfamiliescannotprovideforthemif theyreturn.Respondentsworriedwhatlackofeducationmaymean forchildren’s future intermsoflivelihoods,attitudesandbehaviour.Accesstohealthhasalsobeenaffectedashealthclinicshavebeenattackedandhealthworkersabducted.Agenciesworkinginhardtoreachareastoexpandaccessscaledbackprogramming.Theconflicthasincreasedunsafeabortion18linkedtoratesofsexualviolence,womenandgirlsforcedtoengageinsurvivalsex,reducedavailabilityof contraceptionandasstigmaattached topregnancyoutsidemarriagewasmore likelywithhusbandsabsent.Areproductivehealthpractitionersaid,“Weseetheincidenceofwomendyingfromunsafeabortionandcomingtohealthservicesforpostabortalcareincreasing.”Fulbepeoplehaveexperiencedparticularlyrestrictedaccesstoeducationandhealth.Theywere unable to come to primary healthcare facilities when Fulbe people were being killed,harassedorchasedawayfromvillagesandtownswithserioushealthconsequences.AsimilardynamicexistedaroundaccesstoeducationforFulbechildrengoingtoschoolinnearbyHausatowns.ThisparticularbarriertoanddenialfromhealthcareandeducationeasedafterthestategovernmentorderedcommunitymilitiastonolongeroperatebutmanyFulbepeoplestillhaveresidualfearofbeinginplacesdominatedbythoseofotherethnicitieswhichrestrictsaccess.PSYCHOLOGICALIMPACTSOFVIOLENCEManyrespondentsspokeaboutlastingimpactsofviolenceandfearsitwillreturn.Givengendered patterns of harm where many men were killed, many women and children, more

15Forexample,Zamfarahasonly12percentimmunisationcoverage,isastatewithoneofthehighestindicesofacutemalnutritionnationwide,42.8percentofitschildrenareontrackwithearlychilddevelopmentcriteriaandonly11.4percentofyoungwomenand53percentofyoungmenhavebasicliteracyskills.StatisticsareprovidedinPastoralResolve, Search for CommonGround and Terre desHommes, ‘Zamfara Conflict Analysis andMultisectoral NeedsAssessment,’October2019,atp.v.16PastoralResolve,SearchforCommonGroundandTerredesHommes,‘ZamfaraConflictAnalysisandMultisectoralNeedsAssessment,’October2019,p.xii.17PastoralResolve,SearchforCommonGroundandTerredesHommes,‘ZamfaraConflictAnalysisandMultisectoralNeedsAssessment,’October2019,p.xi.18AccordingtoSections232-236ofthePenalCodeandsections228and230oftheCriminalCodeAct,abortionisafelonyonlypermissiblewhenthemother’slifeisatrisk.Islamismorepermissive:interpretationsallowabortionuntilthefoetushasbeen‘ensouled’ataround4months.Anestimated2.7millionabortionsarelikelytotakeplaceannually,65.6percentdoneinwaysthatareleastsafe(81percentforwomenwithnoeducationand82percentforthepoorestwomen)andunsafeabortionisaleadingcauseofmaternaldeath:PMA2020AbortionSurveyResults:Nigeria,April-May2018,availableathttps://www.pma2020.org/sites/default/files/AbortionModule_Brief_111518.pdf.

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representedamongthosewhoremain,continue toexperience severe psychological distress. Womenspoke about how fear impacts the body andrelationships. A displaced Hausa womaninterviewed in Badarawa said, “There is a lack ofpeace in your home if you aremarried. There arealso so many [babies born with disabilities ordefects] andmiscarriages due to fear as you startlabour before your time.” People working withchildren spoke about psychological impacts and acycle of violence where conflict-affected childrenenactabuseonotherchildren.AseniorSEMAofficialsaid, “Theydon’tknowwhoto trust.Theyhavenoparents.Theyhadpeoplekilledinfrontofthem.Theyneedpsychosocialsupport.”Fulbepeoplespokebeingcaughtinthemiddle-betweenHausaneighboursandfellowFulbe–andhowthispositiongaverisetoemotionaldistress.Bothsetsofpeoplehadcausedharm. They were unhappy how previously positive relations and interactions with Hausaneighbours, with families living together for multiple generations, had deteriorated. Theydistancedthemselvesfromthosewhosoughttoportraytheiractionsasindefenceoftheirethnicgroup,pointingoutAOGswerealsoattackingandstealingfromFulbecommunities.TheyweredeeplytraumatisedthatfellowFulbehadattackedtheirvillages,destroyedtheirfarmsandtakenawaytheircattle.AFulbemaninterviewedinaFulbehamletinBirninMagajiLGAsaid,“IamnothappyaboutitbeingFulbepeopledoingthis.IamproudofbeingaFulbeman.Wedonotneedwhattheyaredoingbutwedonothaveanychanceorrighttochangethemorstopthem.Ifeelinmyheart,Ihatewhattheyaredoing.IhavenooptionsinceIcannotstopthem.”Despitewidespreadnatureandhighlevelsofconflict-relatedtrauma,thereisnoagencyproviding mental health and psychosocial support. Sometimes, violence leads to severepsychologicalproblems.Accordingtoamalecivilsocietymember,“Wehavewomenwhohavebecomemadbecausetheysawtheirchildrenandhusbandkilledandtheiranimalsandpropertywere taken. [A woman], before the attack, was planning to sell cows and go on haj so nowwheneveryouseeher,shekeepsrepeatingthatsheisgoingtoMecca.She’slivingonthestreetandroamingabout.Wehavewomenwhocannotstayaloneinaroom6monthsafterattackasrememberswhathappenedandgetsscaredbyanysmallsoundtheyhear.”LIVELIHOODSANDECONOMICIMPACTSOFVIOLENCETheviolencehashadcatastrophic impactson livelihoods. People from rural Zamfaraaredisplaced intoperi-urbanorurbanareaswhere they struggle to earn incomes.Manywish toreturnhomebutcannotdosoduetopersistentinsecurityandfearofattacks,killingsandsexualviolence.Theycontrastcurrentrealitieswith livesbeforeviolence. Theyspokeofhavinghadanimals,farmlandsandfoodstores,andengaginginmultipleincomegenerationactivities.Now,theystruggletofindwhateverincometheycan,workingasdaylabourersonotherpeople’sfarmsorinhouseholdservicetothoseinhostcommunities-iftheyarelucky.Displacedpeoplewhoreturnfinditdifficulttorebuildtheirlivesgivenhomeshavebeenburned, food storesand farmimplementsdestroyed, animals stolenand savings spent.Livelihoodsactivitiesareuncertainanddangerous.According toaseniorSEMAofficial, “IDPscontinuetosuffer.Theygobacktofarmcropsduringthedaythencomebackineveningasthereisnosafety–theydohitandrunfarming.Whenharvestcommenced,[theAOGs]tooktheircattletoeatcrops.”Itisnotonlyfarmerswhofacedifficulties.Respondentssaidtheirlivestockisstillbeingstolenandtheyareunabletogototheirgrazingareasforpastureduetoinsecurity.AFulbemaninterviewedinahamletinBirninMagajiLGAsaid,“Ourrelativeswithmanycowsstillwent

“Many of our people have been killed.Theyburnedthehouseofourimmediateneighbourswithpeopleincludingsmallchildren inside. Themost painful thingthat happened was that we could noteven identifydeadbodiesas theywereso badly burned... We have seen theterrible side of life... Up to now,whenever I remember, even if I chewfood, I cannot swallow due tobitterness.” - displaced Hausa womaninterviewedinZurmi

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[toagrazingarea].Theywereattackedandtheytookawaytheircows.Wearefindingitdifficulttofeedthecowsthatremainnow...Theyarenotashealthyasbeforeaswecannotfeedthemwellnowandthisaffectedtheirfertility.”Thelivelihoodsofpeopleinrelativelysafetownshavealsobeenaffected.Womennolongergotothemainroadtosellfoodtheyhadcookedduetoinsecurity.Theynolongerwanttouseloudmachinerysuchassewingorgrindingmachinesasdoingsowouldalertattackerstothefactsomeoneisathomeandtheywouldbecaughtunawaresasthesoundofthemachinewouldmasktheattackers’entrance.Fulbewomenwhohadpreviouslysoldmilkandmilkproductshaveseenincomes drastically drop as familiesnow had less cattle and the ones that remained did notproducemuchmilkduetolackofadequatepasture.

Due tohigh sexualviolence,womenandgirls inmany locationshave stopped fetchingfirewood.Inmanycommunities,mennowdosoinsteadbuttakecaretogoearlyandcomebackquickly.Sincefirewoodcollectionshiftedfromwomentomen,womenhavereducedcontroloverincomes.Moreover,insecurityhasreducedtheamountoffirewoodcollectedwhichoftenisnownomoresoldbutusedforcookingfuel.Widowswithoutgrownsonsorwomenwhosehusbandsdonotgotocollectfirewoodparticularlystruggletofindfuelforcooking.Highlevelsofkidnappingofpeopleandcowsforransomhavereducedsavingsandcapitalinbothruralandurbanareas.Fightershavealsoextortedprotectionmoneyfromcommunitiesandthreatenedtoattackthemifthismoneyisnotpaid.AmountsdemandedrangefromN500,000toN10million. Inorder topay these sums, people sell produce and cows.OneFulbeman inBalgaresaidhehadtosellsixofhis16cowstocontributemoneydemanded.Peoplewithdisabilitieshavefounditparticularlydifficulttofindlivelihoods.AdisplacedHausamanwhonowusingcrutchesaftersustaininganinjurywhilefleeingviolencesaidothermenfromhisvillagehavegonetoAbujainsearchofworkbutheisunabletodoso.AdisplacedHausawomaninterviewedinBirninMagajiwholosttheuseofherleftarmduringtheattackisstillunabletodoanyworkoverayearafterwardsandisreliantonhermothertotakecareofher.MANYPROTECTIONISSUESBUTNOPROTECTIONINTERVENTIONSORACTORSVery few agencies fromoutside the state are currently operational in Zamfara andnoagencies that are operational there do protectionwork. There is a lack of knowledge ofprotection issues letalonemainstreamingofprotection into interventions.Forexample,aUNstaff member working on child protection said he was unsure if there were any childrenassociated with armed groups. Dynamics around GBV are under-examined, not sufficientlyincluded in organisational analysis and do not influence programming. Agencies providinghealthcaresaytheyhavenoexperienceinorknowledgeofprotectionandwhiletheytreatwomenwhocometohealthclinicshavingexperiencedsexualviolence,theyarecurrentlytakingnoactiontomainstreamprotectionintotheirwork.

“Welost22cows.Icannotdefinetheconditionwearein.Itisbeyondcomment.Istillsellmilkbutthecowsthatusedtogetmilkhavebeentakenaway.Therearenotmanycowswhichhasaffectedwomen’sbusiness.Weusedtogoouteverydaytosellmilkbutnowonlygooutonceaweekasthemilkisnotmuch.Wedonothavemoneytobuythings.Wesometimesgo1or2dayswithouteatingfood.”-FulbewomaninterviewedinahamletinZurmiLGA

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WHATARETHEGENDERDYNAMICSAROUNDCONFLICTANDHOWDOGENDERNORMSANDREALITIESDRIVEVIOLENCEAND/ORPEACE?

PRE-EXISTINGGENDERNORMSGendernormsdifferbetweengroups.genderroleswereinflux.AccordingtoawomanrightsactivistinterviewedinGusau,Fulbemencanmigrateforsignificantlengthsoftimewhilewomenremaininsettlements,takecareoffamiliesandsellmilkfromafewcowsleftwiththemwhichtheirchildren(girlsandboys)takeforpasture.Incontrast,Hausamentendtoworkonfarmswhile women “process products, cook, go for firewood, fetch water and shoulder theresponsibility of the children.”While kulle (seclusion) is stillpracticed insome communities,levelshavereducedandarefluidinpracticewithwomen’spresenceinpublicspacesincludingschools,hospitalsandmarketsincreasing.Gender roleswere changing even before the violent conflict withmen no longer alwaysplayingbreadwinnerrolesascribedtothembyHausacultureandincreasedpressureonwomento provide. According to a male civil society activist interviewed in Gusau, “Hausa men aresupposedtobethebreadwinnerbuttheyarenotabletodoso.Wefindthatwomentookcareofthefamilybeforetheconflict.”Yet,despiteahistoryofwomenplayingpowerfuleconomic,socialandpoliticalrolesinnorthernNigeria,Zamfara,aselsewhere,sawhighlevelsofgenderinequalitybeforetheconflict. According to a male respondent who works for a Zamfara based civil societyorganisation,“Womenaremarginalisedintheareaofdecisionmakingandnoteducatedtobeabletoreachmanagerialpositions....Theyfinditdifficulttoownpropertyandeveniftheyown,

Zamfara sees a two-way interaction between gender and violence with violent conflictprofoundlyaffectingandchanginggenderrolesandgendernormsescalatingconflict.Gendernormsdifferbetweengroupsandgenderroleswereinfluxbeforetheviolentconflict.Theseshiftshavebeenacceleratedandinfluencedbyviolence.Whilepeopleofallgendershavebeenkilled,injuredandmadedisabled,moremenhavetendedtobedeliberatelytargetedduringfighting,viewedwithsuspicionbytheopposingsideand,forFulbemen,bysecurityagents.Menandboysoffightingageofallsidestotheconflicthavetakenrolesinviolence,fallingonaspectrumofbeing forced to being intrinsically motivated to do so. Meanwhile, women and girls haveexperiencedphysicalviolence,beenrapedandforciblymarried.Giventhenumbersofmenwhohavebeenkilledduringviolence,themajorityofthosewhosurviveattacksarewomenandtheirchildren.Notonlydotheylivewithlastingphysicalandpsychologicalimpactsofviolence,butthey are also more likely to live in sites of displacement, head households and be forced tostrategisewaystoprovideforthefamily.Economicfactorshavealsoaffectedratesofmarriageanddivorcewithcertaingroupsofgirls,particularlythosewhoseparentshadbeenkilled,nowmorelikelytobemarriedatevenyoungerages.Gendernormshavealsodrivenconflict.Womenandgirlsarethefirstandlasttoexperienceviolence,theirbodiesusedasbattlegroundstoattackthe opposing group. Sexual violence heightens tensions and makes violence more likely.Communitiesseeitscontinuationdespitethecurrentpeaceprocessasindicationofcontinuedinsecurity.Gendernormsandentrenchmentofmilitarisedmasculinitieshavealsobeenusedtogoadmenintofightingandcommissionofviolence.Whileitseemsfew,ifany,womencommitteddirect acts of violence, it is clear thatwomenof all sides have enabledorurged violence.Asdynamicsdeveloped,somewomenstartedchangingtheirstanceandengaginginpeacebuilding.However, women’s exclusion from formal decision-making processes, including those aroundpeace, restricts the impact theycanmake.Asaresultof thesepatriarchalgendernorms, thepotentialofwomeninZamfara tocontribute topeaceremains largelyuntappedandwomen,excludedfrompeacebuildinginterventions,cancontinuetoactandspeakinwaysthatdeepenandentrenchconflictdynamicsfurther.

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theirhusbandcontrolsthepropertyandwealthofwomen...Womenfeeltheycannotcontributeevenindecisionsthataffectthemincluding[asrelatesto]thisconflict.”VIOLENCEASADRIVEROFCHANGINGGENDERROLESShifts ingenderroleshavebeenacceleratedbyviolence.Menpresent inconflictaffectedcommunitiestendtobeelderlymenoryoungboys.Therearefewmenoffightingagebecausetheyhavealreadybeenkilled,havebeenkidnapped,arewithAOGsorhaveleftcommunitiesforfearofattacksorininsearchofwork.Mostwomenrespondentssaidhusbandswholeavetolookforworkdonotsendmoneytothemandsometimesleavewithouttellingwomenwheretheyhave gone to.There havebeen casesofmen returning to communities after to findwives inrelationshipswithothermen.Despitehavingbeeninrelationshipswithotherwomenthemselvesandoftenhavenotbeenincommunicationwhileaway,thisdiscoverycanleadtoconflict.Asaresult,manyconflict-affectedwomenheadhouseholds.Theyareforcedtoassumethisrole and strategise ways to provide for the family.While women always contributed to thehousehold,theynowmorevisiblyplaydecisionmakingroles.Evenwherehusbandsandfathersare present, there is increasedpressureonwomentoprovidewhichcantranslateinto greater power in householddecisions. This change has not alwaysbeen viewed positively by the menconcerned.Menwithdisabilitieswhofaceeven greater challenges in earningincomes inparticular expresseda senseofinfringementofmasculinity.Itwasnotpossible to findoutwhat the relation isbetweenthisinjuredmasculineprideanddomesticviolenceandabuseinthetimeavailable but some women’s rightsactivistsestimatedrateshadincreasedasmen sought to continue to exert theirpowerandauthority.Economic factors have also affectedrates of marriage and divorce with certain groups of girls, particularly those whoseparentshadbeenkilled,nowmorelikelytobemarriedatevenyoungerages.WhileNGOshadhadsomesuccessindecreasingratesofearlyandforcedmarriagebeforetheconflict,theysaw increasingprevalenceoncemoredue to violence. Factors include increasedpoverty andparents’inabilitytoprovide,thenumbersoforphanedgirlswhosecaregiversfelttheyhadlittlechoicebuttomarryoffandaprotectivestrategyofmarryingdaughterstomitigatethelikelihoodof AOG fighters forcing parents to hand over unmarried girls formarriage to them. A FulbewomaninterviewedinahamletinZurmiLGAsaidshehadmarriedoffherson’sdaughtersaged13yearsoldbutthegirlswouldstillbeunmarriedifhersonhadnotbeenkilled.Conversely,otherrespondentsspokeofnotbeingable tomarryoffdaughtersdue to lackofmoney.Before theviolence,marriageswouldtakeplaceaftercropsharvestedhadbeensold.Astherehadnotbeenanyharvestforsometime,thewomen’sfamilywasunabletobuybridegiftsandmencouldnotpaybridepriceeventhoughthisamounthaddrasticallyfallen.Therearealsolessmenaroundasmanymen,youngeronesinparticular,havemovedelsewhereinsearchofworkandtoescapebeingkilled.

“In thepast, as aman, you have your source ofincomeandtherearesomanythingsyoucandobutyoucannolongerdothisandincomeisnotenough.Forexample,youwouldgotobushtocutwoodorpluckfruitstosell.Ifyougotothatplace[now],theywilleitherkidnapyouforransomorshootyou.Thesechangeshaveaffectedrelationsin the household but you need to exercisepatience.Whenyouwerethebreadwinnerbeforeand now she is the breadwinner, someresponsibilitiesshestartstotakeup.Youtellherto do something and she does not do it. Therespecthascomedown.Wearenothappyaboutthese changes.” - displaced Hausa maninterviewedinBirninMagajiwhonowhastousecrutchestowalkafterbeinginjuredinanattack

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GENDERASADRIVEROFVIOLENCEWomenandgirlsarethefirstandlasttoexperienceviolence.Sexualviolenceisusedtomakethem feel unsafe, humiliate an entire group and heighten tensions further.19 Harm towardswomenwastheprecursorofviolenceagainstmenandwomen’sbodiesbecamethebattlefieldoftheconflict,used toattackmaleopponents.Thisuseofsexualviolence isclear fromaccountswherewomenwererapedinfrontofmalerelativestohumiliatehusbands,fathers,brothersandsonsandstorieswheremen insertedobjects invaginasintendingondamage.AsaHausayansakaimaninterviewedinZurmisaidabouthowviolencestarted,“Theycametoyourvillagesandrapedoneofyourwivesifyouhavetwowives.Whenthey’redone,theygavethehusbandN200to buy soap to clean her.” Not surprisingly,men reacted negatively to violence against theirsisters,wives,daughtersandmothers,spurredbyoutrageabouthowlovedoneswereviolatedandasnormsofmasculinityputwomenunderthecareofmalerelativeschargedwithprotection.

Killingshavereducedbutsexualviolencecontinues,a formofviolentconflict inandofitself as well as an indication of its continuation. The peace pact, in contravention ofinternational best practice,20 did not address conflict related sexual violence and require itscessationamongstitsceasefireconditions.Furthermore,monitoringofimplementationdoesnotseemtoconsiderGBVwhichcontinuestobeignoredindiscussionsaroundpeaceandsecurity.Gendernormsandentrenchmentofmilitarisedmasculinitieshavealsobeenusedtogoadmenintofightingandcommissionofviolence.Accordingtoamalejournalisttalkingabouttwodifferentcommunitymilitias,“TheyansakaicalltheCJTFwomenastheydonotkillarmedcombatantsbutaremoreofadeterrencepresence.”MembersofHausamilitiasstronglystatedtheyhadtoactbecausetheyaremenofthecommunityandthatitisthejobofmentoprotectfamiliesandcommunities.Itseemsthatfew,ifany,womencommitteddirect acts of violence yet it is clear thatwomenofallsideshaveenabledorurgedviolence.FulbeandHausawomenalikehaveurged their sons and husbands to take uparms to defend their families andcommunities. According to a senior civilservant,“TheFulanimothergroomschildrento become [AOG fighters].” Women’s rightsactivists said women are not only abductedbut choose to joinAOGs, sayingmotivationswerelargelyfinancialbutalsosomewomencouldbeintrinsicallymotivatedtoseekrevengeforkillingoffamilymembers.Womenalsosupporttheirhusbandswhoaremembersofthesegroups,providingthemwithfood,advice,affection,encouragementandotherservicesandcomforts.Awoman’s rights activist spoke of the desire among women to “contribute to protect family 19Thatnosexualviolenceagainstmenandboyswasdiscloseddoesnotmeanitdoesnottakeplace.20UnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,GuidanceforMediators:AddressingConflict-RelatedSexualViolenceinCeasefireandPeaceAgreements,2012.

“Ifsomehusbandsdidnothavemoneytobuyrifle,womenwouldselllivestocktobuyariflefor theirhusbandsdue to the threattheyarefacinginthebush.Wealwaysadvisethemtosell livestock to buy rifles and always keepthem in the house. If anyman saidhedidn’twanttojoin,ifweseeamanwhodoesnotwantto join, we will encourage him even if thismeanswehavetobuyhimarifle.”-displacedHausawomaninterviewedinZurmi

“Upuntilnow,themenofthistownhaveitinthemtotakerevengeoneway.EvenFulbegirlswhousedtobringmilktosell,youthusedtoattackthem.Theysometimesrunawayspillingmilkonthefloorandfinallystoppedcomingheretobringmilkasthemenalwaysthreatentotakerevengeoneday.And theyhave it inmind to takerevengeoneday.Theyhaveneverdisclosed[tous]howtheywillmakerevenge–theywillflogtheFulbewomeneveniftheydonotrapethem...TherapeofHausawomenhasbroughtsomanytensionsaswealwaysfeelbadseeingFulbemenmolestingourgirls.”-HausawomaninterviewedinBadarawa

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membersandthefamilyname.”Theyhidetheirhusbandsandkeeptheinformationabouttheirlocations and activities secret. There is also some indication that they are involved in theimportationandtransportofgunsassuspicionislesslikelytofallonwomenthanmentravelling.Moreover, women who support AOGs are not only Fulbe. Women of all ethnicities serve asinformants.Accordingtoamalecivilsocietyactivist,“Womenareinformantsinthecitiesandalongtheroads.Youseewomenandpeoplewhocannotwalkbeggingonthestreets.Peopleseethemasnobodyanddisregardthembuttheycollectalltheinformationaboutwhoispassingandwhatishappeningandtheyaretheinformants.”WomenthatreturnfromtimewithAOGsareseenasinformants.AccordingacivilsocietymaninterviewedinGusau,“Therearecaseswherewomenhavechosentojoin.Inonecommunity,twogirlschosetojoinbanditsontheirownandthisisknownbythecommunityandnobodywilltalktothemwhentheycomeback.Peoplethinktheyhavecometo thecommunity to look for information.”Ontheotherhand,Hausawomenrespondentsspokeabouthowtheygreatlyencouragedtheirhusbandsandsonstoparticipateincommunity militias. Men faced intense pressure from women around them to act. Womenstressedthethreattheywereunderandtheneedformen,asprotectors,totakeuparms.Sexualviolencewasnotonlyapowerfulincentiveforwomentowantdecisiveactionbutalsoformentoact.Womenalsocheeredandsupportedactionsofcommunitymilitiamen, including throughsellingtheirownbelongingsandlivestocktobuymenguns.Accordingtoawoman’srightsactivistinterviewed inGusau, “Womenprovided [the communitymilitias]with foodandencouragedthem.Forexample, iftheirchildorhusbandkilledaFulani,theywillbehappyandencouragethemtodomore,particularlyiftheirownchildhadbeenkilledorkidnapped.”As dynamics developed, some women started changing their stance and engaging inpeacebuilding. They saw actions of ‘their’ group as worsening the violence and leading toreprisals. This was particularly true with Hausa women. According to a Hausa womaninterviewedinZurmi,“Mostofthewomendonotliketheirmentojointhisgroupas[AOGs]willattack and kill.Women only advisemen not to join – or to leave - by advising them of theconsequences,thattheydonothavethesameweapons,thattheirweaponsarenotasgoodas[the AOGs] own. Some of them listen but others don’t.” Women have also engaged in earlywarning and peacebuilding activities. According to a woman’s rights activist interviewed inGusau, “Women across divides reach out to each other. They give alarms on anything thatprovokesorescalatesviolence…Theybringchildrenclosertothemtopreventinvolvementinconflictandfurtherescalationofviolence…Womenaretheonesbuildingbackrelationships.”However, women’s exclusion from formal decision-making processes, including thosearoundpeace,restrictstheimpacttheycanmake.Womenarenotpartofpeaceandsecuritycommitteesatlocalandstatelevel.Theyarenotpresentonemiratecouncils.Therearenowomenrecognisedascommunityorreligiousleaders.Accordingtowomen’srightsactivists,therearenowomen LGA councillors, no women in the State House of Assembly (SHOA), no womenrepresentingZamfaraattheNationalAssemblyandtheonlywomancommissionerisinchargeoftheMinistryofWomen’sAffairs,aministryoftensidelinedandseenasunimportantandinthatpositionbyvirtueofherfather(theEmirofGummi).Indeed,anywomeninpositionsofinfluencewithinformalstructureshavemalerelativesorgodfathers.TherewasreportedlynowomanonstatecommitteeslookingatsolutionstobanditryorfocusingondemobilisationanddisarmamentofAOGfighters.As a result of these patriarchal gender norms, the potential of women in Zamfara tocontributetopeacenotonlyremainslargelyuntappedbutwomencancontinuetoactandspeakinwaysthatdeepenandentrenchconflictdynamicsfurther.Forexample,effortstodisarmhavefocusedonmalefightersand,despitewomencontinuingtoquestionthewisdomofgivinguparmsinacontextofhighinsecurity,therehasbeennooutreachtowomenonissuesofdisarmamentanddemobilisationletalonereintegrationandrehabilitation.

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WHATARETHEFACTORS(INCLUDINGGOVERNMENT,SECURITYFORCEANDCOMMUNITYACTION)BRINGINGPEOPLETOGETHERAND/ORPROMOTINGPEACEAND

STABILITY?

LEVEL,NATUREANDQUALITYOFSOCIALINTERACTIONSInmanyremoteareas,peopleliveinmono-ethniccommunitiessointeractionsbetweenpeopleofdifferentethnicgroupswerelessthaninperi-urbanareaswhicharemoremulti-ethnic or had Fulbe and Sullubawahamlets neighbouringHausa ones. Not surprisingly,moremixedareaswherepeoplelivedirectlynextdoorhavegreaterlevelsofcohesionthanareaswithmono-ethnichamletsneighbouringeachother.InZamfara,Fulbegroupsarenotonlysettledbutalsocanbemigratory,movingacrossthestate,intoneighbouringstatesandacrossnationalborders.MigratoryFulbeandsettledHausapeopleweremorelikelytointeractasFulbepeoplemigratedthroughFulbe,Hausa,Sullubawa,Busayeandothertownsandsettlementscomparedto theHausa and Busaye (another pastoralist group) as Busaye people tend to be settled inremoteruralareasandrarelymixwithothergroupsunlesstheyhappentobe inthevicinity.Busayepeopleinterviewed,particularlywomen,saidtheirfirstrealexperienceofmeetingpeoplefromotherethnicgroupswaswhentheyweredisplaced.However,levelsofinteractionalonedonotnecessarilyleadtopositiverelationshipsastheirnatureandqualityarekey. If interactionswereconflictual,groupsandindividualsaremorelikelytohavenegativesocialrelationsthanthosewhohadnotinteractedatall.Inthisway,a gradual decline in farmer-pastoralist interactions shows how relations betweenmigratoryFulbeinparticularandsedentaryfarmers,particularlyHausaones,becamemoreconflictualovertimeaspopulationsgrew, farmingencroachedongrazingroutes,criminalityrose,communitymilitiasactedandweaponsmovedacrossnationalborders.Alternatively,whereHausaandFulbecommunitieswereboth settled in the sameareabut in conflictwith eachotherovernaturalresources and had grievances around perceived unjust resolution of conflict, these tensionsworsenedover time. Evenwhere interactionswerepositive, if theirqualitywas lowandofafleetingnatureforexamplewithmigratorypastoralistsandfarmersworkingtheirfieldsgreetingeachother,theyprovednottobesufficientlyrobusttoresistwidersocietalchanges.

Violencehasseverelyrupturedthesocialfabricandreducedsocialcohesionwithinandbetweenethnicandoccupationalgroups.Yet,someareasseepersistinggoodrelationswhileothersdonot.Whileanexhaustivestudywasnotpossible,currentdynamicsseemcontingentonthelevel,nature and quality of pre-conflict social interactions, provision of support and governmentaction.Inmanyremoteareas,peopleliveinmono-ethniccommunitiessointeractionsbetweenpeopleofdifferentethnicgroupswerelessthaninperi-urbanareaswhicharemoremulti-ethnicorhadFulbeandSullubawahamletsneighbouringHausaones.However, levelsof interactionalone do not necessarily lead to positive relationships as their nature and quality are key.Conversely,areaswhereinteractionswerefrequent,ofapositivenatureandwithsufficientdepthshowthegreatestsocialcohesion.Insomeplaces,dynamicsarepartlyduetofactorsescalatingtensionselsewherebeingmissing,forexamplewithcommunitymilitiasmembersdrawnfromadiversityofethnicgroupswhichnotonlymadeitlesslikelyforthecycleofvengeancetotakerootbutalsodeepened,solidifiedandreinforcedlinkswithcommondefenceofcommunitiesprovingan intensely bonding experience. A key indicator of strong social cohesion is the continuedpractice of intermarriage between Fulbe andHausa individuals. Provision of support acrossethnic, occupational and geographical lines also deepens social cohesion. Civil society actorswarnedoflimitstogenerosityandthatrelationsmaydeteriorateifdisplacementandadditionalstrainontheincomesandlivingspaceofhostcommunitiesseemsasitwillcontinuewithoutend.Successivestategovernmentshavetriedtopromotepeacebutwhiletheseeffortsarepromising,theytendtobeattheLGAlevel,arenotinclusiveanddonothavewidereach.

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Conversely, areas where interactions were frequent, of a positive nature and withsufficientdepthshowthegreatestsocialcohesion.Theseareasoftenhadhighratesofinter-marriage, economic interactionsanddependence, common socialising, different groups livingsideby sideand influentialpeopleof allages andgenderspurposefullynotperpetuatingbutrathercounteractingdivisiveconflictnarrativesthatemphasisedtheroleofethnicity.AFulbewomaninterviewedinaFulbesettlementinZurmiLGAsaid,“Welivepeacefullywithinus.Therearenoproblemshere.Therehasbeennoretaliationagainstusbecausetheyknowitisnotuswhoareattackingthem.Wearehereneutralsothatiswhythereisnoproblembetweenus.”AFulbemaninterviewedinavillageinBakuraLGAsaid,“Everythingispeacefulhere.Wearemorelikerelativesheresoeverythingisfineandnobodyaccusesus.Wegrewuptogethersotheyknowus.Wehaveintermarriageanditisstillhappeningnow.”Insomeplaces,dynamicsarepartlydueto factorsescalatingtensionselsewherebeingmissing.Forexample,mostcommunitymilitiasacrossthestateconsistedonlyofHausamenor,iftheyweremixed,Fulbemeninpre-existinggroupswereviewedwithsuspicionandsidelined.Yet in areaswhere therewere strong, positiveand frequent interactionsbetweenHausa andFulbepeople,membersofbothethnicgroupscametogethertoprotecttheirtown.AccordingtoaFulbemaninBakuratalkingaboutdifferentcommunitymilitias,“TheyanbangahereincludeHausa,FulaniandBusaye.It’sthesamewiththeyansakai.Itismixedhereaswegrewuptogetherandareveryclose.”Comingtogetheracrosslinesofdivisionelsewheremakeitlesslikelytosetoff the cycleof vengeancewhere allHausapeoplewere seenas causing themharmbyFulbedominatedAOGswhoattackedHausacommunities,allFulbepeopleseenas‘bandits’byHausamilitiaswhokilled andharassed all Fulbepeople andeachgroup committed acts of violenceagainsttheother inrevengeofwhatwasdone totheirgroup. Italsodeepened,solidifiedandreinforced links between these groups with common defence of communities proving anintenselybondingexperience.AkeyindicatorofstrongsocialcohesionisthecontinuedpracticeofintermarriagebetweenFulbeandHausaindividuals.PROVISIONOF(MUTUAL)SUPPORTProvision of support across ethnic, occupational and geographical lines also deepenssocialcohesion.ManyIDPssaidpeopleinplacestheyhadfledtosafetyhadbeenwelcoming.ASullubawawomaninterviewedinahamletinGusauLGAspokeabouthowhercommunityhadfledtoMadamultipletimes,eachtimetobehousedandtakencareofbytheirhosts.ShesaidthepeopleofMadahadalsotakenstepstotalkwithsoldiersabouttheirhamletandtellthemtheyarenotassociatedwithAOGsandshouldnotbekilledthemeventhough“theirordersare toattackanyoneinthebushnotknowingthereareinnocentsamongus.”Elsewhere,thiswelcomehasnotalwaysbeenconsistentforFulbeIDPs,particularlywhentheygotoHausadominatedareaswheretheyarenotknownandareviewedwithsuspicion.Thislackofsupportdeepensgrievancesandincreasesfrustration.Civilsocietyactorswarnedof limits togenerosityandthatrelationsmaydeteriorate ifdisplacementandadditionalstrainontheincomesandlivingspaceofhostcommunitiesseemsasitwillcontinuewithoutend.OnemanwhoworkswithIDPssaid,“Whenyouhavefoodtotakecareofpeople,itisokaybutthechallengeismuchwhenyoucannottakecareofyourownfamiliesandalsohaveIDPs-thenyouhavechallenges.”Already,LGAofficialsindicatesomehostcommunitymembersfeltIDPswereinformantstoAOGsandcomplicitinattacks.21GOVERNMENTACTIONSSuccessive state governments have tried to promote peace but while these efforts arepromising,theytendtobeattheLGAlevel,arenotinclusiveanddonothavewidereach. 21UNHCR,JointProtectionAssessmentMissiontoNorthwestNigeria,25July–4August2019.

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Underthepreviousadministration,FulbeandHausacommitteeswereconnectedandchargedwithself-policinganyviolenceormisbehaviour.Thecurrentadministrationistryingtoreachouttodifferentactors,areabyarea.Peopleareencouragedtomeettodiscussdifferencessuchasthedestructionofcropsbylivestockbeforethingsescalatewithconversationsfacilitatedbythelocalpolice chief and military commander. However, these mechanisms do not include everyone.Thesediscussionshavealsolargelyleftoutwomen,peoplewithdisabilities,othergroupsoftenmarginalisedbutmost affectedby violence andthoseoutsideLGAheadquarters.This lackofinvolvementnotonly furtherentrenchesexclusionbutmeansdecisionsarenot influencedbytheirexperiencesandperspectivesanddonothavewideownership.WHOARETHEKEYACTORSWITHINFLUENCE,MEANSANDMOTIVATIONSTOMOBILISEGROUPSANDRESOURCESINTOCOLLECTIVEACTIONFORPEACEORFORVIOLENCEAND

WHATARELINKSBETWEENTHEM?

ARMEDOPPOSITIONGROUPSThere is fluidity ofmotivations and perspectives among people associatedwith AOGs.Whilesomewhoinitiallyengagedincriminalitymaybealsonowmotivatedbyrevenge,otherswhoexperiencedattacksandwantedvengeancehavecometocommittheft.Thoseinterviewed

ItisunclearhowmanyAOGscurrentlyexistbutthereweresaidtobe25majorgroupsandupto 150 different camps eachwith their own leader. Althoughmany are Fulbe, a significantproportion come from other ethnic groups. A common narrative of ‘foreigners destabilisingNigeria’isrebuttedbythosewhoengagewithAOGs.WhiletherehavebeenattemptsbyAOGsinnortheast Nigeria (commonly known as Boko Haram) to come to Zamfara, no evidence ofsustainedpresenceorlinkswasfound.Thepeaceprocesshasledtoincreasedinterandintragroup violence due to different attitudes as to whether to put down weapons, increasingfactionalismandpowertussles.ThemilitarylaunchedOperationSharanDajiinearly2016.TheNigerianpoliceforcehasbeeninstrumentalinfacilitatingpeacedialogue.Membersofsecurityagencies,themilitaryinparticular,weresaidtobebenefittingfromviolence.Therearethreemain communitymilitia groupswith somemutualmembership and interaction: yan banga(whichexistedbeforehand);yansakai(thenamegiventothosewhodecidedtoactinresponsetoviolence);andCJTF(setupbythepreviousstategovernmentinresponsetohumanrightsviolationscommittedbytheyansakaianddisbandedbythepresentadministration).The committee for findingsolutions to armedbanditry in Zamfara state listed thenames ofcommunity leaders, security agents and politicians suspected to be linked to AOGs andrecommendedtheirremovalfromofficeand/orcourtmartial.Thisrecommendationhasyettobeimplemented.ZamfaraisrichinnaturalresourcesandmanyrespondentsbelievedtheminingsectorisasignificantcontributorofinsecuritythroughpaymentofprotectionmoneytoforestallAOGattacks.ThereisnoonecleargroupthatspeaksforallFulbeinthestateduetoperceptionsofpoliticisation,corruptionandfactionalism.ThestategovernmentworkswithFulbepeopleandgroupstoreachouttoAOGsandcallthemfordialogueand,althoughtheyareabletoreachouttoleaders,theirlevelofinfluenceoverthemisunclear.Thecurrentadministrationemphasises theworkdone tobringaboutpeace.TheMinistryofBudgetandEconomicPlanningundertheDeputyGovernoristhecontactpointfordevelopmentpartners.TheMinistryofSecurityandHomeAffairsisanewlycreatedministry.TheOfficeoftheSecretarytotheStateGovernmentcoordinatesgrazingreserves.RespondentsfromcivilsocietyandgovernmentalikespokeabouttheneedforcapacitystrengtheningofindividualsworkinginMDAsandtheinstitutionsthemselves.Zamfarahasa longhistoryof intraand interpartyconflictandshiftingpartyalliancesandallegiances.Insecurityhasbeenusedbypoliticiansincampaigninganditisperceivedthat,whilemost politicianswith influence currently see peaceas in their interests, there remain a fewsignificantpoliticalactorswhocouldbepotentialspoilers.

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whowerepartofgroupsdistinguishedthemselvesfromthosemorefinanciallymotivated.Theystressedtheywereactingindefenceoftheirethnicgroupasopposedtootherswhoengageincriminalitybutalsoadmittedthatthedifferencebetweenthesepurportedlytwoseparatetypesofgroupswasuncleartomostpeopleandalsosometimestothoseinvolvedthemselves.It was not possible to get a clear understanding of howmany groups currently exist.According to a senior military commander, there are approximately 25 different groups ofvaryingsizewiththeirownleaderandterritorywhocometogetherforoperationsthendisperse.However,otheraccountsincludingthatofaseniorpolicecommanderputthenumberofAOGcampsat150witheachcamphavinghundredsofmembersandtheirownleader.AlthoughmanyAOGfightersareFulbe,asignificantproportionofthegroupcomefromotherethnicgroups.FulberespondentswhosurvivedattacksweremorelikelytosaytheydidnotknowwhotheirattackerswerecomparedtoHausarespondentswhoinsistedtheywereFulbebutcouldnotalwayssubstantiatethiswithevidence.ThisdifferencecouldbebecausethosewhoattackHausacommunities,motivatedbyreasonsincludingrevengeforattacksonthem,aremorelikelytobegroupswithmoreFulbememberswhereasthosewhoattackFulbecommunitiesmaydosototakeawaycattleandbemoremixed.Alternatively,Hausapeoplemaybemorelikelytostereotype attackers asFulbewhereasFulbepeople resist believing they are from their ownethnicgroup.Notwithstanding,aclearconsensusemergedacrossrespondentsthatsomeAOGmembers, particularly those who provided intelligence, are not Fulbe. As a senior militarycommandersaid,“ThiscutsacrossFulaniandHausa...Ifemirsarecollaborating,aretheyFulani?”Whilethenarrativeof‘foreigners’destabilisingNigeriaiscommon,itisrebuttedbythosewhoengagewithAOGswhoinsistthemajorityarefromthecountry.GiventhenatureofFulbemigrations, thisdistinction canbe a falseone. Some respondentsbelieved itwas these‘foreigners’whowereleadingattacksas‘NigerianFulbe’couldnotcommitthelevelsofviolencewitnessed. Yet, other respondents stressed this narrative is not true. For example, a seniormilitarycommandersaid,“ItisaliewhentheysaytheyarenotNigerians...ThepeoplewearefightingareNigerianslikeus.”HebelievedthisnarrativewaslinkedtopoliticalcontestationwithopponentsspreadingrumoursthatPresidentBuhari,aFulbemanhimself,“isempoweringtheFulaniandallowinghisbrothersfromoutsidethecountry–note,NigeriansarenothisbrothersbutFulanifromNigerandChadarehisbrothers-tocomeinandtakeoverNigeria.”While therehavebeenattemptsbynortheastNigeriaAOGs(commonlyknownasBokoHaram)tocometoZamfara,noevidenceofsustainedpresenceorlinkswasfound.In2014,aseniorJama’atuAhlal-Sunnali-l-Da‘wawa-l-Jihad(JASDJ)commanderwasarrestednearGusauandJASDJhadacampinBakura.Themilitarywenttothelocation,destroyedthecampandkilledfighters.Inlate2018,accordingtoaseniorcivilservant,therewasmigrationofasmallgroupfromthenortheasttoZamfarawhojoinedwithlocalAOGstokidnappeopleforransomandlootfoodmostlyaroundShinkafi.Inearlytomid2019,agroupofapproximately10peopleinDutsunKurainTsafeLGAreportedlyarrivedandstartedpreachingaboutwhatIslamdoesanddoesnotallowandpromisinglocalAOGstheywouldhelpthemfight.TherearerumourstoothatinSokoto,preacherspresumablylinkedtoIslamicStateWestAfricanProvince(ISWAP)arrivedandstartedpreaching.AnalystsconsideredanattackinSeptember2019mayhavebeencommittedbyISWAPasonlysoldierswerekilledandweaponsandvehiclestakenawaywhichfitsISWAPpatternsbutnotnecessarily thoseoflocalAOGsbutthisanalysis ishighlyspeculative.Asof January2020,despitesomeclaimsthatAnsaru(anotherAOGfromthenortheast)wasactiveintheregion,allrespondentsagreedtherewasnodefiniteevidencethatnortheastAOGscurrentlyhadsignificantpresenceinthenorthwest,stronglinkswithlocalAOGsand/oraimedtohavepresenceacrossacontiguousterritoryinnorthernNigeria.Indeed,peopleevincedsomesuspicionastothereasonfor these narratives. They looked at results such claimsmay rationalise, pointing out actionjudgedpermissibleagainst ‘terrorists’wasmoredifficult to justifyagainstpeopleengaging in

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criminality.Yet,whilethisanalysisfoundnoevidenceshowingcurrentlinksbetweenAOGsinthenortheastandnorthwest,thisdoesnotmeanthatnoneexistorcoulddevelopinthefuture.Presently,thereissignificantconflictonwhethertostopfighting.Notallhaveagreedtothepeaceprocess.Civilservantssaythemajorityareonboardwithonlysmallfactionsresisting,butthoseassociatedwithAOGsandcommunitymilitiassaythebreakdownismoreeven.Thereissignificantdiscussionwithinandbetweengroups.(Former)fighters,tiredofviolence,wantpeacebutarestartingtogetimpatientwaitingforgovernmentpromisestobefulfilledandstruggletocontrolthosewhonowwanttoleavethepeaceprocessduetowhattheyseeasfailedpromises.Moreover,somemajorleaders,suchasDanKaramiwhooperateswithinBirninMagaji,TsafeandpartofGusauLGAinZamfaraaswellasTsafanaandKankaraLGAsinKatsina,haveyettoacceptthepeacedeal.Thepeaceprocesshas led to increased interand intragroupviolencedue todifferentattitudesastowhethertoputdownweapons,increasingfactionalismandpowertussles.AHausamaninterviewedinBadarawawhohadbeenabducteddescribedwitnessingargumentsthatescalatedandledtoexchangeoffire.Indeed,thesegroupsseehighinfightingandviolence.According to seniorsecurityofficials, increasing factionalismmakepeacemoredifficult: “Theimpedimentwearefacingisthatintheforest,[fighters]havedifferencesandpowertussles.Theywanttoberecognisedandleadwhichhasledthemtostartkillingthemselves.Before,theywerefacingmilitiagroupsbutnow[thosegroupshave]stoppedactivities–soissuesofwhoamIanddifferences started once they no longer had a common enemy.” Other respondents linkeddynamicstodesireforgovernmentrecognitionwithsomewantingtobeseenasleaderstobepartofnegotiationsandtherecipientsofmoneyandotherresourcesbelievedtoflowfromthis.NIGERIANSECURITYAGENCIESThemilitary launchedOperation SharanDaji in early 2016 to fight cattle rustlingandbanditryinthenorthwest.TheeighthdivisionoftheNigerianarmedforcesheadquarteredinSokotocoversSokoto,Zamfara,KebbiandKatsinawhileits1BrigadewithtwobattalionsandonegarrisonisresponsibleforZamfaraandKebbi.Thesoldiersofeighthdivisionarestationedintheareawiththeirfamiliesremainingintownseveniftheyhappentobedeployedtofightinginmoreruralareas.Additionaltroopsfromelsewhereinthecountryhavebeendeployedtothetheatre.Thereissometensionbetweendesiredmilitarystrategyandstategovernmentdialogue.Accordingtoaseniormilitarycommander,“Itisgoodtotalkbutalsofrustratingaswearefightingwith one hand tied behind our back.” The military also faces difficulties given opponents’knowledgeofterrain,physicalpresenceincommunitiesandwidenetworksofinformantswhopassonknowledgeofsecuritypresenceandmovements.Thequalityofcivilmilitaryrelationsisvariable,particularlywithFulbecommunitiesandpeopleforcedtofleehomesduetooperationsand threats of reprisals. Yet, many respondents said there was improvement in militarybehaviourwithbetter response time todistress callsand fewer complaints.This changewaspartlyattributedtothepeaceprocesswhichhadreducednumbersofactiveAOGfighterssoldiersweretryingtocombatwithinadequatepersonnelandotherresources.Asaresult,themilitarywasseenasbetterabletofocuscapacityonthefewernumberofareasthatstillseeviolence.TheNigerianpoliceforcehasbeeninstrumentalinfacilitatingthepeacedialogue.UsmanNagogo, theCommissionerofPoliceheldmeetings inviting leadersofFulbecommunitiesand(Hausa) communitymilitias todiscussways forward.Nagogo, speaking at apressbriefing inJanuary2020,outlinedhisprioritiesfor2020tobuildonprogressachievedasfollows:1) Improvepersonnelefficiencybytrainingtoconfrontnewtrendsincludingthroughemphasis

onweaponshandlingandtheneedtoprotecthumandignityandconstitutionalrights.2) FullimplementationofcommunitypolicingandcreationofpeacecommitteesinallLGAs.

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3) Enhancement of operational base via provision of logistics and increased numbers ofpersonnelwhohavegreatermoraleandaretrainedandguidedtorespecttheruleoflaw.

4) Upgradingofspecializedoperatingunits.22TheNationalSecurityandCivilDefenceCorps(NSCDC)hasnotplayedasignificantroleintheviolentconflicttodatebuthaspotentialforpositivepeacebuildingcontributionsinthefuture. Their alternative dispute resolution department, agro-rangers squad which aims tomediate and reconcile conflicting parties and peace, and conflict resolution department, ifstrengthenedincapacity,canmitigateviolenceandconsolidatepeacemovingforwards.Somemembersofsecurityagencies,themilitaryinparticular,weresaidtobebenefittingfrom violence. The state government committee for finding solutions to armed banditry inZamfarastatefoundsoldiers,policeofficersandSSSpersonnelhadcolludedwithandsupportedAOGs.Military commanderswerebelieved tobediverting expenditure intopersonal financeswhilesoldiersonthegroundwereseenasengagingineconomicactivitiesincludingfarmingandlivestockrearing. It isunclearwhether thiscattle include thoseconfiscatedduringoperationswhichFulbecommunitiescomplainarenotreleasedbacktorightfulowners.Whileathoroughinvestigationintomilitaryhumanrightsviolationswasnotpossible,respondentsspokeofsexualviolence, lackofdistinctionbetweenAOGsandothers,particularlyofFulbeethnicity,targetedduringmilitaryoperationsandextra-judicialkillingscommittedbysoldiers.COMMUNITYMILITIASThere are three main community militia groups in Zamfara with some mutualmembershipand interaction. As elsewhere innorthernNigeria,manyareashadyanbanga(vigilante)groupsbeforehand.Whencommunitiesdecidedtorespondtocriminality,manymennotpartofthesegroupsundertookactivitiesaimedatcommunityprotectionandbecameknownastheyansakai(volunteers).AN500amonthallowancepaidtoyanbangamembersbytheLGAwasincreasedtoN5,000.Thissumwasavailableto500yanbangamembersineachofthe17emiratesinthestate.Respondentssaidthedifferencebetweenthesetwogroupswasmonthlypayment of state government allowances to yan bangamembers and greater commission ofhuman rights violationsbyyansakaimembers. In2018, in response to allegationsof humanrightsabusescommittedbytheyansakai,thestategovernmentcreatedanewgroupcalledtheCivilianJointTaskForce(CJTF).Committeessetupatemiratelevelconsistingofrepresentativesofthepolice,StateSecurityService(SSS)andNSCDCandtheemirscreenedpotentialmemberstoensurerecruitswereofgoodbehaviour.Membersweregivenuniforms,vehiclesandmonthlystipendsofN15,000.Thesegroupsworkedtogetherwithsecurityagentsandprovidedusefulinformation and guidance to them due to their knowledge of local terrain. The present stateadministrationhasdisbandedtheCJTFandgivenorderstheyarenolongertoattack.Yanbangagroupsstillexistbuthavebeenrenamedasyanbangaforpeace.ThereissomeunhappinessinHausacommunitieswhofeeltheynowhavenoprotectionagainstfutureviolence.EMIRSANDPOLITICIANSWITHLINKSTOAOGSThecommitteeforfindingsolutionstoarmedbanditryinZamfarastatelistedfiveemirsand33districtheadssuspectedtobe linkedtoAOGsaswellas10soldiers, fourpoliceofficersandsomepoliticiansandrecommendedtheirremovalfromofficeand/orcourtmartial.23Respondentswereunclearastowhythoselistedhadnotfacedconsequences.

22Author’snotesfrompressconference,verifiedbycopiesofhisspeechdistributedtothosepresent.23ShehuUmar,‘Banditry:ReportIndicts5ZamfaraEmirs,33DistrictHeads,’DailyTrust,12October2019.

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FULBEGROUPSThere isnoonecleargroupthatspeaks forallFulbe inthestateduetoperceptionsofpoliticisation,corruptionandfactionalism.Atpresent,therearebetween10and14separateassociations. New groups arise due to unhappiness at existing groupswhich are seen to notrepresentFulbe interests, be too close to government and/or receive resources that arenotpassedalong.TherearecurrentattemptsatconflictresolutionandplanstoformanumbrellaorganisationthatspeakswithoneunifiedFulbevoice.AsofthetimeofdatacollectioninJanuary2020,allFulbegroupshaddecidedtojointhisumbrellaexceptforMiyettiAllahwhichotherswerehopingwouldcomeonboardsoon.ThestategovernmentworkswithFulbepeopleandgroupstoreachouttoAOGsandcallthemfordialogue.However,thelevelofinfluenceofFulbeleadersandgroupsoverAOGleadersandmembersisunclear.Ontheonehand,someFulbeseethemascorruptedandextractivebutontheotherhand,theyhavekinshipandotherbonds.Moreover,thepositionofFulbegroupsviaàvisviolencecanvary.THEROLEOFMININGANDRESOURCEEXTRACTIONZamfara is rich in natural resources and many respondents believed mining was asignificantcontributor to insecurity.A respondent fromthe industrysaid some companiesstoppedoperationsaspeopleworkinginmineshadbeenkidnappedforransom.Inlargersitesrunbyminingcompanies,activitiescontinuedespite thegovernmenthavingofficiallybannedmining.Here,respondentsspokeofhowtherehavebeennoAOGattacksdespitemoneytobemadeandbelievedAOGswerepaidmoneytokeepaway.Respondentsalsospokeofhow,insomelocations,AOGmembersfetchwaterfromboreholesatminingsites.Onemanworkingforcivilsocietysaidhebelieved“politiciansareinstigatinginsecuritysoinvestorsdonotcomehereastheywilldisturbthemfromtheirmining.”AjournalistdetailedhowminesonlyexistwiththepermissionofAOG fighterswhocontrol theresourcesstemming fromthem.HebelievesAOGhideoutshavebeenstrategicallyplacedinareaswithhighlevelsofnaturalresourcesandthattheyhaveactedtostoppeopleengaginginartisanalminingintheseplaces.RespondentsinvolvedinartisanalminingspokeofbeingbeenchasedawayfromareasbyAOGswhowarnthemtoleave.STATEGOVERNMENTINSTITUTIONSThecurrentstategovernmentemphasisestheworktheyhavedonetobringaboutpeace,withsomerespondentsclaimingthatotherareassuchashealthcare,educationandsustainablelivelihoodshavebeenneglected asa result of this focus. There are several state governmentstructuresinplaceaimedataddressingtheconflictandhumanitariansituationbutrespondentsfrom civil society and government alike spoke about the need for capacity strengthening ofindividualsworkinginMDAsandtheinstitutionsthemselves:• The Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning under the Deputy Governor is the

contactpointfordevelopmentpartnersoperationalinthestate.• TheMinistryofSecurityandHomeAffairs,previouslyagovernmentdepartment,isa

newly created ministry. It has a linked Special Adviser on Conflict Resolution andReconciliation and two relevant two directorates. The Director General of the ConflictResolution and Reconciliation Directorate, a former army colonel who commanded abattalioninSokototofightAOGs,assumedofficeinmid-January2020.Itsscopeofworkisunknown but seems focused on addressing structural and cultural causes of conflict anddevelopingeffectivesecurityarchitectureandearlywarningandearlyresponsemechanisms.Meanwhile, the Directorate of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and SocialDevelopmentincludestheZamfaraStateEmergencyManagementAgency(SEMA).

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• TheOfficeoftheSecretarytotheStateGovernmentcoordinatesthegrazingreservesthe stategovernmentplans tobuild ineach senatorial zone. Atpresent,workon thegrazingreserveinMaradunhascommencedwithfurthergrazingreservesplannedinZurmiandMaru.AvisittotheMaradungrazingreservefoundbuildingworkwasprogressingwithhousesbeingbuiltfor210householdswithspaceadjacenttoeachhousewhereupto100cattlecouldbekeptovernight.Inaddition,astadium,mosque,primaryhealthcarefacilityandIslamiyya,primaryandsecondaryschoolswerebeingconstructedandanearbycanalwouldbeusedasawatersource.However,revocationoflandallocationstofarmershasnotbeenaccompaniedbyanyallocationoflandelsewhere.Moreover,theselectioncriteriaandprocessforthosewhowouldliveinthisgrazingareahasnotbeendevelopedandisunclear.Thereisanurgentneedforimprovedconflictsensitivityofthisproject.

MAPPINGOFPOLITICALACTORSZamfarahasalonghistoryofintraandinterpartyconflictandshiftingpartyalliancesandallegiances.Respondentsidentifiedahistoryofpoliticalcontestation,particularlyaroundthe2011 elections, as causing the increased criminality in the state which created the enablingenvironmentforthesharpincreaseinviolence.WHATARETHEPOTENTIALTRAJECTORIES,BOTHPOSITIVEANDNEGATIVE,AROUND

PEACEANDSECURITY?

Zamfara currentlyexperiences relativepeace compared toayearagobut theft, sexualviolenceandfearofattackcontinue.NotonlyarepredominantlyHausacommunitymilitiasnolonger harming Fulbe people but in some locations, AOG fighters are protecting areas.Respondents spoke about feeling increased security but while killings have reduced,encroachmentof livestockonto farms, theft and sexual violence continue.Although themainplankofthepeaceagreementwasaboutpredominantlyHausacommunitymilitiasandAOGfightsgivingupweapons,only limitedprogresshasbeenmade in thisregard.Thegovernmentandsecurityagenciespoint to theweaponshandedover to themasamarkerofsuccessbut theirnumberis,atpresent,asmallfractionofthatpresentinthestate.Theideaisfordisarmamenttohappeninphaseswitheachgroupgivingupsomearmsaftertheotheronehasdoneso.Accordingtoamalejournalist,“TheyansakaiadmittheyhavelotsofweaponsandwillnotgiveuptheirweaponsuntiltheyarecompletelysuretheFulaniwillgiveupweapons.”However,weaponryheldbydifferentgroupsisimbalancedwithAOGshavinghigherqualityweaponsascommunity

Zamfaracurrentlyexperiencesrelativepeacecomparedtoayearagobuttheft,sexualviolenceandfearofattackcontinue.Althoughmostrespondentswereappreciativeofgovernmentactionsforpeace,somewerescepticalabouteffectiveness.AperceptionthatthegovernmentisonthesideoftheFulbeiscommonamongHausacommunities.AOGsarereluctanttodisarmbecausetheydonottrustthecurrentstateofaffairswill last.Manyofthosedisplaced,whohearAOGfighters are committing criminality and sexual violence in their areas, donotwish to returnhome.Crossborderdynamicsandthelackofunifiedapproachisakeychallenge.Moreover,thereisalackofjoinedupapproachesbetweenfederalandstategovernments.Civiliansareforcedtochoosesideswhichputsthematharm.Yearsofviolencehascreatedhighlevelsofmistrustanddecreasedsocialcohesion.Yet,thereisastrongdesireforpeaceamongmanypeopleonallsides.Therearethreepotentialfuturetrajectoriesoftheconflict:1.Aslowreturntopeace2. Criminality and banditry persist in rural areas and increasing fragmentation andfactionalisationofAOGs3.Atotalcollapseofpeacedealandreturntohighlevelsofviolence,proliferationofgroupsand,potentially,attemptsbyAOGsinnortheastNigeriatolinkwithAOGsinthenorthwest.

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militiasrelyonlocallymanufacturedguns.CivilianscomplainedAOGfighters,althoughtheynolongerkill,movearoundcommunitieswiththeirweaponsinstillingfear.Although most respondents were appreciative of government actions for peace, somewerescepticalabouteffectiveness.AccordingtoaHausamanwhowasabductedandheldincaptivity,“Theonlysolutionistofightthem.Thepeaceprocessisrubbishastheywillstillattackyouandcollectyourphoneandmoney.”Someyansakaimemberswereunhappyandinreadinessto resume fighting. They pointed to cases where people had been lured back to villages bypromisesofsafetyonlytofindattackspersisted.AyansakaimaninterviewedinZurmirecountedwhathadhappenedrecentlywhenayanbangamantoldfighterstheywouldnottakehisdaughteronlyforthemtoshootandkillhimandtakeawaythegirl.Hewentontosay,“Peacehasevendroppedout”andthatfightersreleasedfromprisonhadgonebacktojointheirgroups.Aperception that thegovernment ison the sideof the Fulbe is commonamongHausacommunities, particularly members of community militias. According to one civil societyrespondent,“ThereisaperceptionamongyansakaithatgovernmentarebackingtheFulanimoreand,atanymoment,conflictcanescalate.TheyfeelattacksarehappeningnowforexampleinZurmi because [AOGs] know they are not armed. Also, they see the ruga but not similarinterventiontargetingfarmers.”

AOGsarereluctanttodisarmbecausetheydonottrustthecurrentstateofaffairswilllast.FulbeleadersgavefourreasonswhyAOGmembersdonotwanttodisarm.First,theyareholdingontoweapons for self-defence, reluctant to surrender them until everyone else has done so.Second,AOG fightersneedweaponsnotonly todefendthemselves fromoutsidersbutdue toconflictandfightingwithinandbetweengroups.Third,fightershavingboughtweaponsrequirecompensationbeforegivingthemup.Fourth,somearenotwillingtostopfightingastheymakesignificant money. Some Fulbe leaders questioned the government’s, pointing out that eventhough the committee for finding solutions to armed banditry in Zamfara state undertookextensive investigations, its report has not been published nor its recommendationsimplemented.TheycomplainedthegovernmentwaspayingnoattentiontothosewhosoldandtransportedweaponsortothosebuyingcowsatlowpricesthathadbeenstolenbyAOGfighters.Manyof thosedisplaced,whohearAOG fightersare committing criminalityand sexualviolence in their areas, do not wish to return home. Some respondents predictedencroachmentonto farmlandsand increased tensionsduring the rainy seasonand that thesedynamicswouldbeheightenedifpeoplereturnedtocommunitiesandstartedfarmingoncemore.

“Theyan sakaiare respecting thepositionofnohostilityandweapons.There is at leastafaçadethattheyarenolongerbelligerentwhereasthe[AOGs]movearoundtowreakhavoc…Thelocalsarestationarywithinthecommunityandlocalvigilantearefromthatcommunity.Itiseasiertofishouttheyansakaiiftheycommitanoffencebutitisdifficulttofishoutthe[AOGs]astheystrikeandmove.Duetothat,thegovernment’shandisforcedtopamperandappealtothe[AOGs]morewhereaswithHausa,theywillgetyouifyoucommitanything.”–seniormalemilitarycommander

“If theyhadgivenup theirweapons,wecouldhavegoneback.Wehavecontactsandarecommunicatingwithpeoplewhosay[AOGs]arestilltherewiththeirdangerousweapons–nothing has been happening for peace [in rural areas]... Things are becoming worseespeciallyinthebushsincetheyhavestoppedtheyanbangaandyansakaifromoperatingas[AOGs]arejustdoingwhattheyfeellikedoing.Theyenterhouseswherethereareteenagegirls.Theytellherfatherthattheyaretakingherformarriageandgivemoney.Sometimes,theydonotevengivemoneybutjusttakeandgo.Theyarestilldoingthisinthebush.”-displacedHausawomaninterviewedinZurmi

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Crossborderdynamicsandthe lackofunifiedapproach isakeychallenge.ZamfarahasborderswithKatsina,Kaduna,Niger,SokotoandKebbiaswellaswithNigerRepublic.PreviouspeacedialogueinZamfaraisbelievedtohaveledAOGstomovetoKatsina24andthecollapseofthepeacedealinKatsinahasincreasedthefrequencyofattacks,abductions,sexualviolenceandkillingsonandofciviliansthere.WhiletheZamfarastategovernmentistryingtonegotiatepeace,othersarenot.Asaresult,fightersfromacrossthebordercometoZamfara.Accordingtoacivilsocietyman,“[InSokotothey]wereattackedbysecurityforcescausinglotsofcasualtiessotheyhave grievances and hunger [and come to Zamfara and] take it out on civilian populations.”Alternatively,duetothepeaceprocessinZamfara,AOGsareseenasusingthestatetoregroupandlaunchattacksonneighbouringstates.AsUsmanNagogo,CommissionerofPolice,saidinapressbriefinginJanuary2020,“IfwesolvetheproblemofZamfarabutnot[of]otherstates,wewillstillbeonitastheywillsettleinZamfaraandattackotherstatesorbeinotherstatesandattackZamfara.”25Allheadsofsecurityagenciesinterviewedagreedontheneedfordiscussionanda commonapproachbetweenneighbouring statesandbetweenNigeriaandNiger. Therehavebeenmeetingsaimingatfosteringthiscooperationbringingtogetherpoliticalandsecurityactorsbuttheireffectivenessisunclear.Moreover,thereisalackofjoinedupapproachesbetweenfederalandstategovernments.Sometimes, there are contradictory statements from the state and federal governmentwhichhindersprogress.Forexample,whenthestategovernmentwasconductingpeacedialoguewithAOGs,PresidentBuharistatedthatallfightersshouldbeeradicated.PresidentBuharihasalsoannouncedthewithdrawalofmilitarypersonnelandhandoverofsecurityresponsibilitiestothepolice. Most senior civil servants interviewed were not involved in discussions before thisdecisionwasmade.Aseniorcivilservantcoveringissuesofsecuritysaid,“Iamscepticalabout[troopwithdrawal]assecurityissofragileevenwithmilitarypresenceandthepolicedonothavecapacity tocontrol thesituation.Wecannothaveavacuum.”Evenmilitarypersonneldidnotthinkthetimewasright.Accordingtoaseniormilitarycommander,“Zamfaraisnotyetreadyforthis.Westillneedsomemajoroffensivestobecarriedouttosilence[AOGs]toaparticularlevel.”Civiliansareforcedtochoosesideswhichputsthematharm.TheyareattackedbyAOGsiftheyaresuspectedofcollusionordonotpassoninformationaboutsecurityforcemovementsbutfaceseverepressurefromsecurityforcestoprovideintelligencewhoalsoautomaticallytendtoviewthoseremaininginruralareasasaffiliatedwithAOGs.Years of violence has created high levels of mistrust and decreased social cohesion.Currently, even though the situation is calmer, recriminations persist. According to a FulbewomaninShinkafi,“TheHausatalkbadagainstus...TheycanseethattheFulbearealsobeingaffectedbuttheydonotcareeveniftheycanseenotallofusarelike[theAOGs].”AdisplacedHausamanwhohadbecomedisabledduetoviolenceinterviewedinBirninMagajisaid,“Theyareallthesame.TherearenoinnocentFulbe.InZamfara,thereisnoFulbewhoisnotathief.”ItisnotonlyrelationsbetweenFulbeandHausa thathavebeenaffectedbutalsowithinethnicgroups.Hausapeoplesuspectneighboursofbeinginformersandpassingonintelligenceusedtoattack. Fulbe respondents said relationshipsbetweendifferentFulbe individualsandgroupshavebeenaffectedaslevelsofmutualsupportarenolongerpossibleduetodepressedlivelihoodsandcapital.Moreover,thatpeopleofFulbebackgroundhaveattackedFulbehamlets,killedFulbepeopleofallagesandgenders,stolentheirlivestock,forcedyoungmenintojoiningthemandcommittedsexualviolenceagainstwomenandgirlshasgreatlyreducedthisstrongethnicbond.Yet,thereisastrongdesireforpeaceamongmanypeopleonallsides.AFulbemanwhohad

24UNHCR,AssessmentReportontheStateofInsecurityinSokoto,ZamfaraandKatsinaStates,NorthwestRegionofNigeriafrom25July–4August2019,6August2019,sharedwithauthor.25Author’snotesfrompressconference,verifiedbycopiesofhisspeechdistributedtothosepresent.

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committedviolenceinthepastspokeofhowhisgroupdidnotseekrevengeforarecentattackon their hamlet, despite believing attackers to be the same people who killed older familymembersinthepast,theincidentthatpromptedhimtojointhegrouptoseekrevenge.Thistime,peoplefromthenearbyHausatownwithwhomhisgrouphadpreviouslybeeninconflictcometocondolethemandthosewhohadbeenattackedrefusedtheofferofthosewhowantedtoworkwiththeminsolidaritytotakerevenge.Therearethreepotentialfuturetrajectoriesoftheconflict.1.Aslowreturntopeacebuthighlevelsoffoodinsecurityduetointerruptedlivelihoodsandimpactsofviolence2.Criminalityandbanditrypersist in rural areas as someactors refuse todisarmand inresponsetohighfoodinsecurityandlowlivelihoodprospectsandincreasingfragmentationandfactionalisationofAOGs3.Atotalcollapseofpeacedealandreturntohighlevelsofviolence,proliferationofgroupsand,potentially,attemptsbyAOGsinnortheastNigeriawhohavebeengaininginstrengththeretolinkwithAOGsinthenorthwest

CONCLUSIONSThereisgreatpotentialforcontinuedpeaceconsolidationinZamfarabutalsosignificantriskofthecollapseofthepeaceprocessandareturntohighlevelsofviolence.Muchwilldependontheactionsofthestategovernmentandtheirabilitytopersuadeconflictingpartiesthatthepursuanceofpeaceisintheirinterests.Already,thereisunhappinessabouttheslowpaceofimplementationofthegovernment’sundertakingsinthepeacedealandfrustrationaboutaperceivedlackofeven-handednesstodifferentgroups.Theseattitudesriskcalcifyingagainstthebackdropofpersistinginsecurity,particularlyforwomenandgirls,thatappearstoberising.Thatthereisanewgovernmentinplaceisanopportunityasmanypeopleappeartohavehopeofchange.However,manycivilservantsandseniorpoliticiansthemselvesareself-reflectiveofthe lackof individual and institutional capacity aroundpeacebuildingand conflictmitigation.Manypoliciesarebeingdesignedandimplementedinconflictinsensitiveways.Littleregardhasbeen paid to promoting social cohesion andmutual coexistence of those whowere recentlycommitting violence against each other. Government interventions rather than being gendertransformationaltendtooverlooktheimportanceofgenderinthisconflict,excludewomenfromdecisionmaking,disregardhighGBVlevelsandfurtherentrenchpatriarchalgendernorms.Atthesametimethere isawillingnesstoengageoutsideactorstoanextentnotalwaysseen inconflictaffectedstates.