Analysis of Reasons and Countermeasures for the Necessity of Alternative Futures Discourses in South Korea

Futures 55 (2014) 1–14

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Futures

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Analysis of reasons and countermeasures for the necessity of

Hyeonju Son *

456 Paddock Drive W., Savoy, IL 61874, United States

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Available online 18 December 2013

Keywords:

Alternative futures discourses

South Korea

Integrated approach

Modernization paradigm

Unipolar worldview

Uncertainty avoidant culture

Westernization

Indigenization

A B S T R A C T

This paper examines an overview of the Western origins and concepts of alternative

futures to address the ‘alternatives to what’ question, and to define three approaches to

clarify the concept of alternative futures. An integrated approach, as a holistic means,

should be considered as incorporating both the formal approach and the content-based

approach. Moreover, this paper presents the necessary reasons for alternative futures

discourses in Korea and proposes several countermeasures to improve Korea’s futures

practice. To date the Korean society and its futures practices have been dominated by five

tendencies: (a) a dominant modernization paradigm, (b) a prevailing unipolar worldview,

(c) an uncertainty avoidant culture, (d) poor methodological practice, and (e)

Westernization of the Korean futures studies. These current tendencies and their ensuing

negative effects have undermined both the continuation of creative futures and the Korean

way of seeing the future. Thus, Korea’s futures practice has experienced a lack of

alternative futures approaches as well as a kind of identity crisis. In order to respond to

those problems and create rigorous products of future practice, it is crucial for Korea’s

futures community to concentrate on the five alternative tendencies: (a) inventing Korean

models in a viable utopia, (b) adopting a liberal cosmopolitan worldview, (c) building an

uncertainty tolerant culture, (d) overcoming methodological challenges and (e) moving

toward indigenous futures studies. In particular, indigenous futures studies can provide

the grounds for relevant and enriched futures studies as well as the development of

universal futures studies.

� 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Over the past decade the concept of alternative futures has been widely employed by the futures field and otherdisciplines and has vigorously addressed various aspects of futures images and phenomena. Many futurists use alternativefutures as synonymous with possible futures, probable futures, and preferable futures [1–4]. This concept of alternativefutures has evolved to develop an elaborate mode of futures thought by adding plausible futures [5–8] and constructing anew profile for future images [9–12]. The core concept of the current definition refers to multiple futures representing themany different forms futures could take. Emphasis is particularly placed on the plural form of the word future. Thus,alternative futures, in a broad sense, are defined as ‘‘a cluster of possibilities’’ [13]. Theses cluster of possibilities are oftengiven in the form of scenarios. The emphasis on multiple futures brings into view reactions to the problems of prediction,especially the unwarranted extrapolation and fallacy of a single vision.

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H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–142

But the definition of alternative futures has two conceptual flaws. First, it is confined to form rather than content. Thisform-focused definition weakens the philosophical and ideological overtones from the question of alternative futures. Ittends to stick to the connotation of a certain set of formal types about alternative futures, though it does not mean the form-focused definition has no interest in content. There are few questions or answers for ‘alternatives to what,’ though preferableand other possible futures present normative claims. The increasing importance of multiple forms of the futures cannotguarantee the profusion of futures thoughts and images. The widespread acceptance of the concept does not necessarilyaddress the deep insight of the general characteristics of a future society. The second flaw arises when many people supportthe concept of alternative futures without necessarily knowing what it means and entails. Like the concept of appropriatetechnology and sustainable development [14,15], the concept of alternative futures can mean ‘‘many things to many people’’or ‘‘almost anything to anyone’’ and its meaning varies between futurists and applications. Moreover, it may enable allmanner of multiple futures to be called alternative futures. The current definition of alternative futures can thus lead to bothambiguity and flexibility. Furthermore, it can result in self-fulfilling positive effects, which are based on a belief thatalternative futures will bring more positive effects to the study of the futures and future generations as well as lessen anyharmful consequences. The current definition also assumes that alternative futures are the best way for all people. Thisassumption is limited because sound alternative futures to some may be unsound alternative futures to others. The currentdefinition of alternative futures lacks the mutual complementarity between form and content, with form-providing processand scope, and content-providing orientations and elements. Although the multiplicity of alternative futures is important inany futures creation, narratives based on multiple futures that are not directed by concrete values and ethical visions mayresult in more problematic futures instead of desirable futures. Thus, the form-focused definition of alternative futures is anunsuitable and narrow framework as a way of representing a comprehensive meaning of alternative futures.

In South Korea (hereafter Korea, except when specificity is needed) alternative futures rose to prominence in publicdiscourse in the late 1990s and early 2000s following Korea’s severe economic crisis in 1997. The crisis prompted Korea todevelop alternative futures approaches in order to see a wide range of possibilities as well as to create Korea’s own futuredevelopment model to make prudent provisions. Moreover, during the 1960s to the 1980s democracy was an importantelement to consider in this development. However, the late 1990s were characterized by the consolidation of politicaldemocracy and globalization. The discussion of a post-democratic transformation and the future of Korea in a globalizedworld involved nationwide efforts, concurrent with the penetration of the concept of sustainable development [16–20].

Despite the popularity of alternative futures, not much Korean scholarship has overtly addressed the meaning of thisconcept. Like other alternative concepts, such as alternative schools, alternative energy, and alternative tourism, Koreanscholarship views alternative futures merely as a new approach for solving current and potential problems for the futures. Itis based on the problem-centered approach where main concerns are on finding problems and exploring alternativesolutions. Korean scholarship has been inclined to adopt the Western concept of alternative futures without consideration ofKorea’s interests and conditions. It is somewhat believed that the Western alternative futures approaches aremethodologically more advanced. As a result of this thinking, there has been little or no discussion of why Korea needsalterative futures discourses and how western-born alternative futures approaches apply to Korea. Furthermore, thereasoning behind the necessity of alternative futures discourses can influence the process of the future knowledgeproduction, including research topics and the futurists’ view of the boundary of alternative futures.

In this respect, this paper is comprised of the following sections: Section 2 defines three approaches to clarify the conceptof alternative futures and presents an overview of Western origins and concepts of alternative futures to address the‘alternatives to what’ question. Section 3 explores the reasons why Korea needs alternative futures discourses by presentingfive tendencies and several negative effects. In addition, countermeasures are offered for overcoming the limits of Korea’sfutures practice and promoting the alternative futures approach through a discussion of five alternative tendencies and otherseveral alternative strategies. Section 4 summarizes the main points posited in this paper and provides several implicationsto respond to the problems and questions raised.

2. Western origins and concepts of alternative futures

It is important to distinguish between a formal approach, a content-based approach, and an integrated approach forclassificatory schemes relevant to the concept of alternative futures. A formal approach to alternative futures tends toemphasize forms, including categories, scope, process, and methods, rather than content, including meanings, orientation,substance, and subject matters. The key-identifying feature is enabling multiplicity, in which the main focus is on thediversity of futures in formal aspects. Particular attention is paid to how multiple futures should best be created. An intenseassertion has been made that focuses on multiplicity that may require futurists to push beyond the concept of a predictablefuture to a variety of possible futures. Therefore, it tends to isolate any substantive content from creating futures and leads toa value-free undertaking: that is, some scenarios create neutral scenario titles using letters, colors, and numbers.

A content-led approach, in contrast, encompasses normative and ideological ideas as the means for enriching futureknowledge through content. It expresses interest in futures phenomena based on their content aspects rather than on theirformal aspects. It sets the objective to explore a range of normative and ideological content for constructing future visions bytackling established trends and challenging official futures. The crucial concern appears to be which futures we shouldcreate, or what the best futures are for meaningful lives. A strong claim has been made that the focus on enabling normativitymay lead futurists to see which alternative futures contribute to the social betterment. Whereas a content-based approach,

H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–14 3

which is the value-laden nature of alternative futures, can produce the great transformation for normative and ideologicalfutures instead of analytical and descriptive futures, it may lead to a monistic concept of futures and distract attention fromkey external driving forces of the futures, resulting in uniform interpretation of desirability and failure to provide persuasivedifferent futures.

An integrated approach incorporates both the formal approach and the content-based approach in a holistic manner toaddress the general forms of process and the inner aspect of alternative futures. It not only provides an enabling multiplicitybut also an enabling normativity. Furthermore, it helps futurists to conceptualize the mutual complementarity of the form-focused and content-based definitions in alternative futures. The main idea is that an integrated approach can overcome theproblem of the distinction between form and content.

The term ‘alternative futures’ as a systematic technique was developed by Kahn and former RAND theorists [21]. Kahn, inhis paper, ‘‘Alternative World Futures (1964),’’ examined alternative international orders: the Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Deltaworlds [21]. The four alternative scenarios are based on an ‘‘as if’’ proposition and ‘‘sophisticated techniques (game theory,systems analysis, cost-effectiveness ratios)’’ [21]. The ‘‘as if’’ proposition engages the use of hypotheses, which are notscientific theory or laws. Sophisticated techniques can provide a more thorough explanatory framework of the futures. Inthis sense, Kahn’s alternative futures might address ‘‘hypothetical sequences of events’’ [22] in the systematic ways.

Like Kahn, Bell defines alternative futures as ‘‘hypothetical futures’’ [23]. He also argues the importance of possiblefutures in its introduction of The Year 2000: A Framework of Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (1967).

What is central. . .to the present future studies is not an effort to ‘predict’ the future, as if this were some far-flung rung oftime unrolling to some distant point, but the effort to sketch ‘alternative futures’—in other words, the likely results ofdifferent choices, so that policy makers can understand costs and consequences of different desires [22].

Bell’s alternative futures are concerned with ‘‘likely results of different choices’’ as they might make a claim about thepossible futures. Therefore, Kahn and Bell’s alternative futures concept emphasizes different assumptions and provides away to examine hypothetical futures that embrace a spectrum of possibilities. Their theories advocate not only rejecting thenotion of prediction, but also any claim to a single future vision. Kahn and Bell’s concept is closely related with the formalapproach.

Another pioneer work in alternative futures was the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth (1972), which producedcomputer-modeling scenarios for future global economies and environments [24]. These scenarios spoke to how unlimitedeconomic and population growth caused global dangers such as a scarcity of natural resources, environmental deterioration,malnutrition, and economic collapse. The authors’ intention was to deliver possible stories of discontinuity between thepresent and the future. Moreover, the Club of Rome objected to the dominant discourse of growth-oriented developmentembodied in the progress of modernity; in contrast, they recommended sustainable development to prevent overshootingand collapse. The report was also concerned with the global alternative futures beyond national boundaries. The Club ofRome’s alternative futures are based on the integrated approach.

The concept of a conserver society is a distinct alternative to a society of overproduction and overconsumption. In 1973,the Science Council of Canada uses the term conserver society in its report, Natural Resource Policy Issues in Canada, to inspirebalanced development between the environment and economic growth [25]. The conserver society emphasizes thereduction of increased inequality and centralized power for sustainability and is associated with green movements.Moreover, it concerns the survival of humanity and future human needs such as non-material, spiritual and moral solace,responsibility, and communal satisfaction. It tends to criticize a widespread desire for conspicuous consumption. Theconserver society is a content-based approach.

In Lovins’ article entitled ‘‘Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken’’ (1976) [26] and in Soft Energy Paths (1977) [27], hepresents two different images: a soft and a hard energy path. The soft energy path reflects a low-energy demand society as adesirable society that relies on soft energy technologies, including renewable energy technologies. The hard energy pathreflects a society with expanding energy consumption. The concepts of soft and hard energy paths provide importantperspectives to create and describe a desirable future society. Lovin’s works argue for future practices to develop and applymoral values for creating future scenarios. Moreover, his alternative futures are not only multiple forms of futures but arealso regarded as desirable. Lovins’ soft and hard path is a conceptual integration of form and content.

Robertson [9] defines alternative futures in The Sane Alternative: A Choice of Futures (1978) by presenting five alternativescenario archetypes: (a) business as usual, (b) the disaster, (c) the totalitarian conservationist, (d) the hyper-expansionist(HE) future, (e) the sane, humane, and ecological (SHE) future. He offers the SHE scenario as the preferred future. Dator [10]discusses four generic alternative futures: (a) continued growth, (b) collapse, (c) conserver society, and (d) transformation.Also Bezold [28] suggests aspirational futures based on three archetypes: ‘‘most likely, challenging, and visionary.’’Robertson, Dator, and Bezold’s archetypal alternative futures provide a comprehensive explanation of future experiences.Not only is the nature of the futures described, but they also suggest a dramatically transformed future society. Therefore,they relate to an integrated approach.

The most popular and well-known alternative futures approach is scenario planning. Introduced by Wack, a planner atShell Francaise in the early 1970s, this approach has been practiced by SRI International, Royal Dutch Shell, and GlobalBusiness Network [29–31]. Schwarz’s book The Art of the Long View (1991) and van der Heijden’s book Scenarios: The Art of

Strategic Conversations (1996) have contributed to the popularity of scenario planning [29]. Shell’s success story employingthe scenario approach during the oil crisis in the 1970s, spurred its use by numerous other private sectors to supportstrategic planning. Therefore, it is sometimes called as the ‘‘Shell approach’’ [30]. As an alternative to both linear forecasting

H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–144

and strategic problems for making better decisions in business, it employs a 2� 2 scenario matrix based on the mostimportant and the most uncertain variables. Scenario planning has developed an integrated approach to envision possiblefutures and consider their strategic implications with some degree of specificity.

Wildcards are big surprise alternatives to probable futures and can be defined as ‘‘high-impact, low probability eventsthat are generally discounted by most people’’ [32]. If wildcards occur, they result in serious consequences such as threats tohuman survival and dramatic paradigm shifts. Examples of wildcards are natural disasters, disease epidemic, terroristattacks, wars, technological failures, a stock-market crash, etc. The wildcard approach known as ‘‘futurequakes’’ wasinitiated in 1992 by the joint group efforts of the CIFS (Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies), the BIPE Conseil (Issy-Les-Moulineaux), and the Institute for the Future (Menlo Park, CA) [33]. The features of wildcards are elaborated by Rockfellow[34], Ray [35], Petersen [36], and Cornish [37]. In particular, Petersen’s Out of Blue (1997) [36] and Taleb’s The Black Swan

(2007) [38] emphasize the importance of the power of extremely rare phenomena including unexpected events, anomaliesand irregularities for improbable futures. These texts contributed to gain impetus of the wildcard approach in the late 1990sand 2000s. Wildcards are linked to a content approach because they add the specific elements of surprise and risk as thedriving force for shaping futures.

Further, representative types of alternative futures are variously evolved: global futures with computer modeling [39,40],scenario planning with 2� 2 scenario matrix [41,42], archetypal alternative futures [43–45], wildcards [46,47], and othermultiple futures [48,49]. Moreover, there are many appealing alternatives to existing worldviews and societies: ecology andsustainability [50,51], techno-utopia [52,53], techno-dystopia [54,55], space futures [56,57], world order [58,59], planetaryfutures [60], economic justice [61,62], education futures [63,64], and post-capitalist order [65,66].

3. Reasons and countermeasures

The growing lack of true understanding of alternative futures discourses has been seen in Koreans futures studies over thepast decades. This phenomenon may be attributed to five reasons: (a) a dominant modernization paradigm, (b) a prevailingunipolar worldview, (c) an uncertainty avoidant culture, (d) poor methodological practice, and (e) Westernization of theKorean futures studies. One of reasons, such a prevailing unipolar worldview reflects a recurrent pattern of thedisadvantages of a content-based approach in creating futures knowledge. When Korean futures engage in internationalpolitics from the perspective of American dominance as an ideal world order and put focus on the big brother-and-littlebrother and cold war mentalities, it allows for minor attention to be paid to multiple futures such as a third way or a multipleworldview by which Korea can carve out its futures. Also, while Korean futures work requires futurists to attend to multipletypes and methods, it frequently leads to poor methodological practice and ignores the importance of meaning, value, andhuman actions. On the other hand, the concept of enabling multiplicity can function as an explanatory variable rather than acategorical one. In this context, Korean futures barely combine the content with the form at the same time and oftenemphasize one at the cost of the other. On those accounts, five main reasons provide evidence of the importance of theintegrated approach for futures practice in Korea and also tell us how to apply the concept of alternative futures in a specificcountry. Whereas alternative futures are a generalized concept in any futures practice, the Korean futures community shoulduse the concept of alternative futures differently in light of the particularities of the Korean settings. This section alsoprovides five countermeasures of what Korean futures community should do to begin its relevant futures work.

3.1. Dominant modernization paradigm: inventing Korean models in a viable utopia

In Korea, growth is the main focus of the modernization paradigm, and catching up with the West is the main strategy indevelopment. Everyday discourses and practices concern economic growth, technological progress, and high massconsumption. As a result of making serious modernization efforts, the Korea economy has shown a strong resilience despitethe 2008 world economic crisis. It continues to indicate a strong world market share (rank): ‘‘shipbuilding (1st), motorvehicle (6th), steel (5th), petroleum-chemistry (5th), textile (5th), IT (semiconductor 3rd, digital home appliance 5th)’’ [67].Moreover, Korean manufacturers have overtaken some Japanese companies, including in the areas of semiconductors,shipbuilding, televisions, and the Lithium-ion battery industry [68]. Particularly, in 2006, Samsung, which is the best-knownKorean brand, surpassed the Japanese electronics giant Sony as the world’s leading TV maker [69].

Because of Korea’s rise in the global market, Koreans hesitate to follow the futures models of Japan and the West. ManyKoreans are looking at new prospects for futures development and moving beyond the modernization paradigm. Theybelieve that inventing a Korean model is the most appropriate way to respond to new global and domestic conditions.Discourses regarding this subject are divided into the conservative and the progressive viewpoints. Korean society has beenpolarized over the last two decades in terms of economy, education, and politics [70,71]. The political and ideological dialogsbased on the conservative and progressive divisions over hot issues are a powerful phenomenon. The progressives favorequality, distribution, and a fundamental reform of capitalism, and support the intervention of the government to reach itsgoals. The conservatives, on the other hand, favor freedom, growth, and gradual reform to capitalism, and support a free-market economy to obtain its goals. Furthermore, both the conservatives and progressives express quite stable standpointsof envisioning Korean models.

The dominant progressive discourses on producing a Korean model are centered on a welfare state and a social democracythat challenge the developmental model and the expansion of neoliberalism [72,73]. The progressives regarded the

H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–14 5

neoliberal paradigm as the main cause of looming economic crisis, greater social and economic polarization, and a weakwelfare state in Korea. They cite the illusions of progress offered by developmentalism and the failure of neoliberalism. Theprogressives show a wide range of different perspectives such as (a) ‘‘ecological, peace, and social democracy,’’ (b) ‘‘laborcentered unified economic federation,’’ (c) ‘‘social solidarity state,’’ (d) ‘‘social investment state,’’ (e) ‘‘dynamic welfare state,’’and (f) ‘‘neo-progressivism’’ [74]. These six perspectives emphasize the partnership for growth between economicdevelopment and environment, ecology, social welfare, solidarity, and distributive justice. The progressive discourses can beseen as attempting to construct new forms of resistance to neoliberalism and produce the popularity of new paradigms forthe transformation of the social and political landscape.

The conservative discourse regarding the invention of a Korean model is referred to as Seonjinhwa (achievingadvancement) that is composed of collective efforts to realize globalized and post-modern goals for progress throughinnovation [75,76]. The Sonjinhwa can be defined as the development and implementation of new strategies, including(a) economy ($30,000 per capita income era), (b) politics (liberal democracy instead of populism), (c) society (anappropriate balance between private and public interests), (d) culture (the creation of a global culture), and (e)international level (world contributing nation) [77]. These five topics of discourse assume the most advanced countrieshave experienced neoliberal transformation and neoliberal policies are global trends. Also, Korea has achieved rapidindustrialization and democratization over the past five decades and is poised at a critical moment to search for newmodels of development. Therefore, the Seonjinwha discourse is the later stage of development, and neoliberaltransformation is the main driving force. Its philosophical foundation is communitarian liberalism that emphasizes theimportance of mutual obligation and social solidarity in the sense of liberalism to solve the problems of neo-liberalindividualism [75]. The Seonjinhwa discourse is an attempt to adjust to globalization and promote neoliberal ideas. Thus,it is regarded as a new form of refurbished neoliberal capitalism and is a gradual and problem-solving alternativeapproach to neoliberalism.

Despite their serious effort to invent Korean models, the progressive and conservative discourses have failed to developsalient perspectives beyond Western modernity. Although the two discourses go beyond the preoccupation with economicgrowth, they are based on growth orientation and an evolutionary approach. They remain dependent upon Western ideas:the progressive discourse imitates the model of a European welfare state whereas the conservative discourse imitates the USneoliberal model. The progressive discourse has tried to provide more tangible alternative perspectives than theconservative discourse because the former put more emphasis on the environment, citizen’s participation, and people-centered notion than the latter. The two discourses can be seen as full modernization versions rather than unique Koreanizedversions. Utopian thoughts such as an equal society, an ideal cosmopolitan order, and a perfectly harmonious society, havedisappeared in the discussion of inventing Korean models and seem to be an obsolete concept. Thus, in the words of Kothari[78], Korea’s inventions of its own models are falling into ‘‘an end of alternatives’’ or ‘‘an erosion of alternatives’’ because of ‘‘adecline of engagement with Utopias.’’ The inventing Korean model should be related to ‘a construction of alternatives.’ Itshould pursue utopian thought, radical visions, and surprise futures such as anti-development, degrowth, aversion totechnology, technological utopianism, ecological international communities, future human space exploration, nonviolentfutures, future spiritual life, an inclusive society, etc.

3.2. Prevailing unipolar worldview: adopting a liberal cosmopolitan worldview

Korea’s approach to current international affairs has been influenced by its inclination toward a unipolar worldview andits mentalities. The unipolar worldview is a framework of looking at international politics from the perspective of Americanpreeminence and considering American dominance as the ideal version of world order. Many Koreans believe the Americanhegemony ensures their interest and future prosperity. Two-related mentalities can be founded in the unipolar worldview.The first is the ‘big brother-and-little brother’ mentality. Koreans refer to the United States as a big brother offering militaryand economic assistance whereas Korea as a little brother plays adequate roles that the United States wants in global politics.Such a mentality draws on an unequal relationship between the two countries indicating that ‘‘the United States was SouthKorea’s security guarantor and patron’’ [79] and tends to accept the current status quo of US dominance in the global system.The second is the ‘‘cold war mentality’’ which is a security perception confronting the two blocs, capitalist and communist,within the world hegemony during the cold war era [80]. In South Korea, the cold war mentality continues to show apowerful existence, exemplified by the separation of North and South Korea. Several forms of discourse and practice,including rhetoric, school textbooks, and national security laws, have reinforced this cold war mentality [81–84]. Forinstance, textbooks repeatedly describe North Koreans as, ‘‘the beast-like communist spy’’ and ‘‘evil Communists’’ [82]. Thismentality is based on a ‘‘two valued orientation’’ [85] that produces an antagonistic attitude and is prone to a polarizedargument. South Korea or capitalists are good whereas North Korea or communists are bad. It also prevents South Korea from‘‘policy innovation’’ [85], resulting in unsuccessful negotiations and military tensions with North Korea. Thus, the bigbrother-and-little brother and cold war mentalities may distort public and policy makers’ view of reality and futureprospects, and lead to not accepting alternative possibilities and uncertainty.

The contemporary global order has transformed the unipolarity of US dominance to a multipolarity comprised of severalregional powers of comparable strength, which signifies an important development in international politics [86–88].Moreover, global economic power is shifting from the G7 countries to emerging economies in Asia and Latin America.According to Goldman Sachs, China will be the largest economy by 2050, followed by the United States, India, Brazil, Mexico,

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Russia, and Indonesia [89]. This power shift means that the imperatives of state behavior on national security, economicdevelopment, and environmental sustainability can be distinguished in the age of multipolarity from the age of unipolarity.

For almost six decades Korea has developed a strong regional partnership with the United States through the Korea–USalliance. In the multipolar world, Korea may confront the possibility of shifting alliances because the loyalty of an ally cannever be taken for granted. A change in alliance can lead to high tensions between the powers and even war [90]. Kim [91]explains why the multipolar world creates a high degree of uncertainty: ‘‘A multipolar order suffers from the simple fact thatit is harder to achieve consensus when you have more than two voices and thus the possibility of misunderstanding orconflict could be larger.’’

In addition to the current solid Korea–US alliance, Korea and China have also developed close strategic ties due to theircommon concerns about Japan’s military potential and their growing economic partnership [92]. In 2009, China was thelargest export market to Korea, followed by the United States and Japan [93]. At the same time, China became a majorimporter of Korean products, followed by Japan and the United States [93]. Currently the importance of China as an economicpartner for Korea is greater than that of the United States. China and Korea have developed a more intimate economicrelationship since the normalization policy was enacted in 1992 and can be seen as a cooperative strategic partnership. Thus,most Koreans perceive the rise of China as a great opportunity rather than a potential threat [94–96].

Some commentators expect that Korea will fall on the Chinese side after Korean unification [91,92]. According to Kim[91], there are five reasons for Korea to get close to China: ‘‘Given Korea’s long cultural and historical association with China,the long land border they share, China’s growing importance as a trade partner (likely overtaking the US in 50 years), Korea’senduring enmity toward Japan, and perhaps a growing resentment toward the US.’’ Inoguchi and Bacon [97] argue that in thenear future, Korea would have to make a strategic choice as to whether to side with a United States–Japan alliance or a Chinaaxis.

At any rate, it is highly possible that the Korean peninsula would get involved in the great power struggle between theUnited States and China over the dominance of East Asia, for they are mutually exclusive in their national interests.Furthermore, the challenge North Korea presents is a fulcrum of uncertainty for Korean futures. Essentially, North Korea hasbrought a structural political uncertainty to the Korean peninsula since the division of Korea in 1945. The discourse of‘Another Korean War’ was initiated at the end of 2010 largely after the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan andSouth Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island bombing by North Korea [98,99]. These two incidents have destabilized the inter-Koreanrelationship. The escalation of tensions between the two Koreas has involved the apocalyptical rhetoric of the war [100].Beyond the possibility of ‘Another Korean War,’ a continued and potential crisis or transformation could erupt on the Koreanpeninsula in the next couple of decades for four reasons: (a) a possible Korean unification, (b) North Korea’s nucleardevelopment, (c) North Korea’s isolated and secretive nature [101], and (d) North Korea’s sudden power shift.

In the emergence of a multipolar world, alternatives to the unipolar worldview require going beyond the unipolarworldview’s traditions and values. The new form of such a liberal cosmopolitan worldview would replace the unipolarworldview. In general, cosmopolitanism is the opposite of a communitarianism that emphasizes the importance of specificethical, cultural, and political communities rather than what benefits human beings as a whole [102]. Liberalcosmopolitanism emphasizes the role of a nation, whereas radical cosmopolitanism rejects special obligations to fellownationals or citizens [103,104]. The former is a more flexible concept than the latter. Kant [105] argues that nation-statescontribute to the perpetual peace. Moreover, Appiah [103] emphasizes the correlations between the role of the state andequality, and Beck [106] rejects ‘‘the dawn of the world republic’’ and believes that ‘‘the ideas of human rights and democracyneed a national base.’’

The liberal cosmopolitan worldview should be a particular concern for the following three alternative strategies. The firststrategy is to develop multipolar perspectives. The present unipolar worldview generates many contradictions about Korea’sfuture and its isolation from other nations. In terms of foreign policy and economic development, Korea should work towardmultilateral cooperation to find solutions to global issues. Fundamental changes in foreign policy and economic growthstrategy have become unavoidable. The second strategy considers the dynamics of East Asian regionalism and theinterregional exchange. These are salient issues affecting the future of Asia as well as global security. The idea of East Asianregionalism and East Asian identity movements should be envisioned when pursuing peace. Moreover, ‘‘intra-regional socialand cultural exchange,’’ such as ‘‘the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework and the East Asia-Latin American Forum(EALAF)’’ [107], may help develop East Asia’s pan regionalization. Many Korean scholars and activists stress the importanceof East Asia’s pan-regional development and interregional exchange for establishing the East Asian peace. Those argumentsappear in declaratory statements. The dominance of the big brother-and-little brother mentality and Korean nationalism arecontributors to the scarcity of both pan-Asian visions and the interregional exchange in the details of Korean discourse andliterature. The third strategy involves alternative approaches charting a third way between capitalism and socialism becausecurrent unification discourses are solidly entrenched in a market-oriented unification. Dominant unification discourses are,in general, associated with three scenarios: (a) ‘‘unification through system evolution and integration,’’ (b) ‘‘unificationthrough collapse and absorption,’’ and (c) ‘‘unification through conflict’’ [108]. They assume unification based on theprinciple of a free market society, and its discourses and assumptions reflect the cold war mentality. Most Korean people andscholars alike view North Korea as a bad country or long for its demise. North Korea is seen as an object, not a subject, in theunification process. The alternative approach proposes the new unification concept as taking place as a third paradigmbecause it opposes the cold war mentality and offers a reordering of the Korean economic and political system, and mostimportantly, because it creates sustainable futures. As a result, there could be new attention paid to a new form of the Korean

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economic structure, the third way beyond capitalism and communism, and ‘‘a middle way between neo-liberalism andsocial democracy’’ [109] for Korean unification.

3.3. Uncertainty avoidant culture: building an uncertainty tolerant culture

Korea shows a relatively high degree of an uncertainty avoidant culture [110]. Hofstede defines uncertainty avoidance as‘‘the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations’’ [110]. In the basicconcept of uncertainty avoidance, it is avoidance rather than uncertainty that plays an explanatory role in characterizinghuman behaviors in ambiguous situations. On the uncertainty avoidant index, Korea was ranked 16/17 and scored an 85compared to a mean score of 65 among 53 countries included in the study [110]. In an uncertainty avoidant culture, Koreanstend to fall back on ‘‘technology, law, and religion’’ [110] to defend themselves against uncertainties. They feel morecomfortable with predictable conditions and emphasize conformity. They believe that uncertain situations can beconsidered a threat, and that collective norms and values reduce uncertainty. Korea’s uncertainty avoidant culture has moreregard for the tendency toward continuation and predictability of futures than a tendency toward discontinuity andalternative futures.

Reflecting this sense of viewing uncertainty as a threat, fortune telling and divination are prevalent among the youngergenerations as well as the older generations in urban and rural areas [111]. According to a chairman of the Association ofKorean Prophets, Korea has more than 300,000 fortune tellers [112] and there was one fortuneteller for every 166 Koreans in2009. Many Koreans seek out fortune tellers for advice and wisdom on how to deal with the uncertainty they areexperiencing in the areas of money, marriage, job security, health, relocation, and their children’s education. The prevalenceof fortune telling is indicative of attempting to reduce anxiety about the uncertainty of the future because fortune tellingprovides some degree of prediction.

Korea has been referred to as a Yeolpung society, literally meaning ‘‘a society of hot wind,’’ to symbolize Koreans’collective fascination with specific fads or trends on a gigantic national scale [113]. In other words, a Yeolpung societytranslates as a society of fad and frenzy [113]. If Koreans consider something a trend or dominant phenomenon, everyoneadopts it quickly and enthusiastically. However, the Yeolpung phenomenon seems like longer-lasting fads or transitorytrends with salient behavioral norms and is very contagious and powerful to provide the meaning and directions of life.There is something of Yeolpung phenomenon in the momjjang syndrome (‘‘socio-cultural phenomenon of having a good-looking body’’) [114], kwaoe frenzy (‘‘private tutoring and out-of-lessons’’) [115], English fever [116], the well-beingphenomenon [117], and plastic surgery [118]. The Yeolpung phenomenon can be viewed as a reflection of isolation and lossof identity. Koreans seek to avoid the fear of isolation and uncertainty by conforming to the collective norms offered by fadsand trends.

The cultural heritage of uncertainty avoidance identifies the Korean society as a considerable low-trust society, producinga lack of communication within and between groups [119]. According to Fukuyama, a low-trust society needs more rules andregulations, which increases transaction costs, resulting in a less competitive society [119]. Moreover, an uncertaintyavoidant culture may lead to the rise of ‘‘totalitarian ideologies’’ [110]. Totalitarian ideologies, using nationalism andxenophobia as political tools, are a typical example of how to avoid uncertainty by providing expected behaviors in the formof formal rules and restricting the activities of deviant groups [110]. If Koreans are in a state of high uncertainty, they feelhelpless to influence their social world and future. They tend to give up their independence and are more likely to embracetotalitarian thinking and paradigm.

In contrast, uncertainty tolerant culture is inclined to ‘‘openness to change and innovation,’’ ‘‘willing to take unknownrisks,’’ ‘‘what is different is curious,’’ and a ‘‘tolerance of diversity’’ [110]. People in an uncertainty tolerant culture tend toencourage more risk taking and exhibit a higher tolerance for ambiguity, whereas people in an uncertainty avoidant culturetend to have a low tolerance toward uncertainty and ambiguity. Thus, the former is more likely to focus on the opportunitiesof alternative futures and constantly seek social change. In contrast, the latter is more likely to be concerned with thecertainty of the futures such as planning and having clear expectations. Korea’s uncertainty tolerant culture will besymptomatic of an increase of alternative perspectives and practices among Koreans. Accordingly, Korea’s future communitywould be more willing to cultivate a uncertainty tolerant culture and risk acceptance for maximizing new opportunities. Inparticular, trust is a new channel of building such a culture [110] and reduces the uncertainty [119]. In a uncertainty tolerantculture, an alternative strategy would be about how to build a high-trust future society. Trust and a better society arerobustly linked with each other [119–121]. Trust can provide societies with the moral foundations to solve collectiveproblems and help other people in the communities [121]. For that reason, an alternative strategy to build a high-trustsociety is important.

3.4. Poor methodological practice: overcoming methodological challenges

There are two problems of methodological practice in futures work in Korea. First, futures scholarship has mainly dealtwith the prediction of past trends and a single most likely future. For instance, Ha [122] conducted a meta-trend analysis fordetermining overall trends in education and identifies five trends: (a) growing importance of higher education, (b) growingnetwork learning, (c) more lifelong learning, (d) increase of knowledge and education inequality, and (e) strengthening linksbetween education and economy. Korea’s Presidential Commission on Policy Planning in Vision 2030 predicts Korea will

H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–148

become a G10 by 2030 and its per capita income will reach US $49,000 by 2030 [123]. Goldman Sachs makes predictionsbased on the economic projection of Korea in 2050 [89]. It also expects Korea’s income per capita will be higher than each ofthe G7 countries and Korea will place second after the United States in terms of income per capita.

The futures of Korea mentioned above are forecasted by extrapolating the past. A single most likely future is suggestedwithin the context of a specific vision. Those predictions and visions are basically set on the then-trends and economicprojections. They assume that current situations will continue to exist in some form, and the future will continue in the samedirection as in the past. However, the prediction of past trends and a single most likely future cannot ensure sound practice.The future is far more complex and erratic than tracking down past trends. For instance, it was often said in the 1980s and the1990s that ‘‘the future is female’’ and ‘‘tomorrow belongs to women’’ [124,cited in 125]. Most people believed that due to theinformation age which features the decline of the manufacturing industry and growth of the service industry, the number ofwomen would increase in the workforce and as a result they would hold more leadership positions in the economy than men.Even, Naisbitt and Aburdene predicted that women would dominate the information society [126], but, men, however,continue to dominate the information society today and women are limited to ‘‘upward mobility and career prospects’’[127]. Those who argue the dominance of women in the future are inclined to focus more on dominant trends andtechnological determinism. They overestimate the influence of technology on society and ignore the interaction betweentechnology and society. Furthermore, they need to consider other factors such as gender power dynamics and a male-dominated culture causing the exclusion of women from cultural opportunities and leadership roles [128].

Second, although some scholars address alternative scenarios, they tend to focus on ‘‘simple scenarios’’ rather than‘‘complex scenarios.’’ Van Notten et al. distinguish between complex and simple scenarios in terms of content [129]. Acomplex scenario consists of ‘‘an intricate web of causally related, interwoven, and elaborately arranged variables anddynamics,’’ focusing on ‘‘alternative patterns of development consisting of a series of action-reaction mechanism.’’ Incontrast, ‘‘simple scenarios are more limited in scope,’’ focusing on single topics and the extrapolation of trends. For example,Chamberlin [130] develops four scenarios based on possible outcomes of then-trends in the early 2000s: (a) ‘‘sustaining the1998 reforms,’’ (b) ‘‘reform yes, but. . .,’’ (c) ‘‘reform rejected,’’ and (d) ‘‘military coup d’etat.’’ These scenarios contain factsrelated to social, economic, and political indicators such as the annual GDP growth, crime rate, voters, big conglomerate’sactivities, and international relations with the United States. Choe, Eum and Jeon [131] produce four scenarios for the year2030: (a) ‘‘vision 2030,’’ (b) ‘‘again 1997,’’ (c) ‘‘gloomy silver,’’ and (d) ‘‘my way.’’ These scenarios are snapshots describingtheir end-state. Pollack and Lee [132] present four alternative scenarios for the unification of the Korean peninsula: (a)‘‘integrated and peaceful unification,’’ (b) ‘‘collapse and absorption,’’ (c) ‘‘unification through conflict,’’ and (d)‘‘disequilibrium and potential external intervention.’’ These scenarios put more stress on the unification process thanother factors of South Korea’s future. They are limited topics and show a homogeneous set of variables.

The scenarios mentioned above illustrate the features of simple scenarios that pay attention to the extrapolation oftrends, specific indicators, snapshot feature, limited topics, and homogeneous variables. Furthermore, they focus more onevents and structural change than values, social relations, power distribution, and cultural representation. These simplescenarios tend to ignore the importance of the concepts of power and values. They are based on two assumptions: (a) the firstsource of a society’s transformation is the external environment, and (b) representation of future phenomena is thelikelihood of events and structural change. In this context, scenarios should consider the value-and power-related contextualfactors.

Korea’s futures work has revealed the tendency toward poor methodological practices and, as such they are likely to leadto a lack of confidence as rigorous studies. Prediction and single vision-oriented futures lean toward focusing on presenttrends. As a result, they hardly address the spectrum of future possibilities. Moreover, simple scenarios exclude humanbeings from scenarios by rarely addressing the role of power dynamics and cultural practices. Consequently, threealternative strategies are needed for overcoming methodological challenges: (a) an increased use of alternative futureapproaches, (b) awareness of the importance of human actions, values, and power dynamics, (c) more complex scenarios.

3.5. Westernization of the Korean futures studies: moving toward indigenous futures studies

As aforementioned, Koreans enthusiastically followed the model of Western countries for modernization. Americabecame emblematic to Koreans as the idealized image of the advanced West. It goes without saying that the US economic,political, and military presence in Korea has contributed considerably to the country’s rapid industrialization. Accordingly,many Koreans tend to identify modernization with Westernization and Westernization with Americanization. They believedthat the adoption of American ways was the best way to improve their own standing in Korean society and give them a placein the sense of modernity. American values and culture were widespread in the Korean society [133–138].

American knowledge has also had cumulative effects on Korean academia. This community has shown a heavydependence on the American academic community. For example, Korean political science primarily mirrors Americanpolitical science, even translating American textbooks and borrowing its knowledge on political theories and systems. Mostpolitical science faculty have been educated in the United States. The influence of the US political science profession has beensignificant and is continuing. Moreover, Korean sociologists are faced with academic dependency on American sociology,causing ‘‘employment discrimination against Korean practitioners in favor of US-trained ones’’ [139]. Thus, Koreanscholarship is full of references to American academic work. Korean opinion leaders, intellectuals, and students believe thatAmerican perspectives are useful when forming their own views on how to solve Korea’s problems.

H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–14 9

In the same vein, Korea’s futures studies have shown intellectual dependency on Western futures studies, in particular,American futures studies. Theories, concepts, and methods in futures studies originating from the United States and Europewere seen as sources of futures thoughts and practices. In the late 1960s, with the emergence of futures studies, Hahn-BeenLee, who was educated in the United States and considered the father of Korean futures studies, played a critical role inintroducing futures perspectives [140,141]. He understood futures studies as a ‘‘developmentology’’ providing policyguidance and long-term perspectives for national development [142]. He established ‘The Year 2000 Committee’ (1968) and‘the Korean Society for Future Studies’ (KSFS) (1969) as an institutional base of futures activities. ‘The Year 2000 Committee’was reprised as ‘The Commission on the Year 20000 in the United States and ‘The Committee for the Next Thirty Years’ in theUK, which acted as the catalyst to encourage Korean futures studies [143]. KSFS introduced basic concepts and methodsincluding Olaf Helmer’s Delphi method [144] and took part in the International Futures Research Conference in Oslo in 1967[143] as well as in Japan in 1970 [145]. Moreover, Korean scholars adopted and advocated Western futures methods andideas such as Herman Kahn and Daniel Bell’s post-industrial society, Erick Jantsch’s technological forecasting, the neo-Malthusian pessimism of Limits to Growth, extrapolation, and normative forecasting methods [143,146–148].

Because Korea’s early futures studies drew solely upon Western tradition, the discipline has fallen into what is known as‘‘captive mind’’ which is ‘‘uncritical and imitative in its approach to ideas and concepts from the West’’ [149]. Alatasdeveloped the concept of the captive mind to criticize intellectual imperialism, to represent colonial mentality, and illustratethe blind adoption of Western knowledge in the Third World. The captive mind causes serious problems for one’s mode ofthinking especially: ‘‘the inability to be creative and raise original problems, the inability to devise original analyticalmethods, and alienation from the main issues of indigenous society’’ [149].

The long-term captive mind in Korea’s futures studies generates five problems in producing innovative futuresknowledge. First, there is a homogeneous vision problem. Korea’s future images are similar to those of the West. Koreanfutures-related scholars apply Western futures images to Korea’s future without an appropriate adaptation of the Westernfutures ideas [150–152]. Second, Korean futures studies have not shown theoretical and methodological innovation. Theyeither imitate Western futures ideas and implant Western-born methods into Korean settings, or they simply introduce thebasic concepts and translate English futures literature into Korean. Korean futurists make little efforts to develop newconcepts, theories, and methods. Thus, there are few publications concerning theoretical and methodological innovation. Forexample, there is semantic examination of the concept of ‘future’ from the East Asian viewpoint, especially Korea’s [153].Third, most Korean futures work tends to ignore Korean literary tradition and historical approaches. For example, westernliterature on the history of futures studies is extensive, whereas there is a dearth of literature on Korea’s futures studies inEnglish. Son [154] briefly describes Korea’s futures history in English, and KFSA [155] and Bae [156] address a short history inKorean. Fourth is the dislocated subject selection. Futures research subjects and agendas should be based on Korean society’sreal concerns, not those of the West. However, many research agendas tend to be dictated by emerging or popularinternational topics. The worth of research is judged by the introduction of new-western theories and concepts and globaltopics rather than its relevance or usefulness in understanding Korea’s future. Much of the concerns of subject selection aredirected by Western trends and approaches. Fifth is the futures alienation. The dominance of western futures knowledge isclosely associated with high-level abstract concepts and theoretical principles. Accordingly, elite groups such as professors,journalists, policy makers, bureaucrats, writers, scientists, and corporate executives dominate the discourses. In thereproduction of futures discourse, the voice of the public is silent. The interests and ideologies of elite groups tend to bepresent in the production of future discourse rather than those of the public. Alienated by the elites, the public feels they havelost control of creating and forecasting the future of Korea. They feel powerless and worthless as the changes in Koreansociety accelerate, and they have more uncertain views of the future.

To actively address the five problems mentioned above, Korea’s futures studies needs to undergo indigenization relevantto Korea. Indigenization is not a total rejection of Western knowledge but ‘‘[a] selective adaptation to indigenous needs’’[149]. Its aim is to enrich Western futures methods and theories, develop Korean future perspectives, and reflect Koreanneeds and interests. Indigenous Korean futures studies adopts western futures theories, concepts, and methods, and thenapply them to the Korean context, focusing on Korean history, cultural practices, concerns, worldviews, and future images. Inthis context, indigenous Korean futures studies can be tentatively defined as intellectual orientations which includeperspectives and approaches derived from a historical and cultural context, dominant trends, emerging issues, and futuresimages. It should be an institutionalized futures practice that represents the diversity of the paradigms within Korea’sfutures.

Four alternative strategies may produce an indigenous futures studies. The first strategy is a critical approach to theWestern-centric futures studies in Korea. It criticizes the misleading western-oriented futures studies in Korea, recognizesthe drawbacks of Western ways of framing Korea’s futures, rejects a blind acceptance of Western concepts and methods, andcreates distinctive Korean aspects of futures studies. The second strategy searches the philosophical foundations ofindigenous futures studies. Much of the work of Korean futurists tends to fall into the positivistic research tradition. Manyfuturists believe that futures studies cannot be scientific or seen as a science, because the futures are not real and only exist asan idea. This assumption is based on the positivistic concept of science where scientific knowledge lies within ‘‘the realm ofsensible phenomena’’ [157]. Although the possible futures do not exist, futures studies can stay in the realm of scientificresearch by using a system of organized knowledge concerning basic principles of research, rational procedures, rigorousmethods, reflective intuition, and disciplined imagination. Korean futurists usually focus on futures methods rather thanfutures methodologies. Application of futures methods to any futures work can be seen as attaining the credibility and

H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–1410

usefulness of futurists’ research. However, this methodological pretension leads to the lack of a philosophical foundation intheir research and serves as the central barrier to a useful analysis of constructing sound futures studies. The Korean futurescommunity should theorize the future phenomena in Korean context based on a philosophical foundation. The third strategywould be to create cultural alternatives to represent the Korean visions of a future and to oppose the dominant Eurocentricculture. The fourth strategy is the development of a new type of emancipatory futures studies for solving the problem offutures alienation. According to Wright [158], the word emancipatory means ‘‘the elimination of oppression and the creationof the conditions for human flourishing.’’ In this context, emancipatory futures studies concerns alternative futures for socialand political justice with an egalitarian access. It is interested in exploring the visions and interests of the poor, themarginalized, and the common good from a long-term perspective.

The final goals of indigenous Korean futures studies are neither ethnocentric futures studies, nationalization of futuresstudies, nor methodological regionalism of futures studies. However, indigenous futures studies can contribute tostrengthen the relevance of futures studies in Korea, free from the dominance of Western concepts and culture-based futuresstudies and Western-oriented homogeneous visions. It can provide a more meaningful future vision and life to Koreans aswell as produce a more reliable and valid policy process for reflecting the greater desires and interests of the Korean society.Indigenous futures studies can be used as a starting point for Korean-style futures studies but not be considered an end point.Once indigenous Korean futures studies are developed, the Korean future community can transform it into universal futuresstudies that reflect universal human futures and that endorse the universality of futures studies. Existing futures studies is tosome degree not universal but ethnocentric because it involves ideas and interests of a particular society, culture, and class.

4. Conclusion

This paper by examining the Western concepts of alternative futures, presents reasons for the necessity of alternativefutures discourses in Korea and proposes a number of countermeasures to improve Korea’s futures practice. Since Kahnintroduced alternative futures, the concept of alternative futures has varied over time. Kahn and Bell‘s concept (a formalapproach) is based on hypothetical futures and rejects prediction and a single future vision. The Club of Rome‘s futures (anintegrated approach) are alternatives to official futures thinking and generate a fundamental shift in the way futures areconsidered. Both the conserver society (a content-based approach) and Lovins’ (an integrated approach) concept center onalternatives to a consumer-capitalist society and focus on environmental issues. Robertson, Dator, and Bezold‘s concepts (anintegrated approach) are archetypal alternative futures and represent the nature of the futures. Moreover, scenario planning(an integrated approach) is an important tool to test the viability of strategic alternatives, whereas wildcards (a content-based approach) are alternatives to highly probable futures. These representative definitions of alternative futures revealthat an integrated approach has been predominantly used in futures literature. This conclusion is supported by the clearemphasis of the integrated approach on a diversity of futures views and the significance of meaningful futures.

The current concept of alternative futures is based on a formal approach that provides a medium for some of the ways thatfuturists position themselves in the different kinds of types of futures. Taking a formal approach, futurists pay little attentionto substantive content. If content is given its appropriate value in the definition of alternative futures, it would be moreconceptually productive and alive with futures meaning. The conceptual underpinnings of the content-based approach putforward the normative and ideological aspects that reflect the underlying economic, social, and political thinking. This paperthus proposes an integrated approach in order to overcome the problems of both a formal approach and a content-basedapproach. By combining the form and content dimensions, the concept of alternative futures does not only envision all formsof possible futures, but also provides a theoretical expression and a plural interpretation of possible futures for guiding thepublic and policy makers toward a different path in systematic ways. Furthermore, an integrated approach is grounded inhistorical legacies, key stable trends, and future uncertainty that continuously interact with human actions, powerdynamics, and cultural representation. Alternative futures are not only futures phenomena (including events, values,cultural norms, and social structures), but are also idealizations of multiple dimensions of futures. They are a practice thatincludes normative values and their transformation into better futures over the long-term. Most importantly, they call forviable utopias and radical responses in order to question the dominant trends, approaches, and discourses such as linear orgrowth trends as well as a consumption society.

Table 1 outlines a comparative analysis of the necessity of alternative futures discourses. It reflects the differences in fivecurrent tendencies in terms of the negative effects, alternative tendencies, and alternative strategies. The Korean society andits future practices have been dominated by five tendencies: (a) a dominant modernization paradigm, (b) a prevailingunipolar worldview, (c) an uncertainty avoidant culture, (d) poor methodological practice, and (e) Westernization of theKorean futures studies. The five current tendencies are deemed problematic resulting in several negative effects. Thesecurrent tendencies and negative effects cause Koreans to be caught up in western views of future images and realities.Moreover, they undermine the continuation of creative futures and prohibit a Korean way of seeing the future. Thus, Korea’sthoughts and practices pertaining to the futures encounter a lack of alternative futures discourses and create a type ofidentity crisis. In order to respond to the lack of alternative futures discourses and the resulting identity crisis, and to obtainrigorous and persuasive products of futures practice, Korea’s futures community needs to concentrate on the five alternativetendencies: (a) inventing Korean models in a viable utopia, (b) adopting a liberal cosmopolitan worldview, (c) building auncertainty tolerant culture, (d) overcoming methodological challenges, and (e) moving toward indigenous futures studies.These five alternative tendencies can lead to a guiding framework for how to apply alternative futures to Korean situations

Table 1

Comparative analysis of the necessity of alternative futures discourses.

Reasons Countermeasures

Current tendencies Negative effects Alternative tendencies Alternative strategies

1 Dominant modernization paradigm ‘‘An end of alternatives’’; obsolete

concepts of utopian values; realistic

visions

Inventing Korean models in a

viable utopia

Strong engagement with

utopian thought, radical visions

and surprise futures (anti-

development, degrowth,

aversion to technology,

technological utopianism,

ecological international

communities, future human

space exploration, nonviolent

futures, future spiritual life, an

inclusive society, etc.)

2 Prevailing unipolar worldview Big brother-and-little brother

mentality and cold war mentality (‘‘two

valued orientation’’ and no ‘‘policy

innovation’’)

Adopting a liberal

cosmopolitan worldview

New multipolar perspectives;

the dynamics of East Asian

regionalism and the

interregional exchange; third

way unification

3 Uncertainty avoidant culture Strong attachment to social conformity

and a lack of communication

(routinization of fortune-telling

practice; Yeolpung phenomenon; a

disadvantage in creating a trust society;

promotion of totalitarian ideology)

Building an uncertainty

tolerant culture

The articulation of how to build

high-trust future society

4 Poor methodological practice Lack of confidence in future works (lack

of spectrum of future possibility, the

ignorance of importance of human

actions, values, and power dynamics)

Overcoming methodological

challenges

Increase of alternative future

approaches; awareness of

importance of human actions,

values, and power dynamics;

more complex scenarios

5 Westernization of

the Korean futures studies

Captive mind (homogeneous vision, no

theoretical and methodological

innovation, ignorance of Korean

literature tradition and historical

approaches, dislocated subject

selection, and futures alienation)

Moving toward indigenous

futures studies

Critical approach to the

Western-centric futures

studies; search of philosophical

foundations; creation of

cultural alternatives;

development of emancipatory

futures studies

H. Son / Futures 55 (2014) 1–14 11

and make possible the practical implementation of an integrated approach. Several alternative strategies can aid Korea’sfutures work to impose alternative tendencies and reject some of the causes of current tendencies and their negative effects.In fact, the main purposes of Korean indigenous futures studies does not explicitly focus on ethnocentric futures studies butprovides the grounds for relevant and enriched futures studies as well as the development of universal futures studies.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my deepest thanks to Barbara Diller-Young, Sujung Kim, and Dongha Son for their comments andsupport of this paper.

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