Analysis of IEEE 802.11e and Analysis of IEEE 802.11e and Application of Game Models for Application of Game Models for Support of Quality-of-Service Support of Quality-of-Service in Coexisting Wireless Networks in Coexisting Wireless Networks Stefan Mangold ComNets Aachen University 30-June-2003
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Analysis of IEEE 802.11e and Application of Game Models for Support of Quality-of-Service in Coexisting Wireless Networks Stefan Mangold ComNets Aachen.
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Analysis of IEEE 802.11e and Analysis of IEEE 802.11e and
Application of Game Models for Application of Game Models for
Support of Quality-of-Service in Support of Quality-of-Service in
2/10/4 backoff entities per ACBackoff entities with variable priority are more dominant, as expected
WARP2 simulation results deviate for different persistent factors
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 23
EDCF SummaryEDCF SummaryEDCF SummaryEDCF Summary
EDCF MAC protocol is distributed (as DCF, simple)Multiple queues per station (queue = backoff entity)The presented model can be used for prediction of expected share of capacity per backoff entityThe model can be extended towards delay and loss predictionEDCF supports QoS, but cannot guarantee as resulting share depends on activity of other backoff entities
QoS Support in legacy 802.11? no!
QoS Support in 802.11e EDCF? yes, but no guarantee!
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 24
HCF Controlled Medium AccessHCF Controlled Medium AccessHCF Controlled Medium AccessHCF Controlled Medium Access
EDCF cannot guarantee QoS, because of distributed MAC
For guarantee, controlled medium access allows access right after PIFS, without backoff
Similar to polling in legacy 802.11 (PCF)
CTS
RTSAIFS[AC] DATA (MSDU)
ACK
EDCF-TXOP gained by contention-basedchannel access during contention period
duration < EDCF-TXOPlimit
QoS CF-Poll
optimal CAP allocationtime for HC 1
delayed start of TXOP
CAPallocation
PIFS
delayed CAP allocationtime for HC 1
time
tolerated by HC 1
under control of HC 1
busychannel
CTS
RTSAIFS[AC] DATA (MSDU)
ACK
EDCF-TXOP gained by contention-basedchannel access during contention period
duration < EDCF-TXOPlimit
QoS CF-Poll
optimal CAP allocationtime for HC 1
delayed start of TXOP
CAPallocation
PIFS
delayed CAP allocationtime for HC 1
time
tolerated by HC 1
under control of HC 1
busychannel
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 25
HCF in Overlapping BSSHCF in Overlapping BSSHCF in Overlapping BSSHCF in Overlapping BSS
Controlled medium access requires an isolated BSS
No other backoff entity must access the medium with highest priority (after PIFS), otherwise collisions occur!
This is a very strict requirement, and difficult to achieve in an unlicensed frequency band
Dynamic frequency selection may help, as in HiperLAN/2
The controlled medium access is often referred to as HCF
This coordination function is not distributed, it is centralized (requires a Hybrid Coordinator)
It works only in isolated scenarios, which is not a very likely scenario in unlicensed bands
The coexistence problem of overlapping BSSs will be discussed in the following
QoS Support in legacy 802.11? no!
QoS Support in 802.11e EDCF? yes, but no guarantee!
QoS Support with 802.11e HCF? not in unlicensed bands!
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 27
Scenario: two BSSs Sharing one ChannelScenario: two BSSs Sharing one ChannelScenario: two BSSs Sharing one ChannelScenario: two BSSs Sharing one Channel
CCHC(player 2)
CCHC(player 1)
vectors indicate"has control over"
CCHC'sdetection ranges
802.11station
802.11station
HiperLAN/2station
HiperLAN/2station
CCHC(player 2)
CCHC(player 1)
vectors indicate"has control over"
CCHC'sdetection ranges
802.11station
802.11station
HiperLAN/2station
HiperLAN/2station
Basic service sets are modeled as players that attempt to optimize their outcomesSingle stage game: one superframe (~200ms)Multi stage game: repeated interaction
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 28
The Superframe as Single Stage GameThe Superframe as Single Stage GameThe Superframe as Single Stage GameThe Superframe as Single Stage Game
[0...1]
QoS [0...1]
[0...1]
Allocation process during a superframe:
QoS:
SFDUR(n)[ms]
the periodic beacon is successfullytransmitted by one of the CCHCs
TBTT TBTT
time
1...L1 TXOPs allocatedby CCHC1 (here, L1=3)
d11(n) [ms] d3
1(n) [ms]d21(n) [ms]
DL1(n) = D3
1(n) [ms]D11(n) [ms] D2
1(n) [ms]
t11(n) t3
1(n)t21(n)
nth CCHC superframe = thenth single-stage game
allocatedby CCHC1
allocated byCCHC2
SFDUR(n)[ms]
the periodic beacon is successfullytransmitted by one of the CCHCs
TBTT TBTT
time
1...L1 TXOPs allocatedby CCHC1 (here, L1=3)
d11(n) [ms] d3
1(n) [ms]d21(n) [ms]
DL1(n) = D3
1(n) [ms]D11(n) [ms] D2
1(n) [ms]
t11(n) t3
1(n)t21(n)
nth CCHC superframe = thenth single-stage game
allocatedby CCHC1
allocated byCCHC2
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 29
Abstract Representation of QoSAbstract Representation of QoSAbstract Representation of QoSAbstract Representation of QoS
Throughput: normalized share of capacity
Delay: normalized resource allocation interval
Jitter: normalized delay variation
,
iL (n)i i
ll 1
1(n) d (n)
SFDUR(n)
i
i imax l l 1...L (n) 1
1(n) max D (n)
SFDUR(n)
i
i i imax l l 1
l 1...L (n) 1
1(n) max D (n) D (n)
SFDUR(n)
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 30
Player "i" and opponent player "–i" have individual requirementsPlayers select demands to meet requirementsThrough allocation process, players observe outcomes per single stage game: observed QoS
This single stage game is repeated with every superframePlayers adapt behaviors in the multi stage game
The PlayerThe PlayerThe PlayerThe Player
action ai of player i:select demand based
on requirement,observation, and
estimated demand ofplayer -i
z -1allocation process
requirement
time
ireq
ireq
iobs
iobs
n
n
idem
idem
n
n
demand of player -i
time
idem
idem
n
n
demand
time time
observation(outcome)
action ai of player i:select demand based
on requirement,observation, and
estimated demand ofplayer -i
z -1allocation process
requirement
time
ireq
ireq
iobs
iobs
n
n
idem
idem
n
n
demand of player -i
time
idem
idem
n
n
demand
time time
observation(outcome)
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 31
Allocation Process (Formal Description)Allocation Process (Formal Description)Allocation Process (Formal Description)Allocation Process (Formal Description)
Required:
If this process can be formally described through an accurate approximation, we can analyze
Expected outcomes (existence of Nash equilibrium (NE))
Stability (convergence to NE)
Fairness (position of NE in bargaining domain)
It can be discussed…… what QoS support is feasible for the individual players (player = CCHC = BSS)
… what level of QoS can be achieved
… if mutual cooperation improves the outcome per player
both players demandrequirements throughoutall stages (BEH-P)
0.2 1 1.8 2.6 3.4 4.2 5 5.8 6.6 7.4
0
0.2
0.4
1
time (s), SFDUR = 200ms
Util
itie
s U
1,2
pl 1pl 2
in total, player 1 observes a higher payoff than player 2 whenboth demand their requirements
0.2 1 1.8 2.6 3.4 4.2 5 5.8 6.6 7.4
best
coop
persist
defect
time (s), SFDUR = 200ms
pl 1pl 2
after 2s, both players changetheir behavior from BEH-P toBEH-B independently, then attempting to improve their individual payoffs
0.2 1 1.8 2.6 3.4 4.2 5 5.8 6.6 7.4
0
0.2
0.4
1
time (s), SFDUR = 200ms
Util
itie
s U
1,2
pl 1pl 2
in total, player 2 gains and player 1suffers from playing the best responses
neither player is able to improve its outcomeby unilaterally changing its behavior from whatis demanded after the process converged into NE
0.2 1 1.8 2.6 3.4 4.2 5 5.8 6.6 7.4
best
coop
persist
defect
time (s), SFDUR = 200ms
pl 1pl 2
both players cooperate after 2s
0.2 1 1.8 2.6 3.4 4.2 5 5.8 6.6 7.4
0
0.2
0.4
1
time (s), SFDUR = 200ms
Util
itie
s U
1,2
pl 1pl 2
in total, payoffs are higher in cooperationthan in NE, therefor the NE is not Paretoefficient in this example
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 40
Cooperation can be beneficial for both players, and is established in repeated interactions (multi stage game)Cooperation and punishment:
Payoff discounting in multi stage game:
How to establish CooperationHow to establish CooperationHow to establish CooperationHow to establish Cooperation
n=n0
for a number of stages,depending on discouning factorCOOPERATE:
BEH-CPUNISH(1):
BEH-DPUNISH(n’):
BEH-D
opponentdefects
any behaviorof opponent
any behaviorof opponent
otherwise
n=n0
for a number of stages,depending on discouning factorCOOPERATE:
BEH-CPUNISH(1):
BEH-DPUNISH(n’):
BEH-D
opponentdefects
any behaviorof opponent
any behaviorof opponent
otherwise
i n iMSG
n 0V V (n)
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 41
Condition for CooperationCondition for CooperationCondition for CooperationCondition for Cooperation
It is more efficient to cooperate instead of defect (instead of playing best response), if…
It depends on the discounting factor (importance/shadow of future) if mutual support is achievable:
The more important the future is, the more likely is the establishment of cooperationFor example, CCHCs will interact for many superframes
n n' 1k k ki i i i i i i
CC DC CD CCk n k n 1 k n n' 1
V V V V
i ii CC DC
i iCD DC
V V
V V
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 42
Dependence on Discounting FactorDependence on Discounting FactorDependence on Discounting FactorDependence on Discounting Factor
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
i
VCOOPi ( i=1)
i = 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
i
VCOOPi ( i=1)
i = 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
i
VCOOPi ( i=0.8)
i = 0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
i
VCOOPi ( i=0.8)
i = 0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
i
VCOOPi ( i=0.75)
i = 0.75
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
i
VCOOPi ( i=0.75)
i = 0.75
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
iV
COOPi ( i=0.6)
i = 0.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.5
1
1.5
stages of punishment through player -i
VM
SG
i o
f pla
yer
iV
COOPi ( i=0.6)
i = 0.6
Future counts
Future is less important
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 43
Wrap UpWrap UpWrap UpWrap Up
There is always a Nash equilibrium in the single stage game
If the outcome of the Nash equilibrium is not satisfying, a player may attempt to punish the opponent, for establishment of mutual support
Depending on the behaviors of the CCHCs (the interacting players), and their requirements, cooperation can be achieved
QoS can be supported if cooperation is established
QoS Support in legacy 802.11? no!
QoS Support in 802.11e EDCF? yes, but no guarantee!
QoS Support with 802.11e HCF? not in unlicensed bands!
QoS Support with shared radio resources? with mutual support: yes!
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 44
ConclusionsConclusionsConclusionsConclusions
IEEE 802.11e EDCF will provide basic means for QoS support
The controlled medium access of HCF (polling) cannot support QoS in unlicensed frequency bands
New analytical model for EDCF is developedallows to predict and control QoS
New approach for coexisting radio networksmay help radio networks operating in unlicensed bands to support QoS
Results will be used in …Contributions to IEEE 802.11e
IEEE 802.19 coexistence discussions
Spectrum etiquette development at Wi-Fi alliance
Development of Spectrum Agile Radios (DARPA)
Backup SlidesBackup Slides
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 46
ArchitectureArchitectureArchitectureArchitecture
WirelessStation Wireless
Station
WirelessStationIBSS
Wired Station(Access Point, AP)
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
BSS
Wired Station(Access Point, AP)
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
BSS
802.x LANvia Portal
DS
WirelessStation Wireless
Station
WirelessStationIBSS
Wired Station(Access Point, AP)
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
BSS
Wired Station(Access Point, AP)
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
WirelessStation
BSS
802.x LANvia Portal
DS
Infrastructure Basic Service Set (BSS)one station is the access point
Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS)ad-hoc
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 47
Medium Access - ExampleMedium Access - ExampleMedium Access - ExampleMedium Access - Example
Station 1 initiates frame exchange firstOther stations set the Network Allocation Vector (NAV)Distributed approach difficult for station to support QoS
CTS
RTS
time
randombackoff(7 slots)
randomback-off(9 slots)
station 3defers, but
keeps backoffcounter (=2)
ACK
DATA
new randombackoff
(10 slots)
stationdefersDATA
ACK
ACK
DATA
remainingbackoff(2 slots)
SIFS
SIFS
SIFS
SIFS
SIFS
DIFS
DIFS
DIFS
DIFS
NAVs
station 1
station 2
NAVreset
stations set NAV uponreceiving RTS
station 6 sets NAV upon receiving CTS,this station is hidden to station 1
NAVupdates
station 5
station 4
station 3
station 6
NAV (timer)
transmission
CTS
RTS
time
randombackoff(7 slots)
randomback-off(9 slots)
station 3defers, but
keeps backoffcounter (=2)
ACK
DATA
new randombackoff
(10 slots)
stationdefersDATA
ACK
ACK
DATA
remainingbackoff(2 slots)
SIFS
SIFS
SIFS
SIFS
SIFS
DIFS
DIFS
DIFS
DIFS
NAVs
station 1
station 2
NAVreset
stations set NAV uponreceiving RTS
station 6 sets NAV upon receiving CTS,this station is hidden to station 1
NAVupdates
station 5
station 4
station 3
station 6
NAV (timer)
transmission
Stefan Mangold - ComNets Aachen University 48
Multiple Backoff Entities per StationMultiple Backoff Entities per StationMultiple Backoff Entities per StationMultiple Backoff Entities per Station
transmission
one priority
backoff:DIFS
151023
legac y 802.11 stationwith one backoff entity:
PF[AC] notpart of
802.11e
upon parallel access at the same slot, the higher priority ACbackoff entity transmits, the other backoff entity/entities act