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We are the grass, we suffer :

Reflections on war and poverty in Mozambique

Ana Bénard da Costa

Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA) - ISCTE

[email protected]

Abstract

Summarizing Mozambique’s political and economic development since the

end of colonialism to present times cross-relating it with descriptions made

by Mozambicans who have lived these different periods, this paper examines

the relationship between war and poverty in Mozambique and how social

actors perceive this relationship. The author does not believe in direct

causalities between war and poverty and stresses the need of multiple

approaches, which may account for the complexity of this phenomena and

the multiplicity of factors that explain them in the different contexts in which

they occur. Finally, this article examines the post-war period and someaspects of the different policies pursued that result in a felling of insecurity,

violence and high levels of poverty that persist in Mozambique nowadays.

Introduction

This paper is part of the investigation research “Poverty and Peace in

the Portuguese-speaking African countries1” a project that focuses on

the relation between poverty and war/peace in these countries and the way

social actors understand them.

1 Funded by Foundation for Science and Technology and coordinated by Cristina Rodrigues(CEA-ISCTE).



POVERTY, WAR AND PEACE 2

In order to understand the social actors perceptions regarding poverty and

war issues, an historical approach is particularly relevant. Social perceptions

are shaped by past experiences inscribed in recent and remote memories.

Getting to know this past through social actors words is essential to

understand poverty nowadays, by contextualizing them historically, and

simultaneously to understand how these memories are recreated and

updated in specific contexts and processes in the present, shaping social

actors strategies and practices and consequentially their perceptions, This

paper focuses on poverty, war and peace in Mozambique from the final phase

of colonial times till today.

Studies on poverty and war in Mozambique

The first study on poverty in Mozambique dates from 1989, it was

estimated then that 60 per cent of the population lived in “absolute poverty”

(Oppenheimer e Raposo, 2002: 45). Before this, poverty can only be

measured indirectly, either through Mozambicans memories, traveller’swords, or through economical or demographic data.

Although there aren’t any specify studies on poverty before 1989, in works

on Mozambique History (cf. Isaacman, 1979, 1983; Pélissier, 1984; Vail e

White, 1980; Newitt, 1995, and others) different wars are mentioned in more

or less detail: the colonial war, wars as a result of world wars, peace

campaigns and wars that occurred during pre-colonial times. They also

mention serious economic crises arising from drought, which increased

mortality, diseases, lack of water and food forcing the population to move to

less affected regions. All those would increase conflicts and wars. Newitt

(1995:253) writes that Frei João dos Santos (1609) reports their occurrence in

Mozambique in 1580.




More recently, there are studies on the impact the colonial war had on

Mozambique‘s economic development. As an example, João Mosca’s

description (2005, p.128) of the situation after 1960:

Major Public investments were made in the military and police forces:

for the purpose of changing from a restricted economy to a expansive one,

affecting inflation and allowing short-term economic growth (…) In a war

context, this growth and an emergence of varied interests caused protest

movements and economic crises

Jochen Oppenheimer (1992-1994,p.171) based on Baltazar Jr.’s chronology

(1993), points out that the end of the colonial period (1973) is characterizedby less production, investment and capital flee. The crisis lasts till 1977,

when some recovery occurs lasting till 1981, but the GDP declining tendency

will only revert after the introduction of the PRE (Economical Adjustment

Program) in 1987.

From colonial times till the end of the eighties, Mozambique lived through

frequent economic crises alternating with short periods of production growth.

How they affected the population’s life conditions varies and this diversity is

quite obvious in the last years of colonialism, which was a result of the

colonial government political options during the war. Anne Pitcher (2002,

p.30-33) mentions that towards the end of the sixties, monetary income

accounted for 44 per cent of rural families income, and the remaining came

from subsistence agriculture. The author analyses the social economic

development disparities during this period and argues that they created an

atmosphere of conflict and mistrust between regions and social groups with

different development rate 2.

The analysis of the last period of colonialism sheds light on post-

independence events economically and militarily due to continuity and

discontinuity. If there is discontinuity economically (the crises that starts in

1977 can be explained by policies that disrupt the economic situation that

2Sobre este assunto ver Abrahamson, H. e A. Nilsson, A. (1995, p. 25)




existed during colonialism) there is some continuity in military aspects

between colonial conflict and the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo.

Borges Coelho (2003, p.177, p.180) argues that during colonialism a violence

potential surges due to society militarization of universal recruitment to

regular army, forcing population to gather in villages and the creation of

militia groups.

Those militias (mostly youngsters) had developed a culture of violence at

the time of independence, the ideal period to expand and express

themselves. Besides they were regarded as the enemy’s collaborators by the

new powers, joined by the thousands of ex-soldiers of the colonial army that

not only were not integrated in Forças Populares de Libertação de

Moçambique (FPLM) but were persecuted, punished and “purified” in re-

education camps (Coelho, 2003:1889)3.

To this potential of violence is added external aggression (that to a certain

point is internal: part of the forces that Rhodesia supported were

Mozambicans that were expelled and persecuted by the socialist State),

economic crises and discontent that rural development policies created.

But haven’t the seeds of the economic crisis been planted in the ColonialState? Yes, if we think about illiteracy levels, lack of Mozambican

professionals and the violence of colonial exploitation that imposed by

“itself” that the new independent state tried alternative development

policies. Weren’t there other options between the extremes of colonial

policies and a centralized economy of nationalizations? An interviewee told

us about an insurance experiment carried out after the independence, that

according to him, was a success:

Then I went to work in insurance. All insurances companies were

nationalized, all managed by EMOZE (...) we drew up contracts that

3Around 30,000 Mozambicans served in the colonial army. In 1975 it was decided that the10,000 men who fought for liberation “to insure political fidelity” would compose theMozambican army. In 1978, compulsory military service was instituted and by 1980 the armywas 70,000 men strong.(Coelho and Macaringue, 2002, p. 49 and footnote 6).




prevented the departure of the Portuguese. We gave them a good salary

and guaranteed them employment in Portugal after five years service in

Mozambique and five thousand dollars. It was a bit pragmatic (...) It worked

out well and for a long period of time. (...) They did not do this in banking

and have suffered from it (S.J. 6/9/2008).4

After 1977, economy starts to recover. Abrahamson and Nilsson (1995,

p.48) explain that "the euphoria of independence" mobilized people for

"campaigns" and volunteer work. Simultaneously, there are real investments

in social sectors like the expansion of the school system, reduction of

illiteracy (93% to 70% in five years), increase in health centres in rural areas(from one to 26 thousand inhabitants to one for 10 thousand inhabitants).

But a few years later, in the beginning of the 80s, the signs of economic

retreat are clear, rising until 1987 (introduction of the PRE) (Oppenheimer,

1992-1994, p. 200).

The Mozambican government perceives this economic crisis as a result of

the war, together with the destruction of infrastructures, communications,

population displacement but they also indicate natural disasters5 as a major

cause. Bretton Woods institutions believe that socialist economic policies are

responsible.

This belief, or a combination of both, do not explain the complexity of

factors of the levels of poverty in Mozambique since it begins to "exist" as

something that can be measured (but existed long before that) and

conditions the rank this country has occupied in terms of development in the

world.

If the war itself does not explain poverty (although it adds to it), poverty

alone does not explain the war. Different domestic and foreign policies (now

and in the past) are more likely explanations of Mozambique’s civil war and

4 Informant’s anonymity is preserved.

5 The Mozambican government supported this thesis until at least the mid-80s (seeOppenheimer, 1992-1994: 202).




poverty, contributing year after year to low levels of economic and social

development. These different policies are also directly responsible for the

violence in the last war, violence that still exists in peacetime threatening

Mozambican’s safety. As it is impossible to analyze in detail all these factors,

the following pages will explain the most significant ones.

The war: interpretations and perceptions.

When we speak of the last war in Mozambican territory, there is a

controversy regarding its name. Only after Samora Machel’s death, it was

publicly acknowledged in Mozambique that this war was more than just a

group of "armed bandits" and terrorists paid by foreign interests. The effects

of this propaganda in the way Mozambicans named this war are evident, as I

was able to witness during fieldwork. Thus, soon after the Peace Accords,

(Costa, 1995) the word used were "attacks", "bandits", troops (Frelimo’s

army), and later on, after peace consolidation in 1999 and 2001, this war was

named "the conflict" or "this war of bandits" or "the last war." The expression

"civil war" was mentioned in this last fieldwork by one informant who said "...during the last war, known as the 16 years’ war, civil war, it is called the war

of destabilization, but this is the political side of the thing, but the civil

war ..." (SJ 6/9/2008 August 2008).

Another informant gave us his personal opinion on the causes of war:

"This renegade (André Matsangaíssa) had no academic background (...)

and all the Political Bureau members had great brains. Why haven’t they

asked him «what do you want, do you want a home? Do you want a car?»

He stayed there (in Rhodesia) and the government makes more mistakes,

because they believe cities to be too crowded they create the

rehabilitation camps, they put people there which causes discontent and

increases Renamo’s ranks. The people were then fleeing to neighbouring




countries, and most of them joined Renamo (...). When Chissano is

appointed he says: «now we will create a “talks” commission and the so-

called armed bandits will choose where we will hold talks» (...). Chissano

took over as president in 1986 - many people have died since that speech

until peace arrived, the war did not stop (...). The suffering of the people

was caused by the war, by the government, and is it not Frelimo the

government? "(ST 27/8/2008).

This excerpt contains no reference to Rhodesia and South Africa. This

informant put all the blame on the politicians and the government.

Although there is no doubt that first Rhodesia and later South Africa

were the major supporters of this war, it is also clear that Renamo had

domestic support. This support came largely from the rural populations who

felt marginalized by the state and by Frelimo´s political and economic

projects (Geffray 1991).

In addition to political changes in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South

Africa that in part explain the differences in war tactics over the years, the

Mozambican people have had quite different reactions throughout the

conflict between Frelimo and Renamo (see Costa, 1995). These differences

can also be explained by the strategies developed by the Mozambican

people, that have allowed them to choose between fleeing or staying, making

this a conflict of their own (Lubkemann 2005: 500-501)

The following are parts of the interviews where these different situations

were reported:

"My aunt’s children were killed in this civil war, and some other members of our family were also killed (...), some sought refuge in Zimbabwe, but my

closest family members stayed (...) They never wanted to leave (...) I was on

my way there with my wife and children when we were attacked, thank God,

we were not harmed, some were killed, others injured, but not us. But I




continued my journey, if one has to be killed, so be it, I had to get to my

parents, I never spend two or three years without going home6. "(BC 8/9/2008).

"I did research on cotton in 1991 (...) They took me to a place, and only

when I left I learned that this was an area controlled by Renamo. (...) I

discovered that farmers and multinationals had found a way to produce cotton

in war zones, to be marketed in the government zones. These were informal

local networks where the Renamo’s guerrillas themselves allowed the cotton

manufacture in areas where they operated, to the benefit of all those involved.

"(SJ 6/9/2008).

The above sentences reflect different strategies of "conflict ownership"

where personal and/or collective interests articulate themselves (or attempt

to) with the confrontation forces on the ground. With the cotton farms, it

reaches the paradox of two confrontation forces "agreeing" with each other,

with the company and with the farmers, a local peace that contradicts the

state of war in the country.

This local conflict ownership contradicts the analysis that attempted to

explain the extreme violence of some of Renamo’s attacks only as a result of

"war tactics" conceived by top hierarchy strategists (see Gersony, 1988;

Hanlon, 1984; Wilson, 1992;Geffray, 1989; Vines, 1991; Finnegan, 1992 ).

This was eventually true in some cases but in others, as Lubkemann points

out (2005: 504)“‘Violence’ was an experience problematized and

fundamentally shaped by the social formations and micropolitical matrixes in

which it took place”.

Lubkemann (2005, p.505) explains that this local violence ownershipoccurs because the social actors are not easily mobilized for projects whose

main objectives are the replacement of a central power by another, adhering

6 Obviously, the reasons given by this informant may not be true. The family may havechosen to stay in the region under Renamo’s control. But is not the truth of the speech thatis being analyzed, but the fact that in the same region people strategies facing attacks arediverse.




easily to projects involving a decrease of central powers influence over

community internal affairs.

The way the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo evolved, not yet

fully clarified, are a result of the strategies required for different political,

economic and social environments, changes in foreign interests involvement

(cold war) and changes in economic interests at leadership level on both

sides. But changes are also a result of the strategies that social groups

developed facing the soldier’s presence and the possibility of violent means

appropriation to resolve local disputes and conflicts or to implement

strategies to obtain power and/or autonomy. Finally, those strategies are also

a response to diverse economic situations, this diversity being in part, a

result of the opportunities created necessarily by the war.

On this subject, Cramer (2006ª:400-402) criticizes the idea that the

Mozambican rural population was reduced to a homogenous group during the

war, living of subsistence agriculture. The author claims that those that could

produce agricultural surpluses or earning money could survive and even

expand their business by attracting extremely cheap labour force, because

those not in the same situation would work for any salary as long as they gotsome purchasing power. The author believes that this situation led to the

creation of economic networks that continued in the post-war period (see

Cramer, 2006b).

During that period, most of the population lived in unbearable conditions.

However, at the time the conjugation of war effects and socialist economic

policies made it many cases impossible to distinguish the causes of the

population life conditions. So, when informants were asked about the effects

of war on their lives, their replies either related to this, or to the economic

conditions created by socialist policies. The war period is known as "the time

of suffering," "of great sacrifices" and "the time of hunger."

On Saturdays my daughters went queuing to Maputo to see if they

could find something, sometimes they didn’t bring anything back. The




supplies only allowed one kilo of rice and a pound of sugar per month. My

husband used to go to the border and bring something but there were

days when there was nothing, no sugar or tea. Then we got a farm, but it

was a time of great sacrifices (RZ 3/9/2008).

My childhood was a good time for me, in my house we lacked for

nothing, we had everything: we had cattle, we had milk. My father

worked in South Africa and my mother worked in the fields. (...)Frelimo's

entry was not a “party”, it was very bad, they ruined a lot of things, it was

bad and they took advantage when they saw the population destroying…

(...). At that time we had a lot of cattle, around sixty; they belonged to my

father, my brother and to me. What ruined it was that war, that civil war

that lasted 16 years. They came and they took everything, in one day we

were left with nothing (JL 26/8/2008).

Peace, (in)security and poverty

When the informants were questioned about the current situation in

terms of safety (violence) and living conditions in comparison with thesituation during the war, the less educated (most had primary education)

answered according to their life experience, their memories and their

future expectations. In this group, responses are for the most part

positive: for them "life is better" although they accept that there is a lot of

poverty and violence. Informants with higher education degrees answered

according to their perception of the "others", the “poor." Their answers

were rarely based on their personal experiences. In the latter group, the

majority said conditions were now worse for most of the population. Some

interview’s excerpts where this is mentioned are transcribed below:

There are changes, I arrived here (Mafalala) in 1976, there were

houses made of reed, now there are no more reed houses, it is all

concrete. Although they cry for lack of money, there is. (...) Me and my




son, we are not equal, I suffered a lot, the eldest is in 10th grade, wears

shoes, has a mobile. When I was that age, there were no such things (...) I

wanted to, but I could not attend 10th grade. My father worked hard in

the mines but never managed to have what I have today. I have a stereo,

he had small radio, he worked for nothing. I don’t. (H.T. 10/9/2008).

In Samora’s time things were bad, there was nothing, only cabbage, we

had to queue. Now it’s not normal, it’s good (...) At that time there were

robberies, but not that pulling of other people’s things. In Maputo they

are all marginal because they don’t want to work, they don’t want to do

anything. These children of banditry, they are many (FD 9/9/2008).

I think people's lives are not improving at all (...) the crime rate

increased. I think today’s situation has nothing to do with the war (...). I

know people who got rich with the war and in peace time their lives

changed completely. (B.N. 28/8/2008).

They are saying that poverty decreased, it didn’t, it increased in the

last three, four, five years. Now there is access to wealth, but there is a

large polarization that is dangerous and that will be the next generation

of conflicts. (...) and there is a scheme already set up because of

insecurity. It was a good thing that demobilized soldiers were integrated

into security companies; they absorbed the ones who knew about

weapons (...) (SJ6/9/2008).

The two issues verbalized in the excerpts above - (in)security and

poverty/wealth - relate to each other, to a recent past of war and policies

that were implemented from independence until now. It is particularly

important in understanding the issues related to security, the policies that

focus directly on national forces whose function is to maintain order and

peace: the army and the police.

It was established in the Peace Accords, that the new national army

would integrate Renamo and Frelimo elements and that the remaining




soldiers would be demobilized. The official number of demobilized soldiers

was 78,078 of a total of 92,881 soldiers officially recognized as being part

of the two armies7 (Coelho, 2002, p.147) and, according to a study carried

out in Maputo (the city, its outskirts and two districts of the province with

the same name) (Coelho 2002), the majority found employment as

security guards. Thus, these guards, usually armed, continue to be

involved in activities similar to those that they performed as soldiers,

contradicting one of the “resettlement principles, which was to keep ex-

combatants spread out and away from the arms" (Coelho, 2002, p.195).

If there is not, as Borges Coelho argues (2002, p.222), a direct relationship

between ex-combatants and violence, there is obviously a direct relationship

between insecurity and security companies emergence and between

insecurity and the effectiveness of security and law and order forces: the

army and the courts.

In 2003 the army had a relatively small number of professional soldiers

(15,000). This is explained by the fact that the army was not a Government

priority, and when forced to integrate Renamo soldiers in the Armed Forcesfor the Defence of Mozambique (FADM), chose to concentrate its efforts in

the police force that remained always under their control (and at the time,

out of Onumoz’s mandate), transferring to the Police of the Republic of

Mozambique (PRM) a large number of soldiers. This divestment of an army

that during the war for obvious reasons, had access to important resources,

and the soldier’s transfer to the police force created problems that the

security sector still faces: " Unhappy armed forces with little capacity to

protect the territory, although heavily armed, and an overstaffed police force

of untrained men "(Leão 2004, p.34).

7It has been established in the Peace Accords that the FADM’s would integrate 30,000 menprovided in equal numbers by Renamo and Frelimo, but in December 1995 FADM had only12,195 men (Coelho, 2002ª, p.61-67) and in 2004, 15,000 men (Leão, 2004).




The situation of the PRM is no different, although the government and the

donors have provided greater funding than to the Army (Leão 2004, p.39). As

pointed out by one of the informants, "the police does not usually defend, the

court does not usually react, there are no institutions" and as such, security

companies are still a profitable private business, as shown by its significant

number8 which is growing in a country where the police is still unable to put

an end to trans-national criminal networks.

The fact that security companies are a lucrative business raises some

issues regarding the possible interests underlying the maintenance of

situations conducive to violence (unemployment, poverty, court inefficiency,

corruption and the relative freedom with which some illicit trafficking is

carried out). This is aggravated by the fact that members of the Mozambican

elite are involved with such companies (Serra, 2007).

Apart from the fact that private security companies are economically

interesting for its "owners", they also play an important "social role" by

employing thousands of men. However, guards receive very low salaries9 and

many of them have other activities.

From the above description, it is obvious that there is a relationbetween the economic conditions the country lives in and the insecurity and

violence in peacetime. And when questioned on this matter, the informants

said that the level of insecurity and violence is greater in peacetime than it

was in war time: "in Samora’s time, there was no insecurity, no one stole

anything, there was respect, there were no corruption"(ST 28/8/2008). The

deep-rooted interests for a situation of insecurity cannot account for the low

levels of human development in Mozambique, other interests relating to the

funds from International Aid help to explain this situation.

8 According to Carlos Serra (2006) in the year 2005/2006, the telephone directory of thesouthern area of Mozambique listed 23 security companies, employing around 23,000 men.9 “The average monthly salary for armed security guards is approximately 800,000 Meticais(33 U.S. Dollars), which leaves them vulnerable to bribery or criminal involvement" (Leão,2004, p.45).




Poverty and development policies in peacetime

Resulting from ideological options, from the international political arena

of that time (Cold War), the colonial past, the socio-economic situation of the

majority of the Mozambican population in post-independence time and the

situation of instability that caused capital and settlers to leave the country,

and consequently, the lake of skilled labour force (Newit, 1995: 552), the

political options have conditioned and still condition the level of economic

development of Mozambique. These options were the direct causes, far more

than war and natural catastrophes, of the poverty level recorded in the first

year it was measured, and still are to this date.

It can be argued that the political and economic choices of the

successive governments of Mozambique, from the moment it became a

democratic state and adopted a liberal economy, have been conditioned by

guidelines from international development organizations and donor countries,

which have been imposing, since the mid-80s, a number of measures that

have a high social cost, besides having connived with situations that have

caused (and still cause) major imbalances in the distribution of wealth (seeHanlon, 2002; Hanlon and Smart, 2008). If this is true, it is not less true that

the Frelimo government and the Mozambican elite have been profiting from

many of these options and, the persons who are responsible for their

enforcement have not, generally speaking, challenged them.

So far, the factors identified as important for economic growth and

poverty reduction (effectively and/or rhetorically) - political and economic

liberalization, democracy, good governance, political and administrative

decentralization, fight against corruption, privatization policy, job creation

(formal sector), human resources capacity building (through support to

education and health care) - have not been yielding the desired effects.

According to Jochen Oppenheimer, a significant part of the GDP growth

comes from "mega projects like the Mozal " (2006:12) and "intensive foreign




investment in capital has limited impact on employment growth and poverty

reduction"(UNDP, 1998, cit in. Oppenheimer, 2006, p. 12).

Therefore, even after the debt relief under the HIPC initiative10 and the

commitments made for compliance of the Millennium Development Goals,

the levels of human development in Mozambique remains very low, despite

more than fifteen years of peace and political stability and a continued and

substantial Development Aid. According to the UNDP Human Development

Report 2007/2008, the country still holds one the worse positions in the

Human Development Index (now ranking 172 out of 177 counties, dropping

from previous position 168).

Regarding the current situation of Mozambique in terms of poverty and the

evolution that has occurred since it is being measured, there is a major

discussion concerning its quantification and the results achieved (see

Oppenheimer and Raposo 2002, Vieira 2005, Hanlon 2007, 2008).

Official data show a decline in poverty in recent years (69% in absolute

poverty in 1997, and 54% in 2003) but Joseph Hanlon says:

“Poverty is increasing and deepening (...). Some people are much

better off, and some rise while others fall. But for half the population,poverty is deepening, and they are not benefiting from the record

GDP growth rates” (2007:15)

This conclusion is beginning to be shared by the Mozambican Government

(AIM, 2007) but the diseases and epidemics are considered to be the causes

of this setback on the "fight against poverty". Also, other organizations (MDG,

2007) refer (again) that droughts and floods as causes for poverty.

Thus, the factors identified as poverty causes remain unrelated with the

economic policy pursued by the Mozambican Government, which has been

substantially inspired, supported and financed by international financial

organizations and bilateral donors. The “blame“ falls on the diseases and

10HIPC- Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative.




natural catastrophes. If most of these factors are a consequence of the

policies that have been adopted, they certainly do not contribute to finding

the solutions that will effectively reduce poverty and solving all the other

problems addressed in this paper that generate violence and insecurity.

Conclusions

Throughout this paper we could observe that war and poverty are distinct

phenomena, and although not establishing a direct relation of cause and

effect, they still deeply conditions Mozambican society. The complexity of

these phenomena and the multiplicity of factors that explain them, require

multiple approaches. Some of them will be understanding social actors logics,

strategies and perceptions that were involved in the war at different levels,

and are now labelled as poor, living their daily lives in insecurity, subject to

and actors of different types of violence, but many others approaches are

also needed.

It is necessary to develop contextualized analysis and research of variousbranches of social sciences and humanities that focus on different aspects of

reality that have an impact on poverty, that conditioned war and intersect

nowadays in the existing (in)security and violence.

Therefore it is important to study the recent war without ideological

prejudices, trying to understand what in fact happened, with whom, when

and where. To understand its inheritance in terms of latent conflicts,

available weapons, relationships complex networks that persist until now and

where economic and political interests intersect, linking lawful activities to

the mafia’s underworld and formal to informal business. Finally but

fundamental, it is necessary to rethink economic policies that govern

international aid. The current global financial crisis is a unique opportunity to

do so.




Poverty, war, insecurity and violence in Mozambique, or in the world, can

never be understood, much less reduced, if we isolated them, considering

them as exogenous to economic and social relations from whom they are

part at global and local levels. The importance and responsibility of

international organizations and donor countries in the way these studies have

been carried out are indisputable. And, as it has already been mentioned,

little can be done if these organizations policies are not changed. These

policies, apart from conditioning international cooperation and bilateral aid,

also influence theories and methodologies that supply information to the

studies that try to understand the effects of these same policies in economic

and social changes.

Is this possible? To what extent are these organizations victims of their

own development policies? To what extent is it not established a world

international aid cooperation system that to preserve itself, preserves

problems that is was supposed to end?

These are open questions that eventually, in a time of rapid changes

and especially after the recent global financial and economic crisis, will have

answers sooner than is now possible to imagine.

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