An Underwater Ice Station Zebra: Recovering a Secret Spy Satellite Capsule from 16,400 Feet below the Pacific Ocean / Hexagon booklet web final

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An UnderwAter Ice StAtIon ZebrA

Recovering a Secret Spy Satellite Capsulefrom 16,400 Feet Below the Pacific Ocean

USE MOBILE

DEVICE TO SCAN

Crane lifting Trieste II (DSV-1).(Credit: CIA)

Recovering a SECRET SPY SATELLITE CAPSULE

Table of ContentsNote to Reader 1

Partners 2

An Underwater Ice Station Zebra: Recovering A KH-9 Hexagon Capsule

From 16,400 Feet Below The Pacific OceanDavid Waltrop 5

Selected Declassified CIA Documents 20

Cover: Trieste II (DSV-1) under tow at night.(Credit: Naval Undersea Museum, Keyport, WA)

Opposite: Trieste II (DSV-1) stowed in White Sands dock well.(Credit: CIA)

AN UNDERWATER ICE STATION ZEBRA


Note to Reader

As a standard practice, the Historical Collections Division (HCD) collaborates with outside academic institutions, presidential libraries, think tanks, and museums to carry out its mission of releasing historically significant collections of declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) materials to the public. Leveraging the capabilities of multiple organizations more effectively utilizes scarce resources with the ultimate benefit to the American public of greater knowledge of intelligence activities at reduced costs.

In this release, describing the underwater recovery of a HEXAGON satellite film capsule, HCD has broken new ground. For the first time, we have collaborated with an independent, peer-reviewed, publication to release a group of documents. The enclosed article on this little known underwater operation (starting on page 5) originally appeared in the volume 19, number 3, 2012 issue of Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly. With Quest’s agreement, we have reprinted the article as published to make it available to the public without charge.

The declassified CIA documents are posted to the Agency’s public website athttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/

Opposite: Part of the HEXAGON film bucket photographed on the ocean bottom at 16,400 feet. (Credit: CIA) 1

Disclaimer

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this booklet are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article’s statements or interpretations.


Information Management Services, Historical Collections Division (HCD),

in partnership with the Directorate Information Review Officers, is responsible for executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program. This program seeks to identify and review for declassification collections of documents that detail the Agency’s analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics and events. HCD’s goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections. HCD also develops release events and partnerships to highlight each collection and make it available to the broadest audience possible.

HCD’s mission is to:H Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the information that has

helped shape major US foreign policy decisions.

H Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical material that gives greater understanding to the scope and context of past actions.

H Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.

H Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government.

H Demonstrate CIA’s commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

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Recovering a KH-9 HEXAGON Capsule

The Naval Undersea Museum in Keyport, Washington, collects and interprets the history, science, and operations of the underwater Navy. With over 40,000 artifacts and 8,530 library holdings, the museum is an important repository for information and items related to undersea weapons, submarine technology, diving and salvage artifacts, and submersibles. Exhibits comprising more than 17,000 square feet of gallery space examine and showcase 150 years of naval undersea history and technology. Standout artifacts include the sail from the Cold War submarine USS Sturgeon (SSN-637), submersibles Trieste II (DSV-1) and Deep Quest, and the end cap from underwater habitat Sealab II. The museum is one of twelve official Navy museums and is accredited by the American Association of Museums.

Published since 1992, Quest is the only peer-reviewed journal exclusively focused on preserving the history of spaceflight. Written by professional and amateur historians along with people who worked in the programs, each quarterly 64-page issue features articles chronicling the making of the space age, plus rare photos and interviews on human spaceflight, robotic exploration, military programs, policy, international activities, and commercial endeavors. These are the stories that fascinate and captivate; that give behind-the-scenes insight into the space program.

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Trieste II (DSV-1) in the sunlight. (Credit: Naval Undersea Museum, Keyport, WA)

Recovering a KH-9 HEXAGON Capsule

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By David W. Waltrop

The 1963 Cold War thriller, IceStation Zebra, by Scottish authorAlistair MacLean is a high intrigueespionage story of American and Sovietagents vying to recover film from asatellite that had crashed in the Arctic.The novel and later 1968 movie adapta-tion of the same name starring RockHudson, Patrick McGoohan, ErnestBorgnine, and Jim Brown, although fic-titious, resemble the real-life episode ofa film capsule from an AmericanCORONA spy satellite that went downnear Spitzbergen, Norway, in April1959, and may have been recovered bythe Soviet Union.1 The Spitzbergenincident is not the only time when partsof a U.S. spy satellite landed in thewrong place. In August 1964, picturesof another CORONA capsule appearedin local newspapers after it accidentallylanded in Venezuela.2 In May 1972,suspected fragments of a KH-8 GAM-BIT satellite came down in farmlandabout 75 miles north of London,England.3

However, one of the most amaz-ing stories of a wayward piece of anAmerican spy satellite occurred duringthe first KH-9 HEXAGON mission. Afilm capsule from that satellite crashedinto the Pacific Ocean on reentry. TheCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) andU.S. Navy led a secret operation toretrieve that capsule from a depth of16,400 feet, the deepest underwater sal-vage then attempted. What follows isnot just a CIA or Navy narrative. It is astory encompassing the NationalReconnaissance Office (NRO),Department of Defense (DOD), andprivate industry. It is an account inwhich decades before the phrases “jointduty,” “multi-INT intelligence,” and“interagency collaboration” gainedpopularity in America’s national securi-

ty lexicon, a diverse group from vari-ous organizations with unique talentscame together to undertake a dangerousmission, never before attempted.

The First KH-9 Mission The first HEXAGON mission

(M1201) lifted off from VandenbergAir Force Base, California, shortlybefore noon on 15 June 1971. Like theCORONA and GAMBIT satellitesbefore it, HEXAGON photographed“denied areas” and returned theexposed film to Earth in recovery vehi-cles (RV), called “buckets,” ejectedfrom the satellite. The buckets re-entered the atmosphere, were slowedby a parachute, and then waiting AirForce C-130 aircraft captured them inmid-air near the primary recovery zonenorth of Hawaii. CORONA and GAM-BIT initially had one bucket, but astechnology improved, both carried two,which increased a satellite’s on-orbitlife and allowed operators controlling asatellite to return part of the film loadwithout ending an entire mission.Technology improved to the point thatthe first HEXAGON satellite had fourbuckets (Figure 1) and the largest filmsupply—175,601 feet (1,350 lb)—ofany U.S. satellite up until that point.4

Despite high battery tempera-tures and voltage problems eight to tenhours into the mission, the new HEXA-GON operated normally. On 20 June,the first bucket, with 40,000 feet offilm, separated from the satellite andre-entered the Hawaiian recovery zone.Pilots from the 6594th Test Groupbased at Hickam Air Force Base,Hawaii, responsible for conducting themid-air recovery of buckets, spotted thedescending object, but because of itsbadly damaged parachute, allowed it toland in the water. Divers retrieved itbefore it sank. The second bucketreturned 52,000 feet of film six days

later. This time an aircraft caught it andits less-damaged parachute in mid-air.During recovery of the third bucket on10 July, the main parachute had appar-ently snapped off. The 1,100 lb incom-ing object, traveling between 400 and500 feet per second, hit the ocean witha projected 2600Gs of force, sinking onimpact.5

Accounts vary on what the recov-ery crews saw as they waited in circlingships, helicopters, and airplanes for thebucket’s return. Several mistakenlyreported signals from other aircraft ascoming from the bucket’s water-acti-vated beacon. A helicopter crew sawthe drogue chute, which deployed firstto pull out the main chute, with a straphanging from the main chute attach-ment point, indicating that the main haddetached from the drogue. Theyobserved the drogue hit the water, floatfor approximately one minute, and thensink. A search of the area where thebucket came down found discoloredwater, possibly from a location dyemarker, for about 100 square feet, alongwith bubbles, but no debris.

Due to the parachute problems onthe first two buckets and the loss of thethird, satellite operators placed only 50percent of the film onboard the fourthbucket to lessen its weight. On 16 July,that bucket entered the recovery zoneand a C-130 caught it in mid-air.6

Notwithstanding the problemsencountered, the first HEXAGON mis-sion was called an amazing success.While the parachute failures presentedmajor concerns, the battery overheat-ing, voltage anomalies, and other diffi-culties seemed easily corrected. The123,601 feet (930 lb) of recovered filmfar exceeded that carried on the firstsuccessful CORONA (20 lb), and thetypical KH-7 GAMBIT (45 lb) andKH-8 GAMBIT “dual bucket” (160 lb),flights. The imagery from the first

AN UNDERWATER ICE STATION ZEBRARecovering a KH-9 HEXAGON Capsule from

16,400 Feet Below the Pacific Ocean

www.spacebusiness.com/quest

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HEXAGON bucket alone coveredmore than two-thirds of all knownSoviet missile sites, and a set of photo-graphs taken on one pass over Albaniapermitted the identification, by classand weapon type, of that country’sentire inventory of aircraft and ships.These accomplishments, plus a 2.3-footbest resolution, led a NationalPhotographic Interpretation Centerofficer at Eastman Kodak’s film pro-cessing center in Rochester, New York,to say after receiving the first bucket’sfilm: “My God, we never dreamedthere would be this much, this good!We’ll have to revamp our entire opera-tion to handle the stuff.”7

Losing the third bucket’s pre-cious film, however, was very disap-pointing.

Planning the Salvage Operation Dr. F. Robert Naka, deputy direc-

tor of the NRO (DDNRO), and Carl E.Duckett, CIA deputy director forScience and Technology, soon author-ized the Office of Special Projects, theAgency element responsible for recon-naissance satellites, to make informalinquiries with the Navy about the pos-sibility of recovering the item from theocean floor. Navy, CIA, NRO, AirForce, and industry representatives metat CIA headquarters on 27 July to for-malize the details.8 The Navy proposedusing the Trieste II Deep Sea Vehicle 1(DSV-1) to effect the operation.

The Navy operated three deep-sea submersibles named Trieste from1958 to 1984. Each vehicle, called abathyscaphe, used a lighter-than-watergasoline-filled float to carry a pressuresphere in which the pilots would ride.The Trieste I, built in 1953 by Swissphysicist Auguste Piccard in Trieste,Italy, and soon purchased by the U.S.Navy, gained international recognitionwhen on 23 January 1960 it became thefirst piloted craft to reach the bottom ofthe Marianas Trench, the deepest partof the ocean. The Trieste I (in 1963)and Trieste II (in 1964) then surveyedthe wreckage of the nuclear poweredsubmarine USS Thresher after it sankin the North Atlantic on 10 April 1963with the loss of all hands. A third ver-

sion, eventually designated Trieste II(DSV-1), surveyed the USS Scorpionafter it sank on 22 May 1968 in morethan 10,000 feet of water about 400miles southwest of the Azores.

Although the Trieste II (DSV-1)’smaximum achieved depth was only13,000 feet at the time of the CIA head-quarters meeting, the Navy expected aplanned test dive to 20,000 feet laterthat August to demonstrate no troublein reaching the deeper depth.9Moreover, documents say that since theNavy had already intended to deploythe submersible to the HawaiianIslands from August through October,the Trieste II DSV-1 could effect the

bucket’s recovery on a non-reim-bursable basis.10

Determining the bucket’s loca-tion on the ocean floor would be theoperation’s hardest part, but based onthe Navy’s experience, there appearedto be a “very good chance” of success.Locating the impact point as accuratelyas possible was crucial. From thatpoint, it was necessary to predict thesink rate and the affect of water cur-rents on the sinking object, whichdepended on estimating the damagedbucket’s shape, its effective density,and velocity at point of impact. With ageneral search zone identified, theNavy would use NRO funds to hire a

Figure 1: KH-9 HEXAGON satellite with its four buckets clearly visible. Credit: NRO



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team led by Dr. Fred N. Spiess, directorof the Marine Physical Laboratory(MPL), Scripps Institute ofOceanography, to find the bucket andplace Deep Ocean Transponders(DOTs) on the ocean floor that wouldlater direct the Trieste II (DSV-1) to thetarget. Dr. Spiess’ connection providedthe perfect cover: if uncleared crew orpublic asked, the recovered item was anMPL instrument. The Navy’s estimatefor ten days of search time, plus fourdays travel time, was $100,000.

One key question remained,would the film still be useable?Surprisingly, an Eastman Kodak testimmersing a 10,000-foot sample roll offilm in simulated Pacific seawater atdeep sea pressures for five days indi-cated that a considerable portion of theimagery might be recoverable if thesalvage team could keep the film wetand away from light until processed.The test found that initial exposure ofthe roll’s edge to salt water caused thefilm’s emulsion gelatin to swell, effec-tively sealing the roll’s center againstfurther intrusion. To ensure security ofthe classified payload and keep sun-

light from ruining the film, at a depth ofless than 120 feet divers would coverthe object with canvas before transfer-ring it to surface ships. They furtherplanned to surface at night if possibleto reduce the chances of exposure tolight. Eastman Kodak personnel wouldthen tediously despool the film by handat their Rochester processing facility.In a memo summarizing the 27 Julymeeting, Donald W. Patterson, CIAHEXAGON Sensor Subsystem pro-gram director, concluded there was “agood chance of recovering the RV, andthat the film would be useable withsome small degradation.”

An Army major on the NRO staffadded some points about the value ofretrieving the film in a separate notesummarizing the meeting for undersecretary of the Air Force and directorof the NRO (DNRO) John L. McLucas.“The third RV contained the mostimagery of the four,” he wrote;“Further, this imagery was acquired onthat part of the mission when theweather was particularly favorable,especially in Western Russia andEastern Europe.” He explained the time

needed to fix the parachute problemmight significantly delay the nextHEXAGON mission, making the buck-et’s film more critical to satisfyingimagery requirements, and that therecovered items might help solve theparachute problem. The operationwould provide experience in the eventof other losses. The major concluded,“The potential gains from the recoveryof RV-3 would far outweigh the moder-ate funding required. It is appropriatethat an attempt be made.”

McLucas agreed. With the basicplan set, on 10 August he sent a memoto Robert A. Frosch, assistant secretaryof the Navy for research and develop-ment, asking for help arranging “thenecessary Navy and Scripps support.”The NRO Staff Major’s points musthave persuaded the DNRO who wrote,“Recovery of the film would be mostdesirable since the imagery recordedwas from a particularly productive por-tion of the mission. Additional infor-mation as to the nature of the parachutefailure might also be obtained.”11

Frosch responded eight days later thatthe Navy would be “pleased to assist,”

Figure 2: One of Perkin-Elmer’sproposed net salvage methods,which the Navy feared wouldstir up the ocean bottom.

Credit: NRO


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but cautioned “success of the operationdepends upon locating the reentry vehi-cle, by no means a certainty [since] thesmall size of the package and accuracyof the reported sinking position makelocation a difficult task.” The Trieste II(DSV-1), he wrote, could start recoveryoperations after 5 October. The USNSDe Steiguer, a survey ship capable oftowing a camera-equipped search fishat a depth of more than 20,000 feet,would be available to Dr. Spiess for aten-day search to commence on about 1October.12

Overcoming Obstacles Various teams began determining

light levels at different depths, prevail-ing sea currents, ocean bottom condi-tions, and executing the other requiredtasks, but several concerns quicklyarose. Frosch’s prediction about theaccuracy of the reported impact pointwas prophetic as many groups hadwidely divergent views on its location.The Satellite Tracking Center had threepoints: an original point, a point laterchanged due to a calculating error, anda final point. The drogue chute’s loca-tion, which recovery aircraft deter-mined based on the two- to three-mileaccuracy of their Loran C navigationsystems, showed another point. Themain chute deployment point led to yetanother spot. Calculations based onwind direction, ballistic trajectory,spacecraft ephemeris, as well as anindependent government assessment,yielded different results. Based on thesevarious inputs, the search team eventu-ally defined a 1.5-mile wide by 8-milelong search zone 350 miles north ofHawaii.13

Leonard B. Molaskey, a Perkin-Elmer program manager responsible fordevising a method to raise and transportthe bucket from the Pacific to EastmanKodak’s film processing center,encountered problems owing to thesunken object’s unknown condition.14

Opinions varied on whether it was stillintact or had broken apart at impact orduring its descent into the high-pres-sure deep. Initial plans called forattaching a hook with a cable to thebucket and hauling it to the surface, but

fears that corrosive seawater mighthave weakened key beryllium structur-al elements, caused the group to rejectthat idea in favor of methods that wouldenvelop the sunken item. Molaskey’steam considered several net options(Figure 2), but those too were inadvis-able as discussions with the Navy foundsuch a device “would undoubtedly stirup sediment on the ocean floor to theextent that the operator’s visibilitywould be reduced essentially to zero forperiods of up to an hour.”15 The finalapproach used a “hay hook” design todescend over, and close around, thebucket before bringing it to the surface(Figures 3 and 4).

The shipping container designedto transport the salvaged item toEastman Kodak’s processing center(Figure 5) had to be large enough tohold the “hay hook,” with the bucketinside, along with the canvas to protectit from uncleared personnel and sun-light. In addition, the container neededto be capable of being moved while fullof water, filled from the top and drainedfrom the bottom (since Eastman Kodakplanned to reuse the seawater duringdespooling), and have wheels for easytransport. It could be no bigger than 72inches high, 65 inches wide, and 78inches long to fit through a door atEastman Kodak. To prevent bacterialgrowth on the film, and with the inad-visability of using fungicides, the sal-vage team needed to maintain the con-tainer (with bucket, hook, and canvasinside) at a temperature of 40 oF or lessfor the journey to Eastman Kodak.16

Most problems were well on theirway toward a solution by about mid-September. Perkin-Elmer subcontractedwith the Pennsylvania-based ContainerResearch Corporation to build the ship-ping container, and it was on schedulefor delivery to the SubmarineDevelopment Group I, the Navy unitdirectly responsible for the salvageoperation, at San Diego, California,where crews readied the Trieste II(DSV-1) and support ships. The Navy’sUnderwater Research and DevelopmentCenter agreed to fabricate the Perkin-Elmer “hay hook” by 17 September.Plans were also underway to procure a

cooling unit to keep the bucket below40 oF.17 Further promising tests of theHEXAGON film concluded that a verythin edge of film (about a quarter inch)would likely be fogged, then a two-inchedge with a latent image degraded inexposure but probably still usable, fol-lowed by 2.5 inches of good photogra-phy. This news gave one CIA officerreason to be optimistic when he report-ed on 14 September, “The operation isproceeding smoothly and everyoneconnected with it is enthusiastic andfeels that there is a reasonable chanceof success.”18

Then potential disaster struck. Aflash flood in Glen Riddle,Pennsylvania, on 14 September left theContainer Research Corporation’s engi-neering, purchasing, sales, and manage-ment offices in about six feet of waterand a foot of silt. The HEXAGON con-tainer, on a higher level, escaped dam-age and its cover was located intact inthe silt, but not before the raging watershad washed away the skids and all butat least one of the casters used to sup-port the device. On Perkin-Elmer’sdirection, the Container ResearchCorporation shipped the undamagedcomponents as scheduled. They arrivedon time at the San Diego dock a fewdays later, and “although somewhatmarked up and scratched from theflood” appeared sound.”19

Executing the Salvage OperationThe operation came together in

the last week of September. In additionto the shipping container, crews deliv-ered the “hay hook” to the San Diegodock, security cleared the essentialScripps and Navy personnel, and thegroup settled on a plan to construct awooden refrigerator to keep the bucketbelow 40 oF.20 Before actual recoveryoperations commenced, however, aseries of land and sea trials occurred totest the hook’s functionality and allowcrews to practice transferring the itemfrom the Trieste II (DSV-1) to surfaceships. In the first test, on 20 September,the hook, suspended from a crane, suc-cessfully lifted a loaded 55-gallon drumoff a sandy beach from various posi-tions (nose down, on its side, etc.) and



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at different depths in the sand to simu-late immersion in the ocean bottom.The 900 lb hook was 150 lb over spec-ifications owing to the installation ofcounterbalance weights, but it initiallyappeared to operate well. A closer

inspection, however, revealed it failedto open to the full 70 inches asdesigned. Molaskey neverthelessbelieved shortening the center rod onboth sides by about three inches wouldeasily correct the problem.21

An Integral Operating Unit(IOU) composed of the USS Apache,USS White Sands, and Trieste II(DSV-1) left San Diego for the “at sea”test site 60 miles offshore on 27September. At 11:00 AM, the next day,Lt. Cmdr. Malcolm G. Bartels, theWhite Sands and Trieste II (DSV-1)commander, outlined the test proce-dures. Two officers, Lt. Cmdr. Phil C.Stryker Jr. and Lt. Richard “Dick” H.Taylor, would join Bartels in the three-person craft. The Trieste II (DSV-1)would carry an NRO-provided dummybucket, tethered to its forward portskeg, 4,200 feet to the bottom to avoidsearching for or possibly losing it. Thesubmersible would test the hook’sopening and closing abilities, thenback away 50 to 100 yards to deter-mine the sensitivity of the dummybucket’s pinger and the receivingequipment onboard the Trieste II(DSV-1). If all went well, the sub-mersible would recollect the dummybucket, surface, and practice transferoperations to the White Sands. TheIOU would then sail directly to thesearch zone off the HawaiianIslands.22

Plans called for the oceangoingtug Apache to tow the White Sands, aWorld War II era auxiliary repair dockwith limited independent maneuver-ability, to an operating area, with theTrieste II (DSV-1) stowed in its dockwell (Figures 6 and 7). Launching theTrieste II (DSV-1) required floodingthe dock well and towing the sub-mersible out to sea through the WhiteSands stern gate. Once launched, theapproximately ten hour-long pre-divecheckout procedure, which includedloading about 67,000 gallons of avia-tion gasoline and 30 tons of steel shotballast into the small craft, wouldoccur.

Following the completion ofpre-dive procedures, the first test divecommenced at 3:45 PM on 29September. Onboard the Trieste II(DSV-1), several sonar, television,camera, navigation, and electricalproblems occurred almost immediate-ly after submerging. Reaching the bot-tom, the manipulator arm had difficul-

Figure 3: Perkin-Elmer designed “hay hook” attached to the Trieste II. Credit: CIA

Figure 4: Perkin-Elmer “hay hook” in the open position. Credit: CIA


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ty cutting away the dummy bucket. Thesubmersible had to rise off the bottom,dangling the object from its skeg tocause enough tension in the tether tocut it. A lack of depth perception outthe viewport made maneuvering thehook over the bucket extremely diffi-cult. Although they came close, thecrew was unable to lower the hook overthe object on this dive. During thesemaneuvers, the winch cable jumped thepulley and broke, dropping the hook.Having lost 900 pounds unexpectedly,the small submersible shot up 400 feetbefore its crew could release enoughgasoline to stop the ascent. Back on thebottom, the hook and dummy bucketwere difficult to find; it took 45 min-utes to find both. Unable to retrieveboth objects in its mechanical arm, theTrieste II (DSV-1) surfaced with thehook hanging straight down. The three-man crew finally returned to the WhiteSands at about 2:00 AM on 30September.23

A meeting occurred a few hourslater to choose a course of action forthe remainder of the test. Cmdr. JohnBradford “Brad” Mooney, representingCapt. Samuel R. Packer, commandingofficer of Submarine DevelopmentGroup I, strongly advocated the need toperfect a recovery technique with alldue haste. During the course of the day,with the Trieste II (DSV-1) still under-tow to avoid the lengthy period neededto stow and relaunch the submersible,crews repaired the craft’s electricalproblems, recharged batteries, reposi-tioned the winch line, replenished shotand gasoline, and completed otherpreparations for the next dive. Thecrew added black, white—and eventu-ally international orange—strips, toincrease the hook’s visibility, installeda plumb bob in the hook’s center to aidin positioning it over the bucket, andagain modified the mechanism toenlarge its opening span. After com-pleting these tasks, and testing thehook’s expanded opening radius bylifting it with the White Sands crane,problems with the White Sands freshwater supply forced the IOU back toSan Diego on 1 October.24

The ships returned to the test site

five days later where the Trieste II(DSV-1) was unable to locate thedummy bucket on the ocean floor andexperienced another navigation com-puter failure causing the submersible tosurface about five miles from the targetpoint. This caused concern not only forthe equipment problems, but becausethe De Steiguer was already transitingto the search zone. The Trieste II (DSV-1) did not locate the dummy bucketuntil the test third dive on 11 October,but with the submersible’s power run-ning dangerously low, and no time foradditional test dives, Bartels, Stryker,and Taylor instead exercised the hookwithout actually maneuvering it overthe dummy bucket. That gave the menconfidence they could collect the itemgiven enough time. When the Trieste II(DSV-1) surfaced and was backonboard the White Sands, the IOUheaded for the search zone. On 20October, the De Steiguer reported itfound the lost bucket and had pho-tographed it with the camera on thesearch fish (Figure 8).25

While transiting to the searchzone, the White Sands crew built awooden refrigerator on deck asplanned. The eight-foot tall, by eight-foot wide, by eight-foot long contrap-tion consisted of a three-quarter inch

plywood box constructed around a two-foot by four-foot frame insulated byone-and-a-half inch glass wool blan-kets with the aluminum side facing thebox’s interior. An outside cooling unitblew air into the box through an open-ing behind the cooling coil. On 2November, as the IOU approached thesearch zone, discussions among thecrew discovered that the device couldnot cool “8,000 pounds of sea water tobelow 40 oF in the outside ambit ofabout 90 oF in bright sunlight.” Thecrew painted the unit’s exterior white,constructed a duct to recirculate thecooled air, taped off all seams, andinsulated the unit as much as possiblein order to improve its cooling abilities.They then undertook the difficult taskof placing the shipping container—which when hanging from the ship’scrane, swung like a “house wrecker’sball” in even the smallest rolls—insidethe cramped refrigerator box and filledit with seawater to start the coolingprocess. During this period, pieces ofinsulation fell into the shipping con-tainer, requiring the crew to overflowthe container with water to remove thecontainments and send out calls to themainland for more insulation.26

As crewmembers handled therefrigerator and container problems,

Figure 5: Early sketch of Perkin-Elmer designed shipping container intended totransport the salvaged bucket to Eastman Kodak’s film processing center inRochester, New York. Credit: NRO


contaminants


others readied the Trieste II (DSV-1) for launch. At 8:30 PM,the White Sands started flooding its dock well, and by 10:30that night, had taken the Trieste II (DSV-1) undertow. Sincethe refrigerator had cooled to only 56 oF on 3 November, theWhite Sands began making regular ice to place inside themakeshift refrigerator and called in additional airdrops of dryice and insulation to cool the contraption. With the airdrops inprogress during the early afternoon of 4 November, the WhiteSands headed for “zero DOT,” one of the transponders the DeSteiguer placed to mark the sunken bucket’s location. TheApache, meanwhile, released additional DOTs. As the WhiteSands approached zero DOT, Bartels, Stryker, and Taylor

descended toward the bottom in the Trieste II (DSV-1). Atabout 8:00 PM, one hour and 45 minutes into the dive, theypaused 300 feet above the ocean floor. Relaying range to theDOTs via a hydrophone, while the Apache and White Sandstracked their position, the men began searching for the sunkenitem. Although they received several sonar contacts, theymade no visual sighting, and feared they might be in thewrong location. The dive ended around 2:00 AM on 5November without finding the bucket.27

A meeting with two Apache officers from the dive’snavigation team later that morning to plan the next attemptdecided that the Apache should survey the field from the sur-face to confirm the location of the underwater DOTs. Duringthe meeting, however, bad weather moved in and grew steadi-ly worse over the next days with 30-knot wind gusts andeight- to ten-foot swells reported on 7 November. Weatherconditions postponed the Apache’s navigation survey becausethe White Sands, unable to maintain headway against the highseas, required the Apache to provide a tandem tow for theWhite Sands and Trieste II (DSV-1), which could not bestowed in such difficult sea conditions.28

On 9 November, with Apache’s fuel running low andweather conditions worsening, the ships headed toward theoperation area’s southernmost sector. Growing concern thatheavy seas might damage the Trieste II (DSV-1), undertowfor such length in rough weather, caused the IOU to reducethe tandem tow’s speed to the minimum two knots needed tomaintain steerage. On 10 November, the USS Currentrelieved the Apache, which headed to Pearl Harbor for refuel-ing. The Current towed the White Sands and Trieste II (DSV-1) to the lee side of the Hawaiian Islands where crews stowedthe submersible onboard the White Sands before the Apachereturned to tow the White Sands, with the Trieste II (DSV-1)inside, into Pearl Harbor on 15 November.29

The next day, Rear Admiral Paul L. Lacy Jr., command-er, Submarine Forces, Pacific Fleet, met with Cmdr. Mooney,in charge of the operation at sea, and his officers, and then pri-vately with the onsite CIA representative, to decide whetherto postpone operations until fairer spring weather arrived. Thedecision was to try again immediately with additional Navysupport. After refitting all ships, including replacing themakeshift wooden refrigerator built in transit with an eight-foot by eight-foot by twenty-four-foot walk-in freezer capableof maintaining temperatures as low as 0 oF, the IOU left PearlHarbor on 21 November. This time, Capt. Packer replacedMooney as the officer in charge to add his full authority. TheNavy also assigned two other tugs, the Abnaki and Coucall,for greater flexibility. When the IOU reached the search zoneon 24 November, the White Sands separated its towline allow-ing the Apache to conduct the DOTs survey, which badweather had postponed during the first recovery attempt. TheApache located all DOTs despite fears the De Steiguer-placedDOTs, which only had a one-month life expectancy, may haveexpired. Analysis of the survey and discussions with Dr.Spiess indicated that the De Steiguer, which had experiencednavigation problems enroute to the search area, might havemisreported at least one and possibly two DOT locations.

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Figure 6: Trieste II (DSV-1) stowed in the White Sands dock well.Credit: CIA

Figure 7: A crane lifting U.S. Navy’s Trieste II (DSV-1) sub.Credit: CIA


11


12

Armed with this new information, crews felt they could vec-tor the Trieste II (DSV-1) directly to the bucket, avoiding anelaborate search.30

Weather delayed the next dive until 5:45 PM on 30November. On the way down, Bartels, Stryker, and Tayloragain encountered mechanical problems with the Trieste II(DSV-1). The Doppler sonar failed. A leak in the starboardshot release caused the submersible to develop a 25-degreelist to port, and the men felt they lacked control until reachinga depth of about 7,000 feet. Around 15,000 feet, a computerpower failure lost part of the navigation memory. Riding withthe trail ball (a device hanging below the submersible to alertthe crew when they were approaching bottom) out to about 35feet obscured the ocean floor so they winched it in to 10 feet.This caused the submersible to move forward since the cable,due to the list, assumed a slight angle to the rear, pulling thecraft down slightly. Attempts to lower the ball failed. As aresult, the Trieste II (DSV-1) had to either slow down or slidethe skeg along the bottom to move, making steering diffi-cult.31

The men eventually received a signal from one of theDOTs and drove in that direction until losing contact due to adead zone between the sonar’s 30-yard minimum range andthe 30-foot maximum visual range out the viewport. The crewthen spotted the sunken bucket passing about two feet off thestarboard skeg. They stopped immediately, but the sub-mersible’s momentum carried it beyond the target. Theymaneuvered to bring the bucket into view when the low volt-age battery light activated. The crew was unable to plant anew DOT next to the target, and with little power remaining(4 of 65 battery cells were depleted to the extent they reversedpolarity), had no choice but to end the mission. They surfacedat 4:15 AM on Wednesday, 1 December.32

Steadily deteriorating weather again halted dive opera-tions. Twenty-knot winds, two-foot seas, with over six-footswells battered the ships on 2 December, followed by 30-knotgusts two days later. Near tragedy struck once again when on5 December the White Sands, towing the Trieste II (DSV-1) inhigh seas, slowed or briefly stopped. Momentum carried thesubmersible into the White Sands stern, causing the towline toslacken and wrap around the larger ship’s port station-keepingpropeller. In changing towlines, a swell caught the small sub-mersible and set it adrift. The Apache managed to take thesubmersible in tow, without collision or damage to either ves-sel, except for the White Sands now inoperable engine. Aninconspicuous note in the Apache deck log captured thedrama: “Trieste II is adrift. Commenced making variouscourses and speeds to take Trieste II in tow.”33 The IOUreturned to Pearl Harbor days later with plans to resume oper-ations after Christmas.34

With salvage activities temporarily halted, retiringHEXAGON Program Manager Col. Frank S. Buzard sent amessage to NRO Staff Director Col. David D. Bradburn andNRO Deputy Director Naka on 7 January 1972 expressingthoughts about a Soviet attempt to recover the sunken item inthe event “we decide to abandon the scene for a short period

or permanently.” Security marked concerns almost from theeffort’s start. As early as 16 August 1971, the deputy assistantfor NRO security cited CIA findings that “the Soviets have nocapability to recover the capsule,” and no evidence they knowit crashed. The CIA concluded that while the Soviet Navymaintains a tug equipped with communications equipmentthat could presumable monitor U.S. reentries in the PacificOcean to support its nuclear submarine fleet, the tug wasnowhere near HEXAGON’s recovery area on 10 July.35

Buzard, on the other hand, referencing Defense IntelligenceAgency reports, found the opposite: the Soviet Union mayhave the ability to recover objects from 33,000 feet, and spec-ulated they likely know the bucket landed in the ocean.Buzard explained Moscow and other governments “have thesame territorial rights in the ocean as we. If we abandon thesite they can move in,” and pointed to a Soviet ship keepingstation in the North Atlantic directly over one of its downedNovember class submarines for over a year-and-a-half “pre-sumably to preclude any U.S. effort to recover hardware.”Since the IOU’s salvage operations, “have established a pre-cise area of extreme interest, which the Soviets must beaware,” he warned, “we should not abandon the site until ourobjective is achieved.” Buzard recommended, “If we abandonthe site without achieving the objective, we should performall actions that make it appear as if we have retrieved 1201-3

Q U E S T 19:3 2012

Figure 8: Photograph of the sunken bucket’s intact upper struc-ture, taken by the USNS De Steiguer search team on 20 October1971 at 16,400 feet. Credit: CIA



Q U E S T 19:3 2012

Figure 9: First piece of debris the Trieste II (DSV-1) sighted 25-26 April 1972.Credit: CIA

Figure 10: Second piece of debris the Trieste II (DSV-1) sighted 25-26 April 1972. Credit: CIA

[designation for third bucket fromHEXAGON M1201] including thosecommunications which would be ordi-narily needed for.”36

The IOU left Pearl Harbor againfor the search zone five days afterBuzard sent his note, but bad seasforced the unit back to port in earlyFebruary without conducting dive oper-ations. Poor weather and the need to drydock the White Sands for repairs post-poned salvage operations until thespring. No evidence was found to indi-cate the Navy followed Buzard’s adviceto keep station over the bucket, but itseems unlikely given the poor weatherconditions. The IOU next departedPearl Harbor for the search site on 8April.

At about 5:00 PM on 25 April1972, Bartels, Stryker, and Taylor start-ed their third dive for the bucket.Following a two-hour descent, and athree-and-a-half-hour search, theysighted a tangled mass of metal andscreen wire harness 18 to 24 inches longand eight to ten inches wide (Figure 9).They next sighted two jagged gold foilpieces six to eight inches across (Figure10). Transiting to a large sonar contact800 feet away, they found whatappeared to be a six-to-eight inch longpiece of nylon webbing with a two-inchmetal ring attached, and then, finally,the missing item embedded in the seafloor 18 to 24 inches.

Evidence as to the object’s condi-tion varies. A 29 April message said itappeared intact with a hole in the centerof the aft thermal bulkhead and multiplestrands of film streaming out anotherhole at the 9 o’clock position about twoor three feet, undulating with the seacurrent. Photos of the salvage operationand post-recovery analysis, however,indicate that the bucket probably brokeapart and that the film stacks (Figures11 and 12) had detached from the struc-ture and were laying exposed on theocean floor. Only the bucket’s upperstage remained intact. This upper struc-ture possibly appeared in the 20October photos the De Steiguer searchteam took and could account for theapparently inaccurate 29 April reportthat the bucket was intact.37


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Figures 11 and 12. Film stacks on the ocean floor, 25-26 April 1972. Credit: CIA

Ninety minutes of careful maneu-vering, and six attempts later, the hookwas in position to retrieve the filmstacks. The submersible rose off thebottom, held motionless for ten minutesto allow silt and mud to drain (Figure13), and once everything appearedsecure, started a careful ascent, but theaction proved too much for the fragileitem. Ten minutes later, pieces of filmbegan breaking off in lengths varyingfrom one inch to two or three feet(Figure 14). Almost halfway to the sur-face, the film started breaking into twoto three foot segments. By the time theTrieste II (DSV-1) neared the surfacearound 2:30 AM on 26 April, more thannine hours after starting its dive, pieceswere hanging through the lines of thehook. To minimize surface swell, thehook was lowered to about 35 feetwhile a five-person dive team from theWhite Sands, 3,000 to 4,000 yardsaway, raced to the scene in small boats.The film stacks nevertheless continuedbreaking apart and disintegrated into acloud of reddish brown dust about tenminutes before the divers arrived. Allthat remained were unusable shreds offilm three to six feet in length hangingfrom the hook. Nothing suggesting asatellite remained for others to find.38

At 3:33 PM on 26 April, theApache, with the White Sands in tow,changed course to 120 degrees true anddeparted “from the MPL research site”for the last time.39 An Eastman Kodakanalysis of seven strands of recoveredfilm later concluded the film “separatedinto pieces due to externally and rapid-ly applied forces,” probably at the ini-tial impact point, not prolonged expo-sure to seawater, depressurization, orthe ocean floor’s high pressure and lowtemperature. The impact had beensevere enough to transfer paint in twoplaces as the film roll hit, or was hit by,nearby parts of the assembly. The num-ber 300 (Figure 15) was partially legi-ble on one occasion.

EpilogueAfter the parachute failures on

the first Hexagon mission, McDonnell-Douglas and the AerospaceCorporation designed a stronger



Q U E S T 19:3 2012

“extended skirt” chute (Figure 16),manufactured by Para Dynamics inEl Monte, California. The Irving AirChute Company designed a newdrogue chute. Tests proved the newchutes were vastly superior to theoriginal devices designed by theGoodyear Aerospace Company.Analysis of the recovered chutesfrom the first two and fourthHEXAGON buckets found the mainshroud lines overstressed by a factorof two, which resulted from a faileddesign and a testing oversight thatdid not account for the high-shockof initial chute deployment. Callingthe old chutes “at best marginal,”NRO Historian Robert Perry con-cluded in his recently declassified1973 HEXAGON history that itseemed almost miraculous crewsretrieved three of the four buckets:“by all odds,” Perry wrote, “theratio should have been reversed.”As an added measure, technicians“baked” the new chutes at 370degrees for eight hours to set theirshape before installation into thebucket. To ensure quality,Aerospace and McDonnell-Douglasrepresentatives inspected andpacked each chute using a new vac-uum technique, which extracted airto reduce volume. The parachutedeployment altitude was also low-ered to 40,000 feet so thicker aircould further slow the descendingobject. The added time to correctthe design defects delayed the sec-ond HEXAGON launch until 20January 1972, but the new chutesworked perfectly on all four buck-ets.40

A 24 May 1972 CIA memofor the record summarizing the sal-vage operation identified severallessons learned. It maintained thatan integrated search and salvageeffort could have avoided the searchteam’s confusing data, which sentthe Trieste II (DSV-1) looking in thewrong location during the first dive.It recommended creating a methodof readying the Trieste II (DSV-1)independent of weather conditions,because the Navy needed two or

Figure 13: Film stacks inside the recovery hay hook shortly after leaving the bottom, 25-26 April 1972. Credit: CIA

Figure 14: Photo showing the film stacks disintegrating in transit to the surface, 25-26April 1972. Credit: CIA


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three days of calm seas to prepare thesubmersible once launched, and criti-cized the craft’s “relatively poor” relia-bility noting, “Major system failuresoccurred on each of the three dives.”The memo stated the IOU’s lack ofmobility limited the number of dives,because the ships, moving at aboutthree knots, needed at least three daysto transit from Pearl Harbor to thesearch zone, missing dive opportunitiesand requiring extended periods at seawaiting for improved weather. It endedsaying the success of the secondHEXAGON mission considerablyreduced the intelligence value of recov-ering the film from the ocean bottom;the motivating factor became showingthe ability to perform a deep-sea recov-ery.

The magazine UnderseaTechnology published a three-para-graph article on the salvage operationin July 1972. Although it did not men-tion any classified aspects–only that theTrieste II (DSV-1) recovered a “smallelectronic package” during the “deep-est operation of its kind ever success-fully accomplished in the world” andnamed the key personnel and shipsinvolved—it did cause a discussionbetween NRO Deputy Director Nakaand the Navy on its source. The Navytold Naka it did not authorize therelease.41

On 4 November, six months after

the operation to recover the HEXA-GON bucket ended in a cloud of dust,the CIA launched the 170-crewedGlomar Explorer, built by eccentricbillionaire Howard Hughes, to conducta larger, more ambitious, undersea sal-vage operation. Publicly, it wouldextract minerals from the ocean floor,but its true mission was to retrieve aSoviet Golf-II submarine, which sankin March 1968, 1,560 miles northwestof Hawaii, in 16,500 feet of water. Theoutcome of both operations turned outoddly similar with part of the Sovietsubmarine falling back to the oceanfloor during its attempted salvage on 8August 1974.42

The HEXAGON capsule recov-ery ranks in the top of bold operationsundertaken in intelligence and underseaexploration history. Although the filmstacks “slipped from our fingers at thelast moment,” it was the world’s deep-est successful salvage up until thatpoint, accomplished against staggeringenvironmental and technical odds.43 Astrikingly brief reference in the WhiteSands ship’s history file at the U.S.Naval Historical Center says, “Theperiod from 2 August through the endof the year was occupied by a majoreffort in preparing and conducting thedeepest salvage-recovery operation yetattempted by man.”44 Chief of NavalOperations Admiral Elmo R. ZumwaltJr. presented the Integral Operating

Unit with a Meritorious UnitCommendation for “this singularly sig-nificant achievement,” which “provid-ed the United States Navy with thecapability to conduct deep-oceansearch, location, and object recoveryoperations in 80 percent of the seaareas on Earth.” DNRO McLucas alsopraised the crews of the ships involvedin a 15 May memo to Secretary Frosch,writing they “established and demon-strated a unique capability vital to thesecurity of the United States.”45

Locating such a small object at such adepth, and in such a remote location,under difficult sea and weather condi-tions over an eight-month period was aremarkable feat utilizing innovativesalvage techniques, navigation equip-ment, and concepts in ocean survey andnavigation. It deserves a unique placein history.

About the AuthorDavid Waltrop is a program manager inthe CIA Historical CollectionsDivision. He served previously as theNational Reconnaissance Office(NRO) deputy chief historian and co-editor of NRO’s quarterly corporatepublication. All statements of fact,opinion, or analysis expressed in thisarticle are those of the author and donot necessarily reflect the official posi-tions or views of the CIA, NRO, or anyother U.S. government agency. Nothingin this article should be construed asasserting or implying U.S. governmentauthentication of information orAgency endorsement of the author’sviews. The CIA and NRO havereviewed this material to prevent thedisclosure of classified information.Citations to CIA records were omitted.

For More InformationFor information on this operation,including declassified photos and docu-ments, and a copy of this article fordownload, see the CIA public website:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/index.html

Figure 15: Photo taken during Eastman Kodak's post-salvage analysis of recovered filmshreds showing the number 300 imprinted on the film. Paint transfer due to the extremeimpact shock caused the imprint. Credit: CIA



Q U E S T 19:3 2012

AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Dr.Vance Mitchell, Dr. Jeffrey Charlston,Cargill Hall, Jim David, Brad Mooney,Mal Bartels, Dick Taylor, and LeeMathers for assisting with this article,and offer special gratitude to thedeclassification officers responsible forreleasing this story.

Notes1. NRO Review and Redaction Guide forAutomatic Declassification of 25-year oldinformation, version 1.0, 2008 edition,p. 178-179. Available at www.nro.gov,declassified records, frequently request-ed records.

2. Frederic Oder, James Fitzpatrick, PaulWorthman, The Corona Story, 1987, p.96-98. Available at www.nro.gov,Declassified Records, FrequentlyRequested Records.

3. Robert Perry, A History of SatelliteReconnaissance: Volume 3A Gambit,1974, p. 297-298. Available atwww.nro.gov, Declassified Records,Gambit and Hexagon Special Collection,Gambit and Hexagon Histories,Document 4.

4. Frederic Oder, Paul Worthman, TheHexagon Story, 1988, p. 97. (henceforth,Hexagon Story). Available atwww.nro.gov, Declassified Records,Gambit and Hexagon Special Collection,Gambit and Hexagon Histories,Document 7.

5. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Recovery of RV - #3, 27 July 1971,National Reconnaissance Office Archiveand Records Center (henceforth NROARC), Job 199900043, Box 4, File 24;Memo for the Record, SUBJ Status ofRecovery Effort as of 14 September1971, 14 September 1971, NRO ARC,Job 199800074, Box 5, File 157.

6. Hexagon Story, p. 97.

7. Robert Perry, A History of SatelliteReconnaissance: Volume 3B Hexagon,1973, p. 104-105 (henceforth Perry,Hexagon History). Available atwww.nro.gov, Declassified Records,Gambit and Hexagon Special Collection,Gambit and Hexagon Histories,Document 5; Hexagon Story, p. 97, 101.

8. For accounts of the 27 July CIA meet-ing in this and the following three para-graphs see: Memo, L. Molaskey to

Distribution, SUBJ Recovery of RV - #3,27 July 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24; D.Patterson, Memo for the Record, SUBJRV-3 Recovery Planning Meeting, 28 July1971, NRO ARC, Job 199800074, Box 5,File 156; Memo to DNRO McLucas, SUBJPossible Recovery of Hexagon Mission1201 RV-3, 3 August 1971, NRO ARC,Job 199800074, Box 5, File 156.

9. Documents indicate the Navy hadcertified the Trieste II (DSV-1) to 13,000feet at the time of the 27 July CIA meet-ing, but operation participants say theNavy had certified the submersible to20,000 feet, with a maximum achieveddepth of 13,000 feet.

10. Operation participants do not recallthis existing deployment to the HawaiianIslands, in comparison to the docu-ments, but cannot rule out such a mis-sion.

11. Memo, DNRO McLucas to AssistantSecretary of the Navy for Research andDevelopment, SUBJ Deep Sea Recoveryof Hexagon Reentry Vehicle, 10 August1971, NRO ARC, Job 199800074, Box 5,File 156.

12. Memo, Secretary Frosch to DNROMcLucas, SUBJ Deep Sea Recovery ofHexagon Reentry Vehicle, 18 August1971, NRO ARC, Job 199800074, Box 5,File 156.

13. Memo for the Record, SUBJ Status ofRecovery Effort as of 14 September1971, 14 September 1971, NRO ARC,Job 199800074, Box 5, File 157.

14. Richard Chester, A History of theHexagon Program, p. 159-167. Availableat www.nro.gov. Declassified Records,Gambit and Hexagon Special Collection,Gambit and Hexagon Histories,Document 1.

15. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of RV #3,20 August 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24.

16. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Recovery of RV #3 – Meeting atNWC 7-30-71, 2 August 1971, NRO ARC,Job 199900043, Box 4, File 24; Memo,L. Molaskey to Distribution, SUBJ Teleconto <DELETED>, 4 August 1971, NROARC, Job 199900043, Box 4, File 24;Perkin-Elmer Contract Authorization, 3September 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24.

17. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Visit to San Diego RERecovery of RV #3, 1 September 1971,NRO ARC, Job 199900043, Box 4, File24.

18. Memo for the Record, SUBJ Status ofRecovery Effort as of 14 September1971, 14 September 1971, NRO ARC,Job 199800074, Box 5, File 15.

19. Memo, T. Urban to L. Molaskey, SUBJTrip to Container Research Corp. GlenRiddle, PA on 9/14/71, 15 September1971, NRO ARC, Job 199900043, Box 4File 24; Memo, L. Molaskey toDistribution, SUBJ Trip Report – RecoveryHook Test Program – San Diego,California 20-21 September 1971, 24September 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4 File 24.

20. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of #3 – SanDiego, California – 23 and 24September, 29 September 1971, NROARC, Job 199900043, Box 4, File 24.

21. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery Hook TestProgram – San Diego, California 20-21September 1971, 24 September 1971,NRO ARC, Job 199900043, Box 4, File24; Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of #3 – SanDiego, California – Activities of 9-22-91,30 September 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24.

22. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of #3 –Activities of 27 September through 3October 1971, 4 October 1971, NROARC, Job 199900043, Box 4, File 24.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid. Molaskey’s trip reportdescribes a fresh water problem on theWhite Sands, but recovery participantsdo not recall this causality.

25. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Status of RV-3 Recovery (Telecon toCdr. Mooney, Sub Dev. Group I), 8October 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24; Memo, L.Molaskey to Distribution, SUBJ Teleconwith Lt. Cdr. Doyle, 12 October 1971,NRO ARC, Job 199900043, Box 4, File24; Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Status of RV-3 Recovery, 13October 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24.

26. Ibid.


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18

27. Ibid.

28. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of RV#3, 18November 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24.

29. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of RV#3, 22November 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24; USS Apache(ATF-67) Deck Log for November 1971,National Archives and RecordsAdministration, RG 24, Box 89.

30. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report-Recovery of RV #3, 22November 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24; Memo, L.Molaskey to Distribution, SUBJ TripReport–Recovery of RV #3, 10 December1971, NRO ARC, Job 199900043, Box 4,File 24.

31. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of RV #3, 10December 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24.

32. Ibid. Molaskey’s trip report says thecrew attempted to use the submersible’smechanical arm to plant a new DOT nextto the target, but the arm would not oper-ate correctly, possibly owing to the listand battery problems. Operation partici-pants, however, adamantly contend thearm never worked below 10,000 feet.The pilots would never have attempted touse the arm during the actual bucketrecovery.

33. USS Apache (ATF-67) Deck Log forDecember 1971, National Archives andRecords Administration, RG 24, Box 89.

34. Memo, L. Molaskey to Distribution,SUBJ Trip Report – Recovery of RV #3, 10December 1971, NRO ARC, Job199900043, Box 4, File 24.

35. Memo, SUBJ Recovery of RV-3, 10August 1971, NRO ARC, Job 199700059,Box 3, File 89; Message 1048, 10 August1971, NRO ARC, Job 199700059, Box 3,File 89; Message 2437, 12 August 1971,NRO ARC, Job 199700059, Box 3, File89; Memo, SUBJ Recovery of HexagonR/V, 16 August 1971, NRO ARC, Job199700059, Box 3, File 89.

36. Message 0123, 7 January 1972,NRO ARC, Job 199700059, Box 3, File89.

37. Message 2294, 29 April 1972, NROARC, Job 199800069, Box 3, File 1.

38. Ibid.

39. USS Apache (ATF-67) Deck Log forApril 1972, National Archives andRecords Administration, RG 24, Box 89.

40. Perry, Hexagon History, p. 105-106;Hexagon Story, p. 101-103.

41. “Trieste Recovers ElectronicsPackage from 16,400-ft. Depth,”Undersea Technology (July 1972), p. 25;Memo for the Record, SUBJ (A) Message4390 Dated 14 August 1971 and (B)Hexagon, 23 August 1972, NRO ARC, Job199700059, Box 3, File 94; Message4390, 14 August 1972, NRO ARC, Job199700059, Box 3, File 94.

42. “Project Azorian: The Story of theHughes Glomar Explorer”, Studies inIntelligence, 1985. Released by CIA on12 February 2010.

43. Memo, J. Draim to DNRO McLucas,

SUBJ Deep Sea Recovery of Hexagon, 9May 1972, NRO ARC, Job 199800074,Box 5, File 152.

44. Memo, C. Hudiburgh to CommanderSubmarine Group One, SUBJ WhiteSands (ARD20) Command History 1971,3 May 1972, U.S. Navy Yard Washington,DC, Navy Archives Ships File, Box 859A.

45. Memo, DNRO McLucas to AssistantSecretary of the Navy, Research andDevelopment, SUBJ Deep Sea Recoveryof Hexagon Reentry Vehicle, 15 May1972, NRO ARC, Job 19980074, Box 5,File 152.

Q U E S T 19:3 2012

Figure 16: KH-9 HEXAGON Mark 8 “extended skirt” parachute with bucket below. Credit: NRO



Left: Trieste II (DSV-1) pilots Lt. Cmdr. Bartels (left), Lt. Taylor (center), and Lt. Cmdr. Stryker (right). (Credit: Richard Taylor, Jack Myers)

Right: Photo possibly show-ing Trieste II (DSV-1) before last dive on the HEXAGON bucket. “Mid-Pacific Oper-ations” was the recovery’s unclassified name. (Credit: Naval Undersea Museum, Keyport, WA)

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Diagram

of Trieste II (DSV-1).

(Credit: Naval U

ndersea Museum

, Keyport, WA

)

Crane lifting Trieste II (DSV-1).(Credit: CIA)

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produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event, are joined with supporting analysis, essays, video, audio, and photographs,

and showcased in a booklet plus DVD, and made available to historians, scholars, and the public.

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