An Introduction to Philosophy (A Sheed & Ward Classic)

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PUBLISHER'SNOTE

TheFrencheditionofthiswork,underthetitleIntroductionG^ndralealaPhilosophic,appearsasthefirstvolumeofseven,whichdealwithFormalLogic,TheoriesofKnowledge,Cosmology,Psychology,Metaphysics,Ethics,Êsthetics,andtheHistoryofPhilosophy.But,sincesixoutofthesevenvolumesremaintobewritten,ithasbeenthoughtbettertoissuethepresentvolumequiteindependently.

Theseriesasawholeisintendedtoprovidetext-booksforaregularuniversitycourseasitisfoundinFrance,andwiththatparticularendinviewprintsinlargertypethoseparagraphswhichthestudentshouldreadfirst,andinsmallertypethoseparagraphswhicharemerelyexplanatoryorexpansiveofthem.Thisschematisinghasbeenabandonedtomakethevolumeserveforgeneralreaders,nouniversitycoursebeingenvisagedinEnglandorAmerica.

ThetranslationhasbeenmadefromtheeleventhFrenchedition.

PREFACE

MychiefaimincomposinganElementsofPhilosophyseries,towhichthisbookmayserveasanintroduction,istogiveafaithfulpresentationofthesystemofAristotleandSt.Thomas,andinitsUghttojudgetheimportantsystemswhichhavefollowedeachotherduringthelastthreecenturiesandtheprincipalproblemsdiscussedbymodernphilosophy.Ihavetriedtoadaptthemethodofexpositiontocontemporaryconditions,andinparticularhavefollowedofsetpurposeaprogressiveorderofexposition—asfaraspossibletheorderofintellectualdiscovery—neverappealingtoanytruthnotalreadyknownandunderstood,andneverintroducinganewnotionorpropositionforwhichthewayhasnotbeenpreparedbythosewhichhavegonebeforeitandleduptoit.Themethodhasobligedmetodepartonseveralpointsfromtheprocedureofthetraditionaltext-books—aboveall,considerablytomagnifytheimportanceandextendthescopeofthisIntroduction.Yet,thus,IhavebutreturnedtothemethodfollowedbyAristotlehimself.ThefirstthreebooksofhisMetaphysicsare,infact,nothingbutanextensiveintroduction.

Aworkofthiskind,ifitistobethorough,demandsthedetaileddiscussionofcertainpoints,withoutwhichthestudyitseekstopromotewouldloseallits

valueasamentaldiscipline.Ishouldbeuntruetotradi-

PREFACE

tionalphilosophyifIreducedittoafewmaintheseswhichhavelosttheirfreshness,andafewcommonplacesofaspiritualistmetaphysic,andneglectedtobringoutitsfineintellectualcontoursanddisplayitspowerofpenetratinganalysis.

Thepresentworkisintendedforbeginners.Itcanthereforemakenoattempttoreproducethedepthorthewealthofsubtledialectictobefoundintreatiseswrittenforspecialists,andremainsstrictlyelementary.Itmust,however,preservethescientificcharacterpropertoaphilosophicalexposition.

Somereadersmaytakealarmatscholasticterminology.Yetnoscience,nodiscipline,noformofsport,even,orindustry,candispensewithaspecialterminology—oftenfarmorearidandartificialthanthevocabularyofphilosophy.Torequirethatphilosophersshoulduseeverydaylanguageimpliesthattheirscienceisjustanenterprisingtopicofconversation,idlearm-chairspeculationforafterdinner.Ontheotherhand,itmaylegitimatelybedemandedthatnotechnicaltermbeuseduntilithasbeenclearlydefined.

Finally,Iwouldsaythat,ifthephilosophyofAristotle,asrevivedandenrichedbySt.Thomasandhisschool,mayrightlybecalledtheChristianphilosophy,bothbecausetheChurchisneverwearyofputtingitforwardastheonlytruephilosophyandbecauseitharmonisesperfectlywiththetruthsoffaith,neverthelessitisnotproposedhereforthereader'sacceptancebecauseitisChristian,butbecauseitisdemonstrablytrue.Thisagreementbetweena

PREFACE

philosophicsystemfoundedbyapaganandthedogmasofrevelationisnodoubtanexternalsign,anextra-philosophicguaranteeofitstruth;butitisnotfromitsagreementwiththeFaith,butfromitsownrationalevidence,thatitderivesitsauthorityasaphilosophy.

Nevertheless,reasonandfaith,whiledistinct,arenotseparate,and,sinceIamwritingprincipallyforChristianreaders,Ihavenotdeniedmyselfanoccasional

referencetoknowledgefamiliartoeveryCatholic,ortocertaintheologicalapplicationsofphilosophicprinciples,thebettertoputphilosophyinitsproperplaceinChristianminds,ortohelpthemtomaintaintheunityoftheirthought.Thefactremzdnsthatinourargumentsandintheverystructureofourexpositionofphilosophy,itisnotfaith,butreason,andreasonalone,whichoccupiestheentiregroundandholdsundividedsway.

CONTENTS

m.THESOPHISTSANDSOCRATES.

IntroductionThesophistsSocrates....

(a)Ethicsandknowledge

(b)Irony,maieutic,dialectic

(c)Moderateintellectualism

64

6568

69

70

72

IV.PLATOANDARISTOTLE.

TheminorSocratics.Plato....

(a)Histheoryofideas.

(b)Hissystemofphilosophy

(c)Itslimitations.Aristotle....

(a)CorrectionsofPlato.

(b)TheAristoteliansystem

(c)Aristotle'sworksAristotleandSt.Thomas.Philosophiaperennis

7475757881828387929799

V,DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY.

Scientificknowledge.ItsmaterialobjectItsformalobject

ConclusionI

Furtherconsiderations

102103107

108

loB

VI,PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES

Philosophyjudgesthespecialsciences

Itgovernsthem

Itdefendsthem

Itispre-eminendyfree

Furtherobservations.

ConclusionII12

III113117118118

CONTENTS

VII.PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOLOGY....I24

Natureoftheology....124

Theologyjudgesphilosophy..126

Philosophysubmitstotheologyits

conclusions,notitspremises.126

Philosophiaancillatheologiae...129

Furtherconsiderations...129

ConclusionIII.-132

VUI.PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE..'133

Unscientificknowledge..-133Philosophyisderivedfromcommonsense,understoodasthenaturalapprehensionoffirstprinciples.136Commonsensemayaccidentallyjudge

philosophy.....138

ConclusionIV..141

Themethodofphilosophy..141

PARTTWOTHECLASSIFICATIONOFPHILOSOPHY

147

CONTENTS

Theproblemofuniversals

(a)Nominalism

(b)ReaUsm.

(c)ModerateRealism

159159160160

III.THEPHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICSANDTHE

PHILOSOPHYOFNATURE

Thetermbody.

Thephilosophyofmathematics

Thephilosophyofnature

(a)Mechanism

(b)Dynamism

(c)HylomorphismPsychologyProblemoftheoriginofideas

ConclusionVIII

.163

•163

164

.166

.166

169

.170

Abstraction:ProblemofhumannatureConflictingschools....

172

172174

163

IV.CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOOY)

Beingquabeing.Criticism....Problemoftruth

ConclusionIX

Conflictingschools:.

(a)Scepticism

(b)Rationalism

(c)ModerateintellectualismProblemoftheobjectoftheintellect

ConclusionX.

Beingandintelligibility

ConclusionXI.

14

178178179181

181182182183185

187

187

187

CONTENTS

V.ONTOLOGY:ESSENCE

Problemsofontology.Essence

(a)Inthewidesense

{b)InthestrictsenseCharacteristicsofthisessence

ConclusionXII


Ourintellectcanapprehendessence

ConclusionXIII


Essenceisuniversalinthemind.

ConclusionXIV

Individualnatureandmatter:

(a)Individualnature

(b)Firstmatter

(c)Archetypalbeing

(d)Nature,essence,andquiddity

189

189191191194197

201

201203

203

203205

207

207208209210213

VI.ONTOLOGY!SUBSTANCEANDACQDENT

OriginofthesenotionsSubstance....

ConclusionXV

Furtherobservations

Accident.....

ConclusionXVI


Conflictingschools

Theindividualityofsubstance.

(a)Substantiaprima,substantiasecunda

(b)Perse,as«,inse...

217

217222

224

224227

227

228230233233

CONTENTS

VII.ONTOLOGY:ACTANDPOTENTIALITY

Originofthesenotions

(a)Identityandchange.

(b)Theirapparentincompatibility

(c)SolvedbytheconceptpotentialityPotencyorpotentialityAct

ConclusionXVII

Thenatureofchange

ActandpotentiaHtyinthings

Axiomsi-vii....ConflictingschoolsTerminology:.

(a)Materialandformal

(b)Virtualandformal(actual)

(c)Implicitandexplicit

(d)Inexpressact,inaccomplished

act.....

239

239239241242242244

245246246248

250

251252

254255

255

VIII.THEODICY(naturalTHEOLOGY)

Subsistentbeingitself

257

257

IX.THEPHILOSOPHYOFART.ETHICS

Introduction

Thephilosophyofart

Ethics

Divisionsofethics

Conflictingschools

261

261261264267268

CONCLUSION....

Classificationofphilosophy

271

271

INTRODUCTORY

Philosopherswereoncecalledwisemen.ItwasPythagoraswhofirstinventedthetermphilosophy(91X1*TTî^(Toîat;',loveofwisdom),ôbservingthatwisdombelongsinthestrictsensetoGodalone,andforthatreasonnotwishingtobecalledawiseman,butsimplyafriendorloverofwisdom.Hismodestywasitselfamarkofgreatwisdom,forthesublimityanddifficultyofthehighesttruths,andtheweaknessofournature"insomanyrespectsenslaved,"forbidmantoacquire"apropertyrightinwisdom"'suchthathecanemployitinentirefreedom.Asaresultofthemanynecessitiestowhichheissubject,heholdsitonlybyaninsecuretitle,sothathemaybetermednotwise,butfarmoretrulyabeggaratwisdom'sdoor.Neverthelessphilosophyisnothingotherthanwisdomitselfsofarasitisaccessibletohumannature.

Itisnotawisdomsupernaturallyinfusedintooursoulswhichmanpossessesinvirtueofasuperhumanillumination.Neitherisitawisdomwhollyspontaneousandunconscious(suchaswithinitslimitsistheprudenceofanimals,andeventhewisdomofsimplesouls),whichhepossessesinvirtueofanaturalinstinct.Itisthewisdomofmanasman,whichhe

'Cicero,Tusc,v.8;cf.DiogenesLaertius,i,12.»Aristotle,Metaph.i,2,982b.St.Thomas,InIMetaph.,1.3.Cf.DeVeritate,q.,7,a.7.

ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY

acquiresbythelabourofhisintellect,anditisforthatveryreasonthathiswisdomisgainedwithsuchdifficultyandheldsoinsecurely,andthatthosewhoseekitshouldbecalledphilosophersratherthanwisemen.

Suchisthenatureofphilosophyderivedfromtheetymologyofthetermanditsemploymentinordinaryspeech.Aphilosopherisamanhumanlywise.Andthemanwhodevoteshimselftophilosophy,bysodoingundertakestoshowhisfellowsthesublimestviewsatwhichman'sunderstandingcanarriveofthegreatproblemswhichsolicitthemindoftherace.

Thedefinitionofphilosophyas"humanwisdom"isstillasuperficialdefinition,andanominaldefinition,whichsimplyrendersagreementpossibleastothesenseoftheterm.Toattainamoreprofounddefinition,arealdefinitionwhichrevealsthenatureoftheobject,weshallstudyinthesequenceofconcretehistorytheformationorgenesisofwhatmenhaveagreedtocallphilosophy.

Insodoingweshallfollow,sofarasitispossibleinanexplanatorytext-book,theactualmethodofAristotle,toooftenneglectedbybookswhichteachhisconclusions,butapparentlyignorehisspirit.Thatgreatreahstadvancednothingaprioriandalwaysstudiedthehistoricaldevelopmentofaproblembeforeheproposedhisownsolution,whichthusappearedasthenaturalgoalofaprocessofdiscovery.Suchamethodwillnodoubtcompelustoundertakeaconsiderabledigressionintothefieldofhistory,butitis,nevertheless,inouropinionindispensable.

Ontheonehand,fromthepracticalandeducationalstandpoint,anaccountofthehistoricaloriginsof

INTRODUCTORY

philosophicthoughtisthebestmethodofacquaintingbeginnerswiththeproblemsofphilosophy,introducingthemintotheworld,entirelynewtothem,ofrationalspeculation,andfurnishingthem,incidentally,withmuchextremelyusefulknowledge.Theirfirstrequisiteistoknowwhattheyarestudying,andtopossessasufficientlyliveandaccuratenotionoftheproblemsofphilosophypresentedintheirsimplestform.

Ontheotherhand,injusticetooursubjectitself,tostatestraightaway,withnopreviousexaminationorconcretejustification,conclusionsrelatingtothenatureofphilosophy,itsobject,dignity,andsoforth,wouldbetopresentthetraditional

conceptionofphilosophyunderanarbitraryandaprioriaspectwhollyalientoit,andtoriskenslavingourpupilstoemptyformulae.Bybeginning,onthecontrguy,withabriefoutHneofthehistoryofancientphilosophyuptoAristotle,thatistosayuntiltheconclusionofitsformativeperiod,wedisplayphilosophyinitsoriginandconstruction,andtherebyshowhowthetransitionwaseffectedbetweentheteachingofcommonsenseandthescientificknowledgeofphilosophers,howthegreatphilosophicproblemsaroseofthemselves,andhowaparticularconceptionofphilosophy,whichwillbeputlatertothetestofdiscussion,resultsinevitablyfromthishistoricalinquiry,andnaturallyforcesitselfuponthemind.Weneednotfeartoinsistuponthesepreliminaryquestions,whichweshallhavetoconsideragainfromanotherangleincriticism.Theyconcerntheveryexistence,thenature,andthevalueofphilosophy.

PARTONETHENATUREOFPHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICTHOUGHTBEFOREPHILOSOPHYINTHESTRICTSENSE

Philosophicspeculation,preciselybecauseitisthesupremeachievementofreason,isunknowntoalltheso-calledprimitiveraces.Indeed,evenofthecivilisationsofantiquitythegreaterparteitherhavepossessednophilosophyorhavefailedtodiscoveritstruenatureanddistinctivecharacter.Inanycase,philosophyonlybegantoexistataverylateperiodabouttheeighthandespeciallythesixthcenturyB.C.,andthenfoundtherightpathtotruthbyasuccesswhichmustberegardedasextraordinarywhenweconsiderthemultitudeofwrongroadstakenbysomanyphilosophersandphilosophicschools.

Nevertheless,someofthemostelementarytruthswithwhichphilosophydealswereknownlongbeforephilosophyitselfhadcometobirth,andthemoreimportantofthesearetobefoundinamoreorlessrudimentaiyformandmoreorlessseriouslycorruptedamongallthepeoplesofantiquity,evenatthemostremoteepochs.Butitwasnotfromthephilosophersthatthesepeopleshadlearnedthem;theirknowledgewasderivedinpartfromthatwhollyspontaneousandinstinctiveexerciseofreasonwhichwecallcommonsense,butaboveallfromprimitivetradition.


Themostreliableinductionsofhistorycombinewiththeconclusionsoftheology^toprovetheexistenceofaprimitivetradition,commontothedifferentbranchesofthehumanraceandgoingbacktotheoriginofmankind.Andevenindefaultofanypositivesourcesofinformation,itisaveryreasonableconjecturethatthefirstmanreceivedfromGodknowledgetogetherwithexistence,thatbyeducationhemightcompletetheworkofprocreation.

Butwasitpossiblethatthisknowledge,togetherwiththeprimitivereligioninwhichitwasincorporated,couldbetransmittedinitsintegritybythehumanrace?Wehave,ontheonehand,truthsoftheloftiestsublimitytobehandeddownfromonegenerationtoanother,yet,ontheother,anintelligencedominatedbythesensesandimagination.Adisproportionsoextremeinevitablydeterioratedthetraditionreceivedattheoutset,aslittlebylittletherustofobHviongathereduponit,errordefiledit,anditfellapreytothecorruptionsofpolytheismandthemoredegradedformsofreligion(animism,totemism,idolatry,magic,etc.).Nevertheless,inspiteofthechangeswhichitunderwent,theprimitivetraditionhaspreservedformankindthroughouttheagesadeposit,progressivelydiminishingnodoubt,offundamentaltruths.Inthisdepositwereincludedmanyphilosophicconceptions—thatistosay,conceptionswhichconcernedthemostsublimeproblemswithinthescopeofreason.Butsincetheyweretaughtonlybyareligioustraditionwhichcorroboratedtheinstinctiveteachingsofcommonsense,theywere

1p.Lemonnyer,O.P,(followingSchmidt),LaRivilaiionprimitiveetlesdoTtnSesactuellesdelascience.Paris,1914.

PRE-PHILOSOPHIGTHOUGHT

knowninapre-philosophicfashionandexistedinapre-philosophicstate.

Itisnotsurprisingthatallpeoplesintheprimitive^stageofhistorywereignorantofphilosophicspeculation.Butitismoreastonishingthatevencertaincivilisationsweredevoidofphilosophy—forexample,theSemitic,andtheEgyptian,whichis,inthisrespect,inthesamecategoryastheSemitic.Despitethehighlevelofscientificculturereachedbytheintellectualaristocracyoftheseraces,thesolephilosophicconceptions,itwouldseem,whichtheEgyptiansandChaldeanspossessedwereafewverygeneralideas,implicitintheirreligion,concerningtheDeity,thehumansoulanditsstateafterdeath,andthepreceptsofmorality.Thesetruths,which,moreover(asinthecaseofeveryrace),arepurer

thefurtherbackwefollowtheirhistory,werenevermadethesubjectofrationalstudyandspeculation,butweresimplyaccepted,asalsoweretheirscientificbeliefs,aspartofasacredtradition.Religiontooktheplaceofphilosophy,andfromreligiontheseracesreceivedcertainphilosophictruths;philosophytheyhadnone.InthismattertheJewsdidnotdifferfromtheirfellowSemites.Scornfulofhumanwisdomandtheachievementsofpurereason,and,indeed,withoutaptitudeforsuchinvestigations,theyproducednophilosophers(atleastnotbeforePhilo,whowasacontemporaryof

*Primitiveinrespectofaparticularbrainchofthegreathumantreeandsofarasourknowledgeofthepastextends,butnotprimitiveintheabsolutesense.Farbehindwhatwetermtheprimitivestateofthepeoplesknowntousliesalongstretchofhumanhistoryofwhichweknownothing.


JesusChrist),buttheypossessedtheprophetsandtheLaw.

AllthegreatIndo-Europeancivilisations,ontheotherhand,manifestanimpulse,whichnodoubttookwidelydifferentforms,towardsrationaland,inthestrictsense,philosophicspeculation.But,exceptinGreece(andtoaverypartialextentinIndia),thisimpulsenowheresucceededinachievinganindependentscientificdisciplinedistinctfromreligion.Atraditionalreligiondidnotinthiscasetaketheplaceofphilosophy,butphilosophy,or,weshouldrathersay,humanwisdom,penetratedreligionandwasconfusedwithit.Thewisemanfulfilledasacredfunction.Hewasnottheheadofaphilosophicschool,butthefounderofareligioussect,ifnotofanewreligion.

{a)AmongthePersians,'^whoseoriginalreligion,sofarasweknowitfrominscriptions,wasafairlypuremonotheism,ZoroasterorZarathustrafoundedMazdeismorZoroastrianism(abouttheeighthorsixthcenturyB.C.?),apowerfulachievementofspeculationwhichsystematised(andincidentallydistorted)certainfundamentaltruthsderivedfromtheprimitivetradition,

*InthissummaryreviewofthegreatAryanreligions,wehavebeenobligednotonlytoisolatebyaprocessofabstractiontheintellectualaspectsofthosereligionswithwhichthephilosopherisconcerned,but,moreover,tosimplifyconsiderablyandreducetoanartificialclassificationdoctrineswhosevastandfluctuatingcomplexity(thisisespeciallytrueofBrahmanismandBuddhism),

andoccasionalinconsistency,dismayhistorians.ItshouldbeaddedthattheexplanationsofOrientalthoughtgivenbyscholarsarestilllargelyconjecturaland,inallprobability,especiallyasfarasphilosophyisconcerned,inmanycasesextremelyinadequate.


intheattempttogivearationalexplanationofthevastproblemwhichhasfacedhumanthoughtfromtheoutset,theproblemofevil.ByhisfailuretoperceivethatGodisthesolesupremeprincipleandthesourceofeverythingwhichexists,sofarasitpartakesofbeing,andthatevilismereprivationofbeingwithoutpositiveexistence,andthereforethatnocreatureisevilbynature,Zoroasterendedindualismandtaughttheexistenceoftwoprinciplesimcreatedandco-eternal,theprincipleofGood{Ormuzd)andtheprincipleofEvil(Ahriman),whosharethedominionoftheuniverseandwhoseunrelentingstruggleconstitutesitshistory.SofarasAhrimanistobeidentifiedwiththerebelangelofprimitivetradition,ZoroastrianismtendedtomakethedevilagodstrivingagainstGod.

(b)AmongthepeoplesofIndia,whoseintellectualandreligioushistoryisfarmorecomplex(sinceinthisfieldnocertaintyhasyetbeenreached,wepresenttheinterpretationoftheirbeliefswhichseemstousmostprobable),wewitnessaremarkablephenomenon.Whentheoriginalreligion—theprimitivereUgionoftheVedas^—nolongerprovedsufficienttosatisfytheintellectualdemandsorsocialneedsofamoreadvancedcivilisation,philosophicnotions,whichseemtohaveoriginatedasinterpretationsofsacrificeandothersacredritual,butdevelopedinaspirithostiletotheancienttraditionsandthecultofthe

^ThemostancientamongthereligiousbooksoftheHindus(Vedameansknowledge),theRig-Veda,isapparentlynotolderthanthetwelfthcenturyb.c.Vedicreligionseemstohavebeenanincoherentpolytheismcolouredbyavaguepantheism.


gods,foundahomeamongthesacerdotalcasteandtookpossessionofthepriesthood.Toreconciletheperpetuationoftheirofficewiththeirnewopinions,thepriests,whilecontinuingtoperformthetraditionalceremonies,directedtheirworshipnolongertotheoldgods,buttotheundefinedandsecretforcesofthe

universe.

(i)Thisresulted,afteraperiodofconfusion,intheformationofanewsystem,Brahmanism(orHinduism),whichisessentiallyaphilosophy,ametaphysic,aworkofhumanspeculation,butbeing,sotospeak,clothedintheornamentsofthesanctuary,wasinvestedfromtheoutsetwiththesanctionsandattributesofareligion.Adivineoriginwasascribedtothebooksinwhichitwastaught(theBrahmanasandUpamshads)ândtheycouldbeobtainedonlyfromthepriests.HenceBrahmanismmaybecalledasacred,hieraticortheologicalmetaphysic,andalreadyintheeighthcenturyB.C.thesupremacyofthepriestlycasteamongtheHindusseemstohaverealisedinitsfashionthatsocialandspiritualsovereigntyofthephilosopher-priestandthereligionofsciencewhichwasthedreamofcertainnineteenth-centurythinkers.

Itistruethatthesciencewhichthosethinkerswishedtoinvestwithasacredcharacterwasthescienceofphenomena,or,asitwastermed,positivescience,whichisnotwisdom,evenhuman,and,asAugusteGomtejustlyobserved,isincapableofproducingorderinanydepartment.ThehumansciencetowhichBrahmanismgaveadivinecharacterwas,onthecontrary,thescienceofultimaterealities,metaphysics,humanwisdominthestrictsense:apowerfuleffortofmetaphysicalthought(sofaraswecanjudgeofit


fromdocumentswhoseinterpretationisstillfarfromcertain),buttheproductofreasonstilluntrained,incapableofmaidngthenecessarydistinctionsandofavoidinginternalcontradictions,seducedbythedreamofanintuitiveknowledgeoftheAll,angelicratherthanhuman,anddoomedbyitsveryambition.Thissystem,atleastwhenweconsideritspredominanttendencies,taughtthattheFirstPrincipleoftheworld,namedBrahmaôrAtman,^constitutesinhimselftheintimaterealityofeverythingwhichtrulyexists,whencelogicallyfollowspantheism,ortheidentificationofGodwithhiscreation.^Nevertheless,

1Fromthenameoftheoccultandsacredforcewhichgaveritualitsefficacyandpervadedallthings.OriginallyregardedasthefirstemanationofthesupremeGod,itbecamefortheBrahmanstheuniquesourceofbeing.Themasculinenoun,Brahma,designatestheFirstPrincipleasGodandLord,theneuter,Brahman,astheoneimp>er5onalsubstance.

2Fromthenameoftheprincipleoflife(the"self"transcendingthephenomenalindividual),whichwasregardedasanimatingmanandtheimiverse.

'Thetermpantheismisrelativelyrecent,havingbeenintroducedintothevocabularyofphilosophybyTolandintheeighteenthcentiiry.ButthedoctrineitdesignatesisasancientastheearUestphilosophicalerrors.

Forasystemtobepantheistic,itneednotexplicitlyidentifyGodandcreatures(veryfewpantheistsfulfilthiscondition).ItissufficientthatitsteachingsarelogicallyineconcilablewithanabsolutedistinctionbetweenGodandcreatures.

ThisobservationisparticularlyimportantforthestudyofOrientalphilosophies,ofwhichpantheismistheoriginalsin.Indeed,itarisesintheircasefromtheverymethodofthoughttheyemploy,whichappearstoconsistprimarilyinthetreatmentofanalogousconcepts(realiseddifferentlyindifferentobjects)asthoughtheyexistedassuchoutsidethemind,whichledthemtoconcludethatthingswhichremainthesamebecomeondifferentplanesofrealityessentiallydifferent.Forexample,Atmanisboththesupremeprincipleoftheuniverse,transcendingallmultipUcity,andtheprinciplewhichdistingiiishesandconstituteseverypersonality.LiketheSchoolmen,butfor


anattemptwasmadetoavoidthisconclusion.TheSupremePrinciple,whichpossessesneitherpersonalitynorknowledge,towhichnoattributecanbeapplied,whichisabsolutelyunknowablebyanyconcept,howeveruniversal,notevenbytheconceptofbeing,sothatitmustbecalledNothingorNon-Being,isthesoletruereality.Thereforetheexistenceofeverythingmultipleorlimited,everythingwecanknowbyoursensesorevenbyourconcepts,isassuchillusion,mereappearance.Thisisidealism,thedenialoftherealityoftheworldandofthings.Butthebareexistenceofthisappearanceorillusionisanevil,indeedevilpureandsimple.TheexistenceofindividualobjectsandofthiscosmicdelusionwhichiscalledNature(Maya),andwhichkeepsuscaptivesofthemanifoldandthetransitory,isessentiallyevilandthesourceofallsuffering.

Theproblemofevil,therefore,seemstodominatetheentirespeculationoftheIndianmetaphysicians,asalsoofthePersiansages.ButthePersians,whosebentwaspractical,alwaysconsideredevilundertheaspectofsin,and,obsessedwiththedifferencesbetweenmoralgoodandevil,whichtheyattemptedtouseasa

criteriontodividebeingsintotwometaphysicalcategories,endedindualism.TheHindus,onthe

differentreasons,theIndiansdistinguishbetweenthepersonality(whichisforusthespiritualsubsistenceofthesoul)andthematerialindividuality(whicharisesfromthedispositionsofthebody).

Thismodeofthought,whichwemeetagainmoreorlessemphasizedineverydoctrineoftheosophicorientation,makesitpossibletoavoidtheappearanceofpantheism,becauseitsinherentself-contradictionpermitstheaffirmationofessentialdifferencesbetweentermswhichshouldlogicallybeidentified.But,preciselybecausetheseaffirmationsareonlypossibleinvirtueofafundamentalself-contradiction,itinevitablyinvolvesarealpantheism.

PRE-PHILOSOPHICTHOUGHT

contrary,exclusivelyoccupiedwithcontemplation,regardedevilpre-eminentlyundertheaspectofsuffering,orratherprivation,inthesenseinwhichmetaphysiciansunderstandtheterm.^Ledastraybyaprofoundrealisationofagreattruthwhichtheywereunabletoapprehendclearly(forwhileitisverytruethatitwerebetterforusnottoexistthantoexistwithoutbeingimitedtoGod,theybelieveditwerebetterforallthingsnottoexistthantoexistwithoutbeingGod),theyendedinapessimismwhich,thoughundoubtedlyverydifferentfromtheromanticpessimismofaSchopenhauer,wasprimarilythebarrenrenunciationofaproudintellect,andattemptedtobeself-sufl5cient.

What,then,intheirconceptiondidwisdomteachman?Ittaughthimtofreehimselffromsufferingandillusion,andwiththatobjecttoridhimselfofallindividualexistence.TheBrahmansheldthedoctrineofthetransmigrationofsouls,ormetempsychosis;theybelievedthatsouls,onthedeathoftheorganismwhich

1FromthispointofviewIndianspeculationmaybesaidtoaffordaprominentexampleofpuremetaphysicalintellectualism.Regardingthingssolelyfromthestandpointofintellectualspeculationandtheuniversalorder,andnotfromthestandpointoftherectitudeofthehumanwillandthatparticularorderbywhichmanisorderedtohislastend,itquicklycametolosesightalmostentirelyofthenotionofmoralgoodandevil,anditsethicsconsistsprimarilyinametaphysicalpurification,directedexclusivelytoaparticularidealofintellectualknowledge.

Ananalogoustendencyisobservableineverysystemwhichconfusesbyanexaggeratedintellectualismthemoralwiththemetaphysicalorder(aconfusionwhichisglaringinSpinoza'sEthics,forexample)and,failingtorecognisethatGodisnotonlytheprovisoruniversalisofcreation,butalsotheprovisorparticularisofthemorallife(cf.St.Thomas,Sum.TheoLi,q.103,a.8,withCajetan'sCommentaty),endsbyclaimingtotranscendthedistinctionofgoodandevilanddenyingtheexistenceofmoralevil.


theyhadanimated,passedintoanotherorganism,thuslivingsuccessivelyindifferentbodiesofmen,animals,orplants.^Thepunishmentofthewickedandfoolishconsistedaccordinglyincontinuingtoundergoinaseriesofreincarnationsthepainofindividualexistence.Thesoulofthewiseman,onthecontrary,wasdeliveredfromtheyokeoftransmigration;absorbedorreabsorbedinAtman,itescapedthesufferingsoftheworldbylosingalldistinctiveindividuality.

TheethicsofBrahmanismteachesthemeanswherebythisdeliverancecanbeachieved;thewisemanprogressestowardsthatgoalinthislifebymeansofcontemplation.Brahmanismunderstandsthatcontemplationisabeginningofbeatitudeinthislife;but,asitmistakesthenatureofbeatitude,soitmistakesthenatureofcontemplation.Thecontemplationwhichitclaimstoteachis,infact,onlyametaphysicalcontemplation,orratheraspeciesofsupra-rationalvision,whichitexpectstoachievebythemerelynaturalpowersofthecreatedintellect;unlikeChristiancontemplation,itistheproductoftheintellectalone,notofsupernaturalcharityandthe

1S05atleast,metempsychosisiscurrentlyunderstood.Itisnotunlikelythatthisinterpretationofthedoctrineisthepopulartranslationofadoctrinelesscrude,accordingtowhicheverybeingpassesthroughanindefiniteseriesofstatesorcyclesofexistence,eachofwhichisonlylivedonce,andourearthlyexistenceissimplyoneparticularstateamongmanyothers.Ifthisbethecase,thedoctrineofsuccessivereincarnationsoriginatedinanunintelligentdistortionofthistheory,stillfurthercorruptedwhenitwasintroducedintotheWest.(Thepossibility,however,remainsthatoriginallythePythagoreansandOrphicsunderstoodthetransmigrationofsoulsinasymbolicsense.)

Itisalsopossible,onthecontrary,thatthetheoryinquestionwasalearned

interpretation,elaboratedbytheIndianmetaphysicians,ofapopularbeliefintransmigration.


infusedwisdomwhichaccompaniesit.ItsaimisunionwithGodbyknowledge,notbylove.Insteadofadmittinganactivityoverflowingfromitsownsuperabundance,itwithdrawsfromactivityofanykind,whichitabandonswhollytotheinferiorpowers.Bythismetaphysicalcontemplation,Brahmanismproposestoputusgraduallyinpossessionofourlastendandinitiateusintotheblessedstateofthedelivered.Sinceitthusstrivestoreachbyman'sunaidedpowersheightswhichgracealonecanattain,itresultsinapseudo-mysticismofapurelyintellectualcharacter(incontrasttoother,purelyemotional,formsoffalsemysticism)inwhichthewiseman,hopingnotonlytobeunitedwithGod,buttoblendwithhim,intoxicateshimselfnotwithGod,butwithhisownself-annihilation.Hence(apartfromthoseinstancesofgenuinespiritualitywhichgraceisalwaysfreetoproduce)ahostofcounterfeitsofsupernaturalmysticism,alsoofasceticexercisesandmethods,includingamongtheirbaserforms(withthefakirs)thosetoursdeforceofexaggeratedasceticismwhichprovethatthemortificationoftheflesh,whennotregulatedbyreasonanddictatedbylove,canbeasfallaciousaspleasure.NaturalismisthusthefinalcharacteristicandthecapitalviceofBrahmanism,âsindeedofphilosophicmysticismingeneral,whetheritbetheproductofBrahmanism,Buddhism,neo-Platonism,orIslam.

(ii)Fromthesixthcenturyonwardsnewschools

^WedonotmeanthatBrahmanismdescendstotheadorationofsensiblenature,abovewhich,onthecontraryitclaimstorisecompletely.Bytheterm"naturalism"weheremeantheclaimtoarriveatunionwithGodandperfectionwithoutthesupernaturalassistanceofgrace.


aroseinIndia,someorthodox,othersheterodox.OfthesetheprincipalwasthatfoundedbyCakya-Muni,surnamedtheBuddha^(theenlightened,thesage).Buddhism,adoctrineessentiallynegativeandsolvent,directed,moreover,topracticeratherthantospeculation,mayberegardedasthecorruptionanddissolutionoftheBrahmanphilosophy.

Substitutingforthatwhichisthatwhichpassesaway,refusingtosaythat

anythingdoesordoesnotexist,andadmittingonlyasuccessionofimpermanentformswithoutfixedfoundationorabsoluteprinciple—inotherwordssubordinatingbeingtowhatisknownasbecomingorferi—îtshowed,attheverytimeatwhichinGreeceHeraclitusformulatedthephilosophyofflux,allthecharacteristicsofaperfectevolutionarysystem,and,ifitdeclaredtheexistenceofGod,asofasubstantialselfandanimmortalsoul,unknowable{agnosticism),itsrealtendencywastodenytheexistenceofGod(atheism),andtosubstituteforsubstanceofanykindastreamorflux,regardedindeedâsitselfreal,offormsorphenomena(phenomenalism).^HenceforBuddhismmetempsychosisconsistsinacontinuouschainofthoughtsandfeeHngs(astreamofconsciousness,asweshouldtermitto-day)passingfromonemodeofexistencetoanotherinvirtueofasortofurgetowardsUfe,dueitselftothedesiretolive:itisdesirewhichisthe

"HisactualnamewasGautama.ThenameCakya-Munimeanstheasceticorhermit{muni)oftheraceorclanoftheCakya.BuddhalivedduringthesecondhalfofthesixthcenturyB.C.Hewouldseemtohavediedabouttheyear477.

2AtleastbyBuddha'soriginaldisciples.

'"Ever>'thingisempty,everythingvmsubstantial"wasasayingofBuddha's.


causeofexistenceand"wearewhatwehavethought."

Atthesametime,theteachingofdeliverancefromsuffering,whichinBuddhism,evenmorethaninBrahmanism,dominatestheentiresystem,assumesadifferentandevenmoreradicalform.Evilisnolongermerelythepossessionofindividualorpersonalexistence;itisexistenceitself:itiseviltobe,andthedesireofexistenceistherootofallsuffering.Thewisemanmustthereforedestroyinhimselfman'snaturallongingforexistenceandforbeatitude,thefullnessofbeing;hemustabandonallhopeandextinguisheverydesire.Hewillthusattainthestateofemptinessortoialindeterminationcallednirvana(literallynakedness,metaphoricallyimmortality^refresh-ment,thefartherbank—theterm,initselfindefinite,wasneverdefinedbyBuddha),whichwilldeliverhimfromtlieevilofexistenceandtheyokeoftransmigration,andwhich,inthelogicalconsequenceofBuddhistprinciples,mustberegardedastheannihilationofthesoulitself.Forsincethesoulisonlythechainor

currentofthoughtsandfeelingswhichderivetheirexistencefromthedesiretobe,toextinguishthatdesireistoextinguishthesoul.

ThisnirvanaisthegoalforwhoseattainmentBuddhismmadeuseoftheasceticpracticeswhichittookoverwithconsiderablemitigationfromBrahmanism,alsoofitsmoralcode^whichisthusdirected,nottoGod,buttoaspeciesofmysticalnothingness

*Weheretmderstandmoralcodeinaverywidesenseasmeaningacodeofbehaviour.Iftheexpressionbetakenasimplyingmoralobligation,whoseultimatebasisistheChristiandoctrineofGodthetranscendentCreator,wemustconcludethatBuddhism,asindeedalltheOrientalreligions,IndianorChinese,hasnomoralcode.


asitslastend.Moreover,thesourceandultimatemeasureofBuddhistethicsisman,notGod.Ifitrejectedthesystemofcasteswhichexaggeratedthedemandsofsocialorderanddividedmanalmostintodistinctspecies,itwasonlytodissolvesocialorderofanykindinanabsoluteequalityandindividualism.Andthoughitprescribedauniversalbenevolence(whichextendedeventoprohibitingtheslaughterofanimalsandtoacompulsoryvegetarianism),almsgiving,pardonofinjuries,andnon-resistancetothewicked,itsmotivewasnotloveofone'sneighbourassuch,whosepositivegoodand(byimphcation)existenceweareboundtowill,buttoescapesufferingtooneselfbyextinguishingallactionandenergyinakindofhumanitarianecstasy.Buddhismis,therefore,aproofthatgentlenessandpity,whentheyarenotregulatedbyreasonanddictatedbylove,candeformhumannatureasmuchasviolence,sincetheyarethenmanifestationsofcowardice,notofcharity.

ThisdoctrineofdespairisnotonlyaheresyfromthepointofviewofBrahmanism;itisanintellectualplaguetohumanity,becauseitproceedsfromthenegationofreason.Itisnot,therefore,surprisingthatwefindinitthemajorityofthefundamentalerrorsbywhichcontemporaryattacksonreasonareinspired.IfatthepresentdayithasfoundawarmwelcomeamongcertaincirclesinEurope,itisbecauseallthosewhohopetoderivefromhumanitarianismamoralcodeofhumankindnessfortheacceptanceofanatheisticsocietyarealreadyimplicitlyBuddhists.

(iii)Buddhismisaphilosophy,agnosticandatheistic,whichneverthelessusurpsthesocialand


ritualfunctionsofareligion.Itisasareligionthatithaswontheallegianceofsomanymillions.ÎncertainotherschoolstowhichBrahmanismgavebirth—schoolsrecognisedas"orthodox"—wefind,ontheotherhand,atendencytowardsthenormaldistinctionbetweenphilosophyandreligion.

Thesedarshanas,itistrue,wouldseemtobenotsomuchdistinctsystemsascomplementaryaspectsofoneandthesamedoctrine,theBrahmanistmetaphysics.HerewemaypassovertheVedanta,themostcompletestatementofthatmetaphysicsanditsdoctrineofdeliverance;theMimamsa,aspeciesofcommentaryontheritualandanexplanationoftheunseenforcessetinmotionbyeveryact;theSankhya,founded,itissaid,byKapila(fifthorsixthcenturyB,c.?),whichtreatsoftheemanationofallthingsfromtheirsource,andseemstohavetaught,likePlato,apsychologicaldualismwhichexplziinssufferingbytheunionsoulscontractwithmatter;andalsoToga^whichteachesthepracticalmethodswhichleadtocontemplation,thatistosay,thetotallossofconsciousnessandidentificationwiththeuniversalBeing(Iskvara)byasupra-rationalknowledge.ButthedarshanaVaisesika,ascribedtoKanada(aboutthefourthcenturyB.C.?),whichincludesaroughoutlineofcosmology,anddivideseverythingwhichexistsintoanumberoffundamentalclassesorcategories,substance,quality,movement,association,difference,and

^However,inproportionasithassecuredwideacceptance,Buddhismhasceasedtobeatheistic,onlytofallintothemostdegradedconceptionsofdeity.PopularBuddhismaspractisedto-dayinmanypartsofAsia,where,toadaptitselftoexistingbeliefs,ithasassumedthemostvariedshapes,isnothingmorethanaformofidolatry,totallydifferentfromphilosophicBuddhism.


inherence,andexplainsthefourelementsofponderablematter,earth,water,air,andfire,bytheunionofindivisibleandindestructibleparticles,"atoms"inthelanguageofphilosophy,ândthedarshanaNyaya^foundedbyGotama,whichattemptstoconstructatheoryofreasoningandproof—thatistosayalogic,thoughalogicextremelyconfusedandincomplete—areclearlytherough

sketchesofaworkstrictlyandsolelyphilosophical.Butthesecrudeattemptsdidnotleadtoacompletedsystem,andIndianthoughtneverachievedarationalandautonomousphilosophy.

{c)WhenweturntotheFarEastandconsidertheveryancientcivilisationofChina^^wefindthatwhentheprimitivereligionoftheChinese,whichseemstohavebeenfairlypure,'hadfromthetwelfthcenturyb.c.undergonegrosscorruptionandmaterialisation,substitutingtheskyforGod,*worshippingthesunandmoon,payingdivineworshiptothesoulsofancestorsandtospirits,andallowingitselftobecometaintedbymagicandsorcery,wisemenwerecompelledhere

1Kanada,however,toexplainthisunion,attributedrealqualitiestohisatoms.ObservethatBrahmani^m,whichrejectsatomism,admitsfiveelements(etherbeingthefifth);Buddhismonthecontrary,whichhaswelcomedatomism,onlyfour.

2WhateverbetheracialappurtenanceoftheChinese,theirhistoryundoubtedlyshowscloserconnectionswiththeAryansthanwiththeSemites.ItisforthisreasonthatChinesephilosophyisdiscussedinthepresentsection.

*IttaughttheexistenceofonesoleGod—Shang-ti—personal,intelligent,distinctfromtheworld,SovereignRuleroftheracesofmankind;alsotheimmaterialityandimmortalityofthehumansoul,andevenofferedtothespiritsofancestorsthesamesacrificesandmarksofreverenceastothegoodspiritswhoareguardiansofmen.

*InallprobabilityHeaven{Tien)wasinoriginsimplyametaphoricalsynonymoftheSovereignRuler{Skang-H).


alsotoseekaremedyforadecadencewhichaboutthesixthcenturyB.C.threatenedtheirciviHsationwithutterruin.

IthaslongbeenbeUevedthattheChinesesagesweresimplymoralistswhollyoccupiedwithlayingdownrulesofconductandcompletelyindifferenttometaphysicalspeculation.ThisisatrueaccountonlyofConfuciusandhisfollowers;itdoesnotseemtobeappHcabletoLao-Tse,thoughwecanonlyacceptwithconsiderablereservetheinterpretationsofhisteachingofferedby

certainmodernTaoists.

Accordingtotheiraccount,Lao-Tse(born604b.c)washimselfthediscipleofatraditionwhoseoldestmonumentistheTi-King,abookwhichconsistsessentiallyofsixty-fourgraphicsymbols(hexagramsordoubletrigrams)arrangedinaseriesofmechanicalgroups/formedbycombiningsimplersignsandsusceptibleofverymanyinterpretations(metaphysical,logical,mathematical,moral,political,astronomic),eachnumbercorrespondinganalogicallywiththeothers.ThemetaphysicalspeculationoftheTi-Kingappearstohavebeenprimarilyconcernedwiththequestion,HowcantheAbsolute,beingwhollyself-sufficient,actandmanifestitself?ItdistinguishesinthesupremeandsoleFirstPrincipleorPerfectiontwodifferentaspects,Chien^theunmovirigandunknowablesourceofallactivity,andChuen,knowableactivity,whicheternallymanifestsperfectioninaprocessofspiralevolutionandanendlessfluxofforms.Butthesetwoaspectsmergeinonesingleandself-identicalbeing,andallthings,afterpassingthroughalltheforms

1RaymondLull,inhisattemptstocreateanideographicalgebra,employedananalogousprocedure.


ofevolution(ofwhichthehumancycleisbutonecurve),mustreturntoChien.Thismetaphysicmaythereforebedescribedasaspeciesofevolutionarypantheism.ItconstitutesthefoundationofLao-Tse'ssystem(Taoism),hischiefcontributionbeinganelementofoccultismandasceticism,^Tao(theWay),theeternalgoalandprocessofevolution,istheroadbywhichallthingsmustpasstoarrivefinallyatthecompletecessationofactivity[Nibban,theChinesenirvana),inwhichtheyarereabsorbedinnothingnessandbecomeonewiththefirstprincipleofailactivity.ThewisemanwillimitatetheTaobycuttinghimselfofffromallthings,fortheWay,thoughithasproducedbeings,doesnotpartakeoftheirmovements."Havingbuiltthishouse,itdwellethnottherein."Detachedfromwealth,passions,andsensibleexperience,andknowingthatevilismereappearance,hetrainshimselfinsolitude,secrecy,andhumility(ahumilitywhichhasnothingincommonwiththeChristianvirtueofthatname,beingnothingmorethanprudenceandcontemptforone'sfellowmen),untilhereachesastateofperfectknowledgeinwhichhenolongeractsexceptbythepureintelligence.Thewisdom,theillusorywisdom,towhichTaoistasceticismleadsitsdisciples,anasceticismwhichmakesuseofopium,asBuddhistasceticismofhypnosis,is

formanaprincipleofrevolt,thereforetheadept

1Itmaybeaddedthatinthetwelfthcenturya.d.Chu-Hi,whohasbeenregarded,mistakenlyitwouldseem,asamaterialist,formulated,inthetraditionofLao-Tse,asystemwhichintheChinesesystemofeducationhasbecome,practicallyspeaking,theofficialphilosophy.Itexplainstheconstitutionofthingsbyadualprinciple{liandki)whichisnotwithoutresemblancetothedualityofformandmatterinAristotleandtheAlexandrians.


mustkeepitasecretforhimselfandanarrowcircleofinitiates.*

NodoubtConfucius(Kung-fu-tse,551-479B.C.),who,unlikeLao-Tse,representsfortheChineseamoderateandpracticalwisdom(which,fromitsplaceintheirsystemofeducationanditsownactivecharacter,isgenerallyaccessible),preservedmanytruthsoftheprimitivewisdom.Heavoided,however,everyultimatequestion,andconfinedhimselftoanethicpurelyhuman,social,earthly,andevencommonplace.Opportunism,heobserves,isthedistinctivemarkofthewiseman.Everypredeterminedlineofaction,everypreconceptionisamistake.Inallmattersoneshouldpursueamiddlecourse,liveunfetteredbyonefixedpurpose,embracenoopinionwithenthusiasm,rejectnothingbecauseitisantipathetic,dowhateverseemsbestinthecircumstancesofthemomentandasthesituationdemands.Confucianism,asystemintendedforthemultitude,endedinpurematerialism.Taoism,whichclaimedtoaddressasmallcircle,andwhich,iftheinterpretationgivenabovebecorrect,constitutes,togetherwithBrahmanism,oneofthemostsingularattemptsevermadebymantoattain,inthatignoranceoflovewhichseemsanaboriginalcharacteristicofOrientalthought,awisdomexclusivelyoftheintellect,bywhichhecoulddeifyhimselfinmetaphysics,hasexperiencedinChinaalternateperiodsoftriumphandpersecution,andhasorganised,apparentlyeversincetheopeningcenturiesofourera,secretsocieties

*"Emptytheirheads,andfilltheirbellies,"wasLao-Tse'sadvicetoastatesman;"weakentheirmindsandstrengthentheirsinews.ToteachthepeopleistoruintheState."


inwhichithasdefinitivelytakenrefiigesincetheseventeenthcenturyandin

whichithasdegeneratedintoaphilosophicandpoliticaloccultismofthemostpernicioustype.

Thisbriefhistoricalsketchhasshowntheimportantpartinthehfeofhumanityplayedbysagesandtheirwisdom.Allthesenations,situatedonthefrontiersofdarkness,andlackingadivinerevelationoftruth,wereobliged,whentheirreligionsprovedincapableofsatisfyingtheneedsoftheindividualsoulorofsociety,tohaverecoursetothewisdomsuppliedbyhumanreason.Thiswisdom,inthecivilisationsofwhichwehavespokenhitherto,wasneverdifferentiatedfromreligion,but,onthecontrary,encroachedonthedomainofthelatterandclaimedtoconductmentotheirlastend,untilinIndiaweactuallyfindthatBrahmanismsuccessfullyachievedthatcanonisationofmetaphysicswhichthreatenedtheGreco-Romanworldinthereignoftheneo-Platonicemperor,JuliantheApostate.ItachievedalsothattransfusionintoreligionofahumanphilosophyattemptedbyKantianmetaphysicsinthenineteenthcentury{Modernism).

Ithasalsoshownhowthishumanwisdomhaseverywhereprovedbankrupt,andhow,evenbeforephilosophytookshapeasanindependentdiscipline,mostofthegreatphilosophicerrorshadbeenalreadyformulated.Fromtheveryfirst,themostarduousproblemstowerhkemountainsbeforetheintellectofman;theproblemofevil,theproblemofbeing,theproblemofthebecomingandfluxofthings.Itisnot,therefore,surprisingthatareasonliableto


errorthemomentittranscendedtheelementarytruthswithintherangeofcommonsense,areasonstillunstableandundisciplined,andthereforeallthemoreambitious,wentastrayfromtheoutsetandopenedthehistoryofmetaphysicswiththedualismofZoroasterandthepessimismoftheHindu,thepantheismandidealismoftheBrahmans,theatheisticevolutionismofBuddha,andtheillusorywisdomofLao-Tse.Whenitbecamemoremodest,itwasonlytofallintotheethicalpositivismofConfucius,renouncingallsublimityandevendenyingitsownraisond'etre.Norshoulditsurpriseustofindthesameerrorsreappearingatalaterstage,v/henphilosophyhadbeenfullyelaborated.Error,atwhateverperiodofhumanhistoryitmayarise,isduetoafailureofman'sreasoningpower—is,sotospeak,areturnofitsprimitiveweakness,andthereforeofitsverynatureretrograde.

Afurtherfact,however,callsforremarkhere,afactonlytoowellestablishedbythisprehistory,sototermit,ofphilosophy:namely,thatthesefundamentalerrorsarenotunsubstantialandinsignificantdangers;theymaysucceed,tothebaneofthosediseasedcultureswhichtheycondem.ntosterility.Truth(inallmatterswhichtranscendthedataofcommonsense)isnot,asthoseareapttobehevewhohavehadthegoodfortunetobebomintoacultureformedbyit,giventomanreadymade,likeanaturalendowment.Itisdifficulttoattain,andhardtokeep,andonlybyafortunateexceptionisitpossesseduncontaminatedbyerrorandinthetotahtyofitsvariouscomplementaryaspects.Wehavethereforethemosturgentcausetobegratefulforthepossession


ofarevelation,bywhichGodhasgivenusfromonhigh,besidesaknowledgeofsupernaturaltruthinaccessibletoreason,asureandeasyaccesstotheessentialelementsofthesametruthwhich,sofarasitfallswithinthenaturalorder,isindeedaccessibletoourspeculation,butcanbesoeasilymissedbyit.Thosealsohavethestrongestclaimonourgratitudewhofrombelow,bythestrenuousexerciseoftheirreasonandunaidedbyrevelation,succeededinbringingtolighttheprinciplesandlayingthepermanentfoundationofthisnaturaltruth,andinconstructingatrueandprogressivehumanwisdom,inotherwordsaphilosophy,which,whenmetlaterandraisedbythetruthrevealedfromheaven,wouldbeincorporatedintothefabricofahigherwisdom,theology,thewisdomofmandeifiedbygrace,wisdominthehighestsenseoftheterm.HowhighlythereforeoughtwetoprizethesacredheritageofGreekthought!

InGreeceâloneintheancientworld,thewisdomofmanfoundtherightpath,andastheresultofafortunateharmonyofthesoul'spowersandofalongefforttoachievementalorderanddisciplinehumanreasonattaineditsfullvigourandmaturity.Inconsequence,thesmallHellenicraceappearsamongthegreatempiresoftheEastlikeamanamidstgiganticchildren,andmaybetrulytermedtheorganofthereasonandwordofmanastheJewishpeoplewastheorganoftherevelationandwordofGod.

ItwasinGreecealonethatphilosophyachievedherautonomyandwasexplicitlydistinguishedfromreligion.Atleastduringthepurestandmostglorious


ageoftheHeilenicmind,itrecogniseditsownboundariesandwascontenttoclaimastrictlylimitedterritory—thescientificstudyofpurelyrationaltruths—whereasGreekreligion,alreadyverymuchdegradedinthetimeofHomer,becameincreasinglyincapableofsatisfyingtheneedsoftheintelligence,andgrewmorecorrupteveryday.True,thetimewouldcomewhentheGreeks,arrogantlyabusingphilosophyandreason,wouldattempttoembracethethingsofGodwithinthelimitsoftheirwisdom,"wouldbecomevainintheirthoughts"anddeservethecondemnationpronouncedbySt.Paulonthewisdomofthisworld,"whichisfoolishnessinthesightofGod."Buttheirphilosophy,thoughbornoftheirmind,isundefiledbytheircorruptions,anditssoleobjectisthetruth.

THEPRE-SOGRATIGPHILOSOPHERS

TheearliestthinkersofHeliaswerethepoets,theinterpretersoftraditionalreligion.Myth-makers,likeHesiodorHomer,sometimesprophets,suchasthatEpimenidesofCnossoswhopurifiedAthensfrompestilencebyerectingaltarstounnameddivinities,theyhavenoplaceinthehistoryofphilosophyinthestrictsense,Greekphilosophy,asAristotleshows,onlybeganwithThalesofMiletus,oneoftheSagesorGnomics,wholivedintheseventhorsixthcenturiesB.G.^

TheprimaryaimoftheseSages,traditionallyseveninnumber(theirnamesarevariouslyhandeddownbyancientwriters),wastoimprovetheconductoftheirfellowcitizens.Theiraphorisms,someofwhichPlatoquotesintheProtagoras,donomorethanembodythepracticallessonstheyhadlearnedfromtheirexperienceoflife.Theyweremenofacdon,legislators,ormoralists,menofprudence,butnotyetphilosophers.AloneamongthemThalesembarkedonscientificspeculadon.Geometricianandastronomer,hedemonstratedthatailtheanglesinscribedinasemicirclearerightangles,andappearstohavepredicted—nodoubtowingtohisacquaintancewith

^FortheiragitnentsfromtheearlyphilosophersquotedinthischapterProfessorBurnet'stranslation(EarlyGreekPhilosophy)hasbeenusedIforAristotle'sMetaphysicsProfessorW.D.Ross'stranslation.

46

THEPRE-SOCRATICPHILOSOPHERS

Babylonianscience—thetotaleclipseofthesunwhichoccurredonMay28th,

585.

Thephilosopherswhosucceededhimwerestillforthemostpartmenwhoplayedanactivepartinpublicaffairs,ardentpoliticiansofthecitystate;but,inspiteofthispracticalactivity,theyweremoreorlessclearlyconsciousfromthebeginningofthetruenatureoftheirwisdom.Moreover,saveinthecaseofafewexceptionalindividuals(forinstance,Empedocles,themiracleworker,andPythagoras,whofoundedareligioussect),Greekphilosophywasfromtheveryfirstdistinctfromreligion—indeedittookshapeasacriticandfoeofthepopularmythologyandwasmanifestlytheproductofpurereasoning.

InthisworkweareconcernedonlywiththeprogressivedevelopmentofGreekphilosophyfromThalestoAristotle,foritwasduringthisperiodthatphilosophy,withitsabsolutevalidityformankindasawhole,tookdefiniteshape.Theprocessoccupiedsomethreecenturiesandisdivisibleintothreegreatepochs—theperiodofformation(thepre-Socraticphilosophers),theperiodofcrisis(theSophistsandSocrates),theperiodoffruitfulmaturity(PlatoandAristotle).

THElONIANS

(a)Humanreasonnowsetoutwithitsunaidedpowersinsearchoftheprinciplesandcausesofthings.Whatfirststrikesman'sintelHgenceiswhatheseesandtouches,whatheknowsbyhissenses,andwhenheattemptstounderstandanything,hebeginsbyaskingwhatitismadeof.ThereforethefirstthinkersofHellasonlyconsideredinthingsthematerialofwhich


theyaremade,theirmatter(whatweshalllearntocallthematerialcause),whichtheynaivelytooktobeacompleteexplanationoftheobject.Moreover,sincethemostuniversalandmostimportantphenomenonofnatureischange,especiallythechangebywhichonebodybecomesanother{e.g.breadbecomesflesh,woodfire),theyconcludedthattheoriginalmatterofwhichallthingsarefashionedmustbeidenticalinall,thecommonsubjectofallcorporealchanges.Butsincetheywerestillunabletoconceiveanyimpalpableorinvisibleprinciple,theythoughttheyhaddiscoveredthismatterinsomeoneofthe,elementsperceivedbythesenses.

Thales,forexample(624-546),influencedbytraditionalmythswhichderivedall

thingsfromtheprimordialwaters,andarguingfromthefactthatplantsandanimals"arenourishedbymoisture"andthatthegermofanimallifeismoist,concludedthatwateristhesolesubstance,preservingitsidentitythroughallthetransformationsofbodies.ForAnaximenes(588-524)thissubstancewasair,forHerachtus(540-475?)fire,forAnaximander(610-547)theboundless(bywhichheunderstoodtheindeterminate,arceipov),afusionofallthecontraries.Moreover,water,air,fire,andtheboundlesswereregardedassomethingactive,Uving,andanimate,endowedbyaninternalforcewithamanifoldandunlimitedfecundity.ThiswasthemeaningofThales'sdictum,allthings"arefullofgods,"Travxankripy]6eoiv.^FromthehistoryofthisextremelyprimitiveIonianschool,whosephilosophyistermedhylozoistbecauseitascribedlife(Ccoy))tomatter(uXv)),welearn

1Aristotle,DeAnima,i,5,411a7.48


toregardasthemostelementaryandcrudeofphilosophicdoctrinesthematerialisticmonismwhichteachestheexistenceofaonesinglesubstanceofamaterialnature,andevolutionism^whichattemptstoexplaineverythingbyanhistoricprocessofunfolding,development,orevolutionofsomethingpre-existent.

Evolutionism,which,owing,ontheonehand,toGermanmetaphysics,ontheothertoDarwinandSpencer,becamesopopularinthenineteenthcentury,wasalreadytaughtinGreecebythephysicistsofthesixthandfifthcenturiesb.c.Ânaximanderinparticulartaughttheeternalevolutionofworlds"whichriseandsetatlongintervals,"andheldthatanimalssprangfromthemudoftheseafloor,clothedatfirst,aswithaspeciesofshell,inapricklybarkwhichtheyshedondryland,ândthatmanarosefromanimalsofanotherspecies,'havingbeenoriginallyformedwithinthebodiesoffishes,wherehedeveloped,beingejectedassoonashehadbecomesufficientlylargetoprovideforhimself.*

LaterEmpedoclesofAgrigentum(493-433?),whosespeculationinotherrespectsmarksanadvanceonthatofthelonians,êxplainedtheoriginofUvingbeings

1InIndiaaboutthesamedateBuddhismwasformulating,aswehaveseen,thereligionofevolutionism.

*Plac.Philos.,V,19,i.Dox.430,15.

'Pseudo-Plut.,Strom.,frag.2,Dox,579,17.

*Plut.,Sjmp.,q,viii.579,17.

"ForasinglecorporealsubstanceEmpedoclessubstitutedfourelementsspecificallydifferent,thefourwhichbecamelaterthefourclassicalelementsofancientchemistry—earth,water,air,fire.Hisdominantinterestwastodiscovertheefficientcauseoftheevolutionofthings,whichhebelievedtoconsistinthetwogreatmotiveforcesloveandhate.Empedocleswasnotonlyaphilosopher:hewasalsoamagician,doctor,poet,orator,andstatesman.Aristotleascribestohimtheinventionofrhetoric.


bytheseparateproductionoftheindividualorgansandmembers,e.g.thehead,eyes,arms,whichweresubsequentlyjoinedbychanceineverypossiblecombination,ofwhichonlythosehavesurvivedwhichwerefittedtoUve{cf.theDarwinianprincipleofthesurvivalofthefittest).

Itisalsoworthremarkthat,beforeDemocritus,AnaximanderandEmpedoclesalsosought,Ukethepseudo-scientificevolutionismofmodemtimes,toexplainallthingsmechanically,thatistosay—astheresultofasimpleaggregationofmaterialelementseffectedbylocalmotion.

(b)Amongthesephysicists,asAristotletermedthem,orphilosophersofsensiblenature,mustbereckonedthreegreatthinkers,Heraclitus,Democritus,andAnaxagoras.

(i)HeraclitusofEphesus,âlonelyandproudgeniuswhodespisedthemultitudeandpopularreHgion,drewheroicallyfi*omthethoughtoftheIonianphilosophersitsultimatemetaphysicalpresuppositions,andtherebyfixedforaUsucceedingagesoneofthepossibleextremesofspeculationanderror.Aparticularrealityperceivedinthingshadtakenholdofhisintellectwithsuchforcethathebecameitshopelessslave.Thatrealitywaschangeorbecoming.Hisvisionwassofixedonthechangewhichallthingsundergothathedeclaredthatchangealoneisreal.IlavTapel,aUthingsareinflux;andmenarefoolstotrustinthestabilityoftheirfalsehappiness,"whentheyareborn,theywishtoliveandtomeettheir

^ThedatesofHeraclitiis'sbirthanddeathareuncertain.Hewasinhisa-Kix-fiftheprimeofhisage,about500B.C.

THEPRE-SOGRATICPHILOSOPHERS

doom—orrathertorest—andtheyleavechildrenbehindthemtomeettheirdoominturn."Wedonottouchthesamethingtwicenorbathetwiceinthesameriver.Theverymomentwetouchanobject,ithasalreadyceasedtobewhatitwa5before.Whateverexistschangesfromtheveryfactofitsexistence.

Thatistosaychangehasnoabidingandpermanentsubjectidenticalwithitself,Ukeanivorybilliardballwhichremainsanivorybilliardballwhileitisinmotion.Wearethereforecompelledtopronounceboldlythatthatwhichis(thethingwhichchanges)atthesametimeisnot(becausethereisnothingwhichpersiststhroughoutthechange)."Westepanddonotstepintothesameriver;wcareandarenot."Moreover,contrariesmustbepronouncedidentical.Theseaisthepurestandtheimpurestwater.Goodandillareone.'Noone,"writesAristotleinafamouspassage,"canpossiblyconceivethatthesamethingdoesanddoesnotexist.Accordingtosome,Heraclituswasofadifferentopinion,butwearenotobligedtobelievethatamanreallythinkswhateverhesays.Thereasonoftheopinionheldbythesephilosopherswasthattheonlyrealitiestheyadmittedweresensibleobjects,and,sincetheyperceivedthatsensiblenatureisinperpetualmotion,somehaveheldwithCratylus^thatnostatementcanbemadeaboutit;hewascontenttowaghisfinger."ThisscepticismwastheinevitableconsequenceofHeraclitus'sphilosophyofpureflux,despitehispersonalconviction,

*OneofHeraclitus'smostfamousdisciples.HewasPlato'sfirstteacher.(Aristotle,Metaph.,i,6.)

*Metaph.,iv,5,loioa13.


passionatelyheld,oftherealityandvalueoftruih."Ifyoudonotexpecttheunexpected,"hesaid,"youwillnotfindtruth,foritishardtobesoughtoutanddifficult."

HeracUtusisthusthephilosopherofevolutionandbecoming.Inhisview,allthingsarediflbrentiationsproducedbydiscordorstrife{7z6'kz[io<^Tcar^p

Tcavrcov)ofasinglemobileprinciplewhichheconceivesintheformoffire,afireethereal,living,anddivine.Sofromtheoutsetstandsoutintheclearestlightthatfatalnecessitywhichchainseveryphilosophyofpurebecomingtomonism'ortopantheism^"If,"wroteAristotle,'''youmaintainthatallbeingsareone,yousimplyreturntoHeraclitus'sopinion.Allthingsarethenconfused,goodandevilbecomeidentical,manandthehorseareoneandthesamething.Butthisisreallytomaintainnotthatbeingsareone,butthattheyarenothing."

(ii)BornwithinafewyearsofHeraclitus'sdeath,DemocritusofAbdera(470-361?),whohadamoresuperficialintellectandapredilectionforideaseasilycomprehensible,attemptedtodiscoverinthefluxofsensiblephenomenaapermanentandunchangingelement;butinhissearchforthisunchangingelementhemadeuseofhisimaginationratherthanhisunderstanding.Thereforethesolerealityhewouldrecognisewassomethingwhich,thoughitisinaccessibletothesenses,canneverthelessbeapprehendedbytheimagination—namely,puregeometricalquantityassuch,strippedofallqualities(colourless,

^Thedoctrinethatailthingsareonesinglebeing.'ThedoctrinewhichidentifiestheworldwithGod.*Phys.,i,2,185b19.


scentless,tasteless,etc.),andpossessedsolelyofextensioninthethreedimensionsofspace.Democritusfoundtheexplanationofeverythingintheplenum,whichheidentifiedwithbeing,andthevoid,identifiedwithnonentity.Theplenumwasdividedintoindivisiblepartsofextension("atoms"),whichwereseparatedonefromanotherbythevoidandinastateofeverlastingmotion,anddifferedonlyinshape,ôrder,'andposition.'Theorderoftheuniverseandthestructureofindividualbeingsheattributedtotheblindnecessityofchance.ThusDemocritus*introducedintoGreekphilosophyduringthelifetimeofSocratesthedoctrineofatomismandmoregenerallythephilosophytermedmechanical,whichraisesgeometrytothepositionofmetaphysics,reduceseverythingtoextensionandmotion,andprofessestoexplaintheorganisationoftheuniversebyahostoffortuitouscoincidences.InthisfashiontheParthenoncouldbe"explained"astheresultofthrowingstonesoneonanotherduringanindefinitetermof

Âs,forexample,AdiffersfromN.

»AsANdiffersfromNA.

'AsNdiffersfromthesameletterplaceddifferently:Z.

*AsalsohismasterLeucippus.HadLeucippusandDemocrituscomeinanywayundertheinfluenceoftheIndianphilosopherKanada?Themorelikelyhypothesisisacoincidenceduetosimilarityofintellectualoudook,particularlyifKanada,whosedateisveryuncertain,wascontemporarywithorevenposteriortoDemocritus.Speakinggenerally,thereseemsnoreasontobelievethatOrientalspeculationsoinfluencedGreekthoughtastoteachitinthestrictsenseortransmitanyparticularsystem.That,ontheotherhand,itinfluencedtheGreeksbyarousingaspiritofspeculativeinquiryandprovidingintellectualmaterial(whichtheyalonewereabletotreatscientifically)istheobviousconclusionfromthesimplefactthatGreekphilosophyoriginatedinthoseprovincesoftheHellenicworldwhichwereincontactwiththeEa^t.


years,thetragediesofRacineasduetotheindiscriminateshufflingoftypeforasufficientlengthoftime.

(iii)FinallyAnaxagorasofGlazomenae(500-428),whowasafriendofPericles,andinthematurityofhispowerswhenDemocrituswasbornandHeracUtushadjustdied,turnedGreekphilosophytowardsahighersourceofillumination,andcorrectedratherthancontinuedthespeculationoftheloniansbytheaidofideaswhich,itmustbeconfessed,heeitherworkedoutbadlyorwasunabletouse.

Ontheonehand,heperceivedthatthematerialprincipleofwhichallbodiesareformed,andwhichthelonianshadidentifiedwithoneparticularelement,mustalreadysomehowcontaininitselftheentirediversitytowhichitwillgivebirth:unlesseverythingwereineverything,nothingcouldcomefromnothing.^Hethereforeconcludedthattheprincipleinquestionconsistedofanendlessmixtureofallnaturesandquahtiesinsuchfashionthateachcorporealparticlecontainedwithinitselftheelements{homoeomeries)ofalltherest;forexample,eachparticleofthebreadweeatcontainsinvisibleelementsofthebone,blood,flesh,etc.,whichwillbediscoveredlater,changedonlyintheirrelativeproportions,ineachparticleofbone,blood,flesh,etc.Itwasabizarreconception,and,astaughtbyAnaxagorsis,notworthseriousdiscussion,butneverthelessacrudeadumbrationofAristotle'sgreatconceptionoffirstmatter{materiaprima)which

isnothinginact,butaUbodiesinpotentiality.

1Cf.Aristotle,Phys.,i,4,187a26.Simpliciiu,Phys,,155,23.

THEPRE-SOCRATIGPHILOSOPHERS

Ontheotherhand—anditishischiefclaimtodistinction—herealisedthatthematerialprinciple,thatofwhichallthingsaremade,isinsufficienttoexplainthem.Wemustalsodiscovertheagentthatproducesthem(theefficientormotorcause)andtheendforwhichtheagentacts(thefinalcause).Isit,asPlatowastoasklater,asufficientexplanationofthefactthatSocratesissittinginprisontosaythathehasbone,joints,andmusclesarrangedinaparticularfashion?Wemustalsoknowwhobroughtaboutthatdispositionofthesebonesandmuscles—namely,Socrateshimselfbyhiswill—andwhyhewilledit.

BecauseAnaxagorasarrivedattherecognitionthattheremustnecessarilyexist,besidesthematerialelementsoftheworld,aseparateIntelligence(voui;')towhichtheorderingoftheuniverseisdue,healone,asAristotleremarks"keptsober"whenalltheotherphilosophersofhisperiod,drunkwiththewineofsensibleappearances,"spokeatrandom."^

THEITALIANS

BesidestheschoolofIonianphilosophy,thereexistedintheHellenicworldofthesixthandfifthcenturiesB.C.twoothergreatphilosophicschools—thePythagoreanandtheEleatic.

PythagorasofSamos(572-500;accordingtootherauthorities,582-497),thefounderofaphilosophicsocietyofareligiousandpoliticalcharacter,whichheldthereinsofgovernmentinseveralcitiesofMagnaGraecia(SouthernItaly),andwaslaterdissolvedby

1Metaph.,i,3,984b18.


violence,ûnderstoodthatthereexistedrealitiesofahigherorderthanthoseperceptiblebythesenses.ButitwasbythestudyofnumbersthathehadarrivedattheknowledgeoftheseinvisiblereaUties,whoseimmutableorderdominatedanddeterminedtheprocessofbecoming;andhenceforwardhehad

understandingonlyfornumbers.Notcontentwithteachingthatthereispresentinallobjectsandintheuniverseasawholeahiddenprincipleofmeasureandharmony,hetaughtthatnumbers—bywhichthisharmonyisrevealedtooursenses—arethesoletruereality,andregardedthemastheveryessenceofthings.PythagoraswasnotonlyconversantwiththeimportantobservationsofOrientalastronomy,but,byhisfundamentaldiscoveryoftherelationshipbetweenthepitchofsoundsandthelengthofvibratingstrings,hadreducedtotherigidityofnumericallawsofugitiveaphenomenonassound.Imaginetheawedastonishmentwithwhichhemusthavediscoveredbehindthefluxofsensiblephenomenatheintelligibleconstantandimmaterialproportionswhichexplaintothemathematiciantheregularitiesweobserve.Consider,moreover,themysterioussymbolicvalueofnumbersattestedaUkebythesacredtraditionsofmankindandthemostpositiveofphilosophers(fromAristotle,whopaidhomagetotheholinessofthenumber3,toAugusteComte,whowillconstructanentiremythologyoftheprimenumbers),anditiseasytounderstandhownaturallythethoughtofPythagoras

*Inthissocietyabsoluteobedienceprevailedeveninthespeculativesphere.ItwasinthePythagoreanbrotherhood,notintheschoolsoftheChristianMiddleAges,thateverythingyieldedtotheMagisterdixit,airrbs^<pa


andhisdisciplespassedfromthesigntothecauseandmadethesymbolaprincipleofreality.

Consequently,numericalprincipleswereregardedastheprinciplesofeverythingthatexists;fromtheoppositionbetweenthedeterminateandtheindeterminate(infinite)arederivedallthefundamentalpairsofopposites—oddandeven,theelementsofnumber,theoneandthemany,rightandleft,maleandfemale,restandmotion,straightandcrooked,lightanddarkness,goodandevil,thesquareandthequadrilateralwithunequalsides—whichdeterminethenatureandactivityofthings.Everyessencehasitsnumberandeveryessenceisanumber.Thenumber4,forexample,isnotsimplyafigureofjustice,itconstitutestheessenceofjustice;similarlythenumber3constitutesholiness,thenumber7time,thenumber8harmony,thenumber5theunionofthesexes,thenumber10perfection.Whennumberswhichinthemselvesarenotlocalisedreceiveapositioninspace,bodiescomeintoexistence.Thusallspeculationontheoriginornatureofthingsresolvesitselfintospeculationonthegenesisandproperties

ofnumbers.

Pythagoras,therefore,andhisschool,towhommathematics,musicandastronomyowesomuch,neverarrivedatthetrueconceptionofthefirstphilosophyormetaphysics.Theyachieved,itistrue,adegreeofabstractionsuperiortothatatwhichthelonianshadhalted,anddidnot,likethem,confusemetaphysicswithphysics.Buttheyconfuseditwiththescienceofnumber,intowhich,moreover,theyimportedqualitativeinterpretations;and,consequently,inspiteoftheirefforttoreachtheobject


ofpureintelligence,theywereheldfastinthebondsofimagination.Andif,ontheotherhand,theyperceivedthatthenatureofthingsisintrinsicallydeterminedbyimmaterialprinciplesmorerealandtruerthanthatwhichistangibleandvisible,theywerenotyetabletoattciinthenotionoftheformalcause,whosefullelucidationwasreservedtoAristotlealone.

ItistoPythagoras,aswehavealreadyremarked,thatweowetheterm,philosophy.ApassageofDiogenesLaertius(viii,8)showsthatforhimthedignityofscienceconsistedinitspurelyspeculativeanddisinterestedcharacter,apointonwhichAristotle,atthebeginningofhisMetaphysics,wastoinsiststrongly."Humanlife,"hesaid,"maybecomparedtothepubhcgames,whichattractdiversesortsofmen.Somecometocompeteforhonoursandthecrownsofvictory,otherstotrade,others,themorenoblesort,solelyfortheenjoymentofthespectacle.SimilarlyinUfesomeworkforhonour,othersforprofit,afewfortruthalone;theyarethephilosophers...."PythagorasappearstohavetaughttheunityofGod,whomheregardedasoneomnipresentSpiritfromwhomourspiritsemanated.Hewasthefirsttogivetheuniversethenamey.6a[ioc^,which,liketheLatinmundus,conveystheideaofbeautyandharmony.

Themostfamousandthemostderidedofhistenetswasthedoctrineofthetransmigrationofsouls,ormetempsychosis,whichheprobablyderivednotfromEgypt,asHerodotussuggests,butfromHinduism(bywayofPersia);âdoctrinewhichveryearly

ÂsGomperzobserves,"theAsiaticGreeksandaportionofthepopulationofIndiawerealreadysubject,whenPythagoraslefthis


obtainedinGreecetheadhesionoftheOrphicsandthePythagoreans."Comingonedayuponapuppywhichwasbeingcruellybeaten,"theagedXenophaneswroteofPythagorasinmordantverse,"helamenteditsfateandcriedoutinpity'Stop!Don'tbeathim.Thatisthesoulofoneofmyfriends;Irecognisehimbyhisvoice.*"

ThePythagoreansalsobelievedthattherevolutionofcosmiccyclesmustproducetheeverlastingrecurrenceatenormousintervalsofallthings,reproducedidenticallyeveninthemostinsignificantdetails."AccordingtothePythagoreans,"Eudemustoldhisdisciples,"adaywillcomewhenyouwillbeallgatheredagain,sittingintheverysameplacestolisten,andIshallbetelUngyouthesamestoryoncemore."^

AstronomywasamongthescienceswhichthePythagoreanschoolcultivatedmostsuccessfully.Philo-laus,whotaughtthattheearth,thesun,andallthestarsrevolvedaroundamysteriouscentreoftheuniversefilledwithfire,mayberegardedasadistantprecursorofCopernicus.ButeveninthisspherethePythagoreansbetrayedinthemostflagrantfashionthevicesoftheexclusivelymathematicalmind.

nativeIonia,tothesameruler,Cyrus,thefounderofthePersianEmpire"{ThinkersofGreece,i,3).

Speakingmoregenerally,itwas,itwouldapf>ear,bywayolthePythagoreanschoolthatcertaindistinctivelyOrientalconceptionsandmodesofthoughtfirstenteredGreece,topassfromPythagoreanismtoPlatonismandneo-Platonism,andthence,swollenbyfurtheradditions,intoGnosticismandthemoreorlessundergroimdstreamofheterodoxspeculation.

1Simplicius,Phys.,732,30D.Nietzsche,whowasobsessedanddriventodespairbythethought"oftheeverlastingrecurrenceofthings,"derivedthissingularconceptionfromGreekphilosophy.


"ThePythagoreans,"wroteAristotle/"havingbeenbroughtupinthestudyofmathematics...supposethewholeheaventobeamusicalscaleandanumber.Allthepropertiesofnumbersandscaleswhichtheycouldshowtoagreewiththeattributesandparts,andthewholearrangementoftheheavens,theycollectedandfittedintotheirscheme;iftherewasagapanywhere,theyreadily

madeadditionssoastomaketheirwholetheorycoherent.Forexample,asthenumberioisthoughttobeperfectandtocomprisethewholenatureofnumbers,theysaythatthebodieswhichmovethroughtheheavensareten;butasthevisiblebodiesareonlynine,tomeetthistheyinventatenth—thecounter-earth—notstudyingthephenomenatodiscovertheircausesandtesttheirhypotheses,butimposinguponthephenomenatheirhypothesesandpreconceivedbeliefs,therebyclaimingtoassistGodtofashiontheuniverse."

THEELEATICS

Thoughitcannot,strictlyspeaking,besaidthattheschoolofEleafoundedmetaphysics,sinceitfailedtokeepafirmgraspofthetruth,itmustreceivethecreditofhavingraisedGreekthoughttothemetaphysicallevelandattainedthenecessarydegreeofabstraction.TheoldestoftheEleaticswasXenophanes,awanderingrhapsodist,bornabouttheyear570atColophon,whencehemigratedtoEleainsouthernItaly—banished,nodoubt,bythePersianinvasions.Xenophanespouredscornuponthemythologyofthepoetsandtheopinionsofthecommon

1Melaph.,\,5,986a.DeCaelo,ii,13,293a.60

THEPRE-SOGRATIGPHILOSOPHERS

people."Farbetter,"hesaid,inslightingreferencetothehonourspaidtoathletes,"isourartthanthestrengthofmenandhorses."HetaughttheabsoluteunityofGod,butconfoundedhimwiththeuniverse,declaringinapantheisticsensethatGodisoneandall,evxalTcav.

Butthemostprofoundthinker,indeedthetruefounderofthisschool,washisdiscipleParmenidesofElea(born540),theGreatParmenides,asPlatocalledhim.Transcendingthewôrldofsensiblephenomenaandeventhatofmathematicalformsoressencesandnumbers,heattainedtothatinthingswhichispurelyandstrictlytheobjectoftheintellect.Foritcanscarcelybedeniedthatthefirsttruthaboutthingswhichtheintellectperceivesisthattheyexist,theirbeing.Thenotionofbeing,thusabstracted,impressedParmenidessopowerfullythatitfascinatedhim.AshiscontemporaryHeraciituswastheslaveofchange,Parmenideswastheslaveofbeing.Hehadeyesforonethingalone:whatisis,andcannotnotbe;beingis,non-beingisnot.Parmenideswasthusthefirstphilosopherwhoabstractedandformulatedtheprincipleofidentityornon-

contradiction,thefirstprincipleofallthought.

Andashecontemplatedpurebeing,heperceivedthatthisbeingiscompletelyone,absolute,immutable,eternal,withoutbecoming,incorruptible,indivisible,wholeandentireinitsunity,ineverythingequaltoitself,infiniteândcontaininginitselfeveryperfection.-Butwhilehethusdiscoveredtheattributesofhimwhois,herefusedtoadmitthatanyotherbeing

^Simpiicius,Phys.,144,25-145,23.(Diels,frag.8,22.)'Aristotle,Phys.,i,3.


couldexist,andrejectedasascandaltothereasonthebeingmingledwithnonentity,becauseproducedfromnothingness,ofeverycreature.

Hewasthusledsofarastraythatheascribedtothebeingoftheworldthatwhichbelongsonlytouncreatedbeing.Andratherthanbefalsetowhathebelievedweretheexigenciesofbeingandreason,hepreferredtorefuseheroicallythewitnessofthesensesanddenytheexistenceintheuniverseofchangeormultiplicity.Change,motion,becoming,asalsothediversityofthings,arebutanillusoryappearance.Thereexistsonlybeing,theone.

Doesnotchangeimplythatanobjectbothwasandwasnot(whatitbecomes),andatthesametimecontinuesandceasestobe(whatitwas)?Doesnotmultiplicityimplythatwhatis(this)isnot(that)?Donot,therefore,multiphcityandchangecontradictthefundamentalprinciplethatwhatispossessesinitselfbeingandnotnon-being?

ItwasindefenceofParmenides'sdoctrineoftheimpossibilityofchangethathisdiscipleZenoofElea^(born487)composedhisfamousarguments,bywhichheclaimedtoprovethattheveryconceptofmovementisself-contradictory:argumentsfallacious,nodoubt,butofsingularforceandrefutableonlybythedoctrineofAristotle.

ThusParmenides,reachingtheoppositepoletoHeraclitus,fixed,ashedidonceforalloneoftheextremehmitsofspeculationanderror,andprovedthateveryphilosophyofpurebeing,fortheveryreasonthatitdeniesthatkindofnon-beingwhich

^NottobeconfusedwithZenotheStoic,wholivedmuchlater(350-264)and

wasbornatCittiuminCyprus.

THEPRE-SOGRATICPHILOSOPHERS

Aristotletermedpotentialityandwhichnecessarilybelongstoeverythingcreated,isobligedtoabsorballbeinginabsolutebeing,andleadsthereforetomonismorpantheismnolessinevitablythanthephilosophyofpurebecoming.

THESOPHISTSANDSOCRATES

Thelongeffortofthesespeculativepioneerswhichwehavebrieflyrecapitulatedhadequippedhumanthoughtwithanumberoffundamentaltruths.Butif,lookingbackwardswithaknowledgeofthemightysynthesisinwhichallthosetruths,thenpartiallyperceived,havebeenharmonisedandbalanced,wecancontemplatewithadmirationthegradualformationofthevitalcentresandarteriesofphilosophy,atthetime,infifth-centuryHellas,thesegoodresultswereconcealednotonlybythemedleyofcontradictorytheories,butbythenumberandgravityofprevalenterrors,anditseemedasthoughtheentiremovementhadachievednothingbutdisorderandchaos.

TheGreekthinkershadsetoutwithhighhopesofknowingeverything,andclimbingtheskyofwisdominasinglestep.Asaresultofthisimmoderateambition,andbecausetheylackeddisciplineandrestraintinhandlingideas,theirconceptswereembroiledinaconfusedstrife,aninterminablebattleofopposingprobabilities.Theimmediateandobviousresultoftheseattemptsatphilosophisingseemedthebankruptcyofspeculativethought.Itisnot,therefore,surprisingthatthisperiodofelaborationproducedacrisisinthehistoryofthought,atwhichanintellectualdiseaseimperilledtheveryexistenceofphilosophic

64


speculation.Thisintellectualdiseasewassophistry,thatistosay,thecorruptionofphilosophy.

THESOPHISTS

Sophistryisnotasystemofideas,butaviciousattitudeofthemind.

Superficiallythesophistswerethesuccessorsanddisciplesofthethinkersofanearliergeneration—eventhewordsophistoriginallyborenoderogatorysignificance—inreaHtytheydifferedfi-omthemcompletely.Fortheaimandruleoftheirknowledgewasnolongerthatwhichis,thatistosay,theobjectofknowledge,buttheinterestoftheknowingsubject.

Atoncewanderingprofessorsaccumulatinghonoursandwealth,lecturers,teachersofeverybranchoflearning,journalists,ifonemaysocallthem,supermen,ordilettanti,thesophistswereanythingintheworldbutwisemen.Hippias,whoachievedequaleminenceinastronomy,geometry,arithmetic,phonetics,prosody,music,painting,ethnology,mnemotechnics,epicpoetry,tragedy,epigram,dithyramb,andmoralexhortation,ambassadorofEUs,andjack-of-all-trades(heattendedtheOlympicGamesinclothesmadeentirelybyhimself),remindsusofsomeherooftheItaUanRenaissance.Othersresemblethephilosophesoftheeighteenthorthe"scientists"ofthenineteenthcentury.ButthemostcharacteristicfeatureofallaUkewasthattheysoughttheadvantagesconferredbyknowledgewithoutseekingtruth.

Theysoughttheadvantagesconferredbyknowledgesofarasknowledgebringsitspossessorpower,preeminence,orintellectualpleasure.Withthisinview,


theyputthemselvesforwardasrationalistsandwalkingencyclopaedias;toeveryquestiontheyhadananswerready,deceptivelyconvincing;ândtheyclaimedtoreformeverything,eventherulesofgrammarandthegenderofnouns.^Buttheirfavouritestudywasman,ofallthemostcomplexanduncertain,butoneinwhichknowledgeiseasiestcoinedintopowerandreputation;andtheycultivatedmostassiduouslylaw,history,casuistry,'politics,andrhetoric.Theyprofessedtobeteachersofvirtue.Theydidnotseektruth.Sincethesoleaimoftheirintellectualactivitywastoconvincethemselvesandothersoftheirownsuperiority,theyinevitablycametoconsiderasthemostdesirableformofknowledgetheartofrefutinganddisprovingbyskiliularguments,forwithmenandchildrenalikedestructionistheeasiestmethodofdisplayingtheirstrength,andtheartofarguingwithequalprobabilitytheprosandconsofeveryquestion—anotherproofofacumenandskill.Thatistosay,intheirhandsknowledgealtogetherlostsightofitstruepurpose,andwhatwiththeirpredecessorswassimplyalackofintellectualdisciplinebecamewiththemthedeliberateintentiontoemployconceptswithouttheleastregardforthat

delicateprecisionwhichtheydemand,butforthepure

^Critias,forexample,consideredbeliefinthegodsastheinventionofanastutestatesmanwhosoughttokeepthecitizensobedientbyclothingthetruthinagarmentoffiction.

2ItwasProtagoraswhoattemptedtorationalisethegendersofnouns:desiring,forexample,thatnijvis(anger)shouldbegiventhemasculinegender,alsottt^Xt?^(helmet),etc.

*Recall,forexample,thecelebrateddiscussionbetweenProtagorasandPericlesafteranaccidentalhomicideinthecourseofanathleticcontest,onthequestionwhooughttobepunished:themanwhoarrangedthecontest,theunskilfulplayer,orthejavelinitself.


pleasureofplayingthemoffoneagainsttheother—anintellectualgameofconceptualcountersdevoidofsolidsignificance.Hencetheirsophismsorquibbles.Theirethicswereofapiece.Everylawimposeduponmantheydeclaredtobeanarbitraryconvention,andthevirtuetheytaughtwasinthelastresorteithertheartofsuccess,orwhatourmodernNietzscheanscallthewilltopower.

Thus,ofthespiritwhichhadinspiredtheloftyintellectualambitionsoftheprecedingage,thesophistsretainedonlytheprideofknowledge;theloveoftruththeyhadlost.Moreardentlythantheirpredecessorstheydesiredtoachievegreatnessthroughknowledge,buttheynolongersoughtreality.Ifwemayusetheexpression,theybelievedinknowledgewithoutbelievingintruth.Asimilarphenomenonhasrecurredsinceinthehistoryofthoughtandonafarlargerscale.

Undertheseconditionsthesoleconclusionwhichsophismcouldreachwaswhatistermedrelativismorscepticism.ProtagorasofAbdera(480-410),forexample,maintainedthat"manisthemeasureofallthings—ofwhatis,thatitis,andofwhatisnot,thatitisnot,"bywhichhemeantthateverythingisrelativetothedispositionsofthesubjectandthetruthiswhatappearstruetotheindividual.Andhiscontemporary,GorgiasofLeontini(died375),afamousorator,inhisbookentitledOfMatureortheNon-Existent,taught(i)thatbeingisnot,inotherwords,thatnothingexists:non-existenceisnon-existence,andthereforeitis—

aquibbleonthewordiswhichonedaywouldbeHegel'sgrandmetaphysicalgame—hencebeing,itscontrary,isnot;(ii)thatifanything


existedwecouldnotknowit;(iii)thatifanyonecouldknowanything,hecouldnotcommunicatehisknowledgetoanother.

SOCRATES

ItwasSocrates(469-399)whosavedGreekthoughtfromthemortaldangerintowhichthesophistshadbroughtit.Exceptforthefactthathetooknofeesforhisinstruction,hismannerofUfewasexternallythesameastheirs.Likethem,hespenthistimeindiscussionswithyoungmen,anditisnotsurprisingthatasuperficialobserver,suchasAristophanes,confusedhimwiththesophists.Inreality,hewagedagainstthemanunrelentingwarandopposedthemateverypoint.Thesophistsclaimedtoknoweverythinganddidnotbelieveintruth;Socratesprofessedignoranceandtaughthishearerstoseeknothingbutthetruth.Thushisentireworkwasaworkofconversion.Hereformedphilosophicreasoninganddirectedittothetruth,whichisitspropergoal.

ThisworkwasofsuchimportanceforthefiitureofthehumanintellectthatitisnotstrangethatSocratesaccomplisheditasamissiondivinelyimposed.Hepossessednotonlyanextraordinarypowerofphilosophiccontemplation(weareinformedbyAulusGelliusandPlatothathesometimespassedentiredaysandnightsmotionless,absorbedinmeditation)butalsosomethingwhichhehimselfregardedasdaimonicorinspired,awingedfervour,afreebutmeasuredforce,evenperhapsattimesaninteriorinstinctofahigherorder,giftssuggestiveofthatextraordinaryassistanceinregardtowhichAristotle


saidthatthosewhoaremovedbyadivineimpulseneednoguidanceofhumanreason,sincetheypossessinthemselvesabetterprinciple.^HecomparedhimselftoagadflysenttostingtheAtheniansawakeandforceupontheirreasonaconstantexaminationofconscience,aservicewhichtheyrepaidwithhemlock,thusaffordingtheagedSocrates,alreadyonthevergeofthegrave,opportunityforthemostsublimedeathtowhichmerelyhumanwisdomcanlead.

(a)Socrateswasnotametaphysician,butapractitioner,aphysicianofsouls.His

businesswasnottoconstructasystem,buttomakementhink.Thiswasthemethodbywhichhecouldbestconquerasophistrywhoseradicalvicewasnotsomuchanerrorofdoctrineasadeformityofthesoul.

ForthechieftopicofSocrates'sdiscussionswastheproblemoftheconductofhumanHfe,themoralproblem.Hisethics,asfaraswecanjudgeitbythereportsofPlatoandXenophon,seemsatfirstsighttohavebeendictatedbynarrowlyutiUtarianmotives.WhatIoughttodoiswhatisgoodforme,andwhatisgoodformeiswhatisusefultome—reallyuseful.Butatoncetheneedbecomesevidentofdiscoveringwhatisreallyusefultoman;andatthispointSocratescompelledhishearerstoacknowledgethatman'strueutilitycanonlybedeterminedbyreferencetoagood,absolute,andincorruptible.Bythusconstantlyraisingthequestionofman'slastend,ânddirectingmentowardstheirsovereigngood,hewentbeyondutilitarianismofeverydescription,and,

^Magn.Moral.,vii,8.Cf.Eth.,vii,i.

'Aquestionwhichhehimselfseemstohaveansweredsomewhatambiguously.


withthefullforceofasanecommonsense,vindicatedthesupremacyofmoralgoodandourgreateternalinterests;hisethicsthuspassedoverintothemetaphysicalsphere.InthesecondplaceSocratesprovedbyeverymethodofargumentthatinordertobehaverightlyman'sfirstrequisiteisknowledge;heevenwentsofarastomaintainthatvirtueisidenticalwithknowledgeandthereforethatthesinnerissimplyanignorantman.Whateverwethinkofthismistake,thefactremainsthatforSocratesethicswasnothingifnotacollectionoftruthsestablishedbydemonstration,arealandagenuinescience.Inthistwofoldcharacter,metaphysicalandscientific,ofhismoralteaching,hestoodinradicaloppositiontothesophists,andmayberegardedasthefounderofethics,

{b)Butitwasimpossibletofoundscientificethicswithoutdefiningatthesametimethelawswhichdeterminescientificknowledgeofeverydescription.HerewereachtheessenceoftheSocraticreform.Byreturningtoreasonitselftostudytheconditionsandvalueofitsprogresstowardstruth,thatistosay,bytheuseoflogicalandcriticalreflection,Socratesdisciplinedthephilosophicintelligence,showedittheattitudetoadoptandthemethodstoemployinordertoattaintruth.

Thefirstrequisitewastocleansethemindofthefalseknowledgewhichpretendstogettothebottomofthingswithafewfacileideas.Thatiswhyhealwaysbeganbyleadingthosewhomheentangledinthenetofhisquestionstoconfesstheirignoranceofthatwhichtheyhadbeencertaintheyknewbest(Socraticirony).Butthiswasmerelythepreliminarystageofhismethod.Soonthequestioningbegan


afresh,butitsobjectnowwastoleadSocrates'sinterlocutor,whosethoughtitguidedinthedirectiondesired,todiscoverforhimselfthetruthofwhichhehadadmittedhisignorance.ThiswastheessenceoftheSocraticmethod,hismaieutic,theartofintellectualmidwifery.Moreover,SocratesreaUsedsothoroughlythattheattainmentoftruthisavitalandpersonalactivity,inwhichtheteachercanonlyassisthispupil'sintelUgence,asadoctorassistsnature,butthelatteristheprincipalagent,^thathecomparedtheacquisitionofknowledgetotheawakeningofamemorydormantinthesoul,acomparisonfromwhichPlatowastoderivehisfamoustheoryofreminiscence(dva[xvif)(Ti.(;').

How,then,didthismaieuticformthephilosophicintellect?Bydeterminingitsproperobject,teachingittoseektheessencesanddefinitionsofthings.^Socrateswasneverwearyofrecallingreasontothisoneobject:thatwhichthesubjectofdiscussionis,whatiscourage,piety,virtue,theartofship-buildingorcobbling,etc.Allthesehaveabeingpeculiartothemselves,anessenceornaturewhichthehumanunderstandingcandiscoverandexpressbyadefinitionwhichdistinguishesitfromeverythingelse.BecauseSocratesthusrequiredthattheessentialshouldinallcasesbedistinguishedfromtheaccidental,andbecausehepersistentlyemployedhisintellectinthesearchforessences,hisphilosophymaybetermedthephilosophyofessences.Itwasnolongeraquestionofreducingeverythingtowater,fire,numbers,orevenabsolutebeing,noryetoffindingsomeindeterminateconcept

1Cf.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.,i,q.117,a.i.

2Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,xi,4,1078b17-3^'.

AmINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPHY

sufficientlyelastictoenfoldeverythinglikeashapelessmantle.Onthecontrary,Socrates'saimwastoattaintheproperintellectualexpressionofeverything—to

defineanddetermineitsessencebyaconceptapplicableonlytoitself.

AtthesametimeSocratestaughtthereason,ifnotbyafinishedtheoryofratiocination,orbyconstructing,asAristotlewouldconstructlater,alogicofsyllogismanddemonstration,atleastpracticallyandofsetpurpose,toemployconcepts,not,asinthebarbarousword-playofthesophists,asweaponstodeliverstrokesathaphazard,butinsuchafashionthattheyfittedexactlytheouthneandstructureofreahty.Hethuscreateddialectic,aninstrumentofknowledge,asyetnodoubtdefective,butwhichpavedthewayforthecorrectnotionofscientificknowledge,andwascomparedbyPlatototheartoftheexpertchefwhocutsupafowlbydistinguishingandfollowingcarefullythesmallestjointsofitsanatomy.

(c)Thusthisunwearieddisputer,forallhissuperficialscepticism,possessedaninvincibleconfidenceintheintellectandinscience—butofanintellectdisciplined,humbleinitsattitudetowardsreality,andascienceawareofitslimitations,advancingsuccessfiillyandsecurelyintheapprehensionoftruthonlysofarasitrespectedthesovereigntyoftherealandwasconsciousofitsignoranceineverydirection.InthiswerecogniseSocratesastheteacherofthescientificspirit,asalsoofthephilosophywhichweshalllearntoknowasmoderateintellectualism.Byhislogicalandcriticalworkheforgedtheinstrumentindispensablefortheprogressofthemindandturned


thecrisiscreatedbysophistrytotheprofitandsalvationofreason.Byhisworkasateacherofmorality,henotonlyfoundedthescienceofethics,butUberatedthoughtfromthefascinationofthesensible,andunintentionally,perhaps,setphilosophicspeculationontheroadtometaphysics,wisdominthestrictsense.Thishedidsimplybyraisingphilosophy(thiswasthetruesignificanceoftheSocraticdemandforself-knowledge)fromexclusiveoccupationwiththephysicaluniverse^tothestudyofhumannatureandhumanactivities,whichcontainaspiritualelementofahigherorderaltogetherthanUiestarsortheentireuniverseofmatter.

ButSocrateswasnomorethanapioneerofgenius.Hegavetheimpulse,butneverreachedthegoal.Whenhediedeverythingwasstillintheair.Formethodisnotenough,asystematicbodyofdoctrineisnecessary;andSocrates,thoughhisteachingwasfertileinfruitfulhints,possessed,apartfromtheelementsof

ethics,nodoctrineinthestrictsense.ThedoctrinalcompletionofhisworkandtheconstructionofthetruephilosophywerereservedforPlatoandAristotle.

1Parmenideshimselfarrivedatthemetaphysicalconceptionofbeingbyanexclusiveconsiderationofthecorporealimiverse.

PLATOANDARISTOTLE

SoundoctrinalwasSocrates'steachingthathisdisciplesdevelopeditalongverydivergentlines.ThephilosophersknownastheminorSocratics,whoseizeduponsomepartialaspectoftheMaster'sthought,whichtheydistortedmoreorless,wereeithermoralistspureandsimple(liketheCyrenaics,^whoplacedman'slastendinthepleasureofthemoment,andtheCynics,^who,goingtotheoppositeextreme,deifiedforceofcharacterorvirtue),orlogiciansinfatuatedbytheloveofargument(eristics),liketheneo-sophistsofElisandespeciallyoftheschoolofMegara,'whotendedtodenythepossibilityofknowledgeand,bycompellingphilosopherstofindanswerstotheirarguments,indirectlycontributedtotheprogressoflogic.TheMegariansdeniedthatinanyjudgmentonethingcouldbepredicatedofanother.Accordingtothem,thisamountedtoaffirmingthatthepredicatewasthesubjectandthuseverythingbecameidenticalwith

1TheleadingphilosophersofthisschoolwereAristippusofGyrene,TheodoretheAtheist,Hegesias,andAnniceris.

2ThenamewasderivedfromthegymnasiuminAthens(Kwdaapye^)whereAntisthenestaught.ThechiefCynicswereAntisthenes(born445B.C.),DiogenesofSinope(400-323),andCratesofThebes.

*TheprincipalrepresentativesoftheschoolofEliswerePhaedoandMenedemus,oftheMegarian,EuclidofMegara(nottobeconfusedwithEuclidthegeometrician),EubulidesofMiletus,DiodorusCronos,andStilpo.

74

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everythingelse.Hencebeingexistsisthesolelegitimateproposition,andtheEleaticmetaphysicstheonlytruephilosophy.

PLATO

TheappellationmajorSocraticsbelongsonlytoPlato,Socrates'sintellectualheir,andhisdisciples.Plato(427-347),^whosefatherwasofroyaldescentandwhosemothertracedherpedigreetoSolon,ambitioustoreignaskingintheintellectualdomain,endeavouredtocombineinthepowerfulunityofanoriginalsystemtheentirehostofspeculationswhichhefoundscatteredandfragmentaryintheconflictingsystemsofhisphilosophicpredecessors.Withhimphilosophyattainedhermajority.ButtheworkwhichheattemptedandwhichtheSocraticreformhadmadepossibleremainedincompleteanddefective.Undertheimpulseofhisloftyanddaringgenius,theintellectsoaredtoofastandtoohigh,andfailedtoachievebyafinalvictorytheconquestofreaHty.

(fl)LikeParmenides,PlatounderstoodthatthesubjectofmetaphysicsisbeingitselfButherefusedtoabsorbeverythingwhichexistsintheunityofimmutableandabsolutebeing.Andhewasthusledtothediscoveryofimportantmetaphysicaltruths.Heperceivedthat,sincethingsaremoreorlessperfect,moreorlessbeautifulandgood,moreorlessdeservingoflove,andsincetherearethingswhosegoodnessismixedwithevil—whichinphilosophicterminologyparticipateingoodness—theremustneces—

1Afterextensivetravels,PlatosettledinAthens,v^'herehepurchasedtheestateofacertainAcademustobethehomeofhisschool,knownthereforeastheAcademy.


sarilyexistabeinginwhichgoodness,beauty,andperfectionarefullandentire,unmingledwiththeircontraries,abeingwhichisthegroundofthebeautyandgoodnessofeverythingelse.HisthoughtthusascendedtothetrueGodtranscendingtheworldanddistinctfromit,whomhesawasgoodnessitself,theabsolutegood,thegood,sotospeak,inperson.ButthiswasnotthemostprominentaspectofPlatonism.Aswepointedoutabove,Socrates'sphilosophy—aphilosophyrathersuggestedbyhispracticethanformulatedtheoretically—wasthephilosophyofessences;Plato'sphilosophywas,beforeeverythingelse,thephilosophyofideas.

Socrateshadshownthatwhatwemustseekandattainatallcostaretheessencesofthingswhichthemindapprehendsandexpressesinadefinition.What,then,is

itwliichtheintellectperceiveswhenitapprehendstheessenceofaman,atriangle,white,orvirtue?Clearlyman,abstractingfromPeter,Paul,John,etc.,triangle,abstractingfromanyparticulartriangle,isoscelesorequilateral,andsimilarlywhiteandvirtue.Moreover,theconceptorideaofmanortrianglepersiststhesamewhenappliedtoahostofmenortrianglesindividuallydifferent.Inotherwords,theseideasareuniversals.Further,theyareimmutableandeternalinthissense,thatevenif,forexample,noactualtriangleexisted,theideaoftriangle,withallthegeometricaltruthsitinvolves,wouldremaineternallythesame.Moreover,theseideasenableustocontemplate,pureandunalloyed,thehumanity,triangularity,etc.,inwhichthedifferentbeingsweknowasmen,triangles,etc.,participate.Failingtoanalysewithsufficientaccuracythenature

PLATOANDARISTOTLE

ofourideasandtheprocessofabstraction,andapplyingtoohastilyhisguidingprinciple,thatwhateverexistsinthingsbyparticipationmustsomewhereexistinthepurestate,Platoarrivedattheconclusionthatthereexistsinasupra-sensibleworldahostofmodelsorarchetypes,immaterial,immutable,eternal,maningeneralormaninhimself,triangleinitself,virtueinitself,etc.Thesehetermedideas,whicharetheobjectapprehendedbytheintellect,thefacultywhichattainstruth—thatistosay,theyarereality.

Butwhat,then,isthestatusofthesensibleworld?Whatarewetothinkoftheindividualchangingandperishablethingsweseeandhandle?Sincetheyarenottheideas,theyarenotreality.Theyare,asHeraclitustaught,merebecoming.Platodidnotdenytheirexistence,butregardedthemasfeebleanddeceptiveimagesofreality,theobjectofopinion(Soâ),notofcertainortrueknowledge,fleetingasshadowscastuponawall.Man,therefore,captiveofthebodyandthesenses,islikeaprisonerchainedinacave,onthewallofwhichheseespassbeforehimtheshadowsofthelivingbeingswhomovebehindhisbackinthesunlight—fugitiveshadows,evadinghisgrasp,oftheidea-substanceslitbytheSunoftheintelligibleworld,Godortheideaofthegood.

But,afterall,isametaphoranexplanation?ThePlatonicideasarethatinvirtueofwhichthingspossesstheirspecificnatures—maninhimselforhumanityisthatwhichmakesSocratesaman,thebeautifulinitselforbeautyisthatwhichmakesAlci-biadesorGalliashandsome.Inotherwords,thePlatonicideasaretheessencesandtheperfectionsofthings.But,ontheotherhand,theyare

distinct


fromthings—belong,indeed,toanotherworld.How,then,arewetoexplaintherelationshipbetweenthingsandtheirideas?Platorepliedbycallingthemlikenessesorparticipationsoftheideas.Buttheseterms,whichlaterwillreceiveinScholasticismaprofoundsignificance,areinPlato'ssystemnothingmorethanmetaphorsdevoidofstrictlyintelligiblecontent.Andthefurtherquestionimmediatelyarises,whyandhowanythingexistsexceptideas—thatistosay,anythingnotpurereality.Inotherwords,Platohastoexplainwhatthethingiswhichparticipatesintheideas,receivestheirlikenessorreflection.Platorepliedthatitismatter(ortheboundless,(ScTCEtpov).Andsincetheideasarethatwhichis,hewascompelledtoregardmatterasthatwhichisnot,asortofnon-existentbeing:apregnantconceptionwhich,inAristotle'shands,wastobepurgedofallinternalcontradiction,butwhich,aspresentedbyPlato,seemsself-contradictory,themoresosinceheconfusesitelsewherewiththepurespaceofthemathematician.

{b)Undisturbedbythesemetaphysicaldifficulties,Platoproceededtobuildup,inaccordancewithitsinnerlogic,theedificeofhissystem.Forthetheoryofideasinvolvedanentiresystemofphilosophy,embracingthenatureofknowledge,man,andthephysicaluniverse.

Humanknowledgewasdividedintotwototallydifferentcategories:imagination(elxacria)andopinion(Soâ),whichareconcernedwiththatwhichofitsnaturecannotbetheobjectofknowledge,thevisibleandcorruptibleworldanditsdeceptiveshadows;and

PLATOANDARISTOTLE

intellectualknowledge(voyjcji,!;'),whichisconcernedwithintelligiblethingsandisitselfsubdividedintoreason(Siavoia),whoseobjectismathematicalnumber,andintellect(vou(^),whichrisesbymeansofdialectictotheintuitivecontemplationoftheidea-essencesandfinallyofGod,thesuper-essentialgood.

Platohadnowtoexplainthisintellectualknowledge,theoriginoftheideasinourminds,imagesoftheeternalideas.Sincetheseideascannotbederivedfromthesenses,whicharefetteredtoillusion,wemustreceivethemimmediatelyfromonhigh,andtheymustbeinnateinoursoul.Inaformerexistence,before

itsunionwiththebody,thesoulbeheldtheideasandpossessedintuitiveknowledge.Thatknowledgestillremainswithus,but,cloudedanddarkenedbytheUfeofthebody,itabidesinthesoulasadormantmemory,anditisbygraduallyrevivingitthatthequestofwisdomenablesustoreconquerouroriginalintuitionoftruth.Thusmanisapurespiritforciblyunitedwithabody,asitwereanangelimprisonedintheflesh{psychologicaldualism).Thehumansoullivedbeforeitanimatedthebody,towhichitistiedasapunishmentforsomepre-natalsin,andafterdeathitentersanotherbody;for,whilePlatobelievedintheimmortalityofthesoul,healsoheldthePythagoreantenetoftransmigration,ormetempsychosis.

Sincethephysicalworldisnotanobjectofknowledge,Platocanspeakofitonlyinfablesormyths,whichhedevelopswithalltheresourcesofaconsummateart,althoughtheyserveonlytodisguisetheimpotenceofhisphilosophytoaccountformaterialreality.


Itisinhismythsthatheascribestheproduction,orrathertheorganisation,oftheworldtoademiurge—whom,intheopinionofmanycommentators,heregardedasdistinctfromGodandinferiortohim—andexpoundsthequeernotionthatmanistheoriginofalllivingorganisms:thefirstmencreatedbythegodswereofthemalesex;thosewholedevilliveswerechangedafterdeathintowomen,who,inturn,iftheycontinuedtosin,werechangedintoirrationalbrutes,perhapsevenintoplants.

InethicsPlato,likehismasterSocrates,butmoreclearlythanhe,establishedthefundamentaltruthofmoralphilosophy:neitherpleasurenorvirtuenoranypartialgood,butGodhimself,andGodalone,isthegoodofman.Buthowdoesmanattainhisgood?Bymakinghimself,Platoreplied,aslikeaspossibletoGodbymeansofvirtueandcontemplation.Platoalsoexamined,thoughinadequately,theconceptofvirtue,andoutlinedthetheoryofthefourcardinalvirtues,prudence,justice,fortitude,andtemperance.Hetaughtthatitisbettertosufferthancommitinjustice,andintheRepublic^hepaintssosublimeandsoflawlessaportraitoftherighteoussuffererthatitisasthoughhehadcaughtaglimpseoftheDivdneFace.But,asaresultofhisexaggeratedintellectualism,hefailedtodistinguishtheactsofthepracticalfromthoseofthespeculativeintellectandidentifiedvirtue,whichrequiresrectitudeofthewill,withknowledge,whichisaperfectionofthereasonalone.Hethereforemisapplied

theprinciple,initselftrue,thatthewillalwaysfollowstheguidanceoftheunderstanding,andmaintednedthatsinissimplyduetolackofknow—

ii,362A80

PLATOANDARISTOTLE

ledgeandthatnoonedeliberatelydoesevil:"thesinnerismerelyanignorantperson,"Theconsequenceofthistheory,whichPlatodidnotintend,isthedenialoffreewill.

Plato'ssociologybetraysthesameidealistandrationaHsttendencywhichleadshimtomisapplyanothertrueprinciple,namely,thatthepartexistsforthewhole;sothatinhisidealrepublic,governedbyphilosophers,individualsareentirelysubordinatedtothegoodofthestate,whichaloneiscapableofrights,anddisposesdespoticallyofeverypossiblespeciesofproperty,notonlythematerialpossessions,buteventhewomenandchildren,thelifeandhberty,ofitscitizens{absolutecommunism).

{c)TheradicalsourceofPlato'serrorsseemstohavebeenhisexaggerateddevotiontomathematics,whichledhimtodespiseempiricalreahty.Theywerealsoduetoanover-ambitiousviewofthescopeofphilosophy,inwhichPlato,likethesagesoftheEast,thoughwithgreatermoderationanddiscretion,placedthepurification,salvation,andlifeoftheentireman.

Moreover,itisonaccountofthesefalseprincipleslatentinhissystemthatallthosephilosophicdreamswhichtendinonewayoranothertotreatmanasapurespiritcanbetraceddirectlyorindirectlytoPlato.

ButofPlatohimselfwemaysaythathisfalseprinciplesgrewinanatmospheretoopuretoallowthemtoyieldtheirfullfruitandpoisontheessenceofhisthought.St.AugustinewasthereforeabletoextractfromPlato'sgold-minetheoreoftruth.


Plato'sthoughtworkedonalargescaleandsoughttoembraceallthingsinasinglegrasp.Buthissuperiorwisdomandamazinggiftofintuitionpreventedhimfromfixinginafinalanddefinitestatemenofdoctrinemanyaspeculationwhichfloatedvaguelybeforehismind.Weakpointsonwhichanother

philosopherwouldhaveinsistedhetouchedlightly.Hencewhatinitselfisamarkofimperfection—vagueness,imprecision,hints,neverworkedout,withwhichheisoftensatisfied,amethodofexpositionmoreaestheticthanscientific,employingonlym,etaphorsandsymbols,amethodwhichSt.Thomaswithgoodreasoncriticisesseverely^—wasactuallyhissafeguard,preservinghimfromatoodisastrousdistortionofthetruthshehaddiscovered.FromthispointofviewitmaybesaidthatPlatonismisfalse,ifregardedinesseasafullydevelopedsystem,but,ifregardedinJieriasaprogresstowardsagoalbeyonditself,oftheutmostvalueasastageinthedevelopmentofthetruephilosophy.

ARISTOTLE

ToextractthetruthlatentinPlatonismwasthemightyreformeffectedbyAristotle.AristotlesuccessfullytooktopiecesPlato'ssystem,adaptedtotheexigenciesofrealitytheformalprincipleshehaddiscoveredandmisapplied,reducedhissweepingperspectiveswithinthelimitsimposedbyasublimecommonsense,andthussavedeverythingvitalinhis

1Platohabuitmalummodumdocendi;omniaenimfiguratedicitetpersymbola,intendensaliudperverba,quamsonentipsaverba.(St.Thomas,InIDeAnima,viii.)

PLATOANDARISTOTLE

master'sthought.Hedidmore:hefoundedforalltimethetruephilosophy.Ifhesavedwhateverwastrueandvaluable,notonlyinPlato,butinalltheancientthinkersofGreece,andbroughttoasuccessfulconclusionthegreatworkofsynthesiswhichPlatohadattempted,itwasbecausehedefinitivelysecuredtheattainmentofrealitybythehumanintellect.HisworkwasnotonlythenaturalfiîtofGreekwisdompurifiedfromPlato'smistakesandthealienelementsincludedinPlatonism;itcontained,completelyformedandpotentiallycapableofunlimitedgrowth,thebodyoftheuniversalhumanphilosophy.

BeforeAristotle,philosophymayberegardedasinanembryonicstageandinprocessofcomingtobirth.Thenceforward,itsformationcomplete,itwascapableofindefinitedevelopment,andknewnobounds.Inventumphilosophicumsemperperfectibile.

Infact,GreekspeculationafterAristotlehadspentitsforce,andwasunabletokeepfirmholdofthetruth.Itwouldreceiveconsiderablematerialenrichment,

butinessentialswoulddeforminsteadofperfectingphilosophy.^

{a)FortwentyyearsAristotlewasPlato'sdisciple;buthewasadisciplewiththeequipmentofaformidablecritic.NoonehasrefutedPlato'sidealismmorepowerfullythanhe,ormoreeffectivelydemolishedasystemwhichplacesthesubstanceofthingsoutsidethemselves.

Itisperfectlytruethattheprimaryobjectoftheintellectis,asSocratestaught,theessencesofthings;

^ThisisthereasonwhywehaveendedwithAristotlethisintroductorysketchofthehistoryofphilosophy,ormoreexactlyoftheformationofphilosophy.


perfectlytruealso,asPlatohadperceived,thattheessenceofPeter,Paul,orJohnishumanityorhumannature,abstractingfromtheindividualcharacteristicspeculiartoPeter,Paul,orJohn.Butthisessenceasauniversalexistsonlyintheintellect—inourmind,*whichextractsorabstractsitfromthethingsinwhichitexistsindividualised^—and,ontheotherhand,itissolelyasanobjectofintelligence(inasmuchasitcannotbeconceivedapartfromcertainattributes),andnotinitsrealexistence,thatitiseternalandnecessary.Thereforetheessencesofperishablethingspossessnoseparateexistenceinthepurestate,-andtheentirePlatonicworldofarchetypalideasissheerfiction.Thetruthofthematteris,asweshallprovelaterindetail,thatthereexistsineverythinganintelligibleandimmaterialelement,whichAristotlecallsformînvirtueofwhichitpossessesaspecificnatureoressence.Butthisprincipleisnotseparatefromthings;itinheresinthemasoneofthefactorswhichconstitutetheirsubstance.Thusindividualobjects,thoughmutableandmortal,arenolongerdeceptiveshadows;theyarereality.

Ifrealobjectsofahigherorderexist,nonearemoreimmediatelyaccessibletoourknowledge.Ifthesensibleworldbe,asitwere,animperfectlikenessofthedivinelifeofpurespirit,itisabeingwhichresemblesanotherbeing,notamereimagewhichhasnoexistenceinitself.Iftheworldissubjecttobecoming,itisnotpurebecoming,butcontains

1AndprimarilyintheDivineIntellect,astheSchoolmenweretoexplain,thustakingaccovmtofthetruthcontainedinPlato'sexemplarism.

»Cf.St.Thomas,InIMetaph.,1.lo,158(ed.Gathala).

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enduringandsubstantialrealities.Ifthereisnoscienceoftheindividualobjectofsenseassuch,neverthelessascienceofsensiblereaUtyispossible,becausethereexists,incarnate,sotospeak,inthatreality,somethingintelligibleandimmaterial.

Thusthecorporealuniverseistheobjectnotofmereopinion,whichcanbeexpressedonlybymythandallegory,butofscientificknowledge,thescienceofphysics.Aristotlewasthetruefounderofphysics.^HisincomparablypowerfulgeniusviewedmobihtyintheimmutableHghtofintellect,showedthatallchangeobeysunchanginglaws,laidbarethenatureofmotionitself,ofgenerationandcorruption,anddistinguishedthefourspeciesofcausationoperativeinthesensibleworld.

Inlanguagestrangelytrenchantandsevere,hesumsuphislongpolemicagainstthedoctrineofideas.Plato,heargues,completelymisconceivedthenatureoftheformalcausewhenheseparateditfromthings.Whilehefancied"hewasstatingthesubstanceofperceptiblethings,"heasserted"theexistenceofasecondclassofsubstances,"andhis"accountofthewayinwhichtheyarethesubstancesofperceptiblethingsisemptytalk;for'sharing'(participating)meansnothing."Hethusmadeitimpossibletogiveasatisfactoryaccountofnature,and,byattributingallcausationandalltruerealitytotheideas,hewasunabletodistinguishintheactivityofthingsthelespectivepartsplayedbytheefficientandthefinal

1Aristotle'sexperimentalphysics(thescienceofphenomena)isamagnificentintellectualconstructiontotallyruinedbymistakesoffact.Buthisphilosophicalphysics(thescienceofmovingbeingassuch)laysdownthefoundationsandprinciplesofeverytruephilosophyofnature.


cause.Hethusneglected"theefficientcausewhichistheprincipleofchange,"Hefurtherfailedtogiveanyaccountofthecauseof"thatwhichweseetobethecauseinthecaseofthearts,forthesakeofwhichmindandnatureproduceallthattheydoproduce."For"mathematicshascometobethewholeofphilosophyformodernthinkers,andtheyprofesstoexplainallotherthingsby

mathematics.""Andastomotion,iftheideasaremotionless,"thereisnoarchetypeofmotionintheworldofideas,butinthatcase"whence,"accordingtothePlatonists,"didmotioncome?Ifwecannotexplainmotion,thewholestudyofnaturehasbeenannihilated."^

RefutationofthetheoryofideaslogicallyinvolvedthecriticismandcorrectionofalltheotherpartsofthePlatonicsystem.InepistemologyAristotleshowedthatphysics,mathematics,andmetaphysics,orthefirstphilosophy,areindeedthreedistinctsciences,butthattheyaredistinguishedbytheirsubject-matter,notbythefacultyemployed,whichinallalikeisreason.Buthismostimportantachievementinthisspherewastoprove,bythemarvellousanalysisofabstractionwhichdominateshisentirephilosophy,thatourideasarenotinnatememoriesofpre-natalexperience,butderivedfromthesensesbyanactivityofthemind.

Inpsychology,ifinhisreactionagainstPlato'smetempsychosis,andfromanexcessivecaution,herefrainedfrominquiringintotheconditionofthesoulafterdeath,atleasthelaidthefirmfoundationsofthespiritualistdoctrinebyproving,ontheonehand,inoppositiontoPlato'sdualism,thesubstantialunityof

1Meiaph.,i,9,992a25-992b10.

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thehumanbeing,composedoftwosubstantialpartsincompleteandcomplementary,and,ontheother,againstthematerialists,thespiritualnatureoftheoperationsoftheunderstandingandwill.Hethuscreatedtheonlypsychologycapableofassimilatingandexplainingthevastmaterialaccumulatedbymodernexperiments.

Inethics,bydistinguishingbetweenthespeculativejudgment(whichproceedsfromtheunderstandingalone)andthepracticaljudgment(whichproceedsconjointlyfromthewill),heshowedhowfreewillispossible,andhowthesinnerdoeswhatheknowstobeevil,anddrew,especiallyinhistreatmentofthecardinalvirtuesandinhisanalysisofhumanacts,theoutlinesofwhatwastobe,sofarasthenaturalorderisconcerned,theethicsofChristianity.•

{b)ButAristotlemustbestudied,notonlyinhisattitudetoPlato,butabsolutelyinhisattitudetothatwhichis.ForPlatodidnomorethanfurnishhimwiththeoccasiontowrestlewiththeproblemofbeing.Aristotlewonthematch,leaving

ushisgreatconceptsofpotentialityandact,matterandform^thecategories^thetranscendentals,thecauses,asweaponswherewithtowagethesameintellectualcontest,andteachingus,asairuemasterofwisdom,toriseabovethestudyofvisibleandperishablethingstocontemplationofthehving,imperishablerealitywhichknowsnochange."Immovableinitspureactivity,thisbeingisinnowaysubjecttochange....Onsuchaprincipledependtheheavensandtheworldofnature.ItsUfeissuchasthebestwhichweenjoy,andenjoyforbutashorttime.Foritiseverinthisstate,since


itsactisalsopleasure—theactofthesupremeintelligence,purethoughtthinkingitself....IfGodisalwaysinthatgoodstateinwhichwesometimesare,thiscompelsourwonder;andifinabetter,thisisyetmorewonderful.LifealsobelongstoGod:fortheactofthoughtisUfe,andGodisthatact;andGod'sessentialactisUfemostgoodandeternal.WesaythereforethatGodisalivingbeing,eternalandperfect,sothatlifewhichendureseverlastinglybelongstoGod,forGodisthislife."^Moreover,thisGodisperfectlyone,absolutelysingle."Thosewhosaymathematicalnumberisfirst,andgoontogenerateonekindofsubstanceafteranotherandgivedifferentprinciplesforeach,makethesubstanceoftheuniverseamereseriesofepisodesandtheygiveusmanygoverningprinciples;buttheworldmustnotbegovernedbadly.AsHomerobserved,theruleofmanyisnotgood;oneistheruler^*

ThusAristotle,asAlexanderofAphrodisiasremarksinafinepassageofhisCommentaryontheMetaphysics*"leadsusfi"omthethingswhicharethemselvesonthelowestplane,butmostfamiliartous,uptotheFather,whohasmadeallthings,toGodthemostsublime,andprovesthatasthefounderisthecauseoftheunityoftheglobeandthebrass,sotheDivinePower,authorofunityandmakerofallthings,isforallbeingsthecauseoftheirbeingwhattheyare."

Aristotle'smindwasatonceextremelypracticalandextremelymetaphysical.Arigorouslogician,butalsoakeen-sightedrealist,hegladlyrespectedthe

1Metaph.,xii,7,1072b;9,1074b35.

*Metaph.,xii,10,1076a.

'AlexanderofAphrodisias,InMetaph.,ad1045a36.

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demandsoftheactual,andfoundroominhisspeculationforeveryvarietyofbeingwithoutviolatingordistortingthefactsatanypoint,displayinganintellectualvigourandfreedomtobesurpassedonlybythecrystallinelucidityandangelicforceofSt.ThomasAquinas.Butthisvastwealthisarrangedinthelightofprinciples,mastered,classified,measured,anddominatedbytheintellect.Itisthemasterpieceofwisdom,awisdomwhichisstillwhollyhuman,butnevertheless,fromitsloftythrone,embraceswithasingleglancethetotaUtyofthings,

Aristotle,however,wasaprofoundratherthanacomprehensivethinker.Hetooklittlecaretodisplaytheproportionsandwideperspectivesofhisphilosophy;hisprimaryobjectw£istoapprehendbyanabsolutelyreliablemethodandwithafaultlessprecisionwhatineverynatureaccessibletohumanknowledgeismostcharacteristic,mostintimate—inshort,mosttrulyitself.Thereforehenotonlyorganisedhumanknowledge,andlaidthesolidfoundationsoflogic,biology,psychology,naturalhistory,metaphysics,ethics,andpolitics,butalsocutandpolishedahostofpreciousdefinitionsandconclusionssparklingwiththefiresofreality.

ItcanthereforebeaffirmedwithouthesitationthatamongphilosophersAristotleholdsapositionaltogetherapart:genius,gifts,andachievement—allareunique.Itisthelawofnaturethatthesublimeisdifficulttoachieveandthatwhatisdifficultisrare.Butwhenataskisofextraordinarydifficultybothinitselfandintheconditionsitrequires,wemayexpectthattherewillbebutoneworkmancapableofitsaccomplishment.Moreover,awell-builtedificeis


usuallybuiltnotontheplansofseveralarchitects,butontheplanofasingleone.If,therefore,theedificeofhumanwisdomorphilosophyistobeadequatelyconstructed,thefoundationsmustbelaidonceforallbyasinglethinker.Onthesefoundationsthousandsofbuilderswillbeabletobuildinturn,forthegrowthofknowledgerepresentsthelabourofgenerationsandwillneverbecomplete.Buttherecanbebutonemaster-builder.^

Forthatreason,inspiteofthemistakes,defects,andgapswhichbetrayinhisworkthelimitationsofhumanreason,Âristotleisastrulythe

^DescartesremarksverytrulyinhisDiscoursdelaMithode:"Workscomposedofmanypiecesandmadebythehandofseveralworkmenarenotsoperfectasthosewhicharetheworkofasingleindividual."

Buthewaswronginbelieving(i)thathewasthemandestinedtolaythefoundationofphilosophy,aworkwhichtheancientshadfailedtoaccomplish;(ii)thatbyhimselfhewascompetent—atleast,givensufficienttimeandexperience—notonlytolaythefoundationofscience,buttocompletetheedifice;and(iii)inrejectingcontemptuouslytheentireachievementofprecedinggenerations,togetherwiththetraditionalwisdomofhumanity.Aristotle,onthecontrary,succeededinhistaskbyconstantcriticismandanalysisofhispredecessors'thought,andbymakinguseoftheaccumulatedresultsofhumanspeculationinthepast.

2Aristotleisoftencreditedwithcertainerrorsmadebyhisdisciplesorcommentators,especiallyaboutthehumansoulandthedivineknowledgeandcausality.Butacarefulstudyofthetextprovesthatwhenthephilosophermaintainedthattheintellectisseparate,hemeantthatitisseparatefrommatter,notfromthesoulitself{cf.St.Thomas,InIIIDeAnima,4and5),andthereforehedidnotdeny,asisoftenasserted,thepersonalimmortalityofthehumansoul{cf.alsoMetaph.,xii,3,1070a26).NordidheteachthatGodisnottheefficientcauseoftheworldandmovesitonlyastheend,orgood,whichitdesires.(ThepassageintheMetaph.,xii,7,meanssimplythatGodmovesasfinalcauseorobjectoflovetheintelligencewhichmovesthefirstheaven;hedoesnotaffirmthatGodcanactonlyasfinalcauseandhasnotmadethings.Onthecontrary,inMetaph.,ii,i,993b28,hesaysthattheheavenlybodiesaredependentonthefirstcause,notonly

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philosopherparexcellence,asSt.Thomasisthetheologian.^

fortheirmotion,butfortheirverybeing.Cf.Metaph.vi,i,1026b17.)Cf.alsothepassagefromAlexanderofAphrodisias,quotedaboveinthetext,inwhichGod'sefficientcausalityinAristotle'ssystemisadmirablybroughtout.Asforthepassage{Metaph.,xii,9)inwhichAristotleinvestigatestheformalobjectoftheDivineIntellect,remarkingthatitisbetternottoknowthantoknowcertainthingsofalowerorder,itmostcertainlydoesnotamounttothedenialthatGodknowsthethingsoftheworld;thestatementisputforwardsimplytoprepare

forthesolutionofthequestiondiscussed.Thatsolution,asindicatedbyAristotle,isformallytrue,andconsistsintheproposition,whichSt.Thomaslateraffirmedmoreexplicitly,thattheDivineIntellect,becauseofitsabsoluteindependence,hasnootherformalobjectthantheDivineEssenceitself,andthereforedoesnotknowthethingsoftheworldinthemselves,butinthatessenceinwhicheverythingislife.

Itremainstrue,nevertheless,thatAristotlecommittedseriouserrors(forinstance,hisattempttoprovetheexistenceoftheworldabaeterno),andwasalsoguiltyofmanyomissions.Inparticular,thedoctrineofcreation,whichfollowswithabsolutenecessityfromhisprinciples,isnowhereexplicitlyformulatedbyhim(indeed,noheathenphilosopherreachedaclearnotionofcreationexnihilo);andonthosequestionswhich,thoughinthemselvescapableofrationalproof,aremostdifficulttosolvewithouttheaidofrevelation—therelationoftheworldtoGod,thelotofthesoulafterdeath—hemaintainedareserve,whichwasperhapsveryprudentinitself,butleaveshisworkmanifestlyincomplete.

1Goethe,repeatingthethemeofRaphael'swonderfulSchoolofAthens,inwhichPlatoisdepictedasaninspiredoldman,hisfaceturnedheavenward,Aristotleasamaninthefullvigourofyouthpointingtriumphantlytotheearthanditsrealities,hasdrawninhisTheoryofColours(Part2,Ueberliefertes)astrikingcomparisonbetweenPlatoandAristotle."Plato,"hesays,"seemstobehaveasaspiritdescendedfromheaven,whohaschosentodwellaspaceonearth.Hehardlyattemptstoknowthisworld.Hehasalreadyformedanideaofit,andhischiefdesireistocommunicatetomankind,whichstandsinsuchneedofthem,thetruthswhichhehasbroughtwithhimanddelightstoimpart.Ifhepenetratestothedepthofthings,itistofillthemwithhisownsoul,nottoanalysethem.Withoutintermissionandwiththeburningardourofhisspirit,heaspirestoriseandregaintheheavenlyabodefromwhichhecamedown.Theaimofallhis


(c)Aristotlewasbornin384atStagira,inThrace.'Thesonofadoctor,bynameNicomachus,hebelongedtothefamilyoftheAsclepiadae,descended,itwassaid,fromAesculapius.AttheageofeighteenhebecameapupilofPlato,whoselecturesheattendeduntilhisdeath(347).AfterPlato'sdeathhewenttoliveatAtarneusinMysiawhereHermiaswasking,andfromtheretoMytilene.Hethen

spenteightyearsatthecourtofKingPhilipofMacedon,wherehebecameAlexander'stutor.Afterhispupil'saccessiontothethrone,hesettledinAthens,whereheestablishedhisschoolattheLyceum(agymnasiumconsecratedtoApolloLycaeus).HetaughtashewalkedtoandfrowithhispupilsunderthetreesoftheLyceum,whencethenamePeripatetics(walkers)bywhichhisdisciplesbecameknown.HespenttwelveyearsinAthens.Whenthepartyopposed

discourseistoawakeninhishearersthenotionofasingleeternalbeing,ofthegood,oftruth,ofbeauty.Hismethodandwordsseemtomelt,todissolveintovapour,whateverscientificfactshehasmanagedtoborrowfromtheearth.

"Aristotle'sattitudetowardstheworldis,ontheotherhand,entirelyhuman.Hebehaveslikeanarcliitectinchargeofabuilding.Sinceheisonearth,onearthhemustworkandbuild.Hemakescertainofthenatureoftheground,butonlytothedepthofhisfoundations.Whateverliesbeyondtothecentreoftheearthdoesnotconcernhim.Hegiveshisedificeanamplefoundation,seekshismaterialsineverydirection,sortsthem,andbuildsgradually.Hethereforeriseslikearegularpyramid,whereasPlatoascendsrapidlyheavenwardlikeanobeliskorasharptongueofflame.

"Thushavethesetwomen,representingqualitiesequallypreciousandrarelyfoundtogether,dividedmankind,sotospeak,betweenthem."

1"Wemustremember,moreover,thatStagira,acityofChalcidice,wasaGreekcolonywhereGreekwasspoken.ItisthereforeincorrecttoregardAristotle,asheissometimesregarded,asonlyhalfGreek.HewasapureHellene,aspureasParmenides,forexample,orAnaxagoras."(Hamelin,LeSystemed'Aristote,p.4.)

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totheMacedoniansbroughtagainsthimanaccusationofimpiety,onthepretextofahymnhehadoncecomposedonthedeathofhisfriendHermias,heretiredtoChalcis,wherehediedattheageofsixty-three(322).

Thestoryistoldofhimthathisloveofstudywassogreatthathedevisedtheplanofholdinginhishand,whileatwork,aballofcopperwhich,ifhefellasleep,wouldrousehimbyfallingintoametalbasin.ToassisthisresearchesPhilipandAlexanderplacedtheirvastresourcesathisdisposal.Hewrotebooks

tobereadbythegeneralpublic{dialogues),whicharealllost—Ciceropraisedtheirstyleinthehighestterms:flumenaureumorationisfundensAristoteles{Acad.,II,38,119)—andacroamaticbooks,inwhichhesummarisedthelecturesgiventohisdisciples;themajorityofthesehavesurvived.^

Thehistoryofthesebooks,asrelatedbyStrabo,isverystrange,andillustrates,asaptlyasPascal'sremarkonCleopatra'snose,thepartplayedbytrifling

*ThefollowingisalistofAristotle'sworks:—

i.ThecollectionofworksdealingwithLogicandknowncollectivelybythenameofOrganon(instrumentofscientificknowledge).TheyconsistoftheKary^yoplcn,theCategories;the'AvaXvTiKairpdrepaKaiOffrepa,thePriorandPosteriorAnalytics;theTdmKa,theTopics;theHfpl<To(piaTiKQ)viXiyx'î',OnSophisticArguments;andtheUeplipfiTivelai,OnInterpretation,DeInterpreiatione,atreatiseonthemeaningofpropositions,whichinspiteofAndronicus'srejectionmustbeacceptedasauthentic.

ii.ThePhysics,^vciKi]dxpSaais(theauthenticityofBook7isdoubtful),withwhichwemustgroupthefollowii^treatises:OntheHeavens{DeCaelo),TlepldvpavoO;OnGenerationandCorruption,Ueplyeveaiu^Kai<p0opS.s;OnthePartsofAnimals,Ueplî^wvfi6pitav;OntheSoul,Uepl^vxv^;OnSensation,Tleplal(r6r,ffewskcualadriruv;OnMemory,Uepltj.vf)fi.r)%Kaiavafivva-eta^;theMeteorology,MereupoXoyiKd;theHistoryofAnimals,riepirifiâl<rroplai(theauthenticityofBook10isdoubtful);andmanyothertreatises,severalofwhichareofdubious


accidentsindeterminingthedestiniesofmankind.Atthephilosopher'sdeaththeywereinheritedtogetherwithhisUbrarybyhisdiscipleandsuccessorTheophrastus.Theophrastusbequeathedthemtoadisciple

authenticity,especiallytheDeMundo.(ThetreatiseonPhysiognomyisspurious,butisapparentlyacompilationfromauthenticfragments.)

iii.TheMetaphysics,Tduer^rk(f>v<nKd,ofwhichthesecondbook,aiXttTTov,istheworkofadisciple,PasiclesofRhodes.

iv.TheNicomacheanEthics,'HdiKo,îKOfiixfia,andtheEudemianEthics,

'KdiKctEvBrifida.Thelatterworkwascomposed,notbyAristotle,butbyEudemushimself.TothesewemayaddtheGreatEthics(MagnaMoralia),"ROiko,tieyaha,whichisarisumiofthetwopreceding;andthereforenotwrittenbyAristotle;thePolitics,UoKitiko.;thePoetics,Tlepinoti]TiKT]i;andtheRhetoric,T^x^r)pr/TopiKifi.ThetreatiseOnVirtuesandVices,theEconomics,andtheRhetorictoAlexanderarespurious.In1891wasdiscoveredandpublishedtheConstitutionofAthens,'AO-nvalwvTToXiTela.ItformedpartofacollectioninwhichAristotlegaveanoutlineoftheconstitutionsof158Greekstates.

OftheSchoolmenwhocommentedontheworksofAristotle,themostimportantareAlbertusMagnus,St.Thomas,andSilvesterMaurus,whoseparaphraseandcommentaryfollowingthetextwordforwordmaystillbeusefullyconsulted.SaintThomaswrotecommentaries:(a)ontheDeInterpretatione(unfinishedandreplacedbyCajetan'sforlessons3-14ofBook2);[b)onthePosteriorAnalytics;(c)onthePhysics;(d)ontheDeCaeloetMundo(St.Thomasdiedbeforeitwascompleted,andfromBook3,lesson8,thecommentarywascontinuedbyhispupil,PeterofAuvergne);[e)ontheGenerationandCorruptionofAnimals(St.Thomas'sunfinishedCommentaryhasbeencompletedbypassagesborrowedfromotherwriters,inparticularfromtheCommentaryofAlbertusMagnus);(/)ontheMeteorology(completedbyanotherhandfromBk.2,lesson11);[g)ontheDeAnima(thecommentaryonBooks2and3isbySt.Thomashimself,thecommentaryonBk.icompiledfromhislecturesbyoneofhispupils,RaynaldofPiperno;(A)ontheParvaNaturalia[DeSensuetSensato,deMemoriaetReminiscentia,deSomnoetVigilia);(i)ontheMetaphysics(moderneditionbyPadreCathala,Turin,Marietti,1915);(j)ontheNicomacheanEthics;{k)onthePolitics(completedbyPeterofAuvergnefromBk.3,lesson6,or,asothersthinkfiromBk.4).Cf.DeRubeis,Dissert.23invol.i.Op.Omn.S.ThomaeAq.,Leonineedition.

ForthewritingsofSt.Thomasandtheauthenticityofhisvariousminorworks,seeMandonnet,O.P.,DesEcritsautherUiquesdeSaintThomas(reprintedfi:omtheRevueThomiste,1909-1910)Friburg.

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namedNeleus,Neleusinturntohisheirs.Thelatter,fearingtheymightbeseizedfortheroyallibraryatPergamum,hidtheminanundergroundchamber.Theydiedandthemanuscriptswerelost.Theyremainedlostforacenturyanda

halfandwereonlyrecoveredbythegoodfortuneofasuccessfulbook-lover.AbouttheyearlOOb.g.thedescendantsofNeleus'sheirsdiscoveredthemanuscripts(inaverybadcondition,aswecanwellimagine)andsoldthemforalargesumtoawealthycollector,ApelliconofTeos,whopublishedthem,inaveryfaultyedition.AtthecaptureofAthensbytheRomansin86b.g.theycameintothepossessionofSulla.ThegrammarianTyrannichadaccesstothemandmadeuseofthem,andfinallyAndronicusofRhodescataloguedandrepublishedthem.^CommentarieswerecomposedbyAlexanderofAphrodisias(secondcenturya.d.),alsobyseveralneo-Platonicphilosophers.Porphyry(thirdcentury),Themistius(fourthcentury),Simplicius,andPhilo(sixthcentury).

1Strabo,Geog.,xiii,i,54;Plut.Sulla,26.Strabo'stestimonyisofconsiderableweight.Ithas,however,beenprovedthatsomeofthemostimportantscientifictreatisesofAristotlewereknowntothePeripateticsandtheiropponentsinthethirdandsecondcenturiesB.C.WemustthereforeconcludethatStrabo'saccountisreliableinitspositiveassertions,sofarasthehistoryofAristotle's"acroamatic"manuscriptsareconcerned,butinaccurate,oratleastexaggerated,initsnegativestatements.MoreorlesscompletecopiesofthePhilosopher'sworksmusthavebeenincirculationinthePeripateticschoolbeforeApellicon'sdiscovery.WemayneverthelessagreewithHamelin'sconclusionthat"thescientificwritingsofAristotlewerelittlereadevenbythePeripateticschoolinitsdegeneracy.Apellicon'sdiscoverywouldhavehadtheeffectofmakingtheseworksoncemorefashionable."Thetruthofthematterthereforewouldbethat,beforethisdiscoveryandtheworksofAndronicus,Aristotle'sscientifictreatiseswerenotindeedunknown,asStrabosays,butatanyratelitdeandbadlyknown.


TheScholastictradition,whichgrewupfromtheeighthcenturyonwardintheChristianWest,wasforlongignorantofAristotle'soriginalworks,withtheexceptionoftheOrganon(thetreatisesonlogic),whichhadbeentranslatedintoLatin^byBoethius(480-526).Butitwasacquaintedwithhisthought,whichhadbeentransmittedandpopularisedatsecondhandandformedanintegralpartofthegreatphilosophicsynthesisoflateantiquity,Platonicthoughitwasinthemain,onwhichtheFathers,especiallySt.Augustine,haddrawnsolargelyintheserviceofthefaith.IntheChristianschoolsAristotle'slogicwastaughtinBoethius'stranslation.ButitwasnotuntilthelatterpartofthetwelfthcenturythattheotherwritingsofthePhilosopher{physics,metaphysics,ethics)begantoreachtheSchoolmen,mainly,itwouldappear,asaresultoftheardentpolemic

conductedatthatdatebytheleadersofChristianthoughtagainstthephilosophyoftheArabs,whopossessedthesebookstogetherwiththeneo-PlatoniccommentariesinaSyrianversiontranslatedlaterintoArabic,andappealedtotheirauthority.Atfirsttheobjectofconsiderablesuspicion*onaccountofthesource

^LaterBoethius'sworkwaspartiallylost,anditwasnotuntilafterH41thatcertainbooksoftheOrganon,reintroducedfromtheArabs,begantoappearinthephilosophicliteratureoftheMiddleAges,wheretheyformedwhatwasthenknownastheLogicaNova.ThesewerethePriorandPosteriorAnalytics,theTopics,andtheSophisticArguments.Cf.deWulf,Hist,delaPhil,midiivale,anded.pp.149sqq.

*Censures(issuedin1210byacounciloftheprovinceofSenswhichmetatParis,andrenewedin1215,inthestatuteimposedontheUniversityofParisbythelegateRobertdeCourcon,astatuteconfirmedbyGregoryIXin1231andbyUrbanIVin1263)forbadetheemploymentofAristotle'swritingsinpubliclecturesorprivateteaching.Wemustremember,however,that,asM,Forgetpointsout{Rapp.cm

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fromwhichtheyhadbeenreceivedandthemistakeswhichtheArabcommentatorshadfoistedintothem,alltheworksofAristotleweresoontranslatedintoLatin,atfirstfromtheArabictext,later^fromtheoriginalGreek.^

Nowtookplacethemeetingofhumanwisdomanddivinetruth,ofAristotleandtheFaith.AlltruthbelongsofrighttoChristianthought,asthespoilsoftheEgyptianstotheHebrews.Quaecunqueigiturapudomnespraeclaradictasunt,nostraChristianorumsunt,*becauseaccordingtothatsayingofSt.Ambrose,whichSt.ThomasdeHghtedtoquote,everytruth,whoeversaidit,comesfromtheHolySpirit.'^Butsomeonemustactuallytakepossession,someonemustenrolin

congr.scientif.intern,descath.,Brussels,1894),individualsremainedfreetoread,study,andcommentonthesebooksinprivate.Moreover,thecensuresboundonlytheUniversityofParis.In1229theUniversityofToulouse,foundedandorganisedundertheprotectionofthepapallegatehimself,attractedstudents

byannouncinglectxiresonthebooksforbiddenatParis.Finally,evenatParis,whenthefacultyofartsincludedinitscoursefrom1255publiclecturesonthePhysicsandMetaphysics,ecclesiasticalauthoritymadenoattempttointerfere.And,moresignificantlystill.PopeUrbanIV,akwyearslater,tookunderhispersonalpatronageWilliamofMoerbeke'stranslationofAristotleandSt.ThomasAquinas'sCommentaries.SeeGhoUet,"AristotelismedelaScolastique"inVacantandMangenot'sDictionnairedeThiologie,anddeWulf,op.cit.,p.242.

1SomeofAristotle'sworkswereapparentlyreadatfirstinaLatintranslationfromArabic,othersinadirecttranslationfromtheGreek.Inanycaseitwasnotlongbeforethelatterentirelysupersededtheformer.St.ThomasusedonlydirectversionsfromtheGreek.

2ThebestofthesetranslationsisthatoftheentireworksofAristotlemadebetween1260and1270byWilliamofMoerbekeatthesuggestionandunderthesupervisionofSt.Thomas.ItisanabsolutelyliteralrenderingoftheGreektext.

'St.Justin,ApoL,ii,13.

*Omneverumaquocumquedicatur,aSpiritusancioest.


theroyalserviceofChristthemarvellousintellectofAristotle.Thiswork,begunbyAlberttheGreat(i193-1280),wascontinuedandbroughttoasuccessfulconclusionbySt.ThomasAquinas(1225-1274).Itsaccomplishmentdemandedarareconjunctionoffavourableconditions—theripecultureoftheageofSt,Louis,themagnificentorganisationoftheDominicanorder,thegeniusofSt.Thomas.^St.Thomas,whomtheChurchhasproclaimedDoctorparexcellence,DoctorCommunisEcclesiae,andwhomshehasenthronedastheuniversalteacherofherschools,wasnotcontentwithtransferringtheentirephilosophyofAristotletothedomainofChristianthought,andmakingittheinstrumentofauniquetheologicalsynthesis;heraiseditintheprocesstoafarhigherorder,and,sotospeak,transfiguredit.

Hepurgeditfromeverytraceoferror—thatistosay,inthephilosophicorder,forsofarasthesciencesofobservationorphenomenaareconcerned,St.ThomaswasnomoreablethanAristotletoescapetheerrorsprevalentinhisday,errorswhichdonotinanywayaffecthisphilosophyitself.Heweldeditintoapowerfulandharmonioussystem;heexplored

*ForthesuccessfulperformanceofsuchataskitwasalsorequisitethatChristianthoughtshouldhaveattainedthehighdegreeofelaborationalikeinthephilosophicalandtheologicalorderwhichithadreceivedfromtheFathersandtheScholasticpredecessorsofSt.Thomas.ThereforetheworkofAlbertusMagnusandSt.Thomaswasnottochange,butonthecontrarytocompleteChristianphilosophy,givingititsmatureexpression.Ifcontemporarieswereprimarilyimpressedwiththenoveltyoftheirwork—anovelty'ofcompletion,notofalteration—thereasonisthatthefinalprocesswhichperfectsasystemmustalwayscomeasashocktothosewhowitnessit,andwhomostlikelyareattachedbyforceofhabittocertainaspectsofitsimperfectstateassuch.

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itsprinciples,cleareditsconclusions,enlargeditshorizon;and,ifherejectednothing,headdedmuch,enrichingitwiththeimmensewealthoftheLatinChristiantradition,restoringintheirproperplacesmanyofPlato'sdoctrines,oncertainfundamentalpoints(forexample,onthequestionofessenceandexistence)openingupentirelynewperspectives,andthusgivingproofofaphilosophicgeniusasmightyasthatofAristotlehimselfFinally,andthiswashissupremeachievement,whenbyhisgeniusasatheologianhemadeuseofAristotle'sphilosophyastheinstrumentofthesacredsciencewhichis,sotospeak,"animpressonourmindsofGod'sownknowledge,"^heraisedthatphilosophyaboveitselfbysubmittingittotheilluminationofahigherlight,whichinvesteditstruthwitharadiancemoredivinethanhuman.BetweenAristotleasviewedinhimselfandAristotleviewedinthewritingsofSt.Thomasisthedifferencewhichexistsbetweenacityseenbytheflareofatorchlightprocessionandthesamecitybathedinthelightofthemorningsun.

Forthisreason,thoughSt.Thomasisfirstandforemostatheologian,wemayasappropriately,ifnotwithgreaterpropriety,callhisphilosophyThomistratherthanAristotehan.

ThisphilosophyofAristotleandSt,Thomasisinfactwhatamodernphilosopherhastermedthenaturalphilosophyofthehumanmind,foritdevelopsandbringstoperfectionwhatismostdeeplyandgenuinelynaturalinourintellectaUkeinitselementaryapprehensionsandinitsnativetendencytowardstruth.

Sum,TTieoL,i,q.i,a3,a</2.


Itisalsotheevidentialphilosophy,basedonthedoubleevidenceofthedataperceivedbyoursensesandourintellectualapprehensionoffirstprinciples—thephilosophyofbeing,entirelysupportedbyandmodelleduponwhatis,andscrupulouslyrespectingeverydemandofreality—thephilosophyoftheintellect,whichittrustsasthefacultywhichattainstruth,andformsbyadisciplinewhichisanincomparablementalpurification.Andforthisveryreasonitprovesitselftheuniversalphilosophyinthesensethatitdoesnotreflectanationality,class,group,temperament,orrace,theambitionormelancholyofanindividualorany

practicalneed,butistheexpressionandproductofreason,whichiseverywherethesame;andinthissensealso,thatitiscapableofleadingthefinestintellectstothemostsubHmeknowledgeandthemostdifficultofattainment,yetwithoutoncebetrayingthosevitalconvictions,instinctivelyacquiredbyeverysanemind,whichcomposethedomain,wideashumanity,ofcommonsense.Itcanthereforeclaimtobeabidingandpermanent[philosophiaperennis)inthesensethatbeforeAristotleandSt.Thomashadgivenitscientificformulationasasystematicphilosophy,itexistedfromthedawnofhumanityingermandinthepre-philosophicstate,asaninstinctoftheunderstandingandanaturalknowledgeofthefirstprinciplesofreasonandeversinceitsfoundationasasystemhasremainedfirmandprogressive,apowerfulandlivingtradition,whileallotherphilosophieshavebeenbornandhavediedinturn.And,finally,itstandsoutasbeing,beyondcomparisonwithanyother,one;onebecauseitalonebestowsharmonyandunityonhumanknowledge—bothmeta—

lOO

PLATOANDARISTOTLE

physicalandscientific—andonebecauseinitselfitrealisesamaximumofconsistencyinamaximumofcomplexity,andneglectoftheleastofitsprinciplesinvolvesthemostunexpectedconsequences,distortingourunderstandingofreahtyininnumerabledirections.Theseareafewoftheexternalsignswhichwitnesstoitstruth,evenbeforewehavestudieditforourselvesanddiscoveredbypersonalproofitsintrinsiccertitudeandrationalnecessity.

lOI

DEFINITIONOFPHILOSOPHY

Webeganbycallingphilosophyhumanwisdom.Nowthatthehistoryofitsoriginshasgivenusfurtherinformationastothenatureandobjectofthiswisdom,weareinapositiontoattemptamoreprecisedefinitionofphilosophy.

Forthispurposeweshalltakephilosophytomeanphilosophyparexcellence,thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics.Whatweshallsayofitintheabsolutesense[simpliciter)willbeapplicablerelatively[secundumquid)totheotherdepartmentsofphilosophy.

Philosophyisnota"wisdom"ofconductorpracticalfifethatconsistsinactingwell.Itisawisdomwhosenatureconsistsessentiallyinknowing.

How?Knowinginthefullestandstrictestsenseoftheterm,thatistosay,withcertainty,andinbeingabletostatewhyathingiswhatitisandcannotbeotherwise,knowingbycauses.Thesearchforcausesisindeedthechiefbusinessofphilosophers,andtheknowledgewithwhichtheyareconcernedisnotamerelyprobableknowledge,suchasoratorsimpartbytheirspeeches,butaknowledgewhichcompelstheassentoftheintellect,Hketheknowledgewhichthegeometricianconveysbyliisdemonstrations.Butcertainknowledgeofcausesistermedscience.Philosophythereforeisascience.

Knowingbywhatmedium,bywhatlight?Know-


ingbyreason,bywhatiscalledthenaturallightofthehumanintellect.Thisisaqualitycommontoeverypurelyhumanscience(ascontrastedvsdththeology).Thatistosay,theruleofphilosophy,itscriterionoftruth,istheevidenceofitsobject.

Themediumorlightbywhichascienceknowsitsobjectsistermedintechnicallanguageitslumensubquo,thelightinwhichitapprehendstheobjectofitsknowledge(itselftermedtheobject,quod).Eachofthedifferentscienceshasitsowndistinctivelight{lumensubquo,mediumsenmotivumformale)whichcorrespondswiththeformalprinciplesbymeansofwhichtheyattaintheirobject.ButthesedifferentprinciplesareaUkeinthis,thattheyareallknownbythespontaneousactivityofourintellect,asthenaturalfacultyofknowledge,inotherwordsbythenaturallightofreason—andnot,hketheprinciplesoftheology,byasupernaturalcommunicationmadetoman{revelation),andbythelightoffaith.Wehavenowtoconsidertheobjectquodofphilosophy.

Knowingwhat?Toanswerthisquestionwemayrecallthesubjectswhichengagedtheattentionofthedifferentphilosopherswhoseteachingswehavesummarised.Theyinquiredintoeverything—knowledgeitselfanditsmethods,beingandnon-being,goodandevil,motion,theworld,beingsanimateandinanimate,manandGod.Philosophythereforeisconcernedwitheverything,isauniversalscience.

Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatphilosophyabsorbsalltheothersciences,or

isthesolescience,ofwhichalltherestaremerelydepartments;noron

ANINTRODUCTIONTOPHILOSOPH'y

theOtherhandthatitisitselfabsorbedbytheothersciences,beingnomorethantheirsystematicarrangement.Onthecontrary,philosophypossessesitsdistinctivenatureandobject,invirtueofwhichitdiffersfromtheothersciences.Ifthiswerenotthecasephilosophywouldbeachimera,andthosephilosopherswhosetenetswehavebrieflysketchedwouldhavetreatedofunrealproblems.^Butthatphilosophyissomethingreal,andthatitsproblemshavethemosturgentclaimtobestudied,isprovedbythefactthatthehumanmindiscompelledbyitsveryconstitutiontoaskthequestionswhichthephilosophersdiscuss,questionswhichmoreoverinvolvetheprinciplesonwhichthecertaintyoftheconclusionsreachedbyeveryscienceinthelastresortdepends.

"Yousay,"wroteAristotleinacelebrateddilemma,'onemustphilosophise.Thenyoumustphilosophise.Yousayoneshouldnotphilosophise.Then(toproveyourcontention)youmustphilosophise.Inanycaseyoumustphilosophise."

^Nodoubttheyalsostudiedmanyquestionsrelatingtodiespecialsciences,forthedifferentiationofthescienceshadnotbeencarriedsofarasinmodemtimes.Neverthelesstheprimaryobjectoftheirstudylayelsewhere,and,atleastafterSocrates,thosespecialsciences—astronomy,geometry,arithmetic,music,medicine,andgeography—whichtheancientscultivatedwithsuccessdevelopedseparately,andincleardistinctionfromphilosophy.Thevery.ki'oryofthespecialsciences,whichinmoderntimeshavemadesuchenormousprogressindependentlyofphilosophyandasautonomousbranchesofstudy,plainlyprovesthattheyarenopartoftheformer

2"elfikv(pCKoao(ptyreov,(pt\oao(pr,Tiov,Kal,elfiiicp'TocprjTiov,(pCKoaocpt)-riov,w6.vT(t}%&pa.(pi\oiTo(prjTiov."

ThisdilemmaistakenfromtheUporftirTiKd?,alostworkofwhichonlyafewfragmentshavecomedowntous,{Cf.fr.50,1483b29,42;1484a2,8,18.)


Buthowcanpliilosophybeaspecialscienceifitdealswitheverything?Wemustnowinquireunderwhataspectitisconcernedwitheverything,or,toputitanotherway,whatisthatwhichineverythingdirectlyandforitselfintereststhe

philosopher.If,forexample,philosophystudiesman,itsobjectisnottoascertainthenumberofhisvertebrasorthecausesofhisdiseases;thatisthebusinessofanatomyandmedicine.Philosophystudiesmantoanswersuchquestionsaswhetherhepossessesanintellectwhichsetshimabsolutelyapartfromtheotheranimals,whetherhepossessesasoul,ifhehasbeenmadetoenjoyGodorcreatures,etc.Whenthesequestionsareanswered,thoughtcansoarnohigher.NoproblemsUebeyondorabovethese.Wemaysaythenthatthephilosopherdoesnotseektheexplanationnearesttothephenomenaperceivedbyoursenses,buttheexplanationmostremotefromthem,theultimateexplanation.Thisisexpressedinphilosophicalterminologybysayingthatphilosophyisnotconcernedwithsecondarycausesorproximateexplanations;^butonthecontrarywithJirstcauses,highestprinciplesorultimateexplanations.

Moreover,whenwerememberourconclusionthatphilosophyknowsthingsbythenaturallightofreason,itisclearthatitinvestigatesthefirstcausesorhighestprinciplesinthenaturalorder.

Whenwesaidthatphilosophyisconcernedwitheverything,everythingwhichexists,everypossibleobjectofknowledge,ourstatementwastooindefinite.Wedeterminedonlythematterwithwhichphilosophy

^Thatistosay,approximatingtotheparticularsofsensiblephenomena.


deals,itsmaterialobject,butsaidnothingoftheaspectunderwhichitviewsthatobject,ortheattributesofthatobjectwhichitstudies;thatistosay,wedidnotdefineits,formalobject,itsformalstandpoint.Theformalobjectofascienceistheaspectunderwhichitapprehendsitsobject,or,wemaysay,thatwhichitstudiesprimarilyandintrinsicallyandinreferencetowhichitstudieseverythingelse;^thatwhichphilosophystudiesinthisformalsenseinthings,andthestandpointfromwhichitstudieseverythingelse,isthefirstcausesorhighestprinciplesofthingsinsofarasthesecausesorprinciplesbelongtothenaturalorder.

Thematerialobjectofafaculty,science,art,orvirtue,issimplythethingorsubject-matter—withoutfurtherquahfication—withwhichthatfaculty,science,art,orvirtue,deals.Forinstance,thematerialobjectofchemistryisinorganicbodies;ofthefacultyofsight,objectswithinourrangeofvision.Butthisdoes

notenableustodistinguishbetweenchemistryandphysics,whichisalsoconcernedwithinorganicbodies,orbetweensightandtouch.Toobtainanexactdefinitionofchemistrywemustdefineitsobjectastheintrinsicorsubstantialchangesofinorganicbodies,andsimilarlytheobjectofsightascolour.Wehavenowdefinedtheformalobject{objectumformatequod),thatistosay,thatwhichimmediatelyandofitsverynature,orintrinsicallyanddirectly,oragainnecessarilyandprimarily(theseexpressionsareequivalentrenderingsoftheLatinformulaperseprimo),isapprehendedorstudiedinthingsbyaparticularscience,

1Qtodperseprimohaecscientiaconsideraletsubcujusrationecaeteraomniacogncscil.


art,orfaculty,andinreferencetowhichitapprehendsorstudieseverythingelse.

Thusphilosophy,aloneamongthebranchesofhumanknowledge,hasforitsobjecteverythingwhichis.Butineverythingwhichisitinvestigatesonlythefirstcauses.Theothersciences,onthecontrary,havefortheirobjectsomeparticularprovinceofbeing,ofwhichtheyinvestigateonlythesecondarycausesorproximateprinciples.Thatistosay,ofallbranchesofhumanknowledgephilosophyisthemostsublime.

Itfollowsfurtherthatphilosophyisinstrictesttruthwisdom,foritistheprovinceofwisdomtostudythehighestcauses:sapientisestaltissimascausasconsiderare.Itthusgraspstheentireuniverseinasmallnumberofprinciplesandenrichestheintellectwithoutburdeningit.

TheaccountwehavejustgivenisapplicableinanunquaUfiedsenseonlytothefirstphilosophyormetaphysics,butmaybeextendedtophilosophyingeneral,ifitisregardedasabodyofwhichmetaphysicsisthehead.^Weshallthendefinephilosophyingeneralasauniversalbodyofsciences*whoseformalstand-

^Theancientsunderstoodbythetermphilosophythesum-totalofthemainbranchesofscientificstudy{physics,orthescienceofnature;mathematics,orthesciencesofproportion;metaphysics,orthescienceofbeingassuch;logic;andethics).Therecouldthereforebenoquestionofdistinguishingbetweenphilosophyandthesciences.Theonequestionwithwhichtheywereconcernedwashowtodistinguishthefirstphilosophy,ormetaphysics,fromtheother

sciences.We,onthecontrary,sincetheenormousdevelopmentofthespecialsciences,mustdistinguishfromthemnotonlymetaphysics(thescienceofabsolutelyfirstprinciples)butthestudyofthefirstprinciplesinaparticularorder(forinstance,themathematicalorthephysical);andtheentirebodyoftheseconstituteswhatwecallphilosophy.

2Onlymetaphysicsandlogicconstituteauniversalsciencespecificallyone.


pointîsfirstcauses(whetherabsolutelyfirstcausesorprinciples,theformalobjectofmetaphysics,orthefirstcausesinaparticularorder,theformalobjectoftheotherbranchesofphilosophy).Anditfollowsthatmetaphysicsalonedeservesthenameofwisdomabsolutelyspeaking{simpliciter),theremainingbranchesofphilosophyonlyrelativelyorfromaparticularpointofview{secundumquid).

ConclusionI.—Philosophyisthesciencewhichbythenaturallightofreasonstudiesthefirstcausesorhighestprinciplesofallthings—is,inotherwords,thescienceofthingsintheirfirstcauses,insofarasthesebelongtothenaturalorder.

Thedifficultyofsuchascienceisproportionatetoitselevation.Thatiswhythephilosopher,justbecausetheobjectofhisstudiesisthemostsublime,shouldpersonallybethehumblestofstudents,ahumility,however,whichshouldnotpreventhisdefending,asitishisdutytodo,thesovereigndignityofwisdomasthequeenofsciences.

Theperceptionthatthesphereofphilosophyis

1Strictlyspeaking,thereisnooneformalobjectofphilosophy,sincephilosophyasawholeisnotsimplyone,butacompoundofseveraldistinctsciences{logic,naturalphilosophy,metaphysics,etc.),eachspecifiedbyadistinctformalobject{ensrationislogicum,ensmobile,ensinquantumens—cf.PartII).Butbetweentheformalobjectsofthedifferentphilosophicsciencesthereissomethinganalogouslycommon—thefactthattheystudy,eachinitsownorder,thehighestandmostuniversalcauses,andtreattheirsubject-matterfromthestandpointofthesecauses.Wemaythereforesaythatthehighestcausesconstitutethefinalobjectortheformalstandpointanalogouslycommonofphilosophytakenasawhole,


universalledDescartes(seventeenthcentury)toregardphilosophyasthesolescienceôfwhichtheotherswerebutparts;AugusteComte,onthecontrary,andthepositivistsgenerally(nineteenthcentury),soughttoabsorbitintheothersciences,asbeingmerelytheir"systematisation."Itisevidentthatthecauseofbotherrorswasthefailuretodistinguishbetweenthematerialandformalobjectofphilosophy.

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.ThomasPhilosophyandthecorpusofotherscienceshavethesamematerialobject(everythingknowable).Buttheformalobjectofphilosophyisfirstcauses,oftheothersciencessecondarycauses.

DescartesAugusteComte

PhilosophyabsorbstheThesciencesabsorb

othersciences—isthewholephilosophy—thereisnoofscience.philosophy.

Wesaidabovethatphilosophyisascience,andthatitattainscertainknowledge.Bythiswewouldnotbeunderstoodtoclaimthatphilosophyprovidescertainsolutionsforeveryquestionthatcanbeaskedwithinitsdomain.Onmanypointsthephilosopher

1Descartesusedtheterm"philosophy"initsancientsense.Fortheancients,asforDescartes,theworddenotedtheentirebodyofscientificknowledge.Buttheancientsdividedphilosophythusunderstoodintoseveraldistinctsciences,amongwhichmetaphysicswasdistinguishedasinthefullestsensephilosophy.Descartes,onthecontrary,regardedphilosophy,stillunderstoodastheentirebodyofscientificknowledge,asasciencespecificallyone(ofwhichmetaphysics,physics,mechanics,medicine,andethicsweretheprincipalsubdi.isions).Hethusrecognisedonlyonescience.Inourviewphilosophyisabodyofscienceswhichowesitsimityanddistinctionfromtheothersciencestoitsformalstandpoint(firstcauses).Theleadingmemberofthisbodyofsciencesismetaphysics,asciencespecificallyone,whoseformalobjectisluiiversal(beingquabeing).


mustbecontentwithprobablesolutions,eitherbecausethequestiongoes

beyondtheactualscopeofhisscience,forexampleinmanysectionsofnaturalphilosophyandpsychology,orbecauseofitsnatureitadmitsonlyofaprobableanswer,forexampletheapplicationofmoralrulestoindividualcases.Butthiselementofmereprobabilityisaccidentaltoscienceassuch.Andphilosophyyieldsagreaternumberofcertainconclusions,andofthosemanymoreperfect,namely,theconclusionsofmetaphysics,thananyotherpurelyhumanscience.

no

PHILOSOPHYANDTHESPECIALSCIENCES

WÊhavenowtodefinetherelationshipbetweenphilosophy(particularlythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)andtheothersciences.

Everyscienceismistressinherownhouse,inasmuchaseverysciencepossessestheindispensableandsufficientmeansofattainingtruthwithinitsownsphereandnooneisentitledtodenythetruthsthusproved.

Ascience,however,orratherascientist,mayhappentomakeamistakeinitsowndomain.Insuchacasethescienceinquestionisnodoubtcompetenttojudgeandcorrectitself,butitisobviousthatasuperiorsciencehasalsotherighttojudgeandcorrectit,ifthemistakeshouldcontradictoneofitsownresultsandthuscomeunderitsjurisdiction.Butphilosophy,andespeciallyphilosophyinthehighestsense,thatismetaphysics,isthesovereignscience.Thereforeitiscompetenttojudgeeveryotherhumanscience,rejectingasfalseeveryscientifichypothesiswhichcontradictsitsownresults.

Takeforexampleanhypothesisofphysicswhichappearstocontradictatruthofphilosophy.^Physicsiscompetenttojudgethathypothesisbythelawsof

1Itmay,forinstance,bequestionedwhetherthelawofinertia,asformulatedsinceGalileoandDescartes,canbereconciledwithtlicaxiomofphilosophy:quidquidmoveturabaliomovetur.

Ill


physics,butphilosophyisalsocompetenttojudgeitbytheprinciplesofphilosophy,determiningwhetherandhowfaritreallycontradictsthe

philosophictruthinquestion.(Ifthecontradictionisreal,itisevidentthatthehypothesisofphysicsinquestionmustbefalse,foronetruthcannotcontradictanother.Thephysicistmustthereforebowtotheverdictofphilosophy,revisehisargumentsandmakefurtherexperiments.^)

Letusnowtakeaconclusionofphilosophywhichappearstocontradictatruthestabhshedbyphysics.Îtisforphilosophytojudgethatconclusioninaccordancewiththeprinciplesofphilosophy,todecidewhetherandhowfaritisreallyinconflictwiththephysicaltruthinquestion.Butphysicsisincompetenttodeterminethequestionbytheprinciplesanddataofphysics.(Ifthecontradictionisreal,itisobviousthattheallegedconclusionofphilosophyisfalse,foronetruthcannotcontradictanother.Thephilosopherwillthereforebow,notindeedtotheverdictofphysics,buttotheverdictofphilosophyjudgingitselfbymeansofphysics,andwillrevisehisargumentsaccordingly.)

*Itistrue,nodoubt,thatwehaveactuallytodo,notwithphilosophy,butwithphilosophers,andthatphilosophersarefallible,andaphilosophermaythereforebemistakeninjudginganhypothesisofphysics,butthisdoesnotprovethathehasnorighttojudgeit.

Aphysicistmaythereforebejustifiedinaparticularcaseinmaintaininganhypothesisofphysicsagidnstaphilosopherwhoassertsthatitcontradictsatruthofphilosophy.Butthatisbecausetheevidencehepossessesinsupportofhishypothesisconvinceshimthatthephilosopherismistakeninhisverdict—inotherwords,hasnotgivenitutphilosophus,asamouthpieceofphilosophy.Buthewouldnotthereforebejustifiedindenyingthephilosopher'scompetenceassuchtodeterminethequestion.

2Forexample,whenthephilosophicaldoctrineoijreewillappearstothemechaniststocontradictthephysicallawoftheconservationofenergy.


Moreover,sincethelawsofonesciencearesubordinatetothelawsofasuperiorscience,itclearlyfollowsthatitistheofficeofthesuperiorsciencetogoverntheinferior.Butsincetheprinciplesofphilosophy(thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)aretheabsolutelyfirstprinciplesofallhumanknowledge,theypossessanauthorityovertheprinciplesofallotherhumansciences,whichareinacertainsensedependentuponthem.Thatistosay,philosophy(thefirst

philosophyormetaphysics)governstheothersciences.

Sincetheprinciplesofphilosophy(thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)aretheabsolutelyfirstprinciplesofallhumanknowledge,theprinciplesorpostulatesofallhumansciencesareinacertainsensedependentuponthem.

Theydonot,itistrue,dependdirectlyontheprinciplesofmetaphysics,asthetruthofaconclusiondependsonthetruthofitspremisses.Theyareself-evidentbythelightofnaturalreason[principiapersenota).Buttheyarenotabsolutelyspeaking{simpliciter)firstprinciples.Therefore,althoughtheycarryconvictionindependentlyofmetaphysics,neverthelesstheypresupposeinfacttheprinciplesofmetaphysicsandcanberesolvedintothem.Theycanbeknownwithoutanexphcitknowledgeoftheprinciplesofmetaphysics,buttheycouldnotbetrue,unlessthelatterweretrue.Andinthissensetheyareindirectlysubordinatetothelatter.Forinstance,themathematicalaxiom,twoquantitieswhichareequaltoathirdquantityareequaltooneanother^canberesolvedintothemetaphysicalaxiomofwhichitisaspecialcase:twobeingsidenticalwithathirdareidenticalwithoneanother.

Itisforthisresisonthatallthesciencesaresaidto


beindirectlysubordinatetometaphysics.Moreover,theyareobligedonoccasiontoemploytheuniversallyvalidprinciplesofmetaphysics.Inthissensetheyaresaidtobesubordinatetometaphysicsinaparticularaspectorrelatively{secundumquid).

Togovernordirectanythingistoprescribeitsobjectorend.Thesciencesarenotdirectedbyphilosophytotheirend,inthesensethattheycannotattainitwithouttheaidofphilosophy.Arithmetic,forexample,hasnoneedofphilosophytoinvestigatethenumericaltruthswhichitinvestigatesofitsverynature.Philosophy,however,assignsthedistinctiveendsofthespecialsciencesinthesensethatitdeterminesspeculativelythedistinctiveobjectofeach,andwhatconstitutestheirspecificunityanddifferentiationfromtherest(classificationofthesciences).Ândsodoingitassignstheorderinwhichtheystandonetoanother.Thusallthesciencesareorderedbywisdom:sapientisestordinare.Ifthereforeascience,ormorecorrectlyascientist,shouldhappentolosesightofitstrueobjectbyencroachingonthedomainandrightsofanother

science,*itisthedutyofphilosophytoredressthedisorderinvolved.Inthiscapacityphilosophygovernsordirectsthesciences

*Aproblemdiscussedinmajorlogic.

2Suchdivagationsandencroachmentsareonlytoofrequent.Forexample,thenon-EucIidcangeometriesmaybesotreatedastodivertmathematicsfromitsproperend.Ontheotherhand,sinceDescartes,mathematicshasusurpedthedomainofallthesciences,andinourtimephysicsandchemistryareconstantlyencroachinguponthedomainofbiology,medicineuponpsychology;whiletheincursionsmadebyphysicsorbiologyintotheprovinceofphilosophyitselfareinnumerable:forexample,thepseudo-scientifictheoriesofthenonexistenceaffinalcauses,theunrealityofqualities,determinism,atomism,orthebiologicaldogmasoffransformismandmechanism.


(tothesedistinctiveends),notbypositiveprescription,butbysettingthemright,iftheytransgresstheirboundaries.

Ontheotherhand,thatknowledgeinwhichthemindattainsitsultimategood,thatistosay,thehighestknowledge,mayberegardedasthecommontranscendentgoaltowardswhichallthespecialsciencesconverge.Butthisknowledgeisbestowedbyphilosophy—thescienceoffirstcauses—whichinthiscapacitygovernsordirectsthesciencesinviewofthecommonendtowhichtheirparticularobjectsaresubordinate.Allthesciencesarethusdirectedtowisdom.

Fromallwehavejustsaiditfollowsthattobeproficientinthesciencesitisnotnecessarytobeaphilosopherortobaseone'sworkonaphilosophy;neitherneedthescientistwhileengagedinhisspecialtaskseekadvicefromthephilosopherorattempttoplaythephilosopherhimself;but"philosophyaloneenablesthemanofsciencetounderstandthepositionandbearingsofhisspecialscienceinthesum-totalofhumanknowledge"or"toacquireanotioneitheroftheprinciplesimplicitinallexperimentalknowledgeorthetruefoundationsofthespecialsciences."Îtfollows,further,thataperiodinthehistoryofhumancultureinwhichphilosophyisnotallowedherrightfulsuzeraintyoverthesciencesasscientiarectrix°inevitablyendsinaconditionofintellectualchaosandageneralweakeningofthereasoningfaculty.

Descartes,justbecauseheabsorbedallthesciences

1T.Richard,Philosophicduraisonnementdanslascienced'aprisSaintThomas,p.14..'St.Thomas,InMetaph.,Inlroduction.


inphilosophy,andregardedscienceasabsolutelyandwithoutquaUficationone,believedthattheprinciplesofallthesciencesdependdirectlyontheprinciplesofthefirstphilosophy(metaphysics).Inconsequenceheheldthatthestudyofthesciencesandofphilosophyitselfmustbeginwithmetaphysics,thatistosay,withthecoping-stoneoftheentireedifice.

Thecontraryerroristhebeliefthattheprinciplesofscienceareabsolutelyindependentoftheprinciplesofphilosophy.Thereisthereforenoplaceforascientiarectrix,andthesciencesarenolongerastructurebuiltonadefiniteplan,butaformlessagglomeration.ItissurprisingthatAugusteGomte,whowishedtoreducephilosophytoameresystematisationofthespecialsciences,failedtoseethatthisveryfunctionofclassifyingandsystematisingthesciences(inwhathetermstheirobjectivesynthesis)isonlypossibleifphilosophyisadistinctscienceofahigherorderonwhichtheothersareinacertainrespectdependent.^

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.TfiomasTheprinciplesofthespecialsciencesaresubordinatetotheprinciplesofphilosophy,butonlyindirectly.Philosophythereforegovernstheothersciences,butitsgovernmentissuchthatitmaybetermedconstitutional.(Thespecialsciencesareautonomous.)Thestudyofthefirstphilosophy(metaphysics)shouldbeundertaken,notatthebeginning,butattheendofintellectualresearch.

PhilosophyofPhilosophyofthosewhoreject

DescartesPhilosophy

TheprinciplesoftheTheprinciplesofthe

specialsciencesarcdirectlyspecialsciencesarenot

subordinatetothoseofsubordinatetotheprin-

*ForGomte,indeed,sociologytakesthepositionofscientiarectrix,only,

however,asorderingthesciencesinreferencetothehumansubject,notinthemselves.{Subjectivesynthesis.)


philosophy.Thelatterciplesofanyscienceofa

thereforeexercisesoverthehigherorder.Thesesci—

othersciencesagovernencesthereforeareinno

mentv^hichmaybetermedsensegovernedbutarein

despotic.aconditionwhichmaybe

Thestudyofthefirsttermedanarchy.Thereis

philosophy(metaphysics)nosupremescienceorfirst

shouldbeundertakenatphilosophy(metaphysics),thebeginningofintellectualresearch.

Finally,ifasciencebasesitsdemonstrationsoncertainpostulatesordata,whichitcanneitherexplainnordefend,theremustbeasuperiorsciencewhosefunctionitistodefendthesepostulatesordata.Inthissensethescienceofarchitecturedefendsthatofbuilding.Itis,however,obviousthateveryscience,exceptthehighest,basesitsdemonstrationsonpostulatesordataitisincapableofexplainingordefending.Forinstance,mathematicsdoesnotinquirewhatisthenatureofquantity,number,orextension,norphysicswhatisthenatureofmatter.Andifanobjectorshoulddenythatthesensibleworldexists,thattwoquantitiesequaltoathirdareequaltooneanother,orthatspacehasthreedimensions,neitherphysicsnormathematicscanrefutehisobjection,sincetheyonthecontraryassumethesepostulatesordata.Thereforeitmustbethefunctionofphilosophy(thefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)todefendagainsteverypossibleobjectionthepostulatesofallthehumansciences.

Itisfromcommonsense,orfromthenaturalevidenceoftheintellectandexperience,thatthesciencesderivetheirpostulates.Thisisnodoubttheirsufficientwarranttobuildonthesepostulates,butitisinsufficienttosafeguardandprotectthemagainst


errorswhichcallthepostulatesinquestion.Anditisalsoinsufficienttoprovidefortheperfectingstabilityandessentialneedsofhumanknowledge.Humanknowledgewouldremainexcessivelyimperfectandweak,andwouldfailtoreachitsfinalend,ifthepostulatesofthescienceswerenotscientificallyexplained,discussed,anddefended.

Philosophy,therefore,andparticularlythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics,becauseitiswisdomandthesupremescience,judges,governs,anddefendstheothersciences.Buttheruleriscertainlynotdependentuponthosewhomhegoverns.Wethereforeconcludethatphilosophyisindependentoftheinferiorsciences,oratanyratedependsonthemonlyinthesensethatasuperior,whenheisnotstrongenoughtobeself-sufficient,dependsontheservantsorinstrumentswhichheemploys.ItwasforthisreasonthatAristotleregardedphilosophyasthesciencepreeminentlyfree.

Philosophyappealstothefacts,thedataofexperience.Toobtainthenecessarymaterialsitusesasinstrumentsthetruthsprovidedbytheevidenceofthesensesandtheconclusionsprovedbythesciences.Itdependsonboth,asasuperiorwhocannotdohisownworkdependsontheservantsheemploys.

Adependenceofthiskindisapurelymaterialdependence,sincethesuperiordependsontheinferiortobeservedbyhim,nottodohimservice.Hethereforejudgesbyhisownlightofwhateverhisservantsbringhimtosupplyhisneeds.Forexample,oneofthemostsuccessfulstudentsofbees,Francois


Huber,whowasblind,interpretedbythelightofhisintellectthefactsseenbyhisservants'eyes.

Butfurther,thispurelymaterialdependenceofphilosophy,thoughabsolutelynecessaryinrespectoftheevidenceofthesenses,isrelativeandcontingentinrespecttotheconclusionsofthesciences.Itisinfactfromtheevidenceofthesensesthatphilosophyderivesthefundamentalprincipleswhich—interpretedbyitsownHght—itemploysaspremissesinitsdemonstrationsandasthemeanstoproveitsspecialtruths.Forinstance,thetruth,perceivedbythesensesandinterpretedbythelightofphilosophy,thereismotionintheuniverse,servedAristotleasthepremissfromwhichheprovedthatbeingisdividedintoactand

potentiality,andthatthereisafirstmoverthatispureact(God).Itisobviousthatphilosophyisabsolutelyunabletodispensewithdataofthiskind,andthatthedatathusemployedaspremissesmustbeabsolutelytrue.Otherwisetheconclusionswhichphilosophydeducesfromthemwouldbeuncertain.Butitisotherwisewiththepropositionsandconclusionsofthesciences.Nodoubttheseconclusions,iftrue,contributetothestoreofmaterialsutilisedbyphilosophy—butphilosophy(andparticularlythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics)isundernonecessitytoemploythem,indeedoughtnottoemploythemtoestablishitsownconclusions,atanyratenotitscertainconclusions,thoughitmaymakeuseofthemasconfirmatoryevidence.Itmustcertainlyhaveatitsdisposalsomescientificconclusions,indeedasplentifulasupplyaspossible,becauseitcannotdevelopitsprinciplessatisfactorilyuntilitseesthemembodied,sotospeak,inconcreteexampleswhich


thesensescanperceive.Butitdoesnotneedoneparticularscientificpropositionratherthananyother,provided,thatistosay,that,truetoitsownnatureandmaintainingtheHbertyduetoasuperiorscience,itdrawsitsproofsfromitsownprinciplesandfromthefundamentaltruthssuppliedbytheevidenceofthesensesandnotfromtheconclusionssuppliedbythesciences.Theselatter,infact,shouldnotbepremissesbutsimplyillustrationswhichassistphilosophytoattainitsowntruths.Asoundphilosophycanthereforedispensewiththeparticularsystemofscientificexplanationsofwhichitmakesuseinaccordancewiththestateofscienceataparticularepoch,andifthatsystemwereonedayprovedfalsethetruthofthatphilosophywouldnotbeaffected.Onlyitslanguageandthesensibleillustrationswithwhichitclotheditstruthswouldrequiremodification.

Theseremarksareimportant.TheyshowhowthedatumofexperienceonwhichphilosophyisprimarilybasedsuflScesfortherequirementsofasupremeanduniversalscience.Thisdatumisprovidedbyaninstrument—theevidenceofthesenses—earlierthanscientificobservation,infinitelymorecertainthantheinductionsofthesciences,andplacedbynatureatthedisposalofeveryman,andconsistsoftruthssosimplethattheyareuniversallyandabsolutelyvalid,soimmediateandevidentthattheircertziintyexceedsthatofthebestestablishedscientificconclusions.^

^Tothisfundamentaldatumwemayadd—butassecondarymatterandattimes

valuableconfirmation—thefactsofamorespecialdescriptiondiscovered,controlled,andmeasuredbytheobservationsandexperimentsofscience.Weshouldbearinmindthattheabsolutelyevidenttruthswhichconstitutetheprimitiveandfundamentaldatumofpliilosophymustbecarefullydistinguishedfrom


FromwhathasbeensaidwecanalsounderstandwhythepurelyscientificmistakestobefoundinolderstatementsofAristoteUanandThomisticphilosophy,statementswhichinevitablybearthestampofthescientificbeliefsoftheirperiod,donothingtodiscreditthetruthofthatphilosophy.FornophilosophyhasobservedmorefaithfullythanthatofAristotleandSt.Thomasthelawsofthoughtwhichguaranteeitspurityandfreedom.

Ontheotherhandphilosophy,thoughdistinctfromthespecialsciences,isnotunrelatedtoorisolatedfromthem.Onthecontrary,itpossessesthedutytoexerciseitsofficeasscientiarectrixbyconstantlythrowingitslightonthediscoveriesandhypotheses,theunceasingactivityandthedevelopmentofthesciences,andoneofthemostessentialrequisitesforitslifeandprogressintheworldistomaintainanintimatecontactwiththelowerbranchesofstudywhosedataitinterpretsandrendersfruitful.

Totheextenttowhichphilosophythusconcernsitselfwithinterpretingbytheaidofitsowntruthsthefactsorhypotheseswhichpositivescienceregardsasproved,theerrorsorlacunaeofpositivesciencemayintroduceaccidentallyintoatruesystemofpliilosophyelementsoferrorwhichare,sotospeak,thetokenandpriceofthehumandevelopmentofphilosophy—but

certaininterpretationsofexperiencedrawnfromunscientificobservationwhicharenothingmorethanpseudo-scientificstatements.If,forexample,innaturalphilosophy,toprovetherealityofsubstantialchange,itwerearguedthatwhereaswaterisaliquidbody,hydrogenandoxygenaregaseousbodies,theargumentwouldrest,notonatruthattestedbythesenses,butonascientificerror,forinrealitythesameinorganicbodiesarefoundinthethreestatessolid,liquid,andgaseous.Obviouslyanadequatescientifictraininghelpsthephilosophertoavoidpitfallsofthiskind.


theycanonlyfalsifyaphilosophyitselftotheextenttowhichitisuntruetoitsownnatureandenslavesitselftothelowerbranchesofstudy.^

Itisclearfromeverythingwhichhasbeensaidthatthenatureandneedsofphilosophymakeitincumbentuponthephilosophertokeephimselfasfullyacquaintedashecanwiththescientificknowledgeofhisperiod,provided,however,thathepreservesintactthefreedomofphilosophictruth.Forthoughthephilosopherassuchneednotusetheaffirmationsofthespecialsciencestoestablishhisowntruths,heoughttomakeuseofthem,(i)toillustrateaptlyhisprinciples,(ii)toconfirmhisconclusions,(iii)tointerpret,throwHghtupon,andassimilate,theassuredresultsofthesciencessofarasquestionsofphilosophyareinvolved.Andfinallyheshouldusetheaffirmationsofscience(iv)torefuteobjectionsanderrorswhichclaimsupportfromitsresults.

Fromyetanotherpointofviewthestudyofthesciencesisnecessaryforthephilosopher:hisowneducationmustofnecessity,owingtotheveryconditionsofhumannature,beaprogressfromtheimperfecttotheperfect,sothatbeforeundertakingthestudyofwisdomheshouldundergothetrainingofthesciences.*

1The'*crime"ofthedecadentScholasticsofthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturieswasthattheybeUeved,andmadeothersbelieve,thatthephilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomaswasinthissenseboundupwiththemistakesofancientscience,ofwhichitisinrealitywhollyindependent.

2Thephilosopheralsorequiresascientifictrainingtobeinapositiontodistinguishreadilybetweentheprimaryevidenceofexperienceandcertainpopularbutreallypseudo-scientificinterpretationsofexperience,such,forexample,asthehypothesisofthesun'smotionaroundtheearthortheover-hastybeliefthataparticularinorganicbodyisessentiallyliquidandanotheressentiallysolidorgaseous.


Itisnotthereforesurprisingthatallthegreatphilosophershavebeenthoroughlyacquaintedwithcontemporaryscience.Somehaveevenbeengreatscientists(forexampleAristotle,AlbertusMagnus,andLeibniz),andseveralscientificdiscoveriesofthefirstmagnitudehasbeenmadebyphilosophers,forinstarrcethemathematicaldiscoveriesofPythagoras,Descartes,andLeibniz.

Inthisconnectionwemayobservethataprofoundandpracticalknowledgeofa

singlesciencewithwhichthestudentisdirectlyacquaintedcontributesfarmoretoaphilosophictrainingthanasuperficialandsecondhandknowledgeofalargenumber.Thoughowingtothedegreetowhichspecialisationhasbeencarriedinmoderntimeshecannothopeevertopossessthatcompleteknowledgeofallthescienceswhichispossessedbythescientistinhisparticulardepartment,thephilosophershouldneverthelessaimatacquiringasufficientlythoroughknowledgeoftheentirebodyofthesciences,anidealinitselfnotbeyondtheboundsofpossibility,asisprovedbytheexampleofseveralpowerfulminds.

ConclusionII.—Philosophyisthehighestofallbranchesofhumanknowledgeandisinthetruesensewisdom.Theother(human)sciencesaresubjecttophilosophy,inthesensethatitjudgesandgovernsthemanddefendstheirpostulates.Philosophyontheotherhandisfreeinrelationtothesciences,andonlydependsonthemastheinstrumentswhichitemploys.

PHILOSOPHYANDTHEOLOGY

Philosophyisthehighestofthehumansciences,thatis,ofthescienceswhichknowthingsbythenaturallightofreason.Butthereisascienceaboveit.ForiftherebeasciencewhchisaparticipationbymanoftheknowledgepropertoGodhimself,obviouslythatsciencewillbesuperiortothehighesthumanscience.Suchascience,however,exists;itistheology.

ThewordtheologymeansthescienceofGod.ThescienceorknowledgeofGodwhichwecanattainnaturallybytheunassistedpowersofreason,andwhichenablesustoknowGodbymeansofcreaturesastheauthorofthenaturalorder,isaphilosophicscience—thesupremedepartmentofmetaphysics—andisknownastheodicyornaturaltheology.TheknowledgeorscienceofGodwhichisunattainablenaturallybytheunassistedpowersofreason,andispossibleonlyifGodhasinformedmenabouthimselfbyarevelationfromwhichourreason,enlightenedbyfaith,subsequentlydrawstheimplicitconclusions,issupernaturaltheologyorsimplytheology.Itisofthissciencethatwearenowspeaking.

Itsobjectissomethingwhollyinaccessibletothenaturalapprehensionofanycreaturewhatsoever,namely,Godknowninhimself,inhisowndivinelife,orintechnicallanguagesubrationeDeitatis,not,asin

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naturaltheology,Godasthefirstcauseofcreaturesandtheauthorofthenaturalorder.AndalltheologicalknowledgeisknowledgeintermsofGodthusapprehended,whereasallmetaphysicalknowledge,includingthemetaphysicalknowledgeofGod,isknowledgeintermsofbeingingeneral.

ThepremissesoftheologyarethetruthsformallyrevealedbyGod{dogmasorarticlesoffaith),anditsprimarycriterionoftruththeauthorityofGodwhorevealsit.

Itslightisnolongerthemorenaturallightofreason,buttheUghtofreasonilluminatedbyfaith,virtualrevelationinthelanguageoftheology,thatistosay,revelationinsofarasitimplicitly(virtually)containswhateverconclusionsreasoncandrawfromit.

Alikebythesublimityofitsobject,thecertaintyofitspremisses,andtheexcellenceofitslight,theologyisaboveallmerelyhumansciences.Andalthoughitisunabletoperceivethetruthofitspremisses,whichthetheologianbeHeves,whereasthepremissesofphilosophyareseenbythephilosopher,itisneverthelessasciencesuperiortophilosophy.Though,asSt.Thomaspointsout,theargumentfromauthorityistheweakestofall,wherehumanauthorityisconcerned,theargumentfromtheauthorityofGod,therevealer,ismoresolidandpowerfulthananyother.^

Andfinallyastheobjectoftheologyishewhoisaboveallcauses,itclaimswithafarbettertitlethan

*Licetlocusabauctoritate,quaefundaiursuperrationehumana,sitinfirmissimus,locustarrumabauctoritatequaefundatursuperrevelationedivinaestefficacissimus.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.i,q.i,a8,ad2.


metaphysicsthenameofwisdom.Itiswisdomparexcellence.^Whatrelations,then,mustobtainbetweenphilosophyandtheology?

Asthesuperiorscience,theologyjW^^jphilosophyinthesamesensethatphilosophyjudgesthesciences.Îtthereforeexercisesinrespectofthelatterafunctionofguidanceorgovernment,thoughanegativegovernment,which

consistsinrejectingasfalseanyphilosophicaffirmationwhichcontradictsatheologicaltruth.Inthissensetheologycontrolsandexercisesjurisdictionovertheconclusionsmaintainedbyphilosophers.

Thej&r^mfjj^jôfphilosophy,however,areindependentoftheology,beingthoseprimarytruthswhichareself-evidenttotheunderstanding,whereasthepremissesoftheologyarethetruthsrevealedbyGod.Thepremissesofphilosophyareself-supportedandarenotderivedfromthoseoftheology.Similarlythelightbywhichphilosophyknowsitsobjectisindependent

*Theologyistheoreticalwisdom,parexcellencethewisdomwhichknowsGodbytheintellectanditsideas,thatistosay,bythenormalprocessesofhumanknowledge.ThereisanotherwisdomofastillhigherorderwhichisagiftoftheHolySpirit,andenableslistoknowGodexperimentallyandbymeansofcharity.Itenablesxistojudgeofdivinethingsinstinctively,asthevirtuousmanjudgesofvirtue{permoduminclinationis),notscientificallyasthemoralistjudgesofvirtue{permodumcognitionis).Cf.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.i,q.i,a6,a</3.

2Seeabove,pp.111sqq.Thephilosopherandthescientistareneverentitledtodenytherightswhichtheologypossessesoverphilosophyandthesciences.Theymay,however,bejustifiedinrejectinginaparticularinstance,notindeedtheauthorityoftheChurch,butthejudgmentofanindividualtheologian,sincetheindividualtheologiandoesnotnecessarilyspeakasthemouthpieceoftheology,andmaythereforebemistaken.


oftheology,sinceitslightisthelightofreason,whichisitsownguarantee.^Forthesereasonsphilosophyisnotpositivelygovernedbytheology,^norhasitanyneedoftheologytodefenditspremisses(whereasitdefendsthoseoftheothersciences).Itdevelopsitsprinciplesautonomouslywithinitsownsphere,thoughsubjecttotheexternalcontrolandnegativeregulationoftheology.

Itisthereforeplainthatphilosophyandtheologyareentirelydistinct,andthatitwouldbeasabsurdforaphilosophertoinvoketheauthorityofrevelationtoproveaphilosophicalthesisasforageometriciantoattempttoproveatheorembytheaidofphysics,forexample,byweighingthefiguresheiscomparing.Butifpliilosophyandtheologyareentirelydistinct,theyarenotthereforeunrelated,

andalthoughphilosophyisofallthehumansciencespreeminentlythefreescience,inthesensethatitproceedsbymeansofpremissesandlawswhichdependonnosciencesuperiortoitself,itsfreedom—thatis,itsfreedomtoerr—isUmitedinsofarasitissubjecttotheology,whichcontrolsitexternally.IIntheseventeenthcenturytheCartesianreform

^Thislightisitsownevidenceandinphilosophyissufficientofitself.Butthisdoesnotpreventitservingalso—intheology,however,notinphilosophy—astheinstrumentofasuperiorlight;neither,ofcourse,doesitimplythathumanreasonisnotsubordinateinitsveryprinciplestotheFirstIntellect.

2Theologycanturntheinvestigationsofphilosophyinonedirectionratherthaninanother,inwhichcaseitmaybesaidtoregulatephilosophypositivelybyaccident{peraccidens).Butabsolutelyspeakingtheologycanregulatephilosophyonlynegatively,ashasbeenexplainedabove.Positivelyitdoesnotregulateiteitherdirectly,byfurnishingitsproofs(asfaithforapologetics),orindirectly,byclassifyingitsdivisions(asphilosophyitselfclassifiesthesciences).


resultedintheseveranceofphilosophyfromtheology,^therefusaltorecognisetherightfulcontroloftheologyanditsfunctionasanegativeruleinrespectofphilosophy.Thiswastantamounttodenyingthattheologyisascience,oranythingmorethanamerepracticaldiscipline,andtoclaimingthatphilosophy,orhumanwisdom,istheabsolutelysovereignscience,whichadmitsnoothersuperiortoitself.Thus,inspiteofthereligiousbeliefsofDescarteshimself,Cartesianismintroducedtheprincipleofrationalistphilosophy,whichdeniesGodtherighttomakeknownbyrevelationtruthswhichexceedthenaturalscopeofreason.ForifGodhasindeedrevealedtruthsofthiskind,humanreasonenlightenedbyfaithwillinevitablyemploythemaspremissesfromwhichtoobtainfurtherknowledgeandthusformascience,theology.Andiftheologyisascience,itmustexerciseinrespectofphilosophythefunctionofanegativerule,sincethesamepropositioncannotbetrueinphilosophy,falseintheology.^

*Itmay,itistrue,berepliedthatDescartes'sintentionwassimplytoemancipatephilosophyfromtheauthorityofaparticulartheologicalsystem—Scholasticism—whichheregardedasworthless,becauseittookitsphilosophicormetaphysicalprinciplesfromAristotle.

Inreality,however,itwaswiththeologyitselfthathebroke,whenhebrokewithScholasticism,whichisthetraditionaltheologyoftheChurch.Andmoreoverhisconceptionofscienceimpliedthedenialofhisscientificvalueoftheology.Inanycasetheresultofhisreformwastheassertionoftheabsoluteindependenceofphilosophyinrelationtotheology.{Cf.Blondel,"LeChristianismedeDescartes."RevtiedeMitaph.etdeMorale,1896.)

2Thetheoryofadoubletruth,bywhichthesamethingmaybetrueinphilosophy,butfakeintheology,wasinventedbythemediaevalAverroists,whosoughtinthiswaytoevadethecensuresoftheChurch.Invariousformsithasbeenrevivedinmodemtimesbyallwho,likethemodernists,wishtokeepthenameofCatholicswhilefreelyprofessinginphilosophyopinionsdestructiveofsomeparticulardogmatictruth.


Ontheotherhand,philosophyrenderstotheologyservicesofthegreatestvaluewhereitisemployedbythelatter.Forinfacttheologyemploysinitsdemonstrationstruthsprovedbyphilosophy.Philosophythusbecomestheinstrumentoftheology,anditisinthisrespectandinsofarasitservestheologicalargumentthatitiscalledancillatheologiae.Initself,however,andwhenitisprovingitsownconclusions,itisnotabond-servantbutfree,subjectonlytotheexternalcontrolandnegativeruUngoftheology.

Aswasshownabove,philosophyisfromtheverynatureofthingsobhgedtoemployasaninstrumenttheevidenceofthesenses,andeven,inacertainfashion,theconclusionsofthespecialsciences.Theology*consideredinitselfasasciencesubordinatetotheknowledgeofGodandtheblessed,isnotinthiswayobligedtomakeuseofphilosophy,butisabsolutelyindependent.

Inpractice,however,onaccountofthenatureofitspossessor,thatistosay,onaccountoftheweaknessofthehumanunderstanding,whichcanreasonaboutthethingsofGodonlybyanalogywithcreatures,itcannotbedevelopedwithouttheassistanceofphilosophy.Butthetheologiandoesnotstandinthesamerelationtophilosophyasthephilosophertothesciences.^Wehaveseenabovethatthephilosopher

^Thisdistinctionbetweentherelationshipoftheologytophilosophyandthatofphilosophytothespecialsciencesderivesfromthefactthat,sincetheologyisa

participationofthedivinewisdom,thehumansubjectistooweakforitsunaidedstudyandtodrawconclusionsfromitiscomj)elledtoemployaspremissesconclusionsestablishedbyaninferiordiscipline.

Since,however,philosophyisahumanwisdom,atwhichreasoncan


shouldemploythepropositionsorconclusionswhichheborrowsfromthesciences,nottoestabUshhisownconclusions(atanyratenotconclusionsforwhichmetaphysicalcertaintyisclaimed),butmerelytoillustratehisprinciples,andthereforethatthetruthofametaphysicalsystemdoesnotdependonthetruthofthescientificmaterialitemploys.Thetheologian,onthecontrary,makesuseateveryturnofphilosophicpropositionstoprovehisownconclusions.Thereforeasystemoftheologycouldnotpossiblybetrueifthemetaphysicswhichitemployedwerefalse.Itisindeedanabsolutenecessitytiiatthetheologianshouldhaveathisdisposalatruephilosophyinconformitywiththecommonsenseofmankind.

Philosophytakeninitselfnormallyprecedestheology.Certainfundamentaltruthsofthenaturalorderareindeedwhatwemaytermtheintroductiontothefaith{praeambulaJidei).Thesetruths,whicharenaturallyknowntoallmenbythelightofcommonsense,areknownandprovedscientificallybyphilosophy.Theology',beingthescienceoffaith,presupposesthephilosophicalknowledgeofthesesametruths.

Philosophyconsideredastheinstrumentoftheologyservesthelatter,principallyinthreeways.Inthefirstplacetheologyemploysphilosophytoprovethetruthswhichsupportthefoundationsofthefaithinthatdepartmentoftheologywhichistermedapolo—

arrive,thoughwithdifficulty,byitsunassistednatviralpower,thehumanmindshouldbeabletodrawfromitcertainconclusions(especiallymetaphysicallycertainconclusions)withoutemployingaspremissestheconclusionsofsciencestowhichitissuperiorind^[nityandincertainty.


getics,^whichshows,forexample,howmiraclesprovethedivinemissionoftheChurch;secondarilytoimpartsomenotionofthemysteriesoffaithbytheaidof

analogiesdrawnfromcreatures—asforinstancewhentheologyusesthephilosophicconceptionofverbummentale,thementalword,'toillustratethedogmaoftheTrinity;andfinallytorefutetheadversariesofthefaith—aswhentheologyshowsbymeansofthephilosophictheoryofquantity*thatthemysteryoftheEucharistisinnowayopposedtoreason.

Wemustnotforgetthat,ifphilosophyservestheology,itreceivesinreturnvaluableassistancefiromthelatter.

Inthefirstplace,sofarasitisofitsnaturesubjecttotheexternalcontrolandnegativeruhngoftheology,itisprotectedfromahostoferrors;andifitsfreedomtoerristhusrestricted,itsfreedomtoattaintruthiscorrespondinglysafeguarded.*

Inthesecondplace,insofarasitistheinstrumentoftheology,itisledtodefinemorepreciselyandwithmoresubtlerefinementsimportantconceptsandtheorieswhich,lefttoitself,itwouldbeindangerofneglecting.Forexample,itwasundertheinfluence

SeeGarrigou-Lagrange,DeRevelatione,i,2,1918.

2Atheorystudiedinpsychology.

'Anexplanationgivenbycosmology.

*Unassistedreasoncanindeedavoiderroronanyparticularpointwhatsoeverwithinthesphereofphilosophy,butinviewoftheweaknessofhumannattireitisunablewithouttheassistanceofgracetoavoiderroronsomepointorother;thatistosay,withoutaspecialgraceorthenegativecontrolofrevelationandtheologyitcannotachieveaperfecthumanwisdom.{Cf.St.Thomas,Sum.Theol.,i,q.i,a.I;Sum.contraCent.,i,4;Garrigou-Lagrange,DeRev.,i,pp.411sqq.)


oftheologythatThomismelaboratedthetheoryofnatureandpersonality,andperfectedthetheoryofthehabitus,habits,etc.

ConclusionIII.—Theology,orthescienceofGodsofarasHehasbeenmadeknowntousbyrevelation,issuperiortophilosophy.Philosophyissubjecttoit,

neitherinitspremissesnorinitsmethod,butinitsconclusions,overwhichtheologyexercisesacontrol,therebyconstitutingitselfanegativeruleofphilosophy.

PHILOSOPHYANDCOMMONSENSE

Beforewcknowthingswithascientificorperfectknowledgebyreflectinguponthemandbytheircauses,weknowthemimperfectly{unscientificknowledge,theknowledgeofeverydaylife).Wemustrememberthatweareobligednotonlytobeginwiththisunscientificknowledgeofeverydaylife;wemustbecontentwithittotheend,improvingitmoreorlessbystudyandreading,inthatenormousnumberofcaseswherescienceinthestrictsenseisunattainable.

For,sofarastheknowledgeofsecondarycausesisconcerned,nomancanpossiblyattain,withtheperfectionrequiredofthegenuinescientist,universalknowledge;inotherwords,hecannotspecialiseinallbranchesofscience,acontradictioninterms.Heisfortunate,indeed,ifhecanmakehimselfmasterofasinglescience.Foralltheothershemustbesatisfiedwithaknowledgewhich,howeverenrichedandimproveditmaybeinthecaseofwhatisknownasacultivatedman,thatistosay,amanwellacquaintedwiththescientificknowledgeofotherpeople,isalwaysinferiortoscienceinthestrictsense.Butinthedomainoffirstcauses,thescienceofallthingsiswithinaman'sgrasp,foritispreciselythedistinguishingcharacterofthesciencecalledphilosophytoknow

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allthingsbytheirfirstcauses/anditistothephilosopherorthesage,thewiseman,thatwehavetherighttoapplyLeonardodaVinci'saphorism:facilecosaefarsiuniversale;itiseasyforamantomakehimselfuniversal.

Ordinaryknowledge-consistsforthemostpartofmereopinionsorbeliefs,moreorlesswellfounded.Butitimpliesasolidkernelofgenuinecertaintiesinwhichthephilosopherrecognisesinthefirstplacedataofthesenses(forexample,thatbodiespossesslength,breadth,andheight),secondly,self-evidentaxioms(forexample,thewholeisgreaterthanthepart,everyeventhasacause,etc.),andthirdly,consequencesimmediatelydeduciblefromtheseaxioms(proximateconclusions).Thesecertaintieswhicharisespontaneouslyinthemindwhenwe

firstcometotheuseofreasonarethustheworkofnatureinus,andmaythereforebecalledanendowmentofnature*asproceedingfromthenaturalperception,consent,instinct,ornaturalsenseoftheintellect.Sincetheirsourceishumannatureitself,theywillbefoundinallmenaUke;inotherwords,theyarecommontoallmen.Theymaythereforebesaidtobelongtothecommonperception,consent,orinstinct,ortothecommonsenseofmankind.

Thegreattruthswithoutwhichman'smorallifeisimpossible—forexample,knowledgeofGod'sexistence,thefreedomofthewill,etc.—belongtothisdomainof

Îtisthereforeobviouswhatastupendousdelusionisinvolvedinthepositivistviewofphilosophy.Werephilosophymerelytheco-ordinationorsystematisationofthesciences,itsattainmentwouldpresupposeaperfectmasteryofallthesciences,thatistosay,specialisationineveryscience,whichamountstosayingthatphilosophyisbeyondthereachofman.

*Kleutgen,Laphilosophicscolastique,i,p.439.


commonsense,asconsequencesimmediatelydeducible(proximateconclusions)fromprimarydataapprehendedbyobservationandfirstprinciplesapprehendedbytheintellect.Allmen,unlessspoiledbyafaultyeducationorbysomeintellectualvice,possessanaturalcertaintyofthesetruths.Butthosewhoseunderstandinghasneverbeencultivatedarenotabletogiveanyaccountoratleastanysatisfactoryaccountoftheirconvictions;thatistosay,theycannotexplainwhytheypossessthem.

Thesecertaintiesofcommonsense,conclusionsofanimplicitreasoning,areaswellfoundedasthecertaintiesofscience.Buttheirpossessorhasnoknowledge,oranimperfectknowledge,ofthegroundsonwhichhebasesthem.Theyarethereforeimperfectnotintheirvalueastruthbutinthemodeorconditionunderwhichtheyexistinthemind.

Oftheself-evidenttruths{thewholeisgreaterthanthepart,everyeventhasacause,etc.)whicharetheobjectofwhatistermedtheunderstandingofprinciples,andwhosecertaintyissuperiortothatofanyconclusionofscience,commonsensepossessesaknowledgewhosemodeisequallyimperfect,becauseitisconfusedandimplicit.

Commonsensethereforemayberegardedasthenaturalandprimitivejudgmentofhumanreason,infalUble,butimperfectinitsmode.

Thewhollyspontaneouscharacterofcommonsense,anditsinabilitytogiveanaccountofitsconvictions,haveledcertainphilosopherstoregarditasaspecialfacultypurelyinstinctiveandunrelatedtotheintellect(theScottishschool,endofeighteenthandbeginningofnineteenthcentury;Reid,DugaldStewart,andinFrance,JoufFroy),orasasentiment


distinctfromandsuperiortoreason(theintuitiveorsentimentalistschool;forinstance,Rousseau,Jacobi,andinourowntimeBergson).Butinthatcaseitwouldnecessarilybeblind,forwepossessnootherlightthanthatoftheintellectorreason.Thelightofcommonsenseisfundamentallythesamelightasthatofscience,thatistosay,thenaturallightoftheintellect.Butincommonsensethislightdoesnotreturnuponitselfbycriticalreflection,andisnotperfectedbywhatweshalllearntoknowasascientifichabit{habitus).

Wemustnowdefinetherelationswhichobtainbetweenphilosophyandcommonsense.

Philosophycannot,astheScottishschoolmaintained,befoundedontheauthorityofcommonsenseunderstoodsimplyasthecommonconsentoruniversalwitnessofmankind,orasaninstinctwhichinfactcompelsourassent.Foritisinfactfoundedonevidence,notonauthorityofanykind.

Butifbycommonsenseweunderstandonlytheimmediateapprehensionofself-evidentfirstprinciples,whichisoneofitsconstituents,wemaysaywithtruththatitisthesourceofthewholeofphilosophy.Forthepremissesofphilosophyareindeedtheevidentaxiomswhichinvirtueofitsnaturalconstitutionimplantintheminditsprimarycertainties.

Itisimportanttobequiteclearthat,ifphilosophyfindsitspremissesalreadyenunciatedbycommonsense,itacceptsthemnotbecausetheyareenunciatedbycommonsense,orontheauthorityofcommonsenseunderstoodastheuniversalconsentorcommoninstinctofmankind,butentirelyandsolelyontheauthorityoftheevidence.


Finally,ifwetakeintoaccounttheentirebodyoftruths(premissesandconclusions)knownbycommonsensewithcertaintybutinanimperfectmode,wemustconcludethatphilosophyissuperiortocommonsense,astheperfectstageofanything(inthiscasethescientificstageofknowledge)issuperiortotheimperfectorrudimentarystageofthesamething(inthiscasethepre-scientificstageofthesameknowledge,whichisyettrueandcertainatbothstages).

Ifincommonsenseweconsidernottheconclusionswhichitreachesbutthepremissesalone,itisstillinferiortophilosophyinrespectofitsmodeofknowledge,butsuperioraliketophilosophyandtoallthesciencesinrespectoiitsobjectandofthelightinwhichitknows.For,aswehavesaidabove,philosophyandallthesciencesareultimatelyfoundedonthenaturalevidenceoffirstprinciples(towhichphilosophyreturns—incriticism—tostudythemscientifically,whereastheothersciencesarecontenttoacceptthemfromnature).

Philosophystudiesscientificallythethreecategoriesoftruthstowhichcommonsensebearsinstructivewitness:(i)thetruthsoffactwhichrepresenttheevidenceofthesenses;(ii)theself-evidentfirstprinciplesoftheunderstanding,inasmuchasitclearsuptheirmeaningbycriticalreflectionanddefendsthemrationally;(iii)theconsequencesimmediatelydeducible(proximateconclusions)fromthesefirstprinciples,inasmuchasitprovidesarationalproofofthem.And,further,wherecommonsenseyieldstothemereopinionsofpopularbelief,philosophycontinuestoextendindefinitelythedomainofscientificcertainty.Thusphilosophyjustifiesandcontinues


commonsense,as,forinstance,theartofpoetryjustifiesandcontinuesthenaturalrhythmsoflanguage.

Itisalsotheprovinceofphilosophytodecidewhatarethegenuinecertaintiesaffirmedbycommonsense,andwhatistheirtruesignificance;afunctionwhichcommonsenseisincapableofperforming,fortheveryreasonthatitdoesnotunderstand,ordoesnotunderstandclearly,thegroundsofitsknowledge.Inthissensephilosophycontrolscommonsense,as,forexample,theartofpoetrycontrolsthenaturalrhythmsoflanguage.

Nevertheless,commonsensehastherightanddutytorejectanyphilosophic

teachingwhichdeniesatruthofwhichitpossessesnaturalcertainty,astheinferiorhastherightanddutytoopposeasuperiorwhoactsinamannerevidentlyunjust.Forassoonasatruthbecomesknowntous,bywhateverchannel,itisasinnottoacceptit.Commonsensemaythereforeaccidentallyjudgephilosophy.

ItisrelatedofDiogenesthatwhenZenotheEleaticwasarguinginhispresenceagainstthepossibilityofmotion,hissolereplywastogetupandwalk.Similarly,whenDescartestaughtthatmotionisrelativeor"reciprocal,"sothatitmakesnodifferencewhetheryousaythemovingobjectismovingtowardsthegoalorthegoaltowardsthemovingobject,theEnglishphilosopherHenryMoreretortedthatwhenamanrunstowardsagoalpantingandtiringhimself,^hehasnodoubtwhichofthetwo,themovingobjectorthegoal,isinmotion.

Theseprotestsofcommonsensebzisedontheevidenceofthesenseswereperfectlyjustified.Itmust,however,beaddedthattheywereinsufficient

1LetterofMarch5,1649.138


—notindeedtoconfutetherespectivethesesofZenoandDescartesbuttoconfutethemaserrorsinphilosophy.Thatwouldhavedemandedaphilosophicrefutationoftheargumentsadducedbythesephilosophers,andexplanationsshowingwhyandatwhatpointtheywentwrong.

Itmustbeobservedthatthoughinitselfandinordertoestablishitsdemonstrationsphilosophydoesnotdependupontheauthorityofcommonsense,understoodastheuniversalconsentorcommoninstinctofmankind,neverthelessitisdependentuponitinacertainsense{materially,orinrespectofthesubject),initsoriginasahumanactivityandinitsdevelopmentinthemindofphilosophers.Fromthispointofviewphilosophymaybecomparedtoabuilding,andthegreatpre-scientificconclusionsofcommonsense(theexistenceofGod,thefreedomofthewill,etc.)tothescaffoldingwhichnaturehaserectedbeforehand.Oncetheedificehasbeencompleteditsupportsitselfonitsrock-bed,thenaturalself-evidenceofitsfirstprinciples,andhasnoneedofscaffolding.Butwithoutthescaffoldingitcouldnothavebeenbuilt.

Itisnowevidenthowunreasonablethatphilosophyis,whichpridingitselfonitsscientificknowledgeofthingsdespisescommonsenseaprioriandonprinciple,

andcutsitselfofffromitsnaturalconvictions.Descartes(whoinotherrespectsandinhisveryconceptionofscienceconcedestoomuchtocommonsense)beganthisdivorce,ontheonehand,byadmittingastheonlycertaintruthsthosescientificallyestablished,thusdenyingtheintrinsicvalueoftheconvictionsofcommonsense,andontheotherhand,byprofessingaspartofhissystemseveraldoctrines


incompatiblewiththoseconvictions.HisdiscipleMalebranche,andaboveallthecriticalphilosophersoftheKantianschool,asalsocertainmodernistphilosophers,havecarriedthistendencytoitsextreme,untilforsomeofthesephilosophersitissuflSdentthatapropositionshouldbeacceptabletocommonsenseforittobequestionedordeniedbyscience,whichwouldbecontaminatedbythe"credulity"ofthecommonherd,unlessittaughtthecontraryofwhatmankindatlargebelievestobetrue.

Yetthegreaterthenaturalstrengthofaman'sintelligence,thestrongershouldbehisgraspofthesenaturalcertainties.Hethereforewhoprofessestocondemncommonsenseshowsnotthestrengthbuttheweaknessofhisunderstanding.

Itisnowobviousthatinitsattitudetocommonsense,asinitssolutionofthemajorityofthegreatphilosophicproblems,ThomismkeepsthegoldenmeanbetweentwoopposingerrorsHkeamountainsummitbetweentwovalleys.

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas

Theconvictionsofcommonsensearevalid,andscienceisuntruetoitselfifitrejectsthem.Butthebasisofphilosophyisthenaturalwitnessoftheintellect,nottheauthorityofcommonsense.

Rationalist,Critical,andScottishSchoolModernistSchools

NotonlyaretheconvicNotonlyistheauthority

tionsofcommonsenseofcommonsenseincapable

valid,buttheauthorityofoffurnishingthebasisof

commonsenseimposingphilosophy,butthecon—

itselfasablindinstinctonvictionsofcommonsense

themindisthefoundationaredestituteofanyspecu—

onwhichphilosophyshouldlativevalue,bebased.


Fromallthathasbeensaiditisevidentwhatanimportantpartthecertaintiesofcommonsenseplayasanintroductiontophilosophy.Thosewhoarebeginningthestudyofphilosophyandabouttoacquaintthemselveswiththemostrecentproblems,andevenperhapsthemostmisleadingsystems,oughttoreposeanabsolutetrustintheconvictionsofcommonsenseofwhichtheyfindtheirmindsalreadypossessed,fortheywillhelpthemtorisetoahigherandmoreperfectknowledge,conclusionsscientificallyestablished.

ConclusionIV.—Philosophyisnotbasedupontheauthorityofconunonsenseunderstoodastheuniversalconsentorcommoninstinctofmankind;itisneverthelessderivedfi-omcommonsenseconsideredastheimderstandingofself-evidentfirstprinciples.

Itissuperiortocommonsenseastheperfector"scientific"stageofknowledgeissuperiortotheimperfectorordinarystageofthesameknowledge.Neveithelessphilosophymaybeaccidentallyjudgedbycommonsense.

Forthepurposesofthispresentoutlineweneedonlyaddthatphilosophyisnotconstructedapriorionthebasisofsomeparticularfactselectedbythephilosopher(Descartes'scogito),orprinciplearbitrarilylaiddownbyhim(Spinoza'ssubstance,Fichte'spureego,SchelUng'sabsolute,Hegel'sidea)whoseconsequencesheingeniouslydevelops.Itsformalprinciplesarethefirstprinciplesapprehendedintheconceptofbeing,whosecogencyconsistswhollyintheirevidence


fortheintellect,ândontheotherhanditsmatterisexperience,anditsfacts*thesimplestandmostobviousfacts—thestarting-pointfromwhichitrisestothecausesandgroundswhichconstitutetheultimateexplanation.Notawhimsyspunoutofhisownbrain,buttheentireuniversewithitsenormousmultitudeandvarietyofdatamustbethephilosopher'steacher.

Andhemustalwaysbearinmindthat,ifphilosophyenablesthehumanintellecttoapprehendwithabsolutecertaintythehighestandmostprofoundreaUtiesofthenaturalorder,itcannotthereforeclaimtoexhaustthoserealitiesbymakingthemknowntotheutmostextentoftheirinteUigibiUty.Fromthispointofviewsciencedoesnotdestroythemysteryofthings,thatinthemwhichisstillunknownandunfathomed,butonthecontraryrecognisesanddeUmitsit;'evenwhatitknowsitneverknowscompletely.Thewisemanknowsallthings,inasmuchasheknowsthemintheirultimatecauses,buthedoesnotknow,isinfinitelyremovedfromknowing,everythingabouteverything.Ignorance,however,isnotthesameaserror.Itissufficientforthephilosopherthatheknowswith

ThisiswhatthePositivistsfailtosee.

2Thisiswhatthepureintellectttalists—fromParmenidestoHegel—whoconstructtheirmetaphysicswhollyapriori,havefailedtograsp.

'Aristotle{Metapk.,i,2)remarksthattheoccasionalcauseofphilosophyisroOavfidiêiv,admiratio,bywhichhemeanswondermingledwithdread,inotherwordsawe,awonderwhichknowledgetendstoremove.Butwemustbecarefultounderstandhismeaningofthewonderwhichdoesnotunderstand,notoftheadmiration,indeedtheawe,bomofunderstanding.Thewisemanisastonishedatnothingbecauseheknowstheultimatecausesofallthings,butheadmiresfarmorethantheignorantman.Cf,DePart.Arum.,i,5,645a16:^c■waffLrois<pvaiKoUivearluOav/xaffrdv.


certaintywhatitishisprovincetoknowandwhatitisofthefirstimportanceforustoknow.Indeed,itisbetternottoknowthingswhichdivertthemindfromthehighestknowledge,asTacitusremarks:nescireguaedam,magnaparssapientiae.

Wehaveconsideredthenatureofphilosophy;itremainstodistinguishitsdepartments.Weshallthusobtainaclearnotionofitssphere,andatthesametimebecomeacquaintedwithitsprincipalproblems.

PARTTU'OTHECLASSIFICATIONOFPHILOSOPHY

THEMAINDIVISIONSOFPHILOSOPHY

Whenamanundertakesawork,hebeginsbytestinghistoolinvariouswaystolearntheusehecanandshouldmakeofit.

Thephilosopher'sworkistoacquireknowledge;histool,reason.Thereforethephilosopherbeforehebeginshisworkmustexaminereasontodiscovertheuseheshouldmakeofit.

Thestudyofreasonasaninstrumentofacquiringknowledgeormeansofdiscoveringtruthiscalledlogic.

Logicistherefore,strictlyspeaking,notsomuchadepartmentofphilosophyasascienceorart,ofwhichphilosophy(andindeedallthesciences)makesuse,andtheintroductiontophilosophy.Itisapropaedeutictoscience.^Theothersciencesaredependentuponlogicinasmuchasitteachesthemethodofprocedureintheacquisitionofknowledge,andweareobUgedtopossessthemeansortoolsofknowledgebeforewecanacquireknowledgeitself.

Itisthusevidentthatthestudyofphilosophymust

1"Resautemdequibusestlogica,nonquaerunturadcognoscendumpropterseipsas,sedutadminiculumquoddamadaliasscientias.Etidealogicanoncontinetursubphilosophiaspeculativaquasiprincipalispars,sedquasiquoddamreductumadearn,proutministratspeculationisuainstrumenta,scilicetsyllogismosetdejinitiones,etaliahujusmodi,quibusinspeculativisscientiisindigemus.UndeetsecundumBoethiuminComment,sup.Porphyrium,nontarnestscientiaquamscientiaeinstrumentum."St.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.5,a.i,a^2.Itisthereforeonlyreductivelythatlogicbelongstotheoreticalphilosophy.


fromtheverynatureofthingsbeginwithlogic,althoughonaccountofitsdifficultyandextremelyabstractcharacterlogicusuallyrepelsratherthanattractsbeginners.Âfewofthemodernsrebelagainstthisorderofstudy,andmaintainthatlogicshouldbestudiedonlyinthecourseoflearningtheotherbranchesofphilosophy,oraftertheyhavebeenlearned.Butthisislikearguingthatthesurgeonshouldonlystudyanatomybythepracticeorafterthepracticeofhisartuponthesick,itisabsurd,Aristotleremarks,tostudyatthesametimeascienceanditsconditionsormethodofprocedure.axoTxova^xaJ^YITetv£7ti,cJTYi[i.ir)vxalXpOTTOVerutcTTYifXYjc;'.''

Whenbythestudyoflogichehasmadehimselfmasterofhistool,thephilosophercansettowork.Whatthatworkisweknowalready:toacquireaknowledgeofthingsbytheirfirstprinciples.

If,however,weconsidertheaimoflearning,therearetwodistincttypesofknowledge.Wecan,forexample,makeuseofoureyessimplyinordertosee

•Cf.St.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.6,a.i,ad3."Dicendumquodinaddiscendoincipimusabeo,quodestmagisfacile,nisinecessitasaliudrequirat.Quandoqueenimnecesseestinaddiscendononincipereabeoquodestfacilius,sedabeoacujuscognitionecognitiosequentiumdependet.Ethacpositioneoportetinaddiscendoinciperealogica,nonquiaipsasitfaciliorscientiisceteris;habetenimmaximamdifficultatem,cumsitdesecundointellectis;sedquiaaliaescientiaeabipsadependent,inquantumipsadocetmodumprocedendiinomnibusscientiis.Oportetenimprimumsciremodumscientiaequamscientiamipsam,utdiciturII.Metaph.

2Metaph.,ii,995a12.St.Thomas,InIIMetaph.,1.5."Quiaenimdiversisecundumdiversosmodosveritateminquirunt,ideaoportetquodhomoinstruaturperquernmoduminsingulisscientiissintrecipiendaeaquaedicuntur.Etquianonestfacile,quodhomosimulduocapiat,seddumadduoattendit,neutrumcaperepotest:absurdumest,quodhomosimulquaeratscientiametmodumquicorwenitscientiae.Etpropterhocdebetpriusaddiscerelogicamquamaliasscientias,quialogicatraditcommunemmodumprocedendiinomnibusscientiis."

THEMAINDIVISIONSOFPHILOSOPHY

andenjoythesightofthings,andwecanalsomakeuseofthemforthepracticalpurposesoflife.

Inthesamewaywecanemployourreasonscientifically,solelyforthepleasureofknowledge.Thesciencesthusacquiredexistsolelyforthesakeofknowledge(thetheoreticalsciences).Andiftherebeatheoreticalsciencewhichseekstoaccountforthingsbytheirfirstprinciples,itsobjectwillbethatwhichisthefirstprincipleinthetheoreticalorder,namely,thefirstcausesofeverythingwhichexist(thatistosay,thefirstcausesnaturallyknowable).Thatscienceistheoreticalphilosophy.Wecan,ontheotherhand,employourreasonscientificallyforourprofitandtheimprovementofourhfe;thesciencesthus

acquiredexisttoprocurebysomekindofactivitythegoodofman(thepracticalsciences).Andiftherebeapracticalsciencewhichseekstoregulatehumanactsbyfirstprinciples,itsobjectwillbethatwhichisthefirstprincipleinthepracticalorder,namely,theabsolutegoodofman(theabsolutegoodnaturallyknowable).^Suchascienceispracticalphilosophy—otherwisetermedmoralscienceorethics.^

Thereare,indeed,otherpracticalsciencesbesidesethics;forexample,medicine,whichseekstoprocurethehealthofman.Buttheobjectofthesesciencesisnotgood,pureandsimple(thesovereigngood),butsomeparticularhumangood.Theydonot,

*Thatistosay,thesovereigngoodofmanasitwouldbe,ifhisendweresimplynaturalhappiness.Seebelow,pp.265-267.

*Observethatthisdivisionofphilosophyintotheoreticalandpracticalrelatestotheend,theaim,nottotheobjectitselfofthescience,whichassuchisalwaysnecessarilytheoretical.Thereforeitdoesnotenterintothespecificationinthestrictsenseofthephilosophicsciences.Seebelow,p.271.


therefore,referinthepracticalordertowhichtheybelongtothefirstprincipleofaction,andforthatreasonarenotphilosophies.Ethics,ormoralscience,isthustheonlypracticalsciencewhichdeservesthenameofphilosophy.^

Wemustbearinmindthatalthoughtheobjectofethicsistoprocureagoodwhichisnotsolelyagoodoftheintellect,thatistosay,doesnotconsistinknowledgealone,itsruleoftruthisthatwhichis,anditproceedsbywayofdemonstration,resolvingconclusionsintotheirpremisses.Inotherwordsitispracticalinvirtueofitsobject(toknowinordertoprocurethegoodofmanintheorderingofhisacts),butasscienceinthestrictsenseitistheoreticalknowledge.*

Wemustfurtherremarkthatthepracticalsciencesareobviouslysubordinatetothetheoretical,(i)aspresupposing(ifnotintheorderoftheiroriginin

1Itmaybeaddedthatofthepracticalsciences,onlyone,ethics,isinfactvereetpropriescieniia,thatistosay,proceedsbywayofdemonstration,inanecessarymatter,andimpartsatruth,whichconsistsinknowingthingsinconformitywith

whatis,andnotinproperlydirectingacontingentaction.Theotherpracticalsciences(medicine,architecture,strategy,etc.)arearts,notsciencesinthestrictsense.{Cf.JohnofSt.Thomas,CursusPhilos.,i.Log.ii,q.i,a.5).

Butthoughethicsisinthestrictsenseascience,itisforthatveryreasononlyinanindirectsensepractical:foritsprocedureconsistsinprovidingknowledge{speculabiliter)notinproducingaction{opera-biliUr),andthoughitcertainlysuppliesrulesimmediatelyapplicabletoconcretecases,therightapplicationandgooduseoftheserulesinpracticeistheeffectnotofethicsbutofthevirtueofprudence.

Ontheotherhand,asweshallseelater,thephilosophyofartisalso,inasense,apracticalphilosophy.Butitisveryfarfrombeingapracticalscience,evenhkeethicsintheindirectsense,forittreatsonlyofprinciplesandisunabletodescendtotherulesimmediatelyapplicabletotheconcreteworktobeexecuted.

*Henceevenpracticalphilosophyisatheoreticalwisdomwhichproceedsbywayofknowledge(seeabove,p.102).

time,atleastinthenatureofthings)thetruthsprovedbythesesciences,whichtheyapplyforthebenefitofman—forexample,medicine,asthescienceofheaUng,presupposesanatomy;(ii)assciencesinferiorindignitytothetheoreticalsciences.Forthelatterarestudiedfortheirownsake,andarethereforegoodinthemselves,whereasthepracticalsciencesarestudiedforthegoodorutiUtyofman,andarethereforegoodonlyinrelationtothatgoodorutility.Itfollowsthatphilosophyinthestrictestsenseistheoreticalphilosophy(especiallythefirstphilosophyormetaphysics),logicbeingthescienceintroductorytoit,andethicsthesciencedetachedfromittotreatspeciallyofthatwhichconcernsthegoodofman.

Wearenowinapositiontodefinemoreexactlytheobjectofthesethreemaindivisionsofphilosophy.

Asciencewhichseekstoprocureman'ssovereigngoodmustbeforeallelsetreatofthosethingswhicharetheindispensableconditionsofitsattainment.Butthesearetheactionswhichmanperformsinthefreeexerciseofhisfaculties;inotherwords,humanactsassuch.Wemaythereforesaythathumanactsaretheformalobject(subject-matter)ofmoralphilosophy.

Asciencewhoseaimistoknowthingsbytheirfirstcausesmusttreatprimarily

ofthatinthingswhichdependsimmediatelyuponthosecauses.Butthatinthingswhichdependsimmediatelyuponthefirstorhighestcausesisthatwhichismostessentialinthem,theirbeing,andthatwhichisthemostwidely,indeeduniversally,distributed,being,whicheverythingwhatsoeverpossesses.Wethereforeconcludethatthe

151


formalobjectoftheoreticalphilosophyisthebeingofthings.

Nowtheoreticalphilosophystudiesthebeingofthingsindifferentfashionsandfromhigherorlowerpointsofview(degreesofabstraction).Itmaystudythebeingofthingswiththeirsensibleproperties{ensmobile),orthebeingofthingswiththesolepropertiesofquantity{ensquantum),orthebeingofthingswiththesolepropertiesofbeing(beingquabeing,ensinquantumens).Hencearisethethreeprincipaldivisionsoftheoreticalphilosophy(seebelow,Ghs.Ill&IV).

Finally,asciencewhichstudiesreasonasthetoolfortheattainmentoftruthmusttreatbeforeallelseofthatwhichwehandleormanipulatewhenwereason.Butthatwhichwehandleormanipulatewhenwerezisonisthethingsthemselves.Forexample,whenweaffirmthatmanissuperiortotheotheranimalsbecausehepossessesintellect,itisindeedthethingitself,man,whichweholdinourmindandtowhichwejoinorattributethoseotherthings,intellectandsuperiority.Butthemanthatwethushandleinourmindisobviouslynotthemanasheexists,orcanexistinreality;thereisnoquestionofseizingsomemanwhopassesinthestreettostickanattributeontohisback.Thatourmindmayworkonthem,thingspossessinthemindamannerofbeingwhichtheydonotandcannotjjossessinreality.Theyexisttheresofarastheyareknown.Predicatedoneofanotherdivided,reunited,linkedtogetheraccordingtothenecessitiesofknowledge,theyleadthereadistinctlife,withitsownlaws.Itisthislifeanditslaws,theordertowhichthingsmustsubmitsofarastheyareobjectsofknowledge,iftheyaretoguidethemind

totruth,thatlogicprimarilystudies,andsinceitisconcernedwithsomethingwhichexistsandcanexistonlyinthemindorwithwhatphilosopherstermanensraiionis,aconceptualbeing,wemaysaythattheformalobjectoflogicis

thatconceptualbeing,ensrationis(theorderwhichshouldprevailamongconceptualobjects)whichdirectsthemindtotruth.

Asopposedtoconceptualbeing,theensrationisywhichcanexistonlyinthemind—forexample,thegenusanimalorthespeciesman{thegenusanimalcomprisesmankindandthebrutes,manisthespeciesofPeter)—wetermrealbeing,ensreale,thatwhichexistsorcanexistinreality—forexample,animals,man,humannature{allanimalsaremortal,humannatureisfallible).

ConclusionV.—Philosophyisdividedintothreeprincipalparts:(i)logic,whichistheintroductiontophilosophyinthestrictsense,andwhichstudiestheconceptualbeing{ensrationis)whichdirectsthemindtotruth;(ii)theoreticalphilosophyorsimplyphilosophy,whichstudiesthebeingofthings(realbeing,ensreale);(iii)practicalphilosophyorethics,whichstudieshumanacts.

153

LOGIC

Logicstudiesreasonasthetoolofknowledge.Tostudyanycomplicatedmachine,areaperforinstance,wemustbeginbymakingitworkinthevoid,whilewelearnhowtouseitcorrectlyandwithoutdamagingit.Inthesamewaywemustfirstofalllearnhowtousereasoncorrectly,thatistosay,inconformitywiththenatureofratiocination,andwithoutdamagingit.Hencearisesourfirstproblem:Whataretheruleswhichwemustobeyinordertoreasoncorrectly?Weshouldnextstudyourreapernolongerinthevoid,butasappliedtotheactualmaterialwithwhichitwasdesignedtodeal,learninghowtouseit,notonlycorrectly,butprofitablyandefficiently.Inthesamewaywemuststudyreasoningasappliedtofacts,askingourselvesunderwhatconditionsreasoningisnotonlycorrectbutalsotrueandconclusive,andproductiveofknowledge.Itisinthisdepartmentoflogicthatwestudythemethodsemployedbythedifferentsciences.Butbeforethisafargraverproblemwillariseanddemandsolution.

Itisbyourideasthatthingsarepresentedtothemind,sothatwecanreasonaboutthemandacquireknowledge.

Everybodyknowsbyexperiencewhatanideais.Itissufficientforamantoreflectonwhatisin

154

LOGIC

hismind,whenhemakesajudgmentofanykind.Forinstance,philosophershavemademanymistakes;philosophers^mistakes,havemade,many—allthesearepresentinthemindassomanyideas.Neverthelesstoclearupanypossibleobscurity,wewilltrytodescribewhateverybodymeansbytheword.Wewill,forinstance,defineideasasimagesorinteriorreproductionsofthings,bywhichthelatterarepresentedtousinsuchawaythatwecanreasonaboutthem(andthusacquireknowledge).

Nodoubtthewordsweemployexpressourideas.Buttheybringwiththemsomethingbesides.If,forexample,Ipronouncethewordangel,Ihaveinmyconsciousnesstwoimagesofthebeinginquestion.Inthefirstplaceanidea,invirtueofwhich,strictlyspeaking,Iknowthatparticularbeing(theideaofapurespirit),butinadditionasensiblerepresentation(theimageofsomefiguremoreorlessnebulousandwinged)whichpossessesnoUkenesswhatevertothebeinginquestion,forapurelyspiritualbeingisinvisible.

If,again,IpronouncethewordsquareIhaveinmyconsciousnesstheideaofthesquare,bymeansofwhichIcanreasonaboutthethingconcerned(theideaofarectangularpolygonoffourequalsides)andatthesametimeasensiblerepresentation—whichinthiscaseadequatelyrepresentsthethinginquestion—aparticularfigurewhichIimaginedrawninchalkontheblackboard.Theideaandtherepresentationarequitedistinct,asisshownbythefactthatIcanvarythelatterinahostofdifferentways(theimaginarydrawingcanbelargerorsmaller,white,red,yellow,etc.)withoutanyvariationoftheformer.Moreover,


ifIweretopronounce,forexample,thewordmyriagoninsteadofsquareÎshouldpossessasdefiniteandasclearanideaofitasIhadofthesquare(theideaofapolygonoftenthousandsides)^whereastheonlysensiblerepresentationIcouldformofitwouldbeextremelyvagueandconfused.

Itisevidentthatifthesensiblerepresentationsassistmetoreason,theyarenottheinstrumentwithwhichIreasontoacquireaknowledgeofthings.ForIcanreasonasaccuratelyabouttheangelorthemyriagonasIcanaboutthesquare.

AndmyreasoningisinnowaydependentonthethousandalterationsIcanmakeinmysensiblerepresentationsofanangel,myriagon,orsquare.

Fromthisweconcludethatthingsarepresentedtoourconsciousnessintwodifferentfashions,eitherbyanideaorbyasensiblerepresentation.

Bythefirstwethink(intelligimus)thething,bythesecondweimagineit.Therepresentationissimplyaspeciesofphantom,animageofwhatwehavepreviouslyseen,heard,touched,etc.,inshort,ofwhathasbeenoriginallymadeknowntousbyasensation.Formerlycalledaphantasm,itisnowcalledsimplyanimage.Infuture,then,weshallreservetodenoteitthetermimage,whosemeaningweaccordinglyrestrict.(Butwemustnolongerusethesamewordtodenoteanidea.)Weconclude,therefore,that—

ConclusionVI.—Ideasaretheinternallikenessesofthingsbywhichthelatterarepresentedinsuchawaythatwecanreasonaboutthem(andthusacquireknowledge);imagesaretheinternallikenessesofthingsbywhichthelatterarepre-

LOGIC

sentedtousasoursensationshavefirstmadethemknowntous.Wordsdirectlysignifyideas,atthesametimeevokingimages.

Ifnowwecompareobjectsastheyarepresentedbyideasandastheyarepresentedbysensationsorimages,weseeatoncethattheyaredistinguishedbyacharacteroftheveryfirstimportance.If,forexample,Icallupbeforemymindtheimageofaman,Iseepresentinmyimaginationwithoutlinesmoreorlessvagueandmoreorlesssimplifiedsomeparticularman.Heisfairordark,tallorshort,whiteorblack,etc.ButifIformtheideaofman,as,forinstance,whenIstatethepropositionmanissuperiortotheirrationalanimals,orwhitesandblacksarealikemen,thatideadoesnotbringbeforemeanymaninparticular.Itleavesoutofaccountalltheindividualcharacteristicswhichdistinguishonemanfromanother;inthelanguageofphilosophyitabstractsfromthem.

Thisisprovedbythefactthatwhileremainingabsolutelythesameandwithoutneedofanymodificationwhatsoever,itcanbeappliedtothemostdissimilarindividuals;SanchoPanzaisjustasmuchamanasDonQuixote.Moreover,whenwecastourmindoverthedifferentsciences,thatistosay,thedifferentsystemsofideasbywhichweknowreality,wefindthatnoneofthemis

concernedwiththeindividualassuch.Chemistry,forinstance,onlystudiesinchlorineornitrogenwhatiscommontoalltheindividualmoleculesofchlorineornitrogen.Andthismustnecessarilybethecase.Theindividualassuchexplainsnothing(for,sinceitrepresentsonly


itself,itobviouslycannotaccountforanythingelse).Âgain,wehaveonlytotakeanyideawhatsoeverandfixourattentiononwhatitpresentstous,comparingitwiththeimageswhichformanddissolvearoundit,toperceiveatoncetheabstractnatureoftheidea.Inthetransitionfromtheimagetotheideawhateverisindividualevaporates,sotospeak,slipsbetweenourfingers,andvanishes.Take,forexample,theideaofweaponwhichIemploywhenIstatethatmanistheonlyanimalobligedtomanufactureitsweapons.AsIpronouncedthewordweapons,Iwasnodoubtconsciousofahalo,sotospeak,offluctuatingimagessurroundingtheideathusexpressed,toanyofwhichIcanatpleasuregiveamoredefiniteshape,dijavelinveryshadowynodoubt,aflintaxeâcross-bow,agun....Butoftheindividualcharacteristicsoftheparticularjavelin,axe,bow,orgunastheyappearinmyimaginationwiththeirdistinctiveform,colour,anddimensions,nothingwhateverremainsinmyideaofweapon.Everythingofthesorthasdisappeared.ThoughwhatIapprehendbytheideaiscertainlysomething,thatsomethingisofanentirelydifferentorder(immaterial),itissimplyacertaindeterminationofbeing,acertainnature,aninstrumentofattackordefence;andthatisdevoidofanyindividualcharacter.Thatistosay,objectsaspresentedtousbyoursensationsandimagesarepresentedinastatewhichisindividual,orintechnicallanguagesingular.Onthecontrary,objectsaspresentedtousbyourideas,bytheinternallikenesseswhichenableustoreasonaboutthem,arepresentedinastatewhichisnon-individual,abstract,orintechnicallanguageuniversal.

1Cf.T.Richard,op.cit.,p.21.158

LOGIC

Wecalluniversalthatwhichisthesameinamultitudeofindividuals,oneinmany,unuminmultis.)Weshallthereforeholdasanestablishedtruththat—

ConclusionVII.—Oursensationsandimagespresenttousdirectlyorbythemselvestheindividual,ourideasdirectlyandbythemselvestheuniversal.

Butthequestionatoncearises:Sincerealobjectsareindividualorsingular,howcantheknowledgeweobtainbymeansofourideasbetrue,sinceourideasdirectlypresentonlytheuniversal?

Thisproblem,whichwillcompelustoinvestigatecarefullyinwhatexactlyconsiststheuniversalityofthatwhichourideaspresent,is,notindeedinitself,butatanyrateforusmen,thefirstandmostimportantofphilosophicproblems.^Foritisconcernedwiththenatureoftheintellectitselfandofourideas,thatistosay,withtheinstrumentbywhichallourknowledgeisobtained;andthesolutionpropoundedbydifferentphilosophersdominatestheirentiresystem.

Fromthispointofview,andtakingnoaccountofmanydifferencesofsecondaryimportance,wemayclassifyphilosophersinthreegreatschools:

{a)Thenominalistschool,forwhichuniverszdshave

1Doestheproblemofuniversalsbelongtologic,psychology,ormetaphysics(criticismorepistemology)?Toallthree,infact,accordingasitisstudiedfromthreedifferentstandpoints.Wemayinquirewhatconstitutesthenatureofauniversal(standpointoftheformalcause),orthemannerinwhichauniversalisformedinthemind(standpointoftheefficientcause),ortheepistemologicalvalueoftheuniversal(standpointoithefinalcause).


noexistenceexceptasnamesorideaswithwhichnothinginrealitycorresponds;forinstance,thereisnothingintherealityofhumannaturewhichisequallypresentinPeter^Paul,andJohn.Thispositionamountstosheernegationofthepossibilityofintellectualknowledge,andreducessciencetoafigmentofthemind.Themosttypicalrepresentativesofthisschoolare,inantiquitythesophistsandthesceptics,inmodemtimestheleadingEnglishphilosophers,WilliamofOccaminthefourteenthcentury,HobbesandLockeintheseventeenth,BerkeleyandHumeintheeighteenth,JohnStuartMillandSpencerinthenineteenth.Itmaybeaddedthatthemajorityofmodemphilosophers(thatistosay,ofthosewhoignoreoropposethescholastictradition)aremoreorlessdeeply,andmoreorlessconsciously,imbuedwithnominalism.

(b)Therealistschool("absoluterealism")forwhichtheuniversalassuch,theuniversaltakenseparately,asitexistsinthought,constitutestherealityofthings.

Thispositionreducessense-knowledgetomereillusion.Thatwhichisrealis,forexample,ahumannatureexistinginitselfandseparatelyoutsidethemind,amaninhimself(Platonism),orauniversalbeingexistingassuchoutsidethemindandregardedasthesoleanduniquesubstance(doctrineofParmenides,Vedantism).Thesystemsofcertainmodernphilosophers(Spinoza,Hegel)approximatemoreorlesscloselytorealism.^

{c)Theschoolwhichisusuallycalledthatof

>Itmastbeborneinmindthatrealismunderstoodinthissense,farfrombeingincompatiblewithidealism,isessentiallyanidealistdoctrine.Forrealismofthistyperegardsastherealityofthingsthatwhichisdistinctiveofourideasassuch.Platoisthusatoncethemosttypicalrepresentativebothofidealismandabsoluterealism.

LOGIC

moderaterealism.(Itsdoctrine,however,isinthemoststrictsenseoriginal,andkeepsthejustmeanbetweenrealismandnominalism,notbywateringdownormodifyingabsoluterealism,butbyaviewofthingswhichtranscendstheopposingerrors.)Thisschool,distinguishingbetweenthethingitselfanditsmodeofexistence,theconditioninwhichitispresented,teachesthatathingexistsinthemindasauniversal,inrealityasanindividual.Thereforethatwhichweapprehendbyourideasasauniversaldoesindeedreallyexist,butonlyintheobjectsthemselvesandthereforeindividuated—notasauniversal.Forexample,thehumannaturefoundalikeinPeter,Paul,andJohnreallyexists,butithasnoexistenceoutsidethemind,exceptintheseindividualsubjectsandasidenticalwiththem;ithasnoseparateexistence,doesnotexistinitself.ThismoderaterealismisthedoctrineofAristotleandSt.Thomas.

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas{ModerateRealism)

ThatwhichourideasThatwhichourideas

presenttousasauniversalpresenttousasauniversal

doesnotexistoutsidetheexistsoutsidethemind

mindasauniversal.individuated.

NominalismRealism

ThatwhichourideasThatwhichourideas

presenttousasauniversalpresenttousasauniversal

hasnorealexistencewhatreallyexistsasauniversal,soever.

Itisimpossibletoover-emphasisetheimportanceoftheproblemofuniversals.Itisforwantofattentiontoitthatsomanyphilosophersandscientistsofmodemtimesclingtothenaivebeliefthatscience


mustbeacopypureandsimple,atracingoftheindividualreality;serveupthestockargumentsofignoranceagainstabstraction,theessentialpreconditionofallhumanknowledge;andwhentreatingoftheprinciplesofthesciences,especiallyofmathematics,spinelaboratetheories,devoidofsolidfoundation,whosesoleresultistorenderknowledgetotallyimpossible.

-i

THEPHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICSTHEPHILOSOPHYOFNATURE

Thedistinctiveobjectoftheoreticalphilosophyisthebeingofthings.Thethingswhichareimmediatelyobservedarecorporealthings,bodies.Butthetermbodymaybetakenintwodistinctsenses.Itmaymeanamathematicalbody,oranaturalorphysicalbody.Amathematicalbodyissimplythatwhichpossessesthree-dimensionalextension,breadth,length,andheight.Anaturalorphysicalbodyisthatwhichisperceivedbythesensesaspossessingcertainactiveandpassiveproperties.

THEPHILOSOPHYOFMATHEMATICS

Ifthephilosophyofmathematicsstudiesthebeingofbodiesinthefirstsenseofthetermbody,itisobviousthatthefirstproblemitmustconsiderisinwhatdoestheprimaryobjectofmathematicsconsist;inotherwords,whatisthenatureofquantity,extension,andnumber?^

1Questionsrelatingtothephilosophyofmathematicsareusuallytreatedin

naturalphilosophyorinmetaphysics.Webelieve,however,thatifclassificationistobescientific,weareobligedtomaintaininwhatisnowknownasphilosophy(scientificknowledgeofthingsbytheirfirstcauses)thefundamentaldivisionofthesciences(thewholegroupofwhichconstitutedfortheancientstheoreticalphilosophy)intothreeparts:physica,mathematica,metaphysica,correspondingto

163


Theenormousprogressmadebymodernmathematicshasrenderedmoreindispensablethaneverbeforethephilosopliicstudyofthefirstprinciplesofthemathematicalsciences,whichalonecanprovidearationalaccountofthetruenatureofmathematicalabstractionandthementzdobjectswhichitconsiders,theproperties-andmutualrelationshipsofthecon'tinuousandthediscontinuous,therealmeaningofsurdsandtransjinitenumbers,theinfinitesimal,non-Euclideanspace,etc.,andfinallyofthevalidityofmathematicaltranscriptsofphysicalreahty,andofsuchhypotheses,forexample,asthetheoryofrelativity.

THEPHILOSOPHYOFNATURE*

Sincethephilosophyofsensiblenaturestudiesthebeingofbodiesinthesecondsenseofthetermbody,it

thethreegradesofabstraction(seep.152).Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,vi,i,1026a18.TjoeiiiveUv<pi\o(Xo<plaidewptjTiKal,ixad7)/j,aTiKT^,<(>v<nKi/i,deciXoyiKTi.

Itistrue,asweshallseelater,thatthephilosophyofmathematics,fortheveryreasonthatitstudiestheessenceofquantityandisthusatleastreductivelymetaphysical,transcendsthestrictsphereofthemathematicalsciencesandisspecificallydistinctfiromthem.This,however,doesnotalterthefactthatitisconcernedwiththeseconddegreeofabstractionandmustthereforebestudiedasaseparatebranchofphilosophy.

1Inthelogicalorderofthesciences,thenaturalscienceswhichcorrespondtothefirstdegreeofabstraction(seep.152)precedethemathematicalsciences,whichcorrespondtothesecond,sothatinaccordancewiththisorderweshould

beobligedtodividetheoreticalphilosophyinto(i)Thephilosophyofnature(correspondingtothefirstdegreeofabstraction),(ii)Thephilosophyofmathematics(correspondingtotheseconddegree),(iii)metaphysics(correspondingtothethirddegree).

Neverthelessthephilosophyofmathematicsshouldprecedenaturalphilosophyfortworeasons.

Ontheonehand,truthsofthemathematicalorderareeasierto

MATHEMATICSANDNATURE

mustdealwithalargenumberofproblems.Wecan,however,pickoutthemostimportantoftheseformentionhere.

Themostuniversalandobviouscharacteristicofthecorporealworld,whichisinvolvedineveryphysicalevent,ischange.Philosophers,inwhosevocabularychangeofeverydescriptionistermedmotion,mustthereforeinquirewhatmotionis.

Itisatonceobviousthatifmotionexists,somethingmustbemoved,namely,bodies.Further,certainchangesseemtoaffecttheverysubstanceofbodies;as,forinstance,whenthechemicalcombinationofhydrogenandoxygenproducesanewbody,water.Howisthispossible?Wearecompelledtoaskwhatcorporealsubstanceis.

(a)Themechanists—whetherintheirdoctrineofthehumansoultheyarematerialists(Democritus,Epicurus,Lucretius,amongtheancients,Hobbesintheseventeenthcentury,etc.)orspiritualistsUke

apprehendthantruthsofthenaturalorder,whichpresupposeexperience.Forthisreasonchildrenshouldbetaughttheelementsofmathematicsbeforethenaturalsciences,thestudyofwhicêquiresamoreadvancedage.{Cf.Aristotle,Mc.Eth.,vi;St.T'homas,Sup.Boet.deTrm.,q.5,a.i,a//3.)

Weshouldthereforefollowthesameorderinphilosophyandleadtheminduptothestudyofnaturalphilosophybythestudyofthephilosophyofmathematics.

Ontheotherhand,andthisisthemoreimportantconsideration,naturalphilosophywiththelastandhighestofitssub-divisions,namelypsychology,

touchesthefrontierofmetaphysics.Itwouldbeabreachofcontinuitytoinsertthephilosophyofmathematicsbetweennaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics.

IntheseventeenthcenturySylvesterMaurusmaintained—andinsodoingwasfaithfultotheAristoteliantradition—thatthenaturalorderofstudyisasfollows:(i)logic,(ii)mathematics,(iii)physics,(iv)metaphysics.{Quaest.philos.,i,q.vii.)


Descartes—reducecorporealsubstancetomatter,whichinturntheyconfusewithquantityorgeometricalextension.Theycanthereforeadmitnoessentialorspecificdifferenceamongbodies,whichareallmodificationsofonesinglesubstance.Moreover,thephysicaluniverseisforthemdevoidofqualityandenergy,sincespaceandlocalmotionalonearereal,andtheunionofmatterandspiritinabeingsuchasmanbecomesabsolutelyunintelligible.

{b)Anotherschool{dynamism)tendsonthecontrarytogetridofmatterasaconstituentofbodies.ItculminatesinthesystemofLeibniz,whoreducedcorporealsubstancetounitsofaspiritualcharacter{monads)analogoustosouls.ForLeibnizextension,indeedsensiblereaUtyasawhole,isnothingmorethananappearanceorasymbol,andthecorporealworldassuchisabsorbedinthespiritual.ThedynamismofBoscovich(eighteenthcentury),whoreducedcorporealsubstancetopointsofforce,andthemodernphysicaltheorywhichclaimstoexplaineverythinginthephysicaluniverseasmanifestationsofonesolereality,energy(ofwhich,however,itsexponentsfailtogiveaphilosophicdefinition),mayberegardedasdegradationsandmaterialisationsofLeibniz'sdoctrine.

{c)TheAristotelianphilosophyrecognisesincorporealsubstancetwosubstantialprinciples:(i)matter{firstmatter,materiaprima),which,however,innowayrepresents,asintheconceptionofthemechanists,theimaginablenotionofextension,buttheideaofmatter(thatofwhichsomethingelseismade)initsutmostpurity—itiswhatPlatocalledasortofnon-entity,simplythatofwhichthingsare


made,whichinitselfisnothingactual,aprinciplewhollyindeterminate,incapableofseparateexistence,butcapableofexistinginconjunctionwith

somethingelse(theform);(ii)anactiveprinciple,whichissotospeak,thelivingideaorsoulofthething,andwhichdeterminesthepurelypassivefirstmatter,somewhatastheformimposeduponitbythesculptordeterminestheclay,constitutingwithitonesinglethingactuallyexistent,onesinglecorporealsubstance,whichowestoitboththatitisthisorthatkindofthing,thatistosay,itsspecificnature,anditsexistence,somewhatastheformimposedbythesculptormakesastatuewhatitis.Onaccountofthisanalogywiththeexternalformofastatue(itsaccidentalform)Aristotlegavethenameof/orm{substantialform),whichmustbeunderstoodinasensealtogetherspecialandtechnical,tothisinternalprincipleofwhichwearespeaking,whichdeterminestheverybeingofcorporealsubstance.

TheAristoteliandoctrine,whichregardsabodyasacompoundo{matter[xikri)andform([xopcprj),isknownashylomorphism.Itacceptsthereahty,ontheonehand,ofmatter,thecorporealworld,andextension,ôntheotherofphysicalqualities,'alsoadistinctionofnatureoressencebetweenthebodieswhichweregardasbelongingtodifferentspecies.Itrevealsthepresence,evenininanimatebodiesandHvingthingsdevoidofreason,ofasubstantialprinciple,immaterialinitsnature,which,however,differsfromspiritsin

Êxtensionofquantityisnot,asthemechanistshold,thesubstanceofbodies,buttheirfirstaccident.

*Qualitiesarealsoaccidentsofcorporealsubstance.(Seebelow,pp.217-232(substanceandaccident).)


theStrictsense,initsincapacitytoexistapartfrommatter.Anditrendersintelligibletheunioninthehumanbeingofmatterandaspiritualsoulwhichistheformofthehumanbody,butdiffersfromtheOthersubstantialformsinasmuchasitcanexistapartfrommatter.

PtdlosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas{Hylomorphism)

Everycorporealsubstanceisacompoundoftwosubstantia!andcomplementaryparts,onepassiveandinitselfwhollyindeterminate[matter),theotheractiveandtheprincipleofdetermination{form).

MechanismDynamism

Ck>rporealsubstanceisCorporealsubstanceis

regardedassomethingexplainedeitherasunitssimple,amatteritselfbelongingtothecategoryidentifiedwithgeometricalofpureformsandspiritsextension.(Leibnizianmonadism)or

asamanifestationofforce

orenergfy.

Wehavenowtoconsideraclassofbodieswhichpossessapeculiarinterestforus,andseemtobesuperiortoalltheothers.Theyarelivingbodies,fromthelowliestmicro-organismtothehumanorganism.Thepropertywhichdistinguishesthemfromallotherbodiesisself-movement.Onthataccountcommonsenserecognisesinthemasoulorprincipleoflife,irreducibletoanycombinationofphysico-chemicalfactorsorelements.Ifthisisindeedthecase,wemustinquirewhethertherearenotdifferentkindsofsoul,whethervegetablesandanimalspossessasoul,etc.Ontheotherhandcertainphilosophers(knownbythegeneralappellationofmechanists)claimthatsciencewillonedayexplainallthephenomenaoflifebytheforcesoflifelessmatter,thatistosay,thattheliving


organismissimplyaverycomplicatedphysico-chemicalmachine.Thisinvolvesaproblemofthefirstimportance.WhatisUfe?Whatarethefirstprincipleswhichconstitutethelivingorganism?

Butofalllivingthingswhichpossessabodythehighestisman.Manisasitwereaworldapart,forthestudyofwhichweareinapeculiarlyfavourableposition,becauseweknowhimfromwithinbywhatiscalledself-consciousness.Hismostdistinctivecharacteristicisthepossessionofintelligenceorreason.If,however,intelligenceisindeedsomethingwhollyimmaterial,itfollowsthatthesciencewhichstudiesman,thoughabranchofnaturalphilosophywhichtreatsofmovingorsensiblebeing,isinasenseintermediatebetweenthisdepartmentofphilosophyandmetaphysicswhichtreatsofthewhollyimmaterial.^

Ifitisthepossessionofintelligenceorreasonwhichmakesmanman,theproblemswhichrelatetohisintellectualactivitymust,itwouldseem,dominate

theentirescienceofman.Ândinfactthe

1Thescienceofmanoccupiesthereforeasingularposition(duetotheverynatureofitsobject)astridetwodistinctsciences,nattiralphilosophyandmetaphysics.Itisforthisreasonthatallquestionsinvolvingtheintellectandthestrictlyspiritualportionofpsychologydisplayinthecaseofmansuchextremecomplexityandare,sotospeak,overshadowedbymatter.Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatwhentheThomistswishedtoinvestigatethesequestionsintheirpuritytheystudiednotmanbuttheangels.HencetheextremeimportanceofthetreatiseDeAngelis,notfortheologyalone,butalsoforphilosophyandmetaphysics.

'Observethatpsychologyasunderstoodbythemodernsdoesnotcorrespondexactlytotheancients'treatmentofthesoul.Aristotle'sTreplfvxv^>DeAnima,studiesnotonlythehumansoul,butalsothesoulingeneralastheprincipleoflife,whethervegetative,sensitive,orintellectual.Suchatreatisethereforebelongstowhatwenowcallbiologyaswellastopsychology.


fundamentalproblemofpsychologyisthatoftheorigin,ofideas:howwearetoexplainthepresenceinusoftheideaswhichenableustoreasonaboutthingsandwhichpresentthingstousasuniversals.

Atthispointwehavebeenbroughtbackbyadifferentapproachtotheproblemofuniversalswhichwehavelatelyconsidered.Wethennotedthatwhatourideasimmediatelypresenttousissomethingnon-individualoruniversal.Wehavenowtoaskhowthisknowledgeoftheuniversalisacquiredbyourminds.

Wesawabovethatthingsastheyareknownbythesensesandthaimaginationarepresentedasindividuals.ItisthisparticularmanthatIsee,withthisparticularappearanceactuallyimpressingitselfonmyretinaanddistinguishinghimfromtheothermanIseebesidehim.Sense-knowledgeisthusknowledgeoftheindividualalone.Theobjectasobjectofsensationortheobjectreproducedbyanimageistheobjectapprehendedinitsindividuality.Since,therefore,whatweknowimmediatelybyourideasisnotindividual,thereasonmustbethatourideasareinfactextractedbyusfromoursensationsandimages,butinsuchafashionthatthereentersintothemnothingwhatsoeveroftheobjectasitexistsasanobjectofsensationorreproducedbyanimage(thatistosay,asweshallsee

later,astheobjectofaknowledgesteepedinmateriality).Arisingfromimages,butofahigherorderthantheimage,andapprehendingnothingoftheobjectasreproducedbytheimage,ourideasmustnecessarilybeunabletogiveusanyknowledgeoftheobjectinitsindividuality.


Moreover,wecouldnotpossiblyderiveourideasfromthings,exceptbywayofoursenses,whichareinimmediatecontactwiththings.Andwehaveonlytoobservethementaldevelopmentofachildtobeconvincedthatallourknowledgebeginswiththesenses.Thereforeintellectualknowledge(knowledgebymeansofideas)mustundoubtedlybederivedfromsense-knowledge.

Ontheotherhand,sinceeverythingapprehendedbysensationsandimagesischaracterisedbyindividuality,ourideasmustbeextractedfromimagesinsuchawaythatnothingoftheimage,assuch,entersintotheidea.

Buthowisthisprocessofextractionconceivable?Ifnothingwhateveroftheobjectasitisreproducedbytheimageentersintotheobjectasitisapprehendedbytheidea,itisobviousthattheideaisnottheresultofanycombinationordistillationofsensationsorimages.Wearethereforecompelledtopostulateanagentofahigherorder,thevoii<;7roL7]Ti.x6(;,asthePeripateticstermedit,theintellectusagens—akindofintellectuallight(wemayperhapscompareittoX-rays)which,whenappliedtotheobjectpresentedtousbytheimage,drawsoutofitforourunderstandingsomethingalreadycontainedinitbuthidden,whichtheimagebyitselfcouldneverreveal.ThesomethingthusextractedandUberatedfromthatwhichconstitutestheindividualityoftheobject(becauseitisliberatedfromthatwhichconstitutesthematerialityofsense-knowledge)istheformorintelligiblelikenessoftheobject,whichis,sotospeak,imprintedontheintellecttodetermineittoknow,bymakingitproducewithinitselfbyavitalreactiontheidea


inwhichitapprehendstheobjectasauniversal;forexample,theideaofmanorlivingbeing,ofAryanorSemite.

Wemust,however,rememberthatwhatourideaspresentthusasauniversalisinitself(abstractingfix)mitsexistenceeitherinthingsorinthemind)neitherindividualnoruniversal,beingpurelyandsimplythat.whichthethingis.^

Wemustalsobearinmindthat,ifourintellectdoesnotdirectlyknowtheindividualassuch,itknowsitindirectly.For,attheverymomentwhenitthinksofanobjectbymeansofanidea,itturnstotheimagesfromwhichtheideahasbeendrawn,whichpresentthethingasanindividual.Andbythusreflectingontheimagesitapprehends,thoughindirectlyandinamannerwhollysuperficialandtotallyinexpressible,theindividualityofthething.

ConclusionVIII.—Ourideasareextracted{ab^straded)fromthesensibledatumbytheactivityofaspecialfaculty(theintellectusagensoractiveintellect)whichentirelytranscendsthesensibleorderandis,asitwere,thelightofourunderstanding.

Philosopherstermabstractiontheoperationbywhichwethusextractourideasfromthestoreofimagesaccumulatedbysenseexperience,ideaswhichrepresentthatwhichthethingis,abstractingfromitsindividuality.

Herewemayaddthatabstractionadmitsoflesserandgreaterdegrees.Forinstance,thoughtheidea

1I.e.thenature,essence,orquiddity,oftheobject.Seepp.20i,206.


ofhorseis,likeeveryidea,abstract,whenwethinkofhorsewecanatthesametimeseeorimaginehorses,andthusknowinthesensibleorderwhatweknowatthesametimebymeansofourideaintheintelligibleorder.If,ontheotherhand,wethinkofangelorspiritJthesolefunctionofthemoreorlessvagueimageswhichaccompanythethoughtis,aswehavealreadyobserved,toassisttheintellecttofunction.Intheirownordertheyhavenovalueasknowledge,fortheytellusnothing.Wecanneitherseenorimagineanangeloraspirit;inthiscase,therefore,wecannotatthesametimeknowbyoursensesthethingweknowbyourintellect.

Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthethingswithwhichphilosophyisprimarilyconcernedbelongtothissecondcategory.Theycannotbeknowneitherbythesensesortheimagination,butsolelybytheintellect.

Itistothishigherdegreeofabstractionthatthestudyofphilosophyowesitsspecialdifficulty.Beginnersareoftenperplexedwhentheysuddenlyexchangetheliterarystudiesonwhichtheyhavebeenengagedhitherto,studiesinwhich

theimaginationwasemployedequallywiththeintellect,foranexercisewhollyintellectual.Butthisdifficultywillsoonpass,iftheywillnottrytorepresentbytheimaginationobjectsofpurethoughtwhichareentirelyunimaginable,such,forinstance,asessence,substance,accident,potentiality,andact;achimericalattempt,whichwillonlycauseneedlessheadachesandeffectuallypreventthemfromunderstandinganythingofphilosophy.

Ifabstractionisindeedsuchanoperationaswehavedescribed,itfollowsinthefirstplacethatman


isendowedwithaspiritualsoul,thefirstprincipleofthisfunction(foritsresult,ourideas,isincommensurablewithsensationsandimagesandofapurelyimmaterialorder);andontheotherhand,thatitisoftheverynatureofthisspiritualsoultobeunitedtoabody(forourideascannotbeformedexceptbymeansofsensationsandimages,whichinturnnecessarilysupposebodilyorgans).Wethusperceivehowtheproblemofabstraction,ortheoriginofideas,isboundupwithanotherfundamentalproblemofpsychology,whichconcernstheveryessenceofman:inwhatdoesthehumanbeingconsist?Doesmanpossessaspiritualsoul,whollydifferentfromthatofthebeasts?Andifsowhatistherelationshipbetweenthissoulandthehumanbody?

Ontheproblemoftheoriginofideasphilosophersmaybedividedroughlyintothreemaingroups:(a)Thesensualists,whoholdthatideasarederivedfromthesenses,butreduceideastosensations,(b)Thepartisansofinnateideas,^whorecognisetheessentialdistinctionbetweenideasandsensationsorimages,butdenythatweextractourideasfi-omthesensedatum,(c)TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomas^whichholdsthatourideasdifferessentiallyfromsensationsandimages,butthattheyareextracted

^Wemaysotermthissecondgroupindefaultofamoresuitabletitle,butonlyifweconsiderablywidenitsmeaning.Forinthisclassofphilosopherswemustincludenotonlythosewhoteachthatourideasexistinourmindsfrombirthinthesamewayasoursoulexists(thedoctrineofinnateideasinthestrictsense),butthosewhoholdthattheyareimmediatelyimplantedinusbyGodorareseenbyusinGJod(Berkeley,Malebranche),orarethearbitraryproductofourmindimposingitslawsonthings(Kant).


fromthembytheoperationofthespirituallightinus(voiji;noirixiy(.6c„intellectusagens).

TheprincipalrepresentativesofsensualismareLocke(seventeenthcentury)andJohnStuartMill(nineteenthcentury)inEngland,andCondillac(eighteenthcentury)inFrance.Thesensualistsare,asarule,alsonominalists,buttheconversedoesnothold,andmanyphilosopherswhomweclasshereamongthedefendersofinnateideasbetray,inmodemtimesatleast,theinfluenceofnominalism.Inthesecondclass(thedefendersofinnateideas)wemustreckonPlatoamongtheancients,Descartes(seventeenthcentury)andLeibniz(seventeenthtoeighteenthcentury)amongthemodems.Thoughtheirexplanationsdiffer,alltheseholdthatourideasareinnate.Kant(endofeighteenthcentury)alsobelongstothisgroup,thoughforhimwhatisinnateisnotourideas,butthecategories,rules,orformsinaccordancewithwhichourmindmanufacturestheobjectsofknowledge.

PhilosophyofAristotUandSt.Thomas

OurideasarederivedOurideasareessentially

fromthesenses(andtheredifferentfromsensations

forefromthings)butbyandimages,butareab—

theoperationofaspiritualstracUdfromthembythe

faculty,andareessentiallyoperationofaspiritual

differentfromsensationsfaculty,andimages.

SensualismDoctrineofInnateIdeas

OurideasarederivedIdeasdifferessentially

fromthesenses,whicharefromsensationsandimages

sufficienttoproducethem,andarenotderivedfrom

anddonotdifferessentithesenses(northerefore

allyfromimagesandsenfromthings,withwhich

sations.oursensesaloneareinimmediatecontact).


Theanswerswhichphilosophershavegiventotheproblemofhumannaturecorrespondstrictlywiththepositiontheyadopttowardstheproblemofabstraction.Thesensualists,atleastsofarastheyarefaithfultothelogicoftheirdoctrine(Gondillac,forexample,wasnot),denyeitherthatthesoulexiste{materialists),orthatwecaninanycaseknowitsexistence{phenomenalists).Thedefendersofinnateideas,ontheotherhand,tendtoregardmanasapurespiritwhichhappenstobejoinedtoabody—how,theyfinditdifficulttoexplain{dualismorexaggeratedspiritualism).^Finally,theschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthatmanisacompositeoftwosubstantialprinciples,eachincompleteinitselfandthecomplementoftheother,oneofwhichisaspiritualandimmortalsoul{animism).

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas(Animism)

Twoprincipleseachincompleteinitself,oneofwhich(therationalsoul)isspiritual,formtogetherasinglesubstance(thehumancomposite).

ErrorofDefectErrorofExcess

ThehumansouldoesnotManisaspiritacci—

exist{materialism)orisdentallyunitedtoabodyunknowable{phenomenal-{exaggeratedspiritualism):ism).thesoulandthebodyare

twosubstanceseachcompleteinitself{dualism).

Weshouldremarkfurtherthatthepositionadoptedbyphilosopherstowardstheoriginofideasalsodeterminestheirattitudetothegeneralproblemofthe

*ThistendencyrecurseveninKant(especiallyinethics),thoughhe,likethephenomenalists,deniesthatreasoncandemonstratethe/existenceofthesoul.>i


existenceofthingsknownbythesenses(thesensibleorcorporealworld)andofthingsinvisibleandspiritual,accessibletoreasonalone.

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas{alsoofcommonsense)Itisimpossiblewithoutabsurditytodoubteithertheexistenceofcorporealobjects(attestedbythesenses)ortheexistenceofspiritualobjects(provedbyreason).

SystemsmoreorlessMaterialistNothingexistswhichisnotperceptiblebythesensesandmaterial{absolutematerialism);oratleastitsexistenceisunknowable{phetwmenalistmaterialismandpositivism).

SystemsmoreorlessIdealistTheworldperceivedbythesenseshasnorealexistence{absoluteidealism);oratleastitsexistenceisunknowableanddoubtful{phenomenalistidealism).

CRITIGISM(ePISTEMOLOGY)

Instudyingmanphilosophyisdealingwithanobjectwhichalreadybyanentireportionofitselftranscendsthecorporealworld,thatistosay,theworldofsensiblenature.Butithasthepoweranddutytogofurther,andsinceitsdistinctiveobjectisthebeingofthings,itmuststudythatbeingnolongerascorporeal,sensible,ormoving(thesubject-matterofthephilosophyofsensiblenature),butsimplyasbeing;consequentlyitmuststudybeingunderanaspectabsolutelyuniversal,andasitispresentnotonlyinvisiblethingsbutalsointhingswhichpossessnocorporeal,sensible,ormobilebeing;thatistosay,inthingswhicharepurelyspiritual.Thisistheobjectofthatbranchofphilosophywhichisphilosophyorwisdomparexcellence,andisknownasthefirstphilosophyormetaphysics.^

CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOGY)

Butbeforeundertakingthisstudy,thephilosophermustsecureagainstallpossibleattackordistortionthe

1ThenamemetaphysicsoriginatedinthefactthatinthecatalogueofAristotle'sworksdrawnupbyAndronicusofRhodes,thetreatisedealingwiththefirstphilosophy(IlepirrjsirpuTtp<t>i\oao<f>la^,thetitleprobablywhichAristotlehimselfwouldhavegiventoit)comesafterthebookswhichtreatofnaturi(Meri

tAtpvaiKi).Itwouldseem,however,thatchronologicallyAristotlefollowedthesameorderintheactualcomp>ositionofhisworks.

178

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principlesofthissovereignscience,whicharealsotheprinciplesofallhumanknowledge.Foritistheofficeofwisdomtodefenditsownprinciplesandthoseoftheothersciences.

Itwillthereforebenecessary,beforestudyingbeinginitself,assuch,tostudytherelationofhumanthoughttobeing.Thisistheobjectofaspecialdepartmentofmetaphysics,knownascriticism,becauseithasthefunctionofjudgingknowledgeitselfLogicshowshowandinaccordancewithwhatrulesreasonattainstruthandacquiresknowledge;thisinturnpresupposesthepKDSsibilityoftrueknowledge(apossibilityattestedbycommonsenseandevidentbythelightofnature).Criticismsubmitsthispresuppositiontoscientifictreatment,showinginwhatthetruthofknowledgeconsists,andestablishingbyareflexargumentthattrue,certain,andscientificknowledgeisundoubtedlyattainable.^

Whatisthetruthofknowledge,andisitpossibletorefiitethosewhoquestiontheveracityofourorgansofknowledge,particularlyoftheintellectorreason?Thisclearlyisthedoublequestionwhicharisesattheoutset.Theanswer,however,issufficientlyplain.

Astothefirstquestion,thereisnodifficultyinunderstandingwhatismeantbythenotionoftruth.Whatisatrueortruthfulword?Awordwhichexpresses,asitreallyis,thespeaker'sthought;awordin

1Bythusdistinguishingcriticism(epistcmology)fromlogic,andmakingitthefirstpart,specialintroduction,orifyouprefer,apologeticintroduction,tometaphysics,wearefaithfultothearrangementanddivisionsofAristotlehimself,whodiscussescriticismbriefly{Metaph.,iv)beforestudyingthegreatproblemsofbeingassuch.


conformitywiththatthought.What,then,isatruethought?Athoughtwhich

represents,asitreallyis,thethingtowhichitrefers;athoughtinconformitywiththatthing.Wethereforeconcludethattruthinthemindconsistsinitsconformitywiththething.

Itisimpossibletodefinetruthotherwisewithoutlyingtoourselves,withoutfalsifyingthenotionoftruthofwhichinpracticewemakeuse,inthelivingexerciseofourintelligence,eachtimethatwethink.

Wemayfurtherremarkthatathoughtfalseinallitsconstituentsisanimpossibilityfor,beinginconformitywithnothingwhatsoever,itwouldbethezeroofthought.If,forinstance,Iaffirmthatstoneshaveasoul^thisisundoubtedlyacompleteerror.Butitistruethatstonesexist,truealsothatcertainbeingshaveasoul;thatistosay,alltheconstituentswhichcomposethisfalsethoughtarenotfalse.Thereforeerroritselfpresupposestruth.^

Wemayalsoobservethatifmanwerereallyandseriouslytodoubttheveracityofhisorgansofknowledgehesimplycouldnotlive.Sinceeveryactionorabstentionfromactionisanactoftrustinthatveracity,actionandinactionwouldalikebecomeimpossible.AmanthereforewhoattemptedtocarryoutinhisUfethethoughttruthisimpossibleformewouldinevitablylosehisreason.Nietzsche,whowasagreatpoetbutregardedbeliefintruthastheultimatebondagefromwhichtheworldshouldbedeUvered,madetheexperimenttohiscost.

iCf.Sum.TheoL,ii-ii,q.172,a.6:Sicutsehabetbonuminrebus,itaverumincognilione.ImpossibiUestauteminvenirialiquidinrebus,quodtotaliterbonoprivetur:undeetiamimpossibileestessealiquamcogrdtionemquaetotalitersitfalsaabsqueadmixtionealicujusveritatis.

CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOGY)

Asforthesceptics,whodoubt,atleasttheoreticallyandinwords,thereliabilityofourorgansofknowledge,especiallyoftheintellectorreason,itwouldobviouslybewasteofbreathtoattempttodemonstrateitsreliabilitytothem.Foreverydemonstrationrestsonsomepreviouslyadmittedcertainty,anditistheirveryprofessiontoadmitofnone.Todefendhumanknowledgeagainsttheirattackitissufficient(i)toshowinwhatthatknowledgeconsistsandhowitisattained;(ii)torefutetheargumentstheyadduce;(iii)tomakeareductioadabsurdum.Whentheysaythattheydonotknowwhetheranypropositionistrue,

eithertheyknowthatthispropositionatanyrateistrue,inwhichcasetheyobviouslycontradictthemselves,ortheydonotknowwhetheritistrue,inwhichcasetheyareeithersayingnothingwhatever,ordonotknowwhattheysay.Thesolephilosophyopentothosewhodoubtthepossibilityoftruthisabsolutesilence—evenmental.Thatistosay,asAristotlepointsout,suchmenmustmakethemselvesvegetables.Nodoubtreasonoftenerrs,especiallyinthehighestmatters,and,asCicerosaidlongago,thereisnononsenseintheworldwhichhasnotfoundsomephilosophertomaintainit,sodifficultisittoattaintruth.Butitistheerrorofcowardstomistakeadifficultyforanimpossibihty.

ConclusionIX.—Thetruthofknowledgeconsistsintheconformityofthemindwiththething.Itisabsurdtodoubtthereliabilityofourorgansofknowledge.

Onthisquestionofthereliabilityofourorgansofi8i


knowledgephilosophersmayagainbedivided—roughly—intothreegroups:

{a)Thesceptics,who,impressedbytheenormousnumberoferrorsputforwardbymen,andespeciallybyphilosophers,doubtthetrustworthinessofreason,andaffirmthattruthisimpossibleofattainment.Theprincipalrepresentativesofscepticismare,amongtheancients,Pyrrho(360-270),theneo-Academics(Arcesilas315-241;Cameades,214-129)andthelaterGreeksceptics(Aenesidemus,firstcenturya.d.,andSextusEmpiricus,endofthesecondcentury);inmoderntimesMontaigneandSanchezinthesixteenthcentury,andpreeminentlyDavidHumeintheeighteenth.

Thephilosopherscalledanti-intellectualists,becausetheydespairofintellectandreason,andlookfortruthtothewill,toinstinct,feeling,oraction(Rousseau,Fichte,Schopenhauer,Bergson,WilliamJames,themodernistandpragmatistschool),mustbeclassifiedwiththesceptics,because,althoughtheydonot,likethescepticsstrictlysocalled,declaretruthunattainable,theymaintainthatitisunattainablebytheorganwhosedistinctivenatureitistodiscovertruth,andbecausebyrejectingtheintellectandreeisontheyeffectuallydeprivemanofhissolenormalmeansofattainingit.

(b)Therationalists,onthecontrary,areofopinionthattruthiseasytoattain,andthereforeundertaketobringallthingswithinthecompassofreason,ahumanreasonwhichhasnoneedtosubmithumblyandpatientlytothediscipline,

whetherofreaUtyitself,ateacher,orGod.Inthefirstcasetheytendtosubjectivism,whichtakesasitscriterionoftruththeknowingsubject,nottheobjecttobeknown;apositionwhichisthedissolutionofknowledge.Inthe

CRITICISM(EPISTEMOlogy)

secondtheytendtoindividualism,whichcallsuponeachphilosophertoworkoutaphilosophyentirelyhisown,andcreateanoriginalandnovelviewoftheuniverse{Weltanschauung).Inthethird,theytendtonaturalism^whichclaimstoattaintoaperfectwisdombytheunassistedpowersofnature,andrejectsalldivineteaching.^

ThefatherofmodemrationalismwasDescartes(seventeenthcentury),towhomMalebranche,Spinoza,andLeibniztracedmoreorlessdirectlytheirphilosophicpedigree.ButitsfirstprinciplesandtruespiritwererevealedbyKant(endofeighteenthcentury),whocompletedtheCartesianrevolution;hispantheisticsuccessors,Fichte,Schelling,andHegel,deifiedthehumansubjectofknowledge.ThroughKant,andthesubjectivistphilosophywhichtracesitsorigintohim,rationaUsm,asbeforeintheeraofthesophists,hasjoinedhandswithitsopposite(scepticism),andbecomeabsorbedintheanti-intellectualismofthemodernists(endofthenineteenthandbeginningofthetwentiethcentury).

{c)TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthattruthisneitherimpossiblenoreasy,butdifficultformantoattain.

Itisthusradicallyopposedaliketoscepticismandtorationalism.Itseesinthemultitudeoferrorsput

1Naturalismrejectsdivineteachinginthesetwodifferentways:(I)ItdeniesGodtherighttoteachmentruthsinthemselvesinaccessibletotheunassistedreason{supernaturalmysteries).(2)Italsodenieshimtherighttoteachmenbyrevelationtruthsinthemselvesaccessibletounassistedreason(truthsofthenaturalorder,philosophictruths—forexample,theimmortalityofthehumansoul)whichreasoncanindeeddiscoverbyitsunaidedpowers,butalwayswiththeriskofminglingerrorwithtruth,whereasrevelationbringsthemwithinthereachofall,easilyandwithoutanyadmixtureoferror.


forwardbymenandparticularlybyphilosophersasignindeedoftheweakness

ofthehumanunderstanding,butareasontoprizetheintellectthemoredearlyandtoembracetruththemoreardently,andaninstrumentfortheadvancementofknowledgebytherefutationsandexplanationswhichtheseerrorscallforth.And,ontheotherhand,itrecognisesthatreasonisoursolenaturalmeansofattainingtruth,butonlywhenformedanddisciplined,inthefirstplaceandpreeminentlybyrealityitself(forourmindisnotthemeasureofthings,butthingsthemeasureofourmind),secondlybyteachers(forscienceisacollective,notanindividual,achievement,andcanbebuiltuponlybyacontinuouslivingtradition),andfinallybyGod,ifheshouldpleasetoinstructmankindandbestowuponphilosophersthenegativeruleoffaithandtheology.*

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt,Thomas

{ModerateIntellectualism)

Thatwhichreallyisthecauseoftruthinthemind.

Reasoniscapableofattainingwithcompletecertainty

themostsublimetruthsofthenaturalorder,butwith

difficultyandonlywhendulydisciplined.

ErrorbyDefectErrorbyExcess

ReasonisincapableofReasonattainstruthin

attainingtruth,whicheverysphereeasilyandeitheriswhollyinaccessiblewithoutanyneedofsub-toman(scepticism)ormustmittingtoanyexternalbesoughtotherwisethandiscipline(rationalism).bytheintellect(anti-intel-lectualism).

SynthesisoftheseTwoErrorsThemindofmanmakesthetruthofthatwhichheknows(namely,phenomena),andthatwhichreallyis,thethinginitself,isunknowablebyreason(criticismorKantianagnosticism).

1Seeabove,p.124.184

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Anotherquestion,amongthosewithwhichcriticismisconcerned,demandsconsiderationhere.Theintellectorreasonbeingtheinstrumentofphilosophy,whatistheformalobjectoftheintellect,towhichintellectualknowledgerelatesdirectlyandinitself?

Toanswerthisquestionitissuflficienttoaskoneselfwhethertheredoesnotexistanobjectwhichisalwayspresenttothemindwhentheintellectfunctions?Suchanobjectdoesexist.WhateverIknowbymyintellect,thereisalwayssomebeingormodeofbeingpresenttomymind.Thereis,however,nothingelseexceptbeingwhichisalwayspresentinthisway.If,forexample,Ithinkofaquality,amagnitude,orasubstance,inallthesecasesalikeIthinkofsomebeingormodeofbeing;butthereisnothingexceptbeingwhichiscommontothesethreeobjectsofthought,andthereforepresentinallthreealike.Wethereforeconcludethatbeingistheformalobjectofintellect,thatistosay,theobjectwhichitapprehendsprimarilyandinitself(perseprimo)andinfunctionofwhichitapprehendseverythingelse.

Toknowthecauseofathing,itspurpose,origin,properties,andrelationswithotherthings,isinthesevariouswaystoknowwhatitis,toapprehenditsbeingunderthosedifferentaspects.Tousetheunderstandingwithoutthenotionofbeingarisingisanimpossibility.

Theintellect,moreover,isabletoapprehendthebeingofbodiesintheirsensibleappearances(phenomena).Itisthus,forexample,thatinphysiologyitstudiesthepropertiesoflivingorganismsinreferencetocauseswhichthemselvesbelongtothesensibleorder.Ofthisnaturearethesciencesofsecondary


causesorthesciencesofphenomena.Buttheintellectcanalsoapprehendthebeingofthingsintheirfirstprinciples.Thisisthefunctionofphilosophyasa

whole,whichinturnissubdividedintonaturalphilosophyandmetaphysicsâccordingasthebeingapprehendedinitsfirstprinciplesbytheintellectisthebeingofbodiesassuchorbeingsimplyasbeing.

Psychologyindeeddealswiththisquestionoftheformalobjectoftheintellect.Butthedistinctivefunctionofcriticismistomakeclearthatthebeingwithwhichwearehereconcernedisindeedtheactualbeingofthings,whichexistsinthemindependentlyoftheknowingmind.Tomaintainonthecontrarythattheobjectofourintellectisnotthebeingofthingsbuttheideaofbeingwhichitformsinitself,ormoregenerallythatweapprehendimmediatelyonlyourideas,'istodeliveroneselfboundhandandfoottoscepticism.Forifthatwerethecase,itwouldbeimpossibleforourmindunderanycircumstancestoconformitselftothatwhichreallyis,andtruthwouldthereforebeunattainable.Moreover,theintellectwouldstandconvictedoffalsehood,forwhattheintellectprofessestoknowiswhatthingsarc,notwhatitsideasare.Inrealityideas,astheconsciousnessofeverymanwitnessesimmediately,areourinstrumentsofknowledge.If,therefore,knowledgedidnotapprehendthethingsthemselves,knowingwouldbeanoperationoractivitywithoutendorobject,whichisabsurd.Fortoformanideaorjudgmentistoknow,justastomakeuseofaknifeistocut.And,justasitisimpossibletocutwithoutcuttingsomething

1ThedoctrineofDescartesandafterhimofallsubjectivephilosophy.

CRITICISM(ePISTEMOLOGy)

—theendorobjectoftheactofcutting,whichisnottheknife,butthethingcutbyit—soitisimpossibletoknowwithoutknowingsomething—theendorobjectoftheactofknowing,whichisnottheidea,butthethingknownbyit.^

ConclusionX.—Theformalobjectoftheintellectisbeing.Whatitapprehendsofitsverynatureiswhatthingsareindependentlyofus.

Fromthetwotruthsjustenunciated,theintellectisatruthfulfaculty,andbeingisthenecessaryandimmediateobjectoftheintellect,therearisesasacorollaryafundamentaltruth.

Byintelligiblewemeanknowablebytheintellect.Buttoaffirmthatbeingisthenecessaryandimmediateobjectoftheintellect,andthattheintellectattainstrueknowledge,amountstosayingthatbeing,assuch,isanobjectofwhichtheintellectpossessestrueknowledge;thatistosay,thatitisintelligible.Andto

saythatbeingassuchisintelligibleistosaythatintelligibihtyaccompaniesbeing,sothateverythingisinteUigibleinexactproportiontoitsbeing.Wethereforeconclude—

ConclusionXL—Beingassuchisintelligible.Everythingisintelligibleinexactproportiontoitsbeing.

*Intellectualknowledgecomesintoexistencebymeansofideas.Butideasaresimplythatbymeansofwhich{idquo),notthatwhich{idquod)weknowdirectly,apuremediumofknowledge,not(unlessreflexively)anobjectortermknown.Thisiswhywesaythatthebeingofthingsistheimmediateobjectofourintellectualknowledge(byimmediatewemeanknownwithouttheintermediaryofanothertermorobjectpTiviouslyknown).


Itmustbeborneinmindthatwhenweaffirmthateverythingisintelligibleinexactproportiontoitsbeingwemeanintelligibleinitself,tointellect,notintelUgibletous,toourintellect.If,indeed,asaresultoftheinferiorityofhumannature,ourintellectisdisproportionedtoabeingwhichexceedsitbecauseitissuperiortoman,thatbeing,thoughinitselfmoreintelhgible,willbelessintelUgibletous.This,however,isthecasewithallwhollyspiritualnatures,andpre-eminentlyofGod.Inhimselfheisthemostintelligibleofbeings,buthisintellectaloneisproportionatetothissupremeintelligibility.

ONTOLOGY:ESSENCE

Havingincriticismexaminedanddefendedtheprinciplesofknowledgeingeneral,whetherscientificorphilosophic,wecanproceedtothestudyofmetaphysicsinthestrictsense,thatistosay,thescienceofbeingquabeing.Thisistheveryheartofphilosophy.Wehavenowtoconsiderbeingassuch,andthegreattruthsitcontainsinitself;toinquirehowitentersintoallthingswithoutbeingexhaustedbyany;tostudyitsinseparableproperties,unity,truth,andgoodness,towhichwemayaddbeauty;andfinallytotreatofitinitsactivity,andattempttopenetratethenatureandmodesofcausation.

Wemustalsoexaminehowthroughouttheentirecreateduniversebeingisdivided,whetherweconsidertheconstitutionofallcreatedbeing(divisionofbeingintopotentialityandactêssenceandexistence)orthedifferentkindsofcreatedbeings(divisionofbeingintosubstanceandaccident).Weshallthen

realisethattheconceptselucidatedbyontologyarethekeytoeverythingelse.Certainamongthemareindeedsoindispensablethatwemustconsiderthemhere,forindeedateveryturnweareobligedtoinvoketheprimaryconceptsofessence,ofsubstanceandaccident,oipotentialityandact.Thoughitisobviouslyimpossibleinamereintroductiontogiveananalysisandcompletedefenceoftheseconcepts,weshalltryto


establishthemwithallduecare,employing,itistrue,examplesratherthandevelopedarguments,andsimplifyingmattersconsiderably,butfollowingneverthelesstheorderdemandedbyastrictlyscientificstudy.

Althoughthenotionofbeing,sinceitisthefirstandbestknownofall,isevidentlytooclearinitselftoadmitofdefinitioninthestrictsense,thefirsttaskincumbentonamanwhowishestothinkseriouslyistoclarifythisnotioninhismind,andwiththatobjecttodiscovertheprimaryconceptionsintowhichitisdivided.'Weshallthereforebeginbyaskingthefollowingquestion:Whataretheobjectsofthoughtwhichinevitablyandfromtheveryoutsetimposethemselvesupontheintellectwhenitconsidersbeingassuch,ortoputitinanotherway,sincebeingistheprimaryobjectofintellect,whatareabsolutelythefirstdataoftheintellect?*

Weshallseethatthisonefundamentalquestionadmitsofthreeanswersaccordingasweadoptthe

1Cf.Aristotle,Metapk.,v.

'Thenotionsexplainedinpp.191sqq.presentsomedifficultytobeginnersonaccountoftheirextremelyabstractcharacter.Itis,however,impossibletoomitthem,fortheyareliterallyofprimaryimportance.Andinparticularweareconvincedoftheurgentnecessitytodefinewiththeutmostcare,fromtheveryoutset,thefundamentalconceptofessence.Materialsforthestudyofthisconceptarescatteredindifferentplaces,butisitnotbecausewehaveforgottentocollectthemthatthetermessence,whenwemeetitonthethresholdofmetaphysics,arousesto-daysuchsuspicion,and,evenifitforcesitselfonouracceptance,leavessuchvaguenessinthemind?

Thestudentmustthereforedevoteparticularattentiontothestudyofthenotionshereexplained,without,however,attemjitingtocomprehendthemperfectly.For

themomentitwillbesufficienttomakehisfirstacquaintancewiththem.Laterwhenhemeetsthemagaininontology,afterhehasbecomemorefamiliarwithphilosophy,theywillseemmucheasier.

ontology:essence

standpointofintelligibility,ofexistence,orofaction.Theconsiderationofthefirstofthesestandpointswillleadustodeterminewhatismeantbyessence,ofthesecondtodeterminewhatismeantbysubstance(asopposedtoaccident),ofthethirdtodeterminewhatismeantbyact(asopposedtopotentiality).

ESSENCE

Weshallfirstconsiderbeingfromthestandpointofintelligibility;thatistosay,weshallconsiderbeingsofarasitisadaptedtoenterthemind,oriscapableofbeingapprehendedbytheintellect.Thisisthemostuniversalstandpointwecanadopt,forwehaveseenthatbeingassuchisintelligibleandhencethatintelligibilityisco-extensivewiththatwhichisorcanbe.Totheprimarydatumoftheintellectfromthispointofviewweshallgivethenameofessence.

(a)ToconsiderbeingfromthestandpointofintelUgibiUtyorasitiscapableofbeingapprehendedbytheintellectisinthefirstplacetoconsideritsofarasitcanbesimplypresentedtothemindwithoutaffirmationornegation—insofarasitcanbetheobjectofsimpleapprehension,asweshalltermitlater.Triangle,polygon,seated,thisman,aresomanyobjectssimplypresentedtothemindwithoutbeingaffirmedordenied.

Fromthispointofviewtheprimarydatumoftheintellectisquitesimplythatwhichisplacedattlieoutsetbeforeourmindwhenweformtheconceptionofanything,orconceivetheideaofit.Sincewehaveagreedtousethetermessenceinthissense,weconclude


thatanessenceisthatwhichinanyobjectofthoughtwhatsoeverisimmediatelyandprimarily{perseprimo)presentedtotheintellect:idquodinaliquareperseprimointelligitur.

Everyideawhatsoever,unlessitbe,liketheideaofasquarecircle,apseudo-

ideainvolvingacontradiction,bringsimmediatelybeforethemindsomething.Thesomethingthusimmediatelypresentedtothemindisanessenceoranature.WhenIthinkofman,humanity,animal,goodness,white,whiteness,seated,triangle,etc.,eachoftheobjectsthusimmediatelypresentedtomymind,eachoftheseintelligibleunitsisbydefinitionanessenceinthewidesenseoftheword.^

Anessencethereforeissimplyanobjectofthoughtassuch.Everyessence,however,possessesitsintelligibleconstitutionwhichdistinguishesitfromothersandinvolvescertainattributes.

Here,however,animportantobservationmustbemade.IfIconsiderthetrianglewithitsproperties,man,humanity,etc.,theyremainexactlywhattheyareasobjectsofthought,whetherIsupposethemactuallytoexistornot.Thefactofexistencedoesnotinanywayaffectessencesassuch.ToconceivethemI

1Wehavealreadyseenthattheindividualassuchisnotdirectlyapprehendedbyourintellect.Whenindirectly,byareflectionontheimages(seeabove,p.172),weformanindividualconcept,theobjectpresentedtoourmindbythisconcept,Peter,thisman,thistree,isabo,sofarasitisanobjectofthought,anessenceinthewidesenseoftheterm.Thatistosay,theconceptofessenceinthewidesensemustbeextendedeventoindividualobjectsofthought.Asforthoseconceptualbeings{blindness,forexample,ornothingness)whichpresentnothingthatreallyexists,thenameessenceisinapplicabletothemforthereasonthataprivationassuchhasobviouslynoessence.(SeeSt.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,i.)Nevertheless,fromourpresentstandpoint,wemaycallthemimproperlyessences,inthewidesense.

ontology:essence

abstractfromthefactthattheydoordonotactuallyexist.

Wethusperceivethatbeinginthesenseofexistenceandbeinginthesenseofessencebelongtotwodistinctcategories.^Thetermbeinghastwowhollydifferentmeanings.Forexample,inthequotation"tobeornottobe,thatisthequestion,"beingmeansexistence^butonthecontraryinthephrasealivingbeingitmeansessence.Inthefirstcasethetermbeingsignifiestheactofbeing,theact,ifImaysoputit,whichpositsathingoutsidenonentity,andoutsideitscauses{extranihil,extracausas);andinthesecondcaseitsignifiesthatwhichisormaybe,thatwhichcorrespondstosomeexistenceactualorpossible.We

maythereforesaythatbeingisdi\ddedintoessenceandexistence.

BEING(thatwhichis:essenceinthewidesense(essentia)(ens)\{entitas)\actofbeing:existence(existentia)

Therelationshipwhichobtainsbetweenthesetwotermsisaproblemwhichweshallstudylater;itis,beyondquestion,notsimplywithreferencetoourselves,Uketheproblemofuniversals,butinitselfthefundamentalproblemofphilosophy:areessenceandexistencereallydistinctinallthingsexceptGod?

Actualexistence,thefactofexistingactually,isnot

Ôbservethatinexistenceitselfwemaydistinguishtwothings:existenceasthefactofexisting{existereinactuexercito)andexistenceasanobjectofthought{existentiautquodquidest).Regardedfromthelatterpointofviewexistenceitselfassumestheobjectivestatusofeveryobjectofthoughtandconfrontstheintellectasaparticularessenceorquiddity.Esseduplicitersumipotest,scilicetinactuexercitoipsiusexistentiae,etpermodumquidditatis;etutexercetexistentiam,additsupraseipsumutquodquidest;etconsequenterutobjectutjiintellectusestabstractius{quamutobjectumvoluntatis):quiaestobjectumvoluntatissecundumquodstatinactuexercitoexistentiae,intellectusautemsecundumquodrationemhabetquidditatiscujusdaminseipso.Cajetan,inI,q.8a,a.3.


includedintheobjectofanyofourideasassuch.Ourintellectcanascribeactualexistencetoaparticularobjectofthoughtonlybybasingitselfdirectlyorindirectlybymeansofratiocinationonthewitnessofoursenses(orreflexivelyofourconsciousness).Thusitimmediatelyjudgessensibleobjectsexist,Iexist,anddemonstratestheexistenceofGodbyarguing,forexample,fromtheobservedfactofmotion.Itcannotbyitselfaloneattaintheactualexistenceoftheobjectsofitsthought.

Thoseessences,ontheotherhand(suchastriangle,evennumbers,humanity),whichoftheirnatureconnoteonlyapossibleexistence(forwhichreasontheyarealsocalledpossibles),aredatafurnishedimmediatelybyourintellectandideas.

Wemustnowexaminemorecloselythisnotionofessence,orbeingunderstood

asthatwhichisorcanbe.Wehavejustdefinedanessence:thatwhichinanyobjectofthoughtwhatsoeverisimmediatelyandprimarilypresentedtotheintellect:idquodinaliquareperseprimointelligitur.Letusseewhetherthisextremelywideconcept(foritisapplicabletoanyobjectofthought)maynotbesubdividedandqualifiedinsuchawaythatthesamedefinitiontakeninamorerestrictedsenseshallhenceforwardbeapplicable,ineachparticularinstance,onlytoaparticularobjectofthought.

{b)Themerepresentationtothemindofanobjectofthought{man,white)isbutthebeginningofintellectualknowledge,whichisperfectonlyinthejudgmentbywhichthemindaffirmsordeniesthisobjectofthoughtinreferencetoanother{Peterisaman,thisfloweriswhite).Ifthenwewouldconsider

ontology:essence

beingfromthestandpointofintelligibility,todiscoverwhatisfromthispointofviewtheabsolutelyprimarydatumoftheintellect,wemustconsiderobjectsofthoughtsofarastheycanbeapprehendedbytheintellectwhenitjudges,forexamplewhenitaffirmsthatPeterisaman.Fromthispointofviewwhich,amongthevariousobjectsofthoughtwhichcanberealisedinagivensubject,isthatwhichtheintellectapprehendsimmediatelyandbeforeeverythingelse?Weshallcallitessenceinthestrictsenseoftheterm.

Consideranyobjectofthought,forexample,Peter,Paul,thisdog,thisbird:Peteristall,Paulislaughingandmoving,thisdogisbarking,thisbirdisflying.Eachoftheseisaparticularwhole,individual,concrete,andindependent,completelyequippedforexistenceandaction.

Itisindividualsubjectsofthiskindthatourmindapprehendsbeforeanythingelse(fromthestandpointofexistence)whenwethinkofthatwhichis.Whenappliedtoobjectsofthiskindtheexpressionthatwhichisacquiresamoredefiniteandspecialforce.Itnolongersimplymeansthatwhichcorrespondstosomeactualorpossibleexistence,butthatwhichfulfilsinthestrictestsenseandbeforeeverythingelsetheactofbeing.Theseobjectsareall,thoughinverydiverserespects,actorsinthedramaoftheuniverse.

When,however,weadoptthestandpointofintelligibility,ourminddoesnotamongthedifferentobjectsofthoughtwhichthingscanpresentapprehendinthefirstplacetheseindividualsubjectsassuch.Onthecontrarytheindividual,as

wehaveseenabove,escapesthedirectgraspoftheintellect.WhatIknowofPeteriswhatIknowheis—forexample,a


man.ItissuchobjectsofthoughtasmanorhumanitywhichitperceivesinPeter,orsuchaswhiteorwhitenesswhichitperceivesinthisflower,itiswhatathingisthat,fromthispointofview,ourmindprimarilyapprehends,anditisthereforeintliisdirectionthatwemustlookfortheabsolutelyfirstdatumoftheintellectinrelationtointelligibility(essenceinthestrictsense).

Theconceptofessenceinthewidesensehasthusbeensubdividedintotwo.Thereisinthefirstplacethatwhichinthestrictsenseis,thatwhich.Andinthesecondplacewhatathingis,what.

{thatwhichis:essencejwhatinthewidesense\thatwhichactofbeing:existence

Thatwhichisinthestrictsenseweshallentitletheprimarysubjectofexistenceandaction.Itiswhatphilosophersalsotermsuppositumandperson.Forthemomentwemayneglectit,for,asweshallsee,itdoesnotconcernourpresentinquiry.

Letus,onthecontrary,considerwhatathingis.Inthenotionofwhatathingistherearefurtherdistinctionsandexclusionstobemade,todeterminemorepreciselywhatisactuallytheabsolutelyprimarydatumoftheintellectfromthestandpointofintelHgi-bilityandthereforedeservestobeentitledessenceinthestrictsenseoftheterm;what,forexample,istheessenceofPeter.Peterisseated.Peteriscapableoflaughter.Peterisaman.IswhatisherepredicatedofPeter—seated,capableoflaughter,man—ineachofthesethreecases,orinonealone,thebeingwhichtheintellectapprehendsinPeterimmediatelyandprimarilyfromthestandpointofintelligibility?Wesaidabovethateveryobjectofthoughtis,assuch,

ontology:essence

anessence{essenceinthewidesense).NowwearestudyingwhatPeteris,andinquiringwhatistheobjectofthoughtwhichconstitutestheessenceofPeter{essenceinthestrictsense).

Thefollowingarethecharacteristicsoftheobjectofthoughtthusdefined,thatis,ofthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectwhenitconsiderswhatathingis.

Itisatonceplainthatthebeingtowhichtheintellectisdirectedinthefirstplacewhenitthinkswhatathingis,isabeingwhichtheintellectcannotconceivethatthinglackingordeprivedof.

Itisinfactintermsofthatbeingthattheintellectimmediatelyconceives,apprehend?,grasps,setsbeforeitselfandnamestheobjectinquestion.Todeprivethethingofthatbeing,ortoalteritsconstitutioninanyway,wouldbetosetbeforetheintellect,bydefinition,adifferentthing.

Itisthusabeingwhichthatthingsofarasitexistscannotlackorbedeprivedof(otherwisetheintellectwouldnotbetruthful).Forexample,Peter,sofarasheexists,cannotbeotherthanaman;ontheotherhand,hecanbenotseated.

Thebeinginquestionisthereforeabeingwhichthethingconsideredbytheintellectisnecessarilyandimmutably.

Moreover,itisobviouslythebeingwhichinthethingpossessesprimaryimportancefortheintellect,sinceitisthattowhichtheintellectisfirstdirected.Itisthusthebeingwhichbeforeanythingelse^the

ItIsplainthatthewordbeforedenotesinthisconnectionapriorityofnature,notoftime.


objectis,andis,sotospeak,thegroundofwhattheobjectisinotherrespects.Itisthefirstbeingofthething.Peter,forexample,isamanbeforeheiscapableoflaughterormortal.

Weconcludethatthebeingtowhichtheintellectisinthefirstplacedirectedwhenitthinkswhatathingis,isitsnecessaryandfirstbeing,or,inshort,thebeingwhichconstitutesthething,whatitnecessarilyandprimarilyis.

Thisisthefirstcharacteristicofwhatweh^veagreedtocallessenceinthestrictsense.

Thereisasecond.Itwasthestandpointofintelligibility,itwillberemembered,whichweadoptedwhenweundertookthisstudyofessence.Peterisaman{rationalanimal)beforebeingmortal.Thatis,manincludesanimal,andinthenotionofanimaltheintellectfindsthenecessarycharacteristic,mortal.Thecharacteristicsmortalandcapableoflaughter—necessarilypossessedbyPeter—haveinhimaprincipleandground,whichbyitsverynotion,orbywhatitis,oritsownintelligibiUty,compelstheintellecttopositthesecharacteristics,andthisprincipleorgroundisoneoftheelementsoraspectswhichconstitutethebeingman.ItisfromthestandpointofintelligibilitythatPeterisamanbeforebeingmortalorcapableoflaughter.

Thusifthebeingmanis,aswehavesaid,first,itisintheorderofintelligibilitythatitisfirst.Inotherwords,itisinPeterthefirstprincipleofintelligibility.^Howeverlongourformula,wemustsay,ifwewouldexpressthistruthexactly,thatthebeingmanisin

1NonenimresintelligibUisestnisipersuamdefinitionemetessentiam,St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,i.

ontology:essence

virtueofitsconstituentelementsoraspectstherootofallthecharacteristicsnecessarilypossessedbyPeter^whichhaveinPeteraprinciplewhichbyitsverynotionrequiresthem.

This,then,isthesecondcharacteristicofwhatwehaveagreedtocallessenceinthestrictsense;ofthebeingtowhichtheintellectisdirectedinthefirstplacewhenitconsiderswhatthingsare.Itisinthethingthefirstprincipleofintelligibility.

Ourintellectapprehendsthisbeingwhichisthefirstprincipleofintelligibilityintwoways,oneimperfect,theotherperfect.

If,forexample,weknowthatanobjectisaman,without,however,beingabletostatewhatmanis,wepossessaconfusedknowledgeofthebeinginquestion.Ourintellectgraspsthatbeing,hastrulyapprehendedit,andreallyperceivesit,but,sotospeak,afterthefashioninwhichoureyesseeanopaqueobject.

If,however,weknowthissameobjectandareabletodefinewhatitis{ananimalendowedwithreason)wenowpossessadistinctknowledgeofthebeing

inquestion.

Ourintellectnotonlyperceivesit,butalsoperceivesitsprinciplesorconstituentaspects.

Inthefirstinstancethebeinginquestionispresentedtousimperfectly,inthesecondperfectly,withtheperfectiondemandedbyscience,sothatwecanemployitasafirstprincipleofintelligibility.(Forexample,fromtheknowledgethatthisthingisendowedwithreasonIcandeducethatitiscapableofspeaking,laughing,worshippingGod,etc.)Butinbothinstancesitisobviouslythesamebeingwhichispresentedto

1Thesecharacteristicsaretermedproperties.


US.Therefore,thoughIdonotyetknoworevencanneverknowthisparticularbeingdistinctlyasarationalanimal,initselfitwillbenonetheless(thoughinthiscaseIdonotknowhow)invirtueofitsconstituentelementstherootofallthecharacteristicswhichpossessinPeteraprinciplerequiringthembyitsverynotion;itwillbenonethelessinitselftheprimarybeingofthethingasthefirstprincipleofitsintelligibility.

Wenowknowwhatarethecharacteristicsofessenceinthestrictsenseandareinapositiontodefineitasfollows:Essenceisthenecessaryandprimarybeingofathingasthefirstprincipleofintelligibility,or,inotherwords,whatathingnecessarilyandprimarilyisasintelligible,inshort,theprimaryintelligiblebeingofathing:idquodperseprimointelligiturinaliquare.^

fthatwhichis:(whatathingisprimarilyiessenceintheessenceinthe-asintelligibleistrictsense

BEING-!widesense\thatwhich:ihcs\ih}tc\.oiaction{suppositum,person)\actofbeing:existence

1Essenceconsideredasanattributeofthething(forexample,manwhenwesayPeterisaman)isstrictlywhatthethingisnecessarilyandprimarilyasintelligible.Essenceconsideredseparatelyandinthepurestate(forexample,whenwespeakofhumanityorthebeingman,wecannotsayPeterishumanityorPeteristliebeingman)isstrictlythatinvirtueofwhichathingiswhatitis

necessarilyandprimarilyasintelligible,or,toputitinanotherway,thatinvirtueofwhichitisconstitutedinadeterminatedegreeofprimarilyintelligiblebeing.Ifthereforeweconsideressenceinthepurestate,wemustsubstituteinoursynopsesfortheexpressionwhattheexpressionthatinvirtueofwhich:

(thatwhichis:(thatinvirtueofwhichathing\s\essenceintheessenceinthe!whatitisprimarilyasintelligible/strictsensewidesense\thatwhich:thesubjectofaction{suppositum,person)\nctofbeing:existence

ontology:essence

ConclusionXII.—TheessenceofathingiswhatthatthingisnecessarilyandprimarilyasthefirstprincipleofitsintelUgibility.

Thisprimarydatumoftheintellectistermedbyphilosophersnotonlytheessencebutalsothequiddityandnature.ItiswhatAristotleandtheschoolmencalledthetoxt,^velvat,thequodquidest,ândwhichtheydefinedasidquodperseprimointelligiturinaliquare,'âdefinitionwithwhichwewerealreadyacquainted,buttowhichwehavenowattachedacompletelydefinitesense.

Thedefinition,whenusedofessenceinthewidesense,meantwhataparticularideafirstpresentstotheintellect.Whenemployedofessenceinthestrictsense,itmeanswhataparticular?,\ih]tctprimarilyisfortheintellect.

Observethateveryobjectofthought,everyessencewhatsoever[essenceinthewidesense)isinfacttheessenceofsomething[essenceinthestrictsense)apprehendedmoreorlesscompletely(insomeorotherofitsproperties).WhenIthinkofanimal,Iapprehendtheessenceof^Peterinonepartofitsproperties.WhenIthinkofmanIapprehenditasawhole.WhenIthinkofAryan,Breton,orPeterIapprehenditasawholewiththeadditionofcertaincharacteristicsorattributesderivedfromthematter(seebelow,pp.207-216).WhenIthinkofalivingbodyendowedwithsensibilityIapprehendtheentireessenceofthesubject

1TheLatinequivalentoftheGreektermisquodquideratesse—asSt.Thomasexplains{DeEnteetEssentia,i),idestIwcperquodaliquidhabetessequid,thatwhichmakesanyobjectofthoughtthisorthatparticularthing.

2Orstatedmorefully:idquodprimoinreconcipitur,sinequoresessenonpotest,esiquefundamentumetcausaceterorumquaesuntineadeinre:utanimal

rationaleesthominisessentia.


animal(andatthesametimetheessenceofthesubjectPeterinonepartofitsproperties).WhenIthinkofwhiteorprudence,Iperceivetheessenceofaparticularquality.WhenIthinkofgoodness,unity,being,IapprehendacertaincreatedparticipationoftheDivineEssence(orIapprehend,byanalogy,ifIthinkofsubsistentgoodness,etc.,theDivineEssenceitself).

Observe,further,thateverysubjectcapableofformingpartofanypropositionwhatsoever^hasanessencedistinctivelyitsown,whetheritbeanindividualsubjectsuchasPeter{substantiaprima,subjectparexcellence),anabstractanduniversalsubject{substantiasecunda)suchasanimal,anaccident,forexample,aparticularcolourorvirtue,oratranscendental,forinstancetheone,thegood,etc.

Theprimaryintelligiblebeingofathingiscalledessence{essentia)becausesincetheintellectismodelledonbeing,whatathingprimarilyisfortheintellectmustbethatwhichisofprimaryimportanceinitfromthestandpointofbeingitself;infact,asweshallseelater,itisbyandinitsessencethatathingpossessesbeingorexistence{esse).Îtiscalledquiddity{quidditas)becauseitisthatwhichthedefinitionexpressesanddeclares,whichinturnanswersthequestionquidesthoc?Whatisthis?Itiscallednature{natura)becauseitisthefirstprincipleoftheoperationsfortheperformanceofwhichthethinghascomeintobeing{nata).*

1Withtheexceptionofconceptualbeings,whichdonot,strictlyspeaking,possessanessence(seeabove,p.192,note).

2Essentiadicitursecundumquodperearnetineareshabetesse.St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,i.

3Qjtidditasestipsareientitasconsideratainordineaddefinitionemexplicantemquidiliasit.Entitasverareiconsideratainordiruadesse,dicituressentia;inordineadoperationemdiciturnatura.

ontology:essence

Theformalobjectoftheintellectisbeing.Ontheotherhand,whatwehave

agreedtotermessenceisnothingbuttheprimaryintelligiblebeingofathing.Ourintellectcan,therefore,reallyapprehendtheessencesofthings.^Todenythiswouldbetodenytheintellectitself,andtosaythatitisboundtomisswhatispeculiarlyitsobject.

Moreover,ourintellectclaimstogiveusknowledgeoftheessencesofthings.Thescienceswhichareitsworkhavenootheraimthantograsptheseessences,eitherdistinctly,todeducefromthemthepropertiesofathing(aswhenweknowthataparticularfigureisaright-angledtriangle,orthatPeterisarationalanimal),orconfusedly,simplyinordertoplaceathinginitsspeciesanddescribeit(aswhenweknowthataparticularbodyissulphuridacid,aparticularplantalismaplantago).Ifthereforeourintellectwereincapableofreallyattainingtheessencesofthings,itwoulddeceiveus.Itisthereforeanabsolutelynecessaryconsequenceofthefundamentalaxiomthatourintellectistrustworthy,that—

ConclusionXIII.—Ourintellectiscapableofknowingtheessencesofthings.

Wedonotmaintainthattheintellectalwaysknowstheessencesofthings(inthetotaUtyoftheirproperties).Thespecificessencesofthingsareoften

1Itcanalsoattaindirectly(byanappropriateconcept)thesecomplete,i.e.completelydetermined,essences,atleastinthecaseofthingsimmediatelyaccessibletous,namely,bodies.(Weattain,forexample,thecomplete,i.e.completelydetermined,essenceofPeter,whenweknowPeternotonlyasalivingbeingorasananimal,butasaman.)


unknowntous,andundefined.Thisisduetotheimperfectionofthehumanintellect.Butwemaintainthatourintellectiscapableofknowingthem—andthereforedoesactuallyknowtheminmanycases.

Neitherdowemaintainthattheintellectcanalwaysknowtheessencesofthingsperfectly,thatisdistinctly.^Thatitcanoftenknowthemonlyconfusedly*mattersUttle.Whatiscertainisthatitiscapableofapprehendingthem.Theeye,totakeaparzdlelcase,seesthecolouredobjectswithinitscompasswithmoreorlessdistinctdetail;itmayrequiretheassistanceofamagnifyingglass,butitcanseethem.

Itisimportanttobearinmindthattheexperimentalsciencesareveryfarfrombeingabletoknowperfectlytheessenceofthethingswhichtheystudy.Theyare,infact,unabletoattainatrulydistinctnotionoftheiressences,andneverpossessmorethanaconfusedorpurelydescriptivenotionofthem.Theyknowthem,sotospeak,afterthefashionofablindmanbymeansofindirectsigns.

Forexample,weknowdistinctlytheessenceornaturemanwhenwedistinguishmanfromtheotheranimalsbythespecificdifferenceendowedwithreason.Butwecannotknowinthesamefashionhowthedog,forexample,differsfromthelion;weknowitonlybydifferencesofapurelydescriptivekind.Oftenevenwhenwehavebeforeusaseriesofconceptsofdiminishinggenerality,forinstance,alivingbody,animal,irrationalanimal,vertebrate,mammal,canine,dog,poodle,

1Evensoitcandeterminethemonlybymeansofanevidentcharacterpreviouslyknownbyus(forinstance,thefacultyofreasoninhumannature)whichitperceivestobeanecessaryfactorofitsconstitution.

*Seeabove,p.J99.

ontology:essence

etc.,endingwithGyporFido,wemaynotknowwhatconcept{canine?dog?poodle?)designates(inthetotalityofitsproperties)theessenceofGyporFido.This,however,doesnotalterthefactthatsomewhereintheseriesofconceptsintheUstjustgiven,andanyotherswhichmightbeinsertedamongthem,theremustnecessarilybeaconceptwhichdesignatesthatessence.(Infact,intheexamplewehavechosen,itistheconceptdog,aszoologydiscoversbyindirectsigns,andwithoutbeingabletogiveusatrulydistinctknowledgeoftheessencethusapprehended.)

Whenwethinkofman,forexample,oranyotherobjectdirectlypresentedtothemindbyahumanidea(anabstractidea),weputbeforeourselvessomethingstrippedofindividuality,somethingwhich,beingapprehendedbyasingleconcept,constitutesinourmindasingle,andsolitaryobjectofthought—whichisthereforeinourmindsomethingbelongingtoone{man)andcapableofexistinginmany(inallmen),thatissomethinguniversal.^Thuseverythingdirectlyapprehendedbyanideaofourintellect—andconsequentlytheessenceofathing—isinourmindasauniversal.

Nodoubt,consideredasitexistsinreality,theessenceisindividuated,foritisthenidenticalwithasubject,Peterforexample,whoishimselfindividual.*

1Seeabove,p.159.

2If,forinstance,IcansayPeterisaman,itisbecausethething(thematerialobject)apprehendedundertheobjectofthoughtmanisidenticalwiththethingapprehendedundertheobjectofthoughtPeter.WhenIthusproceedfromtheexistenceofthingsinmymindtotheirexistenceinreality,Imustsaythattheobjectofthoughtman,singleinmymind,ismultipliedinalltlieindividualsinwhichitisrealisedandisidenticalwitheach.


Butthisconditionofindividualityisnopartoftheverynatureorinmostconstitutionoftheessence,doesnotbelongtotheessenceofPeterassuch,toitscharacterasanessence.Ifindeedtheessenceconsideredinitself{secundumse)wereindividual,ourintellectcouldneverknowit,foreverythingdirectlyapprehendedbyanideaoftheintellectisapprehendedasauniversal.

Consideredinitself{secundumse)theessenceisneitheruniversalnorindividual.Itabstractsfromeveryconditionandmodeofexistence,beingpurelyandsimplywhattheobjectisprimarilyasintelligibleandwhatthedefinitionexpresses..Thusitisequallypresentintheactualthing,individuated(inordertoexist)and,inourmind,universalised(inordertobeknown).Forexample,weseeamanonlyinpublic,thereforeincompletedress,whereasinhisbedroomhewearspyjamas.Neverthelessthemanweknow,whenweseehiminthestreet,isthesameman,becausehispyjamasarenomorepartofhisnaturethanliissuitofclothes;neitherbelongstothemanconsideredinhimself.Similarlyconsideredinitselftheessenceisnotuniversal,butneitherisitindividual;^thatistosay,theessenceassuch,theessenceofPetertakeninitself,abstractsfromallthecharacterswhichdistinguishPeterfromPaulorJohn.'

1Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,vii,8,1033b22;10,1035b14.Herewcarespeakingonlyofcorporealthings,whichaloneareimmediatelyaccessibletous(beingconnaturaltothehumanintellect),consequentlytheonlythingswhoseessenceisdirectlyknowable(otherwisethanbyanalogy)andcanbeknowncomplete,i.e.completelydetermined.

2Fromallthathasbeensaiditfollowsthat,when,forexample,wesayPeter

andPaulpossessthesameessenceorthesamenature,thewordsamereferstotheessenceofPeterandPaulasitexistsinthemind(forthenitisoneandthesameobjectofthought),notasitexistsinreality

ontology:essence

ConclusionXIV.—Theessencesofthingsareuniversalinthemind,andconsideredinthemselvesneitheruniversalnorindividual.

Thispropositionisofthefirstimportance.Todenyitinevitablyinvolvessuspicionofthehumanintellect,whichcannotdirectlyapprehendinitsconceptstheindividualassuch;^weshalleitherdemandfromitwhatitcannotgive,aknowledgestrictlysuperhuman—intellectualintuitionoftheindividual—ordenyitsobjectivereferenceandfallintosubjectivism.

Wemustthereforebearfirmlyinmindthattoknowtheessenceornatureofanythingitisnotnecessarytoknowtheprincipleswhichconstituteitsindividuality,*sincetheessence,consideredinitself,is,infact,nothingindividual.Misconceptionofthisfundamental

(forthenitisidenticalwithPeterandwithPaul,twodifferentindividuals).Butsincetheessenceinquestionisnotindividualinitself{secundumse),inotherwordsisnotdistinctinPeterandinPaulquaessence,itfoUovrethatitisinPeterandPaulsuchthatitcanbeapprehendedbythemindinasingleconceptandconstituteinthemindoneandthesameobjectofthought.Thisisexpressedbythestatementthattheessenceformallyuniversalinthemindisfundamentallyuniversalinthingsorinreality.(Thenatureofanythingexistsinthemindeitherinaconditionoflogicalorformaluniversality,as,forexample,whenwesaymanisthespeciesofPeterandPaul,orinaconditionofmetaphysicalorfundamentaluniversality,aswhenwesaymanismortal.Thetermfundamentalherereferstotheproximatefoundationofuniversality.When,ontheotherhand,wesaythatthenatureoressenceisfundamentallyuniversalinreality,wearespeakingoftheremotefoundationofuniversality).

1Wearenowspeakingofthingsknownbyourintellectanddonotdealwiththequestionhowtheintellectknowsitsownindividualandmaterialact.

2CfSt.Thomas,DeVerit.,q.2,a.^,adi;Intellectusnostersingularianoncognoscenspropriamhabetcognitionemderebus,cognoscenseassecundumpropriasrationesspeciei.


truthisatthebottomoftheerrorsofseveralgreatmodernmetaphysicians,Spinoza,forexample,andLeibniz(exaggeratedintellectuaiists),alsoBergsonandtheanti-intellectualistsofthepresentday.

(a)Theessenceofcorporealthingsisuniversalinthesensejustexplained.Thatistosay,inthiscategoryofbeingthereareamultitudeofindividualspossessingthesameessence.

Individualspossessingthesameessence,forexample,Peter,Paul,andJohn,areonthesamelevelinrespectofprimarilyintelligiblebeing;theyareessentiallyequal.

Neverthelesstheseindividualsdifferonefromanother.Peterisfair,short,andsanguine,Johndark,tall,andcholeric,etc.^Suchcharacteristicspeculiartoaparticularindividualarenotderivedfromtheessence.Otherwisetheywouldbeidenticalinalltheindividualswhichbyhypothesispossessthesameessence.Theyarethereforenon-essentialcharacters.

Neverthelesstheyare,infact,unalterableandnecessary.2Ifhewerenotfair,sanguine,etc.,Peterwouldnodoubtbeaman,buthewouldnotbePeter.Wemustthereforeconcludethatthesecharacteristicshavetheirgroundinwhattheobjectisnecessarilyandprimarily,butasanindividual,or,inwhatwemaytermtheindividualnatureofthething.(Byindividual

1Wearenotnowspeakingofthosepurelycontingentcharacteristicswhichdistinguishoneindividualfromanother,forexamplePeterisinParis,PaulinRome,Peterisrich,Paulpoor,etc.Wearespeakingofthosecharacterswhichariseoutoftheconstituentbeingoftheindividual,theinnatecharacters,whichare,radicallyatleast,unalterable.

*Butinafashionaltogetherdifferentfromthecharactersderivedfromtheessence(properties).Seebelow,p.212,note.

ontology:essence

naturewemeanincommunicabletoanyotherobjector,ifyouprefer,whollycircumscribed.)

{byInthisindividualnaturewefind,asintheessence,thenotesnecessaryandfirstbeing.But,ontheotherhand,andthisistheimportantpoint,itisnotthenecessaryandfirstbeingofthethingasfirstprincipleofintelligibility;itisnotthefirstprincipleofintelligibility.Theindividualcharacteristicssuchasfair,sanguine,etc.,arenot,aswepointedout,derivedfi'omPeter'sessence;theyarenotrequiredbyit.Thatistosay,theydonotpossessinPeteraprincipleorgroundwhichrequiresthembyitsver/notion,orinvirtueofwhatitis,thatistosay,ofitsownintelligibility(as,forexample,rationalrequirescapacityforlaughter).Nevertheless,sincetheyarenecessarilypossessedbyPeter,theyhavetheirrootinPeter,inPeter'sindividualnature;theyhavethereaprinciple.

Theymustthenhaveastheirprinciplesomethingwhichdoesnotrequirethembyitsverynotion,invirtueofitsbeingorofitsownintelligibility,somethinginthenotionofwhichtheintellectcannotdiscoveranecessityforthesecharacteristicsratherthananyothers.Therefore,hisprincipleisinitselfwhollyindeterminate.Ifneitherbyitsnotionnorinvirtueofitsbeingoritsownintelligibilityitrequiresthisratherthanthat,itisbecauseinitselfithasnonotion,being,orintelligibility.Wearethusledtoaprinciplewhichofitselfisabsolutelynothingconceivable,tofirstmatterasAristotleunderstoodit,somethingwhichcanenterintotheconstitutionofabeing,butisnotitselfabeing.


Ifitbeadmittedthatnon-beingofthissortispartofallcorporealthings,andthatwhenitselfindividuatedbysomequalificationîtistheprimaryrootoftheirindividuaUty,itiseasytoseethatthecharacterswhicharederivedfromtheindividualnatureofthething,sincetheirprimaryrootistheindividualmatterwiththedispositionsithappenstopossessatthemomentwhenthethingcomesintoexistence,have,astheirfirstprincipleinthething,aprinciplewhichdoesnotrequirethembyitsverynotion—forinitselfithasneithernotionnorintelligibility;itrequiresthemsolelyinvirtueoftheaccidentaldispositionsithappenstopossessataparticularmoment.

Thus,theindividualnatureisnotthefirstprincipleofintelligibility,becauseitisbyitsmatterthatitistheprincipleoftheindividualcharacters.'

{c)Wehavemerelysoughttoindicateherehowtheobscurenotiono^firstmatter,thestudyofwhichbelongs

Insofarasitmateriasignataquantitate.Obviouslybeingswhollyincorporealorimmaterial{pwrespirits)cannotderivetheirindividuationfromfirstmatter.Theymustthereforebeindividuatedbytheiressenceitself,andeachindividualinconsequencediffersfromtherestasahorsefforexample,differsfromaman,eachbeingbyhimselfaspecificessence.Forthisreasonintheorderofpurespiritstherearenotwobeingsessentiallyequal.Andconsequentlyinthecaseofpurespirits(butonlyintheircase)theessenceissomethingindividualandtheconceptofcompleteessenceidenticalwiththatofindividualnature.*Toavoidanypossibleconfusionbeitobservedthatanindividualnatureisnotunintelligibleinitself.Itisfirstmatterthatisunintelligibleinitself.Thoughtheindividualnatureisnotthefirstprincipleofintelligibility,isnottheprimarily'intelligiblebeingofthething,itisneverthelesstheprimaryprincipleofitsbeing,foritistheessenceasindividuatedbymatter,andisthereforeintelligibleinitself.Thatiswhyanintelligencemoreperfectthanours,theDivineMindforexample,canknowitdirectly.

ontology:essence

tonaturalphilosophy,arisesnaturallyinthemindassoonasitisunderstoodthatconsideredinitselftheessenceofcorporealobjectsisnotindividual,apropositionitselfdemandedbythefundamentalaxiomofthetrustworthinessoftheintellect.

Wemayfurtherpointoutthatsincematter,thisspeciesofnon-being,ispresentasthegroundofindividuation(andconsequentlyastheprimaryrootofcertainqualifications)ônlyintheindividualnature(inPeter'snatureassuch)andnotintheessence{humanity),wemayregardtheessence,theprimaryintelligiblebeing,asfreefromallthequalificationsduetomatterastheirprimaryrootorasimmaterialisedbeing,înotherwordsasthearchetypalbeingofthething,'

1ThatisthesenseofSt.Thomas'sdictum:formaeetperfectionesrerumpermateriamdeterminantur{DeVerit.,q.2,a.2).

2Aristotle,Metaph.,vii,7,1032b14:Xtyu5'ovalav(LvevCXrjirbtIJjvilvai.

^Cf.St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,ii:Haecmateria(signata)indefinitionehoniinisinquantumhomononponitur;sedponereturindefinitioneSocratis,siSocratesdefinitionemhaberet.Indefinitioneautemhominisponiturmaterianonsignata...fromthisitfollows:

(i)ThatSocratespossesseshisessencenotpreciselyasSocrates,butasman,fortheessenceisthatwhichthedefinitionexpresses{cf.DeVerit.,q.2,a.2,at/g)andSocrates,asSocrates,isindefinable,Socrates'sindividualnatureistheessenceofmanindividuatedbythemateriasignata.

(ii)Thatessencetakeninthepurestateorseparately,asforinstancewhenwespeakofhumanityorthebeingman,mayberegardedastheimmaterialisedbeing(strippedofthequalitiesderivedfrommateriasignata),orastheformalbeingofthethingasawhole(comprisingbothmatter—notindividual—andform).Itisinthissensethattheancientsgavetotheessence(itselfcomprisingthematter—notindividual—andtheform)thenameoiform{formatotius):Etideohumanitassignificaturutformaquaedam.Etdiciturquodestformatotius...sedmagisestformaquaeesttotum,scilicetformamcomplectensetmateriam,cumpraecisiorutameneorumperquaemateriaestnatadesignari(St.Thomas,DeEnteetEssentia,3).Itisimportanttoobservethat,althoughtheindividualmatter(e.g.haecossa,haecarnes)isnopartoftheessenceorspecific


anidealbeingwhichinthepurestateorseparatelyhasnoexistenceexceptinthemind,andexistsinrealityonlyasindividuatedbymatter,intheconcretestateoftheindividualnature.

Wemustthereforeconcludethatthereisnothingmoreintheindividualnaturethanintheessencefromthestandpointofprimarilyintelligibleorarchetypalbeing.^Fromthispointofviewallindividualsofthesamespeciesareonthesamelevelofbeing;to

nature,ontheotherhandtheunindividuatedorcommonmatter{ossa,carnes)ispartofit.Whatconstitutesmanisnotthesoulalone,butsoulandbodytogether.{Cf.Aristotle,Metaph.,vii;St.Thomas,InVIIMetaph.,1.lo,1492and1496,ed.Cathala).Thisunindividuatedorcommonmatter,takensimplyasreceivingtheformanddeterminedbyit,andnotastheprimaryrootofcertaincharacters(theindividualcharacters)ofthesubject,ismadeknowntousbytheform:materiacognosciturperformam,aquasumiturratiouniversalis(St.Thomas,loc.cit.Cf.DeVerit.,q.10,a.4fi?5,andispartofthatwhichwehaveheretermedtheimmaterialisedbeing(archetypalbeing)orformalbeingofthething(formatotius,seupotiusformaquaeesttotum).

^Theindividualnaturecontainsmore(thequalitiespeculiartotheindividual,forexample,aparticulartemperament)thantheessence,butonlyfromthestandpointofmatter,notfromthestandpointofpurelyintelligibleorimmaterialisedbeing.Theindividualcharactersarenopartofthatbeingandaddnothingtoitinitsownorder.

Remarkinthisconnectionthattheindividualcharacteristics(fair,sanguine,etc.)fromtheveryfactthattheyarederivedfromthematter,arenecessary,andunalterableinatotallydifferentsensethanarethecharactersderivedfromtheessence(properties).Thelatterarenecessarydejure,asderivedfromaprmcipleconstitutiveoftheessencewhichdemandstheminvirtueofitsveryconcept;itisabsolutelyimpossiblethatPetershouldexistwithoutbeingmortal.Theindividualcharacters,onthecontrary,areonlynecessarydefacto,asderivedfromparticulardispositionsofthematterwhichtheypresuppose.IfitisimpossiblethatPetershouldexistwithoutpossessingaparticulartemperament,theexistenceofthatcharacteristicpresupposescertainmaterialconditionsinvirtueofwhichPeterpossessesaparticularindividualnature,butwhicharenotthemselvesnecessary.Hencethesecharacterscanbetoacertainextentmodified,andareunalterableonlyintheirground.

ontology:essence

knowtheir(universal)essenceistoknowallthereistoknowinthem,forthebeingofPeterasPeterisnomorecompleteordeterminatethanthebeingofPeterasman.Itismerelymorecloselycircumscribed.

Wecannowunderstandhow,althoughthehumanintellectcannotdirectlyknowthebeingofobjectsinitsindividuality,itsnatureasanintellectisnotfrustratedonthataccount,nordoesitmissitsformalobject,forittrulyknowsthebeingofthingssofarasitisprimarilyintelligibleorarchetypalbeing.^Hence,thoughimperfect,itisneitheruselessnoruntrustworthy.

{d)Beitobservedthatthesynonymsessence,quiddity,andnature,allofwhichdenoteauniversal,maybestretchedtodenotesome:hingsingular,whenweconsidertheessence{humanity,forexample)asindividuatedbymatter(inPeter,forinstance),orasitpossessesinrealityasingularmodeofexistence.Nevertheless,strictlyspeaking,thetermnaturealoneiscompatiblewiththepredicateindividual,whereastheexpressionsindividualessenceorindividualquiddityareincorrect.^

Inallthiswehaveinmindthingsimmediatelyaccessibletous,namelycorporealthings,whichthehumanintellectcannotapprehenddirectlyintheirindividuality,because,sinceitisobligedtoabstractfromimagesitswhollyimmaterialideas,itisbythatveryfactcompelledtoabstractfromthatwhichconstitutesthematerialityofsenseknowledge,namelytheindividualm.atter.

Asregardsimmaterialthings{purespirits),ourintellectisequallyincapableofapprehendingthemintheirindividuality,butforanentirelydifferentreason;becausepurespiritsarenotimmediately"ccessibletous,andwecanknowthemonlybyanalogy,notintheiressence,andareunabletoapprehendtheircompleteessence.

^Sofaratleastastheorderofcorporealthingsisconcerned.Intheorderofpurespirits,onthecontrary,theessenceisindividual(see


Wehaveindeedseenthatthetermsessenceandquiddityareusedinreferencebothtotheexistenceandthedefinitionofanything.Thedefinition,however,canexpressonlytheprimarilyintelligiblebeingofthething,foritstatesitsconstituentelementswhicharebytheirverynotionprinciplesofintelligibilityinit.Hencethedefinitioncannotexpressthematerialindividuatingprinciplesofthething,andforthatreasontheindividualnatureassuchisindefinable.Therefore,sincethequiddity,whattheobjectisasdefinable,canonlyconsistintheprimarilyintelligiblebeingoftheobject,itmustbeuniversal.Similarly,thatinvirtueofwhichanythinginvitesthatsupremeperfectionwhichconsistsinexistencecanclearlybenothingbutitsimmateriaHsedbeing.Foritisnotinvirtueofthatinitofwhichthefirstprincipleismatterthatitinvitesexistence.Itsindividualityismerelyaconditioninwhichitmustbeinordertoexist.Andsincetheessence,whatathingis,takenpreciselyasthatinvirtueofwhichitreceivesexistence,canconsistinnothingbutitsimmateriaUsedbeing,itmustbeuniversal.

Thetermnature,onthecontrary,isusedinreference

above,p.21o,notei).Andifweknowtheessencesofspiritualbeingsafterthefashionofauniversal,itisbecauseweonlyknowtheminadequatelyandbyanalogywiththecorporealobjectspreviouslyknown.

TheexpressionindividualnatureisnotuncommoninSt.Thomas{cf.DeVerit.,

q.2,a.5,naturesingularis;Sum.Theol.,i-ii,q.51,3,i,naturaindividui,etc.).Healsouses,thoughexceptionally,theexpressionessentiasingularis{cf.DeVerit.,q.2,a.7).Whatevermaybethoughtoftheproprietyoftheterm,inanycaseSt.Thomasunderstandsbyitsimplytheessenceindividuatedbythematter(notinSpinoza'ssense,theessencecomplete,asanessence,onlyintheindividual).

ontology:essence

totheoperationswhichanythingisadaptedtoperform.Athing,however,doesnotactsolelyinaccordancewithitsarchetypalorprimarilyintelligiblebeing,butalsoasitissubjecttoparticularmaterialconditionsandpossessesaparticularindividuaUty.Nothingthereforepreventsourdivertingthetermnaturefromitsprimarysignificancetodenotesecondarilywhatathingisasindividual.

(whatprimarilyasintelligible:essence,quiddity,naturewhataswhollycircumscribed(essenceindividuatedbymatter):individualnature

[thatwhichis:essenceinthewidesense

BEING-.

\thatwhich:thesubjectofaction

{suppositum,person)

âctofbeing:existence

Finallywemayremarkthatinaseriesofconceptssuchassubstance,livingbody,animal,man,Aryan,Breton,etc.,onlytheconceptman,strictlyspeaking,denotesPeter'sessence.Theconceptssubstance,livingbody,animal,denoteonlycertainelementsorintelligibleaspectswhichenterintotheconstitutionofthatessence;inotherwords,theydenotethatessenceonlyinonepartofitsqualifications,andtheconceptsArjyanorBretononlyascircumscribedanddifferentiatedbycertainadditionalnotesarisingfromthedispositionsofmatter.AryanandBretonarethus,liketheessenceman,universalobjectsofthoughtapprehendedbythemindintheindividualPeterandliberatedbyabstractionfromtheconditionsofindividualmatter;buttheyareuniversalswhoseextensionislessthanthatoftheessence,andwhichbelongtoaparticularclass


(race)dividedintoamultitudeofindividualspossessingthesameessence;and,sincetheycanbedistinguishedonlybymeansofcharactersrootedincertaindispositionsofmattertheycannotbethesubjectofanotionstrictlyspeakingdistinct,oratruedefinition.

-J

ONTOLOGY:SUBSTANCEANDACCIDENT

Adoptingthestandpointofintelligibility,weaskedourselvesintheprecedingparagraphwhatisthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectfromthatpointofview.Wewerethusbroughttothenotioi.ofessencestrictlyso-called,ornature(thetwotermsmayberegardedassynonymous);^whatanobjectprimarilyisasintelligible.

LetusnowconsiderthebeingofthingsnolongerinreferencetointelligibiHtybutinreferencetoexistence.

Whatfromthisnewstandpointisthebeingwhichimmediatelypresentsitselftotheconsiderationoftheintellect,thattowhichthelatterisdirectedbeforeanythingelse?Inotherwords,whatisthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectasexisting?Wehavealreadyansweredthequestion.*Whatthemindapprehendsfirstofallasexisting,isbeingssuchasPeter,Paul,thisman,thisdog,thisbird,individualconcreteandindependentsubjects,fullyequippedtobeandtoact,andwhichwehavetermedtheprimarysubjectsofaction,supposita,orpersons.Îtistheywhoprimarilyfulfiltheactofbeing.

1Seeabove,pp.201,213.^Seeabove,p.195.

2Thenamepersonisreservedforsuppositaofanintellectualnature,whoarethereforemastersoftheiractionsandpossessthemaximumofindependence.

217


Thesubjectofactionmaybethusdefinedfromthestandpointofexistence.It

existswhollybyitselfaloneorbyitsownmeans,notinthesensethatithasnoneedofacause[Peterhasbeenengenderedandmanycausescombinetokeephiminbeing),butinthesensethatitisbyitselfsufficientlydisposedtobedrawnfromnothingnessbythecausesofitsbeing;takenseparatelyitpossessesinitselforinitsownnatureeverythingnecessarytoreceiveexistence.Înthissensewemaysaythatitisabeingexistingbyitself[perse)orinvirtueofitself,invirtueofitsownnature,ensperseexistens.Sinceabeingofthiskindexistsasawholeandinnowiseaspartofanotherbeingorsubjectinwhichitexists,wemayalsosaythatitexistsinitself,inse.

Abeingwhichexistsperse^,orratherabeingimmediatelydisposedtoexistperse,isthusfromthestandpointofexistencethefirstdatumoftheintellect.Observefurther,thatwhentheintellectmakesbeingofthiskinditsobject,ittranscendsthelimitswhichdefinetheessenceinthestrictsenseorthenature{whatathingis,orrather—ifwetakethepureessence,abstractedfromthesubjectwhichpossessesit—thatinvirtueofwhichanobjectiswhatitis).

Wearenowconcerned,aswehavealready

*Wearespeakinghereofcreatedsubjects.Anuncreated(divine)Personpossessesinhimselfeverythingnecessarytoexistwithanunderivedexistence.Whenwesaythatthesuppositumisinnowayapartofthewholeinwhichitexists,thetermwholeobviouslymeansawholetliatisoneinitself(seep.250),notacollectivewhole,forexampletheuniverse.

2Thisformulaispreferable,becauseexistenceitselfcannotenterasaconstituentpartintothedefinitionofanythingcreated.SeefurtherSt.Thomas,Qpodlib.,2,q.2,a.4,arf2:ipsttmessenonestderationesuppositi.

ontology:substanceandaccident

hinted,withthatwhichisinthestrictsense,Peterforexample,andnotwiththatinvirtueofwhichPeteriswhatheis{humanity,thepropertyofPeterinvirtueofwhichheisaman,orhisindividualnature,thePetrinehumanity,sotospeak,invirtueofwhichheisPeter).

'thatwhichis:(what(orthatinvirtueofwhich)

BEING.

essenceintheJ

widesenseIthatwhichprimarilyexists:primarysubjectofaction{suppositum,person)

actofbeing:existence

Tobesure,thatwhichis,Peter,possessesnodistinctivecharactersotherthanthosewhichconstitutewhatheisorhisindividualnature.ButwhenIsayPeterIconceivethisnatureasconstitutingthewholewhichexistsinnothingotherthanitself.^When,ontheotherhand,IsayPetefsnature,Iconceivethatnatureasdistinctfromthewholewhichitservestoconstituteandasexistinginhim,inthatwhole.*Inshort,the

1BecauseIconceiveitaspossessedofacertainmodeorfashionofbeingwhichphilosopherstermsubsistenceorpersonality,andwhichterminatesit,somewhatasapointterminatesaline.

Inthisintroductionwemakenoclaimtosolvetheproblemofsubsistence(thedistinctionbetweennatureandperson)whichconstitutesoneofthemostimportantproblemsofontology.Adoptingthepedagogicalstandpointofcoherentexposition,wehavemerelysoughttopresentandclassifynotions,sothattheirsenseandmutualrelationshipmaybeunderstoodbyasynopsiswhichiscompletefromtheoutset.

3Iconceiveitinabstractionfromthemodalitycalledsubsistenceorpersonalitywhichterminatesit.SimilarlyIcanconsideralineabstractingfromthepointwhichterminatesit,inwhichcasethelinethusconsideredissimplyapartofthewholeconstitutedbythelineandpointtakentogether,andexistsinthatwhole.


subjectofactionpossessesanatureoressence;theconceptofthatnatureoressencetakenassuch{whatorthatinvirtueofwhich)isnottheconceptofthesubjectofaction{thatwhich).

Wewillnowturntothisnatureoressenceofthesubjectofaction.Wehavejustobservedthatthesubjectofactionexists(iscapableofexistence)invirtueofitsownnatureoritsownessence,^Thenatureoressenceofthesubjectofactionisthereforethatinvirtueofwhichitiscapableofexistencepureandsimple

{simpliciter);thenatureofPeterconsideredasthesubjectofactionisthatinvirtueofwhichIcansaysimplyPeterexists.^

ExistencepureandsimpleisundoubtedlyPeter'sprimaryortirstexistence.Butitisnothissolemodeofexistence.Heissadto-day,yesterdayhewascheerful;to-dayheexistsassad,yesterdayheexistedascheerful.Hehaslosttheformerexistenceandacquiredthelatter,buthehasnotthereforeceasedtoexistpurelyandsimply.Thatistosay,hepossessesahostofsecondaryqualificationsinvirtueofwhichheexistsnotonlysimply{simpliciter)butalsounderaparticularaspect{secundumquid).Itisthusthatheisamusicianoraphilosopher,illoringoodhealth,happyorunhappy,etc.Allthesequalificationshaveaccrued{accidere)tothatwhichheisprimarilyasexisting,areincrements,oraccretions,accidents.

Philosophy,health,happiness,sorrow;alltheseareso

'InvirtueofItsessenceinthestrictsenseoftheterminthecaseofapurelyspiritualsubject,invirtueofitsnatureinthesenseofindividualnatureinthecaseofacorporealsubject.(Seep.235,noteI.)

*Thatistosay,Vk'ithoutregardtoanyparticularpointofview,wîthoutmodifyingmythoughtbyanyaddition.


manyessences^towhichourattentionhasnothithertobeendirected,andwhicharenotsell-subsistentinbeing,butonthecontrarysubsisting,sotospeak,onlyascoveringsofthesubjectofaction.Employingtheanalogyofsensibleobjectswemaysaymetaphoricallythatthelatterexistsbeneaththeaccidents[substat)andsupportsthem.Fromthispointofviewitmaybetermedasubstance.*Forexample,wesaythatPeterisasubstance.Moreover,sincehisnatureconsideredpreciselyassuch{whatheis,thatinvirtueofwhichheiswhatheis,thatinvirtueofwhichheiscapableofexistencepureandsimple),Ukehimselfexistsbeneaththeaccidents,italsoisentitledtothenameofsubstance,andwecanspeakofPeter'ssubstance.Wehavenowdistinguishedthenotionofsubstanceasopposedtothatofaccident.^

1Thedefinitionofessencegivenabove(p.201)isapplicabletoaccidents,ifthesubjectisconsideredinaparticularaspect.Understoodinaconcretesense,asattributedtotheobject(forexamplesadwhenwesayPeterissad),theaccident

iswhatathingprimarilyisasintelligibleinaparticularrespect{beingsadisthegroundonwhichPeterpossessescertaincharacteristicswhichnecessarilyfollowfromsadness).Understoodabstractly,andseparatelyorinthepurestate(forinstancewhenwespeakofsorrow)theaccidentisthatinvirtueofwhichathingprimarilyiswhatitisasintelligibleinacertainrespect.

WemayfurtherusethetermessencenolongerinrespectofthesubjectPeter,butinrespectoftheaccidentsthemselves,andsaythatsorrowisthatinvirtueofwhichaparticularpassionprimarilyiswhatitisasintelligible.

2Thesubjectofactionisalsocalledvwdcrraffis(hypo-stasis),-irpwrovviroKflnevov,primumsubjectumattributiorns.

3Observethatthetermsubstance{substantia)correspondstotheGreekwordovalaunderstoodinarestrictedsense.Thetermovclaprimarilydenotesessenceornature,butsincesubstancesarethefirstobjectwhichtheintellectattains,whenitconsiderswhatexists,theyarealsoforthatreasonthefirstobjectwhichconfrontstheintellectwiththenotionofessence;inotherwordstheyarethefirsttomeritthedenominationofessenceornature.Hencethetermoiitria,whichtakeninitsmost


'thaiwhichis:rwhatathingis(essenceorTinaparticu—

essenceinthenature)andinvirtueofJlaraspect:accident

widesense-whichitreceivesexist-j

enceyabsolutely:^

Ahatwhichprimarily.,

/.,,.^vysubstance

exists(thesubjectof|

aiction,suppontum,person)j

actofbeing:existence

SUBSTANCE

Thenamesubstanceisgiven,aswehavejustseen,bothtothesubjectofactionitself{thatwhichprimarilyexists)andtoitsnatureconsideredpreciselyasanatureoressence{whatathingis,thatinvirtueofwhichthesubjectofactioniswhatitisandclaimsexistencepureandsimple).^Whatthenshallbeourdefinition

generalsensedenotesessence,andisafterwardsdividedintosubstanceajidaccident,hasmostnaturallyservedtodenoteinaspecialsensethefirstmemberofthepair,substance.

1Thesubjectofaction(suppositumorperson)isnothingbutthesubstantialnaturecompletedbyaparticularmodality{subsistenceorpersonality)whichterminatesit,asapointterminatesaline(withoutaddinganythingtoitinitsorderofnature)andrendersitabsolutelyincommunicable.Thetermsubstance(correspondingtotheGreekovffia,whichprimarilydenotesessence—seetheprecedingnote)denotesthesubstantialnaturewithoutdefiningwhetherornoitisterminatedbysubsistence.Itisthereforeapplicablealiketothenature(apprehendedbythemindwithoutthesubsistencewhichterminatesit)andtothesubjectofaction(theterminatednature).Butwhenwedistinguishandcontrastthenature(notterminated)andthesubjectofaction,thetermsubstanceremainsattachedtothenature(notterminated)andisthencontrastedwiththesubjectofactiontakenassuch.ThuswhenwespeakofPeter'ssubstance,wemeanpreciselythenatureinvirtueofwhichthesubjectofactionPeterpossessesprimarybeing,andwhichispartofhim.AndtheologiansusetheterminthissensewhentheyteachthatintheDivineTrinitytheFatherandtheSon(twodistinctPersons)possessthesamesubstance,areconsubstantial,ojuoovaioi.

Ontheotherhand,theGreektermvwixTTaai.^{hypo-stasis,etymologicallythesameformationassub'Stantia)afteracertainvacillationin


ofsubstance?Beingreceivingexistenceofitself{perse)orinvirtueofitselfintheunqualifiedsenseadoptedabove?No.Forsounderstoodthedefinitionappliesonlytothesubjectofaction;absolutelyspeaking,italone—Peterforexample—existsasawhole,andnotaspartofabeingorsubjectinwhichitexists.Itsnature,onthecontrary,ispartofitselfandexistsinitself.Peter's

natureexistsinPeter,andispartofPeter.ItistruethatsincePeterishimselfconstitutedbyit,andexistsinvirtueofit{perearn),thisnaturedoesnotexistinsomethingpreviouslyexistingwhichreceivesit(as,forexample,sorrowexistsinPeter,whowaspreviouslyinexistence).Wecanthereforesaythatitexists(iscapableofexistence)perse,intheprecisesensethatinordertoexistithasnoneedtobepartofanotherbeingpreviouslyexistingwhichreceivesitinitself,butthatonthecontraryitconstitutesthewhole(thesubjectofaction)whichexistsbyitself.Inthissenseand,ifwearecarefultoquaUfyandexplainourmeaning,thedescriptionensperseexistensisappUcablenotonlytothesubjectofaction,butalsotoitsnature,andmaythereforeserveasthedefinitionofsubstance.^

(Thesameistrueoftheexpressionensinseexistens.)

itsemployment,camefinallytodenotethesubjectofactiontakenassuch[person)andisusedexclusivelyinthissense.Itisthuscontrastedwithsubstanceunderstoodasanaturenotterminatedbysubsistence.

Werewetemptedtodenythevitalimportanceoftheseabstractconceptsanddistinctions,wemightrecollectthatforthewordb/j-oovaios,onwhichthetrueunderstandingoftheTrinitydepends,butwhichdiffersonlybyaniotafromtheunorthodoxtermdfioiovcrioi,Catholicswerewilling,whentheArianheresyflourished,tosuffereverykindofpersecution,andsometimesevendeath.

*Cf.JohnofSt.Thomas,Cursusphilos.,i,Log.ii,q.15,a.i.


Weshalltherefore^definesubstanceasathingornaturethatcanexistbyitselforinvirtueofitself{perse)—andnotinanotherthing[inalio),thatistosay,inasubjectpreviouslyexisting.^

(Alternativelywemaydefinesubstanceasathingornaturewhosepropertyistoexistinitself.)

ConclusionXV.—Substanceisathingornaturewhosepropertyistoexistbyitself,orinvirtueofitself{perse)andnotinanotherthing.

Itisevidentthattheideaofsubstancerepresentssomethingwhichreallyexists.Ifnosubstanceexisted,noix.turecapableofexistinginitself,allnatureswould

besuchascouldexistonlyinsomethingelse.Butinthatcase,sincenatureAcouldexistonlyinnatureBandnatureBinturnonlyinnatureC,therewouldbeaninfiniteregressionwhichcouldnever

1Existenceitselfcannotbeaconstituentpartofanycreatednature.Itisforthatreasonthatsubstancemustbedefinedasathingornaturecapableofexistingperseorapttoexistperse.Thesameobservationwasmadeaboveinreferencetothesuppositum(p.218,note2).

Wemustmakethesenseofthesuggesteddefinitionclear.Ifperse(orinse)isunderstoodintherestrictedsenseexplainedinthetext,ourdefinitionwillmean:substanceisanatureapttoexistperse{orinse)quanatureoressenceinthesuppositumwhichitconstituteswhenterminatedbythesubsistence.If,however,perse(orinse)isunderstoodintheabsolutesenseinwhichitwastakenabove(p.218),theoposeddefinitionwillmean:substanceisanatureapttoexistperse{orinbe)quasubjectofaction(suppositumorperson).

'Thetermsubstancesignifiesathingcapableofexistinginitself,orofsubsisting;thatistosay,ofbeingself-containedasanexistentthing(itsfunctionsubsistere),sothat,onceitexists,itsustainsinbeingtheadditionalqualitiesoraccidentswithwhichitisinvested(itsfunctionsubstare).Butitisonlyasasuppositumthatsubstanceisimmediatelycapableofperformingthesetwofunctions.Consideredasanatureoressenceitmerelyseekstoperformthem.


reachanatureinwhichallthesenaturesexisted;theythereforecouldnotexist.

Thosephilosopherswho,likeFichte(nineteenthcentury),denouncedthe"deadsubstanceoftheLatins"toopposetoit"Teutonicactionorbecoming"werefightingagainsttheintellectitself,whichissimplyunabletodispensewiththenotionofsubstanceandimposesituponusasanabsolutelyprimaryandimmediatedatum.Moreover,thatwhichtheytookforsubstanceanddeclared"dead,""inert,"etc.,wasamerefigmentoftheirownimagination.Forsubstanceisnotan"emptyreceptacle,""aninertanddeadsupport."Itistheabsolutelyprimalbeingofathing,theradicalprincipleofitsactivityandallitsactuality.AsAristotlesaid,substantiaestprimumens.^Buttoperceivethisaphilosophermustmakeuseofhisintelligence,riseabovetheanimallifeofthesenses,andnotbecontenttoshowhisskilliuhandlingwordsdevoidofconceptualcontent

andfreightedonlywithmaterialimages.

Thesubstanceofanobject,solongasthatobjectexists,isassuchimmutable.^

Peter'ssubstanceisthatinvirtueofwhichPeterexistspurelyandsimply,thatistosay,asPeter.SolongasPeterexists,liissubstanceassuchcannotchange.AndwhenPeter'ssubstancedoeschange(whenPeter'sbodybecomesalifelesscorpse)Peterexistsnolonger,heisdead.

1Metaph.,vii,i.

''NodoubtwhenPetergrowsthechangeaffectsPeter'ssubstaneiitself,whichincreases,butsolelyinrespectofitsquantity.Itdoesnotaffectitassubstance.


Moreover,initselfsubstanceisinvisible,imperceptiblebythesenses.Forthesensesdonotapprehendbeingassuch,butpresenttousdirectlyonlythechangingandthemoving.Inacertainsense,tobesure,itisindeedthesubstanceofPeterthatmyeyessee,asitwastrulyJesuswhomthedisciplessawatEmmaus,butmyeyesthusapprehendthesubstanceonlyinfactandmaterially,notformally.

Inotherwordstheobjectseenortouchedissomethingwhichwhileseenortouchedisatthesametimealsoasubstance;butitisnotseenortouchedasasubstance.Asasubstanceitisconceived,notseenortouched,andsofarasitisseenortoucheditiscolouredorexertingresistance,notbeingandsubstance.Inthelanguageofphilosophysubstanceisintelligibleinitself(perse)andsensibleonlyaccidentally(peraccidens).Thatthereforeinthingswhichpossessesmostimportanceforusescapesthedirectgraspofoursensesandimagination,andisapureobjectoftheintellect,sincetheintellectaloneapprehendsbeingassuch(subrationeentis).

Observethat,iffromthestandpointofexistencesubstanceisinthingsthebeingwhichistheprimaryandimmediateobjectoftheintellect,ontheotherhandtodiscovernotonlythataparticularobjectpossessesasubstance,butalsoinwhatthatsubstanceconsists,orwhatisitsnature,weareobhgedtotakeourstanduponthatwhichrevealsthisnaturetooursenses,namelytheoperations,phenomena,oraccidents,ofthesubstance.Inthissenseweknowthesubstancebytheaccidents.


ACCroENT

Considernowsuchthingsasthelaughter,movement,sorrow,joy,colour,etc.,whichIperceiveinPeter,andwhichmakePeterexistincertainaspects.Thesethingsarecapableofexistence.Buttheyobviouslydonotexistafterthesamefashionassubstance.Toexisttheymustbelongtoanotherbeingpreviouslyexisting.^Theyexistassomethingwhichbelongstoabeingorsubjectalreadyinexistence.Inthissensewesaythattheyexistinsomethingotherthanthemselves.-

ConclusionXVI.—Anaccidentisanatureoressencewhosepropertyistoexistinsomethingelse.

1Previously—ifnotintheorderoftime,atleastintheorderofnature.

2Theaccidentofwhichwearesp>eakingisthepredicamentalaccidentwhichiscontrastedwiththesubstance.Thetermaccident,whenitiscontrastedwithpropertyandsignifiesapredicatenotderivedfromtheessence(thepredicableaccident)hasanothermeaning.

Ifwearethinkingofthepredicamentalaccident,orofthecontrastbetweensubstanceandaccident(acontrastbetweenrealbeings),wemaysaythattheattributerelatestoanaccident(theintellectinvirtueofwhichamaniscapableoflaughterisanaccidentreallydistinctfromthesubstance).If,ontheotherhand,wearethinkingofthepredicableaccident,thatistosay,ofthecontrastbetweenthoseunrealbeingsoflogic(thepredicables),genus,species,specificdifference,property,andaccident,itdenotesnotanaccidentbutaproperty,anattributepredicatedofthesubject,notassomethingwhichhelpstoconstitutehisspecificessence,butasarisingnecessarilyfromit.

Conversely,ifweareconsideringthepredicamentalaccident,wemustsaythattheindividuatingcharacteristics(thepossessionofaparticulartemperament,orheredity)belong,radicallyatleast,tothesubstantial,nottotheaccidentalorder.If,ontheotherhand,weareconsideringthepredicableaccident,wemustsaythatthesecharacteristicsareaccidents(attributespredicatedofthesubject,neitherashelpingtoconstitutethespecificessencenorasderivedfromit).


Itfollowsthatthoughanaccidentpartakes,indeed,ofbeing,itdoesnotexistasabeing;itisessentiallyofabeing,ensentis,andcapableofexistenceonlyasthecomplementorperfectionofabeing.Thusthewordbeingispredicableoftheaccidentonlyinasecondaryandindirectsense,andwhereasbeingintheprimarysenseofthetermisfromthestandpointofexistencethesubjectofaction,sothatourintellectapprehendsimmediatelyandofitselfthesubjectofaction,thesubstance,thatwhichexistsinitself,wefinditdifficulttoarriveataclearunderstandingoftheaccident.Tosucceedweareobligedtoelaborateournotionofbeing,tomakeitmorepliable,planeitdown,bindittothereal,inshort,toapprehendtheaccidentbyanalogywiththesubstancewhichiscontrastedwithit.

Themerefactthatthetermaccidentisasubstantiveinvolvesusinthedangerofregardingtheaccidentasasubstance,apieceofsubstanceorareducedsubstance.Theimaginationintervenes,andwedepicttoourselvesaccidentsandphenomenaasfragmentsofmatterinlaidinthesuppositum,likeacasingofmosaicormarquetry.Thoseforwhomthewordsaccidentorphenomenonevokeimagesofthiskindmissthenotionofaccidentaltogether.Theyconceiveinfactonlypseudo-substancesandareincapableofadvancingastepfurtherinphilosophy.Anoriginaleffortoftheintellectelaboratingthenotionofbeingisherethesoleremedy.

Itisobviousthatthingssuchasanactofthoughtoramovementofemotioncannotbeconfusedwithoursubstance,becausetheycomeandgo,andchangewithinus,whereasoursubstanceneverceasesor


changes,beingassuchimmutablesolongasweexist.Neverthelessthesethingsarerealitieswhichaffectusintrinsically.Theyare,therefore,reallydistinctfromthesubstanceinwhichtheyexistor,intechnicallanguage,inhere.Therearethuscontingentaccidents(suchthatthesubjectcanexistwithoutthem)realandreallydistinctfromthesubstance.

Butifchange,byshowingthatthereareinasubjectthingswhichcomeandgo,helpsustoarriveatthenotionofaccident,itisveryfarfrombeinganecessaryattributepossessedbyeveryaccident.Therearethingswithoutwhichasubjectcannotexist,andwhichneverthelessareaccidents,additionalbeingswhichcompletethesubstance;ourunderstandingitself,forexample,andourwillare

evidentlysomethingrealinus.Buttheycannotbeconfusedwithoursubstance.Forwepossessadistinctnotionofthemwhollyextrinsictothatofsubstance,^whichwouldbeimpossibleiftheywerenotessentiallydifferentfromthelatter.*Thereforetheunderstandingandthe

1Wedistinctlyconceivetheunderstandingorintellectasafacultyofknowingwhoseobjectisbeing,thewillasafacultyofconationwhoseobjectisthegood,substanceasanatureoressencewhosespecificpropertyisself-subsistence.Thethreeconceptsfallwhollyoutsideeachother.

2Weareabletoreasoninthiswaybecausewearedealingwiththingsproportionatetoourintellect,whichapprehendsthembyaproperanddistinctconcept(thingswhichare,wesay,knownbytheiressence).Insuchcases,iftwoconceptsarewhollyexternaltoeachother,itisbecausethethingstheypiesenttothemindreallydifferonefromtheother.Otherwiseourintellectwoulddeceiveus.Itisinthiswaythatweprovethatquantityorextensionisanaccidentreallydistinctfromcorporealsubstance,andthatineverycreatedthingtheessenceisreallydistinctfromtheexistence.(OnthelatterpointseeJohnofSt.Thomas,CursusPhil.,Phil.Nat.,q.7,a.4.)When,however,thedistinctionisduetothestandpointfromwhichthemind


willarerealthingsinusdistinctfromoursubstance,consequentlyaccidents(belongingasweshallseelatertothecategoryofquality).Thereare,therefore,necessaryaccidents(withoutwhichthesubjectcannotexist)realandreallydistinctfromthesubstance.

Thedifferentschoolswhichprofessconflictingdoctrinesontheproblemofsubstancemayberepresentedroughlybythefollowingscheme:

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.ThomasThereareasmanysubstancesasthereareindividuals.Invirtueofitssubstanceeachofthesepossessesprimarybeing,butthereareineachrealaccidentsreallydistinctfromthesubstance.

SubstantialistsPhenomenalists

TherearenorealacciThereisnosubstance;

dentsreallydistinctfromtheaccidentswhichare

thesubstance,whichistheapparenttothesensesor

solereality.theconsciousness(pheno—

Descartes,Leibniz,andmena)arethesolereality,

especiallySpinoza.TheEnglishsensationalists—

Germanpantheistsoftheneo-Kantianschool.Philo—

nineteenthcentury.sophyofpurebecoming.

Descartesdeniedtheexistenceofrealaccidentsreallydistinctfromthesubstance.Heidentifiedcorporealsubstancewithextensionandthesubstanceofthesoulwiththeactofthought.Hethusset

viewsthesameobjectwehaveindeedtwodistinctconcepts,butnotwhollyexternalonetotheother.Forexample,IdistinguishinPeterhisbeingamanandhisbeingananimal,thoughinrealitytheyareoneandthesamebeing.Buttheconceptman,farfrombeingexternaltotheconceptanimal,imphesitonthecontrary.


philosophyonapathwhichcouldonlyleadtopantheism(foriftherearenoaccidentsdistinctfromsubstance,everysubstanceisitsaction—aperfectionwhichbelongstoGodalone—andtheconceptof,substancebecomesidenticalwiththatofabsoluteBeingorGod,withwhomeverythingisthusconfused),orifpantheismistobeavoided,tothedenialofsubstance,whichsuchaphilosophywilldoitsutmosttodisproveandtobanishfromthehumanintellect.

SpinozaerectedontheCartesianfoundationamonismorabsolutepantheismfromwhichLeibnizattemptedinvaintoescapebysubstitutingforthesinglesubstanceofSpinozaaninfinitemultitudeofindividualsubstances(monads),thusineffectreplacingSpinoza'sGodbyaboundlesshostofdeities.Thoughtheyrejectedthenotionofsubstance,forwhichtheysubstitutedthatofbecomingorevolution,andregardedthething-in-itselfnotasanobjectwhichimposesitselfonthemindbutasabackgroundofthemindwhichproducedtheobject,theGermanmetaphysiciansinthesuccessionofKant(Fichte,Schelling,Hegel)mayberankedamongtheexponentsofpantheisticsubstantialismsince

theypositedasingleprinciplewhichconstitutesbyitsdevelopmentthestuffandrealityofallthings.

InthephenomenalistcamptheEnglishsensationalistsandassociationalistsmaintainedthatstatesofconsciousness(sensations,emotions,ideas,etc.)arethesolerealityaccessibletous,andattemptedtoreducethewholeofpsychologytothemutualassociationofthesestatesofconsciousness.Thephilosophersofpurebecoming(Bergson,inparticular,whothusjoinshandswith


Heraclitusoveragulfoftwenty-fivecenturies)denytheexistenceofanythingpermanentinthings,andmaintainthatchangewithoutanysubjectofchangeisthesolereality.(Inpsychologythesephilosophersareopposedtotheformxrgroupinasmuchastheysubstitute"acontinuousstreamofconsciousness"(W.James)foramosaicor"host"ofstatesofconsciousness.Buttheyareagreedinrejectingthenotionofsubstance.)

Kant(eighteenthcentury)substitutedforthedistinctionbetweensubstanceandaccidentsinthings(substanceandaccidentsbeingequallyobjectsofknowledge,theformerbymeansofthesecond)ânoppositionoftwoseparateworlds,theworldofthingsastheyareinthemselves{things-in-thernselves,noumena)andtheworldofphenomenamanufacturedbyourmind.Heregardedthething-in-itselfaswhollyunknowable,thoughheaffirmeditsexistence.Thisthing-in-itself,soughtnowinthesubjectofknowledge,becameallinalltotheGermanpantheistsofthenineteenthcentury.RenouvierandtheFrenchneo-Kantians,onthecontrary,taughtthatthething-in-itself,thesubstance,isnotmerelyunknowablebutabsolutelynon-existent,andtheconceptofitchimerical.

ThevariousphenomenaHstphilosophersjustmentionedfailedtoperceivethatwhattheyreallydenyistheaccident,notthesubstance.Whattheyunderstoodhyphenomenaisamerepseudo-substanceexpressedbyaconceptashamedofitselfandself-contradictory,asubstancepulverised,melteddown,emptiedofrealsubsistence,somethingwhichisnotaccident,but

1Seeabove,p.226.232


beingofabeingsthepurecomplementofbeing,andinconceivableexceptas

correlatedwithsubstance.Sincetheyhaveneverreallyunderstoodwhatismeantbysubstance,andposit,undertheappellationofphenomena,pseudo-substances,theyquitenaturallyrefusetoadmitanothersubstancebehindthesepseudo-substancesoftheirimagination.

THEINDIVIDUALITYOFSUBSTANCE

Thebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectfromthestandpointofexistence(thesubstance)issomethingindividual.Theintellectindeedapprehendsitasindividual,foritapprehendsthebeingofthingsonlybyturningtothesensationsandimageswhichrevealthingstousundertheconditionsoftheirexistenceandintheirindividuality.Moreover,thatalonecanreallyexistwhichisbynatureacompletelycircumscribedandself-containedunit,oranindividual,

[a)Ourintellect,itistrue,canhavenodirectknowledgeofthissubstanceinitsindividuaUty;itsimplyknows,byturningtotheimagesfromwhichitderivesitsideas,thatthissubstanceisindividual,itdoesnotknowinwhatitsindividuahtyconsists;Peter'ssubstanceisdirectlyrevealedtoitonlybyauniversalidea.Peter'ssubstancethusperceived,inabstractionfromhisindividuality,issimplyPeter'snatureapprehendedinthecharacterswhichconstitutehisessence,strictlyspeaking.Andsincewesayofmanthathemoves,laughs,possessesunderstandingandwill,etc.,aswesayit(primarilyandinthefirstplace)ofPeterorPaul—sinceinconsequencethepropertyofexistingbeneaththeaccidents,whichstrictlybelongs


tothesubjectandhisindividualnature,isthencetransferredtothenatureofthesubjectstrippedofitsindividuaHtybyabstraction—weshallalsogivethenameofsubstance,thoughinasecondarysense(substantiasecunda),toPeter'snature,asapprehendedinabstractionfromhisindividuality,thatistosay,theuniversalessencemanorhumanity.Ontheotherhand,bysubstanceintheprimarysense{substantiaprima),weshallunderstandtheindividualsubstance.^

ItisnowclearthatwhenweconsiderthebeingprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellectinmaterialthingswestresseithertheindividualbeingortheuniversalbeingaccordingasweconsiderthisbeingprimarilyapprehendedinrelationtoexistenceorinrelationtointelligibiUty.

Inrelationtointelligibilitythebeingprimarilyapprehendedinthingsbytheintellectistheessence,strictlyspeaking,whichinitselfisnotindividualandexistsinthemindinaconditionofuniversaHty;anditisonlyinanimpropersensethatthetermessenceisusedoftheessenceindividuatedbytheindividualmatter(thatis,oftheindividualnature).

Inrelationtoexistence,onthecontrary,thebeingprimarilyapprehendedinthingsbytheintellectis

1IntheAristotelianandScholasticvocabularythetermsubstantiaprima,ovaiairpLbrrj,denotes(seeabovenote)theindividualnatureofthesubjectofactionwithoutdeterminingwhetherornoitisterminatedbysubsistence.Usuallyindeeditdoesinfactdenotetheterminatednature,orsubjectofaction,thehocaliquid.Itdoesnot,however,denoteformallythesubjectofactiontakenassuchandcontrastedwiththe(non-terminated)nature.Thatfunctionbelongstothetermssuppositwnandpersona{vw6(rra.<n$).

Remarkthatthedistinctionbetweenthesubjectofactionandthenature(non-terminatedbythesubsistence)isinthemainduetotheSchoolmen.Aristotlehimselfdidnotmakeitexplicitly.


theindividualsubstance/anditisinasecondarysensethatthetermsubstanceisusedofthenaturestrippedofitsindividualitybyabstraction(thatis,oftheessenceinthestrictsense).*

Herewemaycalltomindwhatwassaidabove'abouttheindividualnature.Weseeatoncehowweshouldclassifythedifferentconceptswithwhichwehavemadeacquaintancehitherto.*

what{primarilyasintelli-ithegible{essenceintheJsub-strictsense)andin|jectjvirtueofwhichit\thatwhichis:isexists

essenceinthe-;-primarilyascomplete-n

widesenselycircumscribed{individualnature)andinvirtueofwhichitexistsassuch\^<Aa<u)AicAprimarilyis:theprimarysubjectofaction{suppositum,person)J

existence

inaparticularrespect:accident

absolutely:substantia^secunda

'substarue

substantiaprima

actofbeing:

1Takenpreciselyasthatinvirtueofwhichthesubjectpossessesitsfirstbeing,thesubstance,substantiaprima,isthesubject'sindividualnature.Wesaidabove(p.214)thatthatinvirtueofwhichathingissusceptibleofexistenceistheuniversalessence,thereasonbeingthatwewerethenconsideringpreciselywhatisthegroundonwhichathingissusceptibleofexistence,incontrastwiththatwhichismerelyaconditionorstateinwhichitmustbeinordertoexist.Here,however,wearedealingwiththatinwhichtheexistenceofthethingconsideredpreciselyasinthestatenecessaryinordertoexistisgrounded,andthisisnottheuniversalessence,buttheindividualnatureofthesubject.

2Henceintheorderofpurespiritsandtherealone(wherenodistinctionexistsbetweentheindividualnatureandtheessence,seeabovep.211,n.3;p.213,n.2),thesubstanceintheprimarysenseofthewordisalsotheessence,strictlyspeaking.Inthematerialorder,ontheotherhand,substanceintheprimarysenseofthewordisthesubject'sindividualnature,anditisonJyinasecondarysensethattheessence,strictlyspeaking,iscalledsubstarue,'Seepage209.

*Thequodandthequo.Wehavealreadyobserved(seeabove,p.200,note1)thattheessencetakenintheconcreteorasattributed


(b)Perse,ase,inse.Wehavedefinedsubstanceasathingwhosepropertyitistoexistbyitself(perse)orinitself(inse).Wemustdeterminecarefullytheexactsenseoftheseexpressions.

Athingissaidtoexistinitself{inse)whenitdoesnotexistaspartofawholepreviouslyexisting,but

tothething{whatathingprimarilyisasintelligible)isnotpresentedtothemindinitspurity;itisinfactpresentedtothemindtogetherwiththethingorsubjectwhichitdetermines.Topossessitinitspurity,itmustbeconceivedseparately,withoutthethingorsubjectitdetermines,asforinstancewhenwespeakofhumanityor,toforcelanguage,ofthebeingman,theentityman.Inthatcaseitmustbedefinedasthatinvirtueofwhichathingprimarilyiswhatitisasintelligible,or,inotherwords,thatinvirtueofwhichathingisconstitutedinaparticulardegfeeofbeingprimarilyintelligible.Forthisreasonitwillhebettertosubstituteinoursynopsesforthetermwhatthephrasethatinvirtueofwhich.Sowefinallygetthefollowingtable:

INTELLIGIBILITY

BEING^

.thatin

virtueof

which

{idquo)

thatwhichis:whatheprimar

essenceinthejilyisascomplete—

widesenselycircumscribed

(essenceindividuatedbymatter,theindividualnature)thatwhichprimarilyexists:suppositum,person{idquod)actofbeing:thatinvirtueofwhich{idquo)athingisoutsidenothingnessoritscauses:existence

Peterexistsandis/inaparticularrespect:

whatheprimar-Jwhitenessaccident

ilyisasintelli-j

gible{esseruein|âbsolutely:

thestrictsense)humanity..substantia^

Peterexistsandis^secunda

Peter'sindivi-^dualnature

substance

ysubsiantiaprima

Peter

EXISTENCE

Thedistinctionbetweenthequodandthe^moplaysapartofthefirstimportanceinthemetaphysicalanalysisofthings.


itselfconstitutesthewholewhichexists.InthissensePeterexistsinhimself.

Athingissaidtoexistbyitselforinvirtueofitself(^^rse),whenitisbroughtintoexistenceinvirtueofitself,orofitsownnature(bythecausesonwhichitdepends,ifitisacreatednature).InthissensePeterexistsj&^rse.^

Philosophymakesfrequentuseofthisexpression,perse.Italwaysmeansinvirtueofitself,invirtueofitsownessence[persuamessentiam)—whetherthequalityunderconsiderationformspartoftheessenceofthethingornecessarilyresultsfromitasitsprinciple(inwhichcaseperseisopposedtoperaccidens)ôrwhetherwemerelywishtostatethattheattributeunderconsiderationimmediatelypertainstothethingwhichdoesnotreceiveitthroughtheintermediaryofanythingotherthanitsownessence(inwhichcaseperseisopposedtoperaliud).Itisinthissensethatthesubjectofactionexistsperse,whereastheaccidentexistsperaliud.

Buttheexpressionpersedoesnotmeaninvirtueofitselforofitsownnatureastheabsolutelyfirstprincipleorasthecompleteandultimateexplanation.Thisissomethingtotallydifferent,whichisexpressedbythephrasease,oforfromitself(asopposedtoabalio).Thatwhichisaseisevidentlyperse,butthat

whichisperseisnot

Êxistenceperseorinsecan,wehavealreadyseen(seepp.218,223),beascribed,asitisunderstoodinamoreorlessstrictsense,eithertosubstanceingeneral(thatwhichexistsperseandinsecontainsinitselfwhateverisnecessaryinordertoreceiveexistenceandisnotpartofapreviouslyexistentwhole)orexclusivelytothesubjectofaction{suppositumorperson,whichcontainsinitselfeverythingnecessaryinordertoreceiveexistence,andexistsinnorespectaspartofawhole).

*Forexample,Peterispersealive,endowedwithintellect,andthefacultyoflaughter,theartistisperseonewhofashionsobjects.ButPeterisperaccidensasuffererfrominfluenzaortheheirtoalargefortune,theartistperacciderucelibateormarried,etc.


byanymeansforthatreasonase.Thatwhichexistsaseorfromitself,possessinginitselftheentireexplanationofitsexistence,isuncaused;Godaloneisfromhimself,ase.Createdsubstancesonthecontrary[createdsubjectsofaction)arecaused;theyexistperse,invirtueoftheiressence;theydonotexistase.Intheirownnaturetheypossesseverythingnecessarytoreceiveexistence,butnottopossessanexistencenotreceivedfromwithout.Theyaresufficientbythemselvestoexist,inthestrictlyqualifiedsensethattheydonotexistassomethingwhichbelongstosomethingelse,but,absolutelyspeaking,theyarebynomeansasufficientgroundoftheirownexistence.Thatwhichisasecannotceasetoexist;thatwhichispersewithoutbeingasecanloseitsexistence.

Thedistinctionbetweenthatwhichexistsaseandthatwhichexistsperseisperfectlyclear.Neverthelesscertainphilosophershavelostsightofit,notablySpinoza,whoascribesaseity[a-se-itas)toeverysubstance.(Fromwhichitfollowsimmediatelythatthereisonlyonesubstance,andthateverythingisGod—monismandpantheism).WhenindeedSpinozadefinessubstanceasthatwhichisinitselfandisconceivedbyitselfhereallymeans,asthecontextshows,^thatwhichtobeandtobeconceivedneedsabsolutelynothingexceptitselfDescarteshadalreadydefinedsubstanceambiguouslyasresquaeitaexsistitutnullaaliareindigeatadexsistendum,athingwhichexistsinsuchafashionthatithasneedofnothingelseinordertoexist.'

1Cf.Ethics,i,7."PrincipiaPhilosophiae,i,51.

ONTOLOGY:ACTANDPOTENTIALITY

Whenwestudiedbeingfirstfromthestandpointofintelligibility,thenfi-omthatofexistence,wesawthattheobjectprimarilyapprehendedbytheintellect,beingintheprimarysenseoftheterm,wasintheformercasewhatwecallessence,inthelatterwhatwecallsubstance.

Wemustnowconsiderthebeingofthings(understandingthetermbeinginitsmostgeneralandindeterminatesense)fromthestandpointofaction,inreferencetothemannerinwhichthingsbehaveinreality,or,ifyouprefer,inreferencetowhattheydo.Thisnewstandpointacquaintsuswithathirdprimarysenseofthetermbeing.

(a)Whatisthefirsttruthwhichtheintellectgraspsassoonasithasformedthenotionofbeing?Itissufficienttoconsiderthenotiontoseeatoncethatwhatis,is(principleofidentity),oragainthatwhatis,cannotnotbeatthesametimeandinthesamerelation(principleofnon-contradiction).Thatistosay,thateverythingiswhatitis,thatitisnotwhatitisnot,andthatitiseverythingthatitis.

Wewillnowconsiderwhatthingsdo,whatistheirnaturalbehaviour,whatistheprimaryfactofexperiencegraspedbythesensesandconsciousness.Thingschange.Thearrowflies,theanimalruns,whatwas

239


coldbecomeshotundertheactionoffire,foodbecomesflesh,whatwasUvingdies,andeveryspringthatwhichhadnobeingcomesintoexistence.

Although,likeallourprimarynotions,itisverydifficulttoexplainscientifically,everybodyknowsbyexperienceinwhatthisgreatfactofchangeormotionconsists.¥/emaysaythatwhereverthereischangethereisatransition(fromonebeingtoanother,orfromonemodeofbeingtoanother).Andfortransitiontoexist,theremustbesomethingwhichundergoesit,somethingwhichisthesubjectofchange,forexampleasubjectwhichceasestobeinaparticularplaceoraparticularthing{terminusaquo,thearrowpressedtothebow,thefood,the

seed),tobeinanotherplaceoranotherthing{terminusadquern,thearrowinthetarget,flesh,thematureplant).

Thereisnochangewithoutasubjectwhi:hischanged,andwhichmustbesomeparticularthingbeforethechangeiseffected^—inotherwordsbeingispriortochange.

Those,indeed,whomaintainthatchangeispriortobeing,andthatthereischangewithoutasubjectwhichischangedandwhichissomeparticularthingbeforethechangeiseffected,denytheprincipleofidentityandfallintoabsurdity.Forwhentheytakeupthisposition,theymusteithercontinuetoacceptthenotionofbeing,inwhichcasetoaffirmthatthereischangewithoutasubjectofchange,orthatchangeispriortobeing,istoaffirmthatwhathasnobeing

1Forexample,inasubstantialchangethefirstmatter,whichisnotabeing,butpotentialbeing,isthesubjectwhichischangedandconstitutesaparticularbody,orparticularbeing,byitsunionwithaparticularsubstantialform,beforeitconstitutessomeotherbodybyitsunionwithanothersubstantialform.

ontology:actandpotentiality

changes,whichismanifestlyabsurd;ortheymustrejectthenotionofbeingasillusoryandarguethatinsteadofconceivingbeingwemustconceivechange,inwhichcasetheymustrejectasfalse,togetherwiththenotionofbeing,theprincipleofidentitywhichisboundupwithit,andmaintainthatthoughtisessentiallydeceptive,whichisequallyabsurd.

Weare,therefore,absolutelyobligedtoholdthatbeingispriortochange,andthatthereisnochangewithoutasubjectwhichischanged,andwhichissomeparticularthingbeforeitchanges;or,inthelanguageofphilosophy,thatthereisnomotionwithoutasubjectwhichismoved.

(b)Wewillnowturnawayfromexperienceandeverysensiblerepresentationandattempttoconsiderchangewithourintellect,thatistosay,intermsofbeing,theformalobjectofthelatter.Weshallinquirehoworinwhatrespectthestarting-pointofchangecanthusbecomethegoal.Youwillanswer,perhaps,thatitisaccordingasitisthisorthat,inrespectofwhatitis,thatthestarting-pointbecomesthegoal.Butthestarting-pointisnothingbutwhatitis,andisalreadyeverythingthatitis,andthereforeinthisrespectisincapableofbecoming,forit

alreadyis.Youmaythensaythatitisaccordingasitisnotthisorthat,inrespectofwhatitisnot,thatthestarting-pointbecomesthegoal.Butinrespectofwhatitisnot,thethingisnothingwhatever,ispurenothing,andthereforecannotbethesourceoftheproductofchange.Itisincapableofbecoming,foritsimplyisnot.

Hencethestarting-pointofchangecannotbecomeitsgoal—eitherinrespectofwhatitisorinrespect


ofwhatitisnot.Inotherwords,thenewbeingwhichistheproductofchangecanbederivedneitherfromthebeingwhichakeadyexists,norfromanothing,whichhasnoexistencewhatever.Ischange,therefore,impossible,asParmenidesmaintained?Andareweobligedwithhimtodenytheevidenceofoursenses,whichwitnessestothefactofchange?

{c)No.Butweareobligedtodevelopandexploreourideaofbeing.Evidentlyintheanalysiswehavejustmadesomethinghasbeenleftout.Thestarting-pointofchangeisnodoubtalreadyeverythingwhichitis,butitisnotyetallwhichitcanbe;itisnotyetthatparticularthingitisdestinedtobecome,butitpossessesthemeanstobeit,itcanbeit.Thereforebetweenbeingandnotbeingthereisthepowerofbeing.Itisneitherinrespectofwhatitis,norinrespectofwhatitisnot,butinrespectofwhatitcanbethatthestarting-pointofchangebecomesitsgoal.

Thearrowishere{onthebow,forinstance)andfromthestandpointofbeingpureandsimple,itisnowhereelse;butitcanbethere{atthegoal,forexample),andpossessesthemeanstobethere.Breadisbreadandnothingbutbread,andnotflesh,sofarasitis,inthesenseofbeingpureandsimple,thatistosay,ofbeingcompletelyrealised;butitcanceasetobebreadandbecomeflesh.Thereisinitthatwhichenablesittoundergothechangeundertheactionofcertaindeterminatecauses.

POTENCYORPOTENTIALITY

Thingsthereforearenotconfinedandheldfastbywhattheyareandwhattheyarenot.Evenwhile


theyarehereandnotthere,thisandnotthat,theypossessthepowertobethereandnolongerhere,thatandnolongerthis.Butsolongastheyarehereorarethis,thatpowerwhichtheypossessremainsmerepowerandisnotmanifested.

Thispowerinthemisassuchsomethingreal.Consideramanasleep.Heneitherseesnorspeaksnorwalks.ButheisnotthereforebUnd,paralysed,ordumb.Heisreallycapableofseeing,speaking,andwalking.Whilehedoesnotspeakheretainsthepowertospeak,hehasitinhim;whereashecannotwithoutaviolationofnaturebecomeatreeorabird.Oragaintakeabilliardballatrest.Itisimmobile(notmoving).Butitisnotthereforeimmovable.Itisreallycapableofmotion.Whileitdoesnotmove,itretainsthepowerofbeingmoved,ithasitinitself;whereasithasnonaturalpowerofpassingthroughawall.Thepowerofbeingisnotbeinginthefullandprimarysenseoftheterm;butpowerofbeingwithoutasyetbeingisnotsheernonentity.Powerofbeingtakenpreciselyassuchisirreducibleeithertononentityortobeingpureandsimple.Itissomethingdifferentfromeither,somethingsuigenerisforwhichphilosophymustfindaplace.Preciselysofarasthingscanbesomethingtheyarenot,they,afteraninferiorfashion,are.

Wehavethusfoundsomethingwhichdoesnotdeservetobecalledbeing,onwhichthattitlecanbebestowedonlyinasecondaryandimpropersense,asanalms,sotospeak,butwhichneverthelessisreal.Itiswhatphilosopherstermpotencyorpotentiality.

Inusingthetermpotencywemustbeonourguardagainstambiguity.Thispotencyisnotthatofwhich


wethinkwhenwesaythatabeingispotent.Thispotencyisnotanactivepower;powertoeffectsomethingortowork,atleastwhenunderstoodasactive,istheabsolutecontraryofthepowerorpotencywithwhichwearenowconcerned,beingnotpotencybutact.Thepotencyofwhichwearespeakingisentirelypassive,nothingmorethanarealpowerofbeingorbecoming.Waxisinpotencytoreceivetheimpressoftheseal,waterinpotencytobecomeiceorvapour.Theactivepowers(forinstance,thefacultiesofthesoul)arealsorightlytermedpotenciesorpotentialities^butonlyinsofarastheyarenot,orarecapableof

notbeing,actuallyoperative,orsofarastheyaresimplecapacitiesofactionoroperation.

ACT

Since,however,powerofbeing,thoughnotnothing,isnotbeinginthefullandprimarysenseoftheterm,wemustfindanameforbeinginthefullandprimarysenseofthetermasdistinguishedfrompotentiality.Philosopherscallitact.

Herealsowemustbewareofambiguity.Wearenotconcerned,atleastnotprimarilyandchiefly,withanactintheordinarysenseoftheword,withdoingoraction.Actionoroperationisindeedanact,beinginact,butitiswhatistermedthesecondaryact[actusoperationis).Actionpresupposesbeing.Andtheprimaryactistheactofbeing[actiisexsistentiae),moreoverofbeingaparticularthing{actusessentiae).Forexample,abodyisluminousinact,evenwhenitisnotilluminatinganythingelse.Clay,oncemodelled,isastatueinact,waterat32°Fahrenheitisiceinact,


andthemomentanythingeffectivelyisonethingoranotherandespeciallythemomentanythingexists,itisinact.

Actmaythereforebedefinedasbeinginthestrictsenseoftheterm,takeninthefullnessthussignified,oragainthefinished,thedeterminate,ortheperfectassuch.Potentiality,ontheotherhand,isthedeterminable,theperfectible,thatwhichiscapableofbeingfinished,assuch;notabeingbutarealpowerofbeing.

WemusttakecarenottoattempttothinkwithourimaginationtheseconceptsofactandpotentiaUty.Theycanbethoughtbytheintellectalone.LeastofallmustweconceiveofpotentiaUtyassomesortofbeinginactwhichweimagineasmoreorlesshazy,indefinite,inactive,andhiddenintheobject.PotentiaUtyinitselfisabsolutelyincapableofbeingrepresented.Itisnotaspringoranorganhiddeninthething,noracharacterprefiguredinitafterthefashionofanimaginarystatueoutUnedbeforehandbytheveinsofmarblewithintheblock,noryetanactthwartedorrenderedabortive,likeaneffortorpressureovercomebytheresistanceofanobstacle.Itisabsolutelynothingdoneorinprocessofdoing,absolutelynothinginact.Initselfitcannotbeconceived(forinthatcase

itwouldnecessarilybeconceivedassomethingdeterminate).Itcanbeconceivedonlybymeansoftheact(theparticularthing)withwhichitiscorrelated,asthesimplepowerofbeingthatparticularthing.

ConclusionXVII.—Being,consideredinrelationtothefullnessandperfectionwhichtheterm


signifies,isdividedintobeinginthestrictsenseoract,andpowerofbeingorpotentiality.

Wearenowinapositiontounderstandchange.Theproductofchangearisesneitheroutofbeinginactnoroutofnothing,butfrompotentialbeing.Inotherwords,theactionoftheefficientcausedraws,educes,fromthepotentialityofthesubjectthedetermination,theform,whichwaswantinginthestarting-pointofthechangeandcharacterisesitsgoal,aswhentheactionoffireeducesfromthepotentialityofwater(thewateriscold,butcanbehot)thedetermination(aspecificintensityofheat)whichcharacterisesitastheresultofthechange.Thechangeisthetransitionfrompotentialitytoact,or,moreaccurately,accordingtoadefinitiontowhichwemustreturnlater,itistheactofathinginpotentialitytakenpreciselyinrespectofitspotentiality:actusexsistentisinpotentiaproutinpotentia.

ACTANDPOTENTIALITYINTHINGS

Fromwhathasbeensaiditfollowsthatallchangeablethings,inwhateverrespecttheyaresubjecttochange,arecompoundedofpotentialityandact.Godalone,sinceheisabsolutelyunchangeable,isdevoidofanypotentiality.SinceheissubsistentBeingitselfortheFullnessofbeing,heisincapableofbecoming;thereisnoperfectionwhichhedoesnotpossessorratherisnotalready;heispureact.

Thebeingofallotherthings,onthecontrary,istoopoorandtooweaktoreaUsesimultaneouslyeverythingtheyarecapableofbeing.Foreveryoneofthemthereisreallyopenavastrangeofpossibilities,


ofwhichtheycanneverrezilisemorethanafew,andthatbychanging.

Herewemayobservethattheobscureandmysteriousconceptoffirstmatterwhoseacquaintancewemadewhenwestudiedthenotionofindividualnatureisthatofapurepotentialityintheorderofsubstance,whichcanbeanyandeverybodyandbyitselfisnone.Itisthepurelypotentialprinciplewhichinunionwithanactualprinciple(asubstantialform)constitutesaparticularcorporealsubstance,andisthesubjectofsubstantialchanges.

Potentialityandactdividebetweenthemthetotalityofcreatedbeing,bothintheorderofsubstanceandintheorderofaccidents.Inotherwords,theyare,likebeingitself,transcendentalobjectsofthoughtwhichexceedortranscendeverylimitationofclassorcategory,andincludeallcreatedthings.Thesubstanceofbodiesiscompoundedofpotentiality{firstmatter)andact[substantialform).Thesubstanceofincorporealthings[purespirits)isnotcomposite;itisinrespectofthatwhichconstitutesitsnatureoressencewhollyact.Butitisnotthereforepureact(inthecaseofpurecreatedspirits),forthissubstance{substantialessence)isitselfpotentialityinrelationtothatwhichistheultimateactofeverythingreal{actualitasomnisformae)orexistence:purespiritsdonotderivetheirexistencefromthemselves,ase;theycannotbe.

Ontheotherhand,wemayremarkthateveryaccident{whiteness,strength,virtue,etc.)isanact{accidentalform)whichdeterminesthesubjectandisitselfsometimesinpotentialityinrespectoffurtherdeterminations.Theintellect,forexample,isan


accident(anaccidentalform)whosesubjectisthesoul,anditisinpotentialityinrespectofaparticularactofthought.

Itisclearthatallthenotionswithwhichwehavebecomeacquaintedhithertocanbeclassifiedinthefollowingfashion:

'uncreatedbeing:God,ensase

primarilyasin-

.pureac

createdbeing\

thatwhich

isessence<inthe

wide

sense

whattelligible{esstheenceinthestrictsub-^sense)andinvir-ItnaijecttêofwhichitexistsVprimarilyascompletelycircumscribed{individualnature)andinvirtueofwhichitexistsassuchthatwhichprimarilyis:theprimarysubjectofaction{suppositum,person)j

\actofbeing:existence

inaparticularrespect:

absolutely:substantiasecunda

substantiaprima

accident{ac-\cidentalform)

substancecomposed(inthecorporealorder)ofpo-tentialityandact,anditselfactualisedbytheultimateactofeverythingreal

beii^

com'

pound

oipote

tialit

andc

Aft-erwhathasbeensaid,itissufficienttoconsiderthenotionsofpotentiality

andacttoseeimmediatelythetruthofthefollowingAxioms:

(i)Potentialitycannotexistinthepurestate,apartfromanyact.Thisisevident.For,sinceexistenceisanact,potentiahtycanonlyexistinbeingswhichareinsomeotherrespectinact.^

1Hencefirstmattercannotexistseparatelyunactualisedbysomeparticularsubstantialform.Similarlyessenceisinrelationtotheactofexistenceapotentialityreallydistinctfromexistencebutactualinvirtueofexistence.


(ii)Nothingiseducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomebeinginact.Itisplainlyimpossiblethatthatwhichisinpotentiality,thatwhichiscapableofhavingadeterminationoraperfectionbutdoesnothaveit,shouldgivetoitselfwhatitlacks,sofarasitdoesnotpossessit,thatistosay,sofarasitisinpotentiality.

(iii)Actispriortopotentiality.Aconsequenceoftheprecedingaxiom.^

(iv)Potentialityisessentiallyrelativetoactandisforthesakeoftheact[potentiadicituradactum).Itisindeedonlyinrelationtotheactthatthepotentialitycanbeconceived(onlyinrelationtobeingwhitethatwecanconceivethepowerofbeingwhite);anditisalsoonlyforthedeterminationorperfectionthatthedeterminableandtheperfectibleassuchare.

(v)Actandpotentialitybelongtothesameorder;thatistosay,bothmustbeintheorderofsubstance,orbothintheorderofaccident.ForitisevidentthateveryactwhichatthesametimecompletesandspecificallydeterminesapotentiaHtymustbelongtothesameorderasthatpotentiality.Theactivityofthought,forexample,belongstotheorderofaccidentlikethefacultyitselffromwhichitproceedsandwhichisinpotentialitytothatactivity.

(vi)Everythingactsaccordingtoitsnatureinact.

1Thisaxiomisthemetaphysicalexplanationofthetruthpreviouslyaffirmed:beingispriortobecomingorchange.Absolutelyspeakingthisistrue.Intheorderofmaterialcausalityontheotherhandpotentialityispriortoact,becomingpriortobeing,theseedpriortothetree.Buttheseeditselfpresupposesthetreewhichproduceditandatthebeginningoftheentireprocess

theactualityoftheFirstCause.


Sinceactivityisanact{actusoperationis)whichisbroughtintobeingbythesubjectfromwhichitproceedsitpresupposes(aslaiddownbyAxiomii)thatthelatterisinacttotheextenttowhichitproducesthatactivity.Thesametruthdifferentlyenunciatedisexpressedbythedictumactionoroperationmanifestsbeing{operaticsequituresse).

(vii)ThecombinationoftwobeingsinactcannotproducesomethingwhichisoneofitselfWecalloneofitself{unumperse),asopposedtoonebyaccidentâthingwhichconstitutesasinglebeingandnotaconjunctionofbeings,inotherwordsathingwhichisoneinvirtueofthenaturebywhichitexists.Forexample,alivingorganismisaunitofitself,whereasamachineorahouseisanaccidentalunit.^Thisdistinctiononceunderstood,itisplainthattwobeingsinact,andassuchconstitutingtwobeings,canneverbytheircombinationconstituteanythingexceptaconjunctionofbeings,thatistosay,anaccidentalunit.*

Oncemoreonthisquestionofactandpotentialitywefindphilosophersdividedintothreegreatschools.TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthedistinctionbetweenpotentialityandact,thepriority

1Nodoubt,ifyoudestroytheunityofthemachineorthehouse,youdestroythemachineorthehouse,butyoudonotdestroythenatures(orsubstances)ofwhichitiscomposed{iron,steel,bricks,etc.).Destroy,ontheotherhand,theunityofanorganism,youdestroyitsverynature{substance).

2Thisaxiomplaysanimportantpartinnaturalphilosophyandparticularlyinpsychology.Forinstance,theCartesianconceptionwhichregardsthesoulandthebodyasindependentofeachother,twocompletesubstances,isunabletoexplainthesubstantialunityofthehumanbeing,becausetwocompletesubstancesaretwobeingsinact.


ofacttopotentiality,therealityofmotionandbecoming,butthepriorityofbeingtomotion.ItalsoshowsthatbetweenGod(thepureact)andallthingsbesides(compoundsofpotentialityandact)thereisanabsoluteandinfinite

difference.

Exaggeratedintellectualism(Parmenides,Spinoza,Hegel)refusestoadmitthenotionofpotentiality,becausebyitselfitisobscure.If,however,everythingwhichis,iswhollyactorpureact,eithermotionmustbeunreal(Parmenides)orcontrariesidentical(Hegel)andcreaturesmustpossessthesamenatureasGod(pantheism).

Anti-intellectualism(Herachtus,Bergson)equallyrejectsthedistinctionbetweenpotentialityandact,butbecausethenotionofbeingisintheopinionofthesephilosophersillusory.If,however,beingisdeniedinfavourofbecomingorpurechange,pureactcannolongerexist;andhowevertheexponentsofthisschoolmaystruggletoescapethelogicoftheirposition,Godmustpossessthesamenatureasthings(pantheism).

ModerateIntellectualism[SchoolofAristotleandSt.Thomas)

Potentialityandactinthings.Godorthepureactisabsolutelydistinctfromcreatedthings.

ExaggeratedIntellectualismAnti-intellectualism

Nopotentialityinthings.Neitheractnorbeing.

EverythingisabsorbedEverythingisabsorbedin

eitherinpurebeing,orinchangeorpurebecoming,

thecontradictionwhichandGodisidenticalor

constitutesbecoming,andcontinuouswiththings,createdthingsareidentifiedwithGod.

Materialandformal,virtualandformal(oractual),implicitandexplicit,inaccomplishedact,inexpressact.


Inconnectionwiththenotionsofpotentialityandactphilosophersusecertainexpressionswhosemeaningmustnowbeexplained.

Wehavejustlearnedthemeaningofthetwocorrelativesinpotentialityandinact.Themarblebeforeithasbeencarvedisastatueinpotentiality;assoonasthesculptorhasgivenittheformheintends,itisastatueinact.

{a)Closelyrelatedtotheseexpressionsinpotentialityandinactaretheexpressionssofrequentlymetinphilosophymaterialandformal.Theyhavebeenborrowedfromnaturalphilosophy(cosmology)whichprovesthateverycorporealsubstanceiscompoundedoftwoprinciples,Jirstmatter(purepotentialityintheorderofsubstance)andsubstantialformorfirstact.^

Thetermsmaterialandformalhavepassedfromnaturalphilosophyintoallbranchesofphilosophy,todesignate,byanalogy,ontheonehandwhatever,initselfindeterminateandpotential,playsthepartofasubjectwhichreceivesadetermination,ontheotherhandwhateverpossessesofitselfadetermining,actualising,andspecificatoryfunction,oragainwhateveristakenaspossessingaparticularcharacter,inaparticularaspect.Itisinthissensethat,aswehavealreadyseen,^wedistinguishbetweenthematerialandformalobjectsofavirtue,science,orfaculty.

Hencearisesinparticularthedistinctionbetweenthematerialandformalstatement.Wespeakmateriallywhenwedonottakethethingsofwhichwespeakpreciselyaspossessingthecharactersdenotedbythewordsweuse;wespeakformallywheninthe

1Seeabove,pp.166-168.^Seeabove,p.106.


thingsofwhichwespeakweconsidernotsomuchthesubjectwhichpossessesthesecharactersasthecharactersthemselves,withthesharpcontourandclear-cutlinetheydescribeinit.Thisdistinctionisextremelyimportant.Formalstatementshould,indeed,betheconstantaimofphilosophy;and,ontheotherhand,manypropositionsaretrueformaliterloquendowhicharefalsematerialiterloquendo,andviceversa.Forexamplesthefollowingpropositionsaretrueunderstoodformally,butfalseifunderstoodmaterially:

Everythingwhichis,isgood(sofarasitis).

Thecommongoodisalwayspreferabletothegoodoftheindividual(providedthecommongoodisunderstoodformally,inwhichcasetheunionofthesoul

withGod,thatiswiththetranscendentcommongoodofallcreatures,istobepreferredtoeverythingelse).

Superiorsoughtalwaystobeobeyed.(Sofarastheyaresuperiors,andcommandnothingopposedtotheordersofasuperiorofhigherrank.)

Therearemenwhoarenaturalslaves.(Ifslaveisunderstoodformally,asmeaningdestinedformanualorservilework.)

Everyvirtueisstable.(Ifweconsidersolelyitsqualityofvirtue.)

Knowledgeisinfallible(sofarasitisknowledge).

Conversely,thefollowingpropositionsaretrueonlyinacertaincontext,andifunderstoodmaterially.^

*Itwouldbeofinteresttoshowhowphilosophy,sinceithasgivenupthetechnicallanguageofScholasticism,hasincreasinglytendedtousetermsinamaterialratherthanaformalsense.Henceanumberofbadlystatedproblems,andahostofmisunderstandingsbothbetween


ThispictureistheAdorationoftheMagi.

ThisbookisthephilosophyofPythagoras.

Speechhasbeengiventomantoconcealhisthoughts.

Philosophyisproud.

TheBritishConstitutionisgoodbecauseitisillogical.

{b)Wemustbecarefultodistinguishinpotentialityfromvirtual,fortheysignifyentirelydifferentthings.*Athingissaidtobevirtual,ortoexistvirtually,whenitiscontainedinanotherthingofsuperiorrank,notinitsbeingorproperdetermination(itsformality)butunderanotherbeingordetermination(anotherformahty),sothatitistrulythereaccordingtothevirtueordegreeofperfectionwhichbelongstoit,butnotformallyoractually.Inthiscase,thebeinginwhichitisfoundisnotinpotentialityinrespectofit,butonthecontraryinactaftera

higherfashion.Itssuperiorityis,sotospeak,anobstaclewhichpreventsthethingwhichitvirtuallycontainsfrombeingpresentwithitsproperandinferiordetermination(formality).

Thustheperfectionsofallcorporealobjectsexist

modernphilosophersthemselves,andstillmorebetweenthemodernphilosophersandtheancients,withtheirformalterminology.

Itmayalsobeobservedthatcertainphilosophictermsunderstoodinamaterialsense,haveacquiredameaningtotallydifferentfromtheiroriginalsignificance.Take,forexample,thetermobject.Fortheancientstheobjectmeantwhatisplacedbe/orethemindorpresentedtoit,consideredformallyassuch.Henceimaginarybeings,thechimaeraforexample,weresaidtoexistobjectivelyorasobjectspresenttothemind,butnotreallyorasthingsexistingoutsidethemind.Themodems,onthecontrary,understandbyanobjectthethingitselforthesubjectwhichispresentedtothemind,andtoexistobjectivelyisthereforethesameastoexistreallyoroutsidethemind.

1Observe,however,thattheexpressionpotentially,inpotentia,issometimesusedimproperlyinthesenseofvirtually.


virtuallyinGod,conclusionsarevirtuallycontainedinthepremisses,partiallivesexistvirtuallyinthelifeofanorganism.

{c)Wemustnowcallattentiontothefactthatthecontrastbetweenimplicitandexplicitisnottobeconfusedwiththatbetweenvirtualandformal{actual).Athingcontainedimplicitlyinanothermaybethereformallyoractually,notvirtually:butitispresentinaconfusedfashion,wrappedupandhiddenasaflowerlieshiddenandfoldedinthebud.Forexample,inthetruthPeterisamanthereisimplicitlycontainedthefurthertruthPeterisarationalanimal.

{d)Finallyathinggivenformallyandexplicitlymaybeinactintwodifferentways.Take,forinstance,amanwhoisrunningasfastashecantoescapehisenemies.IfIsayheisfleeingImentionwhatheisdoinginexpressact{inactusignato)(whatheisdoingasstressedorexpressed,sotospeak,byhisintention).If,however,IsaythatheisacceleratingtherateofhisbreathingImentionwhatheisdoingonlyinaccomplishedact{inactuexercito).

Similarly,amanwhoreadsRonsard,Lamartine,orVictorHugo,tocountthenumberoftimestheyusethewordsaimerorcherir^readsthepoets,tobesure,andreadsthemformaDyandexpUcitly,butthatisnotwhathedoesinintention.Onthecontrary,whenweconsiderhisobjectinreadingthepoets,wemustsaythatheispreparinganessayofstylometricliterarycriticism.Wemaysaythathereadsthepoetsineffectorinaccomplishedact,butthatexpresslyorinexpressactheispreparingtheessayinquestion.

Again,whenwerepeatliliaagrinonlaborantnequenent,thinkingsolelyofthemeaningofthesentence,


whatwethenknowinexpressactistheliliesofthefield,whicharepresenttoourmindasneithertoilingnorspinning.Butatthesametimeweknowinaccomplishedactthenominativeplural,lilia^whichinturnweshallknowinexpressact,ifwereturntothesentenceinquestionandsubmitittogrammaticalanalysis.

Thatistosay,thephraseinexpressact{inactusignato)isusedofthingstowhichintellectorwillaredirected,whentheyaretheobjectofaconceptoftheintellectoranintentionofthewillspeciallyformedforthem,andarethuspresentedtothemindorbroughtintobeingundertheactualheadingorontheactualgroundexpressedbytheirname.Whenonthecontrarytheyarepresentedtothemindorbroughtintobeingonoccasionofsomethingelseandwithoutbeingintendedinthemselves,wesaythattheyarepresentonlyinaccomplishedact{inactuexercito).

THEODICY(naturalTHEOLOGy)

Metaphysicsstudiesbeingassuch,butforthatveryreasonisobHgedtostudythecauseofbeing.Thatiswhyitshighestbranch,thecoping-stonesotospeakoftheentiremetaphysicaledifice,isconcernedwdthhimwhoissubsistentBeingitself.Thisbranchofmetaphysicsiscallednaturaltheology(thescienceofGodinsofarasheisaccessibletonaturalreason,or,fromanotherpointofview,sofarasheisthecauseofthingsandauthorofthenaturalorder).SinceLeibnizithasalsobeenknownbythelessappropriatenametheodicy.

LeibnizinhisTheodicy(1710)undertooktodefendDivineProvidenceagainsttheattacksofthesceptics(particularlyBayle).Thetermtheodicy

(etymologically:justificationofGod)hasbeenusedsincethattimetodenotethebranchofphilosophywhoseobjectisGod.Butthenameisobjectionableontwogrounds:firstbecausetheprovidenceofGodhasnoneedtobejustifiedbyphilosophers;secondlybecauseprovidenceandtheproblemofevilareneitherthesolenorthemostimportantquestionsofwhichnaturaltheologyhastotreat.

TheprimaryquestionsdiscussedbynaturaltheologyareobviouslythosewhichconcernGod'sexistenceitself.

FortheexistenceofGodisnotinfact,asMale-257


brancheandtheontologistsbelieved,evidenttousimmediatelyandpriortoanydiscursiveactivityofthemind;itisinvirtueofthatintellectualoperationwhichistheactivitymostprofoundlydistinctiveofman,namelyratiocination,thatitbecomesevidenttous,andtoattainthatcertaintyreasoningmustproceednotfromthemereideaornotionofperfectbeing(theontologicalargumentofSt.AnselmandDescartes)butfromfactswhoseexistenceisestablishedbeyonddispute.St.Thomas,resumingtheentiretraditionofthepast,showsbyfivedifferentargumentshowtheconclusionGodexistsisimposedwithabsolutenecessityonthehumanreason.Thereexistintheworldmotionorchange;beingsandeventsnewlybroughtintobeing;thingswhichareandarecapableofnotbeing;thingsgradedindegreesofperfection,whoseperfection,whichconsistsinbeing,ismoreorlesslimited,obscured,mingledwithimperfection;irrationalnaturesdisposedtowardsanobjectorend,asisproved,notonlybythecomplexsystemoftheuniverseorthestructureofUvingorganisms,butevenbythesimpleaptitudeofeveryagenttoproduceitsspecificoperation.Toaccountforthesevariousfactswearecompelled—forunderpainofabsurdityweareobligedtostopatanultimateexplanationofexistence—toadmitacausewhichmoveswithoutbeingmoved,causeswithoutbeingcaused,cannotlackexistence,containsinitspuritytheperfectionofwhichthingspartakeingreaterorlessdegree,possessesanintellectwhichisthefinalgroundofallnaturesandthefirstprincipleofallthings.SuchacausewetermGod;itispureact,derivingitsexistencefromitself{ase).Inotherwords,beingitselfisitsnature

THEODICY(naturalTHEOLOGY)

oressence,itissubsistentBeingitself,hewhois.Thisconclusion,whichforthe

philosopherinvolvesthemostsublimetruthsofmetaphysics,isreachedverysimplybycommonsense,foritisintruththemostfundamentalnaturaloperationofthehumanunderstanding,sothatitcanbedeniedonlybydenyingreasonitselfanditsfirstprinciples(thelawsofidentityornon-contradiction,sufficientreason,causality);andasthehistoryofphilosophyshowsonlytooplainly,themindhasnootherchoicethanbetweenthealternatives:"thetrueGodorradicalirrationality."^

ItisalsotheprovinceoftheodicytoshowwithwhatmannerofknowledgeweknowGodandinduecoursetostudyhisnatureandperfections,inparticulartheunity,simplicity,andimmutabilitywhichareimmediatelydeduciblefromtheperfectionofunderivedexistence{aseity),thefundamentalcharacterofpureact,andwhichprovemostclearlythatheisabsolutelyandessentiallydistinctfromtheworld;hisrelationswiththeworld,hisknowledge,hisactivityasCreatorandMover;andfinallytheproblemsinvolvedinthedivineforeknowledgeofcontingentevents,particularlyman'sfreeacts,andthosearisingoutoftheexistenceofevilintheuniverse.

TheschoolofAristotleandSt.ThomasteachesthatGodisknownbythenaturalreasonanalogically,sothatweperceivethedivineperfections{being,unity,goodness,wisdom,love,etc.)inthemirrorofcreatures,withoutassertinganyunityofnature,commonmeasure,orproportion,ormixtureorconfusionofanykindbetweenGodandcreatedthings.This

^Garrigou-Lagrange,Dieu.sonexistence,sanature,Paris,3rded.,1920.


teachingisopposedtotwocontraryerrors,theerroroftheagnostics,whomaintainthattheDivineBeingisbeyondthekenofourintellectandGodunknowablebythereason(sceptics;phenomenalists;positivistslikeComteandSpencer,theKantianschoolasawhole),andtheerrorofthepantheists,whoconfusetheDivineBeingwiththebeingofcreatedthings(Parmenides,Heraclitus,theStoics,Spinoza,theGermanmetaphysiciansafterLessingandKant;themodernistsandimmanentists).

PhilosophyofAristotleandSt.Thomas

Godisknownbyanalogyandisabsolutelydistinctfromcreatures.

PantheismAgnosticism

GodconfusedwithcreaGodunknowable,

tures.

THEPHILOSOPHYOFARTETHICS

Theaimofthepracticalsciencesistoknow,notforthesakeofknowing,buttoprocurebysomeactionthegoodofman(otherthanthepureactofknowingtruth).Butthegoodofmancanbeunderstoodintwodifferentsenses;eitherofthisorthatparticulargoodorofthegoodwhichisinitselfalonethegoodofmanandwhich,aswesay,determinesthesignificanceofhumanlife.

thephilosophyofart

Ofthedifferentpracticalscienceswhichareconcernedwiththegoodofmanfromthefirststandpoint(thatofparticulargoods,andnotoftheabsolutegoodofhumanhfe),none,aswehavepointedoutalready,îsaphilosophy.Fornoneoftheseproposestoregulatehumanactioninreferencetothesupremecauseinthepracticalorder,thatis(forinthepracticalordertheaimorendpursuedfulfilsthefunctionofcauseorprinciple)inreferencetothelastend(theabsolutegoodofman).

Norarethesepracticalsciencessciencesinthestrictsense,fortheydonotproceedbywayofdemonstration,drawingconclusionsfromtheirpremisses.

1Seep.149.261


Theyareratherartsthansciences,andbelongimmediatelytothewidecategoryofart,nottothatofscience.

Theessentialcharacterofarttakeninitscompleteextensionistoinstructushowtomakesomething,sothatitisconstructed,formed,orarranged,asitoughttobe,andthustosecuretheperfectionorgoodness,notofthemaker,butoftheobjectitselfwhichhemakes.Artthereforebelongstothepracticalorderinthesensethatitinstructsushowtomakesomething,consideringnottheusewe

shouldmakeofourfreewillbutthemannerinwhichtheworkassuchandinitselfshouldbeexecuted.Wemaythussaythatartisconcernedwithwhatistobeina.dc,factibile,7Tot.Y]T6v.

Thisformalcharacterofmakingisfulfilledprimarilyinthematerialobjectsproducedorfashionedbyman{thefactibileinthestrictsense).Butinawidersenseitistobefoundalsoinworksofapurelyspiritualnature.Inthiscaseitgoesbeyondthesphereofpracticeassuch,sofaraspracticeisopposedtospeculationandsignifiesanactivityotherthanthatofpureknowing.Itisinthissensethatthereismakinginthepurelyspeculativeorder(aformofargument,aproposition,areworks,butworksofthespeculativereason),andtherearearts,logic,forexample,whicharespeculativearts.

Inorder,however,toestablishageneraltheoryofartandmakingwemusthaverecoursetothehighestandmostuniversalconceptsandprinciplesofhumanknowledge.Suchatheorythereforebelongstothedomainofphilosophy.

Theprovinceofphilosophythusdefinedisindeed

THEPHILOSOPHYOFART.ETHICS

practical,sinceitisconcernedwithmaking,anditsobjectistoorderfromabovethebranchesofpracticalinstruction.Nevertheless,sinceitisinthestrictsenseascience,itcannotbeessentiallypractical,butremainsessentiallyspeculativeinvirtueofitsobjectandmethodofprocedure;moreover,itisextremelyremotefromactualpractice.Indeed,notonlyhasitnoconcernwiththeapplicationoftherulesofarttoaparticularworktobeaccomphshed,butfurtheritformulatesruleswhicharefartoogeneraltobecapableofsuchimmediateapphcationandtobecorrectlytermedrulesofartinthestrictsense;itisthereforepracticalonlyinanimpropersenseandveryimperfectly.

Theindividualartsalone(branchesofstudyessentiallypractical)possessrulessufficientlydetailedtobeimmediatelyapplicabletoaparticularwork,andtheirapphcationbelongssolelytothem.Further,withtheexceptionofthefinearts,whoseobject,beauty,beingitselfuniversalandimmaterial,enablesphilosophytoperformeffectivelythoughfromaremoteheightherofficeofsupremearbiter,theartssincetheyaredevoidofanyum'versalcharacter,exceptthefactofbeingarts,ofwhichphilosopherscantakecognizance,escapeherjurisdictionalmostcompletely.

Ifwewouldaccuratelydescribethisbranchofphilosophy,weshouldtermitthephilosophyofmaking,butweshallcallitsimplythephilosophyofart.^Here

^Thetermaesthetics,whichhasnowbecomecurrent,wouldbedoublyincorrecthere.Modernwritersunderstandbythewordthetheoryofbeautyandart,asthoughthephilosophyofartweretheplaceinwhichtotreatquestionsconcerningbeautyconsideredinitself(suchquestionsbelongtoontology),andasthoughartwereconfinedtothefinearts(amistakewhichvitiatestheentiretheoryofart).Moreover,


wemustfirstinquirewhatisthenatureofart,ifitisindeed,asSt.Thomasteaches,avirtueofthepracticalintellect,andhowitisdistinguishedontheonehandfromthespeculativevirtues{understandingoffirstprinciples^knowledge,wisdom),ontheotherfromthemoralvirtues,prudenceinparticular;howartistobesubdividedandthedifferentartsclassified;andfinallywhatarethefirstprinciplesanddistinctiveconditions—thoughsolelyofthehighestandmostgeneralorder—ofthoseartswhichhavebeautyfortheirobject(thefinearts)andwhichthusoccupyasuperiorrankamongthearts.

ETHICS

Thepracticalsciencewhichaimsatprocuringman'sunqualifiedgood,hisabsolutegood,isthatofmoralsorethics.Sinceitsdistinctiveobjectisnotthe

thewordaestheticsisderivedetymologicallyfromsensibility{aiaddvofxai.=feel),whereasart,andbeautyalso,aremattersoftheintellect,quiteasmuchasoffeeling.

Scholastictextbooksdonotusuallydevoteaseparatetreatisetothephilosophyofart,andeitherstudyitsproblemsinpsychologyalone,or,thebettertoexplaintheconceptofprudence,inethics.Itwouldbenecessarytoclassifythephilosophyofart,likeethicsitself,undernaturalphilosophy,ifwekepttothesinglestandpointofthespecificationofthesciencesbytheirformalobject.Butifweadoptthewiderstandpointoftheendtowhichthesciencesareordered,wemustdistinguishpracticalfromspeculativephilosophy,anditisequallynecessarytodistinguish,inpracticalphilosophyitself,thephilosophyofmakingandthephilosophyofdoing{cf.theauthor'sArtandScholasticism).Thistreatmentpresentsthedoubleadvantageofcorrespondingtoaverymarkedtrendofmodemthought,whichtendstodevoteaspecialtreatise(aesthetics)tothetheoryofart,andofreturningtooneofAristotle'sfundamentalclassifications:TracrabidvoiafjirpaKTLKTf)i)iroirjTLKr)7JOeuprjTiKTj{Metaph.,ii,I,1025b25).Cf.Top.,vi,6,145a15,andviii,i,157a10;Metaph.,vi,i;Nic.Eth.,vi,2,1139a27.Hamelin{op.cit.,pp.81sgq.)makesaconvincingdefenceagainstZellerofAristotle'srealopiniononthismatter.


perfectionoftheworksproducedandfashionedbymanbutthegoodandperfectionoftheagenthimself,ortheusehefreelymakesofhisfaculties,itisinthestrictsensethescienceofaction,thescienceofhumanacts(intechnicallanguage,oftheagibileorTrpaxxov,thatistosay,ofthefreeuse,sofarasitisfree,ofourfaculties).

Ethicsisaspracticalasanytruescienceinthestrictsensecanbe,foritteachesnotonlythemostgeneralrulesofremoteapplication,butalsotheparticularrulesapplicabletotheparticularactiontobeperformed.

Butatthesametimethissciencehasinview,notsomeparticularsecondaryend,butthelastend(theabsolutegood)ofman,thesupremecauseinthepracticalorder.Itisthereforeaphilosophy.Itiswithoutqualificationthepracticalphilosophy.

Note.—Thoughethicsisaspracticalasanyscienceinthestrictsensecanbe,wemustnotthereforesupposethatitisessentiallypractical(nosciencevereetpropriedictaisessentiallypractical),orthatitissufficienttomakemenbehaverightly.Itsupplies,itistrue,rulesimmediatelyapplicabletoparticularcases,but

ithasnopowertomakeusconstantlyapplythemasweshouldinparticularcases,înspiteofthedifficulties

1Onthecontrary,theessentiallypracticalsciences,thatistosaythearts,themselvesapplytheirrulestoparticularcases.Thesesciencesare,strictlyspeaking,practical,butarenotsciencesinthestrictsensebutonlyimproperly.

Therearethusmanydegreesofpracticality.Thephilosophyofart(whoseendispractical,andwhoseobjectanoperabile,buttobeknown)providesnorulesimmediatelyapplicabletoparticularcases.Itisonlyimproperlyandveryimperfectlypractical.

Ethics(whoseendispractical,andwhoseobjectisalsoanoperabile,butalsotobeknown)doesnotapply,butprovidesrulesimmediatelyapplicabletoparticularcases.Itisaspracticalasascienceinthe


arisingfromourpassionsandthecomplexityofmaterialcircumstances.Itremains,therefore,essentiallyspeculativeinitsfinalobject{knowledgeofhumanacts)andinitsprocedure(thedeductionoftruthsfromtheirpremisses,notincitementtoaction)andisthuspracticalonlyinanimpropersense.Îfmanistodotherightintheorderofactionmoralsciencemustbesupplementedbythevirtueofprudence^which,if"wemakeuseofit,makesusalwaysjudgecorrectlyoftheactweshouldperform,andwillalwaysthatwhichwehavethusjudgedtoberight.

Ontheotherhand,ethicsonlysuppliesrulesofhumanconductinthenaturalorderandinrelationtoman'slastendasitwouldbe,ifitwereanaturalhappiness.Butsince,infact,man'slastendisasupernaturalgood[Godpossessednotbytheimperfectknowledgeofhumanreasonassuch,butbythe

strictsensecanbepractical,butitisnotstrictlyspeakingorperfectlypractical.

Thearts—medicine,forexample,orengineering—whoseobjectissomethingtobedone(notmerelyanoperabile,butenvisagedopera-biliter),providerulesimmediatelyapplicableandactuallyapplythemtoparticularcases,butonlybyenablingustojudgeofwhatistobedone,notbymakinguswiUtodoit(fortheartistcanmakeamistakeandstillbeanartist(becausehewillstomakeit).Theyareinthestrictsensepractical—butdonotattainthehighestdegreeof

practicability.

Finallyprudence(whoseobjectisalsosomethingtobedone)appliestoparticularcasestherulesofmoralscienceandreason,notonlyteachingustojudgeoftheacttobeperformed,butmakingusemployasweoughtourfreeactivity(fortheprudentman,assuch,alwayswillstheright).Itis,strictlyspeaking,practical,andattainsthehighestdegreeofpracticability.

1Cf.St.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.5,a.i,arf3:Scientiamoralis,quamvissitpropteroperationem,tameniliaoperaiiononestactusscientiae,sedactusvirtutis,utpatetVEthic.Undenonpotestdietars,sedrnagisinillisoperationibussehabetvirtuslocoartisetideaveteresdijfinieruntvirtutemesseartembenerectequevivendi,utdicitAugust.X,deCiv.Dei.

THEPHILOSOPHYOFART,ETHICS

beatificanddeifyingvisionoftheDivineEssence),andsincehisactionsmustberegulatedinreferencetothissupernaturalendandsoastoenablehimtoattainit,ethicsorphilosophicmoralityisevidentlyinadequatetoteachhimeverythingheneedstoknowinordertoactrightly.Itmustbecompletedandelevatedbytheteachingsofrevelation.

Theepithetpractical,appliedtoethics,doesnotmerelymeanhavingasitsaimanactivityotherthanthatofsimplyknowing(inthissensepractical,whetherusedofartormorals,isopposedtospeculative);butmorestrictlyconcernedwithactionandbehaviour(theTrpaxTov,thedistinctivesphereofmoralscienceandthemoralvirtuesascontrastedwiththeTtoiTjTov,thedistinctivesphereofart).

Thefundamentalquestionwhichpracticalphilosophymustanswerbeforeanyotherisinwhatconsists(fromthestandpointofthenaturalorder)thelastendorabsolutegoodofman.Itmustthenstudytheactionsbywhichmanapproachesordepartsfromhislastend,examiningfirsttheirnatureandinnermachinery,thenwhatconstitutestheirmoralcharacter,thatistosay,rendersthemmorallygoodorbad.Ethicsmust,therefore,studyinthemselvesthesupremeruleofsuchactions(questionswhichtreatoftheeternallawandthenaturallaw)andtheirimmediaterule(questionsrelatingtotheconscience);itmustalsostudytheintrinsicprinciplesfromwhichthoseactsproceed,thatistosay,themoralvirtuesandvices.

Butsinceethicsisapracticalscienceitmustnotbecontentwiththeseuniversalconsiderations;itmustproceedtothemoreparticulardeterminationof


humanactsandtheirrules.Itisthereforeobligedtostudyingreatdetailtheruleswhichregulateman'sconductfirstsofarastheyconcernthegoodoftheagenthimselfandsecondlysofarastheyconcernthegoodofothers(consequentlythevirtueo^justice).

Thelatterinquiryintroducesanumberofmostimportantquestionspertainingtowhatiscallednaturalright,andtreatinginthefirstplaceofman'sobUgationstoGod(aquestionofnaturalreligion),^secondlyofhisobligationstohisfellow-men.Herearediscussedthequestionswhichconcernmenasindividuals[therightsoftheindividual,forexample,therightofproperty),andthosewhichconcernthemasmembersofanaturalwholewhosecommongoodindividualsmustserve—thefamilyandthepoUticalsociety(therightsofsociety).

Aristotledividedthescienceofmorality,ofhumanconduct[ethicsinthewidesense)intothreeparts:thescienceofman'sactionsasanindividual,ethics(inthestrictersense);thescienceofhisactionsasamemberofthedomesticsociety,economics;thescienceofhisactionsasamemberofthecity(thecivilsociety),politics.^

Onthefundamentalquestionofethics—thequestionofman'slastend—wefindforthelasttimetheschoolsofphilosophydividedroughlyintothreegroups.

TheschoolofAristotleandSt.Thomasteachesthattheentiremorallifedependsonman'stendencytohissovereigngoodorhappinessandthattheobject

1I.e.ofreligionasitwouldbeapartfromthesupernaturalordertowhichmanhasinfactbeenraised.

2SeeonthispointNicEth.,vi,9,1142a9;Eud.Eth.,i,8,1218b13,andthetwofirstchaptersofthePolitics.Cf.Hamelin,op.cit.,p.85.


inwhichthishappinessconsistsisGod—whom,moreover,weoughttolove,notforourownsake,butforhimself(preciselybecauseheisourlastend,thatisto

say,thatwhichiswilledandlovedforitself,notforthesakeofanythingbeyond).

Theschoolswhichfindtheendandruleofhumanconductinpleasure{hedonism,Aristippus,Epicurus),utility{utilitarianism,Bentham,JohnStuartMill),thestate(Hegelandsociologists),humanity(AugusteComte),progress(HerbertSpencer),sympathy(theScottishschool),pity(Schopenhauer)ortheproductionofthesuperman(Nietzsche),assignasman'slastendsomethingcreated,andtherebydegradehimbelowhimself.

Theschoolswhichclaimthatvirtue(theStoics,Spinoza)orduty(Kant)isself-sufficient,eitherbecausevirtueisitselfhappiness,orbecausethepursuitofhappinessisimmoral,assignasman'slastendmanhimself,andthereby,whileseemingtodeifyman,really,Hketheschoolslastmentioned,degradehimbelowhimself,forthegreatnessofmanconsistsinthefactthathissoleendistheuncreatedGood.

ThomistPhilosophy

[EthicsofHappinessortheSovereignGood)

Manisorderedtoalastendotherthanhimself,and

thislastendisGod.

MoralSystemswhichdegradeMoralSystemswhichdeifyManMan

ManisorderedtoalastManisnotorderedto

endotherthanhimself,anylastendotherthanandthisendissomethinghimself,hisownvirtuecreated[hedonism,Epicure-beinghislastend(iS'toia'^m),anism,utilitarianism,etc.).orhisgoodnessnotdependingonanygoodforwhichhehasbeenmade[Kantism).


ThusoneveryoneofthegreatproblemsofphilosophythedoctrineofAristotleandSt.Thomas,whencomparedwiththedoctrinesofotherphilosophers,appearsasaneminencebetweentwocontraryerrors.ThisisanadditionalargumentforitstruthtobeaddedtothoseenumeratedearUer.^

Thetruth,indeed,isnottobefoundinaphilosophywhichkeepsthemeanbetweencontraryerrorsbyitsmediocrityandbyfallingbelowthem,beingbuiltupbyborrowingfromboth,balancingoneagainstanotherandmingUngthembyarbitrarychoicesmadewithouttheHghtofaguidingprinciple{eclecticism);itmustbesoughtinaphilosophywhichkeepsthemeanbetweencontraryerrorsbyitssuperiority,dominatingboth,sothattheyappearasfragmentsfallenandseveredfromitsunity.Foritisclearthat,ifthisphilosophybetrue,itmustrevealinfullwhaterrorseesonlyinpartanddistortedbyabias,andthusmustjudgeandsecure,byitsownprinciples,andinthehghtofitsowntruth,v/hatevertrutherrorcontainsthoughitcannotdistinguish.

1Seepp.99-101.

CONCLUSION

Philosophyisthusdividedintothreeprincipalsections:logic,speculativephilosophy,practicalphilosophy;or,ifwetakeaccountofthesubdivisionsofthesethreesections,intosevenmainsections:minorlogic,majorlogic;thephilosophyofmathematics,thephilosophyofnature,metaphysics;thephilosophyofartandethics.Thisorderisrepresentedbythefollowingtable:

IJI.Minororformallogic:therulesofreasoning

LOGIC1^2.MajorOTmateriallogic:thematterofresisoning

3.Thephilosophyofmathematics:quantity\.—„,.,,.ithematerialworldJ'■"^^^&/

4.1hephuosobhyofnature:{,,,'^\manpsychology

(truth(epistemolog^')criticism

beingingeneralontology

beingase(naturaltheology)theodicy

IIIr6.Thephilosophyofart:making

PRACTICAL

PHILOSOPHY[7.EthicsOTmoralphilosophy:action,conduct

II

SPECULATIVEPHILOSOPHY

Thedivisionofphilosophyintospeculativeandpracticaldepends,notonthespecificcharacterofthevariousphilosophicsciences,butontheendwhichtheypursue.Ifthatendisknowledgealone,thephilosophyisspeculative;ifthegoodofman,itispractical.^

Ifthephilosophicsciencesareclassifiedfromthestandpointoftheirspecificcharacter,êthics,which

1SeeSt.Thomas,Sup.Boet.deTrin.,q.5,ad4.'Thisspecificationdependsessentiallyonthedegreeofabstractionordegreeofimmaterialityoftheobjectstudied.


treatsofthemoralvirtuesândwhoseformalobjectishumanaction,andthephilosophyofart,whichtreatsofthepracticalintellectualvirtuesandwhoseformalobjectishumanmaking,aredivisionsofthescienceofman,whichitselfbelongstonaturalphilosophy(thoughitentersalsointometaphysics).Fromthispointofviewwecanrecogniseasspecificallydistinctphilosophicsciencesonlylogic,metaphysics,andthephilosophyofnature,alsothephilosophyofmathematics,ifthisisnotregardedasasubdivisionofmetaphysicsorofthephilosophyofnature.

1Sicpertinetadphilosophiam[naturalem),etestparsillius,quiaagitdtanimautestactuscorporis,etconsequenterdemoralihusejus,(JohnofSt.Thomas,Cursus.phil.,i,p.732;Log.,ii*q.27,a.i.)

U'y.'yERSirYOFFLORIDA

312b5OMMflM^fli2

An Introduction to Philosophy (A Sheed & Ward Classic)

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