Top Banner
An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin , Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang, Nicholas Kidd Computer Sciences Dept. University of Wisconsin Madison
27

An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

Dec 14, 2015

Download

Documents

Carson Shepperd
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection

Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu

Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin,

Louis Kruger, Hao Wang, Nicholas Kidd

Computer Sciences Dept.University of Wisconsin

Madison

Page 2: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

2

Online Auctioning• Huge volume: eBay hosted 440,100,000 new

listings in Q2 2005• In this talk: trustworthiness of online auctioning • Why do we buy in an online auction?

A. to find a rare/collectable itemB. to find a bargain; commodity at a “good” price

• eBay financial report (expected 2005):– Clothing & Accessories --- $3.3 billion (2nd)– Consumer Electronics --- $3.2 billion (3rd)– Computers --- $2.9 billion (4th)

Data suggests that most people use eBay to find bargains

Page 3: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

3

Finding a Bargain is Tricky

• Inherently untrustworthy environment: – Pseudonymous sellers– Pseudonymous buyers – Delivery? Warranty? Quality?

• Reputation system: a tool to establish trust

Page 4: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

4

Finding a Bargain is Tricky

• eBay’s reputation system provides little help– Based on feedback: vulnerable to “poisoning” attack

Page 5: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

5

Finding a Bargain is Tricky

• eBay’s reputation system provides little help– Based on feedback: vulnerable to “poisoning” attack

– Does not provide information on price

Page 6: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

6

Finding a Bargain is Tricky

• eBay’s reputation system provides little help– Based on feedback: vulnerable to “poisoning” attack – Does not provide information on price– Does not differentiate among the majority of sellers

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

% of sellers (1545 sellers with more than 10 auctions)

90% of sellers:Positive feedback > 97.3%

50% of sellers:Positive feedback > 99.4%

% of positivefeedback

Page 7: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

7

Goals• Alice—a buyer, Bob—a seller• Develop a trustworthy mechanism that helps Alice:

– Achieve her goal: what are the chances that Alice can find a bargain in Bob’s auctions?

– Warn her from fraudulent activities: are the prices in Bob’s auctions artificially inflated?

– Provide her assurance against poisoning attack: why should Alice trust the mechanism?

Page 8: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

8

Contributions

• A reputation system that helps buyers avoid sellers who seem to be inflating prices– Formulated the “seem to be inflating prices” as an

anomaly detection problem – Business level anomaly detection: the basic events are

auctions, bidding. – Behavioral system: based on how human behave/act

rather than on people feedback.

• Only a first step, some goals still ahead

Page 9: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

9

Outline

• Motivation: find a bargain and avoid fraud• Contributions: anomaly detection system to

identify price inflating sellers:– The N model– The M model– The P model

• Case studies

Page 10: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

10

Auctioning 101

• Pseudonymous sellers and bidders • Auctions end after a predefined time (e.g., 7 days)• Highest bid wins • Seller sets minimum starting bid• Shilling: a group of bidders that place fake bids to

inflate the final price

Page 11: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

11

Methodology

• Collect data from eBay – three weeks of data in the category: Laptop Parts &

Accessories– 127,815 auctions, 12,331 sellers, – 604 high-volume sellers: posted more than 14 auctions

controls 60% of the market

• Use statistical model to predict seller behavior– 95% of the sellers are “normal”– 5% are abnormal, or suspicious

Page 12: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

12

Step 1: Average Number of Bids• What is an indication that prices are high?

– high number of bids

• Goal: identify sellers with abnormally high number of bids

5%95%

Average bids per auction

% o

f h

igh

-vo

lum

e se

ller

s

• 95% of high-volume sellers have less than 7 bids per auction

•Model is insensitive to supply: number of auctions posted by a seller

Page 13: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

13

Step 1: The N ModelN

um

ber

of

auct

ion

s fo

r se

ller

Suspicious:5% of high-volume sellers

Correlation: many auctions implies low number of bids

Suspicious seller: one that posts many auctions and still attracts many bids

Average bids per auction

Page 14: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

14

Outline

• Motivation: find a bargain and avoid fraud• Contributions: anomaly detection system to

identify price inflating sellers:– The N model: a seller is suspicious if they post many

auctions that attract many bids – The M model– The P model

• Reputation example

Page 15: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

15

Step 2: Average Minimum Starting Bid• Legitimate explanation for high number of bids:

low minimum starting bid • Goal: identify sellers with abnormally high

number of bids and high minimum bid• Problem: how do you know that the minimum bid

is high?

dwinning_bi

dminimum_bidwinning_bi Relative minimum bid (RMB)

=

Page 16: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

16

Step 2: The M Model

Ave

rage

# o

f bi

ds in

sel

ler’s

auc

tions

Average relative minimum bid for seller

Suspicious: 5% of high-volume sellers

Correlation: low minimum starting bid implies many bids

M suspicious seller: starts with high minimum bid and attracts many bids

M+N suspicious seller: posts many auctions, attracts many bids, starts with high minimum bid

Page 17: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

17

Step 3: Bidders’ Profile of a Seller • Fraudulent explanation for high number of bids:

shilling • Goal: identify group of bidders that repeatedly

bid and lose in a seller’s auctions• Suspicious seller:

– N: sellers with abnormally high number of bids and – M: high starting bid and– P: has a group of bidders that repeatedly bid and lose

Page 18: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

18

Bidder Presence Curve

Bidders %

5% of bidders in this seller’s auctions participated in 80% of the auctions

Participated auctions %

Page 19: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

19

Bidder Presence/Win Curves

Bidders %

Participated auctions %

the same 5% won only 10% of the auctions

Bidders %

Participated or won

auctions %

5% of bidders in this seller’s auctions participated in 80% of the auctions

Page 20: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

20

Bidder Presence/Win Curves(Normal case)

Bidders %

Participated or won

auctions %

10% of the bidders participated in 20% of the auctions and won 20% of the times

Page 21: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

21

Outline

• Motivation: find a bargain and avoid fraud• Contributions: anomaly detection system to

identify price inflating sellers:– The N model: a seller is suspicious if they post many

auctions that attract many bids – The M model: a seller is suspicious if they attract

many bids and start with high minimum bid – The P model: a seller is suspicious if they have a

group of bidders that repeatedly participate and lose

• Reputation example

Page 22: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

22

Reputation Example: Seller 10260N M P

Bidders %Average relative minimum bid for seller

Average bids per auction

Page 23: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

23

Results Summary

• 54 sellers classified as abnormal with respect to at least one model

• 3 sellers classified as abnormal with respect to all three models

• No confirmed fraud

N M

P

3

2

21

24 13

9

Page 24: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

24

Summary

• Trust: do we get what we expected?

• Reputation system as anomaly detection– Attempt to identify price inflation– Work at the business level– Consider poisoning attack (see paper)

Thank you. Questions?

Page 25: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

Back up

Page 26: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

26

Trust

to have belief or confidence in the honesty, goodness, skill or safety of a person, organization or thing

Cambridge Advanced

Learner's Dictionary

Page 27: An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

27

Finding a Bargain is Tricky

• Adverse environment: – Pseudonymous sellers– Pseudonymous buyers – Delivery? Warranty? Quality?

• eBay’s reputation system provides little help

– Does not provide information on price– Based on feedback---vulnerable to “poisoning attack” – Does not really differentiates among sellers