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December 2009
PPuubblliicc SSeeccuurriittyy PPeerrssppeeccttiivveess
American Views on Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Energy, and the
Environment: 2009
Kerry G. Herron
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith
Conducted with funding and institutional support from Sandia
National Laboratories and The University of Oklahoma.
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Public Security Perspectives
American Views on Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Energy, and the
Environment: 2009
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Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D.
Research Scientist Center for Applied Social Research
University of Oklahoma
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D. Professor and Associate
Director
Center for Applied Social Research University of Oklahoma
December 2009
Center for Applied Social Research University of Oklahoma
2 Partners Place, 3100 Monitor, Suite 100 Norman, Oklahoma
73072
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2
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to express appreciation to the following
organizations and individuals whose support made this project
possible.
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
Joan Woodard, Ph.D. Executive Vice President and Deputy
Laboratories Director for National Security, Technologies, and
Systems
John M. Taylor Manager, NSTS Strategic Office
David Cunnington Graphic Artist
University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK
Carol L. Silva, Ph.D. Associate Director, Center for Applied
Social Research Assistant Professor, Department of Political
Science
Matthew Henderson Consultant, College Station, Texas
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Abstract
We report findings from a national Internet survey of the US
general public conducted in mid-2009 that investigates concerns
about the proliferation of nuclear weapons (with emphases on the
cases of North Korea and Iran), evolving views on the efficacy of
nuclear deterrence, and preferences for the future of US nuclear
weapons. Our analysis of public views on terrorism in-clude
assessments of the evolving threat, public tolerance for intrusive
do-mestic measures for preventing terrorism, and perceived
effectiveness of domestic efforts to prevent terrorism in the US.
We also report findings from a national public survey on US energy
and en-vironmental security administered by Internet in mid-2009.
Key areas of in-vestigation include how factual knowledge about
global climate change is related to support for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions and how public knowledge of energy issues relates to
preferences for future energy policies. Additionally, we
investigate how different sources of energy are perceived in terms
of attributes, costs, risks, and preferences, and we analyze how
public beliefs about nuclear energy are structured, to include
risk/benefit tradeoffs and preferences for additional nuclear
generation.
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Intentionally Blank
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Contents
Front Matter Abstract 3 Contents 5 Executive Summary 6
Chapter One: Introduction and Overview 11 Section 1.1: Research
Goals and Objectives 11 Section 1.2: Methodological and Conceptual
Considerations 13 Section 1.3: Organization of the Report 20
Chapter Two: Nuclear Security 22 Section 2.1: Assessing Nuclear
Proliferation Threats 22 Section 2.2: Efficacy of Nuclear
Deterrence 28 Section 2.3: Preferences for the Future of US Nuclear
Weapons 35
Chapter Three: Security from Terrorism 46 Section 3.1: Evolving
Public Assessments of the Threat of Terrorism 46 Section 3.2:
Tolerance for Intrusive Prevention Policies 51 Section 3.3:
Assessing the Struggle Against Terrorism 55
Chapter Four: Energy and Environmental Security 63 Section 4.1:
Public Knowledge and Global Climate Change (GCC) 63 Section 4.2:
Public Knowledge and Energy Policy Preferences 71 Section 4.3:
Public Perceptions of Comparative Energy Sources 78 Section 4.4:
Public Beliefs About Nuclear Energy 85
Appendix 1: Research Methodology 95 Section 1: Sampling 95
Section 2: Data Collection 98
Appendix 2: Nuclear Security & Terrorism Data Summaries
99
Appendix 3: Energy and Environment Data Summaries 138
References 179
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Executive Summary
Chapter One: Introduction and Overview
This report summarizes findings from an Internet survey
conducted June 2–6, 2009 of US general public views on selected
nuclear security and terror-ism issues. We also report findings
from an Internet survey focusing on en-ergy and environmental
security conducted May 28–29, 2009. Each of the surveys builds on
previous foundational studies in this series to show opin-ion
change over time.
Chapter Two: Nuclear Security
Q: How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and
how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran? (pg. 22)
Mean public assessments of the risks of further nuclear
proliferation to addi-tional countries steadily have been rated
above a value of seven on a zero-to-ten scale since our first
measurement in 2005. When asked to assess risks of nuclear conflict
with North Korea or Iran, assessments in 2009 are well above
midscale and have increased 12 percent for North Korea and 19
percent for Iran since 2005. Risks of North Korea or Iran providing
nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups also are rated
high in absolute terms (above seven on a zero-to-ten scale) and
have grown by about five percent for each country since 2005. When
asked to consider the use of US military forces to compel North
Korea or Iran to abandon nuclear weapons programs, mean support is
significantly higher for participating as part of a UN military
coalition than for acting unilaterally, and support for using
military force against Iran is some-what higher than for acting
against North Korea. Mean support for participat-ing in a military
coalition grew by 18 percent against North Korea and by ten percent
against Iran between 2006 and 2009. While lower in absolute terms,
support has increased even more sharply for acting unilaterally
against either state should diplomatic and economic efforts
fail.
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Q: How are public beliefs about the efficacy of US nuclear
deterrence evolving? (pg. 28)
Public assessments of the contemporary efficacy of nuclear
deterrence are nu-anced. When the objects of deterrence are other
countries, most respondents assign generally high, but
differentiated, valuations to US nuclear weapons for different
deterrence purposes. Using a scale from zero (not at all important)
to ten (extremely important), participants rate the mean importance
of US nu-clear weapons for deterring other countries from using
nuclear weapons against us at well above a value of seven. The mean
importance of US nuclear weapons for (a) deterring other countries
from using chemical or biological weapons, or (b) for deterring
other countries from providing nuclear weapons or materials to
terrorist groups is rated substantially lower, but each is above a
value of six on the same scale. The mean importance of US nuclear
weapons for deterring terrorist groups from using weapons of mass
destruction is statis-tically significantly lower still, but
remains above midscale.
The mean importance of nuclear deterrence systematically
increases with age (but not monotonically) and systematically
decreases among those respon-dents who did not experience the Cold
War as adults. Because the net effect of Cold War experience
potentially may be greater than that for chronologi-cal age, public
valuations of US nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes may slowly
erode as the number of Americans who experienced some por-tion of
the Cold War as adults declines.
Q: What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear
weapons? (pg. 35)
In addition to nuclear deterrence, Americans continue to believe
US nuclear weapons are important for maintaining US military
superiority and interna-tional influence. Support for retaining US
nuclear weapons averages about 7.5 on a 0–10 scale and has
increased about 15 percent since 1993. When asked to size the US
nuclear arsenal between zero and 2,200 operationally deployed
strategic nuclear weapons, the average preference in 2009 is 1,342,
with ten percent preferring zero and 26 percent preferring 2,200.
Re-spondents are open to reducing below 1,700 if Russia agrees to
matching and verifiable levels, but most do not want the US to have
fewer than any other country. Mean support for investing in US
nuclear weapons infra-structure is above midscale and has increased
about 18 percent since 1993.
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When presented with balanced arguments for and against
modernizing the US nuclear stockpile, 52 percent support developing
new nuclear weapons, 24 percent are undecided, and 24 percent
oppose new weapons. Support for investing in nuclear weapons
infrastructure or in new nuclear weapons has not declined in the
face of difficult economic conditions.
Chapter Three: Security From Terrorism
Q: How are public assessments of the threat of terrorism
changing, and how do they vary among demographic attributes and
political orienta-tions? (pg. 46)
Mean assessments of the overall threat of terrorism of all kinds
in the US peaked immediately following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11). Between those seminal events and 2009,
mean assessments of the threat of terrorism have declined about 20
percent, but they remain above pre-9/11 levels. Mean assessments of
the overall threat of terrorism worldwide are sig-nificantly higher
than those for the US (p < .0001). Respondents are pessimistic
about future threats, and consider the mean threat of terrorism in
the US over the next ten years to be significantly higher than it
is today (p < .0001).
Assessments of the threat of terrorism systematically increase
with age, political conservatism, and among women. Assessments
systematically decrease with educational achievement and among
racial/ethnic minorities.
Q: How is tolerance for intrusive domestic measures intended to
pre-vent terrorism influenced by threat perceptions and world
views? (pg. 51)
As estimated using multivariate models, tolerance for intrusive
domestic antiterror policies systematically increases with income,
conservatism, hier-archism, and terror threat perceptions.
Tolerance for such measures de-creases with education, and it is
lower among racial/ethnic minorities.
Q: How do members of the public rate domestic efforts to prevent
ter-rorism in the US, how do they assess our abilities to respond
to acts of
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terrorism, and how confident are they that eventually we will
prevail in the struggle against terrorism? (pg. 55)
Mean confidence in our abilities to assess the threat, prevent
terrorism, and respond to acts of terrorism in the US are near
midscale and trending upward. Airport security is rated higher, on
average, than seaport/harbor security or land border security, but
the trend for each is upward. Mean confidence in our abilities to
respond to large-scale acts of terrorism is highest for the
De-partment of Defense. Capabilities of the Department of Homeland
Security and state-level agencies are rated near midscale; county
and municipal capa-bilities are placed below midscale. Mean
confidence in our abilities to pre-vent large-scale acts of
terrorism averages slightly above midscale, while confidence in
preventing small-scale attacks is below midscale, but both are
trending upward. Mean assessments of the overall effectiveness of
US efforts to combat terrorism and eventually to prevail over
terrorism bottomed out in 2007 and have been trending upward
since.
Chapter Four: Energy and Environmental Security
Q: How is public knowledge of the global climate change issue
related to support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions? (pg.
63)
As factual knowledge about scientific consensus in the ongoing
debate over global climate change grows, each of the following
systematically increases: (a) public certainty that greenhouse gas
emissions cause global warming; (b) assessed risks that global
warming poses to people and the environment; (c) perceived
importance of the US reducing greenhouse gas emissions; and (d)
support for accepting international limits on greenhouse gas
emissions.
Q: How is public knowledge of energy issues related to
preferences for future energy policies? (pg. 71)
As basic factual knowledge about energy increases,
dissatisfaction with cur-rent energy policies systematically
increases, as do perceived risks of con-tinued reliance on fossil
fuels and foreign sources of energy. In addition, as energy
knowledge increases, support grows systematically for greater
reli-
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ance on green alternatives to fossil fuels, including
significant increases in nuclear energy.
Q: How are comparative sources of energy perceived in terms of
attrib-utes, costs, risks, and preferences? (pg. 78)
Distinctions are evident in public perceptions of three
different types of fossil fuels: coal and oil are perceived as
being dirty and not preferable, and opin-ion is mixed about their
safety, while natural gas is perceived by most re-spondents as
clean and safe, but opinion is mixed about preferability. Solar,
wind, and hydroelectric sources are perceived by substantial
majorities as clean, renewable, safe, plentiful, and preferable.
Nuclear generation is judged by most as clean but dangerous, and
opinion is equally divided about its pref-erability as a source of
electricity. Misperceptions exist about the relative costs of solar
and wind generation compared to coal, with most participants
considering solar and wind to be cheaper sources of electricity.
The costs of natural gas and nuclear generation are perceived to be
slightly higher than the costs of coal generation. In terms of
overall risk, fossil fuels and nuclear power are rated at similar
levels above midscale, while the risks of renew-ables sources are
judged substantially lower and well below midscale. Solar, wind,
and hydroelectric sources of generation are perceived to be
“renew-able” by most participants, but confusion exists among more
than half our respondents about whether that term should apply to
nuclear generation.
Q: How are beliefs about nuclear energy structured? (pg. 85)
Americans’ beliefs about nuclear energy are systematically
structured, and the relationships are consistent across multiple
samples and over time. As age and education increase, support for
nuclear energy increases modestly, but the largest demographic
effect is gender: men are significantly more supportive of nuclear
energy than are women. Beyond demographic predis-positions, support
for nuclear energy largely is a function of informal bal-ancing of
perceived risks and benefits, with benefits being judged to
out-weigh risks. Lack of understanding that nuclear generation does
not produce significant amounts of greenhouse gases means that the
public has yet to relate nuclear energy to efforts to moderate
global climate change.
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Chapter One Introduction and Overview
his report presents findings from two Internet surveys of the
American public. One survey of 1,754 participants conducted June
2–6, 2009 in-vestigates issues of nuclear security and terrorism.
Another survey of
1,698 respondents conducted May 28–29, 2009 investigates public
views on selected energy security and related environmental
issues.
TEach of the surveys builds on comparative baselines established
in 2005 (nu-clear security and terrorism), 2006 (energy and
environmental security), and continuing surveys in 2007 and 2008.
We also build on prior foundational re-search conducted between
1993 and 2003.1 Financial and institutional support for this study
was provided by Sandia National Laboratories and the University of
Oklahoma.
Section 1.1: Research Goals and Objectives
esearch goals are organized along two major lines of
investigation involving four related dimensions of security. The
energy and envi-ronmental security line of investigation consists
of surveys con-
ducted in even-numbered years, supplemented by tracking surveys
in odd-numbered years. Similarly, the nuclear security and
terrorism line of investi-gation consists of surveys conducted in
odd-numbered years, plus tracking surveys in even-numbered years.
Both series were begun with two parallel Internet and phone
surveys. Follow-up tracking surveys are accomplished via the
Internet. All are designed to provide coordinated research and are
in-tended to measure and analyze evolving public understandings of
four inter-related dimensions of security: nuclear security;
security from terrorism; en-ergy security; and environmental
security.
R
1 For the baseline study on nuclear security and terrorism, see
Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006a; for the baseline study on energy
and environmental security, see Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2007. For
results of follow-on tracking surveys, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith
2007 and Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009a. Each is available on-line
at: http://casr.ou.edu/nsp. Findings from previous surveys on
related issues conducted between 1993 and 2003 are summarized in
Herron and Jen-kins-Smith 2006b.
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http://casr.ou.edu/nsp
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Nuclear Security and Terrorism
Primary research goals for this track are to analyze public
views about the evolving nature of nuclear security and terrorism
and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences
relevant to the evolution of related US security policies. Specific
research objectives include the following:
• Identify emerging trends in public perceptions of US nuclear
weapons policies and selected national and international security
issues. Examine evolving US public assessments of risks, benefits,
policy preferences, and research and investment priorities
associated with nuclear weapons and strategic security.
• Where appropriate, map backward to selected baseline questions
asked in previous surveys in this series for continued trend
analyses and develop new questions intended for repeated
application in future surveys.
• Measure public views on modernizing the US nuclear stockpile
and inves-tigate public perceptions of what kinds of modifications
to existing nuclear weapons constitute perceptions of “new” nuclear
weapons. Monitor trends in public beliefs about the desirability
and feasibility of nuclear weapons abolition.
• Investigate concepts of multidimensional security, to include
public under-standings of how security and freedom should be
balanced and under what conditions threats to national security
warrant varying levels of public sac-rifice.
• Identify and analyze trends in public concerns about homeland
security, including public assessments of the threat of terrorism
and US policies to prevent and respond to terrorism.
• Analyze belief systems among members of the US general public
and their relationships to views on nuclear security and
terrorism.
Energy and Environmental Security
For this line of investigation, our primary research goals are
to analyze public views about contemporary energy security and
associated environmental is-sues and to identify trends in public
perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of related US
policies. Specific research objectives include the following:
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• Identify and analyze public perceptions of US energy security,
to include: (a) energy supply and reliability; (b) energy
vulnerabilities and threats; (c) relative risks and benefits of
fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and renewable sources; and (d)
relationships among energy security, costs, energy depend-ence,
alternative sources, and research and investment priorities.
• Where appropriate, map backward to selected baseline questions
asked in previous surveys in this series for continued trend
analyses and develop new questions intended for repeated
application in future surveys.
• Investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy
security, to include expected implications of global climate
change, support for energy research and development and reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, and relationships among environmental
issues and potential policy options.
• Analyze emerging changes and trends in public views on nuclear
energy, to include risks, benefits, policy preferences, research
and investment priori-ties, and public trust. Specifically
investigate understandings and prefer-ences regarding nuclear
materials management and disposal issues.
• Analyze public perceptions of nuclear fuel cycle and spent
nuclear fuel management options, including (a) regional temporary
storage, (b) reproc-essing, (c) permanent disposal, and (d)
transportation to temporary or per-manent storage facilities.
• Analyze belief systems among members of the US general public
and their relationships to views on energy and environmental
security.
Section 1.2: Methodological and Conceptual Considerations
W e design all phases of the larger research project to support
multi-dimensional analyses, including quantitative methods such as
de-scriptive, relational, and trend analyses. In 2005, 2006, 2007
and 2008 we employed split survey designs providing parallel
Internet and tele-phone surveys for comparing collection methods.
As noted in previous reports in this series, the central tendencies
among Internet and phone responses to some survey questions are
statistically significantly different at the 95 percent confidence
level (partly a function of large sample sizes), but after
weighting for demographic representativeness, in no cases did we
find substantive dif-ferences in aggregate responses between
collection modes that were policy relevant. Policy implications
deriving from phone and Internet collection methods were
essentially the same in each of the four paired surveys.
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However, continuing developments in demographic and
communication trends suggest that phone survey collections
increasingly are varying from cross-sectional demographic patterns
in the US—especially regarding re-spondent ages and socio-economic
indices. This largely is because of the declining numbers of
households with wired phone services and the sub-stantial
difficulties in sampling the population of wireless-only phone
users. As increasing numbers of Americans shift to wireless-only
phone services, differences between potential respondents who can
be reached by wired phone vs. those who can be reached by
wireless-only services are growing. The latest available data from
the National Center for Health Statistics re-garding demographic
differences between adults in the US who have access to wired vs.
wireless phone services include the following distinctions
(Blumberg and Luke 2009):
• More than one of every five American homes (20.2%) has only
wireless phone service. About 33.1% of US adults between the ages
of 18 and 24 and about 41.5% of adults between the ages of 25 and
29 have only wire-less phone services. At the other end of the age
range, only 3.3% of indi-viduals aged 65 and over have
wireless-only services.
• More than three in five adults living with unrelated adult
roommates (60.6%) live in households having only wireless phone
services, and those who rent are more likely to have only wireless
services (39.2%) than those who own homes (9.9%).
• Men (20.0%) are more likely than women (17.0%) to have only
wireless service. Adults living in the South (21.3%) and Midwest
(20.8%) are more likely than adults living the Northeast (11.4%) or
West (17.2%) to have wireless-only services. And non-Hispanic white
adults (16.6%) are less likely than Hispanic adults (25.0%) and
non-Hispanic black adults (21.4%) to have wireless-only
services.
• Adults with college degrees (18.0%) are more likely to have
wireless-only phone services than are high school graduates (13.2%)
or adults with lower levels of formal education (9.8%). Adults
living with children (19.2%) are more likely than adults living
alone (12.2%) or with only other adults (13.2%) to have mostly
wireless services. Adults living in poverty (9.5%) or near poverty
(11.3%) are less likely than higher income adults (18.2%) to have
wireless-mostly phone services. And adults living in metropolitan
areas (15.8%) are more likely to have wireless-mostly services than
are those living in rural areas (13.4%).
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• Approximately 1.9% (nearly four million adults) have no
telephone service of any type, and thus cannot be surveyed by
phone.
Given the length and complexity of our surveys (averaging 25
minutes or more) interviewing via cellular phones is impractical
because of costs, safety, and other location issues (Brick, et al.
2007). Interviewing respon-dents while they are at work also is
impractical for similar reasons. This means that when collected by
phone, our types of in-depth inquiries are lim-ited to respondents
having home access to wired telephony. Given the trends in
telecommunication patterns and differences in important
demo-graphic dimensions, phone collections are becoming
increasingly less de-mographically representative.2
At the same time that wired telephony is declining, access to
Internet services continues to grow. Between 1995 and 1997, the
proportion of adults having access to online services tripled from
nine percent to 30 percent. By 2000, it had more than doubled again
to 63 percent. Though the rate of growth in Internet access has
slowed, it was 73 percent by 2004 and 81 percent in Octo-ber 2008.
Today, only about two percent of computer users do not go online
(HarrisInteractive 2008), and 63 percent of adults in the US access
the Internet via broadband connections at home (Horrigan 2009). Not
surprisingly, with increased access, the demographics of the online
population have become in-creasingly representative of the US
population as a whole. Internet use among those over 65 years of
age, those who have not attended college, and those having annual
household incomes of less than $25,000 continue to be some-what
underrepresented, but large majorities of even these demographic
cate-gories now have access to the Internet (HarrisInteractive
2008).
While we intend periodically to conduct parallel Internet and
phone surveys in future cycles, our previous comparative findings,
combined with the trends noted above, suggest that the phone
comparisons have declining utility unless extensive weighting is
used to correct for growing imbalances in demographic
representativeness. Because Internet surveys can be conducted to
control for demographic and regional representativeness (compared
to national popula-tion data), weighting is not required for
carefully executed Internet surveys.
2 Blumberg and Luke (2009) also note important behavioral
differences relating to health issues (binge drinking, health
status, insurance coverage, access to health care, and certain
other access and behavior issues) between those having
wireless-only services vs. those with wired phones or combinations
of wired and wireless services.
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For these reasons, and because of our four prior surveys
employing parallel Internet and phone collections, we limited
collections for both our surveys in 2009 to Internet samples. As
our findings show, central tendencies suggest a high degree of
continuity in response patterns, and a high level of confidence in
comparisons with previous surveys seems warranted.3 Collection
methods and demographic representativeness are described in
Appendix 1.
Conceptualizing Security
The term “security” is associated with contextual meanings that
are so broad and variable that some scholars consider it to be an
“essentially con-tested concept” (Buzan 1991, Freedman 1992, Gallie
1962, Rothschild 1995). Like other complex ideas such as power,
justice, peace, and freedom, the concept of security includes an
ideological dimension that reduces the utility of empiricism for
resolving differences in definitional and conceptual explanations
(Buzan 1991; Little 1981). Even those who specialize in secu-rity
studies cannot agree on the boundaries of the concept or of the
field of study. To some who take a more classically narrow
approach, security re-lates to matters of the state and its
military capabilities—particularly the use of force (Buzan, Waever,
and de Wilde 1998). But since the end of the Cold War, the concept
of security has broadened to include conventions associ-ated with
many aspects of globalization and humanitarian concerns, such as
hunger, health, human rights, economics and trade, global climate
change, and international system stability (Fierke 2007). Some,
such as Buzan (1991) and Fierke (2007) caution that the
proliferating conceptual applica-tion of the term “security” to new
fields and new concerns may locate agency in states rather than in
institutional or individual actors in specific fields, and some
issues may become militarized even though a political so-lution may
be more appropriate.
While a detailed examination of the concept of security is
beyond the scope of this brief discussion, it is useful note a few
key points. Essentially, per-ceived security is about feeling safe
from harm or danger, and actual secu-rity is about being safe. When
measuring and analyzing public opinion, we are dealing with
perceptions and beliefs, and thus at the individual level of
analysis, security is a feeling that is inherently subjective to
individual con- 3 Throughout this report, graphics show combined
phone and Internet results where appli-cable for prior surveys.
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texts and beliefs. At a social level, security is a normative
political con-struct. It is assessed by governmental agencies and
political leaders, and is partially a function of policy processes.
While some empiricism may be ap-plied, there remain large areas of
subjective interpretation of public security that become the bases
for official judgments and policies. These areas of subjectivity
are the focus of intense public debate in which the views of
ex-perts and those of the general public must be considered by
policy makers.
One of the most critical aspects of defining and understanding
the meaning of security is to recognize that it is heavily
dependent on risk or threat. Theoretically, in the absence of some
real or imagined risk or threat, secu-rity would be maximized, but
actually, under such a theoretical construct (which is not
realistically plausible), security would have no meaning at all.
Edkins (2003) contends that the human desire for perfect security
from all threats to our existence is illusory, and some degree of
insecurity is inherent to all life—including human existence.
Fierke (2007, 8) argues that: “The search for perfect security is
not merely illusory, but becomes part and par-cel of the problem,
that is, it contributes to the production of insecurity and the
construction of threats.”
If it is the imagined and real sources of risks and threats that
give the concept of security meaning, it follows that one of the
most useful ways of conceiving security is in relation to perceived
and actual risks and threats. Following the insightful
conceptualization of security by Arnold Wolfers (1952), perhaps
security can be best understood as the inverse of risk/threat.
Because there are some risks and threats over which no individual
or government has control (such as the threat of eventual death),
comprehensive and enduring security is impossible. Because security
takes its meaning from the absence of risk/threat, and because it
is impossible to prove why something did not occur, attributing the
sources and causes of security is problematic. We may presume the
rea-sons a threatening event, such as interstate nuclear war, has
yet to occur relate to deterrence based on mutually assured
destruction, but we cannot know that is the sole or even primary
reason. Similarly, we cannot know for sure why large-scale acts of
terrorism have not occurred in the United States from Sep-tember
11, 2001 to the time of this writing. We can make assumptions about
the effectiveness of preventive measures and about terrorist
capabilities and motivations, but we cannot prove why another act
of the scale of 9/11 has not yet occurred. From this line of
reasoning, we conclude that the concept of se-curity is based on
individual feelings and political assumptions and assess-
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ments of risks and threats. This becomes key when considering
how to meas-ure and track security.
Because of the essentially contested nature of the concept of
security, be-cause our understanding of it is based on assumptions
about risks and threats, and because of the growing application of
the concept of security to more fields and policy domains, we need
to carefully delineate those di-mensions being studied in this
project. As previously noted, we are limiting our investigation and
analysis to public understandings of four interrelated dimensions
of security.
• Nuclear security encompasses nuclear weapons and their
development, management, modernization, and uses; nuclear materials
and their produc-tion, applications, and safeguards; nuclear
proliferation and associated im-plications; and public perceptions
of and support for policies relating to each of these aspects of
nuclear security.
• Terrorism and its implications for all levels of security
include public under-standings of the various threats posed by
terrorism, assessments of ongoing efforts to prevent and combat
terrorism, and the effects of terrorism on key societal values such
as freedom and liberty.
• Energy security includes energy dependence, adequacy of energy
sources and supplies, threats and vulnerabilities to energy access,
nuclear energy risks and benefits, alternative energy sources, and
research and development into future energy requirements and
options, including willingness to pay for energy research and
development.
• Another dimension of security is the growing importance of
environmental issues as they relate to traditional concepts of
physical security, economic se-curity, and energy management. Of
particular interest in this dimension is global climate change
(another contested concept) and how public assess-ments of its
dynamics are evolving.
Interrelationships
We consider these four dimensions of security to be closely
related and in-teractive, and one of our long-term goals is to
better understand how fellow citizens relate concepts and beliefs
associated with multiple dimensions of security. Given the
baselines established in each of our two lines of investi-gation
into four dimensions of security, we are now able both to probe
more
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deeply into their perceived connectedness and to monitor trends
in relative public views. Some areas seem obviously to be closely
related, such as nu-clear weapons and the potential for their use
in terrorism. Others may be somewhat less clear, such as the
relationships among energy independence, fossil fuels, and global
warming. Still others are much more subtle, such as the
relationships of porous borders and illegal immigration with
security from terrorism and with the social and economic
implications of the associ-ated labor pool. Through repeated and
refined measurements, we pursue more detailed examination of how
Americans relate these four dimensions, the degree to which they
see crosscutting security implications, and how long-term trends
evolve.
Measuring Security
Given the previously noted complexities involved in defining and
conceptu-alizing security, direct questions about security and how
secure people feel are problematic. First, one must specify what
level of analysis is being asked: individual, national, regional,
global? Next, it is quite possible for individuals to feel secure
from terrorism or interstate war, and yet feel inse-cure about
economic well-being, health, the costs of energy, environmental
issues, or any number of other aspects affecting security at the
individual level. And even when respondents are asked to assess
security at a specific level of analysis, it is difficult for them
to separate personal feelings and concerns at the individual level
from those of the social and political groups to which they belong
at higher and more aggregated levels of analysis. To address direct
questions about security means that respondents must make several
assumptions. First is the level of analysis; is it security for me
per-sonally, or for my family, or for my community, or for my
nation, or for everyone? The next cognitive demand is to evaluate
security from what or from whom, which requires assumptions of
specific sources of risks or threats and their nature. Then there
is the temporal dimension of security, which raises issues of
immediate and contemporary security versus longer-term and future
security. This dimension is particularly relevant to discus-sions
of energy and environmental security. There also is the important
question of whose security is being threatened or strengthened and
who is bearing what proportion of the costs. Security measures for
one group often impinge on the security of other groups. This is
particularly relevant in con-sidering security among different
nation states or when dealing with issues
19
-
such as immigration. Some people may be very accepting of
intrusive or re-strictive measures if the associated costs seem
likely to be born by others. While the designs of questions can
specify some of these requirements, di-rect inquiries about
security still demand cognitive compartmentalization and individual
assumptions on the part of respondents, all of which can af-fect
response validity.
For these and related reasons, we think it is preferable
methodologically for purposes of opinion survey research to
conceive of security and measure it as the inverse of risk or
threat. As argued above, one of the many ways to con-ceive of
security is as the absence or minimization of threat. Because
threats can be more discretely defined and specified, we
hypothesize that respon-dents are better able to compartmentalize
and separately assess threats of dif-ferent types acting at
different levels of analysis than they are to assess con-ceptual
questions about the more difficult to specify and more variable
concept of security. While we have included a few direct inquiries
about se-curity assessments, we focus more intently on exploring
public perceptions of threats and risks, the inverse of which can
be used more reliably to repre-sent feelings of security
(Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009b).
Section 1.3: Organization of the Report
Chapter Two analyzes issues relating to nuclear security by
addressing the following three inquiries:
• How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and
how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran?
• How are public beliefs about the efficacy of nuclear
deterrence evolving?
• What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear
weapons?
In Chapter Three, we focus on security from terrorism by
addressing the fol-lowing questions:
• How are public assessments of the threat of terrorism
changing, and how do they vary across demographic groups and
political orientations?
20
-
21
• How is tolerance for intrusive domestic measures for
preventing terrorism in-fluenced by threat perceptions and world
views?
• How do members of the public rate domestic efforts to prevent
terrorism in the US, how do they assess our abilities to respond to
acts of terrorism, and how confident are they that we eventually
will prevail in the struggle against terrorism?
Chapter Four analyzes multiple dimensions of energy and
environmental se-curity by addressing the following inquiries:
• How is public knowledge of the global climate change issue
related to support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions?
• How is public knowledge of energy issues related to
preferences for future energy policies?
• How are comparative sources of energy perceived in terms of
attributes, costs, risks, and preferences?
• How are public beliefs about nuclear energy structured?
Appendix One describes sampling, data collection, and associated
research methods. We also provide illustrations of the demographic
representativeness of respondents compared to US national
population parameters.
Because there are many more survey questions than can be
discussed in this report, we provide two appendices listing all the
questions contained in our latest surveys. In Appendix Two, we
provide a comprehensive listing of ques-tions asked in the survey
on nuclear security and terrorism. Response frequen-cies and
central tendencies are displayed.
Appendix Three provides a comprehensive listing of questions
asked in our survey on energy and environmental security. Here too,
we describe distribu-tions of responses and central tendencies.
-
Chapter Two Nuclear Security
We begin our analyses by addressing the following three nuclear
security issues.
• How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and
how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran?
• How are public beliefs about the efficacy of nuclear
deterrence evolving?
• What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear
weapons?
Section 2.1: Assessing Nuclear Proliferation Threats
o address perceived risks of nuclear proliferation, we begin
with the following general assessment of the threat of nuclear
weapons spread-ing to additional countries.
S15: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no risk
and ten means extreme risk, how do you rate the risk that nuclear
weapons will spread to other countries within the next ten
years?
TThe distribution of responses in 2009 is shown in Figure 2.1,
and trends in mean responses since 2005 are charted in Figure
2.2.1
Figure 2.1: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation to Additional
Countries: 2009
1 Phone and Internet responses are combined for all trend
displays.
1 1 23
5
11 11
17 17 8
23
0
5
10 15 20 25 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
%
No Risk Extreme Risk
S15: Mean = 7.21
22
-
Figure 2.2: Mean Risk of Nuclear Proliferation to Additional
States
As shown in Figure 2.1, three out of four respondents in 2009
rate the risk of further nuclear proliferation above midscale, with
the highest scale value of ten being the modal response. Figure 2.2
shows that mean judgments of proliferation risks have consistently
been placed above a value of seven on the zero-to-ten scale. In
five measurement periods, mean assessments have varied only between
7.56 and 7.21, representing a mere 3.5 percent of the available
scale.
Perhaps the two states causing the most international concern in
recent years about efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are North
Korea and Iran. North Korea purportedly conducted nuclear test
explosions in 2006 and 2009, and Iran is vigorously pursuing
uranium enrichment capabilities that could be used to produce
weapon-grade nuclear materials. To explore pub-lic concerns about
both countries, we pose the following questions investi-gating
public risk perceptions about nuclear conflict between the United
States and North Korea or Iran. Trends in mean responses since 2005
for each state are charted in Figure 2.3
S16/S20 (separate questions asked for each state): Now consider
the case of North Korea (Iran). For this question, assume that
North Korea (Iran) pos-sesses nuclear weapons. On the scale from
zero to ten, where zero means no risk and ten means extreme risk,
how do you rate the risk of the US being in-volved in a nuclear war
with North Korea (Iran) within the next ten years?
7.41 7.56 7.40 7.22 7.21
0
2
4
6
8
10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
xtreme Risk
No Risk
E
23
-
Figure 2.3: Mean Risks of Nuclear War Between the US and North
Korea or Iran in Next Ten Years
First, note that all means in each measurement period are above
midscale. Also note that North Korea’s first attempted nuclear test
explosion in Octo-ber 2006 (after our survey of that year) which
produced disputed results of whether a full nuclear explosion was
obtained was associated with only a modest increase in threat by
our subsequent measurement period one year later in 2007. During
the period from 2006 to 2008, Iran was judged, on av-erage, to be a
higher risk. North Korea’s second nuclear test was reported on May
25, 2009, shortly before our latest survey began, and likely is
associ-ated with a significant increase in perceived risk compared
to the previous measure in 2008 (p < .0001).2 These comparative
trends suggest that re-spondents in five measurement periods judge
the risk of US nuclear conflict with North Korea or Iran in the
coming decade to be substantial and grow-ing. Between 2005 and
2009, perceived risks of nuclear conflict with North Korea
increased about 12 percent, while risks of nuclear war with Iran
grew about 19 percent. While Iran—which has yet to demonstrate a
nuclear test explosion—is judged the higher risk in three of the
five survey periods, by 2009 both countries are perceived to pose
similar levels of risk of nuclear conflict with the United
States.
2 Throughout this study, we report the results of analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) in terms of p-value, which is a measure of the
probability that differences in means would have oc-curred by
chance. In this report, statistical significance is attributed to
those differences that would have occurred by chance fewer than
five times in 100 (equivalent to a 95 percent confidence level).
However, statistical significance does not always equate to policy
rele-vance. The importance of statistically significant differences
in means must be judged in the context of the variables being
measured and the groups being compared.
5.68
5.54 5.65 5.66
6.37
5.1
5.896.31
6.1
6.27
67
0
2
4
6
8
10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Iran
North Korea
Extreme Risk
No Risk
24
-
Next we ask the following questions regarding the risk that
North Korea or Iran might provide nuclear weapons or materials to
terrorists.
S17/S21 (separate questions asked for each state): Again,
assuming that North Korea (Iran) possesses nuclear weapons and
using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means no risk and ten
means extreme risk, how do you rate the risk of North Korea (Iran)
providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists?
In Figure 2.4 we compare trends in mean risk assessments.
Figure 2.4: Mean Risks of North Korea or Iran Providing Nuclear
Weapons or Nuclear Materials to Terrorists
Though all means are well above midscale, Iran is judged in each
measure-ment period to pose the greater risk of providing nuclear
weapons or mate-rials to terrorist groups. Mean perceived risks
increase about five percent for each country between 2005 and
2009.
Beginning in 2006, we added inquiries about public support for
using mili-tary force to compel North Korea or Iran to abandon
nuclear weapons pro-grams. As shown below, both lines of inquiry
assume that diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to cause either
state to abandon nuclear weapons ambitions. The first option
includes the use of US military forces acting as part of a United
Nations coalition; the second question asks about using US military
forces unilaterally. We compare trends in mean responses to each
question and for each country in Figures 2.5 and 2.6.
6.87 6.68 6.83
7.12 7.6
6.84 7.20
6 7.54 7.67 7.48
2008 2009
North Korea
xtreme Risk
No Risk 0
2
4
6
8
10
2005 2006 2007
Iran
E
25
-
S18/S22 (separate questions asked for each state): On a scale
from one to seven, where one means strongly oppose and seven means
strongly support, how would you feel about using US military
forces, as part of a United Nations military coalition, to compel
North Korea (Iran) to abandon its nuclear weap-ons program if
diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to achieve this goal?
S19/S23 (separate questions asked for each state): Again on a
scale from one to seven, where one means strongly oppose and seven
means strongly sup-port, how would you feel about using US military
forces, acting alone if nec-essary, to compel North Korea (Iran) to
abandon its nuclear weapons program if diplomatic efforts fail and
the United Nations declines to take such action?
Figure 2.5: Mean Support for Using US Forces as Part of a UN
Military Coalition to Force North Korea or Iran to Abandon Nuclear
Weapons Programs
Figure 2.6: Mean Support for Using US Military Forces
Unilaterally to Force North Korea or Iran to Abandon Nuclear
Weapons Programs
3.42 3.493.72
4.303.70 3.70
3.974.44
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2006 2007 2008 2009
trongly Support
y
Iran
North Korea
S
StronglOppose
4.39 4.434.71
5.194.71 4.65 4.87
5.18
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2006 2007 2008 2009
y
y ppose
StronglSupport
Iran
North Korea
StronglO
26
-
Both options for using force to compel North Korea or Iran to
abandon their respective nuclear weapons programs show similar
trends, with mean support for US participation in UN coalitional
efforts being significantly higher in ab-solute terms for all
measurement periods than mean support for unilateral US military
actions. Note that in most surveys, mean support within either
option is somewhat higher for compelling Iran than for compelling
North Korea to forego nuclear weapons capabilities. Note also the
upward direction for all four trend lines. Support for coalitional
action against Iran increases about ten percent between 2006 and
2009 while that for action against North Korea in-creases about 18
percent over the same period, and all means are above mid-scale.
Similarly, support for unilateral US military actions against Iran
grows about 20 percent, while support for unilateral actions
against North Korea in-creases almost 26 percent, and mean support
for each moves from below to above midscale. These data do not
suggest that most Americans favor either form of military action at
this time, but they do suggest growing public sup-port for future
military actions if diplomatic and economic efforts to prevent
either country to have nuclear weapons continue to be
unsuccessful.
Short Answer
Q: How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and
how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran?
Mean public assessments of the risks of further nuclear
proliferation to addi-tional countries steadily have been rated
above a value of seven on a zero-to-ten scale since our first
measurement in 2005. When asked to assess risks of nuclear conflict
with North Korea or Iran, assessments in 2009 are well above
midscale and have increased 12 percent for North Korea and 19
percent for Iran since 2005. Risks of North Korea or Iran providing
nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups also are rated
high in absolute terms (above seven on a zero-to-ten scale) and
have grown by about five percent for each country since 2005. When
asked to consider the use of US military forces to compel North
Korea or Iran to abandon nuclear weapons programs, mean support is
significantly higher for participating as part of a UN military
coalition than for acting unilaterally, and support for using
military force against Iran is some-what higher than for acting
against North Korea. Mean support for participat-ing in a military
coalition grew by 18 percent against North Korea and by ten percent
against Iran between 2006 and 2009. While lower in absolute
terms,
27
-
support has increased even more sharply for acting unilaterally
against either state should diplomatic and economic efforts
fail.
Section 2.2: Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence
here are two interrelated questions associated with better
under-standing how public judgments of the efficacy of nuclear
deterrence may be evolving. One question is: deterrence for what
purposes?
And the other is: deterring who? In answering either,
assumptions must be made about the other.
TDeterring Other States
Our most extensive measures about nuclear deterrence assume the
object of deterrence is one or more other states. Our inquiries
into the purposes for which deterrence is sought are: (a)
preventing the use of nuclear weapons against us; (b) preventing
the use of other weapons of mass destruction against us; and (c)
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear
materi-als to other states or to non-state groups. We begin with
the question for which we have the longest time series. We have
asked the following question in each of our surveys since 1995.
Mean responses are charted in Figure 2.7.
S24: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all
important and ten means extremely important, how important do you
believe US nuclear weapons are for preventing other countries from
using nuclear weapons against us today?
Figure 2.7: Mean Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring
Other Countries from Using Nuclear Weapons Against Us
Not At All Important
xtremely E
7.60 7.41 7.66 7.62 7.47 7.16 7.13 7.17 7.28 7.33
0
2
4
6
8
10
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09
Important
28
-
All means are above a value of seven and vary over only about
five percent of the scale. In the post-Cold War security
environment in which the two major nuclear arsenals have been
substantially reduced and the risk of inter-state nuclear war is
judged by most to have decreased from the nuclear standoff between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, mean valuations of US nu-clear weapons
for purposes of deterring use by other states has declined only 3.6
percent in 14 years. This illustrates that our respondents continue
to judge the efficacy of interstate nuclear deterrence to be
substantial.
In 1999 we began asking the following similar question about the
impor-tance of US nuclear weapons for deterring other countries
from using other types of weapons of mass destruction. Means are
compared in Figure 2.8.
S26: How important are US nuclear weapons for preventing other
countries from using chemical or biological weapons against us
today?
Figure 2.8: Mean Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring
Other Countries from Using Chemical or Biological Weapons Against
Us
Extremely
6.57
6.03 6.08 6.14 6.13 6.21 6.69 6.74
0
2
4
6
8
10
1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09
Important
Not At All Important
Again, all means are above midscale and public views of the mean
impor-tance of US nuclear weapons for deterring the use of chemical
or biological weapons against us has increased about three percent
since 1999.
The third purpose (at the state level) for which nuclear
deterrence might have utility relates to preventing other countries
from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists.
We have asked the following question annually since 2005. We show
mean responses in Figure 2.9.
29
-
S25: On the same scale from zero to ten, how important are US
nuclear weap-ons for preventing other countries from providing
nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists today?
Figure 2.9: Mean Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Preventing
Others From Providing Nuclear Weapons or Materials to
Terrorists
Extremely
Here too, we find a similar pattern, with all means above
midscale and a slight trend upward of about three percent.
These trends in mean responses suggest that our participants
continue to view US nuclear weapons as important for deterring the
use of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation by
other countries.
Deterring Nonstate Groups
The rise of nonstate entities capable of conducting terrorist
strikes raises the important question of what role, if any, US
nuclear weapons might play in deterring the use of nuclear or other
weapons of mass destruction by such groups. Deterrence theory
generally posits two requirements for effective deterrence. First,
attribution to a high degree of certainty of who used nu-clear or
other mass casualty weapons must be likely, and second,
unavoid-able retribution that would be unacceptable to the
initiator must be inescap-able. The difficulties of determining the
source of a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials employed by
nonstate terrorist groups and the difficulties of holding at risk
resources of such groups make deterring them problem-atic. To
measure how ordinary Americans perceive the utility of nuclear
6.03 5.72 5.97
0
2
4
6
8
10
2005 2006 2007
Important
6.19 6.24
2008 2009
Not At All Important
30
-
deterrence of such groups, in 2008 and 2009 we added the
following ques-tions to our series on the efficacy of nuclear
deterrence.
Lead-in: So far we have been asking you about deterring actions
by other countries. Now we want you to consider the importance of
US nuclear weap-ons for deterring terrorist groups that may have
members from several differ-ent countries and may operate from
multiple locations.
• S27: Using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means
not at all important and ten means extremely important, how
important are US nu-clear weapons for preventing terrorist groups
from using nuclear weapons against us today?
• S28: Again, on the same scale from zero to ten, how important
are US nu-clear weapons for preventing terrorist groups from using
chemical or bio-logical weapons against us today?
In Figures 2.10 and 2.11, we show distributions of responses and
mean val-ues in 2008 and 2009.
Figure 2.10: Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring
Terrorists from Using Nuclear Weapons Against Us
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2008: 5.98
2009: 6.34
Means
p = .0006
%
Not At All Important
Extremely Important
31
-
Figure 2.11: Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring
Terrorists from Using Chemical or Biological Weapons Against Us
Though many experts and analysts might disagree, most of our
respondents consider US nuclear weapons to have nontrivial utility
for deterring terrorist groups from employing weapons of mass
destruction against us, with modal responses for both questions
being the highest scale value of ten and means for both questions
in both years being above midscale.
Relating Age and Cold War Experience to Valuing Nuclear
Deterrence
Though the data presented above suggest that ordinary Americans
continue to value US nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, might
those valuations evolve as the Cold War era fades in memory and an
increasing proportion of the population comes to maturity without
having experienced the Cold War as adults? When we began our
investigations of the efficacy of nuclear deter-rence in 1995, only
eight percent of respondents had not experienced some part of the
Cold War as adults (defined as 18 years or older). By the time of
our latest survey in 2009, 28 percent lacked Cold War experience as
adults. As the Cold War recedes into history, will individuals who
did not experi-ence it as adults value nuclear deterrence
differently than those who coped with its nuclear tensions? If so,
Cold War experience might become an im-portant cohort factor for
future public valuation of nuclear security. Unfortu-nately,
answering this question is not as simple as comparing measures
among those who did and did not live through some portion of the
Cold War as adults. Comparisons are complicated by the systematic
effects of increas-
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2008: 5.77
2009: 6.16
Means
p = .0004
%
Not At All Important
Extremely Important
32
-
ing age—regardless of the experiences it encompasses. After
controlling for gender, education, race/ethnicity, income, and
ideology, age exerts a system-atic effect on valuations of the
efficacy of deterrence. As age increases, per-ceived importance of
nuclear deterrence also increases. To illustrate, we combine data
from all our surveys between 1995 and 2009 to focus on the central
deterrence question asked in each of the surveys—the importance of
US nuclear weapons for deterring other countries from using nuclear
weap-ons against us (Figure 2.7). After controlling for other
demographics and for political ideology, as age increases one year
(beginning with age 18), valua-tions of US nuclear weapons for
deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons increase 0.02
points on the zero-to-ten scale (p < .0001). This means that
valuations of nuclear deterrence increase 1.24 points or 12.4
percent be-tween the ages of 18 and 80.3
Our next step is to illustrate the cold war experience factor
without control-ling for the effects of chronological age. In
Figure 2.12 we compare mean responses to our question about the
importance of US nuclear weapons for deterring other states from
using nuclear weapons among those in each sur-vey period who did
and those who did not experience the Cold War as adults.
Figure 2.12: Mean Importance of Nuclear Deterrence Among Those
Who Did and Did Not Experience the Cold War as Adults (Not
Controlling for Age)
7.63 7.447.72 7.69 7.57
7.34 7.41 7.37 7.517.58
7.11 7.0
7.19 7.336.91
6.29 6.29 6.5
7
3 However, the relationship is not linear. Below ages in the
mid-thirties, rates of increase are slower per year of age; among
ages between the mid-thirties and mid-seventies, in-creases are
greater per year of age; and at ages beyond the mid-seventies,
assessed impor-tance of nuclear deterrence begins to decline.
2 6.546.72
5
6
7
8
9
10
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09
Experienced Cold War as Adults
Did Not Experience Cold War as Adults
0 = Not At All Important—10 = Extremely Important
idscaleM
33
-
Notice that only the top half of the response scale is depicted.
Differences in means between the two groups are statistically
significant for each meas-urement period except for 1997 and
2001.
Our final step in this analysis employs combined data from all
our surveys and uses multivariate regressions in which the
predictor variables include demographics, political ideology, and a
dummy variable coded such that those respondents who did not
experience the Cold War as adults are as-signed a value of one, and
all others are coded zero.4 These regressions in-dicate the
influence of not having experienced the Cold War, while
control-ling for chronological age, other demographic factors, and
ideology. Regression results are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Multiple Regressions Predicting Importance of US
Nuclear Weapons for Deterring Nuclear Use by Other Countries (S24)
Combined Data: 1995–2009 (n = 15,401)
Independent Variables
Coefficient(Slope)
t-Value
p-Value
Age (18–100) 0.02 9.05
-
of Americans who did not experience the Cold War as adults
grows, public valuations of interstate nuclear deterrence may
slowly erode.
Short Answer
Q: How are public beliefs about the efficacy of US nuclear
deterrence evolving?
Public assessments of the contemporary efficacy of nuclear
deterrence are nu-anced. When the objects of deterrence are other
countries, most respondents assign generally high, but
differentiated, valuations to US nuclear weapons for different
deterrence purposes. Using a scale from zero (not at all important)
to ten (extremely important), participants rate the mean importance
of US nu-clear weapons for deterring other countries from using
nuclear weapons against us at well above a value of seven. The mean
importance of US nuclear weapons for (a) deterring other countries
from using chemical or biological weapons, or (b) for deterring
other countries from providing nuclear weapons or materials to
terrorist groups is rated substantially lower, but each is above a
value of six on the same scale. The mean importance of US nuclear
weapons for deterring terrorist groups from using weapons of mass
destruction is statis-tically significantly lower still, but
remains above midscale.
The mean importance of nuclear deterrence systematically
increases with age (but not monotonically) and systematically
decreases among those respon-dents who did not experience the Cold
War as adults. Because the net effect of Cold War experience
potentially may be greater than that for chronologi-cal age, public
valuations of US nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes may slowly
erode as the number of Americans who experienced some por-tion of
the Cold War as adults declines.
Section 2.3: Preferences for the Future of US Nuclear
Weapons
o better understand public preference about the future of US
nuclear weapons, we pose questions and analyze responses relating
to the following issues:
• Importance assigned to US nuclear weapons for purposes other
than deterrence
T 35
-
• Support for retaining US nuclear weapons and for investing in
associated infrastructures
• Public preferences for the number of operationally deployed US
strategic nuclear weapons and conditions for reducing below the
level of 1,700 cur-rently agreed to with Russia
• General impressions about prospects for modernizing the US
nuclear arsenal
Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Purposes Other Than
Deterrence
To track trends in public valuations of US nuclear weapons for
non-deterrence purposes, we have been making the following inquiry
since 1993. The trend in mean responses is graphed in Figure
2.13.
S29: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all
important and ten means extremely important, how important are
nuclear weapons for maintaining US influence and status as a world
leader?
Figure 2.13: Mean Importance of Nuclear Weapons for US Influence
and Status
In each measurement period, mean responses are well above
midscale and the mean importance of nuclear weapons for US
influence and status has grown about 15 percent since 1993.
In 2005 we began asking the following related question.
6.18 6.53 6.466.88 7.00
0
2
4
6
8
10
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Not At All
6.93 6.74
6.88
6.75
6.90
7.14
2003 ‘0 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09portant
tremely portant
ExIm
Im
36
-
S30: Using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means not
at all im-portant and ten means extremely important, how important
are nuclear weap-ons for maintaining US military superiority?
Again we chart mean responses in Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14: Mean Importance of Nuclear Weapons for US Military
Superiority
When considering the importance of US nuclear weapons for
maintaining US military superiority, the trend is similar, with all
means above a value of seven on the zero-to-ten scale. Clearly, US
nuclear weapons are judged by our respondents to have value beyond
nuclear deterrence for such things as influence, status, and
military superiority. Eighteen years into the post-Cold War
security environment, we detect no lessening of the importance most
Americans attach to US nuclear weapons.
Given these valuations of US nuclear capabilities, how important
do par-ticipants think it is to retain US nuclear weapons today? We
chart the trend in mean responses to the following question in
Figure 2.15.
S33: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all
important and ten means extremely important, how important is it
for the US to retain nuclear weapons today?
7.08 7.13 7.07
0
2
4
6
8
10
2005 2006 2007
Not At All
7.22 7.32
2008 2009portant
tremely portant
ExIm
Im
37
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Figure 2.15: Mean Importance of Retaining US Nuclear Weapons
Today
Contrary to our initial expectations when we began this series,
mean assess-ments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons
increased about 15 percent between 1993 and 2009. In the early
post-Cold War period, mean assessments grew steadily to a peak
measured immediately following the ter-rorist attacks of 9/11.
After an initial adjustment following those events, means
stabilized above a value of seven on the zero-to-ten scale.
Given the trends in perceived utilities of US nuclear weapons
for deterrence and other purposes previously displayed, how
supportive are citizens of sus-taining investments in nuclear
weapons capabilities? Based on focus group discussions, we expect
relatively few members of the general pubic to be well-informed
about spending levels in various nuclear investment catego-ries. It
is challenging even for experts to track investments in nuclear
weap-ons infrastructures across dozens of funding categories and
among many different government agencies. And assessing what people
are willing to spend for “goods” of any type is a challenging
endeavor requiring econo-metric techniques such as contingent
valuation. But even if imprecise, hav-ing directional impressions
about public support for investing in nuclear weapons capabilities
can be useful for policy considerations. To provide general
directional trend information about public support for investing in
nuclear weapons infrastructures, we have posed the following
question in each of our surveys since 1993.
S50: On a scale from one to seven, where one means spending
should sub-stantially decrease and seven means spending should
substantially increase,
6.59 6.787.19 7.5
7.75
0
2
4
6
8
10
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Not At All
7.30 7.45
7.45 7.51
7.40 7.55
2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09
tremely portant
ExIm
Important
38
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how should government spending change for maintaining the
ability to de-velop and improve US nuclear weapons in the
future?
Most respondents do not begin from a position of knowing the
level of cur-rent spending, and they are not told to what levels
spending might increase or decrease. They are not forced to
consider trade-offs among competing investments (opportunity
costs), and they are not told to assume any addi-tional burden in
terms of taxes or per-capita costs. Accordingly, results are not
careful calibrations of spending choices, and we do not interpret
them as indicating support for or opposition to any given spending
level. Mean re-sponses are gross directional indicators of the
general sense respondents have about investing in the
infrastructures associated with the US nuclear arsenal. In figure
2.16 we chart the trend in mean responses.
Figure 2.16: Mean Judgments of How Spending Should Change for US
Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure
Means above midscale suggest a general receptivity to proposals
for in-creasing investments in nuclear weapons infrastructures;
those below mid-scale suggest a general sense that such investments
ought to decrease. The trend shows that from our initial
measurement in 1993 to the period imme-diately following 9/11, mean
support for nuclear weapons investments grew steadily to well above
midscale. Following 9/11, mean support for such in-vestments
declined and stabilized just above midscale, suggesting neither a
strong public sense that investments in nuclear weapons
infrastructures should increase nor decrease. Note that the
economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 did not produce a declining
willingness to invest in US nuclear weap-
3.68 4.00
4.454.78 5.02
4.47
4.05
4.33
4.18 4.18
4.33
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09
Substantially
Substantially Decrease
Increase
39
-
ons capabilities. In fact the mean in 2009 is higher than in
2007 or 2008, matching that last recorded in 2006, well before the
declining economic en-vironment. This pattern suggests that
policies for modifying such invest-ments may be more elastic and
accommodating than reactive to the eco-nomic climate.
Public Preferences for Sizing the US Nuclear Arsenal
In 2008 and 2009, we employed a multistage approach to
investigate how many nuclear weapons are perceived to be
sufficient. In the first stage, we provide respondents with a
shared basic factual foundation using the fol-lowing statement:
Lead-in: Currently the US and Russia have more nuclear weapons
than any other countries. The US and Russia have agreed to reduce
their numbers of operation-ally deployed strategic nuclear weapons
to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by the year 2012.
In stage two, we present respondents with the following opposing
argu-ments appearing in random order.
Some people argue that since the end of the Cold War, US nuclear
weapons have become much less important for our security and that
of our allies. They argue that the US needs only a few hundred
strategic nuclear weapons to pre-vent other countries or terrorist
groups from using nuclear weapons against us or our key allies that
do not have nuclear weapons such as Germany, Japan, and South
Korea. They think money spent on maintaining a large US nuclear
arsenal should be substantially reduced.
Some people argue that because nuclear weapons have spread to
other coun-tries such as India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea,
and because Iran and some terrorist groups may be seeking nuclear
weapons, it would be unwise for the US to reduce below 1,700
operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons currently agreed
to with Russia. They think money spent on the US nuclear arsenal
must be sustained to prevent others from using nuclear weap-ons
against us, and to reduce the need for our key allies to develop
nuclear weapons of their own.
In the final stage of the inquiry, we pose the following
question:
S35: Assuming zero is the minimum number and 2,200 is the
maximum num-ber, how many operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons do you think
40
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the United States needs to prevent other countries or terrorist
groups from us-ing nuclear weapons against us and our key
allies?
Note that the response range is bounded by zero at the low end
and by the existing agreement with Russia at the high end.
Responses are recorded verbatim; values above 2,200 cannot be
entered, but any number between zero and 2,200 is accepted. We
display distributions of responses from 2008 and 2009 grouped into
categories of 200 each in Figure 2.17.
Figure 2.17: Preferred Number of US Operationally Deployed
Strategic Nuclear Weapons
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 1- 200
201-400
401-600
601-800
801-1000
1001-1200
1201-1400
1401-1600
1601- 1800
1801- 2000
2001- 2200
%
2008: Mean = 1,425 / Median = 1,700 2009: Mean = 1,342 / Median
= 1,500
In 2009, ten percent of respondents choose zero; 25 percent
choose a range between one and 500; 13 percent select values of
501–1,000; 13 percent prefer a number from 1,001–1,500; 23 percent
select a value from 1,501–2,000; and 27 percent choose the modal
response of 2,001–2,200.5
To help gage opinions about conditions warranting reductions
below the lower limit of 1,700, we posed four randomly ordered
policy statements and asked participants in 2008 and 2009 to
respond to them on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven
(strongly agree). We show each statement and corresponding mean
responses in Table 2.2.
5 Responses to similar question in previous surveys in which
upper boundaries were not specified suggest that some respondents
would have selected higher numbers had those response options been
available.
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-
Table 2.2: Mean Stockpile Policy Preferences (1 = Strongly
Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)
2008 2009
S36: The US should not reduce the level of its nuclear stockpile
below the level of any other country.
5.13 5.10
S37: The US should decrease the numbers of operationally
deployed strategic nuclear weapons below the planned minimum of
1,700 if Russia agrees to similar reductions that are
verifiable.
4.09 4.07
S38: The US should continue to reduce the numbers of
operationally de-ployed strategic nuclear weapons below 1,700, even
if Russia does not.
3.05 3.11
S39: Having large numbers of nuclear weapons is no longer
necessary. As long as we have a few dozen nuclear weapons, we can
prevent others from using nuclear weapons against us and our key
allies.
3.36 3.33
S40: Regardless of what others do, the US should eliminate all
its nuclear weapons as soon as possible. This would put the US in a
position of moral leadership by setting an example for others; it
would bring the US into compliance with a key objective of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and it would make the world
safer.
2.65 2.74
Mean responses to these five policy options suggest that
participants are open to reducing below 1,700 operationally
deployed US strategic nuclear weapons if Russia agrees to matching
reductions that are verifiable. How-ever, most do not want the US
to have a smaller nuclear arsenal than any other country, and mean
support is below midscale for reducing unilaterally below 1,700.
Proposals for very low numbers approaching zero are opposed by most
respondents.
Public Preferences for Modernizing the US Nuclear Arsenal
To better understand public views on the advisability of
modernizing the US nuclear arsenal, we again employed a three stage
inquiry in 2008 and 2009. We begin by providing the following
shared basic statement of fact:
Lean-in: Existing US nuclear weapons were designed to meet needs
during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was our primary
adversary. They remain safe and effective, but are aging and
expensive to maintain and refurbish. Currently we spend about 6.5
billion dollars per year maintaining the US nuclear stock-pile and
associated infrastructure. New nuclear weapons could be designed
and
42
-
built with different goals, including making them safer and
cheaper to maintain over the long-term, but new nuclear weapons are
controversial.
Following the introductory statement of fact, we present the
following ran-domly ordered opposing perspectives:
Supporters of new US nuclear weapons argue that they would be
safer and more reliable; they would be better suited to our current
security needs; we would need fewer of them; and over the life of
the weapons, they would cost less than maintaining and refurbishing
our current stockpile. They also note that new nuclear weapons
could be developed without nuclear testing.
Opponents of new US nuclear weapons argue that they would
stimulate a new nuclear arms race, encourage the spread of nuclear
weapons to more coun-tries, and be expensive to develop. They argue
that even if existing nuclear weapons do cost more in the long-run,
developing new nuclear weapons sends the wrong signal to the rest
of the world.
After providing a factual baseline and summarizing key opposing
argu-ments, we ask participants the following question:
S46: On a scale from one to seven, where one means strongly
oppose and seven means strongly support, how do you feel about
developing new US nuclear weapons?
Figure 2.18: Views on Developing New US Nuclear Weapons
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2008: 4.43
2009: 4.56
Means
p = .0326
Strongly Oppose
Strongly Support
%
43
-
About 24 percent of respondents in 2009 oppose the option of
developing new US nuclear weapons; another 24 percent are undecided
or neutral; while 53 percent express support for the option. To
test sensitivity of sup-port to cost factors, we follow this
inquiry with one that tells respondents to assume that developing
new nuclear weapons would allow the US to reduce life cycle costs
of its nuclear weapons and associated infrastructures by one-third
to one-half. Under those assumptions, support grows in 2009 from 52
percent to 62 percent, and the mean response increases
significantly from 4.56 to 4.98 (p < .0001). Results suggest
that public views on modernizing the US nuclear arsenal vary
predictably with cost/savings assumptions.
To monitor trend information on willingness to invest in new
nuclear weap-ons, we have been asking the following question since
1993:
S48: On a scale from one to seven, where one means spending
should sub-stantially decrease and seven means spending should
substantially increase, how should government spending change for
developing and testing new nu-clear weapons?
We display the trend in mean responses in Figure 2.19.
Figure 2.19: How Government Spending Should Change for
Developing and Testing New Nuclear Weapons (Means)
When we began asking this question only 18 months after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, most participants preferred that
spending decrease for de-veloping and testing new nuclear weapons.
Between then and our latest measurement in 2009, mean support grew
by a substantial 48 percent to
2.77 2.613.13
3.453.79
3.42 3.66
4.06
3.82 3.97
4.11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09
ubstantially Increase
ubstantially Decrease
S
S
44
-
45
slightly above midscale, registering our highest mean level of
support to date. This trend, combined with the mean of 4.56 shown
in Figure 2.18, suggests that public support for investing in new
US nuclear weapons has evolved from opposition in the early
post-Cold War years to a more accommodating position today. This
trend is even more surprising when considering that growing public
support has been sustained through recent and contemporary
downturns in general economic conditions. While these data do not
reflect widespread support for increasing such investments,
multiple samples of the general public over a 16 year period of the
post-Cold War era indicate sus-tained and even growing public
willingness to consider modernizing the US nuclear arsenal—even in
the face of difficult economic times.
Short Answer
Q: What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear
weapons?
In addition to nuclear deterrence, Americans continue to believe
US nuclear weapons are important for maintaining US military
superiority and interna-tional influence. Support for retaining US
nuclear weapons averages about 7.5 on a 0–10 scale and has
increased about 15 percent since 1993. When asked to size the US
nuclear arsenal between zero and 2,200 operationally deployed
strategic nuclear weapons, the average preference in 2009 is 1,342,
with ten percent preferring zero and 26 percent preferring 2,200.
Re-spondents are open to reducing below 1,700 if Russia agrees to
matching and verifiable levels, but most do not want the US to have
fewer than any other country. Mean support for investing in US
nuclear weapons infra-structure is above midscale and has increased
about 18 percent since 1993. When presented with balanced arguments
for and against modernizing the US nuclear stockpile, 52 percent
support developing new nuclear weapons, 24 percent are undecided,
and 24 percent oppose new weapons. Support for investing in nuclear
weapons infrastructure or in new nuclear weapons has not declined
in the face of difficult economic conditions.
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Chapter Three Security from Terrorism
In this chapter we address public views on the following
questions about security from terrorism:
• How are public assessments of the threat of terrorism
changing, and how do they vary across demographic groups and
political orientations?
• How is tolerance for intrusive domestic measures for
preventing terrorism influenced by threat perceptions and world
views?
• How do members of the public rate domestic efforts to prevent
terrorism in the US, how do they assess our abilities to respond to
acts of terrorism, and how confident are they that we eventually
will prevail in the struggle against terrorism?
Section 3.1: Evolving Public Assessments of the Threat of
Terrorism
ssessing public concerns about terrorism in a useful manner
requires over time measurements of multiple dimensions of potential
threats. In 2008 we began asking a battery of questions involving
overall
perceived threats of terrorism in the US and abroad, as well as
perspectives of how the overall threat might evolve in the coming
decade. Additionally, we inquire about more specific dimensions of
the terrorist threat to include weapons of mass destruction and
suicide bombings. Responses to the follow-ing battery of eight
terrorism threat questions provide the basis for tracking trends as
well as examining specific dimensions of perceived threats.
A
Lead-in: The following questions focus specifically on the issue
of terrorism. For each, please consider both the likelihood of
terrorism and its potential consequences. Each is answered on a
scale from zero to ten, where zero means no threat and ten means
extreme threat.
• S53: Remembering to consider both the likelihood and potential
conse-quences, how do you rate the overall threat of terrorism of
all types throughout the world today?
46
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• S54: Focusing more specifically on our own country, and
considering both foreign and domestic sources of terrorism, how do
you rate the threat of all kinds of terrorism in the United States
today?
• S55: Narrowing our focus to the threat of nuclear terrorism,
how do you rate the threat of terrorists creating a nuclear
explosion in the United States today?
• S56: So-called “dirty” bombs are devices that use conventional
explosives to scatter radioactive materials. How do you rate the
threat of terrorists us-ing a dirty bomb in the United States
today?
• S57: Biological devices are used to spread biological agents
such as germs and viruses. How do you rate the threat of terrorists
using a biological de-vice in the United States today?
• S58: Chemical terrorism could result from terrorist attacks on
US chemical installations or by terrorists purposely dispensing
dangerous chemical agents. How do you rate the threat of chemical
terrorism in the United States today?
• S59: How do you rate the threat of suicide