American Shipping Company ASA · Jones Act tanker & ATB ownership based on carrying capacity 8 Source: Navigistics’ Wilson Gillette Report and AMSC Analysis Note: Measured as carrying

Company PresentationJune 2020

American Shipping Company ASA

Important information

This Company Presentation is current as of June 2020. Nothing herein shall create any implication that

there has been no change in the affairs of American Shipping Company ASA ("AMSC" or the

"Company") since such date. This Company Presentation contains forward-looking statements relating

to the Company's business, the Company's prospects, potential future performance and demand for

the Company's assets, the Jones Act tanker market and other forward-looking statements. Forward-

looking statements concern future circumstances and results and other statements that are not

historical facts, sometimes identified by the words "believes", "expects", "predicts", "intends", "projects",

"plans", "estimates", "aims", "foresees", "anticipates", "targets", and similar expressions. The forward-

looking statements contained in this Company Presentation, including assumptions, opinions and views

of the Company or cited from third party sources, are solely opinions and forecasts which are subject to

risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual events to differ materially from any

anticipated development.

2

Table of contents

AMSC FINANCIAL OVERVIEW2

MARKET OVERVIEW3

APPENDIXA

COMPANY OVERVIEW1

4

Introduction to AMSC Fleet overview

* Market cap. based on closing share price of NOK 24.00 per June 2st, 2020

▪ Established in 2005

▪ Oslo listed with market capitalization of USD ~150m*

o OSE ticker: AMSC

o U.S. OTC ticker: ASCJF

o Bond ticker: AMTI01

▪ Pure play Jones Act tanker owner with a modern tanker fleet

▪ Long-term bareboat contracts generate stable, predictable cash flow

▪ Fleet well positioned to reap upside in a rising Jones Act tanker market

▪ Solid balance sheet with no debt maturities before 2022

# Vessel Design Type Built

1 Overseas Houston Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2007

2 Overseas Long Beach Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2007

3 Overseas Los Angeles Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2007

4 Overseas New York Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2008

5 Overseas Texas City Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2008

6 Overseas Boston Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2009

7 Overseas Nikiski Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2009

8 Overseas Martinez Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2010

9 Overseas Anacortes Veteran Class MT 46 MR 2010

10 Overseas Tampa Veteran Class MT 46 Shuttle tanker 2011

American Shipping Company (AMSC)

Charters

include

S&P

rating

A+

A-

AA-

BBB+

BBB-

TC

TC

TC

TC

TC

TC

TC

TC

TC

TC

Firm BBC with Evergreen Extensions

BBC exp. Dec 2022

BBC exp. Dec 2022

BBC exp. Dec 2022

BBC exp. Dec 2022

BBC exp. Dec 2022

BBC exp. Dec 2023

BBC exp. Dec 2023

BBC exp. Dec 2023

BBC exp. Dec 2023

BBC Options

BBC Options

BBC Options

BBC Options

BBC Options

BBC Options

BBC Options

BBC Options

BBC Options

OptionsBBC exp. Jun 2025

Variety of TC Durations

Bareboat charter to OSGAmerican Shipping Company OSG time charters to blue chip end users

Long term contracts returning stable cash flow

5

Houston

Long Beach

Los Angeles

New York

Texas City

Boston

Nikiski

Martinez

Anacortes

Tampa

Long term charters with evergreen extension options offers AMSC downside protection with upside potential

through a profit share mechanism with OSG

Normalized EBITDA (USD millions) Normalized EBITDA per quarter (USD millions)

6

▪ Normalized EBITDA of USD 22.2 million every quarter is mainly based on contracted bareboat charter hire

▪ USD 1 million is repayments from OSG on a deferred payment obligation

85 85 85 84 85

3 4 411 10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

20182015 20172016

4 4

2019

DPOProfit Share Reported EBITDA

21 21 21 21 21 21 22 21

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

Q2 18

1 1

Q1 18 Q4 18

1

Q3 18

1 1

Q1 19

1

Q2 19

1

Q3 19

1

Q4 19

Reported EBITDADPO

History of stable and predictable EBITDA

Diversified business across multiple segments

OSG - leading Jones Act operator and strong counterpart

1923

10

22

2

4

4

0

5

10

15

20

25

AMSCowned MRs

OSG ownedMRs

ATBs LighteringATBs

MSPtankers

ATCTankers

Total OSGcontrolled

# v

essels

7

▪ Q1 2020 demonstrated substantially improved revenue and

EBITDA, which is expected to continue for the remainder of the

year

OSG financial overview

OSG is a well capitalized and strong counterparty with a diversified U.S. Flag and Jones Act tanker operation

▪ OSG’s business is spanning across multiple Jones Act tanker and ATB segments as well as US Flag and Alaska crude tankers

▪ Overall diversified business with strong cash flow generation expected for 2020, as more than 90% of fleet has TC contract cover for the year to high credit quality end users

▪ AMSC’s 10 vessels are a core part of OSG’s Jones Act tanker fleet accounting for 50% of revenue

Source: OSG Q1 2020 earnings presentation

Breakdown of OSG’s fleet

Jones Act tanker & ATB ownership based on carrying capacity

8

Source: Navigistics’ Wilson Gillette Report and AMSC AnalysisNote: Measured as carrying capacity by barrels and excludes 11 large Alaska Crude Tankers, but includes 2x newbuild ATS for delivery in Q2 and Q4 2020

AMSC fleet

AMSC fleet is a major component of the Jones Act tanker fleet

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

OSG Kinder Morgan Crowley Seacor US Shipping Bouchard Kirby Moran Genesis Keystone Reinauer

AMSC enjoys a key position in the

Jones Act tanker market with a fleet

which represents ~28% of all modern

tanker below 20 years (36 in total)

AMSC has the most cost-efficient fleet …

Strong competitive position reduces re-chartering risk

Notes: 1) Based on Philly Tankers. 2) Based on newbuild cost for the tankers delivered to American Petroleum Tankers. 3) Based on total consideration for 9 vessels, including additional

expenses incurred by Kinder Morgan for taking delivery of newbuilds. 4) Based on average price for 4 vessels.

Source: Company materials

Newbuild delivered costs 2015-2017

S&P transaction values 2013-2015

9

…due to substantially lower delivered cost

Annual bareboat costs given various total capital IRRs with

newbuild cost @ USD 134m and USD 150m

135

130 3)

107

142 4

157

1341) 1342)

150

▪ AMSC has an average delivered cost of USD107m per vessel

▪ Considerable lower than its peers which have either built or bought vessel at prices ranging from USD130-157m

▪ Current estimated newbuild cost at Philly or NASSCO would be around USD150m assuming an order for multiple vessels, with earliest delivery in 2025

▪ AMSC’s bareboat rate reflects the low delivered cost

▪ Provides AMSC with the lowest bareboat breakeven levels in the modern Jones Act tanker fleet

▪ Current average bareboat rate of $24,050 per day represents at least $10,000 per day cost advantage compared to competitors

Estimated newbuild delivered cost in 2025

Table of contents

AMSC FINANCIAL OVERVIEW2

MARKET OVERVIEW3

APPENDIXA

COMPANY OVERVIEW1

All debt is fully supported by entire AMSC business

11

ASC Leasing

I

ASC Leasing

II

ASC Leasing

III

ASC Leasing

IV

ASC Leasing

V

ASC Leasing

VI

ASC Leasing

VII

ASC Leasing

IX

Overseas

Houston

Overseas

Long Beach

Overseas

Los Angeles

Overseas

New York

Overseas

Texas City

Overseas

Boston

Overseas

Nikiski

Overseas

Anacortes

American Shipping

Corporation

CIT

FacilityEuropean Facility

American Shipping

Company ASA

American Tanker

Holding Company

American Tanker IncUSD220m Senior

Unsecured Bond

ASC Leasing

VIII

Overseas

Martinez

ASC Leasing

X

Overseas

Tampa

U.S. Facility

Guarantors

Year End 2019 debt structure Current debt structure

Enhanced debt structure and reduced debt service

12

69

237

46

220Bond

Q4 2019

Tampa Facility

BNP Facility

Martinez Facility

66

132

143

220

Est Q2 2020

Tampa Facility

NEW European Facility

with ~25m undrawn RCF

NEW U.S. Facility

AMSC successfully closed its bank debt refinancing in April 2020 at much improved terms and increased flexibility

Libor swapped for 5 years at an average rate of 0.49% for USD 220 million of the bank debt

FRN 9.25%

L+3.95%

L+3.95%

L+2.90%

FRN 9.25%

L+3.25%

L+3.95%

L+2.70%

Total debt USD 572m

Annual debt service USD 68mTotal debt USD 561m

Annual debt service ~USD 60m

Bond

(USD ~11m lower)

(USD ~8m lower)

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Secured Bank Debt Unsecured Bond Debt Replacement cost parity

Delevering through debt amortization

13*USD 150m replacement cost per vessel, 30 years useful economic life, depreciation to 0, and 11 years average fleet age in 2020

Ample headroom between total debt and replacement cost parity value of fleet

Year-end

USDm

Debt / EBITDA (x) EBITDA / interest (x)

FFO / debt (%)

Improved credit metrics

14

7.9x 7.8x

7.4x7.1x

6.7x6.4x

5.8x

0.0x

1.0x

2.0x

3.0x

4.0x

5.0x

6.0x

7.0x

8.0x

9.0x

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E

1.8x

2.3x

1.9x2.0x 2.0x

2.7x2.8x

0.0x

0.5x

1.0x

1.5x

2.0x

2.5x

3.0x

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E

6%

7%6%

7% 7%

10%

11%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E

Notes: Calculations assume USD 25m undrawn RCF capacity. Bank debt interest pro-forma for refinancing calculated assuming LIBOR = 0.493% (agreed swap rate for USD ~220m of the outstanding bank debt)

for all bank debt. FFO defined as EBITDA less interest expense. Source: Company

Track record of delevering and estimated improving credit metrics going forward –

impact of bank refinancing only from 2020 onwards

Illustrative cash flow waterfall

15

Pro-forma post bank refinancing

TTM (1Q20)

88

4

89

2029

3

28

20

20

27

13

20

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

TT

M F

ixe

d B

BC

Re

ven

ue

TT

M D

efe

rre

d C

ha

rte

r H

ire

(DP

O) TT

M S

G&

A

TT

M N

orm

aliz

ed E

BIT

DA

TT

M B

ank D

ebt

Am

ort

iza

tio

n

TT

M N

et

Inte

rest E

xp

en

se

(excl. b

on

d)

TT

M B

ond

Co

upo

n

TT

M F

ree

Ca

sh

Flo

w

Ba

nk D

ebt

Am

ort

iza

tio

n

Ba

nk I

nte

rest

Bo

nd

Co

upo

n

Fre

e C

ash

Flo

w

US

Dm

▪ Bareboat charters and DPO (less SG&A) provides a comfortable cash flow for debt service

- Stable, low risk from fully

chartered fleet

▪ Figures pro-forma for the bank refinancing are based on a full year of debt service following the refinancing, and assumes that the RCF is fully drawn

Note: Cash flow illustration excludes profit share. Bank debt interest pro-forma for refinancing calculated assuming LIBOR = 0.493% (agreed swap rate for USD ~220m of the outstanding bank debt) for all bank

debt, and USD 25m RCF capacity undrawn. Source: Company

Bank debt refinancing increases free cash flow substantially and allows AMSC to service Bond Coupon with ease

Simplified cash flow waterfall TTM and pro-forma for recent bank debt refinancing

Solid market

fundamentals

Credit metrics

Business model

providing stability and

long-term visibility

Largest listed pure play

Jones Act tanker owner –

with strong revenue

backlog

Investment highlights: Q1 2020 vs Q1 2017

16

▪ Fleet of 9x MR tankers + 1x shuttle tanker, operating in the US Jones Act market

▪ Average age of 8.4 years across the fleet

▪ USD 314m secured bareboat revenue backlog

▪ Average contract duration of 3.6 years

▪ Stable cash flow from bareboat contracts at fixed rates and DPO from OSG, with attractive evergreen extension options

▪ Upside potential from profit share arrangement

▪ Pro-forma debt to TTM EBITDA of 8.0x

▪ Pro-forma net debt to TTM EBITDA of 7.3x

▪ TTM EBITDA to interest expense of 2.2x

▪ Substantial fleet growth coming to an end in 2017. Some scrapping of older tonnage

▪ JA tanker market at a through early 2017, but with promising outlook

▪ Fleet of 9x MR tankers + 1x shuttle tanker, operating in the US Jones Act market

▪ Average age of 11.4 years across the fleet

▪ USD 300m secured bareboat revenue backlog

▪ Average contract duration of 3.4 years

▪ Pro-forma debt to TTM EBITDA of 6.6x

▪ Pro-forma net debt to TTM EBITDA of 6.1x

▪ TTM EBITDA to interest expense 2.6x

▪ Continued scrapping with orderbook close to zero added to market tightening in 2019

▪ Jones Act tanker rates on the rise – TC rates reached USD 60,000 per day in 2019, well above the AMSC vessels’ cash breakeven for OSG

ChangeQ1 2020Q1 2017

▪ Announced exercise of extension options by OSG on all 10x vessels in the last two years, providing 100% utilization until end of 2022

▪ Distributed stable dividend of USD 0.08/quarter unchanged for the last three years

Source:Company filings

Table of contents

AMSC FINANCIAL OVERVIEW2

JONES ACT MARKET OVERVIEW3

APPENDIXA

COMPANY OVERVIEW1

Jones Act – a Vital Part of the US Economy

▪ The Jones Act generally restricts the marine transportation of

cargo and passengers between points in the United States to

vessels that meet the following criteria:

- Built in the United States

- Registered under the U.S. flag

- Manned predominately by U.S. crews

- At least 75% owned and controlled by U.S. citizens

- AMSC’s presence in the Jones Act market is made

possible by the lease finance exception of the Jones

Act

▪ The Jones Act is an essential feature in U.S. national security

- Ensuring non- dependency of ships controlled by

foreign nations

- Maintaining critical domestic shipbuilding capacity

- Supporting a domestic pool of highly skilled mariners

▪ The Jones Act is a significant contributor to the US economy

- Large U.S. employer

- Substantial amounts of capital invested

Source: American Maritime Partnership and U.S. Maritime Administration 18

The Jones Act has been in place since 1920… … and is a vital part of the US economy

100,000,000,000USD 100bn contribution to the US

domestic economy

30,000,000,000USD 30bn total investment in

over 40,000 vessels

400,000Number of jobs directly and indirectly

impacted by the US maritime industry

Delaware Bay Lightening (Crude)

Shuttle tankers from deep water U.S. Gulf to Gulf Coast Refineries (Crude)

Crude from Corpus Christi, TX to LOOP (not shown)

Crude from Corpus Christie and Beaumont to Northeast

Jones Act crude oil & products primary trade routes

A Critical Part of Oil Majors’ Transportation Logistics

19

Jones Act Tanker Routes:

Gulf Coast refineries to Florida and East Coast (Clean)

Mid-Atlantic to New England (Clean)

Alaska and Intra-west coast movements (Clean/Dirty)

Cross-Gulf movements (Dirty)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

4

2

5

3

EAGLE

FORD

PERMIAN

1

Patoka, IL

1US GULF

Key US Oilfields

Clean Pipeline

Barges

Crude Pipeline

8

8

Source: Navigistics’ Wilson Gillette Report Apr 2020

BAKKEN

Cushing, OK

Majority of Fleet Carry Clean Products - highly stable trade over time

20

Fleet deployment by main trades (Tankers and ATBs) US Clean Product Demand stable over time

Source: Navigistics’ Wilson Gillette Report Apr 2020, EIA and AMSC analysis, EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report May 27, 2020. Note: 1) Idle capacity refers only to ATBs mostly approaching scrapping

3%5%

21%

22%

42%

West Coast

ChemicalsMSC

6%

Idle1)

Crude Oil

Clean USG

April 2020

Total capacity: ~22.9 mbbls

▪ Total clean products demand in the US is very stable over time

▪ Highly inelastic to price, as only very low (below $2pg) or very high prices(above $4.5pg) seems to have impact on demand

▪ Currently fuel demand is severely impacted by “stay at home policies” across the US, caused by the Covid-19 pandemic

▪ EIA is forecasting a gradual return to normal demand by the end of 2020

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

20000

22000

24000

Demand for Clean Products (mbbls per day)

Short term dip in clean product demand expected to be followed by gradual recovery in 2H 2020

▪ Demand for clean products in the USA decreased by 35% in April

▪ Recovery has already started as the US economy is gradually opening up

Source: EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report May 27 2020

21

Drop in clean products demand already recovering EIA forecast gradual recovery in 2020

▪ Pick up in demand for gasoline will be driven by:

- Less interest in public transportation, less mass airline

travelling, less cruise vacation

- All leading to “Staycation” in the USA involving more

automobile driving

▪ Demand for diesel is less impacted due its industrial nature being consumed by trucks, buses, machinery, etc.

▪ Demand for Jet fuel will likely suffer until commercial air traffic is back in favour

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

4-J

an

8-F

eb

8-M

ar

5-A

pr

3-M

ay

31

-Ma

y

28

-Ju

n

26

-Ju

l

23

-Au

g

20-S

ep

18

-Oct

15-N

ov

13

-Dec

Total demand for Gasoline, Diesel and Jet fuel

Range 2015-2019 2020

Increasing seaborn transportation of clean products from US Gulf to East Coast

Gulf Coast to Florida Trade Lane

Steady long term growth in clean product shipments to Florida

22

1

PADD 1

PADD 3

PADD 2

Jacksonville

Port Everglades

Tampa

Corpus

Christi

HoustonBeaumont

New

Orleans

Pascagoula

Mbbls per month

▪ As Florida has no pipeline connection nor any refineries, all clean products consumed are supplied by sea

▪ Florida is sourcing 90% of its clean products demand on a Jones Act tanker from US Gulf refineries

▪ Florida consumption is split 65-70% Gasoline, 15-20% Diesel and 10-15% Jet fuel

▪ Increasing consumption of clean products in Florida is driving demand for Jones Act tanker shipments cross US Gulf

▪ Over the past 10 years this trade has grown with a CAGR of about 3.5%

▪ Demand impact from Covid-19 mitigating measures expected to reduce shipments in 2020, but return to normal in 2021

12.5

17.5

22.5

27.5

Ma

r-2

01

0

Jun

-20

10

Sep

-20

10

De

c-2

01

0

Ma

r-2

01

1

Jun

-20

11

Sep

-20

11

De

c-2

01

1

Ma

r-2

01

2

Jun

-20

12

Sep

-20

12

De

c-2

01

2

Ma

r-2

01

3

Jun

-20

13

Sep

-20

13

De

c-2

01

3

Ma

r-2

01

4

Jun-

2014

Sep

-20

14

De

c-2

01

4

Ma

r-2

01

5

Jun-

2015

Sep

-20

15

De

c-2

01

5

Ma

r-2

01

6

Jun

-20

16

Sep

-20

16

De

c-2

01

6

Ma

r-2

01

7

Jun

-20

17

Sep

-20

17

De

c-2

01

7

Ma

r-2

01

8

Jun

-20

18

Sep

-20

18

De

c-2

01

8

Ma

r-2

01

9

Jun-

2019

Sep

-20

19

De

c-2

01

9

Ma

r-2

02

0

Mb

bl

PADD 1 Receipts of Products by Tanker and Barge from PADD 3 Trendline 3.5% CAGR

PADD 3 to PADD 1 Crude Oil Moves by Tanker and Barge Trade lane carrying Crude from Gulf Coast to U.S. Northeast

23Source: EIA, Marine Traffic and AMSC analysis

PADD 1

6

PADD 3

PADD 2

Jacksonville

Port Everglades

Tampa

Corpus

Christi

HoustonBeaumont

New

Orleans

Pascagoula

Washington

New YorkPhiladelphia

Boston

Crude trade to Northeast has remained strong despite current oil market volatility

▪ Historically, volumes have been driven by spread in pricing of

U.S. Crude Oil vs international alternatives

▪ Low crude oil price and falling US oil production is potentially

increasing oil price spread volatility going forward

0

1

2

3

4

Jan

-20

13

May

-20

13

Sep

-20

13

Jan

-20

14

May

-20

14

Sep

-201

4

Jan

-20

15

May

-201

5

Sep

-201

5

Jan

-20

16

May

-201

6

Sep

-201

6

Jan

-20

17

May

-201

7

Sep

-201

7

Jan

-20

18

May

-201

8

Sep

-201

8

Jan

-20

19

May

-20

19

Sep

-20

19

Jan

-20

20

May

-20

20

Mb

bl

Padd 3 to Padd 1 'PADD 3 to PADD 1 Crude Movements by Tanker

Fleet profile by vessel ageConsiderable fleet growth in past years, but scrapping has already reduced active fleet to 2015 levels

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

3540 14550 30 25 20 15 10 5

Scrap/lay up

ATBs AMSC

Tankers

24

Source: Navigistics’ Wilson Gillette Report Apr 2020, broker reports and AMSC analysis

Fleet Reduction as Scrapping Continues

Number of vessels

Candidates for

scrapping

Kbbls capacity

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Fleet Scrapping

Actual Projected

2015 levels

Net capacity reduction driven by scrapping and limited orderbook

25

Source: Navigistics’ Wilson Gillette Report Apr 2020, broker reports and AMSC analysis

Negative Fleet Growth

0% 0%

15%

12%

6%

-7%

-4%-2%

-5%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

▪ Since 2016, five tankers and thirteen ATBs has been

scrapped, sold for operations outside the Jones Act

market or gone into definite lay-up

▪ The entire JA tanker orderbook consist of two small

barges for delivery in 2020 and no new tankers

expected in the next five years

▪ Yard capacity for tankers are limited with NASSCO

mainly building navy ships and Philly Shipyard building

MARAD Training Ships

▪ Likely delivered cost for a newbuild is now around

USD150m with first available delivery slot in 2025

▪ Sustainable multi-year TC rates of ~USD70,000 per

day required to justify newbuilds

26

Summary – long term stable business model despite short term volatility imposed by Covid-19

INCREASING DEMAND

IN KEY TRADES

▪ Continued strong crude trade from U.S. Gulf to the U.S. Northeast

▪ Growing clean trade into Florida and to U.S. Northeast

▪ Jones Act tanker market expected to remain stable despite current volatility

REDUCING FLEET

CAPACITY WITH NO YARD

AVAILABILTY

▪ Slim orderbook with only two replacement barges for delivery in 2020

▪ No available yard capacity to build Jones ACT tankers until 2025 or later

▪ Negative fleet growth expected next two years as scrapping of old tonnage continues

STRONG AND IMPROVING

CREDIT METRICS

▪ Modest secured loan to value, leaving substantial equity support for unsecured lenders

▪ Contracted cash flow providing solid debt service coverage

▪ Significant free cash flow generation offer further liquidity buffer for creditors

LONG TERM CONTRACTS

PROVIDE STABLE CASH FLOW

▪ Bareboat contracts provide strong and stable cash flows

▪ Likely to continue with OSG for many years through evergreen extension options

▪ Most cost competitive fleet reduces re- chartering risk