American Serbs and Old World Politics

3

SERBIAN STUDIES PUBLISHED BY THE NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR SERBIAN STUDIES

CONTENTS VOLUME 4, NUMBER 3 SPRING 1988

Alex N. Dragnich AMERICAN SERBS AND OLD WORLD POLITICS 5

Vasa D. Mihailovich THE IMAGE OF AMERICA IN CONTEMPORARY SERBIAN LITERATURE 2 7

Michael Bora Petrovich KARADZIC AND NATIONALISM 41

George Vid Tomashevich BIBLICAL MOTIFS IN MEDIEVAL SERBIAN PAINTING AND LITERATURE 59

Laura Gordon Fisher THE PATRIOTIC POETRY OF MILAN RAKIC 71

NOTES (Student essays)

Jelona S. Bankovic-Rosul ORIENTAL FATALISM AND VICTORY OF TANAT SIN DEVJL'S YARD AND DERVISTI AND DEATJJ. 79

Ani Lo. L kic-Trboj vic NARRATOR AND NARRATIVE IN ANDRI ' Pll KLETA AVLIJA. 33

Alex N. Dragnich 5

AMERICAN SERBS AND OLD WORLD POLITICS

The Serbs who immigrated to the United States prior to the First World War were largely from European areas that were not at that time part of Serbia, but rather from regions ruled by Turkey and Austria-Hungary, as well as from the other Serbian state, Montene­gro. Because a large majority of these Serbian immigrants hoped to return some day, and because they desired "their areas" to unite with Serbia, they were keenly interested in developments in that part of the world. This interest was kindled as early as 1875, when in that year the Serbs revolted against the Turks in the largely Ser­bian provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina. It was considerably heightened by Austria-Hungary's annexation in 1908 of these prov­inces, and further magnified by Serbia's and Montenegro's successes in the Balkan Wars (1912-13). which resulted in the liberation of some Serbian territories and their unification with Serbia and Mon­tenegro. With the coming of World War I, it became obvious to Ser­bian immigrants in the United States that radical changes would occur in the areas from which they had come. While periodically waxing and waning in subsequent years, this interest and concern has continued as a preoccupation of many American Serbs.

Perhaps the earliest recorded action of American Serbs in re­sponse to developments in the "Old World" was the formation in 1875 of a relief committee by South Slavs in the San Francisco area to aid their co-nationals struggling against the Turks in Bosnia-Her­cegovina.1 With a membership of 18, and calling itself the Slavonic Committee, it addressed letters to other South Slav groups on the Pacific Coast and urged them to organize similar relief committees. Two or three young men even left and joined the insurgents. Three years later, in 1878, South Slav immigrants on the Pacific Coast, especially Serbs, rejoiced in the Slavic triumph over the Turks. The consequent territorial expansion of Serbia and Montenegro, and their formal international recognition as independent states was met with general jubilation among American Serbs.

Subsequent events in the "Old World", notably the overthrow of the Obrenovic dynasty in Belgrade in 1903, resulted in some divi­sion among American Serbs. The return to a democratic political system in Serbia in the years after 1903, however, restored consid­erable unity and :pride among them, and when Austria-Hun.gary an-

Alex N. Dragnich 6

nexed Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908, they responded with hostility. Some Serbian organizations and Serbian-language newspapers,

founded early in this century, engaged in their first significant po­litical action at the time of the annexation. They expressed bitterness at the actions of Austria-Hungary, and called for assemblies of Amer­ican Serbs that would demand liberation of those provinces and their union with Serbia, together wilh the union of all Serbs in one state. Just as this activity was dying down, came the Balkan Wars, rekindling the activity of American Serbs. Their initial impulse was humanitarian, consisting of the collection of money and relief sup­plies to be sent to the Serbian Red Cross and to the Serbian National Defense organization in Belgrade. 2 Secondly, they began to r cruit volunteers for the Serbian army, an activity that continued into World War I.

As World War I approached, most American Serbs were motivated by patriotic fervor. The Serbian-language press viewed the assassi­nation in Sarajevo of the heir to the Austrian throne as a justified revenge of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The assassi­nation in the principal city of Bosnia provided the press an oppor­tunity to stress the Serbian nature of those provinces, and to counter anti-Serbian propaganda from Austria-Hungary. Few, if any. orbs responded to the appeals of Austro-Hungarian consular officials in the United States, asking their emigrants to return home and to join the Austro-Hungarian army. On the contrary, most American Sorbs wanted to do what they could to help Serbia and her armed forces.

With the outbreak of the First World War il was amply clear to all American Serbs that the prospects for a redrawn map of South­eastern Europe were real. The action of the Serbian government in December 1914, declaring that one of Serbia's major war aims was the liberation and unification of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in one state, emphasized that reality. Initially, to some at least, the declaration of the Serbian cabinet seemed like a dream, particularly since the principal allied powers remained silent on the subject until near the end of the war. To others, the declaration called attention to problems over which American Serbs found themselves divided. As the creation of a Yugoslav state became a probability, activities designed to affect the ultimate outcome were on the increase among Serb-American organizations, which were far from united. 3

Alex N. Dragnich 7

The activities of American Serbs in the course of World War I were spearheaded by a number of Serbian fraternal organizations, several of which had their own newspapers, usually weeklies. Also, in the course of the war, some new newspapers were founded, as well as the organizations, The Yugoslav National Council and The Serbian National Defense Council. The best known American Serbs in that period were the inventor, Nikola Tesla, the professor of phys­ics at Columbia University, Dr. Michael Pupin, and New York Uni­versity's educational psychologist, Dr. Paul R. Radosavljevich-all of them immigrants. All three held leading positions in the main Serb-American organizations, although Tesla's role seems to have been nominal. Pupin was perhaps the most prestigious, the most active, and the most influential. He had been made honorary Serbian Consul in New York as early as 1911, and he knew President Wilson personally. In 1919 he was called to the Versailles Peace Conference by Nikola Pasic, the principal delegate of the new Yugoslav state.

The activities of American Serbs were also spurred on by the in­itiative of Serbs from abroad. Among these were Bishop Nikolai Velimirovic, Milan Pribicevic (chief of the Serbian military mission to the U.S.), Milenko Vesnic (Serbian Minister in Paris), as well as others, not to mention members of the Yugoslav Committee in Lon­don. Each of the three persons mentioned here made trips to the United Stales in the course of World War I, and spoke to Serbian and other South Slav organizations, and conferred with their lead­ers. Vesnic even addressed the U. S. Congress in January 1918, al­though he was careful to avoid taking positions that would be in conflict with U. S. foreign policy, especially on the question of the future of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Photographs of and stories concerning the Serbian military mission appeared in leading U. S. newspapers as well as in Serbian-language publications.

Interest in, and concern for, the fate of Serbian people in Serbia was considerably sparked by the activities of a young Serbian lady, Helen Lozanitch.4 Only in her twenties, she came to the United States in 1915 as a delegate of the Serbian Red Cross to seek help. She was successful in seeing many influential Americans, from Pres­ident Wilson and ex-presidents Taft and Roosevelt to the elite of New England society, and found much sympathy for and an under­standing of the Serbian cause. Many doors were opened for her by Professor Michael Pupin, one of the best known American Serbs.

Alex N. Dragnich 8

Publicity concerning her activities came to the attention of rn other American Serbs, who responded in various ways. She :lny spoke to Serbian gatherings in many American cities. Another p s~ son who contrib~ted i~ensely to the Serbian cause was Bish~r Nikolai Velimirovic, considered ~ne of the o~tstanding personaliu:S of the Serbian Orthodox Church m modern times. He spoke not 0 1 to Serbian American groups, but also delivered a number of serrn n Y in Anglican and Episcopal churches. ons

American Serbs who collected. some $60,000 for the Serbian Red Cross during the Balkan Wars, raised some $250,000 in the first l years of World War J.5 Moreover, during the Balkan Wars, so wo 8 000 American Serbs left the United States to join the Serbian m~ Montenegrin armies, and in World War I some additional volunt:n went.B Many American Serbs (especially those from Monteneg~~~ did not wait to be called home, but began returning in smaller gro as soon as the war broke out. Interestingly enough, the Monlene:~s fraternal organization in Butte, Montana decided to disband beca rm so many of its member~ left the United States as volunteers. ~~: Serbian and Montenegrm governments worked through their

d . . rep-resentatives abroad an through those of alhed countnes to facilit t

1 t 7 a e the return of the vo un eers.

The recruitment of volunteers was engineered mainly by lhe S _ bian National Defense Council of America, an organization creat~ in 1914 and patterned after the one in Serbia. Professor Pupin e instrumental in arra?ging with British and Italian shipping com;:~ nies for an inexpensive transport of the volunteers. Some were tr ans-ported in British navy vessels. S?me were on their way when the Serbian army was compelled to ~Ithdraw across Albania, eventual! establishing itself on the Greek Island of Corfu. When in 1916 thy Serbian forces, rested and re-equipped, rejoined the struggle 0~ tl e Salonika Front, thousands of American Serbs were among th 1~ While the appeal for volunteers was widespread among South Selm.

;t,. • , h avs in the United States, uzmic reports t at although the Serbs w the least numerous among the South Slavs in the United States there

1 F , ey provided most of the vo untee~s. ew.Croats or Slovenes volunteered. a

The small number of Serbian soc1al democrats were divided b lh as to preparedness and defense in the United Stales as well' a 0 t war developments in Europe.10 Many Serbian socialists were sf 0

winning the war first; they were opposed to peace al any price. Tl~~

Alex N. Dragnich 9

coming of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia divided them further, and they in effect played no role among American Serbs. In the years following World War I, however, some of their remnants got together and played a role in the U. S. Communist movement.

For the most part, therefore, there was unity and cooperation among American Serbs in the course of the first year of World War I. In 1915, for example, there were a number of meetings held, in which Croats and Slovenes also participated, in which the theme of South Slav unity was stressed. This was in line with the Serbian cabinet's avowed aim to create a common state after the war. From a meeting in New York in August, 1915, a telegram was sent to the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pasic, urging him to work so that not a parcel of South Slav lands should remain under foreign rule, and that all South Slav lands should be united with Serbia and Montenegro.11

The voices of discord were few and ineffectual. To be sure, there was disappointment among American Serbs because of the incon­sequential number of Croats and Slovenes who volunteered to join the Serbian forces, but more because of the failure of South Slavs in Austria-Hungary to create any difficulties (sabotage, desertions, etc.) for the regime. 12 Although these disappointments were rarely ex­pressed in public, perhaps in them were germinated the first doubts as to the wisdom of a common South Slav state.

More concrete steps toward influencing the outcome of old world politics were taken in October 1916, with the creation in Pittsburgh of the Yugoslav National Council, which received greetings from Pasic and the Serbian Prince-Regent, Alexander. 13 This was a follow­up on a meeting in Chicago in March 1915, where Paja Radosavljev­ich was the most prominant Serb, 14 and where the Croats and Slov­enes were better represented than at Pittsburgh. A short time before the latter meeting a Yugoslav Office had been established in Cleve­land, Ohio, as a representative of the Yugoslav Committee in Lon­don.1 5 Soon it became the secretariat of the Executive Council of the Yugoslav National Council, and in February 1917, pursuant to ini­tiative from the Yugoslav Committee, it moved its office to Wash­ington, D.C., and in April began to put out a bulletin in English. The aim was to coordinate its work with the Serbian Legation. Relations between the Council and the Serbian Minister, Ljuba Mihailovic, were so close that for all practical purposes he was looked upon as a member of the Council.

Alex N. Dragnich 10

Nonetheless, dissension developed because Michael Pupin and some other Serbs sensed that there were moves in the Yugoslav National Council to deny to Serbia the leading role in the struggle for unification.16 Their argument was apparently based on the prop­osition that Serbia had been defeated and occupied by the enemy (ignoring the Serbian government and armed forces in exile), and as such, Serbs would be on the same level as all other South Slavs. Pupin believed that he and Serbia deserved better. After all, he had done more than anyone else in publicizing the South Slav question before the American public and American politicians. Although a friend of President Wilson, Pupin as a Republican was able to gel Theodore Roosevelt to come out in support of a Yugoslav stale, even though earlier Roosevelt had said that religious differences between Serbs and Croats were too great for their unification to succeed. And Serbia's sacrifices in the war were too well known to dwell upon.

Although he had a leading role in the Council, Pupin was instru­mental in the creation in New York in February 1917 of a Serbian National Defense Council that would be a part of the counterpart organization in Serbia. The avowed aim was to unite American Serbs so that there would be a distinct Serbian voice in South Slav matters. For this Pupin and his collaborators were accused of being for a Great Serbia instead of a Yugoslav state, a charge which Pupin de­nied. Nevertheless, he was persuaded to give up his leading role and to become honorary president. Milos Trivunac became president. Interpreting this as a defeat for Pupin, many of his opponents joined in open criticisms of him. Pupin's retort was to resign as member of the Yugoslav National Council. Prime Minister Pasic sought to dis­pel the disunity by setting up a regular Serbian consulate in New York, but since Pupin was still retained as honorary consul, his opponents were convinced that nothing had changed.

In July 1917, American Serbs were confronted by a new factor in the question of old world politics. In that month Serbian Prime Min­ister Pasic had conferred with Ante Trumbic, President of the Yugo­slav Committee, and the two of them had signed an agreement which came to be known as the Corfu DeclarationY This agreement set forth in fourteen separate points how the new common slate (to be known as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) would be created. One of those points provided that the new state would be a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy, under

Alex N. Dragnich 11

the Karadjordjevic (Serbian) dynasty. The Corfu Declaration, while a big step forward in uniting the

Slavs in their determination to destroy the Austro-Hungarian em­pire, was also the source of confusion and doubt. Although the first serious attacks on the Corfu Declaration came from Croatian and Slovene groups in America,18 American Serbs were also uneasy. They wondered about the wisdom of giving up Serbia's democratic constitution, her flag, and other national symbols for new ones yet to be created. American Serbs from Montenegro did not like the Declaration because no representative from Montenegro took part in the negotiations on Corfu.

Nevertheless, these Serbs from Montenegro, aside from a small minority, voiced their strong support for union with Serbia, seem­ingly regarding South Slav union as secondary. A convention of delegates of Montenegrin organizations, held in Chicago on January 28, 1918, declared "their solidarity with the ideal and program of the Serbian National Defense League of America."19 On May 28, 1918, a memorandum was sent to President Wilson, purportedly represent­ing the views of 29 communities of immigrants from Montenegro, asserting that Montenegro was always the cradle of Serbian freedom and that she never rejected that role. 20 Nevertheless, King Nikola of Montenegro (then in Paris) succeeded in sending a minister to set up a legation in Washington, which was recognized by the U.S. despite efforts of the Serbian government and others to block it.

Among Croatian and Slovene critics of the Corfu Declaration, the main bone of contention seemed to be the Karadjordjevic dynasty and the presumed favorable position this would give Serbia. They wanted the Constituent Assembly (provided for in the Declaration) to have the power to get rid of the dynasty altogether. Pupin, still a powerful force among American Serbs, argued in December 1917 that the projected Yugoslav state would grow out of the cooperation of the South Slavs, bul also out of the victories of Serbian arms (then fighting on the Salonika front) and those of the Allies. It was natural, he said, lhal the Allies would see in Serbia a source of stabilityP Bul some American Serbs continued lo spread certain vicious but untrue charges against Pupin, all of which contributed to dissension among Serbs as well as oth r South Slavs.22

Mosl of these debates among American Serbs, as well as among other South Slavs, were laking place at a lime when the Allied Pow-

Alex N. Dragnich 12

ers still had made no commitment to the destruction of Austria­Hungary and the creation of a South Slav state. With the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in late 1917, Russia was to play no role in the South Slav question. Statements by Prime Minister Lloyd George in England and by President Woodrow Wilson gave no encourage­ment to the proponents of Yugoslav unity. Moreover, the American and British press tended to be friendly toward Turkey and Bulgaria, and against the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Not until some time had passed in 1918 was it clear that the Allies would support the creation of a South Slav state. It should be noted that the United States did not even declare war against Austria-Hungary until De­cember 1917, and did not come out in favor of dissolution of the Dual Monarchy until March 1918.

The Yugoslav National Council sought to establish direct contacts with high officials of the U.S. government, but without success. It did succeed, however, in having its representatives appear before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. In June 1918, the Council sought to get official recognition from the U.S. government, even though this was contrary to the policy of the Serbian govern­ment as well as Pup in. 23 Although it did not succeed, the effort increased the already existing division in the Council. This was aggravated further by the Council's coming out in favor of a republic instead of a monarchy. This action angered the Council's Serbian members, and especially Pupin and his followers. 24 The end result was that the Council was left without any significant influence.

The concerns and efforts of American Serbs, as well as others, to influence old world politics were overtaken by events. With the collapse of the Central Powers, a hastily formed provisional govern­ment came into being in the Croatian capital of Zagreb. On December 1, 1918 its representatives met in Belgrade with Serbian represen­tatives, including Prince Regent Alexander, and proclaimed the for­mation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The new state was established before the Peace Conference could meet in 1919 in Versailles, which merely recognized what had taken place in Belgrade.

American Serbs and Yugoslavia

There was concern and watchful waiting among American Serbs as the new Yugoslav state went through two years of agonizing de-

Alex N. Dragnich 13

bate over the form of government it would have, a period in which the new state faced a dual danger: (1) domestic discord because the Croatian deputies failed to take part in the deliberations of the Con­stituent Assembly, and (2) the coveting of Yugoslav territories by Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Many American Serbs had returned to the old homeland, but many others were discouraged by the reports of returning volunteers about difficult postwar conditions. With the adoption of a new constitution in June 1921 for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (in 1929 the name was changed to Yu­goslavia) there was a diminution of activity in the U.S. designed to influence old world politics, although a continued interest in and comment upon developments in the new state was to be found in the Serbian-language press.

Michael Pupin, after spending more than two months at the Peace Conference at Versailles, travelled to several Yugoslav cities and reported on economic and social conditions there. He was influen­tial in securing loans in the U.S. for the new state. One man who had been very active in the U.S. during World War I, Boza Rankovic, cautioned American Serbs about their continued attempts to deter­mine the outcome of political issues in Yugoslavia. In 1924, he wrote that those who "want to conduct old world politics should be in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Solvenes and not in America."25

The principal voice of American Serbs in the interwar period (1920-1941) was the American Srbobran (published in Pittsburgh), al­though there were several lesser publications in other parts of the U.S. By the 1930's, leftist Serbs had their organ, Slobodna Rec (also published in Pittsburgh), a publication which for the most part fol­lowed the Soviet Communist party line.

The Srbobran, generally following a Serbian nationalist line, de­fended with fair consistency those actions of the Belgrade govern­ment which it believed to further or protect Serbian interests. In the early twenties, the boycotting of the Yugoslav parliament (Skup­stina) by the Croatian Peasant party deputies, their espousal of re­publicanism, and the travels of their leader, Stjepan Radic, to various European capitals seeking support for the Croatian cause-all came in for censure by Srbobran. The decision in 1925 by the Croatian leaders to abandon republicanism, to recognize the monarchy and to accept the existing Constitution, and to take their seats in parlia­ment was praised by Srbobran. Nevertheless, there was always a

Alex N. Dragnich 14

note of caution and a reservation with respect to Croatian motives, especially those of Radic. When Radic, while a member of the Yugo­slav cabinet, made some speeches that were critical of government policy, Srbobran was quick to point to the incongruity in such be­havior.

With the death in December 1926 of Nikola Pasic, who had been prime minister between 1921 and 1926, Radic and his associates began taking an increasingly independent stand. For the next year and a half, the Yugoslav parliament was the scene of turmoil and obstructionist tactics, which Srbobran condemned. The shooting of Radic and several of his associates during a parliamentary session in June 1928 by a deputy from Montenegro was censured by Srbob­ran, although there was more than a hint that they had brought it on themselves. Srbobran pointed out that a day or so before the shooting, Radic had pointed a finger at some Serbian deputies and said: "You are not men. You are pigs."26 In the days that followed, however, Srbobran pleaded for peace, order, unity, and reconcilia­tion.

In July, the newspaper found that guilt must be widely shared. First of all, the people were guilty, because they elected the repre­sentatives and for eight months watched indifferently while the de­puties quarreled. Secondly, the cabinet was at fault; it should have resigned when it could not handle the situation. Finally, the presi­dent of parliament was at fault because he failed to maintain order.27 Moreover, Srbobran declared itself opposed to splitting Yugoslavia and in favor of national unity. To this end, it called for the formation of a neutral (nonpolitical) cabinet that would supervise the holding of new elections.20

Upon the death of Radic in August, Srbobran carried a lengthy editorial about him, which was objective and generally favorable. It pointed to his successes in moving the Croatian masses, sometimes in good directions and at other times in unfortunate ones.29 Also in August, Srbobran carried front-page accounts of parliamentary speeches which condemned the acts of the assassin, and again called for national unity. 3 0 It recognized the terrible pain which the Croats felt, but it also voiced hurt feelings that certain newspapers in Croa­tia were systematically insulting Serbia and Serbdom. 31 Moreover, Srbobran proclaimed itself against revision of the Yugoslav consti­tution which would create a federal state, because unitarism unites

Alex N. Dragnich 15

and federalism divides. 32

The death of Radic, the withdrawal from parliament of the Croa­tian deputies, and a general uneasiness led King Alexander on Jan­uary 6, 1929 to abolish the democratic constitution, dissolve political parties, and institute a dictatorial regime. This move was portrayed by Srbobran as necessary, because in its view the political chaos was leading the country to catastrophe.33 It declared that no one wanted a dictatorship, yet it was impossible to do without it, point­ing out that three Croats had entered the cabinet of the dictatorship. Srbobran expressed faith that the dictatorship would heal wounds, lead Yugoslavia out of the crisis, and put an end to separatist activ­ities. 34 It continued to give considerable play to proclamations of King Alexander and the cabinet.35 Certain other American Serbs, notably those who were following the Soviet party line, condemned the dictatorship as a feature of bourgeois capitalism.

Moreover, Alexander abolished the historical regions and divided the nation into 9 districts (banovine) named after waterways (mainly rivers). At the same time he changed the official name of the country to Yugoslavia. While hesitant to criticize Alexander, Srbobran was not happy with what seemed a homogenizing process, denying to Serbs the kind of identity that their historic tradition merited.

In 1931, Alexander gave the country a new constitution, re-estab­lishing democratic institutions. This was hailed by Srbobran as a step in the right direction, and as proof that Alexander had intended the dictatorship to be of brief duration. 36 Before the new political system was well launched, Alexander was assassinated in 1934 while on a trip to France. This was an opportunity for Srbobran to praise his greatness and to point to his devotion and many achievements. At the same time, because the Croatian extremists, the Ustashe were deeply implicated in the plot to assassinate Alexander, Srbobran could utilize the opportunity to point to the perfidy of many Croa­tian actions.

On the whole, Srbobran stressed the positive. It referred to Alex­ander as the creator and father of Yugoslavia, asserting that the coun­try would "outlive this difficult blow and remain one and indivisible."37 It quoted Alexander's purported last words, "Protect Yugoslavia." In December, it featured on its front page an account of a Pittsburgh celebration of the anniversary of Yugoslavia's unifi­cation.33

Alex N. Dragnich 16

Because Alexander's son Peter was a minor, royal powers were exercised by the First Regent, Prince Paul. Under his guidance ne­gotiations were initiated to reach an acceptable agreement with the Croats. An agreement, the Sporazum, was signed in 1939, which combined two of the regions (the Sava and Primorje banovine) and made them into the banovina of Croatia, with a virtually indepen­dent governor and a Croatian Diet for certain specific purposes. Be­cause this agreement gave to Croatia certain Serbian lands which had never been part of Croatia, Srbobran 's displeasure was evident. Srbobran, as well as certain other Serbian-languag publications, were not happy with the agreement, because it did not combine the Serbian regions or areas into one Serbia. Moreover, thoy believed that the Serbs should enjoy the same rights of local s If-government that were granted to the Croats.

Again, however, Srbobran stressed the positive. It declared that "A new Yugoslavia was born," and proclaimed: "Long Live Yugo­slavia and the Brotherly Agreement." It spoke of moral unity, and reported celebrations in Yugoslavia hailing the agroemont.Jo

Srbobran did not approve the action of the Yugoslav government in joining the Tri-Partite Pact (Germany-Italy-Japan) in March 1941 and welcomed the military overthrow of that government on Marc!~ 27, 1941 as evidence of the people's hostility toward Germany and Italy. The military invasion of Yugoslavia by these two countries in early April, 1941, was strongly condemned by Srbobran. At the same time, Srbobran could see that Serbs and Serbia would again be ex­posed to enemy occupation and endless suffering. This became am­ply clear as the Germans and Italians quickly defeated tho Yugoslav forces.

Even more painful to Srbobran was the creation by the enemy powers of the so-called Independent State of Croatia, as a satellite of Germany and Italy, and ruled by Ante Pavelic and his Ustashe movement. This puppet state included within its boundaries 2 or 3 million Serbs, who soon were to be massacred in large numbers by the Ustashe.

Second World War and American Serbs

After the Italo-German attack on Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, a short-lived unity prevailed among American Serbs. The quick col· lapse of the Yugoslav military forces, and especially the coming to

Alex N. Dragnich 17

Zagreb with Italian troops of the Croatian quizling, Ante Pavelic, soon changed this. The fact that Pavelic could proclaim the creation of the Independent State of Croatia within five days of the Nazi­Fascist onslaught was accompanied by rumors of treachery by Croa­tians in high places as well as in the Yugoslav military. These ru­mors, ultimately demonstrated true in part at least, were the source of the first seeds of discord sowed among American Serbs.

One major group, clustered around the newspaper Srbobran, and later augmented by the Serbian National Defense Council, expressed pride in the Yugoslav guerrilla movement, led by the Serbian Colo­nel Draza Mihailovic, while at the same time questioning whether Yugoslavia should be restored as a state. The Serbian National De­fense Council (SNDC), be it noted, was founded in 1941 and pat­terned after an organization of the same name which existed in the U.S. during World War I. Another group, whose principal spokes­man was the Communist-line newspaper Slobodna Rec, initially praised Mihailovic and was pro-Yugoslav oriented. After the exis­tence of another guerrilla movement, the Partisans led by Commu­nists, was publicized in mid-1942, along with evidence that the two movements were in military conflict, the polarization of American Serbs shifted more to the question of which guerrilla movement would eventually determine the future of Yugoslavia. Slobodna Rec became a supporter of the Partisans, while Srbobran and SNDC re­mained staunch defenders of Mihailovic and his movement, popu­larly known as the Chetniks.

Before any one knew about two resistance movements, news of the massive massacre of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia burst in the Serbian-American community with dramatic suddeness. On November 6, 1941, Srbobran published on page one, in black borders, a memorandum from Serbian Orthodox Church authorities in Yugoslavia, appealing to the German commander (General Dan­kelmann) to intercede with the Croatian authorities to stop the mas­sacring of innocent Serbs. The memorandum listed the names of victims, many of them close relatives of American Serbs. Prior to the publication of the memorandum Srbobran had published stories of actions against certain Serbs in the quizling state, but the mem­orandum demonstrated that the massacres had assumed massive proportions, including men, women, and children. The number of victims, it was learned eventually, numbered between a half million

Alex N. Dragnich 18

and three-quarters of a million. In the fall of 1941, however, it was impossible to know the number

of victims. Moreover, the information ~as coming from enemy-oc­cupied territory, and therefore suspect m some eyes. The Commu­nist-line Slobodna Rec even suggested that the memorandum might be the work of Nazi collaborators, or even part of a deliberate Nazi plan to sow discord and to create disunily within Allied countries. This was also the attitude of other Communist-line publications, which was also shared by a considerable portion of the non-Com­munist press in the United Stales.

Moreover, the attitude of the U.S. government was that discord among Americans would be harmful to the war effort. Federal Bu­reau of Investigation agents were asked to investigate in a number of communities where large numbers of Yugoslav Americans lived and worked. Serb-American leaders around Srbobran and the Ser­bian National Defense Council were interviewed by members of the Department of Justice (Foreign Agents' Resislration Section) and the State Department. There were even implied threats of consequences of actions which might be harmful to the war effort.

The attitude of the pro-nationalist American Serbs was that they had no desire to do anything that would interfere with the war effort. At the same time, they did not see how their publication of news about what was happening on the territory of the former Yugoslav state could do that. They were not taking ~ny pro-enemy line; as a matter of fact they were blaming the Fascists and Nazis, and their allies (primarily Ante Pavelic) for what had happened. Moreover, they felt a duty and an obligation to speak for the voiceless Serbs in enemy-occupied territory. Moreover, they felt that the freedom of the press entitled them to speak out against a future political asso­ciation with the Croats which could again put the lives of Serbs in jeopardy.

Srbobran's pro-Serbian nationalist line was clearly set forth at the time of the publication of the above-mentioned memorandum. In a most prominant place, and in large letters, Srbobron stated: "Is it possible that after this anyone could at anytime even think of a union with the Croats? Cursed be he who would ever work toward the Serbs and Croats making up a single state .... "

Interestingly enough, the most articulate voice of American Serbs at that time was Jovan Ducic, the well-known Serbian poet and dip-

Alex N. Dragnich 19

lomat, who arrived in the U.S. around the middle of 1941. His brother Mihailo was president of the Serbian National Defense Council. The main outlet for DuciC's writings was Srbobran, which carried his column under a pseudonym, with the general title, "Radi Pravilnije Orientacije" (toward a more correct orientation). Several collections of his articles were published as pamphlets under the following titles: Jugoslovenska Ideologija; Federalism ili Centralism; Dr. Vlatko Macek i Jugoslavija; Tajni plan velikohrvatske ideje i njene ekspan­zije.40 The burden of all of these writings was to defend Serbian interests and to point to the tragedy of a common state with the Croats, and to plead for the avoidance of a repeat of such a tragic error in the future.

Serbian interests were also defended by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Constantin Fotitch, himself a Serb.41 Officially, he was representing the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile, but felt it his duty to inform the U.S. State Department, as well as those around Srbobran, of the plight of the Serbs. With the attacks on Mihailovic in the Communist-line press in the U.S., Fotitch lodged protests with the State Department. 42 The plight of the Serbs was also dramatized by the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of the United States and Canada.43

Without doubt, the most effective spokesman for nationalist American Serbs was the above-mentioned Jovan Ducic. Although writing under a pseudonym, he fooled no one, and brought attacks upon himself from all sides, but mainly from Slobodna Rec and from several Serbian ministers in the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile, who during most of the war were attached to the Yugoslav Information Center in New York. But Ducic's voice was stilled with his death in Chicago in April 1943.

The Serbian ministers in New York, along with their Croatian and Slovene colleagues, defended the pro-Yugoslav line of the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile. One of the Serbian ministers was Sava Kosa­novic, nephew of the great Serbian-American inventor, Nikola Tesla. Kosanovic, who was Tito's first ambassador in Washington and sub­sequently a minister in Tito's government, succeeded in getting Tesla to sign pro-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian National Defense Council statements, although there is some question as to whether Tesla knew what he was signing. The Tesla papers in the Tesla Museum in Belgrade contain a note from Kosanovic, asking Tesla to sign a certain statement that had been forwarded to Tesla at the Yugoslav

Alex N. Dragnich 20

Information Center.44 To Slobdna Rec, which after mid-1942 supported the Tito-led Par­

tisan movement and attacked Srbobran, Fotitch, Dul3i6, and the Ser­bian National Defense Council, the pro-Yugoslav views of the non­Communist Serbian ministers in New York was a godsend. Pur­porting to represent broad democratic sentiments, Slobdna Rec also made use of the proclamations of the All Slav Congress, which had come into being as an organization to assist in mobilizing support for the U.S. war effort.

Similarly, some other organizations in lhe U.S. had taken a pro­Yugoslav stand. In the euphoric unity days of early 1941, even Bishop Dionisije of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the U.S. was a member of the Consulative Committee of The Slavonic Committee for De­mocracy.45 Moreover, the Serbian "Vidovdan Congress," which met on July 4-5, 1942 and which many regarded as a Communist front organization, expressed the determination of American Serbs and other Slavs to oppose fascist efforts to enslave the Slavs. The Con­gress also received greetings from Tesla and Paul Radosavljevich.46

If Srbobran and the Serbian National Defense Council had the talented pen of Jovan Ducic, Slobodna Rec had lhe services of trained Serbian Communists who had been sent to the U.S. in the thirties, notably Srdjan Prica, Mirko Markovic, and Stevan Dedijer. Prica, who came to the U.S. illegally in 1937 as a representative of the Yugoslav Communist party47 was no doubt the most influential. Al­though he had come into conflict (although not open) with the party leadership over the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, he was back at the helm of Slobodna Rec in 1942.

In 1942, the Communist trio got the support, at first secretly and unobtrusively and later openly, of a trio of young Serbian priests who had known each other in Yugoslavia, and who had been sent to the U.S. in 1938 and 1939. They were Nikola Drenovac, Strahija Maletic, and Emilijan Glocar. Drenovac seems to have been lhe leader of the group, who says that they had begun to awaken in 1941.46 He had earlier written articles for Srbobran, and seems to have been recruited to a degree by Prica and Markovic, although it should be noted that Maletic's brothers, Nebojsa and Slobodan were Commu­nist activists in Yugoslavia.49 Drenovac began writing articles for Slobodna Rec under the pseudonym "A Drop of Ink."50

Alex N. Dragnich 21

Drenovac admits that he "could not openly spread the Communist idea from the church pulpit," but says that his every word and his "whole activity were in the spirit of that idea."51 Moreover, he ac­knowledges "precious help and collaboration of Sava Kosanovic," the above-mentioned minister in the Yugoslav Government-in-Ex­ile.52 He and his collaborators travelled widely around the U.S. on speaking tours. They sought to exploit contacts with the then mayor of New York, Fiorello LaGuardia, and other persons of a pro-Yugo­slav orientation, including a wealthy Yugoslav shipowner, Franjo Petrinovic, then residing in South America. 53

The stand of Drenovac, Maletic, and Glocar constituted open re­bellion against the Serbian church hierarchy in the U.S. In 1944, according to Drenovac, he was accused of heresy and found guilty, and denied the right to serve as a priest.S4 By this time he was fully committed to the Partisan cause and went to work full time for Slobodna Rec. Moreover, he formally became a member of the U.S. Communist party. In 1946 he was given a medal (Brotherhood and Unity, First Class) by the Yugoslav parliament for his work in the U.S. on behalf of the new Yugoslavia, to which he returned near the end of 1947.55

The Communist trio of Prica, Markovic, and Dedijer preceded Drenovac in returning to Yugoslavia at the end of World War II in 1945. Of the three, only Prica made it to high office in the Tito regime. Markovic became a professor, but lost out because he took the Moscow side in the Stalin-Tito break in 1948. Dedijer, brother of Tito's official biographer Vladimir Dedijer, for a time was with the Yugoslav nuclear institute, but became disillusioned, and sub­sequently became a physicist in Sweden, married a Swedish woman, and became a Swedish citizen. Prica began as head of the American Desk in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, and subsequently served as Yugoslav ambassador to Paris, Rome, and London. He was also a member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist party from 1953 to 1964.56

Prica readily admits that in their struggle with other American Serbs, he and his colleagues used any and all methods. 57 Among these were propaganda brochures, letters to congressmen, and ex­ploitation of persons thought beneficial. In the last category were such known Yugoslav Americans as writer Louis Adamic, violinist Zlatko Balokovic, and wealthy businessman Nick Bez. Also, they

Alex N. Dragnich 22

worked through various Communist front organizations. Moreover, they surreptitiously attempted to "plant" certain items in Srbobran which were of Croatian quizling origins, and in one case they suc­ceeded, whereupon they ran photocopies of the original in Slobodna Rec, which was an embarrassment to Srbobran .

The Post World War II Period

In the course of World War II, a significant number of American Serbs were favorably inclined to the Partisan movement in Yugo­slavia. Many had not liked the fact that beginning with 1929, Yugo­slav governments had moved into authoritarian waters, whereas the Tito-led Partisans promised a new democratic order. As Tito and his comrades went about setting up a Soviet-type Communist dic­tatorship, however, the views of many American Serbs began to change. Although it was difficult for some to admit that they had guessed wrong, they began to retreat from their one-lime pro-Parti­san positions. The staunch supporters of Slobodna Rec continued to sing the praises of the new order in Yugoslavia, and Slobodna Rec continued to provide a favorable picture of the Tilo regime.

Those around the Serbian National Defense Council, Srbobran, the American-Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and ex-Ambassador Fotilch-all in effect said "we told you so." More than that, they continued to send memoranda to the Stale Depart­ment and to the United Nations, protesting the actions of Tito's dictatorship. Moreover, with the arrest of the Chetnik leader, Mi­hailovic, by Tito's police, the above-mentioned organizations launched a campaign to collect funds for his defense. Many Americans of differing national and political backgrounds joined in a movement, seeking a fair trial for Mihailovic. When in 1946 a specially consti­tuted Tito court sentenced him to death after a brief "show trial," without even permitting testimony from any of the hundreds of American aviators that had been saved by Mihailovic troops, the reaction in the U.S. was generally one of horror and indignation. The downing in 1946 of American military planes, which were flying over Yugoslav airspace (by error or design it is not known), with the loss of American lives, added to the indignation.

The ranks of American Serbs opposed to the Tito regime were considerably augmented by a new wave of Serbian immigrants, al­most exclusively political. Many of them were intellectuals, such as

Alex N. Dragnich 23

the Orthodox bishops, Nikolaj Velimirovic and Irinej Djordjevic, who came from German prisoner of war camps, and former politicians, such as Dr. Milan Gavrilovic, and many lawyers, teachers, profes­sors, and doctors. A large number of these prominent emigres en­listed in varying degrees in the anti-Communist and anti-Tito cause. For example, Slobodan Draskovic, the son of the Yugoslav minister of Interior (Milorad Draskovic) who was killed by a Communist in 1921, began editing a weekly newspaper in Chicago, called Srpska Borba.

The Serbian National Defense Council also increased its activity. It not only provided help in getting new emigres settled but, in addition, began a weekly publication, Sloboda. Moreover, it has sponsored annual national congresses, as well as regional ones, all dedicated to speaking in defense of the Serbian cause, in praise of the martyred Draza Mihailovic, and in condemnation of the Com­munist order in Yugoslavia. The Council has also published various other items in the same vein. From time to time it has received propaganda assistance, as when it was publicly revealed in August 1967 that President Truman had awarded the Legion of Merit post­humously to General Mihailovic in March 1948. In the mid-1970's, the Council-sponsored Serbian National Committee, together with many of the one-time Mihailovic-rescued American aviators, began seeking Congressional approval to permit them to build a memorial to Mihailovic in the District of Columbia, with no success as of 198 7.

As the Tito regime consolidated its power, and particularly as it succeeded in weathering Stalin's effort to isolate Yugoslavia and to overthrow the Tito leadership, some American Serbs tended to drift into apathy. Some even hoped for a liberalization of the system. Moreover, the decision of the Serbian Orthodox Church Council in Belgrade in 1963 to defrock Bishop Dionisije of the American-Ca­nadian Diocese, produced division in the Serb-American commu­nity. Those around the Serbian National Defense Council saw this move as Communist-inspired, with the Church in Belgrade and its Patriarch doing the bidding of Tito's government. Their suspicions were aroused earlier, when the Yugoslav minister of interior had in 1945 asked the Synod of the Serbian Church to call Dionisije to account and to prevent him from working against the new Yugo­slavia. At that lime the Synod had answered that tho clergy are responsible to their church authorities only in mallers of failh and

Alex N. Dragnich 24

Canonic discipline. 58

Those around Srbobran, however, took the position that American Serbs should by loyal to the "Mother Church," and to accept the changes in their diocese that had been ordered. This division among American Serbs led to many court battles, in which even the Su­preme Court of the United States took part. While the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the faction loyal to the "Mother Church," judicial disputes concerning church properties have continued.

It is safe to assume that many American Serbs will continue their active interest in the nature of the political system in the old home­land, and that they will continue to speak out. Those around the Serbian National Defense Council and the Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. and Canada have not limited themselves to ac­tivity in the United States. They actively collaborate with Serbian organizations in other parts of the free world (e.g. Western Europe, Australia, Canada, et al.) in their opposition to Communist rule gen­erally (which they consider a threat to the United Stales] and in Yugoslavia particularly, where they see it their duty to speak in defense of the interests of the Serbian people.

Charlottesville, Virginia

•Wayne S. Vucinich, "Political Currents Among Immigrant Serbs in California on the Eve of the Insurrection of 1875," Balcanica, VIII (Belgrade, 1977), pp. 337-361.

2See Bozidar Puric, Biagrafia Bote Rankovi6a: Daprinas istariji srpskag iseljenistva u Severnaj Americi (Munich, 1963), p. 76, and Jovan Iskruljev, Dr. Paja Radosavljevi6: tivoli rad (Belgrade, 1971), p. 87.

3The best work on the subject, despite some obvious biases, is Ivan Cizmic, Jugos­lavensk; iseljenicki pokret u SAD i stvaranje Jugaslavenske driave 1918 (Zagreb, 1974).

•See Helen Lozanitch Frothingham, Mission for Serbia: Letters From America and Canada, 1915-1920 (New York, 1970).

•Cizmic, pp . 32, 106. 6/bid., pp. 213-227. Also see Puric, Biografija , p. 145. 7"Toplicanin," "Crnogorski dobrovoljci Sjedinjenih Americkih Dr:Zava 1914 i 1915

godine," Sloboda (Chicago), April 28, 1978, p. 14. 8! cannot avoid a personal note. My uncle Zivko Knezevic was among them. 0See Cizmic, pp. 82, 216-217. 10/bid., pp. 73-78, 155ff. "Ibid., p. 10.

Alex N. Dragnich 25

12Puri!':, p. 106ff. "Gizmic, pp. 115-116. "See Joseph P. O'Grady, The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies

(Lexington, Kentucky, 1967), pp. 173-203. 15Gizmic, p. 121. '"For a reasonably full discussion, see Cismic, pp. 165-177. Also see Michael Bora

Petrovich, "Pupin in Serbian-American Life Before the First World War," Serbian Studies, Vol. 4 (Fall-Spring, 186-87). pp. 5-27.

11See my Serbia, Nikola Posit, and Yugoslavia (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974), Chap­ter 7.

' 8Gizmic, p. 138ff. '"Telegram, dated January 30, 1918, in Arhiv Srbije (Belgrade), Srpska Narodna

Odbrana u Americi (SNOA- 20). 2oCismic, pp. 205-211. Puric, op. cit., p. 139, says that of 30 settlements in the

U.S., 23 declared themselves for union with Serbia. 21cizmic, p. 138ff. 22See Puric, Biografia, pp. 96-117, and 13Bff. 23Cizmic, pp. 271-76. 24/bid., pp. 277-287. 25Puric, Biografia, p. 164. 2•June 22, 1928. 27See the issues for July 17, 18, 19, 1928. 2•}uly 28 and 30, 1928. 2•August 11, 1928. 3oAugust 24, 1928. JtSeptember 22, 1928. 32Qctober 30, 1928. 33January 10. 1929. 34January 12, 1929. ,.See issues for January 29, February 5, 12, and 20, 1929. ,•September 11 and November 18, 1931. 370ctober 10, 1934. ,•December 5, 1934. JoSce issues for August 28, 30, and September 1, 1939. ••Jovan Du~ic, Sabrana deJa (Chicago, 1951), VII, VIII, IX, p. x. 41 See his book, The War We Lost: Yugoslavia's Tragedy and the Failure of the West

(New York, 1948). •2The Papers of Cordell Hull, Reel 32, Memo of Conversation (C.H.), December 24,

1942 . .,See their publication, The Martyrdom of the Serbs (Chicago, 1943). ••Kosanovic note is dated 26. IV. 1942. The purported Tesla telegram to the Yugo­

slav Information Center in which he rejects any connection with the Serbian National Defense Council is dated 9 April 1942. Testa was then in his eighties and died in January, 1943.

45Jovan Iskruljev, Dr. Paja Radosavljevi{;, pp. 120-24. ••Ibid., pp. 122- 23 . The author suggests that Radosavljevich had been a sick man

for some time. "'Interview with Prica in Belgrade, Juno, 1976. ••Nikola Orcnovac, Od oltara do revolucionara (Sarajevo, 1976), p. 100. ••Ibid., pp. 102, 107, 146. ""ibid., p. 108. "'/bid., p. 143.

Alex N. Dragnich

"ibid., p. 243. 53ibid., see pp. 252-59. 04ibid., pp. 178-88. 5Sibid., pp. 237, 240-41. '"Interview with Prica in Belgrade, June, 1976. " ibid. ' 8Drenovac, Od oltara, p. 207.

26