AMERICAN REVOLUTION: InLieuofPerfect Plans · AMERICAN REVOLUTION: InLieuof"Perfect" Plans by Omar DeWitt Omar De Witt is the president of AHIKS, a gaming society for those 21 and

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AMERICAN REVOLUTION:In Lieu of "Perfect" Plans

by Omar De Witt

Omar De Witt is the president of AHIKS, agaming society for those 21 and over who areinterested, primarily, in playing wargames bymail. AHIKS offers a rules booklet, a Judge,two publications, and an opponent-matchingservice, among other things. More informa-tion can be obtained by writing De Witt at 78Wickham Drive, Williamsville, N. Y. 14221.

If someone were to hand me a sealedenvelope and say that it contained the"perfect plan" for playing Avalon Hill'sD'-Day or SPl's Sniper', or any other game, Ido not think that I would open the envelope.To my mind there is something unfair aboutreading how to play the perfect game; to me,it is not unlike hunting rabbits with ashotgun or deer with a high-powered riflewith a telescopic sight. Somehow it does notseem sporting. If someone beats me with anice strategy, I will use it the first chance Iget, but I do not go out of my way to gatherperfect plans. To those of you out there whopractice hours rolling the die sideways out ofyour hand so the "I" stays up or who spendmore hours looking for loopholes in the rules,my position undoubtedly looks mightystrange. But part of the game is the personalchallenge, and, if I am following someoneelse's directions on play, it is not really mewho is playing the game.Well, then, why am I writing this article? Itcertainly is not to tell you the profound secretthat will enable you to succeed at TheAmerican Revolution without really trying. Ihave no perfect plan. However, it is aninteresting game, and there are points aboutit worth discussing.

When we study history in grade school andhigh school, we have no doubt that we areabsorbing cold, concrete facts. For one thing,it is there in the text book in black and white,and for another, Miss McCarthy says it'strue. However, when we study history on ourown and start reading books by authors ofdifferent nationalities, the facts are foundnot always to agree. British and US textbooks have different slants on the War of1812 and the American Revolution. Andwhen one actually plays The AmericanRevolution, he finds the differences. Forinstance, the saying "one if by land, and twoif by sea" just is not true. With a "one" ora"two" the British are not going anywhere -by sea or by land. (If you have not played thegame yet, this enigmatic statement will beexplained later.) Other aspects of theAmerican Revolution do agree with written

histories. Historically, the British had twomajor problems in suppressing the rebeluprising. One was poor generalship; theother was keeping undecided colonials (ofwhich there were many) from thinking therebels had any chance of victory. In TheAmerican Revolution, the British Player hasthese problems, too, and they add up to quitea handicap.

The American Player's strategy is prettymuch common sense: Keep out of the way,but stay in striking distance so that when anopportunity for a 1-1 attack comes up, it canbe grabbed. Almost always (there can beexceptions to any rule), it is only sensible forthe American to attack at 1-1 when thechance for a Major Success is there. If thereare less than 5 British regulars in an area orenough Tories to preclude the elimination of5 British regulars, other factors should beweighed. The general rule, here, is probablynot to attack unless chances of acounterattack are small or if the movementof the American units elsewhere is more of athreat. In other words, the priority of anattack that does not offer some chance of aMajor Success is low.

But why take the chance of a Major Successwhen the British are capable of a crushingcounterattack? First, success triggers theFrench intervention - more strength and thatvery helpful fleet. Second, it takes only twoSuccesses to really put pressure on theBritish; as soon as the British must control acertain number of Regions, the mobileAmerican army can really cause problemswhile the British try to cover several points atonce. And, of course, the AmericanContinental Levy doubles after the secondSuccess. The advantages, then, to theAmerican in gaining a Major Success heavilyoutweigh the disadvantages of failure.

After the British gain control of a Region, theAmerican strategy should still be primarily togain a Major Success, but also the Americanshould keep in mind the breaking of Britishcontrol (and reactivating the Militia). Thiswould be second in priority. The breaking ofcontrol or even the threat of breaking controlmight lead to a Major Success, which is theprimary goal; so, a plan with bothpossibilities available has much merit.

And what should the British Player do?Probably the most important item for theBritish Player to consider is an over-allstrategy. If he hunts and pecks at theRegions, his chances of success are small.

The American can move around en masseand pick off isolated islands of British, whichwill break control and leave the British worseoff than before. So, I would suggest: pick astrategy for the war and keep to it.

What strategy? It must take into account theinherent weaknesses of the British army. Themain weakness is its reluctance to move; thesecond is it vulnerability to AmericanSuccess. Any force of five or more has to belarger than nearby American forces (or riskMajor Success), and any force under five isnot able to control much.

The approach that seems most likely tosucceed is this: start the British from onepoint and spread out, keeping a "hardshell" on the outside and enough smallergroups on the inside to maintain control.This approach can begin in the far north, thefar south, and the middle. From the view ofeconomy of force, the north and south seembetter; the rear is protected and thereforeneeds no defenders; the flanks are eitherocean, or wilderness, which slows movement;and the majority of the force is in the vanwhere it is needed for attack and where it isin position to defend the likely route ofattacks.I first tried the northern approach. Theproblem here is all that Militia. The Britishhave to wade through 50 Strength Points ofMilitia to get to New York. I never got to NewYork. My British had to go inland after theMilitia and then sat there while their supplywas cut. "Hey, mate, some bloke is cuttingoff the limb we're sitting on." "Aye, someoneshould do something." Back to the drawingboard.In another game, I started in Georgia. Thatcame to grief because I neglected to build afort right away, but also, problems will arisein rooting the Militia out of the five areas inGeorgia - including two of wilderness.

Neither of these approaches is inherentlyfatal, although the odds of a northernapproach succeeding are reduced because ofthe Militia. Before I try to get through thenorthern minutemen again, I'll wait for themto get unionized; then I can take care of themwhile they are on strike for the 5-minute man ~and holidays with pay.

The third suggestion was the "middle".This is the approach that the SPI playtestersthought most fruitful for the British. Theysuggest landing in the Potomac Valley andgaining control there because it cuts direct

north-south movement of the Americantroops and because it produces moreContinentals than any other Region. Then,keeping a strong force in the Region fordefense, move the rest of the British forcesouth. After the South has been controlled(39 Victory Points), the control of Canada(10)and the capture of New York (10), plus acouple of l's will give the game to theredcoats.This plan means that the British must keep arearguard in the Potomac Valley that islarger than the combined American forces orbecome vulnerable to a Major Success andloss of control. The British cannot retire toforts since units in forts cannot help tocontrol a Region. While the wilderness slowsdown the American units, they can use theOhio Valley, or PV2, as a concentrationpoint to threaten the British units in theSouth.

Picking one of these plans is not unlikedeciding if you want to snack on candiedgrasshoppers, fried worms, or caterpillar-au-jus. But, who knows? You might like it.

Whatever approach the British Player takes,to win he must have better than usual luckwith the die. He needs poor levy, and heneeds to be able to move when he has to(large groups of British have been lost in thegames I have played because they could notmove the one area they needed to get intosupply).

After a strategy is decided upon, the nextquestion is when to begin it. My memories ofhigh school history include pictures of ragged(but gallant) American soldiers being chasedaround by myriad British and Hessiantroops. This is not the case in the early goingin The American Revolution. Those whohave not played the game before, will do wellto check carefully the Continental Levy table.Unless you have a trick die that rolls only 6's,you are likely to be outnumbered by theAmerican forces (Continental and Militia)from Turn Two (Summer, 1775) until theSummer of 1776. The British Player whomoves blithely out of Boston may be in for arude surprise.

If the British decide on the Middle Strategy,a move from Boston to the Potomac Valleyon the first turn is not advisable. It pits 13British regulars and 5 Tories (18 StrengthPoints) against 15 Militia plus whatever theContinental Levy produces, which will beenough in all cases, to get a l-Lon the Britishin the Summer Turn before the British canbuild a fort. That means the Americans haveone chance in 6 of a Major Success (it wouldbe 1 in 2 except that in a 1/2 Exchange the 5Tories and only 4 British regulars would beexchanged, and Tory losses do not counttoward a Major Success). Perhaps those areacceptable odds to some, but I am not surethe gain is worth the risk.

Even in the Summer of '76, moving thereinforcing 40 British regulars to thePotomac Valley can be chancy. It is quitepossible that the Americans will be able toget a 1-1 in the fall on the 40. So, if the sea

COMBAT RESOLUTION TABLEI'l~FIo, •• ~·.S~ •••OcIw>tiDr·aS"-"'1~.. .. "" ""

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movement of other units to the PotomacValley fails in the summer of '76, thoughtshould be given to landing the 40 British inthe Susquehanna Valley or Virginia (movingthem into the fort with another British forceis perfectly safe, but when the time comes tomove them out, only 40 Strength Points cango by sea at one time). The 40 Britishregulars would build a fort and winter there.Any fall '76 move to a new area should becarefully weighed: the British cannot build afort in the winter, and the Americans are atthe height of their strength. After the winterof '77, the Americans lose 2/3 of theContinentals, things calm down for theBritish, and they can move about more atease. At best, with this strategy, the BritishPlayer can expect only a fort in the PotomacValley before the spring of '77; then hebegins gaining control of the Potomac Valleyand moving south.

If the British decide on the NorthernStrategy, there is nothing much to be doneagainst all those Militia until the 40 British

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regulars arrive in the summer of '76. He cansit in Boston for a year and hone hisdie-rolling skills.

If the Southern Strategy is picked,immediate movement to Georgia is OK if itcan be accomplished quickly. Depending onthe Continentals (numbers and positions),movement in the summer might be OK, butnot in the fall of '75 because a fort could notbe erected before the Spring Turn, when itwould probably be too late. Here, too, notmuch can be done to gain control until the 40British regulars arrive.

In all three strategies, the British Player hasone turn after the 40 British regulars arriveto win the game with only 41 Victory Points;then the total he needs rises to 51, and he has6 nonwinter turns to gain that total before itrises to 61. All in all, it is quite a challengefor the British.

Those who have played only games with hexor square movement grids may start thisgame thinking that any movement area is

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just like any other, with the possibleexception of terrain. However, there is moreto it than there may seem at first. The areashave to be looked at with an eye to supply.The British have to worry about supply, andthat comes only via a coastal area. Therefore,a coastal area is of particular value if it isadjacent to several noncoastal areas. Thewily American will usually defend thenoncoastal areas of a Region; so the Britishhave to move after them. Judicious choiceand use of certain pivotal coastal areas willmake this a bit simpler. The coastal area ofGeorgia is adjacent to four noncoastal areas;the one in the Roanoak Valley is adjacent tothree; the one in the Potomac Valley isadjacent to three; and the coastal area inCanada is adjacent to seven - eight if Erie iscounted. The British should give thought tousing these areas in their strategic andtactical approaches. Canada is not asimportant an area as might be surmised fromthe above, because the adjacent areas havefew Victory Points.

I asked the developers to explain thereasoning behind a couple of the rules. Everytime the British try to enter an area, theymust roll a 3, 4, 5 or 6, or those units mustend the movement portion of their turn. Thisrule was put in for two reasons. One is playbalance; without the rule, the Americanswere wiped out. The second is historical;looking at the maneuvers of the actualcampaign, they found that only about oneout of three troop movements went as theyshould have. The most obvious example ofnonmovement occurred in the SaratogaCampaign when Lord Germain, who wascontrolling British operations from Britain,neglected to tell Howe what he was expectedto do. As a result of Howe moving off toPhiladelphia, Burgoyne was cut off and cutup at Saratoga, giving the Americans aMajor Success and triggering the Frencharrival. For another example in the samesummer, it took Howe one month to march54 miles from the head of the Elk River toPhiladelphia.

The rule that the British can break up forcein anyone area into no more than two groupswas made to close a loophole to the aboverule. Otherwise, British Strength Pointscould be divided into 9 groups, with the oddsbeing that six of the points would make themove.

One rule clarification: although the loss of 5British Strength Points because of lack ofsupply does count as a Major Success, theloss of 15 because of lack of supply does nottrigger Partial Withdrawal; it is just anotherMajor Success.From the reading I have done on theAmerican Revolution, the feelings of theContinental Army and General Washingtonthat have come across to me are those ofdesperation and frustration. The main goalseems to have been to keep an army in beingand nip at any loose British ends thatpresented themselves. But primarily: avoiddefeat. And that usually meant avoidinglarge, pitched battles.

y, De Half of the defender eliminated. Onehalf of the Defender's StrengthPoints are eliminated; the attackersuffers no loss.

COMBAT RESOLUTION TABLEProbability Ratios (Attacker's Strength to Defender's Strength)

DieRoll to 1 2 to 1 3 to 1 4 to 1

De De De De

2 Y2De De De De

3 Y2De Y2De De De

4 Y2Ex Y2De Y2De De

5 Y2Ex Y2Ex Y2De Y2De

6 Y2Ex Y2Ex Y2Ex Y2De

Attacks executed at greater than 4:1 odds aretreated as 4:1. Attacks at odds of less than 1:1are not permitted. All fractional elimination isrounded up. All losses are incurred at basic(i.e., not doubled or tripled) strengthsregardless of fortifications effect on odds.

EXPLANATION OF RESULTS:

De = Defender Eliminated. The defendingunitlsl is eliminated (destroyed) andis immediately removed from themap.

In the winter of 1776, Washington was notsure he could continue the war. It was indesperation that he attacked and eliminateda couple of Strength Points of Hessians atTrenton and then a few more Strength Pointsof British at Princeton. Even after the Battleof Saratoga, there was no feeling ofconfidence pervading the Continental Army -just the hope that the odds against them werenot as high as they seemed.On the other hand, the British had troublecoming up with a strategy to defeat the rebelstotally, but when they met them in the field,they were seldom defeated. The Britishattitude that has come down through thehistories is one of confidence in their abilityto beat the rebels.

In the game The American Revolution, thefeelings the players have are exactly turnedaround. At the end of 1776, the AmericanPlayer does not have only a few thousandsoldiers in rags and bare feet; he has a forcealmost as large as the British, and, in combatjust as effective. Even after the first winterattrition, the American seldom has to worrymuch. All he has to do is sit a few areas awayfrom the British expansion, bunch all hisforces (which the Americans never did in theactual campaign), and dart in for a try at aMajor Success when the opportunitydevelops. The American does not get thedesperate feeling of having to hang on - hecan always move two areas away from theBritish and be confident in knowing the oddsof the British getting that far are very slight.

The loss of control of a few colonies is of nomoment; when the British get control ofenough Regions to make a total victory apossibility, the Americans merely bunch upand get control back in one or two of theRegions.

Y,Ex Half Exchange. One-half of theDefender's Strength Points areeliminated, as computed at basicStrength Points; the Attacker losesan equal amount as computed atbasic Strength Points.

The British, however, have to be verycircumspect about even attempting to move,.not only in the first year of the war (as wastrue in the actual campaign), but throughoutthe war. Whenever the British have as littleas 20 Strength Points in an area not in a fort,they are vulnerable. There is no feeling ofconfidence for the British Player - he isdesperately trying to keep the Americanarmy smaller than the smallest British forcein any front-line area.

The obvious counterargument is that theBritish had no reason to be confident ofwinning, and that Washington had no excusefor feeling the Americans had any chance ofultimately losing the war. That may be true,but the fact remains that in the game thepsychological attitudes are the opposite ofhistory.

I strongly suspect that if one were to try toeven out the game by adjusting some of therules (except the Victory Point Total), hewould find that balance in this game is anextremely fine adjustment. I would not besurprised if a chance to help the Britishwould doom the Americans. I think the mostsensible way to balance this game - or anygame - is to play games in sets of twos,changing sides for the second game. Then ifthe British lose (or win!) both games, thewinner of the set would be the player withmore British Victory Points.

I do not discount the possibility that myopponents and I just have not found theright approach for the British to make. Andthat possibility is one reason why I willcontinue to play the game. Some otherreasons are: the game is quick, the rules areclear and relatively simple, and it is a nicechange of pace from the hex-grid games.And it is a challenge .••