Ambassador Addou and US Officials Meeting 1977 to 1978

8/11/2019 Ambassador Addou and US Officials Meeting 1977 to 1978

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PUT TOGHETHER BY SHIRE

Vice President Walter Mondale reports to President Jimmy Carter on his meeting with SomalianAmbassador Addou regarding Soviet pressure for Somalia to accept Ethiopia's existing borders,

and a request for U.S. economic and military assistance to reduce Soviet presence in the area.

Memo.

May 12, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Somali Ambassador Addou,

May 11, 1977

Somali Ambassador Addou called on me May 11, at his request. He

also met last week with Cy Vance.

Addou began by describing Soviet pressures on Somalia to accept

Ethiopia's existing borders. According to Addou, the Soviets

have as their objective the creation of a cluster of states,

including Ethiopia, Somalia, Aden, and Djibouti, under Moscow's

influence.

Addou stated that Somalia's national interests dictate

otherwise: Somalia seeks the self-determination of Somali people

throughout the Horn. Because of this divergence, Somalia is

turning to us for economic and military assistance. Addou

cautioned that only he and President Siad know of this

initiative, which is being pursued at Siad's request.

Addou expressed satisfaction that a U.S. economic mission would

be traveling to Somalia next week to study specific projects. He

is concerned, however, about the vagueness of State's reply

concerning military assistance. Somalia recognizes our

difficulty in supplying large-scale military aid immediately

and, since there is no internal military threat in his country,

Addou noted, the U.S. could begin its military supply at a low

level. Addou insisted, nevertheless, that we give Somalia a

formal reply within one month as to whether we will assist withmilitary hardware. Only the U.S. can help Somalia in dealing

with the Soviet Union, Addou added.

I encouraged them, as did Cy Vance, to buy military equipment

elsewhere and that we would be supportive of that effort. He

then indicated that they might be able to buy military equipment

funneled through North Yemen. I'm not sure what he meant by


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that. He indicated a desire for armored personnel carriers and

mortars as desired items. He indicated receptivity to arms being

purchased for Somalia in Europe, but he repeatedly emphasized

the need for the symbolism of U.S. military support, even though

on a limited basis.

In reply to my question, Addou said that military assistance

from the U.S. definitely would lead Somalia to reduce the Soviet

presence. Somalia would end its military arrangements with the

Soviet Union. Somalia only had turned to the USSR in the first

place, he said, following U.S. and Western European refusal to

help. I asked what the Somalis would be prepared to do regarding

Berbera, and Addou replied, without specifying a time, that the

Soviet use of these installations also might be reconsidered. He

insisted that the Soviets simply have access to the port and

airfield at Berbera and that the communications center there is

jointly operated by the Soviets and the Somalis. Addou observed

that the soviets had infiltrated the entire Somali

establishment, including the military, and this all was a very

touchy matter. I told Addou that, unlike the Soviets, we have no

designs on Somalia.

Addou observed that the Soviets have targeted Ethiopia as a

model for communist revolution. Moscow, he noted, never was as

certain with Somalia because of Somalia's strong religious,

regional and nationalist commitments.

I told Addou that I would discuss our meeting with you. Addou

also hopes to meet with you personally.


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Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report.

Issues include: international broadcasting matters; Somalian-U.S. relations; U.S. economic aid tothe Sudan; U.S. arms sales to Ethiopia; Yugoslav sale of arms to Ethiopia; Soviet-Somalian

relations. Memo. National Security Council. SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 14, 1977.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Evening Report - 14 June 1977

Daily Activities:

Somalia: Conferred with State re Somali Ambassador's call on

President on Thursday, 16 June, and reviewed State's talking

points for President. Will have these with a couple of further

suggestions for you to send to the President tomorrow.

Ethiopia, Sudan, etc: Reviewed various current efforts with

State Area Director, Dick Post. State is becoming frustrated at

slowness with which AID is operating on getting Sudan aid

program moving. They say basic problem is that AID has only one

girl assigned to work on Horn of Africa and most of her time is

taken up with program that is continuing in Ethiopia. This is aninteresting example of problem of getting the bureaucracy to

respond to shifts in policy--the bureaucracy goes on doing the

old familiar things even though we want new initiatives to

start. Implementing a new aid program in Somalia is likely to

involve the same problems as with the Sudan. Since AID is

supposed to be operating under State, I suggested that at

highest level State give AID some push on this whole Horn aid

issue. They are going to try to get Vance to move on it. You

might want to mention this to him at some point.

State also has in the milla memo on our erstwhile Ethiopian armsprogram. There are all sorts of left-over problems on which they

need decisions in principle: should everything be held back?

Should things such as trucks which are on docks waiting shipment

to Ethiopia be turned back to suppliers and sent elsewhere? What

about spare parts, etc. that PMGE has paid for--should we let

them have them? This memo should come through the mill sometime

in the next couple of weeks and will probably require


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Presidential decision.

Significant Information:

Ethiopia: Yugoslavs have sent Ethiopia 90 Patton tanks and large

stock of ammo and spare parts and another 90 T-55 tanks are

expected soon from USSR. --PMGE has claimed recapture of Humera

from the EDU on 12 June. In Addis Abada, PMGE has announced with

some fanfare release of 708 persons who have been amnestied. --

Sudan is reported to be going to ask for removal of OAU

Headquarters from Addis at OAU Ministerial in Libreville at end

of this month.

Somalia: Rather wild report claims that Soviets and Somalis have

patched up their differences and that in return for cessation of

Somali support to Eritrean insurgents, Soviets guarantee that

they will force Ethiopians to turn over Ogaden to Somalia when

Eritrean problem has been licked; Soviets will also permit

Somalis to take over Djibouti. All this sounds too farfetched to

make any sense--it may be disinformation Soviets are

deliberately planting or it may represent rationalizations of

pro-Soviet Somalis who are trying to stave off full break.

NOTE: State has come through with comprehensive memo re

reorganization of USIA. Most of it, I believe, we can endorse,

but I have questions about desirability of putting the

reorganized, consolidated USIA organization under State in way

AID now is. Believe President should keep it directly underWhite House. Will prepare a memorandum for you tomorrow on this.


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Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: preparations

for President Jimmy Carter's 6/16/77 meeting with the Somali ambassador;


June 13, 1977


FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Evening Report - 13 June 1977

Daily Activities

Horn of Africa: Conferred with State re talking point paper for

President's meeting with Somali Ambassador on Thursday, 16 June

and status report on implementation of PRM-21 which is in final

form and ready to be signed off on the 7th Floor. Also spent

half an hour briefing Henry Richardson on Horn situation

Ethiopia: The concluding sentence of a dispatch from our Embassy

in Addis provides a measure of just how "normal" the state of

affairs there has become "Addis itself, with the exception of

continued assassinations, has been unusually calm for a month or

more; how long it may last is anyone's guess but the relative

tranquility is welcome." Just a few assassinations every day;

that's all The PMGE has begun its offensive against the EDU in

the NW; there is no clear evidence yet how it is going. The

Ethiopian consul at Kassala, just over the border in the Sudan,

has applied for U. S. asylum.

Kenya: There is new reporting about the deteriorated condition

of Kenyatta's mind, though his physical health is said to be

good.

Somalia: Arnaud de Borchgrave has given our Embassy in

Mogadiscio text of a fascinating interview he has just had with

Siad, which will be coming out in this week's Newsweek. It shows

what a determined and astute person Siad is and how complex the

Somali political equation can be. Siad denies having broken with

the Russians and expresses considerable skepticism about the

willingness of the U. S. to shift to a policy of full supportfor Somalia--he is realistic enough to see that we cannot take

responsibility for Somalia's territorial ambitions, among other

things. But he still leaves a good many doors open in our

directions and the fact he gave such a comprehensive interview

to an American publication is in itself highly significant. It

leads me to conclude that we will serve our interests best if we

avoid oversimplifications in our dealings with the Somalis, if


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we are open and frank with them about the help we give--pulling

no punches and engaging in now naive, oversimplified professions

of friendship. There are gains to be made in Somalia but we will

make them only if we are as firm about our principles and basic

positions as they are.


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Memorandum regarding a meeting between President Jimmy Carter and Ambassador Addou to

discuss U.S. economic and military assistance for Somalia. Memo. National Security Council.


16 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Somali Ambassador Addou with President

Carter, Oval Office, 2:00-2:20 p.m., 16 June 1977

PARTICIPANTS: President Carter

Ambassador Addou

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Talcott Seelye, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for AfricaPaul B. Henze, NSC

The meeting opened with Ambassador Addou making a rather

extensive statement to the President. He said he appreciated the

great honor of being received by the President and wished to

convey greetings from President Siad and his admiration for the

President's stand on human rights. "There is no political

oppression in Somalia," he declared, "and Somalia's people are

deeply democratic by nature." He went on to comment that the

situation in the region was becoming more complicated: "For

social and economic development we need peace and must be ableto defend ourselves." He said that his government was grateful

for the U.S. economic mission that had just visited Mogadiscio.

"We also want to be able to count on the U.S. for our defense.

The USSR is putting enormous pressure on the Somali government

to accept its idea of Soviet hegemony in the area. International

socialism is supposed to come first and national interests

second. Somalia's national interests must come first and other

forms of cooperation come afterward."

The Ambassador added that Somalis value their independence too

highly to be willing to consider joining together with Ethiopiaor other countries in the area. He described a "problem of human

rights" with Ethiopia--two million Somalis in Ethiopia, he said,

want to be free of Ethiopian rule. To protect its interests,

Somalia needs both economic and military assistance, he said,

and President Siad will be waiting for an answer. In conclusion

he summed up his position: "We must either resist Soviet

pressure or succumb. We hope not to have to succumb, which would


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be contrary to our national heritage.

We appreciate the deep interest you have shown in the Somali

people since you came to office. For years we have sought

improved relations with the United States, but we were not

listened to."

President Carter asked the Ambassador to convey to President

Siad his strong personal good wishes and thanks for his

interest, which parallels ours, in having an increasingly strong

friendship with Somalia. The President also asked that his

congratulations be conveyed to the Ambassador's daughter and

President Siad's son who will be married shortly. The President

then went on to comment that the United States has been

concerned about the closeness between Somalia and the USSR which

had been a reason for doubt on our part that our friendship

could be strong but, he said, "I believe that is now changing --

we have watched with care the development of Berber and the

calls of Soviet ships there; we also have the impression that

Soviet anti-submarine airplanes have been flying from Somalia.

Because of the independent nature of the Somali people, we feel

you are well able to take care of your own interests. We are

eager to understand your needs more clearly. But it is hard for

us to understand the military needs. A military attach would be

helpful in giving us more understanding of your military needs.

We do not want to compete with the USSR because we want Somalia

to be non-aligned and not dominated by anyone. We can move more

easily on a unilateral basis to give economic aid than military

aid. We are trying to work with the Saudis and our Europeanallies to see that Somalia has adequate defense capabilities

without relying on the Soviet Union. We want the Somalis to

recognize their own destiny. We hope your problems with Ethiopia

can be peacefully worked out, and we are pleased that the TFAI

will be encouraged in its independence by everyone in the area.

I hope your own people will see an advantage in seeking progress

with multinational friends, not by relying just on us but by

relying on European countries, too.

We are cooperating carefully with them and with the Saudis. In

meetings with some of our European friends we have discussedSomalia and how important it is to have it associated with us as

a democratic country. We appreciate your own personal friendship

with our country and we recognize you as a spokesman for

democratic processes and freedom. There is no doubt that you

represent your nation well and report our views well to your

government and that means a great deal to us."


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The President continued:

"We recognize the strategic importance of your country because

of the character and attitude of your people and your insistence

on independence of action and thought. You can have a very

important influence in your whole region. The degree with which

we can communicate freely is important, of course, and we do

appreciate the steady but very gratifying trend toward the

removal of past doubts and misunderstandings and difficulties.

The trends are all in the right direction. We are very hopeful--

and the members of the Congress share my hope--that they will

culminate in a completely comfortable relationship between our

country and yours."

The Ambassador commented briefly on the fact that Somalis are

100% religious people and took his prayer beads out of his

pocket to emphasize that he himself prayed five times each day.

He went on to say that the Soviets came to Somalia because the

Somalis had had no choice--"but now we see in you, Mr.

President, hope and inspiration. We hope your human rights drive

encourages other people." The President at this point rose to

say that he would like to step out for a moment to get a small

gift he would like the Ambassador to take back to President

Siad. Meanwhile, Dr. Brzezinski asked the Ambassador whether

President Siad had made any public declarations about human

rights. The Ambassador noted that Siad had condemned the

killings that were taking place in Ethiopia and had taken IdiAmin to task for his cruelty. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Siad

had said anything publicly about President Carter's human rights

position. The Ambassador indicated that he had not but that he

expected he would. The President returned with a volume of U.S.

satellite photography which was examined briefly by the

Ambassador and the President and then good-byes and good wishes

were exchanged.

The Ambassador said he would return from Somalia at the end of

August and he hoped there would be good developments by then.

Dr. Brzezinski accompanied the Ambassador to his car.


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Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Paul B. Henze regarding reasons why the U.S.

should not abandon Ethiopia, even as Somalian aggression threatens to cause the collapse of theEthiopian government. Memo. National Security Council. SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 17, 1977. 4

page(s).

MEMORANDUM


17 August 1977

INFORMATION


FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Whither Ethiopia?

Ethiopia is collapsing faster than anyone thought possible only

a month ago. Mengistu lacks the capacity to inspire his soldiers

to fight. The groups he has most favored--the Gallas and the

Muslims--are deserting him in droves. If the Somalis capture

Diredawa soon and the Eritreans make more major gains in the

north, the situation is likely to deteriorate to the point where

Soviet and Cuban aid, in no matter what quantity it can besupplied, will make little difference. If Mengistu is not pushed

out of power, the Soviets may be tempted to replace him with

someone they might consider more tractable and who would be less

tainted with failure. With such a figure, they could hope to

consolidate their position in a rump Ethiopia. This is only one

of several undesirable possibilities.

Under such cataclysmic circumstances, I propose we extricate

ourselves from mere preoccupation with whether we do or don't

give arms to the Somalis and what the consequences of not giving

them will be, and look out over broader horizons. (After all, ifthe Somalis keep up at the rate they have been going, they will

soon have captured from the Ethiopians more military goods--

originally supplied by us--than we could possibly send them in

the next six months under the most favorable circumstances.) Our

basic aim in this part of the world remains to reduce Soviet

influence, increase our own influence and contribute to human

development in the whole area. Why then abandon Ethiopia?


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Instead of waiting for Mengistu to fall, let's consider whether

we could hasten his fall and replacement by a person or group

who could rally the country and set it back on the path to

constructive political evolution in association with the Free

World. We have heard a lot of talk about the great gains the

military takeover is supposed to have brought to Ethiopia

over the past three years, but there has never been much

evidence to substantiate this wishful interpretation of what has

been going on there as Mengistu, step by step, consolidated his

grip. It's been a bloody mess since November 1974 and the

outflow of educated and talented Ethiopians long ago became a

flood. Mengistu's alleged concern for the downtrodden never

applied to Eritrea. Every identifiable interest-group in the

population has been alienated: students, labor, church,

entrepreneurs, various tribal groups. And now we see the result:

demoralization, collapse. Ethiopia, the oldest political entity

in the world after Egypt and China, is about to fall to pieces.

Legally, however, Ethiopia can't fall to pieces. The OAU can't

reward Somali aggression. The Somalis are not that popular with

other Africans. None of the major powers of the world can

condone the Somali moves.(Eritrean independence is problematical

from a political and legal stand-point, too, but a bit less so,

for it was a UN-mandated territory.) Residually, there is still

a great deal of strength in the idea of the Ethiopian state and

Ethiopia makes more sense as a nation than most African states

do. So--sooner or later Ethiopia will have to be put back on itsfeet and back together again. We owe it to the Ethiopians after

more than 30 years of close association and something of a

"special relationship" with them to play a role in this process.

What can we do? Mengistu wants to cozy up to us again. We can't

do that. He is a bloody tyrant and a failure besides. But we can

take advantage of his desperation to underscore our interest in

Ethiopia as such and in Ethiopians and their fate as people. We

should also consider going farther. We can make it clear that

our main problem is Mengistu and his clique but that we areready to be more supportive of a government more capable of

representing and defending the real interests of the Ethiopian

people. We don't have many direct channels of influence left in

Ethiopia, but we cannot be without means of getting word across

discreetly that if Mengistu were replaced by a more humane

government we would be prepared to consider helping Ethiopia

defend its legitimate interests. Among others, we might suggest


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this approach to the Israelis. It could be in their interest,

for they are in grave danger of losing their whole investment in

Ethiopia when Mengistu falls. They now tell us it is not

Mengistu they support, but the idea of Ethiopia as such. The

trouble is that the two concepts are rapidly becoming

incompatible. The Israelis stand to lose more than we from not

recognizing this and adjusting their position accordingly.

Interestingly enough, what sounds like reliable reporting of

Saudi attitudes indicates that the Saudis still favor a rescue

operation that might preserve some sort of loose Ethiopian

federation including Eritrea and nominally, at least, the

Ogaden.

It is not at all clear just who could take over from Mengistu in

Addis Ababa. We need to know more. There is an astonishing

dearth of evidence of serious plotting. Even in quiet times

under Haile Selassie, there was always a plot a month in

Ethiopia. That Mengistu is going to fall, however, now seems

inevitable. The Ethiopians are on the verge of losing

practically all the forces they have thrown into the Ogaden.

Between Diredawa and Addis and between the capital and Negelle

and Goba in the south there are almost no troops left. If the

Somalis are tempted to do so once they have these key towns,

they can probably march right on to Addis and push Mengistu out

of his chair. If that happens, some sort of internationalization

of the Ethiopian situation -- some sort of rescue operation

will have to be undertaken. Rather than waiting for events to

take their course, we should waste no time in determining

whether we have some capacity to influence them.

The following possible actions occur to me; others could

probably be thought of:

- Take advantage of Mengistu's overtures for keeping up dialogue

in the course of which we seek opportunities to pass word that

while we find it impossible to help Mengistu we are interested

in helping Ethiopia and would welcome a change of leadership. We

might send a special emissary out to Ethiopia ostensibly to size

up the situation and report back to Washington, e.g.

- Discuss with the Israelis, British, Italians, French, Germans,

Saudis and perhaps others how any or all of us could influence

what comes after Mengistu--and how we could keep the Soviets

from picking up the pieces and tightening their grip on what is

left.

- Talk to the EDU about what it thinks it might be able to do


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with a modicum of help from either/or (a) Europeans, (b) other

Africans, (c) Iranians, Saudis, etc., (d) ourselves.

NOTE: Nothing said above is intended to imply that we should not

continue consolidating our relations with all the other Horn

countries: Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti. It is especially importantto maintain a strong Kenya. Reasserting our influence in

Ethiopia would serve to bolster Kenya's confidence in the value

of reliance on the U.S. and the West. If we are passive in our

response to the cataclysm now affecting the Horn, the Soviets

could still come out the net gainers in the area, with major

influence over both Somalia and Ethiopia. If we reassert

ourselves in Ethiopia, the Soviets at best will be able only to

retain some residual influence in Somalia, but with the

disadvantage of having been humiliated by their Ethiopian

misadventure. The Sudan and even a fully independent Eritrea are

unlikely to want or need to accept Sovietsupport for a long time to come.


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Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: request bySomali Ambassador Adou to meet with Brzezinski; relations between Ethiopia and Somalia;

Israeli concern that the Soviet Union may press Ethiopia to expel Israeli military personnel.

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Evening Report - 23 November 1977 (includes 22

November)

Daily Activities:

Horn of Africa: Conferred with State Area Director Post on a

number of current problems re Horn. Briefed him on Shah's

remarks on this area to President. Discussed U.S. initiative to

get Saudis to put pressure on South Yemenis to deny Soviets use

of Aden as replacement for Berbera.

Had call from Somali Ambassador Addou requesting appointment

with you next week. He said he has been called back to

Mogadiscio on consultation, leaving week after next, and would

like to have chance to hear your views before he leaves. I think

it might be useful for you to meet with him, though there is not

a lot new that can be said. Looking ahead, though, we might

start leaning on the Somalis to think of how they might

extricate themselves from the mess their impetuosity has got

them in: withdrawal from the Ogaden in return for promises ofsome form of autonomy within framework of Ethiopian sovereignty,

e.g.

Lectured on Horn to Bob Rothberg's MIT/Harvard group yesterday

had very large turnout and flood of intelligent questions.

Believe there was considerable understanding for

Administration's position.

Ethiopia-Somalia: Somalis are in the midst of an effort to

capture Harar but Ethiopians appear to be putting up strong

resistance. The British have rebuffed Somali requests formilitary help. Several reports indicates Somalis are

energetically buying arms and spares from Eastern European

sources. Presumably, Soviets will not interfere to stop this

flow.

Israelis are worried Soviets may press Ethiopians to eject them.

Kenyan establishment is very unhappy with Foreign Minister


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Waiyaki for having gone overboard in anti-Israeli moves at UN.

Kenyans seem to have consolidated their relationship with

Israelis recently.

There has been a spate of reporting on the EDU which indicates

that:

*There is a serious leadership struggle in the organization.

*There is a controversy among Sudanese security organizations

over who looks after Ethiopian exile activities.

*EDU has learned of major tribal fight (Amharas/Tigres against

Gallas) which broke out among Ethiopian troopsin Humera area

over execution of Atnafu.

*As result, EDU is planning to mount major offensive against

Humera again by mid-December.


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Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: meetingbetween U.S. officials and a Somali delegation; meeting with Israeli official David Tourgeman

regarding the situation in the Horn of Africa; Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts concerningCubans in Africa;


FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Evening Report - 5 December 1977

Daily Activities:

Horn of Africa: Discussed Somali delegation with State and sent

you memo suggesting that if you see them it be this coming

Thursday along with the Somali ambassador. Vance will see thembut no one is advocating Presidential meeting though they have

request it.

David Tourgeman, Israeli Embassy Counsellor, came in to discuss

Horn situation. He was much less upbeat about Mengistu than

before though had a story to effect that Atnafu was not killed

by Mengistu but by extremists who forced Mengistu to go along

with their approach. This would appear to be last-ditch effort

on part of Israelis to salvage something of their earlier

contention that Mengistu is really pro-Western and worried about

the Soviets and therefore we should give him some arms....Pretty far fetched, and I am not sure Tourgeman believed it

himself. He finished up by telling me he was worried that

Ethiopians might kick out the Israelis, especially as Soviets

become vindictive because of unhappiness over Sadat-Begin

initiatives. I said I thought the Israelis might fend off that

possibility by withdrawing from Ethiopia--where it seemed to me

increasingly doubtful that they could be accomplishing much

anyway.

Received report from Reinhardt on what VOA has been saying about

Cuban in Africa.

*Said did not accomplish much during his recent visit to Egypt

and alienated the Egyptians almost as much as he did Nimeiry.

*Kenyans are sending mission to Saudi Arabia with aim of

strengthening relations; a very constructive move and one we

have been urging for some time.


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FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Evening Report - 9 December 1977 (includes 8 December)

Daily Activities:

Horn of Africa: Participated in your meeting with Somali

delegation morning of 8 December; prepared memo for President on

it which went to you this morning along with Siad's letter to

President; attended luncheon for this delegation hosted by State

at Metropolitan Club today. Ambassador Addou has requested token

meeting with Vice President next week; have sent you note re

this.

Was involved with State and you in efforts to get Soviet airlift

to Ethiopia publicized--it seems we came out rather successfully

with everyone on the same wavelength; now we must see what

results we have achieved.

Spent hour morning of 8 December with French academician/

journalist Gerard Chaliand who specializes on Horn and was in

Eritrea, courtesy of the EPLF, for 23 days earlier this year. He

had fascinating things to say about the Eritrean rebellion but

still believes that real solution for Eritrea lies not in

independence, but in confederation with a rational Ethiopia. How

that will come about he has no idea. He has more knowledge indepth of Horn and more realistic understanding of it than anyone

I have talked to recently. Is considering doing an article for

Foreign Policy or Foreign Affairs which would be useful.

Told State and DOD that in view of President's approval of F-5

program for Sudan, thanks to fast State action, we didn't need

report which you had asked for as of 9 December; your memo

requesting it did the job!

Horn of Africa:

Ethiopians are launching a major offensive against the Somalis

in Sidamo and Bale this weekend.

Mengistu has restricted Israeli advisers in Addis to please the

Soviets.

A Soviet General is reported to have declared in Cuba that Cuba


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will have over 30,000 troops in Africa by the end of this year.

There are some indications that the Cubans may be increasing

their manpower in Ethiopia by a couple of hundred.

The Italians are reporting that the Eritreans are going to

declare independence soon but there are no other indications of

this. Military operations in Eritrea continue bloody with no

major changes as Ethiopians try to open up road between Massawa

and Asmara.

Our embassy in Khartoum considers inherently unlikely a report

that the Sudanese and Egyptians have agreed to a scheme to

occupy Berbera to keep the Ethiopians from taking it from the

Somalis. We need more solid information on this before we jump

to any conclusions.


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Paul Henze provides Zbigniew Brzezinski with his evening report. Issues include: intelligence

assessment of Ethiopia's counteroffensive against Somalia; Soviet and Cuban intervention inEthiopia; U.S. discussions with Somali Ambassador Abdullahi Addou; Soviet military assistanceto Ethiopia.


FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Evening Report - 10 January 1978

Daily Activities:

Spent much of the day on the Horn, holding two-hour SCC Working

Group meeting this morning with reps of State, CIA and DOD which

gave us useful opportunity to review latest information, latestintelligence work in progress and latest policy thinking re Horn

problems. The Intelligence Community's military assessment is

coming to conclusion that the chances of a successful Ethiopian

counteroffensive against the Somalis before April are not good,

and if Ethiopians launch an offensive prematurely they are

likely to be beaten back. Implications of this conclusion for

policy are that the Somalis are not in as great danger of being

invaded as they have been claiming. This is turn leads to the

conclusion that measures to protect them may not be as urgent

as they want us to think. This does not mean that there is not

some justification for taking certain measures nevertheless forthe effect they can have on discouraging the Soviets and Cubans

from escalating their involvement further and in order to

reinforce the process that we are now engaged in of warning all

three parties--Ethiopians, Soviets and Cubans--that they should

not think in terms of invading and punishing Somalia. (S)

We also had a good deal of discussion of what could be

accomplished by further efforts to get negotiations going. We

concluded that there is very little chance of getting serious

negotiations going now because neither the Ethiopians nor the

Somalis see it in their interest to engage in serious

negotiations and Soviets and Cubans would undoubtedly discourage

Ethiopians from negotiating even if they were inclined to do so.

Therefore, it is important that the U.S. not get itself into the

center of any negotiating scheme that is bound to come to very

little. On the other hand, it is desirable for people like the

Iranians to be talking of encouraging negotiations and to be in

touch with both parties. If we look upon this as a situation

where we go through a new phase of what we have just been doing


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for several weeks: getting the Africans to try to negotiate,

then no harm will be done to our own position and gradually we

will increase realization on the part of the somalis, at least,

and perhaps later even the Ethiopians, that the only ultimate

solution must come through some form of negotiation.

There was general agreement that negotiation can ultimately

succeed only if and when the Soviets are willing to encourage it

seriously. Unlike the Middle East, where the Soviets are not

parties to the situation in an active way any more, they are the

key active party in the Horn; until they see it in their

interest to negotiate it is difficult to see how there can be

any negotiations. We reviewed the question whether there are any

pressures the U.S. can bring to bear on the Soviets anywhere

that will prompt them to change their approach in the Horn.

State/SP and Soviet specialists attending were skeptical. It is

primarily in this area, however, that I feel we need to do

further work.

I then had lunch with Somali Ambassador Addou and listened to

his view of the Horn situation for an hour and a half. His

current line is that nothing can change for the better in the

Horn until the "Elephant is removed." By Elephant, he means the

Soviets. But he has no idea how the Elephant can be removed. He

talked of encouraging the EDU to overthrow Mengistu and said the

Somalis have close ties with the EDU. I didn't tell him that our

own reporting indicates that the EDU is deteriorating. He shown

no interest in negotiating. The main thing I pushed with him was

a strong suggestion that the Somalis improve their position by

reassuring Kenya--which would make them look better witheverybody. He insisted they were trying to do so.

The COM conference that was going to take place in Nairobi this

coming weekend has been postponed until the middle of next week,

so I will not now be leaving any earlier than next Tuesday.

Significant Information:

Djibouti: the Somalis have already spent over $2 million in

covert action in Djibouti and have given their embassy in

Djibouti nearly $5 million to spend over the coming period if itis necessary to bolster their position there. This is a

formidable outlay for a country with the resources of Somalia.

Ethiopia: Over the next six weeks between 15 and 18 Soviet ships

are expected to arrive in Ethiopia, transporting additional

supplies and equipment. In addition the Ethiopians are expected

to receive a total of 12 MIG-23's during this period, primarily


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by air. The scope of the Soviet investment is staggering....

They seem to have learned nothing from our experience in

Vietnam....

NOTE: Rick relayed notes on your luncheon discussion with

Vance and Brown today re Horn. Will be in touch with State

on continuing basis on these during next couple of days.


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Memorandum for David Aaron from Paul B. Henze regarding talking points for Somali

Ambassador Addou's visit to the U.S. Topics include: relations between the U.S. and Somalia;President Siad's support for guerrillas in the Ogaden; U.S. economic assistance.

Memo. National Security Council.

October 24, 1978

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON

FROM: PAUL B. HENZE

SUBJECT: Visit of Somali Ambassador Addou

The best indication of what Addou may want to say is his

conversation with Newsom last week. He told Newsom Siad had

authorized him to tell us that he is going to return Somalia to

parliamentary democracy and that Addou will be going back to

head the new government. He was not clear about timetable or

mechanics of this process.

Harrop, who has been visiting Somalia this past weekend (along

with Admiral Packer) to take part in celebrations of the 9th

anniversary of Siad's 1969 coup, was told nothing about return

to democracy but heard a good deal about arms and the Ogadenfrom Siad whose line was essentially no different from what it

was when I was out there a year ago September. Siad refuses to

give up his claim to the Ogaden and insists that he must support

the guerrillas, though he does not admit the extent of military

support he is giving them. Siad's celebrations went off well,

though intelligence reporting indicates that tribal dissidence

and dissatisfaction with Siad are growing (a good recent CIA

analysis is attached, TAB A). The Kenyans have recently

permitted a number of Somali dissidents (most of whom fled to

Kenya after last April's coup) to fly to Ethiopia to join the

anti-Siad Somali guerrillas Mengistu is supporting. Harropraised Kenya with Siad but got nowhere--same old story as

before.

Talking points to use with Addou: Addou is coming to deliver a

message to us, so you need not say a great deal to him. The idea

of returning to parliamentary democracy is certainly a welcome


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one, from our viewpoint, for this would mean putting Somalia

back on the path it successfully followed from 1960 to 1969.

Parliamentary democracy in Somalia was sometimes messy (it

always is; and there were special problems in Somalia because an

elaborate proportional representation system resulted in too

many parties) but it kept the country in better balance in its

international relations than it has had since and resulted in a

fair amount of economic progress. Somalia managed to change

presidents and prime ministers peacefully during this period.

The mystery about Siad's intention to return to democracy is how

he could do it and survive personally. It must be a very guided

and controlled "democracy" that he has in mind if, indeed, Siad

has this in mind at all. The whole story may be merely an Addou

ploy. You might want to ask Addou a few leading questions if you

wish to take the time. You might also ask, if he does not

volunteer the information, when he plans to go back to take up

his new responsibilities.

Other points to be made should be consistent with our current

stance toward Somalia:

* We want to regard Somalia as a friend and we want to help

Somalia with its economic development--we plan to continue and

expand the aid we are already giving (about $10M so far with

several additional projects being planned).

* We continue to be disturbed by Siad's support for guerrillas

in the Ogaden. There can be no planning for possible military

assistance while this goes on. In our view, Somali support forthe guerrillas exacerbates tensions with Ethiopia and forces

Ethiopia to rely on the Soviets and Cubans.

* While we sympathize with Somalia's concern for kinsmen in the

Ogaden, we notice that no African country is willing to support

Somali claims. Somalia is not the only African country that has

kindred peoples outside its borders. Continued fighting in the

Ogaden hardly benefits the people who live there. Wouldn't a

policy that enabled these people to live in peace and develop

some basis for autonomy within existing boundaries be more in

accord with recognized human rights principles?

* If Somalia wants to get the Soviets and Cubans out of Africa--

as we do too--wouldn't it be better to do everything possible to

get them out of Ethiopia so that relations between the countries

in the Horn could return to a normal, natural state?

(Finally, there is the so-called "trilateral proposal"--


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Congressman Leggett's scheme for Saudi financing of U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers projects in Somalia. It is doubtful that

Addou will raise this--in which case it is not to our advantage

to do so. Harrop mentioned it in Mogadiscio and got a lukewarm

response from Siad. State believes the Saudis are not really

interested in it but will suggest in response to the McGiffert

memorandum that we ask them. If Addou does raise it, recommend

you simply say that the Somalis will have to persuade the Saudis

to commit themselves before we can carry these proposals

farther.)

Ambassador Addou and US Officials Meeting 1977 to 1978

Documents