The Philosophical Roots of Moses Mendelssohn's Plea for
Emancipation Author(s): Alexander Altmann Source: Jewish Social
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1974), pp. 191-202
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The Philosophical Roots of Moses Mendelssohn's Plea for
Emancipationby Alexander AltmannIn the fall of 1781,when Christian
WilhelmDohm's treatise"On the Civil Imof the Jews"appeared,'Moses
Mendelssohn reimmersed himselfin the provement of naturallaw, a
subjectthat had alwaysattractedhim, and certainaspectsof study
whichhe had alreadytouchedupon in his Academyprizeessayof 1763.2The
reason that movedhim to returnto the subjectis not farto seek.The
issueof the civil admission of the Jews,whichhad beenraisedin
Dohm's treatise,was enteringa new stage of in afterthe promulgation
thePatentof Tolerance Bohemiaon October19, 1781 It .3 was
obviouslydesirableto foster a lively debateconcerningthe matterin
Prussia, wherethe government showedno intentionof followingthe
precedentset by Joseph II. As Mendelssohn it in a letterto his
friendFriedrichNicolai: "I think that at put the presenttime one
ought to keep the publicconstantlyen haleine[in suspense] in
regardto this matter,and that the prosand cons of this
issueshouldcontinueto be a He he into subjectof debate."4 felt
thatas a philosopher mightinterject the discussion of his own.
Hencehis resumedpreoccupation with naturallaw. The first viewpoints
resultof his effortswas a shortfragment"On Perfectand Imperfect
Duties,"which was writtenin November1781. The
ideassketchedthereinbecamethe nucleusof his theory of the
relationshipbetween churchand state, a theory that was meant to his
undergird pleafor emancipation.6 Mendelssohnfirstpresentedhis
notions about churchand state in the Preface to MarcusHerz's
Germanversion of Manassehben Israel's Vindiciae Judaeorum, him in
the earlyspringof 1782as a "Supplement" Dohm's earlier to
publishedby treatise.7Mendelssohn that therewas littlehe could add,
Dohm modestlyremarkedChristian Wilhelm Dohm, Ober die birgerliche
Verbesserungder Juden (Berlin & Stettin, 1781). For the date of
publication, see Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A
Biographical Study (University, Alabama 1973) [hereafter referred
to as Mendelssohn], p. 454. 2 See ibid., pp. 281, 469. 3 See Jacob
Katz's essay in Zion, vol. xxix (1964), pp. 127 f., where the
principal bibliographical references are given. The Austrian
version of the Patent followed on January 2, 1782. 4 The letter
from which this statement is quoted is now published in Alexander
Altmann, "Neuerschlossene Briefe Moses Mendelssohns an Friedrich
Nicolai," Lessing Yearbook V 1973 (Munich 1973), p. 42 (no. 49).
The date is February 8, 1782. 5 Published in Moses Mendelssohn's
gesammelte Schriften, ed. by G. B. Mendelssohn (Leipzig 18431845)
[hereafter referred to as GS], IV. 1, pp. 128-31. 6 The term
"emancipation" is used here anachronistically, since it was not
employed at the time. See Jacob Katz, "The Term 'Jewish
Emancipation': Its Origin and Historical Impact," Studies in
Nineteenth-CenturyJewish Intellectual History, ed. by Alexander
Altmann (Cambridge, Mass. 1964), pp. 1-25. 7 Manasseh Ben Israel,
Rettung der Juden. Aus dem Englischen ibersetzt. Nebst einer
Vorrede von Moses Mendelssohn. Als ein Anhang zu des Hrn.
Kriegsraths Dohm Abhandlung: Uber die biirgerliche der Verbesserung
Juden (Berlin & Stettin 1782); reproduced in GS, III,
177-254.
191
192
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
having all but exhaustedthe philosophicaland political aspects
of the matter.8In actual fact, however, Mendelssohnadded an
entirelynew dimensionto Dohm's humanitarian plea by offeringan
outline of his theory of state and churchthat had a directbearingon
the civil admissionof the Jews.Yet it did so only towardthe end, in
and almostincidentally, connectionwith his remonstration againstthe
use of the werewidelynoted and provokeddiverse Evenso, his remarks
ban by the rabbinate.9 or reactions,in responseto which
Mendelssohnwrote his Jerusalem On Religious 1 It is here that we
findhis full-fledged treatment state of PowerandJudaism (1783).
followfor the issueof civilequality. andreligion,fromwhichimportant
consequences Althoughthe plea for Jewishemancipationis not the
overt theme of the book, no one readingit could fail to see the
implicationsof Mendelssohn's politicaltheory. left whatwas
deliberately unsaidyet could It is the purposeof this paperto
articulate In not be missedupon the least reflection. so doing we
shallbe tracingthe philosophical roots of Mendelssohn's for the
civil admissionof the Jews. plea in The theoryof the originand
functionsof the state as presented Part One of and dutiesincumbent
Jerusalem emergesfrom an elaboratediscussionof the rights
assumedthat, even priorto the social upon man in the state of
nature.Mendelssohn contract,man has both rights and duties-a view
that was not shared by either Hobbesor Rousseaubut was takenover
fromAdam Ferguson'sPrinciples Moral of (1769).In
1772ChristianGarvehad broughtout an annotatedGerman Philosophy
translationof this work,"1and there is clear evidence that
Mendelssohnavailed himselfof Garve'snotes.12 The
distinctionbetweenperfectand imperfect rightsand duties, which is
the cornerstoneof Mendelssohn'stheory,goes back to Ferguson: if a
rightor duty is of such a naturethat it may be exactedby force, it
is called a "perfect"rightor duty. If it is merelyin the natureof a
claim that may be directed to anotherperson'sgoodwill (e.g.,
askingfor charity),it is termedan "imperfect" duty; that is, a mere
duty of duty is an "imperfect" right, and the corresponding
conscience,whichis nonenforceable. Omittingto fulfilla perfectduty
is tantamount to injustice,whereasnoncompliancewith a duty of
conscienceis merely unfair. concepts,Mendelssohncontinued:"Man
cannot Havingclarifiedthese elementary be
happywithoutbeneficence-whetherit be passive,throughreceiving or
active, it, it. He cannotattainperfection throughmutualassistance."
except throughextending Man is therefore obligedto use for the
benefitof his fellowmen as muchof his prophe erty as he can spare
without detrimentto his own well-being.Conversely, may to be
supported others,shouldhe findhimselfin need of help. In the state
by expect of natureit is left entirelyto the
individual'sdiscretionto decide the amount, the timing, and the
natureof his benefactions.There may be competingclaims on his8
Ibid., p. 181. 9 Ibid., pp. 194-202. 10 See Mendelssohn, pp.
489-96, 502-13. Jerusalem oder uber religiose Macht und
Judentum(Berlin 1883) is quoted here. GS, III, 255-362. 11 Adam
Fergusons Grundsatze der Moralphilosophie. Obersetzt und mit
einigen Anmerkungen versehen von Christian Garve (Leipzig 1772). 12
See GS, III, 279, note; Mendelssohn, pp. 523, 525.
TheRootsof Mendelssohn's for Emancipation Plea
193
and beneficence, sincea person'smeansarelimitedandnot all
claimscanbe satisfied, the benefactor musthave the choice in the
matter."Hence,in the stateof natureIand I alone-am entitledto
decidewhether,to what extent,when,to whose benefit, and
underwhatconditionsI am obligedto practicebenevolence." follows
that in It the state of nature all positiveduties are
nonenforceable, imperfectduties;just as positive rights are
imperfectrights. In the naturalstate only duties and rights of
omission are perfect:I am perfectly(i.e., absolutelyand
unconditionally) obliged not to injureanyone, and I am just as
perfectlyempowered preventanyonefrom toinjuring me. 13
The identicalview (no doubtalso borrowedfromFerguson)
beenexpressed had in 1773 by SamuelJohnson, as reportedby
JamesBoswell in his Life of Johnson: "Sir, you must consider that
we have perfect and imperfectobligations. Perfect not
obligations,whichare generally to do something,areclearand
positive,as 'thou shaltnot kill.' But charity,for instance,is not
definable limits.It is a dutyto give by to the poor, but no man can
say how much another should give to the poor."14 Mendelssohn,
however,addeda rider:by concludingcontracts,man left his natural
stateandenteredinto moreor less definedsocialrelationships. own
natureurged His him to do this so as to changehis
undecided,unsettledrightsand dutiesinto
somecontractsobviouslyreflected sucha desire thingmore settledand
decided.Marriage for stable relations.The social contractby
whichthe state came into being was not different fromall
otherprivately concludedagreements. Thoughthe right essentially to
decide on the meritsof competingclaims and to dispensehis goods
restedwith the individual,it seemedadvisableto renouncethe right of
autonomousdecision what portions by meansof a
specialcontract;thatis, by a legalagreement specifying of his
rightsa personcould be compelledto give up for the good of
society.By virtue of the social contracta certainpart of the
person'sduties of consciencetherefore becamecompulsory duties;they
werenow enforceable the state.Henceif a citizen by was remissin the
fulfillment his stipulatedduties,the state had the authorityand of
suchauthority power and powerto compelhis action.The
socialcontractconferring had come into beingeitherby tacit
agreement in rarecases,by explicitcompacts. or, this derivationof
statepowerfromthe transferof personalprivilege Underlying
throughthe social contract,is a highlyoptimisticview of man in the
state of nature. MendelssohndistinctlyrejectedHobbes's view that
the social contractbroughtto an end man's naturalstate of
anarchy,in which therewas a war of all againstall. If it
weretrue,he argued,thatnaturalmanwas underno moralobligation(as
Hobbes had suggested),what could preventhim from
breakingcontractsat any time when he had the physicalpower to do so
with impunity?He believedhimself to have evidenceof an
impliedadmissionon Hobbes'spartthat naturalman was, discovered
Mendelssohndid not discussRousin fact, not devoid of morality.15 In
Jerusalem13 14
GS, III, 269-81.
Quoted in Mendelssohn,p. 843, note 74. GS, 11, 259-61. By
acknowledging the sovereign's fear of Divine power (Leviathan, II,
30), Mendelssohn argued, Hobbes had shown the possible source of a
"solemn right of nature." 15
194
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
seau'stheory,but we know froman earlierwork of his that he
interpreted Rousseau in a mannerthat broughtthe
Frenchphilosophersomewhatinto line with his own view. In the
Epistle (Sendschreiben) Lessingwhich he appendedto his German to he
translation secondDiscours, claimedthaton closerinspection of
Rousseau's (1756) than animalinstincts.He pointedout
Rousseaucreditedeven the savagewith more that the feelingof pity
ascribedby the Discoursto presocialman, necessarily implied love,
and that love, in turn,was basedon the pleasurefound in harmonyand
order; which could moreover, that Rousseau had also attributedto
him perfectibility, mean nothing less than a strivingfor
perfectionand hence an actual, not merely In
potential,propensity.16 replyto the Epistle,Lessingvoiced doubtsas
to the correctnessof Mendelssohn'sreadingof the Discours,17and it
seems obvious from Martin Rang's incisive analysis of
Rousseau'sdoctrine of man that Lessing was of Rousseauunderstoodthe
almost infinitemalleability man, right.Byperfectibility faith in
naturallaw that he not any moral quality.18Yet such was
Mendelssohn's could not conceiveof man in any condition as bereftof
reasonand morality.For Rousseau,man becameman only when he becamea
citizen; only the state and its laws make
humanecoexistencepossible.19For Mendelssohn,on the other hand, the
state only transforms imperfectinto perfectduties;it
cannotcreatecompulsory obligationswhereno duties of
conscienceexistedpreviously.Hence man must be wouldagreewith
assumedto havebeen man even priorto statelaw.20Mendelssohn thatthe
statealonesecuresthe equalityof men. Rousseau,however, This
bringsus to the heart of the matterthat we wish to discuss:the way
in views the natureand functionof the state as inextricably
whichMendelssohn bound with civil equality.To put it succinctly:the
social contractby which man relinup the quishedthe state of
natureand surrendered legislationof positivedutiesto the as
state,must by its verynaturebe considered limitedin scope. It
appliesexclusively of to such determination positiveduties as was
withinman'soriginalpowerto surrender,but it has no validityin the
sphereof inalienablerightsand duties. In more concrete terms:
through the social contract the individualrenounceshis right to his
be the sole arbiterof the extent,manner,and timingof his
benefactions; contributionsto the commonweal are
henceforthimposedupon him to a largeextentby law, and the state has
coercivepowerto securethem. Yet the individualcan at no time have
yieldedto his fellow man in the state of nature,or to the state
through his the social contract,the rightto determine own
thoughtsand beliefs.No one can, for the sake of good fellowshipor
any earthlyreason,go so far as to relinquish his innermostand
private sentimentsand convictions. Hence the state cannot haveSee
Moses Mendelssohn Gesammelte Schriften Jubilaumsausgabe[Jub A], II
(Berlin 1931; reprint, Stuttgart 1972), 86-90. 17 See Lessing's
letter of January 21, 1756; JubA, XI (Berlin 1932), 34. 18 See
Martin Rang, Rousseaus Lehre vom Menschen (Gottingen 1959), pp.
129-40; Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago 1953), p.
271. 19 Rang, op. cit., pp. 143-46.20 16
GS, III, 196, 281.
Plea TheRootsof Mendelssohn's for Emancipation
195
acquiredthe rightof coercionwheremattersof personalconvictionare
concerned. The intimatedomainof a person'sfaith must
thereforeremaininviolate,free from any kind of state
interference.2'A similar view had been expressedby Hobbes, was
argumentation the specific Spinoza,and Locke.Whatwasnew in
Mendelssohn's the mannerin whichhe established principlefromthe
verynatureof the socialcontract.Yet this was not all. He went on to
apply the principlein a highly ingenious manner:grantingthe least
privilegein civil mattersto membersof a certainchurch, amountsto a
kind or withholding certainfreedomsfrom dissidents,he maintained,
of coercion.For everyprivilegeis a bribe,and everydenialof
freedomis a punishment. A state that accordshonor and dignityto one
set of believers,and decreesor permitscontemptand povertyfor
another,therebycoerceshumanbeingsto think and feel-or at least
tempts them to think and feel-in a certain state-approved
manner.For such coercionthere is no valid legal foundation.Such an
invasionof of privacyis utterlybeyondthe competence the state.22
With one masterfulstroke Mendelssohnthus demolishedall semblanceof
againstthe Jew. The very definitionof legitimacyattachingto civil
discrimination the stateas the legalexecutorof the
socialcontractwas shownto invalidate claim any to
preferentialtreatment granted to any church. The premium paid to
any group in terms of civil rights was unmasked, as it were, as an
unlawful act of coercion of conscience. Without uttering a plea,
without a single word of direct appeal, Mendelssohnstated the case
for the civil admission of the Jews. In his Preface to
VindiciaeJudaeorumhe had noted that previous debates while Jews,
about tolerancehad been concerned solely with dissidentChristians,
believersin naturalreligion hardly enteredinto the pictureat all.
Muslims, and the Lessingin his Nathanthe Wise(1779),and Dohm in his
treatise,had considered monarch"(JosephII) of humanityas a whole,"
and an "admirable "prerogatives was In Mendelssohn morereserved.
them.23 Jerusalem hadcommenced implement to for the "wisemaxim"of
tolerance the He praisedFrederick Great,his own monarch, whichhe
wasthe firstrulerin the eighteenth centuryto apply,buthe did not
explicitly the king to do more than he had alreadydone.
Mendelssohneven condoned urge and the prevailing discrimination,
expecteda changefor the betteronly in the distant future.To quote
his words: "True,with wise moderationhe left the privilegesof the
public24religionintact, preserving therebythe
statusquo.Perhapscenturiesof that priviwill cultureand preparation
still be requiredbeforemen will understand leges accordedon
groundsof religionare neitherlawful nor reallybeneficial,and21
Ibid., pp. 197, 285 f. 22 Ibid., pp. 285-86. 23 Ibid., pp. 179-80.
24 Lit. "external" (iusseren), contrasting the interior worship of
man with the external, public worship of the dominant church. The
same sentiments are expressed in Christian Siegmund Krause's
anonymously published work Ueber kirchliche Gewalt. Nach Moses
Mendelssohn (Berlin 1786), in which Krause rejects the notion of an
established religion as advocated by Emmerich de Vattel and G. L.
Bohmer; see pp. 39, 44.
196
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
that it would be a true blessing if all civil
discriminationbased on religion were While leaving no doubt that he
considereddiscrimination entirely abolished."25 of this sort to be
devoidof all legality,he was contentto statehis viewwithoutpleading
the case of civil admission.It was an attitudeworthy of a
philosopher. There was yet another philosophicalapproach that
indirectlyadvancedthe of causehe had so much at heart.Its
immediateconcernwas the separation church as and state. Locke had
drawn a neat distinctionbetween the "commonwealth" and advancingof
"a society of men constitutedonly for the procuring,preserving
their own civil interests"[and]the churchas "a voluntarysociety of
men"devoted to "the public worshippingof God in such a manneras
they judge acceptableto Him, and effectualto the salvationof their
souls."26Mendelssohnadvancedtwo spheresof interestof church
objectionsto this strictdivisionbetweenthe respective with the
temporalwelfareof and state. First,if the state
concerneditselfexclusively its citizensand left
theireternalfelicityentirelyto the church,it was inevitablethat the
church, being in charge of men's ultimate vocation, would claim
superiority over the state and assertits authorityin cases of
conflictingduties. Second, Mendelssohn consideredit neithertrue nor
in the best interestsof man to distinguish so sharplybetweenthe
temporaland the eternal. It seemed to him that Locke's
radicalseparationof temporaland eternalwelfarewas bound to
encouragemen to neglect their duties as citizens on earth "in the
hope of therebybecomingbetter In citizensof heaven."27 a
similarvein, Rousseauhad voiced the fear that a truly good
Christian might lose all interestin the mundaneaffairsof state,
believingthat only life eternalmattered.28 Against such undue
emphasison the world-to-come, Mendelssohnquoted a
well-knownrabbinic saying (Abot 4:12), which he paraphrasedas
follows: "Thislife is a vestibulein which we have to
conductourselves in as we wishto appear the innermost chamber."29
beingthecase,the bifurcation This of society into state and
religionshouldnot mean a total separation.The state has no
interestin religion insofar as strictlytheologicaltenets are
concerned,but the in state is vitallyinterested religioninsofaras
it teachesmoralityand social conduct. If the nation is to be
governedultimatelyby the inculcationof moral principles, ratherthan
by fearof the coercivepowerof the state,the churchmust be
considered an invaluable assetto the state.30 By emphasizingthe
moral function of religion,Mendelssohnfound a way of the
integrating churchinto the state'ssphereof
interestwithoutpermitting state any in interference
thetheologiesandinternal affairsof the variouschurches. the same By
token he placed all religionson one and the same level vis-a-visthe
state. Again,25 GS, III, pp. 300-02. 26 See The Worksof John Locke
(London 1823; reprint, Aalen 1963), VI, 5 ff. ("A Letter concerning
Toleration," First Letter); cf. GS, III, 261. 27 Ibid.,pp. 262-63.
28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres completes, III, 465 (Du Contract
social, IV). 29 GS, III, 263. 30 Ibid., pp. 264-67.
TheRoots of Mendelssohn's for Emancipation Plea
197
and the principle equalitywasasserted, seeingthatthe
Jewwasbeingdiscriminated of on purelyreligiousgrounds,it
followedwith inexorable against logic that the denial of civil
equalityto the Jew was unjustifiable. The state was entitledto
apply one criterion only; namely, the degree of moral influence
exercisedby the various churches.It was by this yardstick,and it
alone, that a religiouscommunitywas to be judgedfroma
politicalaspect. How seriouslyMendelssohn took this criterionmay be
gaugedby the fact that he assignedto the statethe dutyas well as
the rightto supervise churches some the in broadfashionto
preventthe spreadof antisocialideas. Lockehad excludedatheists from
the commonwealth the assumptionthat "promises,covenants,and oaths,
on which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an
atheist."31 The of whetheratheism and moralitycould exist
togetherhad been a major question topic of debatefor some time
past. PierreBayle and John Toland,takingtheir cue from Plutarch,had
arguedthat superstitionand idolatrywere far more injurious to
moralitythan atheism, but Mendelssohnstronglycontestedthis
view.32In his he Jerusalem referred againto this
question,pointingout that one evil was as pernithat it was
incumbent cious as the other,andsuggesting uponthe stateto
ensurethat the doctrineswhich undermined body politic would not
take root. Yet he stressed the need to do so only "froma
distance"-that is, in the most generalway, without enteringinto
philosophicalor theologicalminutiae;in other words, without
exercising coercive power and assuming the mantle of authority in
the intellectualrealm.33
I suggestthat Mendelssohn's plea for noninterference the state
in matters by of specificdoctrine,religiousor otherwise,servesagain
to underlinehis advocacy and vis-a-visthe churches.Dohm held of the
state'scompleteneutrality impartiality the
sameview.WhentheAustrianemperor expelleda deisticsectof Bohemian
exactly peasantsand in the expulsionorder invoked "the only saving
faith," Dohm was outraged,both at the action itself and at the
formulaused, the latterbeing "wholly Dohm's reaction unworthyof the
officialstyle of an enlightenedgovernment."34 shows that in his
view the state was to conductits businessin a completelysecular
vein.The notion of a Christian statewas utterlyforeignto him.It was
this secularized of the state that enabledMendelssohnto base his
hopes for the Jews'civil concept admissionon the intrinsiccharacter
the state-church of relationship. Mendelssohn's theorywould have
been a mereblueprintfor utopiahad not the in conceptof the
churchitselfundergonea radicalmetamorphosis the more enlight35
circlesthat had adopted"collegianism." This school of thought
enedecclesiastical character a divinelyfoundedmysticalbody, as
divestedthe churchof its traditional and consideredit instead,by
analogy with the state, as a free associationof like32
31 Locke, op. cit., p. 47. JubA, II, 21 f.; see Fritz
Bamberger's note, pp. 375 f. 33 GS, III, 287. 34 See
Mendelssohn,pp. 462 f. 35 See ibid., pp. 518-19.
198
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
minded individuals, established by contract. The theory of the
churches as mere "collegia" goes back to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
and Samuel Pufendorf (16321694). It was developed and designated
"collegianism" by Christian M. Pfaff of Tiibingen in his "Academic
Addresses on Ecclesiastical Law" (1742). J. H. Boehmer's monumental
Jus ecclesiasticum Protestanticum reflected the fundamental outlook
of collegianism in its repudiation of the ban as an instrument for
the enforcement of church discipline.36 A work of similar
orientation was Israel Gottlieb Canz's Disciplinae morales omnes,
from which Mendelssohn made excerpts in preparation for writing
Jerusalem.37In one of his notes on those excerpts, Mendelssohn
referred to an inconsistency in Canz's provisions for the treatment
of dissidents: while they were not to be deprived of their civil
rights, they had to forgo the ecclesiastical rights enjoyed by
other members of the church.38 We are not surprised to find that
this position was regarded as unsatisfactory by Mendelssohn, who in
his Preface to Manasseh's Vindiciae Judaeorum had made the point
that ecclesiastical ostracism inevitably injured the social and
civil status of a person.39 His critique of Canz also anticipated
the strong stand he made in Jerusalem on what he called the
pretentious claim of the post-Reformation churches to undisputed
authority and the right of coercion. In his view the churches still
behaved as if they represented the Church (with a capital C),
whereas in fact they were freely established religious
associationsa fact conceded by collegianism, as we have noted.
Whereas collegianism clung to the notion of the contractual origin
of the churches, however, Mendelssohn strenuously denied this
thesis. Only the state had come into being as a result of a social
contract. In the case of religious associations the concept of
contractual origin made no sense whatever. He considered this a
point of tremendous significance, and he defined the difference as
follows: The coercive power of the state is the corollary of the
social contract. It derives from the surrender of the individuals'
natural prerogative to decide in cases of competing claims, as has
been explained above. In the case of religion or church the raison
d'etre for a social contract is lacking. The idea of a transference
of the right to settle conflicting claims to one's benevolence
simply has no place where religion is concerned. For religion is
essentially a concern for one's relation to God. No conflict of
duties toward God-the settling of which might have been passed on
to the church-can be conceived. For which benefits could God
receive from man? It follows that the church could never have
acquired the right to use coercion. "Divine religion .. . does not
prod men with an iron rod; it guides them with 'bands of love.' It
draws no avenging sword, dispenses no worldly goods, arrogates to
itself no right to earthly possessions, and usurps no external
power over any person's mind. Its sole weapons are reason and
persuasion; its strength is the divine power of truth."4036 See
lusti Henningii Boehmeri Ius Ecclesiasticum Protestanticum,vol. V,
3d ed. (Halle, 1763), Book V, chap. 34, par. 55, pp. 962 ff. 37 See
Mendelssohn,p. 519. 38 Ibid. 39 GS, III, 197-201. 40 Ibid., pp.
282, 294-98.
Plea TheRootsof Mendelssohn's for Emancipation
199
with an appealto Judaeorum Mendelssohnconcludedhis Prefaceto
Vindiciae the "most enlightenedand most pious" among the rabbis and
Jewish elders to he renouncethe weaponof herem,and at the end of
PartOne of his Jerusalem struck the samenote again.Seenin
thecontextof his concernfor civiladmission,thispowerful advocacyof
a totally noncoercivetype of religionappearsas the final efforton
Mendelssohn's part to facilitatethe integrationof the Jews into the
secularstate. Coercivepowerin the form of heremhad indicateda
measureof Jewishautonomy in and was a relicof Jewishself-government
the MiddleAges. Unlike the excommubut nicationpracticedby the
church,it was not entirelyecclesiastical, had a certain
connotation.It was the vestigeof a state within the state.41(Not
that the political exercise of this form of power had been left
completelyto the discretionof the rabbinate.We know, for
example,that a royalresolutionof May 5, 1781,deprived the
ban"againstanymember thechiefrabbiof Altonaof therightto pronounce
"great with To of the community.42) Mendelssohnthe use of
heremseemedincompatible of the desiredintegration Jewryinto the
body politic.In the contextof his theoryof of state and religionit
had lost all validity.The verydesireto wield this instrument was to
him evidenceof an attitudethat had to be overcomeif the community
power was to qualifyfor civil admission.43 betweenciviladmission
saw Onthe otherhand,Mendelssohn no incompatibility and the
preservation the Jews'separateidentityas a nation. WhenJohannDavid
of Michaelisargued,againstDohm's plea, that so long as the Jewskept
theirlaws they would be unable to coalesce with the
citizenry,Mendelssohnpublisheda spirited reply in Part Two of
Dohm's treatise:44He did not deny that the Jews wished to
preservetheir separatenationalidentity.In his view, however,a
group'sreadiness to coalescewas no criterionof worthinessas far as
civil rightswereconcerned.The only legitimatequestion was, Can the
Jews be expected to dischargethe duties incumbentupon citizens?He
had no doubt that the answerto this questionwas in order. was But
the affirmative. the issueof herem of a different A
philosophicalmotif of a truly metaphysical nature,bearingon the
plea for Jerusalem. maycallit an argument We of in appears the
lastparagraph emancipation, for religiouspluralism.It is embeddedin
an appealto the Jewishcommunitynot to It sacrificeJewishidentityon
the altar of emancipation. had becomeclear to Menin delssohn that
the celebratedPatent of Toleranceas promulgated BohemiaconHe
taineda clausethat put a premiumon conversionto Christianity.45
himselfhad been imploredto lead his people toward a union with
enlightenedChristianity.46 It seemedthat the issueof civil
rightswas beinglinkedto the lureof baptismor some41 See
Mendelssohn, pp. 472 f. 42 See Heinz Mosche Graupe, Die Statuten
der drei GemeindenAltona, Hamburg und Wandsbeck (Hamburg 1973), I,
93, note 118. 43 See Mendelssohn, p. 471. 44 See ibid., pp. 465 f.
45 See ibid., p. 462. 46 See ibid., pp. 495 f., 508 ff.
200
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
more moderateform of religiousunification.It was againstthis
dangerthat Mendelssohn called upon his brethrento be on their
guard.As he put it, therewas no purpose in trying to effect a
specious unity through some contrived theological formulaof
compromise. The endeavorto obliteratedistinctiveness tantamount was
to thwartingthe purposesof Providence;for variety, not
uniformity,was God's design. This metaphysical concept was not
stated here for the first time or merely at random.It was partand
parcelof Mendelssohn's philosophy.In 1777the baron Karl Theodor von
Dalberg had solicited Mendelssohn'sopinion on the treatise
"Reflectionson the Universe",which Dalberghad publishedthat year.
According to Dalberg, the universallaw governingthe coexistenceof
things was to be found in theirtendency assimilate to
witheachother.Mendelssohn criticized thesis. had this He had
distinguished betweensamenessand unity. Samenesscancelsthe
manifold, unity connectsit. The degreeof unity dependson the
varietyit combines.The more the manifoldis connected,the greaterthe
ensuingunity.The forcesof natureseemto aim not so muchat the
obliterationof differences at the connectionof the manias fold.47In
Jerusalem Mendelssohnappliedthis metaphysical principleto the
socioreligious issue at stake. Religious pluralism,not
uniformity,was the design of Providence.The civil admissionof the
Jewshad to be dissociatedfromany demand for
Jewishself-obliteration. In his endeavorto securethe Jews' civil
admission,Mendelssohndevelopeda theory of churchand state that went
beyond the principleof tolerationadvocated by Locke. What he
propoundedwas a political doctrine conduciveto equalitarianism.
There is good reason to assume that Mendelssohnwas emboldenedto
advancehis strikinglyprogressiveideas becausethe principleof
religiousequality was just then being implemented the wake of the
AmericanRevolution.That he in closely followedthe eventsacrossthe
Atlanticis obvious froma footnote at the end of Jerusalem:"Alas,
now even the Congressin Americarehashesthe old sloganand speaks of
a dominant religion."48 This remark clearly shows that until
this
latest news reachedhim he had been greatlyencouraged the
Americanexample. by He may have guessedthat the setbackwas only a
temporary affair.In the veryyear in which Mendelssohn wrote
Jerusalem(1782), Thomas Jeffersonwrote his Notes in on Virginia,
whichhe expressedthe view that a varietyof religiousopinionswas in
the best interestsof progressand freedom;that the
legitimatepowersof government extendedonly to such acts as were
injuriousto others; and that nobody was injuredby his neighbor's
religiousbeliefs.49 Some similarityin outlook may be noted between
Mendelssohn'spolitical creedand the views expressed
threeyearslaterby anotheradmirerof the AmericanGS, V, 537 f.;
Mendelssohn, pp. 313-15; 809, note 5. GS, III, 361, note. 49 See
Anson Phelps Stokes, Churchand State in the United States (New York
1950), I, 334 f. It was due to James Madison's efforts that Patrick
Henry's assessment bill imposing a federal tax "for the support of
the Christian religion, or of some Christian church, denomination
or communion of Christians, or of some form of Christian worship"
did not become law. See ibid., I, 388 f.47 48
The Roots of Mendelssohn's Pleafor Emancipation
201
Revolution, Richard Price, who was a fellow both of the Royal
Society in England and of the Academy of Arts and Sciences in New
England. Like Mendelssohn, he had criticized the moral-sense theory
of Francis Hutcheson and, like Mendelssohn, he had shown
considerable interest in the theory of probability. 50 In 1785 he
published in London his Observationson the Importance of the
American Revolution, in which he wrote as follows: I In Libertyof
Conscience includemuch more than Toleration.... Not only all
Christians, but all menof all religionsought to be consideredby a
State as equallyentitled to its protectionas far as they
demeanthemselveshonestlyand peaceably.Toleration mode of religion;
of can take placeonly wherethereis a civil establishment a
particular and sect that is, wherea predominant enjoysexclusive
advantages, makesthe encouragement of its own mode of faith and
worshipa part of the constitutionof the State; but at the same time
thinksfit to sufferthe exerciseof other modes of faith and worship.
to Thanksbe to God, the new AmericanStatesare at presentstrangers
such establishments.In this respect,as well as many others,they
have shewn,in framingtheirconsti5 whichis aboveall praise. of
tution,a degree wisdomandliberality There is no evidence that
Price's treatise came to Mendelssohn's notice. Yet Mendelssohn
would have been highly pleased not only by the paragraph just
quoted but also by another one bearing on an issue treated in Part
One of Jerusalem, an issue which had involved Mendelssohn in some
unpleasantness. He had attacked the imposition of oaths upon the
appointment of ministers of religion, and he had dared to question
the veracity of many of the oaths taken. In this context he had
referred to the thirty-nine articles of faith to which the Anglican
clergy, including the lord bishops of the realm, had to
subscribe.52 Johann David Michaelis had reprimanded him severely
for what he considered a calumny, and Mendelssohn had to vindicate
himself.53 He would have been amused had he read what Price had to
say on the very same subject: in is The ChurchEstablishment England
one of the mildestand best sort. But even here what a snare has it
been to integrity?And what a check to free enquiry? .. What a of
burthenis it on the consciencesof some of its best clergy,who, in
consequence being bound down to a systemthey do not approve,and
havingno supportexceptthat which they derivefrom conformingto it,
find themselvesunder the hard necessityof either
50 Richard Price, Review of the Principal Questions and
Difficulties in Morals (1758; 3d ed. 1787), ed. by D. D. Raphael
(Oxford 1948). Price's Observations on Reversionary Payments
(1771), which laid the foundations of a scientific system of life
insurance, was based on his work on a problem in the theory of
probability; see Encyclopaedia Britannica (1964), vol. 18, pp. 467
f.; and Thomas Bayes, Facsimile of two papers... I. An essay toward
solving a problem in the doctrine of chances, with Richard Price's
foreword and discussion ... (Washington 1940). For Mendelssohn's
critique of Hutcheson, see my Moses Mendelssohns Friihschriftenzur
Metaphysik (Tiibingen 1969), pp. 170, 344-56; for his theory of
probability, see ibid., pp. 209-51. on the Importanceof the
American Revolutionand the Means of making 51 Richard Price,
Observations it a Benefit to the World(London 1785), pp.
34-35.52
GS, III, 291-92.
53 See Mendelssohn, pp. 529-31.
202
JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
or prevaricating starving?-No one doubts but that the
Englishclergyin generalcould assentto with moretruthdeclarethat
they do not, than that they do give theirunfeigned all
andeverythingcontained the thirty-nine in Articlesand the Book of
Common-prayer; and yet, with a solemndeclarationto this purpose,are
they obliged to enter upon an officewhichabove all
officesrequiresthose who exerciseit to be examplesof simplicity the
and sincerity.-Who can helpexecrating causeof suchan evil?54
It is astonishingto find how correctlyMendelssohnhad
diagnosedthe situation church.The specificcase he had createdin
Englandby the existenceof an established presentedwas
ostensiblyconcernedonly with the separationof churchand state. Yet
the aim that was uppermostin his mind was the civil admissionof the
Jews. In conclusionwe may say: Mendelssohn's proposal to
transcendall religious in divisionsas irrelevant termsof human
rights,was a liberalsolution. In arguing from certainpremises
naturallaw, he clearlyconsideredthe state of naturenot as of a
historicalphasepreceding establishment politicalsociety,but as a
hypothesis the of abstractedfrom all the obligations
voluntarilyaccepted by men for the best of society, a
hypothesiswhichconsideredman in his very essence.55 WhetherHobbes,
the Locke, and Rousseauregarded state of natureas a
merelyhypotheticalassumption or as a historicalfact is a matter of
debate among scholars.56It seems that Mendelssohnlooked upon the
state of nature as a present reality insofar as the In positionof
the Jewsin civilsocietywas concerned. one of his notebookshe
entered the following remarka propos Rousseau's Second Discours:
"One whose rights areviolatedin an illicitfashionis beingwarred
against:hencetheJewsarecontinually 7 of beingwarred against."5
Theterm"war"is reminiscent Hobbes,as is the reference to the
violationof rights.It was Hobbeswho in the discussionof naturallaw
shifted the emphasisfrom dutiesto rights,as Leo Strausshas
shown:58in the naturalstate there are no absolute or
unconditionalduties; only the right of self-preservation is
unconditionaland absolute.Consequently,the prime functionof civil
society is the safeguardingof this natural right of each
individual. Mendelssohn,though with Hobbesin most respects,fully
sharedhis emphasison this inaliendisagreeing able rightof the
individual; from this liberaldoctrinefollowedthe view that the and
who was constantlybeingwarredagainst,mustbe emancipated. Jew,
54 Price, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 55 See JubA, II, 92. 56 See
Strauss, op. cit., pp. 230, 274 f.; M. Seliger, The Liberal
Politics of John Locke (London 1968). 57 JubA, II, 8. 58 Op. cit.,
pp. 182 f. For the view of Mendelssohn as a "disciple of Hobbes,"
see Strauss' Philosophie und Gesetz (Berlin 1935), p. 66, note
1.