Alter Globalization2 GPleyers

f[l-^^.f ^VAlter-GlobalizationBecoming Actors inthe Global AgeGeoffrey Pleyersr-Ii^''f ! !PV%: !!1 ,ii -%3%!!*.jii;f' ^f?1!!RHli1 1i,n1i1111'1^%!1^\\i\ 1?^fo1J: 1polity 1rI?s..1A Post-Washington Consensus Alter-Globalization 22910Towards a Post-WashingtonConsensus Alter-GlobalizationReconfigurationsThe end of the Washington ConsensusThe global financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 hasprovided a theatricalization of a global ideological shift thatstarted a few years earlier: the end of the three-decade hegemonyof the Washington Consensus (Held, 2005; Touraine, 2007;Stiglitz 2008). The rise of financial speculation on the globalmarket in the 1990s and 2000s led not to a more accurate distribution of investment but to the worst financial crisis since1929. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, no one contestedthat markets and the financial sector need more regulation.Several major alter-globalization arguments have in factreached far beyond the movement's supporters and political divisions. In the 1990s, opening up a country to international tradewas seen as the only path to greater economic growth. By 2008,many state leaders, among them French President Nicolas Sarkozyand Indian Prime Minister M. Singh, openly declared that theywould 'refuse to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of agriculturaljobs on the altar of neoliberalism' (Le Monde, 11 July 2008).Barack Obama's administration had promised to take concretemeasures against international banks, including UBS, whichoffered US citizens opportunities to evade tax through tax havens.V,.-v\\ tand the then UK prime minister Gordon Brown was looking forallies to help him implement a Tobin tax on financial transactionsas well as a special tax on banks. The G-20 has largely replacedthe G-^S. While it doesn't give voice to the poorest countries, itnevertheless offers a more global perspective than the G-8 andputs greater emphasis on the regulation of the global economy.Its prcjmise to limit tax havens addresses a major concern of alter-global^zation activists. Other important proposals are on thetable,.inotably the creation of a new global reserve system, proposed by China and supported by Russia, Brazil, South Africaand Sbuth Korea, as well as by the United Nations Conferenceon Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2009) and the 2009'Stiglitz report'.The legitimacy of, and need for, state intervention in theeconomy was claimed by the alter-globalization movement inopposition to neoliberal thinkers who considered the market tobe a more rational actor (see pp. 157-63). In 2008, even formerBrazilian President F. H. Cardoso, once a major target of alter-globalization activists, stated that 'There are very few countriesthat ^dopted neoliberal prescriptions and have not completelycollapsed like Argentina. Countries that managed to globalizesuccessfully did so by maintaining state decision-making capacityover economic matters." Since the summer of 2008, the state hasregained the legitimacy of intervening in economic matters andhas again been accepted as a key economic actor (Bernardi,2008).It could be expected that this 'ideological victory' wouldincrease the enthusiasm of alter-globalization activists. However,at a time when prominent world leaders share core alter-global-izaticih ideas and when targeted international institutions havebeen widely delegitimized, losing much of their influence, thefuture of the organizations and events that have symbolized alter-globallization seemed uncertain. In Western Europe, major activist networks - such as the Movimiento de Resistancia Global inBarcelona, ATTAC and most local Social Forums - have disappeared or declined. ATTAC-France's internal election fraud inJune ^006 accelerated the downfall of alter-globalization in oneof it^ oldest regional bastions. In 2007, ATTAC-France couldcount on the support of less than 10,000 members, compared to27,0(}0 five years earlier. Alter-globalization is also much lessI