ALLISON - 'Whatever Begins to Be Must Have a Cause of Existence' Hume's Analysis and Kant's Response

Whatever begins to be must havea cause of existence: HumesAnalysis and Kants Response

henry e. allison

University of California, Davis

In T1.3.3. Hume examines the epistemic credentials of the principle

that, whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence, which

he describes as a general maxim in philosophy (T1.3.3.1; SBN 78).1

Denying that it is either intuitively or demonstrably certain, he con-

cludes that it must be founded on observation and experience

(T1.3.3.9; SBN 82). Even though Hume is careful to indicate that he is

not questioning this principle itself, but merely the [a priori] status com-

monly assigned to it, he was taken by many of his contemporary critics

to have done just that. Moreover, this apparently contributed more

than a little to the hostile initial reception given to the Treatise and to

Humes well known regrets about having published it. Accordingly, it

is not surprising to nd Hume subsequently insisting that he never

intended to cast doubt on this principle, but merely on its pretensions

to either an intuitive or a demonstrative certainty.2

Although this insistence is often cited as evidence that Hume was not

an arch sceptic regarding causality, this does not entirely resolve the

problem; for the claim that the principle has an empirical origin and the

form of evidence pertaining to propositions of that type is virtually as

1 References to the Treatise are generally given within the text and are rst to the sec-

tion and paragraph number of the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition, edited by

David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000,

and second to the pagination of the Nidditch revision of the Selby-Bigge Edition

(SBN).2 See A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh [The letter is included

as an appendix to his edition of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by

Eric Steinberg, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977,118)]; and Humes

letter to John Stewart of February 1754 (The Letters of David Hume, edited by

J.Y.T. Grieg, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, vol 1, 187).

WHATEVER BEGINS TO EXIST MUST HAVE A CAUSE OF ITS EXISTENCE 525

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LXXVI No. 3, May 2008 2008 International Phenomenological Society

controversial as the outright denial of the principle itself.3 Accordingly,

I propose to re-examine Humes argument for his thesis, together with a

contemporary response to it by G.E.M. Anscombe, which is based lar-

gely on the rehabilitation of an argument of Hobbes, and the classical

response by Kant. In so doing, I shall try to show (1) that Humes argu-

ment has considerable plausibility, if considered within the framework in

which he poses it (his theory of ideas); (2) that while Anscombe points to

some problems in the argument, she fails to locate its major diculty;

and (3) that this is accomplished by Kant in the Second Analogy.

I

To begin with, it is important to realize that Humes discussion of this

principle does not arise naturally in the course of the argument of

T 1.3. The major question at issue there is the nature of probable rea-

soning, understood in the broad sense to encompass all reasoning

concerning matters of fact; and the fundamental claim is that all such

reasoning is based on the relation of cause and effect. This, in turn,

leads Hume into an investigation of the nature of this relation, which

he maintains involves not only contiguity and succession but also, and

more fundamentally, necessary connection. Proceeding on the basis of

the copy principle, Humes investigation takes the predictable form

of an impression hunt for the latter.4

3 In addition to Kant, the list of critics of Humes attribution of a merely empirical status

to the causal principle prominently includes Thomas Reid, who cites three reasons: 1)

It purports to be a necessary rather than a contingent truth, since it states that every

beginning of existence must have a cause, not merely that it always in fact has one. 2) It

has never been taken to be a generalization from experience (no matter how well con-

rmed), which, as such, would be open to counter-examples. 3) Experience could never

establish that every change of nature actually has a cause, since for the most part the

causes are unknown and sought for. See Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Pow-

ers of Man, Essay VI; vi (Philosophical Works, edited by Sir William Hamilton, Hildes-

heim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967, vol. 1,455b-456a). As we shall see

below, the rst and third of these reasons are armed by Kant. Reid diers from Kant,

however, in accepting Humes negative thesis that the causal principle cannot be

grounded a priori and in arming that it does not require such a grounding because it

is self-evident In the contemporary scene, the most vigorous defender of Hume on this

point and responder to the Kantian challenge (as well as to Kantian readings of Hume

in general) is FredWilson,Humes Defence of Causal Inference, Toronto, Bualo, Lon-

don: University of Toronto Press, 1997, esp. 72-84, and. 101-110.4 The expression copy principle is the name usually applied to Humes central the-

sis: that all our simple ideas in their rst appearance are derivd from simple impres-

sions, which correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent (T 1.1.7; SBN

4). As Don Garrett points out, it involves both a resemblance thesis (that every

simple idea has an exactly resembling simple impression) and a causal thesis (that

every simple idea is at least partly caused by a simple impression) (Cognition and

Commitment in Humes Philosophy, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1997, 41).

526 HENRY E. ALLISON

At rst Hume despairs of nding the requisite impression, which

suggests an outright rejection of the idea of necessary connection. But

rather than arguing in that manner, Hume insists that the latter is an

ineliminable feature of the causal relation and that, if anything, it is

the copy principle that might have to be sacriced.5 Nevertheless, being

extremely reluctant to discard his cherished copy principle, except as a

last resort, Hume decides to abandon his direct survey and endeav-

ors instead to nd some other questions, the examination of which

will perhaps aord a hint, that may serve to clear up the present di-

culty. Without further ado, he formulates two such questions:

First, For what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thingwhose existence has a beginning, shoud also have a cause?

Secondly, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must neces-sarily have such particular eects; and what is the nature of that infer-

ence we draw from the one to the other, and the belief we repose init? (T1.3.2.14-15; SBN78)

Although the second question does seem directly relevant to Humes

concern, the signicance of the rst is not immediately evident. More-

over, while it is not completely clear what Hume himself thought about

the matter, the two questions seem to be logically independent, since one

might hold that every beginning of existence necessarily has some cause,

while denying that any particular cause must have a particular eect and

vice versa.6 Following L. W. Beck, I shall term the principle at issue in

Humes rst question the every-event-some-cause principle and the

one at issue in the second the same-cause-same-eect principle.7

5 See T1.3.2.12; SBN 77.6 This is denied by Wilson, who admits that (1) does not entail (2), but insists that (2)

entails (1) (Humes Defence of Causal Inference, 73-75). I fail to see, however, why

one cannot arm a strict regularity within the causal domain, while maintaining that

there are some events (beginnings of existence) that fall outside its scope. Admittedly,

the second part of Humes fourth rule (the same eect never arises but from the

same cause) might seem to entail the every-event-some cause principle, but it

would only do so if Hume had substituted event for eect. As we shall see below,

Hume himself points out that the claim that every eect has some cause is trivially

true, since cause and eect are relative terms. Nevertheless, the reason why I

remarked that it is not completely clear that Hume himself regarded these principles

as logically independent is because of his sinking(likewise to be discussed below).7 Lewis White Beck, A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant, Essays on Kant and

Hume, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, 120 and passim. Although, given

Humes formulation, one might deem it more accurate to term the latter the partic-

ular-cause-particular-eect principle, I believe that Becks formulation better

expresses Humes position. Since the particular causes and eects are viewed as

tokens of a type, it is the assumption that tokens of the one type will be universally

correlated with tokens of the other that is at issue.


Our present concern, however, is with Humes treatment of the for-

mer principle. After arguing that it is not founded on knowledge or

any scientic reasoning, and concluding that it must be derived from

observation and experience, he notes that the next question should

be how experience gives rise to such a principle? But rather than

addressing that question, Hume once again abruptly changes course

and states that he nds that,

[I]t will be more convenient to sink this question in the following,Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily havesuch particular effects, and why we form an inference from one to

another?... Twill, perhaps be found in the end, that the same answerwill serve for both questions. (T1.3.3.9; SBN82)

In order to understand Humes procedure here, it is essential to realize

that he is not proposing to sink the rst of his two initial questions into

the second.8 Rather, he is sinking the question of how experience gives

rise to the rst principle into the question of the grounds on which we

accept the second. Hume is, therefore, making a three-fold assumption:

rst, that experience is the source of the rst principle (this is presum-

ably a consequence of the argument of T 1.3.3, which rules out any

a priori source); second, that experience provides the basis for the

acceptance of the second principle, which is precisely what Hume will

endeavor to explain in the subsequent sections; third, that it is by

understanding how experience produces a belief in this principle that

we will come to understand how it produces a belief in the rst as well.

Unfortunately, Hume never explicitly tells us just how his answer to

the second question also answers the rst. But if we keep in mind his

well known view that experience produces a belief in the second princi-

ple through custom or habit rather than any process of reasoning, we

may surmise that it is supposed to produce a belief in the rst principle

in the same way. In other words, the development of the custom of

postulating a cause for every beginning of existence must be itself the

result of the constant experience of such beginnings as preceded by

some cause.

If this, or something like it, is Humes view, however, it invites the

question: how do we arrive at the concept of causality in the rst place,

or, alternatively, since Hume is clearly committed to an empirical

explanation of the matter, how does experience teach us that any begin-

ning of existence has a cause? Inasmuch as the possession of the con-

cept seems to be a condition of the possibility of developing the habit

8 The contrary is assumed by both Beck, A Prussian Kant, 121, and Wilson,

Humes Defence of Causal Inference, 74.


of associating like causes with like eects and inferring one from the

other, it is dicult to see how the concept could itself be produced by

this habit.9 In short, assuming the logical independence of Humes two

causal principles, it remains mysterious how experience could give rise

to the rst, which, in turn, suggests the need for a fresh look at the

argument of T 1.3.3.

II

Noting that this principle is taken for granted in all our reasoning and

thought to be intuitively certain, Hume initially attacks the latter

assumption by appealing to his theory of philosophical relations.10

Since, according to this theory, the only relations capable of yielding

certainty (either intuitive or demonstrative) are resemblance, propor-

tions in quantity and number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety,

and since the principle in question does not t into any of these catego-

ries, Hume summarily dismisses any claim of an intuitive certainty. But

apparently recognizing that this would not impress those who question

his theory of philosophical relations, Hume provides a second argu-

ment, which is independent of this theory and intended to show that

this principle is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain.

Humes argument rests on the premise that the only way to establish

the certainty of a proposition is by showing the inconceivability of its

negation. Consequently, the demonstration in question would require

showing the inconceivability of anything beginning to exist without a

9 Virtually all that Hume does say that bears on the matter is to be found in his

remarks following the two denitions of cause, where he claims that these deni-

tions support the thesis that the necessity of a cause for every beginning of exis-

tence is not founded on any arguments either intuitive or demonstrative. And,

with regard to the rst denition, he notes specically that, we may easily con-

ceive, that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of

existence shoud be attended with such an object (T 1.3.14.34; SBN 172). Accord-

ing to the rst denition, by such an object is to be understood one which is

precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the

former are placd in a like relation of priority and contiguity to those objects, that

resemble the latter (T 1.3.14.30; SBN 170 and 32; SBN 172). As far as I can see,

however, neither of Humes denitions help to explain how experience either gives

rise to the belief or supports the claim that everything that begins to exist is

attended with such an object.10 For Hume the philosophical relations are basically principles of comparison, on

the basis of which the mind relates ideas for the purpose of cognition. As such they

are contrasted with the natural relations, which are principles of association. Hume

introduces the philosophical relations in T 1.5 and returns to them in T 1.3.1-2,

where he uses them to distinguish between the domains in which genuine knowl-

edge or certainty (either intuitive or demonstrative) is possible and the domain in

which we are limited to probability or opinion.


cause. The argument, which attempts to show that this condition can-

not be met, goes as follows:

[A]s all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and the ideas of

cause and effect are evidently distinct, twill be easy for us to conceiveany object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, with-out conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive princi-

ple. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of abeginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; andconsequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible,

that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapa-ble of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without whichtis impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. (T1.3.3.3; SBN

79-80)

The argument may be broken down into the following seven steps:

1) All distinct ideas are separable.

2) The ideas of cause and eect are distinct.

3) Therefore, it is easy to conceive an object as non-existent at one

moment and existent at the next, without connecting this with

the idea of a cause.

4) Therefore, such a separation (in thought) is possible for the

imagination.

5) Therefore, the actual separation of these objects (in reality) is

so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity.

6) Therefore, no reasoning from mere ideas [a priori reasoning]

can negate this possibility.

7) Therefore, it is impossible to demonstrate the opposite.

Before examining the argument, it is important to clarify what

Hume understands by a beginning of existence. Insofar as he refers

to objects, he seems to have in mind the coming into being of

entities, for example, of works of art.11 A more careful consideration,

11 Although Hume is unclear on the point, I assume that he does not mean a coming

into being out of nothing, that is, a creation ex nihilo. In any event, we shall see in

part four that the possibility of a coming to be in this sense (at least as an object

of possible experience) is ruled out by the argument of the First Analogy.


however, indicates that Hume is not committed to such a restrictive

view. To begin with, he qualies his claim by denying the possibility

of demonstrating the necessity of a cause for either every new exis-

tence, or [my emphases] new modication of existence (T1.3.2.4;

SBN 79). Although Hume does not here tell us what he means by

the latter phrase, in the Abstract he presents as the paradigm case

of the causal relation the famous example of the collision of two bil-

liard balls. Here the motion or impulse of the rst is characterized

as the cause and the motion of the second immediately conse-

quent upon the collision as the eect (AB 9-10; SBN 649-50).

Similarly, in introducing the idea of the causal relation in the Trea-

tise, he remarks that two objects may be considered as placed in

that relation,

As well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the

other, as when the former is the cause of the existence of the latter.For as that action or motion is nothing but the object itself, con-siderd in a certain light, and as the object continues the same in all

its different situations, tis easy to imagine how such an inuence ofobjects upon one another may connect them in the imagination.(T1.1.4.4; SBN 12)

It seems clear from this that the category of effect encompasses actions

and motions (both of which may be regarded as new modications of

existence) as well as new existences. In fact, even this is too narrow,

since Hume presumably would be prepared to recognize as effects the

cessation of actions and motions as well as their inception, and, more

generally, any change of state, wherein the object continues the

same: for example, the change of water from a liquid to a solid state.12

Accordingly, I shall take beginning of existence to refer to any

change of state and Humes argument as a challenge to the a priori

12 Humes acknowledgement that in such cases the object continues the same cer-

tainly stands in some tension with his later account in T 1.4.2 of the ideas of con-

tinued and distinct existence as ctions produced by the imagination, but I cannot

deal with that issue here. We shall see in part four of this paper, however, that

Kant viewed this thesis as established in the First Analogy under the guise of

the All change is alteration principle and that it is central to Kants analysis of

causality.


status of the principle that every such change, that is, every event, has

some cause.13

The rst step in Humes argument is a restatement of his separabil-

ity principle, which, in its canonical formulation, maintains that,

[W]hatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever

objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagina-

tion (T1.1.7.3; SBN 18).14 Although the matter is highly controversial,

I shall treat the principle itself as non-problematic and consider only its

applicability to the ideas of a beginning of existence and of this begin-

ning as having a cause. Moreover, since steps 6 and 7 merely spell out

the negative implications of Humes argument for the project of dem-

onstrating the causal principle, I shall limit my analysis to steps 2-5.

As initially formulated, step 2 is quite misleading; for in response to

those who argue that every effect must have a cause, because tis

implied in the very idea of effect, Hume points out that cause and

effect are correlative terms (like husband and wife) and that the

true state of the question is not whether every effect must have a

cause, but whether every object, which begins to exist, must owe its

existence to a cause (T1.3.3.8; SBN 82). Nevertheless, as this reformu-

lation indicates, the initial difculty is easily remedied. All that is

required is the replacement of step 2 with step 2: For any object or

state O, the idea of O beginning to exist is distinct from the idea of this

beginning having a cause.

Steps 3-5 argue for the separability of these two ideas: rst in thought

and the imagination (steps 3 and 4) and then in reality (step 5).

13 Since we shall also see in part four that this is equivalent to what Kant understands

by an event, it makes it possible to regard Hume and Kant as arguing against each

other on the status of the every-event-some-cause principle, rather than merely talk-

ing past one another. Nevertheless, it must be noted that, at least in the Treatise,

Hume uses the term event in a very broad sense. For example, he uses it not only

to refer to occurrences such as Caesar being killed (T 1.3.4.2; SBN 83), and out-

comes with various degrees of probability, such as a die landing on one particular

side (T 1.3.11.7; SBN 126) or a ship returning safely to port (T 1.3.12.8; SBN 134),

but also to situations like the experience of a virgin on her bridal night (T 2.3.9.

29; SBN 447), and historical events such as the revolution of 1688 (T 3.2.10.16-17;

SBN 564-65). In the Enquiry, however, Hume tends to use the term in a sense clo-

ser to the Kantian to refer to occurrences like the motion of the second billiard ball

after being struck by the rst and, more generally, to causes and eects (See EHU

4. 8-11; SBN 28-30).14 I say restatement of this principle because Hume here refers to ideas, whereas what

I have termed the canonical formulation cited above refers to objects. Nevertheless,

in his treatment of distinctions of reason Hume apparently equates this principle

with the proposition that, [A]ll ideas, which are dierent are separable

(T1.1.7.17; SBN 24); and this seems to be equivalent to the proposition currently

under consideration. On this point see also the Appendix 12; SBN 634 in connec-

tion with Humes discussion of personal identity.


The contribution of step 3 is not immediately apparent, however, since

it seems to claim merely that for any object or state O, it is possible to

think of O as coming into existence without also thinking of this

occurrence as having a cause (without conjoining it to the distinct

idea of a cause...). But, as Anscombe points out, while this relatively

innocuous thesis follows non-problematically from the preceding steps,

it is of little help in advancing the argument.15 Rather, what Hume

needs is the substantive thesis (30): For any object or state O, O can beconceived not to exist at t1 and to exist at t2, without this coming into

being having a cause.

A brief glance at Humes account of so-called distinctions of rea-

son, such as that between the shape and color of a globe, may help to

highlight the salient difference between 3 and 30.16 Although Humedenies on the basis of his theory of ideas, according to which all ideas

are particular and fully determinate, that one can form an idea of the

shape of a globe without its color or vice versa, he also points out that

one can consider one of these properties without considering the other.

Such a mode of consideration involves a distinction of reason and it

plays a central role in Humes account of how ideas, though in them-

selves particular, can function as universals. Applying this to our pres-

ent concern, since it arms merely the possibility of thinking of

something beginning to exist without also thinking of this beginning as

having a cause, it leaves open the possibility that the distinction

between these two thoughts amounts merely to a distinction of reason.

But since in that event Humes conceivability argument would fail, it is

incumbent upon him to show that the distinction is not of that nature.

And for that Hume needs 30.Assuming that this is what Hume had in mind puts us in position to

understand the function of step 4, which turns on the identication of

conceiving and imagining. Given this identication, if I can imagine x

without also imagining y, then y does not form part of the content of

my idea of x. If it did, I could not even imagine x without also imagin-

ing y, just as I cannot imagine a triangle without imagining a gure

with three sides. But if, as is now being supposed, y does not form part

of this content, then I can not only imagine x without imagining y,

I can also imagine (and, therefore, conceive) a state of affairs in which

x exists and y does not.

15 See G.E.M. Anscombe (Whatever has a Beginning of Existence must have a

Cause, Collected Philosophical Papers, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press, 1981, vol. 1, 96).16 For Humes account of distinctions of reason, see T1.1.7. 17-18; SBN 25. The rele-

vance of Humes account of distinctions of reason to our issue is suggested by

Barry Stroud, Hume, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, 49.


In addition to the dubious equation of conceivability and imagin-

ability, which infects Humes epistemology as a whole, there is a local-

ized objection to the present argument. It has likewise been raised by

Anscombe and takes the form of a dilemma: either Hume is proceeding

from the plausible premise that we can readily imagine something

beginning to exist apart from any particular cause to the conclusion

that we can imagine it beginning to exist without any cause at all, in

which case it involves an apparent slide; or he is claiming straight out

that we can conceive something beginning to exist without any cause at

all, in which case it amounts to a sheer assertion.17

In order to address this objection, it is necessary to explore a bit

more fully the idea of something coming into existence from a

Humean point of view. According to Humes theory of ideas, this

may be analyzed as a complex idea composed of the ideas of an

object in two successive and contrary states (e.g., a billiard ball at

rest at t1 and in motion at t2). Such an idea is complex inasmuch as

it contains a combination of the ideas of two distinct states of affairs,

and it supposedly corresponds to a complex impression with the same

content. What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that the idea of

having a cause does not form part of the content of this idea, from

which it follows on Humean principles that the latter can be con-

ceived imagined apart from the former. Accordingly, given Humestheory of ideas, it is at least arguable that the stronger conclusion is

warranted.

Finally, step 5 involves the move from separate conceivability to the

possibility of separate existence.18 Once again Anscombe objects, char-

acterizing Humes reasoning as based on the Parmenidean principle

that It is the same thing that can be thought and can be. And while

not questioning this principle itself, Anscombe rejects Humes extension

of it to the case of the thought of something beginning to exist on the

grounds that I can imagine or think of a sprig of leaves as existing

without there being any denite number of leaves that I think of it as

having...[though] this does not mean that I can think of it as existing

without having a denite number of leaves.19

Although the latter point cannot be gainsaid, its applicability to

Humes reasoning is questionable. For if the above account of the

17 Anscombe, Whatever has a Beginning of Existence must have a Cause, 97-98.18 It is not completely clear what sense of possibility Hume has in mind here, since

he qualies the claim by stating that separate existence is so far possible, that it

implies no contradiction or absurdity. What seems to be crucial, however, is that

the sense of possibility be strong enough to block any purported demonstration of

the contrary.19 Anscombe, Whatever has a Beginning of Existence must have a Cause, 99.


complex idea of a beginning of existence is correct, then imagining such

a beginning without a cause is more like imagining the trunk of a body

without the limbs than imagining a sprig of leaves as existing without

having a denite number.20 But since this is a crucial point, it may

prove instructive to consider briey Humes critique of Hobbess

attempted demonstration of what amounts to the contrary thesis,

together with Anscombes endeavor to rehabilitate the Hobbesian argu-

ment in response to Humes critique.

III

Hobbes argument is one of three purported demonstrations of the

principle that every beginning of existence must have a cause to which

Hume refers, all of which he dismisses as question begging. In the case

of the other two (those of Clarke and Locke) this is readily apparent,

since the former asserts that if something were lacking a cause it would

have to cause itself; while the latter postulates that if something were

to come into being without a cause, it would have nothing as its cause.

Humes quick dismissal of Hobbes on the same grounds is, however,

somewhat more problematic. According to Humes formulation,

Hobbess argument goes as follows:

All the points of time and place...in which we can suppose any object

to begin to exist, are themselves equal; and unless there be somecause, which is peculiar to one time and to one place, and which bythat means determines and xes the existence, it must remain in eter-

nal suspence; and the object can never begin to be, for want of some-thing to x its beginning.21

20 The example is from Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge 5 (See also

Introduction to the Principles 10).21 To cite Hobbes own words: that a man cannot imagine anything to begin without

a cause, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it;

but if he try, he shall nd as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to con-

ceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it

should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think that

there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else

that it began never, but was eternal (Of Liberty and Necessity, The English Works

of Thomas Hobbes, edited by Sir William Molesworth, London: John Bohn, 1840,

vol. 4, 276). Humes gloss diers from Hobbess actual argument in at least two

notable respects: 1) Hume adds a reference to place that is lacking in Hobbes; 2)

whereas Hobbes suggest that without assuming a cause xing the beginning of the

existence at some determinate time, we would have to think that the object existed

eternally, which presumably is contrary to the hypothesis, Hume takes the argu-

ment to be maintaining that without assuming a cause determining when and where

it came into being, we would have to admit that it would never exist at all. The

latter brings it closer to the line of argument that Hume attributes to Clarke and

Locke and makes it more obviously question begging.


To which Hume replies:

Is there any more difculty in supposing the time and place to be xdwithout a cause, than to suppose the existence to be determined in

that manner? The rst question that occurs on this subject is always,whether the object shall exist or not: The next, when and where it shallbegin to exist. If the removal of a cause be intuitively absurd in the

one case, it must be so in the other: And if that absurdity is not clearwithout a proof in the one case, it will equally require one in theother. The absurdity, then, of the one supposition can never be aproof of that of the other; since they are both upon the same footing,

and must stand or fall by the same reasoning. (T1.3.3.4; SBN 80)

Basically, Hume seems to be claiming that, in arguing for the absurdity

of something beginning to exist without a cause simpliciter by appeal-

ing to the absurdity of such a beginning at a particular time and place,

Hobbes is begging the question because the two scenarios are on equal

logical footing. If the former can be conceived without any absurdity,

then so can the latter. Conversely, if the absurdity of the former

requires proof, then so does that of the latter. In either event, Hobbes

cannot help himself to the presumed absurdity of the latter in order to

establish that of the former.

Humes curt dismissal of this argument has been criticized, however,

by Anscombe, whose critique has two components: 1) a focus on the

notion of something coming into existence, which largely ignores

Humes underlying theory of ideas; and 2) the drawing of a sharp dis-

tinction between imagining and really imagining, that is, seriously sup-

posing or truly judging, that something came into existence without

a cause.22 The key point is that such a supposition requires a consider-

ation of the attendant circumstances of the occurrence, specically its

when and where, which is in accord with Hobbes view but in direct

conict with Humes claim that these are irrelevant to the question at

issue.

Anscombes main argument appears to turn on the distinction

between it coming about that something is present at a certain place

at a given time and something actually coming into existence at that

place (and time).23 Even though they both fall under the description

an object being at placea at t1, which was not there previously,

these two scenarios are not equivalent; for in order for something to

be at a certain place at a given time it need only to have traveled

there from elsewhere, not to have come into existence tout court.

22 Anscombe, Times, Beginnings and Causes, Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 2,

160.23 Ibid., 161.


Thus, the question for Anscombe becomes how one distinguishes

between these scenarios. Her point is that if one is seriously to sup-

pose that something has in fact come into existence at a certain place,

one must be able to eliminate other possibilities, particularly the pos-

sibility that it somehow migrated there from elsewhere. Anscombes

claim is that this determination requires an appeal to a cause. More

specically, in the case of familiar objects such as chairs and babies it

requires understanding the causal process by which entities of that

sort are normally produced.24

Anscombe is correct to insist on the importance of distinguishing

between merely imagining and seriously supposing something coming

into existence without a cause, as well as on the need to consider the

attendant circumstances in attempting the latter. Nevertheless, I nd

her account problematic because of her apparent assumption that,

despite Humes careful qualications, beginning of existence refers

primarily (if not exclusively) to the becoming of whole entities rather

than to changes of state of such entities, for example, the change of a

billiard ball from a state of rest to motion.25 At least her argument,

as I understand it, addresses only the former scenario. To be sure, the

latter may also be described as the coming into being of a new

object (motion), but that seems to be a highly articial way of

describing the situation. Moreover, in such cases the role of causality

is not to assure (or judge) that some object has actually come into

existence at a certain place, as opposed to having traveled there from

elsewhere; it is rather to determine whether a change of state, which

might, but need not, include a change of place, has occurred at all.

And in order to see why this requires the introduction of causality we

must turn to Kant.

IV

In spite of Kants basic opposition to Hume, they are in complete

agreement on the fundamental point that the causal principle cannot

be demonstrated by conceptual analysis and, therefore, not by anything

like the conceivability argument that Hume attacks. As Kant puts it in

a passage, which both refers back to his own transcendental proof of

this principle in the Second Analogy and seems to allude directly to

Hume,

24 Ibid., 161-162.25 Like Hume, Anscombe is unclear about how she understands the coming into

being of entities; but again I am assuming that she does not have in mind a crea-

tion ex nihilo. Certainly, that is not suggested by her examples, e.g., chairs and

babies.


The proof does not show...that the given concept (e.g., of that whichhappens) leads directly to another concept (that of a cause); for sucha transition would be a leap for which nothing could be heldresponsible; rather it shows that experience itself, hence the object of

experience, would be impossible without such a connection.(A783 B811)26

This passage also indicates that Kants response to Humes challenge to

the a priori status of the concept and principle of causality is indirect,

amounting to the introduction of a radically new alternative, namely,

that they make possible the very experience from which Hume claims

they are derived. This is the thesis of the Second Analogy, which, in its

second edition formulation, states that All alterations occur in accor-

dance with the law of the connection of cause and eect (B 232).

As this formulation indicates, the Second Analogy presupposes the

First, which maintains that all change [Wechsel] must be understood as

an alteration [Veranderung] of something that persists.27 Viewing the

two Analogies together, they can be seen as addressing two distinct

senses in which something might be thought simply to come into exis-

tence, which are glossed over in Humes phrase beginning of exis-

tence. One sense is expressed in the traditional theological notion of a

creation ex nihilo, that is, a becoming that is absolute rather than

merely of a new state of an entity that already exists in some form.

This is rejected in the First Analogy, which by arguing that all change

is alteration denies such a possibility. Kant does not, of course, argue

on metaphysical grounds that such an occurrence is absolutely impossi-

ble, but merely that it is experientially impossible, inasmuch as it vio-

lates the conditions of possible experience. The second sense is that an

alteration or, in Humes terms, a modication of existence, might

occur without a cause. This is the concern of Second Analogy, the

argument for which, insofar as it concerns us here, can be broken

26 References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B pagination

of the rst and second editions. Citations are taken from the translation of Paul

Guyer and Allen Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. The reference to the Prolegomena is

to the pagination of volume 4 of Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Konig-

lichen Preusslichen Akademie von Wissenschaften, Berlin 1911, and the citation is

from the translation by Garry Hateld in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, The

Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by Henry Allison and

Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.27 I discuss the argument of the First Analogy in Kants Transcendental Idealism, An

Interpretation and Defense, Revised and Enlarged Edition, New Haven: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 2004, 236-46.


down into ve steps.28 I shall rst sketch these steps and then consider

the adequacy of the argument as a response to Hume.

1) Since an event or happening consists in an alteration, its cogni-

tion requires two successive perceptions of the object. Conse-

quently, unless I can contrast the present state of the object

with its preceding state I cannot be aware of an event.

2) But since every perception follows upon a succeeding one (all

apprehension is successive) this is merely a necessary and not

also a sucient condition of such awareness. In particular, it

does not provide a basis for distinguishing between successive

perceptions of a static state of aairs (e.g., a house) and succes-

sive perceptions of successive states of an object (e.g., a ship

sailing downstream).

3) Drawing this distinction requires an interpretation of succes-

sive perceptions as perceptions of successive states and this

interpretation appeals to the notion of irreversibility. In the case

of event-perception we regard the order in which perceptions

are apprehended as irreversible (A-B and not B-A); whereas in

the successive perceptions of a static state of aairs, we regard

this order as indierent.29

28 What follows is a highly condensed version of the interpretation of the basic argu-

ment of the Second Analogy, which I provide in Kants Transcendental Idealism,

249-52. I say insofar as it concerns us here, because Kants full argument contains

an additional step in which he claims that not merely the perceptions of events but

the events themselves, qua objects of possible experience, are necessarily subject to

the causal principle. Although this step, which turns on the Kantian principle that

The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time condi-

tions of the possibility of the objects of experience (A158 B197), is obviously essen-tial to the full argument, I shall not consider it here because it raises thorny

questions regarding transcendental idealism that would take us too far a eld.29 This appeal to irreversibility is probably the most contentious feature of Kants

argument and a good deal rides on its interpretation. Perhaps the most natural

reading is to take it as a phenomenologically accessible feature of our perceptions,

which one supposedly inspects in order to determine whether or not they yield the

perception of an event. As many have pointed out, however, this does not issue in

a happy result. On the one hand, every succession of perceptions in consciousness,

as a particular succession, is unique and, therefore, irreversible; while, on the other,

irreversibility cannot be used in a non-question begging way as a criterion of event

perception, since it is only if one already assumes that one is perceiving an event

that one can deem the order of perceptions as irreversible in the appropriate sense.

Accordingly, I have argued elsewhere that rather than regarding it as an intrinsic

property of a sequence of perceptions, irreversibility should be taken as characteriz-

ing the way in which one connects successive perceptions in thought (the objective

unity of apperception), insofar as one purports to represent through them an objec-

tive succession. See Kants Transcendental Idealism, 250-52.


4) This irreversibility results from subjecting the succession of per-

ceptions to an a priori rule, which species how any cognizer

confronted with this sequence ought to construe it. Since the

order is temporal, the rule must be provided by a transcendental

schema, and since it is a rule for the thought of an objective

succession (as contrasted with duration or co-existence) it can

only be what Kant terms the schema of causality, namely, the

succession of the manifold [of perceptions] insofar as it is sub-

ject to a rule (A144 B183).30

5) Consequently, to think a succession of states as objective just is

to subsume it under this rule, which entails that one cannot

think of something happening (an event) without also thinking

of it as preceded by some cause.

Assuming that something like the above constitutes Kants core argu-

ment in the Second Analogy and granting that a good deal of work by

way of lling in the details and clarifying its underlying assumptions

would be required to make it persuasive, our nal question is whether

such an argument, appropriately eshed out, constitutes a viable

response to Hume regarding causality.31 As a rst step in addressing

30 For an argument in support of the latter claim regarding the schema of causality,

see Kants Transcendental Idealism, 223-24.31 Recently, Eric Watkins has challenged the premise underlying this often asked

question by maintaining that in the Second Analogy Kant did not even attempt

to refute Humes views, but instead introduced a competing and supposedly supe-

rior model of causality (Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 2005, esp. 381-390). Watkins oers four reasons for this

novel and interesting thesis, the last and allegedly strongest of which is that the

model of causality that Kant provides in the Second and Third Analogies diers

so radically from Humes that there is no common ground from which a refuta-

tion could be mounted. Although there is a good deal of truth in what Watkins

says about the radical dierences in their respective models of causality, particu-

larly if, as Watkins does, one focuses on the Third Analogy, I think that he dra-

matically overstates his case. First, Kants language, particularly in the statement

of the principle of the Second Analogy in the rst edition and in the passage

cited above from the Doctrine of Method about transcendental proof certainly

suggest not only that Kant had Hume in mind, but that he was attempting to

provide a competing proof. Second, if one focuses on the rst of Humes two

questions, it is clear that, whatever the dierences in their models of causality,

they both addressed the same question, namely, whether the concept and princi-

ple of causality are a priori. Hume gave a negative and Kant a positive answer

to this question and this constitutes the heart of their dispute. Finally, by Wat-

kins criterion it seems that there would be very few refutations in philosophy,

beyond those that point to an inconsistency in an opponents position; indeed,

similar claims could also be made about Kants refutations of Leibniz, Des-

cartes, and virtually every philosopher whom he criticizes.


this question, it is essential to underscore the limited scope of Kants

concern in the Second Analogy. On my reading, Kant is there con-

cerned only with the rst of Humes two logically distinct questions

regarding causality, that is, with the a priori status of the concept and

principle.32 This is not to say that Kant had no interest in Humes sec-

ond question, which concerns the principle that like causes have like

eects. It is rather that the latter raises a whole set of dierent issues

and that his response to it is to be found elsewhere, namely, in the

Appendix to the Dialectic of the rst Critique and the Introductions to

the third.33

Limiting ourselves, then, to the rst of Humes questions, the essence

of Kants response is contained in the nal step of the argument

sketched above; for it is here that Kant challenges the separability the-

sis on which Humes conceivability argument turns. If, as Kant main-

tains, one cannot cognize or experience (these here being regarded as

roughly equivalent) an event without thinking (or presupposing) that it

has some cause (though not any cause in particular), then one cannot

separate the thought of something happening from the thought of its

having a cause, which amounts to a direct denial of the conclusion of

Humes argument.

32 I believe that this reading is supported both by the formulation of the principle

of the Analogy, particularly in the A-version, where it states that Everything

that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in accordance

with a rule (A 189): and by the structure of the argument as I have here inter-

preted it. I further believe that it better accords with a key passage, in which

Kant remarks about his conclusion [that the understanding imposes the causal

principle upon appearances as a condition of the possibility of the experience of

something happening] that it seems as if this contradicts everything that has

always been said about the course of the use of our understanding, according to

which it is only through the perception and comparison of sequences of many

occurrences on preceding appearances that we are led to discover a rule, in accor-

dance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances, and are

thereby rst prompted to form the concept of cause. On such a footing this con-

cept would be merely empirical, and the rule that it supplies, that everything that

happens has a cause, would be just as contingent as the experience itself: its uni-

versality and necessity would then be merely feigned, and would have no true

universal validity, since they would not be grounded a priori but only on induc-

tion (A195-96 B240-41). Whatever one may think of the argument underlyingthe claim of this oft cited passage, it seems clear that Kants target is the view

that the concept of causality has an empirical origin and the principle that every-

thing that happens has a cause is an inductive generalization, which is precisely

what Hume claims in T1.3.3.33 See my Kants Theory of Taste, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001,

Chapter 1; Kants Transcendental Idealism (2004), Chapter 15; and especially

Reective Judgement and the Application of Logic to Nature: Kants Deduction

of the Principle of Purposiveness as an Answer to Hume, in Strawson and Kant,

edited by Hans-Johann Glock, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, 169-83.


The problem is that this response, like the arguments of the Analo-

gies as a whole, rests upon a substantive thesis concerning the nature

of human cognition, namely, that such cognition is a discursive activity

consisting in the application of general concepts to sensibly given data.

Consequently, for Kant the cognition of an event requires an interpre-

tative act through which the given sensible data (successive perceptions)

are brought under a rule (the schema of causality), whereby these data

are taken as perceptions of successive states of an object. Thus, just as

Humes challenge to the causal principle rests upon his own theory of

ideas, so Kants reply to Hume relies heavily on what might be termed

his discursivity thesis.

Since this thesis is extraordinarily complex and controversial, I can-

not pretend to do justice to it here.34 Instead, I shall limit myself to the

more modest task of clearing up two possible misunderstandings of

Kants view, which bear directly on the point at issue with Hume and

which may have been suggested by the highly schematic rendering of

Kants argument provided above.

The rst of these stems from an ambiguity in the notion of an

objective succession. This can mean a succession either of events or

of the event-stages that constitute an event. If one takes it in the for-

mer sense and combines this with the thesis that all objective succession

is governed by the principle of causality, then one seems led to Scho-

penhauers classical reductio that, on this view, all successive events are

related as cause and eect.35 If one takes it in the latter sense, however,

this untoward consequence does not arise, since the successive stages

constituting an event are not themselves related as cause and eect. All

that the argument, so construed, requires, is that this succession has

some antecedent cause, which may, though certainly need not, involve

a prior state of the same object. Moreover, I think it clear that this is

how objective succession is understood in the argument of the Sec-

ond Analogy.36

The second and potentially more serious possible source of misun-

derstanding is the talk of objectivity in terms of interpretation, or

34 For my account of the discursivity thesis see Transcendental Idealism, 12-16 and

passim.35 See Arthur Schopenhauer, Uber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden

Grunde, 23, Samtliche Werke, ed. By J. Frauenstadt, vol.1, Leipzig: FU Brochaus,

1919, 85-92.36 See, for example, Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1987, 240.


subsumption under a rule.37 The problem with such language is that

it might suggest the attribution to Kant of the manifestly absurd view

that thinking makes it so that is, that the human understanding

somehow has a magical power to generate objective successions and

their causes simply by applying a rule (in this case the schema of cau-

sality). Consequently, if Kants reply to Hume and, more generally, the

entire argument of the Transcendental Analytic, is to be taken seri-

ously, it is essential to see that Kant is not committed to any such

view.

To begin with, the basic idea underlying Kants procedure, which

is implicit in rather than argued for in the Second Analogy, is that a

discursive understanding such as ours relates its representations

(intuitions) to an object or, equivalently, makes a claim of objective

validity, by subsuming these representations under a category (more

precisely its schema). As a result of this subsumption, the unication or

synthesis of representations, say the successive perceptions of a ship

in motion, is deemed to hold not merely for a particular consciousness

but for consciousness in general, that is, for any discursive cognizer

presented with the same sensory data. Thus the formula of the Prole-

gomena: Objective validity and necessary universality (for everyone)

areinterchangeable concepts (4: 298). Otherwise expressed, a claimof objective validity (in the language of the Prolegomena a judgment

of experience) involves a demand of universal agreement. It states not

merely that this is how things seem to me but how any discursive cog-

nizer ought to conceive the matter. The function of the category or

schema under which the representations are subsumed is to provide a

warrant for this demand. In the case of the Second Analogy, the

object is the alteration of some entity and the schema of causality

may be said to provide the form of the cognition or experience of such

an alteration. Indeed, this is precisely the point of step 5 of Kants

argument as described above.

Although this analysis, with its focus on the a priori conditions of

cognition, obviously diers dramatically from Humes radical empiri-

cism, it is perhaps worth pointing out at this juncture that they share

at least one signicant feature, namely, the recognition of the impossi-

bility of standing, as it were, outside ones representations in order to

37 Although Kant does not typically use terms such as interpretation in these con-

texts, he does at one point remark that at least part of the task of our power of

cognition [the understanding] consists in spelling out appearances according to a

synthetic unity in order to be able to read them as experience (A314 B370-71).In Kants Transcendental Idealism, 186-89, I discuss the interpretive role of the

imagination with regard to perception. Needless to say, inasmuch as such interpre-

tation is governed by a priori rules, it has little in common with the familiar Nietz-

schean conception.


compare them with an objective state of aairs.38 In this respect, they

are both internalists, since for both thinkers what is objective must

be determined on the basis of criteria or conditions that are immanent

to consciousness. The dierences between them turn on the nature of

these criteria or conditions. For Kant they are a priori rules, whereas

for Hume they are provided by associations based on past experience.

More germane to the present point, however, objective validity, as

Kant conceives it, is not equivalent to truth. Kant indicates this in at

least two important places in the Critique. The rst is in the discussion

of the Second Analogy, where he suggests that the Analogies provide

merely formal conditions of empirical truth (A191 B236), whichstrongly suggests that he views them as necessary but not sucient con-

ditions of the latter. That is to say, while no empirical judgment can vio-

late the a priori constraints on possible experience imposed by the

Analogies, conformity to these constraints is not sucient to determine

the veridicality of a judgment. The latter is an empirical, not a transcen-

dental matter, and as such is determined by the usual empirical means.

In the case of causal judgments governed (but not determined) by the

schema of causality, these means might very well include Humes Rules

by which to judge of causes and eects (T 1.3.15; SBN 173-76), which

for Kant would presuppose the causal principle of the Second Analogy.

The second relevant passage is from 19 of the B-Deduction, where

Kant characterizes a judgment as a relation [of representations] that is

objectively valid, as contrasted with a relation of the same representa-

tions according to the laws of association to which he attributes merely

subjective validity (B142). Clearly, in making objective validity into a

denitional feature of judgment, Kant is not suggesting that every judg-

ment, simply qua judgment, is true. His point is rather that every judg-

ment makes a claim to truth or has a truth value, whereas a union of

representations produced by association can be neither true nor false.

The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the subsumption of representa-

tions under the schema of causality, which is, after all, itself just a

judgment of objective succession.

Having disposed of these misconceptions, which threaten to block

any serious consideration of Kants views regarding causality, we are

38 In the Analogies, which are concerned with objective time-determination, Kant

tends to express this point by noting that time itself cannot be perceived. I dis-

cuss this at several junctures in Transcendental Idealism (See pp. 216-17, 236-41,

264-66). Strangely enough, Kant does not appeal to the unperceivability of time in

the main argument for Second Analogy, though he does so in the arguments for

the other two, as well as in the argument for the general principle of the Analogies.

Nevertheless, I believe that it plays a central, albeit somewhat subterranean role

there as well. Moreover, it has an analogue in Humes denial that we have a dis-

tinct impression of time (to be discussed below).


nally in a position to return to our central question: does Kant pro-

vide an effective response in the Second Analogy to Humes denial of

a priori status to the causal principle? Although the discussion cannot

be divorced completely from the fore-mentioned global issues regarding

cognition, I believe that the major point at issue may be put fairly suc-

cinctly: can events, as dened above, be directly perceived or just

seen, or does the judgment that something has happened require some

kind of interpretive act? Kant, as we have seen, arms the latter,

whereas Hume is committed by both his account of impressions and

his theory of philosophical relations to the former.

According to Humes account of impressions, the perception of an

event must be a complex impression, such as that of a billiard ball in

motion after being struck by another ball or a die lying on one of its

sides after being tossed. According to his theory of philosophical rela-

tions, those of time and place (together with identity) are matters of

perception rather than reasoning, which, as such, require nothing

beyond a mere passive admission of the impressions through the

organs of sensation (T1.3.2.2; SBN 73). Moreover, this thesis about

event-perception seems warranted, if we understand it in the Humean

manner. Since such perception involves nothing more than having a

complex impression, and since, ex hypothesi, the mind is passive with

respect to its impressions (both simple and complex), events may be

said to be just seen, rather than inferred or judged. An act of mind

is only required subsequently, if we attempt to infer the existence of

another event as either its cause or eect.39

Nevertheless, I think it doubtful that the perception of an event can be

adequately characterized in this manner. What it leaves out is the dynam-

ical element in such perception, which is emphasized by Kant. On this

model, to perceive an event or, more precisely, to cognize one, is not sim-

ply to perceive a state of affairs that happens to succeed an earlier one,

but to perceive it as succeeding the previous state. And this does seem to

require the interpretation (or taking) of a sequence of perceptions (which

is all that is strictly given) as the perception of a succession in an object.

Moreover, whatever the obstacles to reconciling it with his ofcial

theory, it is difcult to see how Hume could avoid acknowledging the

need for something like an interpretation in this sense, at least not if he

39 Apart from reference to Hume, the objection that we can just see events and, there-

fore, have no need to appeal to any transcendental principles is sometimes raised

against Kant. See, for example, H.A. Prichard, Kants Theory of Knowledge, rep-

rint, New York and London: Garland Publishing Company, 1972, 294-6, and Jef-

frie Murphy, Kants Second Analogy as an Answer to Hume, Ratio 11 (1969),

75-78. My own treatment of this issue has been inuenced by L.W. Becks response

to Murphy. See especially Becks On Just Seeing the Ship Move, Essays on

Kant and Hume, 136-40.


wishes to explain how, on the basis of observed regularities, we assign

causes, form beliefs regarding particular causal connections, and

acquire the custom of expecting similar event-sequences in the future.

For, as I have already argued, what normally requires a cause is not

the being of something in a certain state but its getting to be in that

state, that is, its alteration or, in Humean terms, its acquisition of a

new modication of existence. But then Hume must confront the prob-

lem of accounting for the possibility of distinguishing between having

successive perceptions of a static object and having the perception of

either successive states of an object or successive events, which is not to

be confused with the problem posed by Anscombe of distinguishing

between something coming into existence at a certain place and migrat-

ing there from elsewhere.

Finally, although I cannot develop the point here, the difculty seems

to be exacerbated by Humes account of time. In his most illuminating

treatment of the topic, Hume appeals to the example of ve successive

impressions of notes played on a ute. His point is that the idea of time

is not derived from an additional distinct impression (since there is

none), but arises entirely from the mind noticing the manner, in which

the different sounds make their appearance (T1.2.3.10; SBN 37). Since,

as Hume points out, this manner of appearing is as successive, this com-

mits him to the view that the idea of time arises from the perception of

a succession. But herein lies the problem; for in addition to the appar-

ent circularity (the awareness of a temporal succession presupposes the

idea of time), it seems that Hume simply helps himself to a perception

of succession. In other words, the having of ve successive note-percep-

tions is one thing and the perception of a succession of ve notes quite

another. And if this is correct, it follows that, even apart from the ques-

tion of event-perception, there is need for an interpretive act as a condi-

tion of the possibility of the awareness of a temporal succession.40 In

short, the Humean mind enters the story one step too late.41

40 This act is what Kant described in the A-Deduction as a three-fold synthesis (or at

least the rst two parts thereof). The basic point is that in order to take them as

constituting a successive series of notes, the mind must unite its successive percep-

tions, which, in turn, requires that it retain or reproduce its awareness of its past

perceptions of the notes as it successively attends to the later ones. For, as Kant

puts it, [I]f I were always to lose the preceding representations...from my thoughts

and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole rep-

resentation...could ever arise (A102).41 I wish to thank an anonymous referee for this journal, Angela Coventry, who was

my commentator at a Hume session at the 2006 Pacic Division meeting of the

APA, as well as members of the audience at that session and at subsequent collo-

quia at UCI and UCSD for their helpful comments regarding various versions of

this paper. I have attempted to incorporate many of their suggestions and calls for

clarication into this nal version.


ALLISON - 'Whatever Begins to Be Must Have a Cause of Existence' Hume's Analysis and Kant's Response

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