-
(14~~ CONGRESS
> SEZ\ThTE
REPORT 1st Session so. 91465
ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS
AN INTERIM REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITI’EE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE VIEWS
NOVEMBER 20 (legislative day, NOVEMBER X3), 1975
U..k. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-986 0 WASHINGTON : 1975
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SENATE SELECT CO&IMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO ISTELLIGESCE ACTIVITIES
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice
Chairman
PHILIP A. HART, hllchlgan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tmnessee WALTER
F. ?+IONDALE, hfinnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona WALTER D.
HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES JlcC. Jl.\THIAS, JR., Xwyland ROBERT
JIORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennnsylvania GARY
HART, Colorado
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Star Director FREDERICK A. 0. SCIIWARZ, Jr.,
Chiej Counsel CURTIS R. SYOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority
AUDREY HATRY, Clerk of the Committee
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CONTENTS
Prologue----________------___-_----~-------------------~------------
I. Introduction and Summary--- _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__ _ _ _ _ _ __ _-_ _ _ __
A. Committee’s Mandate- _ _ ___- __ _____________ _
_____________ __ B. Committee Decision To Make Report Public- _
________ __- _____ C. Scope of Committee’s Investigation _______ -
_ __- _________ -__ ___ D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions-
______ _______ ____ _____.
1. The Questions Presented ____ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions
on the Plots _________ _ 3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on
The Issues of Author-
ity and Control--_ _____ - _______________________ _ _______ II.
Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation- _ _ _
_ _
A. Policy Development and Approval Mechanism--- - - _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ B. The Concept of “Plausible Denial” _____ _ _-_
_________________ _
III. Assassination Planning and Plots--- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ A.
Congo__--_____-_____-___________________-----~---~-------
1.
Z:
4.
Introduction____________________________~~-----~--~----~ Dulles
Cable to Leopoldville: August 26, 1960 _______________ CIA
Encouragement of Congolese Efforts to “Eliminate”
Lumumba-___-_____-_________-_______-_________-_____ The Plot to
Assassinate Lumumba _____________ - ___________
Bissell/Tweedy Meetings on Feasibility of Assassinating (4
(b)
(4
(4
(4
(0
(9)
(h)
Lumumba_l__-____-~______-___-__I__-__-___-_-___I
Bissell/Scheider Meetings on Preparations for Assassinating
“An African Leader”------- _____ - _____ -__-___-___-_ Scheider
Mission to the Congo on an Assassination
Operation-____--________________________~--------- Congo Station
Officer Told to Expect Scheider: Dulles
Cables About “Elimination” of Lumumba ___________ -_
Assassination Instructions Issued to Station Officer and
Lethal Substances Delivered: September 26, 1960- _ _ ___
Hedgman’s Impression That President Eisenhower Ordered
Lumumba’s Assassination- _________ _________________ Steps in
Furtherance of the Assassination Operation- _ _ _ _ _
(i) Hedgman’s Testimony About Confirmation from Headquarters of
the Assassination Plan ______c__ -_
(ii) “Exploratory Steps”- - - _ __ _- - __ _ __ -_ _ __ _ _ _
___ __ _ _ (iii) The Assassination Operation Moves Forward
After
Scheider’s Return to Headquarters: October 5-7,
1960-_-___--____________________________------
(iv) Headquarters Continues to Place “Highest Priority” on the
Assassination Operation- _ _ ___- ___________
Tweedy/B&e11 Testimony: Extent of Implementation; Extent of
Authorization _________________ - ___________
(i) Tweedy’s Testimony About the Scope of the Assaasi- nation
Operation ________ - ______ -- ____ -- ____ -_-_
(ii) Bissell’s Testimony About Moving the Assassination
Operation From Planning to Implementation- _ _ _ _ _
Page XIII
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III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued A.
Congo-Continued
5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot
and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Their Agents in the Page
Congo_----------------------------------------------- (a)
Mulroney’s Assignment in the Congo ___________ __- _____
(i) Mulroney’s Testimony That He Went to the Congo After
Refusing an Assassination Assignment From
Bissell__------------------------------------~~
(ii) Bissell’s Testimony About the Assignment . ,
Mulroney---..-----.---------------------------
(iii) Mulroney Informed of Virus in Station Safe Upon Ar- riving
in Congo: November 3, 1960------- _______
(iv) Mulroney’s Plan to “Neutralize” Lumumba- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
(b) QJ/WIN’s Mission in the Congo: November-December
1960___------------------------------------------ (~1 WI/ROGUE
Asks &J/WIN to Join “Execution Squad”: \-,
December 1960__~_-___-_-_------------------------ 6. The
Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing
About Lumumba’s Death in Katanga Province- ___________ (a)
Lumumba’s Imprisonment After Leaving U.N. Custody:
November 27-December 3, 1960-- _- ________ -___-___ (b)
Lumumba’s Death _____________ _ _- _____ ---:--: _______
7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassmatlon Plot Was
Authorized_-------------------------------------,;
(a) High-Level Meetings at Which ‘I Getting Rid of Lumumba Was
Discussed----- ____ -___-___-_-___-___- ____ - ____
(0 Dillon’s Testimony About Pentagon Meeting: Summer
1960___---------------------------------------
(ii) Robert Johnson’s Testimony That He Understood the President
to Order Lumumba’s Assassination
37 37
at an NSC Meeting ____ - _____ -_- ______-_____--- (iii) Special
Group Agrees to Consider Anything That
Might Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960-,--,, (iv) Dulles
Reminded by Gray of “Top-Level Feeling
That “Vigorous Action” was Necessary in the Congo:
September7-8,1960____-----------------------
(v) Dulles Tells NSC That Lumumba Remains a Grave Danger Until
“Disposed Of”: Se~~?~r”‘~_‘_9”~11
(b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House (c) Bissell’s
Assumptions About Authorization by President
Eisenhower and Allen Dulles-- _ _ _ _ -___ __ __-_____---- (d)
The Impression of Scheider and Hedgman That the
Assassination Operation Had Presidential Authorization- B.
Cuba-----------------------------------------------------
1. The Assassination Plots-- _ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ __ _-_ _ __ (a) Plots: Early 1960---- ____ - _____ - _____
-___- ___________
(i) Plots to Destroy Castro’s Public Image- _____________ (ii)
Accident Plot- - _ _ _ __- _____ - _____________________
(iii) Poison Cigars- - _ _ ___- _____________ -_ ___- ________
(b) Use of Underworld Figures-Phase I (Pre-Bay of Pigs) _ _ _ _
(i) The Initial Plan- _ _ _ _ __ --_ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ __ _ _-- (ii) Contact with the Syndicate’- _ ___ ___-___-___-
____ _- (iii) Las Vegas Wiretap__--___~__----- ________-__--__-
(1) CIA Involvement in the Wiretap-.. &------- _____ (2)
Consequences of the Wiretap--- ___________-___-
(iv) Poison is Prepared and Deljvered to Cuba- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
(c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II (Post-Bay of Pigs)--
(i) Change in Leadership- _ _ _A _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ __ _ _
_ _ _ _ -- - (ii) The Operation is Reactivated- _ /_
_________________
(d) Plansin Early 1963 _____ - ______ - ____ --__- ___--______-
(e) AM/LASH _______ - __________ +- _____ -- ______--__-___-
(i) Originof theProject-----,--------- ___--_____---- (ii) The
Poison Pen Device_- -: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ - __ _ _ _
_
(iii) Providing AM/LASH with’ Arms ____ - ________ -___ __
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V
III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B.
Cuba--Continued
2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Author-
ized Within the Central Intelligence Agency? ______________
(a) TheQuestion Presented___-_---_-_--- _________________ (i)
Dunes_-_---_------~------~------~------~-~-----
(ii) McCone__-_______________________________------ (b) Did
Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial Plots
Against Castro?-----------~---~- ___________________ (i) Dulles’
Approval of J.C. King’s December 1959 Mem-
orandum_-___-______________----------------------- (ii) Dulles’
January 1960 Statement to the Special Group- (iii) Meetings in
March 1960 __________________________ (iv) Recision of Accident
Plot in July 1960 ____.________ (v) Briefing of Dulles on Use of
Underworld Figures in
September1960__-----------~-------~---------- (1) Evidence
Concerning What Dulles Was Told- _ _ _ _ (2) Evidence Concerning
When the Briefing Occurred-
(vi) Edwards’ Communications to the Justice Department in 1961
and 1962 ________ ----_-_-_-_-_--- ________
(vii) General Cabell’s Remarks to the Snecial Groun in November
1960- _____ -_- ________ -~---_.---_~---
(c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassination Plots
During His Tenure as DCI? _____ - ____ --_------_
(i) McCone’s Testimony _______ - _____ -__ __ _______ __ _ _
(ii) Testimony of Helms, Bissell and Other Subordinate
AgencyEmployees__________________-___.._----- (iii) Helms and
Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the
Assassination Plots--- __-_-_-_-_- _____ ___ __ ___ __ (iv) The
Question of Whether General Carter, McCone’s
Deputy Director, Learned About the Underworld Plot and Informed
McCone _________ --_-_----_-_
(v) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone-----_---- _____ 3. At
What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?. -- _ - _
(a) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside the
Central Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Admin-
(i) Summary__----~-------------------~------------ (ii) Richard
Bissell’s Testimony-- __ __ _________ _____ ___
(1) Lack of Personal Knowledge----_-------------- (2)
Assumptions Concerning Dulles-- __ ___ __ __ _____
(iii) Testimony of White House Officials- __ _ - _ _ _ _ __ __
__ _ (1) Gordon Gray- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (2) Andrew Goodpaster-- _ _____________ __________
(3) Thomas Parrott-- __ _ __ __ __ _-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ _
(4) John Eisenhower- ____________________________
(iv) Documentary Evidence--- __ _-_-_ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ __ _
_ (1) Inspector General’s Report ____________________ (2)
Contemporaneous Documents--- __ __ _-_ _ _ _ __ __ _
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside the
Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy Administration- - -
- _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __
(i) Pre-Bay of Pigs Assassination Plot- _ _ - __ _-_ _ _ __ __ _
_ (1) Bissell’s Testimony Concerning His Assumption
That Dulles Told the President- _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ (2)
Bissell’s Testimony Regarding His Own Actions-- (3) Kennedy
Administration Officials’ Testimony-, _ _ (4) The Question of
Whether Assassination Efforts
Were Disclosed in Various Briefings of Adminis- tration
Officials- _ _ _________________________
a. Briefing of the President-Elect ______________ _ b.
Discussion with Bundy on “Executive Action
Capability”-- _ __ __ __ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _____ _ c.
Taylor/Kennedy Bay of Pigs Inquiry ________
(5) Conversation Between President Kennedy and
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106 107
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109 109 110 110 111 111 111 112 113 113 114 114 114
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117 118 119
120 120
121 121
Senator George Smathers ______ __ _ __ _-_ _-_ __ _ 123
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VI
III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B.
Cuba-Continued
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside of the
Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(i) Pre-Bay of pigs Assassination Plot-Continued (6) The
Question of Whether the President or the
Attorney General Might Have Learned of the Assassination Effort
from the Cuban Partici-
(7) pants_-_-__-_--__--_--~----------~---~----
The Question of Whether the Assassination Opera- tion Involving
Underworld Figures Was Known About by Attorney General Kennedy or
President Kennedv as Revealed bv Investina- tions of Giancana “and
Rosselli- -_ - I_ - - _ _ - - I- _
a. 1960_-____--_______---------------------- b.
1961_--_------__--__~~------~-----~---~-- c.
1962_-_____-_______----------------------
(1) Did President Kennedy Learn Anything About Assassination
Plots as a Result of the FBI Investieation of Giancana and
Rosselli? ____ i-Z-- __________________
(2) The Formal Decision to Forego Prosecution- (a) Events
Leading Up to a Formal Brief-
ing of the Attorney General ________ (b) Briefing of the
Attorney General on
May 7, 1962__--__-________-_____ (aa) The Attornev General Was
Told ~ I
That the Operation Had Involved an Assassination Attempt----
________________
(bb) Evidence Concerning Whether The Attorney General Was Told
That the Operation Had Been Terminated ____ -__ _ _____
(ii) Post-Bay of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE
Period-__----__-----____________________~----~
(1) Events Preceding the Establishment of MON-
GOOSE_________-_-__-____________________
a. The Taylor/Kennedy Board of Inquiry- _ ___ __ b. National
Security Action Memorandum 100 of
October Fj, 1961, and the CIA Intelligence Estimate-- _____ --
____ -- _________________
c. President Kennedy’s November 9, 1961 Con- versation with Tad
Szulc- _ _- _____________
d. President Kennedy’s Speech of November 16,
(2) 1961---_-_________--___________________
Operation MONGOOSE- _ _ - - _- ____ - __________ a. The Creation
of Operation MONGOOSE-- -__
(1) The Special Group (Augmented) @GA)--- (8) General Lansdale
Named Chief-of-Oper-
ations of MONGOOSE-- ______________ (3) CIA Organization for
MONGOOSE_ - ____
b. Lansdale’s Theory and Objective for MON-
GOOSE__-_-__________-~---------------
c. Bissell’s Testimony Concerning Presidential Instructions to
Act More Vigorously- _ _ _ _ _
d. The January 19, 1962 Special Group Meeting- e. General
Lansdale’s MONGOOSE Planning
Tasks _____ -- __________ -_--__---_._- ____ f. Lansdale’s
Rejection of a Suggestion that a Prop-
aganda Campaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be
Explored _.____ __________
g. The control System MONGOOSE Operations- h. The Pattern of
MONGOOSE Action _________
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VII
III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B. Cuba-
Continued
3. At F Vhat Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside of the
Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(ii) Post-Bay of Pigs Underworld Plot-MONGOOSE \--, ~~
Period-kontinued-
(3) Evidence Bearing on Knowledge of and Author- ization for the
Assassination Plot, Phase II- __ _
a. Helms’ Testimony Concerning Authority- _ _ _ _ (1) Helms’
Perception of Authority __________ (2) Helms’ Testimony Concerning
the Absence
of a Direct Order and Why He Did Not Inform Administration
Officials-------..
($1 Helms’ Perceution of Robert Kennedy’s ‘-’ ~~ Position on
*Assassination ____ _ _ _ ___ _ :- - (4) Helms’ Testimony as to Why
He Did Not
Obtain a Direct Order- _ - _ ___-- _______ (6) Helms’ Perception
of the Relation of
Special Group Controls to Assassination Activity __________
-__-___- __________-
b. Harvey’s Testimony Concernin (1) Harvey’s Perception of Aut
‘6.
Authority--- _ ority--------
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152 153 153
(2) Harvey and the Special Group (Aug-
mented)-----------------------------
c. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Of-
ficials_-_-_------------------------------
(4) The August 10, 1962 Special Group (Augmented)
Meeting_----------------------------------
a. The Contemporaneous Documents- _ _________ (1) Lansdale’s
August 13, 1962 Memorandum-- (%) Harvey’s August 14,1962
Memorandum---- (3) The Minutes of the August lo,1962 Meeting- (4)
The August 10 Meeting-- _ __ _ _- _ _ ___ __ __
b. The Testimony- _ __ _ _-_ _ __ ___ _ -_ ____ __-_- __ (I)
Testimony About the August 10 Meeting- _ _
(a) McCone- _____ -_- ______ - _________ (b) Harvey ____________
- _______ - _____ (c) Goodwin---- ______________________ (d)
McNamara ________ -_-__-- _______
(8) Testimony About Events After the August 10, 1962 Meeting
______ _ ________ ____
(a) McCone ______ - ______ - ___________ (5)
Harvey_------------------------- (c) Elder- _ __ _ __ ______ _-_
____ __ _ -1-L __ (d) Lansdale __________________ --___--
(3) Testimony of Reporters About Lansdale’s Comments on the
August 10 Meeting---
(a) The Martin Report ________ -_ _ _ _ -_ (5) The O’Leary Re
art-- _ _ - _ ________
(iii) The Question of Whether the A 8 /LASH Plot (1963- 196.5)
Was Known About or Authorized by Admin- istration Officials Outside
the CIA- _ - _ ___________
(1) Kennedy Administration’s Policy Toward Cuba in
1963_______-_____----------~------------
a. Organizational Changes _______________ - _____ b. Discussion
of the Contingency of Castro’s
Death____-________-_------------------- c. The Standing Group’s
Discussion of United
States Policy Toward Cuba-- _____________ d. The Special Group’s
Authorization of a Sabo-
tage Program A ainst Cuba----- __________ e. The Diplomatic 8
ffort to Explore an Accom-
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167 168 169
170
170 170
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modation with Castro- ________ - ______ ____ 173
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VIII
III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued B.
Cuba-Continued
3. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Known About or Au-
thorized Outside of the Central Intelligence Agency?-Con.
(b) The Question of Knowledge and Authorization Outside of the
Central Intelligence Agency During the Kennedy
Administration-Continued
(iii) The Question of Whether the AM/LASH Plot (1963- , 1965)
-Was Known About or Authorized by Admin- istration Officials
Outside the CIA-Continued
(2) Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the AM/LASH
Poison Pen Device _______._-__
a. The October Meeting with AM/LASH and the Use of Robert
Kennedy’s Name Without Obtaining His Approval- _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _.
_ _ _ _ _ _
b. The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22,
1963-_-_-----_-_-___----------------
(3) The Question of Authorization in the Johnson
Administration_-_----------- _______________
a. Summary of the Assassination Activity-- _ _ _ _ _ b. The
Issue of Authorization _______________.__ c. The Covert Action
Program Against Cuba in
1964-1965_-_----_-__~----~----.-------- d. The Special Group
Investigation of Reported
Castro Assassination Plots by Cuban Exiles- e. Helms’ Report to
Rusk---------- ___________ f. Helms’ Briefing of President Johnson
on the
1967 Inspector General’s Report _____ __ _ ___ (4) Helms’
Testimony on Authorization in the
Johnson Administration - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
C. Institutionalizing Assassination: The “Executive Action”
Capa-
bility--_-------~--------~-------~---~---------------..--- 1.
Introduction__-_____------------------------------------ 2. The
Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or
Knowledge of the Executive Action Project _______________ 3. The
Question of Authorization or Knowledge of the Executive
Action Project by the DCI- __- _________________________ 4. The
Question of Whether Project ZR/RIFLE Was Connected
to Any Actual Assassination Plots- _ ____ _____ __ _______ __ _
(a) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy-- _ _____ .______ (b)
Bissell’s Instruction to Harvey to Take Over Responsibility
for Underworld Contact: November 1961- __ __________ (c) Use of
QJ/WIN in Africa ______________________________
D. Trujillo_---_---_-----_---_-_-_---_-_-_-_-_-____________-_-
1. Summary_-----_---_-_____________________ 2.
Background___---------~-~----------~---------------~--- 3. Initial
Contact With Dissidents and Request for Arms- _ _ __ _ _
(a) Dissident Contacts----~-----------------~----------~- (b)
The Request for Sniper Rifles- _ _ __ -_-_- _- _-___ ________
4. Summer and Fall of 1960 _________________________________ (a)
Diplomatic Development-Withdrawal of United States
Personnel__--------------------------------------- (b) Dearborn
Reports Assassination May Be Only Way To
Overthrow Trujillo Regime--__-_ __- _- __ ___ _. _ __ __ __ _
(c) Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate- _ ______________ (d)
CIA Plans of October 1960---------------------~-~---- (e) December
1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Actions- - _ _
5. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of “Limited Supplies
of Small Arms and Other Material”--- _ __ __ __ ___________
(a) Memorandum Underlying the Special Group Action-_- _ _ _ 6.
January 20, 1961-April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration
throughthe Bayof Pigs)___--_---_-___-------- _________ (a)
Specific Events Indirectly Linking United States to Dissi-
dents’ Assassination Plans- _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _
__ _ _ _ _ _ (i) Assassination Discussions and Requests for Ex-
plosives ________ -------_----- _________________
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IX
III. Assassination Planning and Plots-Continued D.
Trujille-Continued
6. January 20, 1961-April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration
through the Bay of Pigs-Continued
(a) Specific Events Indirectly Linking United States to Dissi-
Psge dent’s Assassination Plans-Continued
(ii) The Passage of Pistols_- _ _ _ _ _-_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ 199 (1) Pouching to the Dominican Republic-- _ __ _ _ _
__ _ _ 199 (2) Reason for the CIA Instruction Not To Tell Dear-
born-------------------------------------- 199 (3) Were the
Pistols Related to Assassination?------
(iii) Passing of the Carbines- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _- _ z (1) Request by the Station and by Dearborn and
Ap-
provalby CIA______--__------------------- 200 (2) Were the
Carbines Related to Assassination?---- 200 (3) Failure to Disclose
to State Department Officials
in Washington- _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _ __ _ _
201 (iv) Requests for and Pouching of the Machine Guns- - - _ _
_
(1) Requests for Machine Guns- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ 2”::
(2) Pouching of Machine Guns Approved by Bissell- - 202 (b)
Knowledge of Senior American Officials (Pre-Bay of Pi@) _ - 202
7. April 17! 1961-May 31, 1961 (Bay of Pigs Through Trupllo
Assassmation)--__------------------------------------- 205
(a) Decision Not’ to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccessful
United States Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort.. __ -
(b) Further Consideration of Passing, Machine Guns- _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ 2; : (c) Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961_ - _
_ - 208
(d) Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns-------- 208
(e) Dearborn in Washington for Consultation-Drafting of
Contingency Plans - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 209 (f) Cable of May 29, 1961____ -
___________________-_______ 212
8. May 30,..1961 and Immediately Thereafter ____ _ __ _ _ _ __ _
-_ _ - - 213 (a) Trupllo Assassinated--- _____ --___- _____ - _____
- _______ 213 (b) Cables to Washington- - _ ___-__ ____ -
_________________ - 213 (c) Immediate Post-Assassination Period- _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ 214
E. Diem----------------------------------------------------- 217
1. Sumrnary__--------------------.------------------------- 217 2.
The Abortive Coup of August 1963- _ ______-_____ _____----- 217 3.
The November 1963 Coup-- - ___ -__ ____ - -__ --________--___
220
F. Schneider_------------------------------------------------
225 1. Summa~__--------------------------------------------- 225 2.
The President’s Initial Instruction and Background __ _ _ ___
__
(a) September 15 White House Meeting---- _ _ __ -_-_ ________
f;; (b) Background: Tracks I and II ___________________L______
22g
(c) CIA Views of Difficulty of Project _________________-__- 232
3. CIA’s Implementation of Track II _________________________
233
(a) Evolution of CIA Strategy- ___________________________ (i)
The “Constitutional Coup” Approach- __- __________
iiz
(ii) Military Solution- _ _____ __ __ _ _ __ ___-_ -_ __ __ __
__ __ 234 (b) The Chile Task Force- _ _ _ _ __ __ __ _-___-___-_ _
_ _ __ -.- ___ (c) Use of the U.S. Military Attache aml Interagency
Relatlons- 2 (d) Agents Who Posed as Third Country Nationals--
________ 238 (e Chief of Station ________________________ -_-_-
_________ 239
4. C 2 A Efforts to Promote a Coup _________ -_-___-__-- _______
239 (a) The Chilean Conspirators- _ _ __ __-_ __ ___ __-___ __ __
__ __- (b) Contacts Prior to October
15--------------------------
.22:
(c) October 15 Decision ___________ - ________ - ______ - ______
(d) Coup Planning and Attempts After October15 _ _ _ _-___-_
itg
(e) The Shooting of General Schneider.. -__ __ _ __ _ __ ___ ___
__ _ 245 (f) Post October 22Events -_____ --- ______ -___-___-
_______
5. CIA/White House Communication During TrackII---------- !$
(a) September ____ - _________________ - ______ -_--_-_- _____
(b) October--------------------------------------------- E3 (c)
December_------------------------------------------ 253 (d) Did
Track II End?--- _-_ ________ ___ _ - _ __ _-_ _ __ _____ __
253
-
X
PIWe
IV. Findingsand Conclusions--__------------ _____ - _____ -_--
_______ A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves- _ _ _ _______
-__ _ ____ -
1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to
Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba- - - _ __ _ _ - _
_
2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed as a Result of Assassination
Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States----- _ _ - _ - -
_
3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots
Which Resulted in the Deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and
Schneider---..
4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be
of Crisis Proportions---------------- ____ -- ____. - ____.__
5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their
Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders ____________
6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in
Assassination Efforts_--- ____ -- ____ --_-___- _____ --- _____
B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves
_____--__________- 1. The United States Should Not Engage in
Assassination--__---
(a) Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by
the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow
Local Governments ________-_____-________
(b) The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred
Explains, But Does Not Justify Them- __ --___ _- ____ __
2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures
for Their Criminal Talents ____ ---___- _____ -_--___
C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and
Control- The Apparent Lack of Accountability in the Command and
Control System Was Such That the Assassination Plots Could Have
Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization- _ _ _
Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were
255 255
255
256
256
256
256
;z: 257
257
258
259 260
261
2: 262 262 263 263
Authorized_------------------------------------------- (4 D
iern__--------------------------------------------- (b)
Schneider------------------------------------------- (c)
Trujillo____-_--------------------------------------- (d)
Lumumba-_-_--------------------------------------- (e) Castro----
_____ -- ____ -- _____________________________ CIA Officials
Involved in the Assassination Operations Per-
ceived Assassination to Have Been a Permissible Course of
Action_-----------------------------------------------
The Failure in Communication Between Agency Officials in Charge
of the Assassination Operations and their Superiors in the Agency
and in the Administration was Due to: (a) The Failure of
Subordinates to Disclose Their Plans and Opera- tions to Their
Superiors; and (b) The Failure of Superiors in the Climate of
Violence and Aggressive Covert Actions Sanc- tioned by the
Administrations to Rule Out Assassination as a Tool of Foreign
Policy; To Make Clear to Their Subordinates That Assassination Was
Impermissible; Or To Inquire Fur- ther After Receiving Indications
That It Was Being Con-
sidered__---------------------------------------------
(a) Agency Officials Failed on Several Occasions to Reveal the
Plots to Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient Detail and
Clarity _____ _ - __ __ __ _- __ _ _ - _ __ __ _- __ __ _ _ _
(i) Castro _____ -- _________ - ____ -- ___________ - _______
(ii) Trujillo ____ -- _________________ - _________________
(iii) Schneider---- ______________ -- ________________ :-- (b)
Administration Officials Failed to Rule Out Assassinatron
As a Tool of Foreign Policy, To Make Clear to Then Subordinates
That Assassination Was Impermissible- or To Inquire Further After
Receiving Indications That Assassination Was Being Considered ____
_ _- ___________
(i) Trujillo--- _______ -- ______ -- ____ - ______________ _-
(ii) Schneider--_-_______----------------------------
(iii) Lumumba ____________________ - _____ --_-__- ______ (iv)
Castro _______________________ - _______ -- ____ -__-_
264
267
267 267 270 272
273 273 273 273 274
-
XI
IT’. Findings and Conclusions-Continued C. Findings and
Conclusions Relating to Authorization and
Control-Continued 5. Practices Current at the Time in Which the
Assassination
Plots Occmred Were Revealed by the Record To Create the Risk of
Confusion, Rashness and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where
Clarity and Sober Judgment Were Most
Necessary___~-_____-_-~----..~~~~-~------~~~~---------
(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of
Plausible Denial ______ -_-- _.__.___ -_-- _____ --------
(b) The Danger of Using “Circumlocution” and “Euphemism”. (c)
The Danger of Generalized Instructions__-------------. (d) The
Danger of “Floating Authorization”-__------------. (e) The Problems
Connected With Creating New Covert
Capabilities ________ ------ __._ -.-_----__-_--- ______ V.
Recommendations ___._________.___ -- _._______
----__-.-------__
A. General Agreement That the United States Must Not Engage in
Assassination _____________ -_- _______ -_-_---_-_---- __._._.
B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination_____-..-----------------
C. The NeedforaStatute-------------.-----------------------
Epilogue___--____~._..~-~--.~~~..~----~-~--------------------------
Statement of Joinder . ..______.____________________ --- _.___
---_--__
AppendixA---______._-----__-~------~--~-------~-~.---~----------
AppendixB-_______________-___-_-----~---~---~---------------------
Separate Views of Senator Philip A.
Hart_--___-_-_------------------- Additional Views of Senat.or
Robert Morgan- - - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ -
Additional Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr ________ --
___________ Additional Views of Senator Barry Goldwater
___.__________.__________ Supplemental Views of Senator Charles
McC. Mathias, Jr ________ ______ Abbreviations of Citations-- __ __
- _____ ____ - _________ _ ___ ________ ----
Page
277
277 278 278 278
279 281
281 282 282 285 286 289 291 297 299 303 341 345 347
-
PROLOGUE
The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in
the context of United St,ates policy and actions designed to
counter the threat of spreading Communism. Following the end of
World War II, many nations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere fell
under Communist influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers
was accompanied by rapid disintegration of the Western colonial
empires. The Second World War had no sooner ended than a new
struggle began. The Communist threat., emanating from what came to
be called the “Sino- Soviet bloc,” led to a policy of containment
intended to prevent fur- ther encroachment into the “Free
World.”
United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for
the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military
bases throughout the world. Concern over the expansion of an
aggres- sive Communist monolith led the United States to fight two
major wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to
wage a relent- less cold war against Communist expansion wherever
it appeared in the “back alleys of the world.” This called for a
full range of covert activit.ies in response to the operations of
Communist clandestine services.
The fear of Communist expansion was particularly acute in the
United States when Fidel Castro emerged as Cuba’s leader in the
late 1950’s. His takeover was seen as the first significant.
penetration by the Communists into the Western Hemisphere. United
States leaders, including most Members of Congress, called for
vigorous action to stem the Communist infection in this hemisphere.
These policies rested on widespread popular support and
encouragement.
Throughout this period, the United States felt impelled to
respond to threats which were? or seemed to be, skirmishes in a
global Cold War against Communism. Castro’s Cuba raised the spectre
of a Soviet outpost at America’s doorstep. Events in the Dominican
Republic appeared to offer an additional opportunity for the
Russians and their a.llies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule,
occupied the stra- tegic center of the african continent, and the
prospect of Communist penetration there was viewed as a threat to
american interests in emerging African nations. There was great
concern that a Communist takeover in Indochina would have a “domino
effect” throughout Asia. Even the election in 1970 of a Marxist
president in Chile was seen by some as a threat similar to that of
Castro’s takeover in Cuba.
The Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this
Interim Report as an aberration? explainable at least in part, but
not justified, by the pressures of the time. The Committee believes
that it is still in the national interest of the United States to
help nations achieve self-determination and resist Communist
domination. How- ever, it is clear that this interest camlot
justify resorting to the kind of abuses covered in this report.
Indeed, the Committee has resolved that steps must be taken to
prevent those abuses from happening again.
(XIII)
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TitleContentsPrologue