All Slides Combined

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NATIONAL SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Department of International Relations and European Integration

International Institutions and Security

Professor Vasile Sec ăreş, Ph.D.

SNSPA

Bucharest, 2016


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I. A Right to Security:Referents and Perspectives


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1.1. The Euro – Atlantic community and nationsat the beginning of the 21st Century: thenecessity to reformulate their right to security

→ A bedrock of rule-of-law society is toguarantee security – first of all: freedom &rights – and to provide citizens with a stable,secure & predictable environment.

→ Security constitutes a priority public issue butit can be ill-assessed or / and perceived as aconstraint in view of its costs and obligations.

1. A Right to Security?


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1.2. The necessity to develop a new approach: there

is a clear relationship between the traditionalinter-state threats to security & the potentiallydestabilizing impact of tensions within societies.

→ The first phase of this effort : a new security doctrine /

perspective: fighting against different forms of risk – especially non-traditional threats: terrorism, access toWMD, illegal migration, cyber threat, organized crime,accidents & natural disasters.

→ The second phase: the new stage of the presentsystemic/power transition and the use of force: a) the realmilitary threat on the Euro-Atlantic Frontier and thehybrid war, etc; the war in Syria; b) the new terroristthreat (Daesh) as a form of hybrid war.


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1.3. The concept of democratic security (the Summitof the Council of Europe, 9 Oct. 1993): Europeshould become a space of democratic security(liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of lawetc.).

→ The concept of cooperative security: new horizons for anew international environment. NATO & the new“Cooperative security” perspective

→ The new phase: the mixture between cooperation,competition and the use of force (the hybrid war). Russiain the Euro-Atlantic frontier. China in Asia-Pacific.


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2.1. Few concepts employed in statecraft & in thestudy of world politics have as vague referents asdo security or national security.

→ The reshaping of the geopolitical scene & achanging state system: new vulnerabilities &new threats; threats that migrate easily acrossstate frontiers = more difficulties for a gooddefinition or a coherent approach.

→ Originally, the concept dealt mainly with militaryissues → the changing security environment ofthe „90s was demanding a different and morecomplex approach. The new military threat.

2. Security & National Security as a concept


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2.2. Security: an essential human need (Susan Strange).

→ Human security: the starting point of a newapproach based on the central role of human rights.

→ Human security = all types of security which involvehuman individuals and/or groups, protected or

protecting against all kinds of threats found in theirhuman environments (see for instance: the impact of/ and the consequences of structural violence).

2.3. But : security is “primary about the fate of humancollectivities, and only secondarily about the personal security of individual human beings”(Barry Buzan).


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2.4. Security is a complex concept; there arenumerous definitions of it.

→ Generally speaking, security means:

a) The condition of being protected from and not being exposed to danger/ to violence/militarythreat/ other forms of attack or pressure;

b) Freedom from doubt or a state of self-assurance,

certainty, well-founded confidence;c) Freedom from care, anxiety and apprehension in

connection with this agenda of violence, pressureor subversion and the wellbeing of a community.


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2.5. As a notion having political & socialdimensions, security should be discussed at thenational and at the international level:

a) At the national level , security is viewed in termsof the basic survival, welfare and protection ofthe nation / state.

b) At the international level , the same concept

defines the common security concerns betweenstates: the use of armed violence, free access toresources & markets, the rules of theinternational political game, other risks andthreats transcending state frontiers.


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2.6. The impact of a changed international climate: traditional,narrow definitions versus recent, broad conceptions ofsecurity studies. Barry Buzan, Edward Kolodziej orStephan Walt have articulated very different views abouthow to define the concept of security.

→ The narrow definition of security tends to focus onmaterial capabilities and the use and control of militaryforces by states.

→ This contrasts with the distinction among military, political, economic, social and environmental security

threats that affect not only state but also non-state actors.→ The necessity to deal with the critical role of the military

threat & the hybrid war.


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2.7. A larger & a more complex approach needs to:

→ understand that security operates at different

levels and in various areas;

→ make a distinction between vulnerabilities &threats, and between capabilities & intentions;

→ integrate the objective (material) dimension &

the subjective (perception & cultural patterns)

dimension of a security / insecurity situation.


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1. Barry Buzan, Popoarele, statele şi teama – O agendă

pentru studii de securitate internaţională în epoca de

după Războiul Rece, ed. Cartier, Chişinău, 2000.

2. Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, Security. A

New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers,

Boulder, Co., London, 1998.

3. K.J.Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for

Analysis, 7th ed., Prentice-Hall International, Inc.,

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1995.

4. Edward Kolodziej, Securitatea şi relaţiile internaţionale,

ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 2007.

Recommended Readings


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5. Susan Strange, State şi pieţe, Institutul European, Iaşi,

1997.

6. Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, Securitate, suveranitate şi

instituţii internaţionale, ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 2010.

7. Kenneth N. Waltz, Teoria politicii internaţionale, ed.

Polirom, Iaşi, 2006.

8. “Provocarea despre care nu am ştiut... sau al doilea

război al Crimeei”, Revista “Monitor Strategic” Nr 1-2

2014 - Vasile Secares


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5. Ultima etapă a tranziţiei: restructurarea politică şi

strategică în spaţiul Euro-Atlantic şi la nivel

global.”Revista Intelligence” 2014 - Vasile Secares

6. V. Secăreş , “ NATO and the global structure of security:

a new agenda and a long list of challenges and questions

in V. Secăreş coord., “ NATO and the Global Structure of

Security: The Future of Partnerships ”, editura Tritonic

2014

7. ”The New Cycle Of Power In The 21st Century And TheStrategic Relationship Between The USA And China”,

Europolity Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015


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Master’s Degree Program: “Security and Diplomacy”



SNSPA

Bucharest, 2016


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II. Security and Securitization


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1.1. Putting together the national & international dimensions, security means the ability of states &societies to maintain their independent identity andfunctional integrity.

→ National security deals with a wide variety of risksabout whose probabilities we have little knowledge

→ National security means well-founded confidence inthe ability of the state to protect the core-values, the

fundamental institutions & the overall socio-economic wellbeing of a society – the way of life ofthe nation.

1. Back to a definition


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1.2. Military threats remain at the core of the national security analysis; they are traditionally given the highest priorityin national security concerns.

→ Military action can, and usually does, threaten all theelements of the state.

→ In this context, security means: the relative absence ofand/or defense against external – especially militarythreats and their hybrid form; no real prospect for defeat in case of war or even certainty about victory.

→ The military threats can also be internal : in this casemilitary security is about the ability of the ruling elite tomaintain civil peace, domestic stability, territorialintegrity or to eliminate political contest / challenge/subversion having sometimes foreignsupport/interference(see now the hybrid war in Ukraine).


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1.3. Security (stability & safety) of nations isshaped by multidimensional factors → anexpanded definition, including also non-military issues.

→ Pursuing a wider security agenda = takinginto account a range of factors & dynamics,some of which are fundamentally different

from military-political ones (Buzan, Weaverand de Wilde).


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1.4. In its aim to achieve a desired level of security, the state has to deal with a range ofdifferent vulnerabilities / risks and threats.

→ A national security policy can either – or inthe same time – focus inward : seeking toreduce vulnerabilities of the state & to control/ reduce the associated risks; or outward :

seeking to reduce / counteract externalthreats = the necessity to distinguish betweencapabilities & intentions.


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1.5. The distinction between states with serious domestic security problems & those whose primary securityconcerns are external is crucial: strong states vs. weak / failed states (Barry Buzan).

→ Weak states and – even more – failed states are notable to cope with their national security matters =weak political & social cohesion; domestic insecurity;they affect the international security environment byexporting their instabilities.

→ But : even strong states face domestic vulnerabilities!See: complexity, energy, electronic war, terrorism etc.


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2.1. National security is defined within a framework ofinternational politics = a dynamic process of interactioncreating inbalances, crisis & threats = conditions forinsecurity; seeking security, nations/states are sometimes

in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed.→ The impossibility of achieving absolute security in an

anarchical international system.

2.2. The security dilemma (J.Herz): the efforts to achievesecurity diminish the security of others; relative security

as a “permanently unsatisfactory condition” (BarryBuzan); security dilemma and the dominant approach:offence vs. defence.

2. National Security & the international

environment


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3.1. See again the importance of the military dimension of security:military threats remain at the core of national security concerns.The use of organised violence = a “normal” component of world

politics. The present use of the “hybrid war”.

3.2. Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the

state, its internal legitimacy or external recognition; disruptingthe political structure; secessionism; subversion & riots etc.

3.3. Societal threats: threats to the sustainability of traditional patternsof language, culture & religious or ethnic identity. See minorities,migration etc. the present “crisis of migrants” in the EU.

3.4. The economic threats refer to access to the necessary supplies ofkey materials / energy / food / water / markets; economic &financial crisis & recession; disruption in the flow of trade &finance; growing public deficit or debt.

3.5. The ecological threats which can damage the physical base of the

nation / state.

3. The security sectors: military, political,

economic, societal and environmental


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4.1. Because security “is primarily about the fate of humancollectivities” (Barry Buzan), in modern societies itmeans an almost overwhelming and exclusive reliance onthe state, on governmental agencies & on politicaldecisions.

→ People see themselves primary as “consumers ofsecurity”.

4.2. Protecting / seeking national security = a public policy /governmental policy.

→ National security concerns = an essential component of a

political agenda; a matter of politics & politicalinterpretation.

4.3. National security: an objective (material) dimension orreal threats (capabilities & actions) plus interpretation /

perception = subjective dimension (“reading” the

intentions).

4. National security: state, politics &

security policies


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5.1. “Security issues are made security issues by acts

of securitization” (Buzan, Weaver & De Wilde).

→ “Security is a quality actors inject into issues by

securitizing them, which means to stage them onthe political arena … and have them accepted by

a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary

defensive moves” (Barry Buzan)

5. Securitization


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5.2. Securitization:

a) An issue is presented as an existential threat;

b) Requiring emergency measures;

c) Justifying actions outside the normal boundaries of political procedure.

5.2. Sometimes security issues are framed as a specialkind of politics or as above politics.

5.3. Securitization & the decision-making process (thesecuritizing actor).

N.B. the securitizing actors have the ability to securitizeissues by declaring a referent object (i.e. the nation)as being existentially threatened.


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5.4. Securitization: stages

a) An issue is framed as a political issue; a political

definition based on the so-called “raison d’état” (state

interests);5.5. Securitization per se: the “speech act” (identifying a

threat, a necessity to act and a right to declare an

emergency condition).

• Securitization & the political process: the role ofdifferent functional actors (actors influencing

decisions in the field of security); actors, interest

groups & negotiation


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5.6. Securitization & manipulation: convincing theaudience to accept non-issues of national security as

being real security issues.

→ “National security interests” as reasons for very

different political objectives.5.7. Securization as an intersubjective process.

→ The role of values, political culture, political matrix,stereotypes, prejudices etc.

N.B. “the cultural schema and meanings-values system provide a perspective within which some perceptibles are given interpretation and some areignored” (R. Rummel).


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Professor Vasile Secăreş, Ph.D.

SNSPA

Bucharest, 2016


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III. Security & Organized Violence


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• We need an expanded concept / perspective, covering everyaspect of security: territorial/ integrity, state (independence& sovereignty), political stability of institutions, economic,environmental.

• How to organize this agenda: the human dimension and therole of the state.

→ the use of force & the social / political control: intent, will& political aim; violence & power.

→ the human factor as a threat: the capacity to hurt & to cause

losses; to coerce & punish.→ the state & the legitimate use of organized violence;

Clausewitz: war – the use of military force – as a politicalinstrument = coercion.

→ the lethal dimension of foreign policy & national security

policy.

1. What kind of risks are important?


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• The military threats as a priority for nationalsecurity concerns.

→ Military action can cause losses in terms of

territory; it can exterminate the attacked population etc.: but it can obliterate the physical & political existence of the state.

→ During a war: the prospect of defeat;

assessing the costs: submission or victory.The political decision-makers and theirresponsibility


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• The worst case scenario: one never knows about

the future.

• Organized violence as a threat versus organized

violence as a shield: an instrument to protect. → “Nations can no longer hope to protect their

citizens through unilateral military measures”?

(The Independent Commission on Disarmament

& Security – The Palme Commission, 1989):

balance & durability.

→ Avoiding traditional security thinking: who is

going to try?

2. National Security & the critical political

responsibility of the decision-makers


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• The right approach: deterrence vs. preemptive and preventive.

→ Security efficiency: deterrence (deterring

hostile actions means the real possibility toretaliate if necessary).

→ The “good balance” of power: the armsrace.

→ What kind of modernization: a rapidreaction force?

→ The “first strike” approach? Preemptive and

preventive.


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a) Offence versus defense; how difficult is to

assess intent (Jervis); “tight”; “regular” &

“loose” dilemmas.

b) MAD or “the first strike dilemma”.

c) Asymmetric war : assessing risks and non-

risk situations (the new dilemma).

3. Vulnerability of the decision-makers: the

security dilemma (old & new dilemmas)


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• The impact of the existential threat:

survival; “we will pay any price!”.

→ Legitimizing the use of force.

→ Mobilizing resources: they are always

available!

→ The use of extraordinary measures.

4. The special nature of security risks


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• An emergency condition: “special powers” → the

right to use whatever means are necessary.

→ The confidential nature of the decision making

process; cutting access. “Wikileaks”: the newchallenge.

→ Security & intelligence: the old guard of national

mistrust.

→ Security & democracy; the new requirements of

domestic security & the present debate.

→ Security & covert actions / operations.


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• “Right or wrong, my country”.

→ “Our national interests are ultimately more

important”.

→ “Cooperative security”: sharing interests; howreluctant, how enduring?

→ The Euro-Atlantic fronfier: Are they ready to

risk a war for us? Kouchner: “Nobody is going

to make war for Georgia”

→ Foregoing or modifying the pursuit of our own

national interest: what conditions are needed?

5. National security & the zero-sum game

logic


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SNSPA

Bucharest, 2016


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IV. National Security: Policies andstructures (institutions)


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• Power and politics: national security as an

instrument and a framework.

→ Power: the legitimate use of organized violence

(a state monopoly).→ Political objectives and political reasons.

→ National security as a special kind of politics:

political, economic and social consequences.

1. National Security: Power & Politics


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• National security as a public policy.→ Governments enhance their security by decreasing

vulnerabilities and / or by diminishing the perceived threats.

→ A public policy organized by the use of violence (militaryforce): being ready for … and the real use of violence; see

“preventive deployments”, “peace support operations” etc.

→ This involves a mix of special decisions / actions = a special kind of public policy: i.e. the national security policy(including the defense policy).

a) political decisions / measures;

b) measures to create the necessary economic support;

c) military deployments;

d) particular policies toward other states (isolation, self-reliance,neutrality, alliances etc.)


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• National Security policy: negotiation, decision-

making and implementation.

→What kind of interests?

→The impact of domestic policy

→Who is doing what?


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• People, weapons, resources, rules and procedures,

actions.

→ A special group of people has the responsibility to

organize / provide national security: “the managers of the

instruments of organized violence”.

• National Security as a bureaucracy (Weber) and a

profession (Lasswell, Finer, Huntington, Janowitz):

people (military men: “the man on the horseback”),

weapons, values, professional patterns and ethos (“anofficer and a gentleman”: the mission and the sacrifice),

organization, special training.

→ The special status: politicians and specialists (the military

/ security sector) = those who know!

2. National security means institutions


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→ The political role of the army: “domestic andinternational”.

→ Job description: Political realism and militarylogic; consequences. Cultural and psychological

patterns (stereotypes).

→ Transferring the cultural pattern of organizedviolence.

→ The intentional character: intent and planning;“being ready”.

→ The technological dynamics of the military sector:the long cycles of R & D, the arms race =

consequences.


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• Who is doing what?

• “Privatization of security”?

• The democratic control of the security

sector: old and new challenges

3. The security sector : military,

paramilitary and other institutions


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SNSPA

Bucharest, 2016


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V. National and International Securityin the 21st Century. A New Approach


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• Johan Galtung and “the structural violence”.

→ The unequal distribution of resources and

opportunities: “a great measure of structural

violence”. → Galtung (1969), Hoivik (1971, 1977), Köhler &

Alcock (1976), Russett (1977): concepts and

research.

→ The “economic law of life”: development,

political regimes and structural violence.

1. Towards a new approach: Early concepts


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• “Non-offensive defense” and “common security”: thedebate of the ’80s.

→ Egon Bahr : “common security”.

→ Theodor Ebert : “civilian-based («social») defense”.

→ Johan Galtung : civilian based plus strictly defensivemilitary and paramilitary defense.

→ Albrecht von Müller : “integrated forward defense” (therole of technology).

→ Andreas von Bülow : „confidence – building securitystructures“.

→ Horst Afheldt : “defensive defense” (the use of“technocommandos”: flexibility and conditionaloffensive capability).

• Conclusion: the necessity of a more reassuring defenseapproach; the role of confidence – building measures.


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• The end of the Cold War: the idealistic approach.

→ Heralding a new world order and a new era.

→ Escaping from narrow Cold War “zero-sum”

strategies into the broad sunlit vistas ofinternational peace and harmony.

→ Moving from a balance of power based world to

a world where foreign policy is defined by the

politics of shared risk. How real and enduring?

2. Cooperative Security : From Individual

Security to the Politics of Shared Risk


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• Defining a new concept ?

→ Ashton Carter , William Perry and John Steinbruner

(1992): “organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear

stability and containment embodied the aspirations of the

Cold War … Cooperative security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post- Cold War

era”.

→ Gareth Evans (1994) described Cooperative Security as

tending to “connote conssultation rather than confrontation,reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than

secrecy, prevention rather than correction and

interdependence rather than unilateralism”.


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• The unwelcome “return of history”: conflict and war.

→ An unstable and dangerous world.

→ The need of a more pragmatic approach.

• How to construct a realistic and effective approach toCooperative Security?

→ We need to build a system based upon mechanisms

and institutions that have proven themselves effective

in providing relative peace, stability and prosperity.→ “Collective Security and Collective Defense” :

Lessons learnt. Looking inward or outward? Or both

ways?


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• The impact of human rights : human security

stands at the center of any real international

security system built around liberal and

democratic values.→ The furtherance and protection of the basic

freedoms of the individual.

→ Bill McSweeney : “security must make sense at

the basic level of the individual human being for

it to make sense at the international level”.

→ Gross violations of the individual security:

Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Libya etc.

3. Cooperative Security : New Elements.

A New Vision on Euro-Atlantic Security


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• The globalization of concern.

→ Renouncing the Westphalian concept of absolutesovereignty = no sovereign impunity.

→ Shared risk: the international and cooperative dimension

of security.• Promoting stability: pro-active action / engagement

outside the boundaries of the states forming theCooperative Security System (the Euro – AtlanticCommunity).

→ Instability in the areas adjacent to the territory of theEuro – Atlantic Community is a matter of seriousconcerns.

→ Failed states, terrorism and other non-conventional risks

and threats.


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• Richard Cohen (2001): Cooperative Security as a“strategic system”.

→ A nucleus of liberal democratic states (the Euro-Atlantic

Community).

→ Cooperative Security is a consequence of a “securitycommunity” : foregoing or modifying the pursuit of

individual national interests for the sake of the longer-

term common good.

→ Practical and transparent cooperation: a “securitycommunity” and a web of security; NATO and EU.

→ The Russian Challenge & the hybrid war.

4. A model of Cooperative Security : The

Four Rings


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C f i S i


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• The Summit Meeting of the Council of Europe (9October 1993).

→ Democratic security is one of the politicalcomponents of a global concept of security.

→ The approach of democratic security is part ofthe efforts to establish a new order of peace,security and stability throughout Europe.

→ Key features: pluralist and parliamentarydemocracy, indivisibility and universality ofhuman rights, the rule of law, openness in termsof political processes, social integration andsolidarity.

5. The Concept of Democratic Security

6 S i bl S i


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• Some key conditions are met:

− the rule of law;

− the protection of human rights;

− good governance (do public services function in an

equitable manner? do the ruling elites represent commoninterests equitable? etc.);

− security (risks and threats) and the democratic control ofthe security sector;

− socio-economic development (stability versus instability,equality versus inequality, growth or recession etc.);

− justice as a moral imperative.

NB: See the Clingendall Model (The Stability AssessmentFramework, 2005).

6. Sustainable Security


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SNSPA

Bucharest, 2016


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VI. National and InternationalSecurity: the world order


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• The asymmetric distribution of capabilitiesamong the units.

→ Nation-states have different possibilities to take

care of their own security.• The zero-sum game of security

→ The “haves” vs. “have nots”.

• The cooperative dimension and the

political/power conflict.

1. The Distributive Nature of Security Structures


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• Anarchy as an ordering principle of the international

system.

→ Each unit seeks to take care of all functions for itself.

→ Self-help behavior: no unit can count on others to ensure

its well-being and survival.

• The nation-state: no control on the international

environment.

→ National security policy as an instrument.

• K. Waltz : the anarchic structure of international politics is

the underlying cause of war.

→ Units are not equal in terms of power.

→ The security dilemma.

2. Anarchy and Security in the International system

3 N ti l d I t ti l S it


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• Security and the hegemonic system.

→ The distribution of power and its outcomes: the number

of poles and international security (bipolar vs. multipolar

structure).

→ Pax Romana, Pax Ecclesiae, Pax Britannica, Pax

Americana.

→ Balancing as “a universal behavioral trait” (K. Waltz).

• The distribution of power: a framework for individual

options / policies of security.

→ Concrete risks and threats.

→ Concrete opportunities and possibilities.

3. National and International Security

and the Political World Order

4 Th i t ti l di t ib ti


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• The “great transition” to a new configuration of

international relations.

→ The shift in the global power system / a new

distribution of power: emerging & resurgent players assert their individual interests.

→ The enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic

community: the new frontier = a new security

agenda.

→ The progressive shift from Western cultural,

political and economic predominance to a more

diverse international system.

4. The international power distribution

in transition


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• National and international security: stability vs. change.→ The transitional phase before multipolarity.

→ New risks and threats.

→ The increased risk of miscalculation: worst case

scenarios and self-fulfilling prophecies.

• The second phase of transition: The Euro-Atlantic

frontier.

→ The reshaping of the geopolitical map in Northern Africa

and the Middle East. The war in Syria.

→ Security in Asia-Pacific region.

→ The difficulty to manage the process: national actors,

coalitions, NATO & EU.

→ New actors: China, Turkey, Iran.

5 S it d th Gl b l E


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• The importance of political economy.

→ The global economy and power.

→ Economy and security.

• The present financial and economic crisis andsecurity.

→ A new zero-sum game?

5. Security and the Global Economy

6 Th “ ld ilit d ” d


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• The “isomorphism” between the “form of the armedforce” (M. Kaldor) and the political, economic and socialstructure.

→ The distribution of power and the “world military order”(see V. Secăreş, in “Bulletin of Peace Proposals”, Oslo,

no.4, 1981).• The “world military order” as a set of social, economic,

political, military and ideological relations within thenation-states as well as in international life = a system / aglobal configuration.

→ The global military structure as a distinct socio-politicallevel of the existing world order.

→ Generating a world pyramid of power, a system ofdomination and subordination, a network of hierarchicaldependences.

6. The “world military order” and

Security


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• The WMO components (I):

→ The military institutions.

→ Military R&D: weapons.

→ Dominant military doctrines.

→ Military alliances.

→ Global military activities.

→ Bases, troops and military facilities abroad.


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• The WMO components (II):

→ Military interventions.

→ Local armed conflicts.

→ The trade in weapons.

→ Military assistance programms.

→ The defense industries at the periphery.

→ Military regimes. NB: Security is an outcome of the international

system as a whole (political, economic and

military structures).


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SNSPA

Bucharest, 2016


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VII. International Security: theinstitutional and the regional approach


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• The history of world politics: mainly a history of interactionsamong states.

→ Their interests, capabilities and goals shape world politics.

→ Even today states remain the dominant form of politicalorganization in the world.

• However, during the last century: especially after the WW2,the supremacy of the state has been challenged.

→ World affairs are influenced by organizations transcendingnational boundaries – universal international organizations likethe UN and regional organizations like the EU – whose

members are states.→ They perform independent roles and exert global influence.

1. The institutional dimension


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→ The realist approach: anarchy and the limits ofcooperation (who is winning what?; free riders etc.).

→ The result of this evolution: a complex network ofoverlapping national memberships in transnationalassociations having an impact on the management of

international security.

N.B. See:

- the role of the UNO in developing a new dimension ofinternational security: collaborative crisis management

activities based on “consensus decision-making” in theSecurity Council.

- the global role of NATO under the mandate of theSecurity Council or based on its own decision.

- also: the security and defense policy of the EU (CSDP).


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• States and other international actors engage daily in vast numbers oforderly interactions.

→ Strategies and solutions able to organize and structure behavior,increase the payoffs of cooperation and achieve collective goods:especially security.

→ The concept of international regime.• Regimes: networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize

behavior and its effects, in a specific issue area or domain.

→ Or, sets of governing arrangements.

→ Or, principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around

which actor expectations converge in a given issue area (Keohane & Nye, 1997; Krasner, 1983).

N.B.: Keohane notes that “What these arrangements have in common isthat they are designed not to implement centralized enforcement ofarrangements, but to establish stable mutual expectations aboutothers’ patterns of behavior” (Keohane, 1984).


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• Regimes include formal and informal components, national,transnational and international components, public and private rules.

→ They have a major psychological component: policy or decisionmakers feel they should act in certain ways because they areexpected to.

→ Issues areas may be functional (wide or narrow); may be geographic;some regimes have only a few members, while some are very large.

→ Their concerns range from monetary issues, to trade issues, to themanagement of natural resources, to the control of armaments (armscontrol), to the management of power, to the management of outer-space and the seabed.

N.B.: Oran Young says “We live in a world of international regimes”(Young, 1980).

• Security: an essential common issue or public/collective good inEurope, or in some other regions, or at the world level.


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• In an international system based on the military andeconomic predominance of a hegemon, regimes areadopted in a specific way.

→ One state is able and willing to determinate and maintainthe essential rules by which relations among states are

governed.→ The hegemon not only can abrogate existing rules or

prevent the adoption of rules it opposes but can also playthe dominant role in constructing new rules.

→ Hegemony is a mechanism for helping a group to achieve

collective goods.→ This is a competitive mechanism; see the impact of

transitions: the decline of the existing hegemon and itsconsequences on international security.

2. Hegemony and regimes


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• Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft concepts.

→ K. Deutsch: conditions and processes building up asecurity community in the North Atlantic area (Deutsch,1957).

→ Common values and goals; common loyalties, similarinstitutions, rules and procedures, cooperation-communication, reciprocity, a feeling of belongingtogether.

• The new (constructivist) approach of security

communities: Adler and Barnett (1998)

→ Values and identities.

→ The transnational approach.

→ The real actors: peoples.

3. Political communities and security communities


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• The end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the

whole pattern of international security.

→ The regional level of security has become both more

autonomous and more prominent in international politics.

→ The relative autonomy of regional security constitutes a

pattern of international security radically different from

the rigid structure of superpower rivalry of the Cold War.

→ This trend is not shaped by unipolary or multipolarity;

and it is not a mere result of globalization.

4. The regional security complex theory


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• Most threats travel more easily over short distances than over longones: security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters = security complexes (Buzan and Weaver, 2003).

→ Most states are concerned primarily with capabilities and intentionsof their neighbors.

→ Security complexes may be penetrated by global powers, but theirregional dynamics have a substantial degree of autonomy.

• RSCT uses a blend of materialist (neorealist) and constructivistapproaches.

→ The importance of territoriality and the local/regional distribution of

power (avoiding concentration on the global structure).→ Focusing on the political process by which security issues get

constituted (the distribution of power and the patterns ofamity/enmity are essentially independent variables: polarity mayaffect, but it does not determine the character of security relations) .


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VIII. The global structure of security (I):

political and legal institutions,

organizations and regimes

1 Th f i f h d f h C ld W


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• The management of security is theresponsibility of a global structure / an

order of security including different

components: institutions, organizations andregimes.

• At the end of the 20th Century and the

beginning of the 21st Century we are

witnessing a transition towards a new

order of security.

1. The management of security after the end of the Cold War

2 C t d l


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2.1. The role of the existing distribution of power / thehegemonic structure and the concrete hierarchy / the

political and military structure of the internationalsystem: constraints on behavior, stability and control ofthe use of force; deterring an actor from engaging in

some actions; making international politics more predictable and reducing the likelihood of war.

→ Interactions among great powers, limiting each others’actions in their spheres.

→ Balance of power, aggregation of power / coalitions and

alliances.→ The structure of dominance and dependence.

N.B.: the impact of transition: decreasing the “tightness” and“discreteness” of the poles; instability andunpredictability and an increased risk of conflict.

2. Components and roles


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2.2. The role of the international law: a set of rules that constraints behavior.→ It is helping states to create and preserve order.

→ De Vattel (1758): “the rights which exist between nations and states andthe obligations corresponding to these rights”.

→ There are institutions and practices that make, interpret and executerules.

→ Rules of the international law promote predictability (clarifyexpectations); they are used to help coordinate behavior → important inconnection with the collective goods issues.

→ International law regulates conflict and conflict resolution.

→ Foreign policy behavior that violates international norms is less probable because of the costs entailed: fear of chaos and fear of reprisal.

→ States disregarding international law make efforts to contend that their behavior was permitted within the rules of international law.

N.B.: the impact of the “ post/Westphalian revolution” in international relations→ the obligation to protect and the right to intervene.

→ New actors, some of them disregarding international law (see roguestates, global terrorist networks)


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2.3. Security and international cooperation: international

organizations having a security dimension.

→ The charters of these organizations (rules, agreements,

resolutions and treaties) constitute many of the daily

bylaws of international interactions.

→ They are a forum, a permanent mechanism or an

intermediary for problem solving, crucial for

coordination in collective goods situations (especially

security).→ Make and administer rules on how states behave in

regard to the use of force.

3 Th UN t


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• UN: a major source of international law and themost extensive international organization systemin the contemporary world.

→ UN was largely the product of American, Britishand Soviet negotiation; it is based on results ofthe WWII and reflects the unequal distribution of

powers in the system (see the structure and roleof the Security Council).

→ It gives each of the states that was a great powerat the end of the WWII control of political andmilitary security in the UN; it reflects the specialrole of the great powers.

3. The UN system


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• The mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the UN: conflictmanagement, peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

• UN and security regimes: concerning the use of force, self-defense,arms control, self-determination and human rights.

• UN at the beginning of the 21th Century: new challenges and reform.

→ The impact of the end of the Cold War: the Resolution 678 of theSecurity Council (1990) authorizing member states “to use allnecessary means” to coerce Iraq (the coalition war)

→ The new agenda of security and the role of the Security Council ofUN (the shift of power from the General Assembly back to theSecurity Council).

→ The international dimension: actors share a common belief that all parties value mutual security and cooperation; the necessity of amultilateral approach

→ The increased role of peacekeeping missions (between 1988-1994,nearly twice more than in the previous 43 years).

→ UN: limits and constraints; resources: financial and military; the power logic and geopolitics, double standard etc.


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IX. The global structure of security (II):

NATO and the new “Cooperative

System of Security”

1 Cooperative Security: from Theory to Practice


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• A new agenda of international security: conclusions andconsequences.

→ Traditional concepts of security do not provide adequatesolutions to the current challenges of intrastate conflict andregional instability.

→ Defining security as the freedom to exercise certain values / the

absence of threat to acquired values / freedom from coercion: alarger agenda – especially Europe (EU) turned from concernabout the continued survival of the state (so called “hard”security) to an interest in economic well/being (“soft” security)and other values (see other national, transnational andenvironmental threats).

→ The present shift in the primary security perceptions of states: ashift away from defending against a major threat and towards promoting stability.

→ Concern about human condition within different states: grossviolations of the individual security of large numbers of human

beings (Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Libya etc.) have become

the direct and immediate interest of the world community.

1. Cooperative Security: from Theory to Practice


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• Cooperative Security as a new approach.→ Cooperative Security: an activity directed to improve the

environment in which states operate.

→ Cooperative Security must have at its core a nucleus of liberaldemocratic states adhering to common values: only these statescan be trusted with the protection of human rights in their widest

sense.→ Cooperative Security is the direct consequence of a security

community: states within a security community work together toaddress security threats in their immediate environment.

→ Cooperative Security means the active promotion of stability outside the boundaries of the states forming the Cooperative

Security System / addressing instability in areas adjacent to theterritory of the system, or further afield, that might threaten thesecurity of its members and international security in general.


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• Is the UN designed to carry out a full-fledged Cooperativesecurity programme?

→ Boutros-Ghali’s bold “Agenda for Peace” developed anambitious security project, trying to create the necessary militaryinstrument “to deter, dissuade and deny (D3)” (Ruggie, 1993).

→ The difficulty of reaching a consensus (great powers’ interests areoften incompatible).

→ The temptation for members (great powers) to support only those peacekeeping efforts that affect their own immediate securityinterests.

→ The UN lacks the technical, administrative and logistical toolsrequired to implement the peace-keeping agenda (Michaels,1993).

N.B.: US Presidential Decision Directive 13 prohibited contributingUS military units to a permanent stand-by force such as thatauthorized by Art. 43 of the UN Charter (Sept. 1993).

2 An emerging Cooperative Security System


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• The UN has engaged in a number of peacekeepingoperations that many would consider CooperativeSecurity efforts.

→ The UN reflects the lack of shared values and a common

purpose.→ But: Many member countries have participated in UN

multilateral peacekeeping operations.

→ The UN authorized peacekeeping operations (see Bosniaor Kosovo) realized by regional organizations: not

strictly UN operations.

→ In ’94-’95, UN began to contract out to privatemultinational corporations logistical support for its peaceoperations (in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti).

2. An emerging Cooperative Security System


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• Karel Kovanda (Czech Ambassador to the UN), 1995: “Theimportant issues are going to be taken care of by regionalorganizations … with the UN giving its blessing”.

→ Former UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali was supporting theidea that some regional bodies could play a larger role in the security

affairs of their regions.→ NATO: from Collective Defense to Cooperative Security /

reinventing NATO.

→ NATO and the debate of the ’90s: “out of area or out of job”.

→ December 1995: NATO took change of the UN of all military

operations in Bosnia Herzegovina; Operation Joint Endeavordemonstrated that NATO had a positive role to play in aCooperative Security effort.

3 The Global Security Structure and the Cooperative Security


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• R. Cohen (2001): Cooperative Security as a “strategic

system”, based on existing or newly created, strong and

resilient institutions.

→ The role of the UN and especially of the Security Council

in creating the necessary concern of the worldcommunity: “the blessing of the UN”.

→ Collective Security and mutual protection (Collective

Defense): NATO and the EU system of Euro-Atlantic

cooperation addressing hard and soft security issues.→ Promoting stability: preventing and preempting security

threats and instability.

3. The Global Security Structure and the Cooperative Security

System


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• Institutionalizing Cooperative Security.

→ Cooperative Security must be built around a strong

institutional framework.

→ NATO: a practical example of Cooperative Security / a

working model of crisis management (conflict prevention

and crisis response operations).

→ NATO and the EU cooperation and division of labor.

→ The role of OSCE.

→ EAPC, PfP, NATO – Russia and the Russian challenge;

NATO – Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue.


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• The Cooperative Security System: a Constellation of

Security solutions / arangements.

→ The formation of a new security order requires that

cooperative security arrangements be extended to other

forces and potential theaters of military engagement(Carter, Perry and Steinbruner, 1992).

→ How to engage Russia, China, Japan, ASEAN, India,

South Africa, Brazil?

→ The ultimate goal: a stable and strong Eurasian-AtlanticCooperative Security System.

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