misp_214 4..25Spinoza on the Human MindLILLI ALANENThis paper
grew out of a longer essay on Mind in the seventeenth century. As
itis now, it starts in media res, and I need to add some
context.Mind or reason was, since Antiquity, the highest human
capacitythe
powerofmoraldeliberationconstitutingtheultimateconditionforresponsibleaction,andtherebyforautonomousagency.
Itwasalso, bothinthePlatonistandtheAristotelian tradition, the
source and instrument of the highest kind
ofperfectionunderstandingthat came with the highest kind of bliss
or happiness.My concern is the transformation undergone by the
traditional conceptionof reasoninthesenseof apower for practical
deliberationandintellectualunderstandingpower whosegoodexercisewas
seenas thehighest possiblehuman perfection. While philosophy of
nature underwent radical changes duringthe seventeenth century,
this is not obviously the case for philosophy of mind ormoral
psychology. Yet the mechanistic worldviewchallengedphilosophers
torevise, or, as the case may be, break loose from inherited
conceptions of mind andits relation to the world that did not
really t in with it. Descartes, who was the rsttomeet this
challenge, prettymuchcreatedtheconceptual frameworkwithinwhich
subsequent discussions of mind and nature were conducted. The
continuitiesbetweenhis philosophy of mindandscholastic
philosophical psychology aregreater than his terminological
innovations may seem toand certainly have beentaken tosuggest. None
has shown this more thoroughly than John Carriero in hisBetween Two
Worlds. Spinoza, who by and large rejected the compromises
Des-cartes made to save traditional intuitions about mind and its
powers, developed avery different way of adjusting the ancient
ideal of reason with an innite physicalMIDWEST STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHYMidwestStudiesinPhilosophy, XXXV(2011) 2011 Copyright the
Authors. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2011 Wiley Periodicals,
Inc.4plenum in motion, or, in the Cartesian terminology he uses,
the world of mind orthinking intellect with that of extended
nature. In the process, the very concepts ofmind and agency are
thoroughly transformedbut what exactly the picture of thehuman mind
that comes out of Spinozas Ethics, or indeed, if there is such a
thing,is a matter of debate.What I will do here is to look closely
at Spinozas account of mind and reasonin the second part of the
Ethics, and discuss some of the bewildering consequencesthat have
been imputed to Spinoza.1. MIND IN NATUREUsing the famous example
with the worm in the blood, Spinoza explains, in Letter32 (to
Oldenburg), how the human body is part of and dependent on the rest
ofnature. The rst quote is from this letter:As regards (1) the
human mind, I maintain that it, too, is a part of Nature;for I hold
that (2) in nature there also exists an innite power of thinking(3)
which, in so far as it is innite, contains within itself the whole
of Natureobjectively, and whose thoughts proceed in the same manner
as does Nature,which is in fact the object of its thought.Further,
I maintain that (4) the human mind is that same power of think-ing,
not in so far as that power is innite and apprehends [percipientem]
thewhole of Nature, but (4.1) in so far as it is nite, apprehending
[percipit] thehuman body only. (5) The human mind, I maintain, is
in this way part of aninnite intellect. (Shirley, Letters 19495
[cf. Ethics E2p14p22])These startling claims deserve careful
examination. The humanminddened in E2p11 as the idea of the
actually existing human bodyis part of theinnite intellect or God,
that is of Nature considered under the attribute of
thought.Howshould this be understood?The innite intellect, being
perfect and omniscient,has true or adequate ideas of all things,
and so there must be an idea of this or thathuman that is adequate
in Gods eternal thinking. For to say that the divine powerof
thinking contains within itself the whole of nature objectively is
to say that itcontains ideas of all things there are and that these
ideas represent objectively thevery same reality that the things
represented contain actually or formally. There isa perfect match
between each idea and what it representsindeed, they are
theverysamethingandtheyfollowthesameorder of causes
consideredunderdifferentattributes(2p7).
Thehumanmind,however,doesnotknowthebodywhose idea it is adequately,
nor does it have any adequate idea of itself or its placein the
innite order of ideas (deductions) in the innite intellect
(2p252p27). Tohave adequate ideas of things requires knowing their
causes adequately (by Ia4),but the nite mind has no access to the
innite chain of causes acting on the bodywhose idea it is. The
human body is constantly interacting with and acted on byother nite
bodies, and the changes caused in it by external bodiesSpinoza
callsthem affections or imagesare at best registered as inadequate
or confusedideas in the mind.They are confused because they
represent the things causing themSpinozaontheHumanMind
5onlypartially,
astheyaffectthebodyandnotastheyareinthemselves.1Theseconfused ideas
are the basis of the rst and imperfect kind of cognition that
Spinozacalls imagination or opinion, also random experience.2Yet
the fact that the human mind, as the idea of the human body, is
part ofGods innite intellect, gives it, as we will see, surprising
resources: it instantiates,within its own limits, Gods power of
thinking, so whatever obscure and truncatedthoughts that are found
within its limited horizon, it also has the means, if not tofully
understand them, at least to make them clearer by comparing and
arrangingthem in an orderly fashion, connecting them with other
ideas (in Gods mind thatit is part of) corresponding to the true
(and necessary) order of causes in nature.3The rest of the paper
seeks to clarify the original view expressed in claims 45in the
second part of the passage quoted near the beginning of this
section. Thehuman mind seems to have a double identity as, on the
one hand, the idea of thisor that actually existing nite body,
apprehending this body only, and on the otherhand, as part of Gods
eternal intellect and innite power of thinking where thissame body
is instantiated as an adequate and complete idea. I will briey
touch onthe ensuing view of ideas and cognition, and the role of
adequate knowledge inSpinozas ethical project. I will end by
reecting on some more mundane aspects ofthe radical view of mind
that emerge from this doctrine, with its new account ofideas or
beliefs foreshadowing that of Hume.2. THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION
AND SINGULARITYAccordingto2a5,
singularthingsthatcanbeobjectsofhumanperceptionareeither bodies or
modes of thought. Neither has any substantial unity of its own
butdepend both for their being and their being understood on the
substance
whosemodestheyareandofwhoseinnitepowertheyaredeniteanddeterminatetemporal
expressions (1p25c).41. For Spinozas notion of representation, see
Michael Della Rocca, Representation and
theMind-BodyProbleminSpinoza(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 1996),
5764; DonGarrett,Representation and Misrepresentation in Spinozas
Philosophy of Mind, in Oxford Handbookof Spinoza, ed. Michael Della
Rocca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).2.
Itisrandombecauseitiswhollydeterminedbyfortuitousencountersaccordingtothecommonorderofnature
(2p40s). Yetitisofgreatimportance. Itisonlythrough randomexperience
that we know the existence of contingent things, including our own
body: The humanbody, as we feel it, exists (Hinc sequitur.Corpus
humanum, prout ipsum sentimus, existere; 2p13c).3. I will get back
to this below in Section 8, although discussing Spinozas theory of
knowl-edge and its many obscurities is beyond the scope of this
essayit is considered here only for whatit tells us about his
original conception of mind and its nature as part of Gods innite
intellect.4. So in Spinozas ontology, singular things, including
those perceived by the human mind, likethis or that particular
bodythe barking dog, the steaming bath, your impatient mood, or his
ideaof a triangleare but different modes or affections of the
attributes of God (1p14c2). Attributesare dened in 1d4 as what the
intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence.
Godconsists of innite attributes, each of which express an innite
essence (1p11) and each of
whichmustbeunderstoodthroughitself(1p10). Oftheseinniteattributes,
thehumanmindknowsonly two, thought and extension. This yields
Spinozas so-called parallelism, which, because theattributes are
conceptually independent, comes with strict explanatory dualism.
Cf. notes 18 and 24later.6
LilliAlanenInexplicatingthenatureandoriginofthehumanmindtheideaofthehumanbodySpinozadevotesalongdigressiononphysicsfollowing2p13toelucidating
the nature and condition of the nite human body that is its object.
Thishas led many commentators to think that Spinoza simply joins
those who individu-ate the human mind through the human body. I do
not think this is a very fruitfuloptionat least unless one also
thinks there is some unproblematic nonambiguousway of individuating
the body. The individuation of the human body is, for Spinoza,at
least as problematic as that of the mind since he treats both as
modes so cannotrely, in either case, on the traditional notion of
nite substantial being. Finitude, forSpinoza, is tied to
temporality and contingency. By singular thing (res singulares),5he
means a nite thing with a determinate temporal existence and a
denite degreeofcausal force.
Theconceptofsingularityatworkhereisrelativeanddenedthrough the
effects that many things concur in bringing about: if several
indivi-duals(individua) act together
incausingsimultaneouslyoneeffect, theyareconsidered, according to
2def7, all to that extent a singular thing.6Think of theconstituent
parts of a body or engine causing its movement, or what goes into
there producing the heat. Or think of singular things under the
attribute of thought,that is, particular ideas: causality here must
be understood in terms of explanatorypower. Themoreadequateideas
are, themoreeffects or consequences theyaccountfor.
Strictlyspeaking, sincethereisonlyoneinnitesubstance, thereisonly
one genuine cause of all things, the innite power of God or Nature
(1p3436)so the individuality and causal power of nite modes is
relative and a matterof more or less. Let us consider Spinozas
terminology for mental modes beforegetting back to the question of
individuation and the role played by the modes ofextension in this
context.3. PERCEPTION, IDEAS, AND OTHER MODES OF THINKINGSpinozas
use of the termthinking (cogitatio) follows Descartess in that it
is notwell dened and covers all sorts of psychological acts and
states, from concepts andideas toperceptionandsensations
(affections), andemotions (activeandpassive affects), including
desires or strivings. Yet perception or sensation havean even wider
general use in Spinoza, as when he asserts (2p12) that nothing
canhappen in the human body that is not necessarily perceived by
the human mind.The complex idea constituting the mind includes
perceptions of whatever goes onin its object, and this holds
generally for all things in nature. One consequence ofthis thought
extension parallelism seems to be not only that there are ideas of
allsingular things in nature, but also that all things are animate,
and sense or perceivealbeit in different degrees (2p13s). I will
not dwell on this extraordinary thesis or5.
ItakeindividualandsingulartobelargelyoverlappingforSpinoza.
SeeGarrett,Representation and Misrepresentation. note 5.
Contingency, again, for Spinoza, is tied to tem-porality and lack
of necessary, self-caused existence: any nite thing depending on
other externalnite and determinate causes the totality of which are
not adequately known, would in this sensebe contingent.6.
ForaclarifyingdiscussionofSpinozasviewofbodilyandmentalindividuality,
anditsproblems, see Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body
Problem, 2643.SpinozaontheHumanMind 7its interpretation here.7At
least Spinoza does not claim, to my knowledge, that allthings
including oysters and rocks think. On the contrary, he seems to
single outthinkingasacharacteristicofhumanbeing, anditisthinking,
inthisnarrowersense, that interests me here. What does Spinoza
understand by thinking and whatprecisely is the human mindthe idea
of the human bodyqua thinking thing?We have to look closely at some
of the denitions and axioms of Part Two whereSpinoza proceeds to
explain the things following from Gods essence that will leadus to
know the human mind and its highest blessedness (p. 446).Axioms 1
and 2 inform us, rst, that human nature does not involve
necessaryexistence (2a1), and second, that Man thinks (cogitat)
(2a2).8Some take think-inghere in a broad allegedly Cartesian sense
of consciousness, but I will not followthatroute(cf. note8earlier).
Thinking, presumably, mustinvolveatleastsomedegree of
understanding, which for Spinoza presupposes the capacity of
formingadequate ideas and inferring other adequate ideas from them
(cf. also TdIE II/389). I here rely on the denition 2d3 of idea as
a concept of the Mind that the Mindforms because it is a thinking
thing (res cogitans).The termconcept is said to bemore suitable
here thanperception because it seems to express an action (actio)of
the mind. Perception to the contrary indicates that the mind is
acted on by theobject so passive. Let me note in passing that
throughout Ethics Parts 3 and 4,Spinoza uses idea for the mental
counterpart of affections too, and these ideasare, by denition,
inadequate, passive perceptions. So he seems to use idea in
twosenses: idea-concepts and idea-perceptions. The human mind, in
forming ideas inthe sense of concepts is active, whereas its
perceptual ideas, that is ideas of sensoryimpressions or images
are, or at least seem to be, passively
received.ActivityoractionisdenedinPart3intermsofadequatecausationandunderstanding(3d2).
Theactivitythatcomeswiththeconceptualcapacitymustinvolve the
ability to recognize true adequate ideas, and hence to distinguish
truthfrom falsity. An idea is said in 2d4 to be adequate when it is
intrinsically true, that7. See, for example, Don Garrett,
Representation and Consciousness in Spinozas Natural-istic
TheoryoftheImagination, inInterpretingSpinoza, ed.
CharlesHuenemann(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2008), 425.
I have problems though with Garretts identication ofpower of
thinking with degrees of consciousness and his account of the
generality of representa-tion in terms of degrees of consciousness
but think it should be understood in terms of the identityof God
and Nature. From the point of view of nature as an innite whole,
whatever happens in itsminutest parts affects its thinking, so is
perceived in some sense. The difference between divinethinking and
human then is precisely this: the rst perceives everything at once,
the other onlywhataffectsthenitebodyconstitutingitsobject,
withoutperceivinghowitssuccessivelocalperceptions are connected
with the rest. Any physical affection comes with a perception of
it,
butallperceptionsarenotdistinctlyorevenclearlyavailabletothehumanmind.
SoSpinozalikeLeibniz seems committed to the idea of a continuum of
perception and awareness. I am indebtedto Peter Myrdal for helpful
discussions of this last point. For an original and interesting
reading,seeUrsulaRenz,
TheDenitionoftheHumanMindandtheNumericalDifferenceBetweenSubjects
(2P112P135),inSpinozas Ethics.ACollectiveCommentary, eds. Michael
Hampe,Ursula Renz, and Robert Schnepf (Leiden: Brill, 2011),
99118.8. So human beings are nite instantiations of Gods innite
thinking nature (God consideredunder the attribute of thought),
that is, they are ideas constrained by the nite bodies
constitutingtheir object.8 LilliAlanenis, when it is such that
considered in itself without relation to its object9it has allthe
characteristics of truth (2def4 and 2def4expl). Ideas, as we learn
later in 2p49,come with afrmations of their own (2p49), as opposed
to being passively receivedmute tablets in the mind, and conceiving
as Spinoza stresses is more than merelyreceiving and contemplating
ideas (2p49s). Afrmation, according to this doctrine,belongs to the
essence of a (true) idea. Ideas then are not merely had or
enter-tained; rather, they seem formed so as to be akin to what
Descartes calls judgments,although they do not, as Spinoza argues
in explicit opposition to Descartes, dependon any separate act of
the will. Will and intellect for Spinoza are one and the
same,thatistheyarenothingbutsingularvolitionsorideas,
andsingularvolitionsorideas are the same (2p49cd). So insofar as
thinking involves forming and afrmingideas, thinking, one might
conclude, is essentially for Spinoza judging or believing.This, it
seems to me, is also supported by the axioms that follow where
other aspectsor modes of thinking are introduced.Having asserted in
2a2 that man thinks, 2a3 suggests that ideas are basic tothinking
since there are no other modes of thought without
ideas:Therearenomodesofthinking(modi cogitandi), suchaslove,
desireorwhatever the name affects of mind can designate, unless
there is in the sameindividual the idea of the thing loved, desired
and so on. But the idea can begiven without any other mode of
thought. (2a3)Thinkingisarepresentativeaffair10: therearenomodesof
thoughtnocurrent acts of thinkingwithout an idea which is of and
afrms something of itsobject; for instance, if I am thinking of
Cephalus, my idea of Cephalus afrms thatthis horse has wings. No
mode or act of thinking comes without an idea, but, asSpinoza
explains, an idea can be given without any other mode of thinking
(2a3).Afrmation, as we saw, is not a separable mode but an
essential part of the idea, sothis suggests that the mode of
thought that an idea primarily instantiates (i.e., ajudgment or
rather belief) can be given in an individual mind without any
othermode of thinking such as those listed in 2a3, namely affects
like love, desire, etc.One wonders: Does some individual in 2a3
mean some given mode (act) ofthought or perception (my occurrent
idea of Cephalus), or does it refer to me, tothe agent or mind (the
complex idea of my body) in which it is formed and whosemode of
thought it is?119. This could be understood in terms of the notion
of idea of idea, taking the idea of the ideato be the same as the
idea but considered merely under the attribute of thought, without
regard toits (extended) object, as what Spinoza (following
Descartes here?) calls the form of thought, thatis, the actual
thinking or cognition of the idea, which comes with reexive
awareness. I do not thinkthis is the right way to go though.
Rather, the point is that an adequate idea is self-evident andcomes
with the mark of its truth in itself.10. I agree with Della Rocca
that all ideas represent but not that representation is the
essenceof mind. See Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza (NewYork:
Routledge, 2008), 90. As we have just seen,there is more to ideas
than mere representation.11. The question arises because of the
relative nature of individuality and the ambiguities ofthe term
idea as Spinoza uses it. An interesting reading of 2p11c is
defended by Ursula Renz, TheDenitionoftheHumanMind,
whochallengesusualinterpretationsbyarguingthatmensisSpinozaontheHumanMind
9In the next two axioms, the subject of sentience and perception is
referred towith a personal pronoun:(i) We feel (sentimus) a
certainbody tobe affectedinmany ways(2a4); and(ii) We do not feel
or perceive any other singular things except bodies andmodes of
thinking (2a5).This is the rst time a subject of thinking is
introduced, and it is natural tothink of we here as referring to
the mind considered as the patient subject toexternally caused
sensory perceptions. If the human mind is the idea of the
humanbody, this idea, or rather the collection of ideas
constituting it at any given
moment,isshapedbytheaffectionsofthebodywhoseideaitis.
AssubjecttopassionsorpassiveaffectsthatareasubclassofaffectionsSpinozastermforsenseimpressionsweareconditionedbyexternalcausesactingonourbodyanditssensory
organs. The account given of the passive affects in Part Three ends
with thisvivid picture of our predicament: we are driven about in
many ways by externalcauses, and like waves on the sea, driven by
contrary winds, we toss about, notknowing our outcome and fate
(3p59s).Is this to say that weour mindsare personal subjects
primarily qua sen-tient and passionate, when most dependent on
external circumstances? Are wenot also epistemic subjects striving
to form distinct ideas of the objects or causes
oftheaffectionsandpassionstossingusabout?Spinozassalvationprojectclearlyrequires
this: that we, who are subject to our passive affects, also have
the powerto as it were rise above them to think and reason about
their causes and the lawsgoverning them.All affections of the body
are represented as ideas in the mind, but they arenot all strong
enough to be distinctly perceived within that mind, that is, their
ideasarenotstrongorclearenoughtobeindividuallyperceivedbythemindthatisaffectedbythem.
Theideasofaffections,moreover,involveideasthatarenotimmediately
attended to. For instance, they involve what Spinoza calls
commonnotions (2 p40s1) that are always adequate and serve as the
tools of reason thatalone can set us free from the bondage of
passions. Qua common these notions areequally in the part and the
whole, so are as it were at hand at all times in the humanmind too,
without, however, being the objects of the thoughts currently
occupyingit. Thepointof2a3maythenbethattheindividual
mindcontainsmanyideasthat are not objects of its current thoughts
or attention. But if they are not attendedmostly used by Spinoza
with reference to the human mind, and that the idea of the human
bodythat constitutes the human mind is, for Spinoza, the individual
singular subject rather than an ideainGodsintellect.Itseemstomethat
menscanbeusedbySpinozaforanyideaofanitedeterminate thing insofar as
it perceives (or is perceived by God). He often does not
distinguishbetween reason and intellect when talking of the human
mind (e.g., 5pref), but clearly, the humanmind, insofar as it
understands, that is, uses the intellect, is part of Gods innite
intellect (see e.g.5p39s40c). In 5p40c, Spinoza states that the
intellect is the eternal part of the (human) mind andthat it is
through the intellect alone that we are said to be active, and
5p40s that our mind, in sofarasitunderstands,isaneternal
modeofthinkingdeterminedbyanothereternal modeofthinking, and this
again by another, and so on ad innitum, with the result that they
all togetherconstitute the eternal and innite intellect of God.10
LilliAlanentoo (actually thought of), in what sense would they be
given? Given to Godsintellect of which the idea constituting the
human mind is a part perhaps?Part of the difculty here has to do
with the lack of clarity concerning thesubject of representation:
who is doing the thinking, afrming, judging or believ-ing? The
complex idea of the human body and of whatever it contains is at
all timesrepresented in Gods intellect together with the innitely
many other ideas formedby the innite power of thinking. But are we
not supposed to think of this idea ofthe human body as being also
an individual subject representing to itself at
leastsomeoftheideasthatconstituteitasubjectofwhompsychological
actsarepredicated and who is, moreover, an agent cause of its
actions? What does Spinozamean by individual in stating in the
explanation of 2a3 that an idea can be givenwithout there being in
the same individual any other modes of thought?Spinozasterm
modeofthinking coversbothwhatDescartescalledtheact or operation of
thought and the object of thinking; however, this
distinctionbetween idea in the sense of mode or psychological act
and idea in the sense of theobject or logical content of the act
(made by Descartes inAT 7 8 andAT 7 37) doeslittle work for Spinoza
(e.g., 2p11d). As modes, ideas are modications of Godsthinking
nature and any singular thoughts, that is, your thought of the
upcomingbreak and my idea of a winged horse are modes expressing
the nature of God indenite and determinate ways (2p1d). So even if
Idea in 2a3 and 2 p11d mayecho Descartess idea in the strict
sensewhat Descartes also calls idea takenobjectively2a3 makes it
clear that thoughts for Spinoza of whatever kind alwaysinvolve
ideas taken objectively. 2p11d argues that the idea is prior in
nature, sothat when it is given, the other modes (to which the idea
is prior in nature) mustbe given in the same individual. As I
understand it, idea as object of thought andidea as act, form one
individual or indivisible mode together.12Yet they can
bedistinguishedbyadistinctionofreasonorformaldistinction: theycan,
thus, beconceived separately, although they cannot actually exist
apart.For an idea to be given then, I surmise, is for it to be the
object of an actualthought-act.
WhenSpinozain2a3saysthatanideacanbegivenwithouttherebeing any other
mode of thought, all he means, since he also holds that ideas
alwayscome with afrmations, is that itthe ideacan occur (affect a
mind) without anyothermodesofthinking, andthattheseothermodes,
forexample, love, desire,sensing, or perceiving, whatever else they
do, presuppose an idea afrming some-thing about the thing thought
of (loved, desired, sensed). Because ideas in them-selves involve
afrmations, no further act or mode of thought is required for
anidea to be given in Gods intellect or in the human mind.13This
leads us over to the12. The Dutch translation, Curley notes, reads:
the other modes [ . . . ] must constitute
oneandthesamethingwiththeidea (EdwinCurley, ed., TheCollected
WorksofSpinoza, vol.
1[Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1985],456n27).Foradifferentreadingofthis,seeUrsula
Renz, The Denition of the Human Mind.13. In 2p43s, Spinoza says
explicitly that ideas are not dumb things like pictures on a
tabletbut modes of thinking, for example, in the case of a true
idea, the very act of understanding. Sinceall ideas, qua
representations, already come with afrmations of their ownthere
does not seemto be any room for considering ideas apart from the
activity of conceiving, that is, afrmingor asthe case may be,
denying them. Descartess version of the act-object distinction,
therefore, does noSpinozaontheHumanMind 11question of the reality
or being of ideas and Spinozas use of another distinctionand pair
of scholastic terms that he inherits from Descartes: formal and
objectivebeing or reality.4. THE FORMAL REALITY OF THINKINGReality
or being and perfection, as Spinoza denes these terms, are the same
thing(2d6). Themorethingsamindcanthinkabout,
themorerealityorperfectionweconceiveittohave(2p1s),
whichItaketomeanthemoreofGodsinniteattributes or essences the mind
thereby instantiates. Gods power is unlimited: Godcanthink
innitethingsininnitewaysGod canformtheideaofhisownessence and of
everything that necessarily follows from it. Gods power of
think-ing, moreover, is the same as his power of making: Gods ideas
and their objectscome together.14Modern philosophers tend to regard
extended material nature as ontologi-cally and explanatorily
primary with respect to its idea or to the ideas of any
thingswhatsoever. But this is not so for Spinoza. The nature of the
mind, as the idea of thebody, cannot be explained through the
nature of the body whose idea it is, and
thisholdsgenerallyforallideas(see2p32p8).
Farfrombeingsupervenientonthephysical, the mental is a
self-contained expression of the whole of nature which
canbeunderstoodonlythroughitself, forexample,
throughotherideasthatcanbeconceived only through the attribute of
thought. The mental is nature consideredunder the attribute of
thoughtnot an aspect of nature, and thoughts are individu-ated
holistically by their place within the pattern or network of ideas
where theywork for Spinoza. I nd Margaret Wilsons comment on 2p5
misleading here: the formal being ofan idea is not really distinct
from its objective being. See Margaret Wilson, Spinozas Theory
ofKnowledge, in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett
(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996), 96. Consider also
4p8s (and 2p22) where Spinoza talks of the cognition ofgood and
evil as identical to the idea of pleasure or pain by which we are
affected insofar as we areconscious of it. The idea of some thing
affecting me with, say pleasure, is not really distinct from
thepleasure, but is said to be united with it in the same way as
the mind is with the body. My idea ofsome thing as good is merely
rationally distinct from the emotion by which it affects me.If
Spinozas account of ideas is to be understood in this way, a puzzle
arises concerning theproject of curing the passions by transforming
passive affects into active ones. 5p3 tells us that apassive
emotionceases tobe a passive emotionas soonas we forma clear
anddistinct idea of it,and5p3d that the clear and distinct idea of
the emotion so formed is distinguishable only in conceptfrom the
emotion is so far as the latter is related only to the mind. 2p21s
is invoked here. There,Spinoza introduces the idea of the mind,
that is,the idea of the idea,whichis one andthe same withthe idea,
just as the idea is identical to the body but conceived under the
attribute of thought. Hewrites: For in fact the idea of the
mindthat is, the idea of an ideais nothing other than the
form(forma) of the idea in so far as the idea is considered as a
mode of thinking without relation to itsobject(2p21s). Presumably,
the adequate knowledge of the idea of the affect (its causes),
having theidea of the affectthat is, the affect considered as a
mode of mind, as its object, differs from it onlyconceptually or by
a distinction of reason. The adequate idea replaces the inadequate
one, and withit transforms the earlier passive affect intoanactive
one. But this leaves us witha mystery concerningthe identity of the
idea of the original affect, whichseemedtobe contingent onits
confusionas a stateof mind. Rather than being transformed into
activity, the passive affect has ceased to be.14. See the
explication in 2p7s about the formal reality of the idea of this
circle and its beingqua mode of extension.12 LilliAlanenactually
occur, through the other ideas that cause them and that they cause.
Thevery being of the mind, and thereby also its individuality,
depends on the context ofother ideas or modes of thinking within
which it is given or apprehended. Its beingis being perceived or
understood, and it cannot be perceived or understood
apartfromperceiving/understandingalso(atleastsomeof)itscausesandeffects,
forexample, the ideas from which it follows and that it in its turn
generates.Nature considered under the attribute of extension is
likewise a self-contained explanatory whole. The physical does not
supervene on the mental anymorethanthementalonthephysical.
Bothmentalaswellasextendedmodessupervene, if one wishes to use this
term, on the innite substance whose attributesthey are modication
of and that constitute their being or reality.Spinozas brand of
power-monism or identity theory is, thus, very differentfrom more
recent (twentieth-century) identity theories.15What he offers is
theideaof onesubstanceexpressedindifferent ways,inmodesthat
comeintwoirreducible kinds, without any independent access to the
being or essence of thesubstance they express apart from the two
attributes under which we can conceiveit (1def3 and 4).16So,
although any given mode of thought expresses the very
samerealityasitscorrespondingmodeextension,
becauseitisexpresseddifferentlynothing of what goes on in the one,
say a human mind, can be apprehended, or afortiori explained by
what goes on in the other, the human body.17This has very15. The
formal being of ideas is the same being as that of the things whose
ideas they are,though conceived in a different way, through
distinct and independent attributes (2p56). I differhere from
Margaret Wilson who seems to take the formal being of ideas
mentioned in 2p5 in thesense of mode of thought without relation to
its objective content (Wilson, Spinozas Theory ofKnowledge, 96). I
do not see what it would be to consider ideas as mere modes or acts
of thoughtindependently of their object, that is, what it would be
to consider their formal reality in that way.Formal and objective
beings for Spinoza are identical, distinct merely through reason.
Cf. note 4and 14 earlier.16. These attributes, moreover, have
nothing in common apart from expressing, in differentandindependent
ways, oneandthesamesubstance(1p2). Eachof themmust
beconceivedthrough itself, as must the order and connections of
their modes (1p10d).17. Spinoza summarizes the consequence of this
doctrine as follows: Hence, so long as thingsare considered as
modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of
nature, or theconnection of causes, through the attribute of
Thought alone. And insofar as they are consideredas modes of
Extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained
through the attributeof Extension alone (E2p7scol 2 gp. 90,
452).Objective reality or being, as I understandSpinozas use of it,
is the being of the thing qua objectof thought. See, for example,
1p30d, 2p7d and TEI, 3334, Curley, 17; Short Treatise, Appendix
2,Curley 153. Cf. also Spinozas explication of Descartess use of
the term in DPP, Part 1, A4, Curley,243 and A9 Curley, 2435, and
Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, chap. 2, Curley, 304.Any
actually existing (formally real) singular idea or mode of thought
is caused by God as athinking thing not insofar as he is innite or
absolutely, but by another singular idea (inGods innitemind), that
is, by Godin so far as he is considered as affected by another
denite mode of thinking,which in its turn is caused by another and
so on ad innitum (2p9d). But there are real difcultieshere. Spinoza
speaks of ideas of things or their individual essences following
necessarily from theidea of Gods essence, and also describes the
order and connection of ideas as the same as the orderand
connection of things (2p7). Suppose we knew the laws of nature and
the orderof causes connecting natural things, andfurthermore that
these causes couldbe modeled,for example, on the notion of the
impact of one body on another governed by universal laws ofmotion.
If the connections between ideas could, analogously, be thought of
in terms of logical orSpinozaontheHumanMind 13interesting
consequences for the question of the nature (5) and individuation
ofthe human mind (6).5. THE VERY BEING OF THE HUMAN
MINDTheessenceof ahumanbeingaccordingto2p10cis
constitutedbydenitemodicationsoftheattributesofGod. Since,
torecapitulate, theintellectcon-ceives two attributes, each of
which constitutes the essence of a substance (1def4),there are
these two distinct and independent ways that the essence of a
particularhumanbeingcanbeexpressed(orconceived)throughthinkingandthroughextension.
Theyaremutuallyindependentmanifestationsorexpressionsofthesame
being or power, and in this sense they are identical. The mind as
the idea ofthe body is inseparable from it logically or
semantically, as well as metaphysicallyand actually, yet, since the
mind qua thinking and the body qua extended belong toseparate
conceptual categories, the modes of mind cannot be explained
throughmodes of extension or vice versa.Theimportant
2p11referredtoearlier tells us thattherst
thingthatconstitutestheactual being(actualeesse)of
thehumanmindistheideaofa singular thing which actually exists
(2p11). The demonstration argues that theessence of man consists of
modes of certain attributes of God, more precisely,referring to
2a2, by modes of thinking. Of these modes of thinking, the idea, by
2a3,is prior in nature. So the idea of this or that actually
existing nite singular thingis the rst thing that constitutes the
actual being of a human mind
(2p11dem).Thehumanmindisessentiallyanidea, aninstanceofactual
ongoingthinking.Ideas are individuated holistically, so the very
being or esse of this idea depends onwhatever other ideas or modes
of thinking it is caused by and causes (cf. 2p7s).Note that Spinoza
is not concerned here with the eternal, formal essence ofthe human
mindso not with an adequate idea of the human body as an object
ofGods eternal thinking. An adequate idea of the human body would
have to besome kind of complete notion involving the innite chain
of causes acting on it andeffects that it causes. The idea
constituting the actual being of this or that humanmind is not an
adequate idea, even though Spinoza in 2p11c goes on to infer
fromthe demonstration of 2p11 that the human mind is part of the
innite intellect ofGod. Theactual beingofthehumanmindmay,
presumably, bethoughtofbyGods innite intellect eternally, so is, in
this sense, part of Gods eternal essencewho knows [ . . . ]. Yet
even so, it is nothing over and above this changing collectionof
contingent ideas of affectionsideas afrming the existence of their
particularobjects, perceived more or less inadequately, in more or
less partial ways. Spinozawrites: when we say that the human mind
perceives this or that, we are saying[ . . . ] that God [ . . . ]
in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human
mindmathematical deductions, it would be tempting to conclude that
the order of mechanical causesis simply convertible intothat of
logical deductions of ideas.Yet Spinoza gives noclues as
tohowthatcould be or how such a conversion could be worked out, nor
I gather, is it important, if one wants torespect his explanatory
or conceptual dualism. See also Lilli Alanen, The Metaphysics of
Affects:The Unbearable Reality of Confusion, in The Oxford Handbook
of Spinoza, ed. Michael DellaRocca (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, forthcoming).14 LilliAlanenhas this or that idea (2p11c).
God qua thinking constitutes the being or essenceof the human
mindnotqua thinking absolutely and adequately butqua beingaffected
by the particular confused ideas of the denite and determinate
currentaffectionsof thehumanbody,perceivedwiththeirpartial
causes,that is,theircauses as apprehended from its limited point of
view. Spinoza himself asks at theend of 2p11s the reader to proceed
slowly and postpone judgment until they haveread to the end. I am
not sure it becomes much clearer in the end. It is good toremember
though that all talk of the human mind, what it does or what it
suffers,henceforth refers to God not only in so far as he has the
idea of the human mind,but also considered as affected by the idea
of the object, that is, has ideas of theaffections of the human
body (2p12d). It is only through these inadequate ideas
ofthelocalaffectionsofthehumanbodythatGodhastheideaof(cognizes)theactual
being of the human mind and constitutes its essence. What God
cognizes inthis way is said to be cognized or perceived by the
human mind (2p12d).Should one conclude then that the human mind
really has no being or powerof its ownthat whatever power or
activity it instantiates in thinking belongs
nottothisminditselfbuttotheinniteintellectinsofarasithasthisidea,
thatis,insofar as it is considered from the restricted perspective
of the ideas of the currentaffections of the body whose idea it is?
This, indeed, seems to follow, but it need
notmeanthattheactuallyexistinghumanmindiswithoutpowerithastheverypower
that Gods cognition of its actual being and affections involves.
God can beconsideredintwoways: ontheonehand, Godor
naturecanbeconsideredselectively from a determinate point of view,
as cognizing or having the idea ofthis particular actually existing
human mind together with certain other ideas ofnite things
affecting it (2p11c). On the other hand, God can be regarded from
theperspective of eternity, and here, the idea of the human body is
an integral part ofthe innite order of adequate ideas in Gods
intellect. The human mindthat is,the idea of the human body with
its affectionsseems to have no actual being ofits own in this wider
perspective.18As I understand this, it would therefore be
misleading to say that the humanmind as such is a part of Gods
eternal intellect, taking Gods intellect to be
aninnitepowerofunderstanding.
Thehumanmindisacollectionofinadequateideas, which as such do not
belong to the divine understanding except insofar asthis
understanding is limited to a contingent selection of obscure,
inadequate andpartial ideas of the passing and constantly changing
affections of the human body(cf. earlier note 12).One of the
problems I have always had with this passage is to understandhow
the singular mind as a mere mode could move from the limited
perspective setbyits naturetotheabsoluteperspectiveof
theinnitesubstanceinthewayacquiring the view from eternity
presuppose. This kind of move seems required bythe salvation
project of Part 5, and it would be tantamount to moving from what
is18. One could speculate that Gods idea of the human mind
considered this way with (some)of the external causes of its
affections is here, in 2p11, opposed to Gods idea of the nature of
thehuman mind as it is in itself, understanding all its changes
internally as it were, as changes in its orits bodys own power qua
individual (formal) essence owing from Gods innite nature. See
1p16and E5p29s, and 2p45s and 2p24c.SpinozaontheHumanMind 15not a
real subject or agent of thinking to what is one. The move is from
a niteand fairly limited set of ideas to an innite set. Such a move
seems to take placewhenever the nite mind entrapped within its
limited horizon succeeds in formingadequate ideas and, through
them, to transcend its own limits. Part 5 of the
Ethicsfamouslyholdsout
thepromisefornitemindstoseethingsfromthislargerperspectivethat of
eternity or innitude. The promise is grounded in their
being,quamodesorideas,partsofthatinniteintellect,sharingmanythingswithitthrough
which they can reach as it were beyond themselves, beyond the
perspec-tive of the nite body whose ideas they are. The human mind,
in understanding orthinking adequately, becomes an active part of
the divine intellect (5p40,s,c). Thedifculty vanishes when
considering that there is only this one power or subject ofthought,
God, consideredas perceiving fromtwodifferent perspectives.
Theeternal intellect takes on the limited temporal perspective
conditioned by the ideasof the affections of this or that actually
existing body. This may solve the problemon a theoretical level,
but it leaves us with a counterintuitive and pretty obscureidea of
what kinds of beings human minds are. Once the perspective changes
fromthe human mind to that of Gods own essence, it seems that
whatever identity thehuman mind had as a nite being is dissolved
into the whole of which it is a part.What is the role played by the
body whose idea it is here? Does it have any identityof its own,
and how does that matter for the mind?6. THE BODY AND ITS
IDENTITYAs the idea of an actual human body, which is a complex
thing, the human mind isa collection of more and less inadequate
ideas of all the changing parts of the body,their transient states
and their causes. Ideas, as we already saw, are said to
differamongthemselvesasdotheirobjects:
themoreperfectionorrealitythebodycontains, the more perfection or
reality does its idea possess (E2p13s). Bodies arehere individuated
by the quantity of motion, and the rest and the speed of
theirmotions, which depend on the motions of other individual
bodies acting on them(2p13lem1and3)andtheinnitechainof
causesproducingthem. Compositebodies like the human body are
distinguished through some certain ratio of motionand rest among
their parts, which constitutes their form (forma) or nature.
Theirnatureispreservedaslongasthisproportionofmotionandrestispreserved(2p13lem47).19When
this proportion changes, as Spinoza explains in 4p39s, thebody can
be said to die, even when its external appearance and movements
mayremain the same. The Spanish poet who through an accident lost
his memory andbecameunabletorecognizehisworkashisown,
wasasgoodasdeadonthiscriterion: his personality had been destroyed
by the change in the proportion ofmotion and rest in his body (and
brain) that determined its essential dynamic orfunctional
organization. Not only had he lost the creative power of his mind
that19. I agreewithMartinLinthat theratioinquestioncannot
beanysimplenumericalproportion and should be understood more like a
general plan or pattern of dynamic organiza-tion of the individual
body persisting over time. That plan can still have a mathematical
expres-sion. See Martin Lin, Memory and Personal Identity in
Spinoza, Canadian Journal of Philosophy35 (2005): 24368.16
LilliAlanenhadenabledhimtoinventthestoriesandtragedieshewrote,
buthecouldnolonger believe that he was their author. The collection
of ideas that constituted
hismindandtheirinterrelationshadbeenalteredby,
orratherintandemwiththedamage caused by the accident to his body,
thus impairing his power of thinkingand acting.7. STRIVING TO
PERSIST IN ONES BEINGThisbringsusnallytoacrucial
thesisinSpinozasaccount of identity: eachthingeach singular modehas
its characteristic or essential power or striving topersist in its
own being (quantum potest et in se est, in suo esse perseverare
conatur)(3p6d). This power by which it perseveres, conatus, is said
to be the actual essenceof the thing itself (3p67d).But the same
question can be raised again: whose power, what power are wetalking
about? Qua part of the innite intellect, the human mind partakes in
itsinnite power of thinking that it expresses in nite and
determinate ways (cf. 3p6d).The divine power of thinking or
reasoning as expressed in the nite mind, however,is limited. It is
limited to the set of ideas it nds in itselfthat is, to ideas of
its bodyand its affections. The divine intellect is innite as is
the nature that constitutes itsobject: itspowerof
thinkingcorrespondstotheinnitepowerof nature. Theunbounded power of
Gods intellect expresses the unbounded power of the innitenature
considered through the attribute of thought, and it is
characterized by
theorderandadequacyofitsideaswhichreecttheobjective20modalstructureofnature.
The power of thinking in a nite human mind, correspondingly, reects
thelimited power of persevering of the nite actually existing body
whose idea it is andwhose being it expresses. The more things a
nite body can dothat is, the moreeffects it contributes to produce
whenever external things concur with its strivingthe greater is the
power of its mind. This power, as the example with the Spanishpoet
indicates, can express itself in various, more or less creative and
subtle ways.Some complex bodies (or minds) produce poems, cupcakes,
works of art, space-ships, or destructive explosions; others, for
example, windmills, stones, or tornadoes,cause motions or
resistance tomotion. The power of thinking or reasoning,however,
cannotitselfbemeasuredinquantitativeterms. Whatiscrucial
here,presumably, is the deductive order and connection of the ideas
in a mind, the waysthey entail each other and hook up with the
innite system of adequate ideas inGods mind. This means that the
power of thinking of the human mind, which, aswe will see, is its
power of activity, can only be measured by the order and adequacyof
its ideas, the degree to which these ideas correspond to or express
the objectiveorder of things.Spinoza does speak of action, agency,
and freedom in referring to the humanmind, but since action in the
strict sense is tied to adequate causation and under-standing, the
notions of action and agency must be understood in terms
different20. I use objective here in the sense Spinoza uses it,
where objective and formal coincide, soit turns out to be not
unrelated to modern uses of the term.SpinozaontheHumanMind 17from
the usual, which presupposes ends and nal causes. Indeed, these
terms areredened: What is called nal cause is nothing but human
appetite in so far as itis considered as the origin or rst cause of
some thing,21and likewise by the endfor the sake of which we do
something, Spinoza means the same appetite (4def7).What we desire
or strive for depends on our own power to persist and how it
isaffected by external things. Human power (potentia), which is the
same as virtue(virtus), is mans very essence or nature in so far as
he has the power to
bringaboutthatwhichcanbeunderstoodthroughhisownnature
(4def8and3p7).Sincethehumanmindisdependentontheexternalcausessustainingthebodywhose
idea it is, whatever power to act it has on its own must be very
limited.22Inthestrongorabsolutesenseofaction,
weareactiveonlyinadequatereasoningandunderstanding(intellectus)(4p52d,
5p40c,s). Butonemayasktowhat extentwe can be active in that sense?
For if acting is dened as adequateunderstanding,
andthisdependsonadequateideasinthesingularminds, whatreason is
there to think that the power of producing or conceiving them
depends
onthatminditselfandnotonGodsinnitepowerwhoseimperfectinstantiationsthey
are?8. THE GRADES OF COGNITION AND THE ORDEROF THE INTELLECTSpinoza
explains in a letter (to G. H. Schuller) that the human mind can
acquireknowledgeonlyof thosethings whichtheideaof
theactuallyexistingbodyinvolves, or which can be inferred from this
idea.2321. Causa autem, quae nalis dicitur, nihil est praeter ipsum
humanam appetitum, quatenus isalicujus rei veluti principium seu
causa primaria consideratur (4pref).22. Wearesaidto
actwhensomethinghappens, inusoroutsideus, whereofwearetheadequate
cause, and, conversely, we are passive or acted on when something
happens in us, orsomething follows from our nature, of which we are
only a partial cause (E3Def 2). There is, itseems, nothing we do as
parts of nature that can be conceived independently of other parts
(4p2d),so whatever we do, we are merely partial causes of our
actions.Spinoza, it is true, also seems to useactionin a relative
and weaker sense (e.g., in writing thatwe are dreamers in thinking
that we are free causes of our action). Although we can cause
moreeffects in extended nature than oysters or tornadoes dowe can,
it seems, destroy all life on theplanet if we so wishour activity
is at best partial and relativea matter of more or less, andalways
dependent on the external causes concurring with our power. For
discussion of this, see LilliAlanen, Spinoza on Passions and
Self-Knowledge: The Case of Pride, in Emotion and Reason inMedieval
and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Lisa Shapiro and Martin Pickav
(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, forthcoming), sect. 1, and the
literature there referred to.23. He summarizes the argument as
follows:For the potency (power) of a thing is dened solely by its
essence (Prop. 7 Part III, Ethics);however, theessenceofmind(Prop.
13, II)consistssolelyinitsbeingtheideaofanactuallyexisting body,
and therefore the minds potency of understanding extends only as
far as that whichthis idea of the body contains within itself, or
which follows therefrom [ . . . ]. Now, this idea of thebody
involves and expresses no other attributes of God than Extension
and Thought [ . . . ] Now(by Prop.10, I) no other attribute of God
can be inferred or conceived from these two attributes,or from
their affections. So I conclude that the human mind can attain
knowledge of no otherattribute of God that these two, which was the
point at issue (Letter 64, Shirleys translation ofEthics, 252).
Compare the obscure remarks from TdEI7273:18 LilliAlanenThe
actually existing human body is the primary object of perception of
thehuman mind. It is not easy to understand this claim, if one
takes perception in anyordinary sense of representation, for the
body and the mind are the same thingconceived under distinct
attributes. Whatever thought occurs in the human mind is,by the
identity thesis, some affection of the human body. But does it then
followthatwhateverthehumanmindthinksofissomethinginitsbody?
Thisseemsimplausible, when I think of a minaret in some distant
mid-eastern town, or Platosargument for immortality, or the hens in
my neighbors backyard, or your injury,these thoughts are not
representing or of states of my body, not even of states ofmy body
representing these things. One way of understanding it perhaps is
thatwhateverwecanthinkofisbywayofideasofimpressionsinthebodywhosesensory
organs are affected, directly or indirectly by association, by the
externalthing represented.24In his account of cognition offered at
the end of Part 2, Spinoza explains thatthere are certain things
common to all things and that are equally in the parts inthewhole.
Theyaregeneral, thatis, theydonotconstitutetheessenceofanysingular
thing, since they pertain to all things equally (2p37). Moreover,
they canonly be conceived adequately (e2p38c). Since they are
instantiated in the humanbody too, their ideas or notions are in
the human mind. These common
notions,whicharealwaysadequateandfromwhichonlyadequateideascanfollow,
areSpinozas version of the ancient idea of sparks of reason: they
are the basis ofour reasoning processes (2p40s). Examples of these
are ideas of properties sharedby all extended bodies like
extension, motion, rest, and what follows from these(2p37 and
2lemma).Anyideaof affections of thehumanbody,
whichareexternallycausedimages or congurations imprinted in the uid
parts of the extended body, involvethese notions. Spinoza contrasts
them to other, inadequate and confused,
generalideasorso-calleduniversals,
whichareformedonthebasisofimagesthataredifferent and vary with our
individual sensory experience, and how our body
hasbeenaffectedinits(asit
were)randomencounterswithotherthings.25Sense(73) It only remains,
then, to ask by what power our mind can formthese [simple ideas]
and howfar this power extends. For once this is discovered, we
shall easily see the highest knowledge wecan reach. It is certain
that this power does not extend to innity. For when we afrm of a
thingsomething not contained in the concept we form of it, that
indicates a defect of our perception,or that we have thoughts, or
ideas, which are, as it were, mutilated and maimed. For we saw
thatthe motion of a semicircle is false when it is in the mind in
isolation, but true if it is joined to theconcept of a sphere, or
to the concept of some cause determining such a motion. But if it
isasit seems at rstof the nature of a thinking being to form true,
or adequate, thoughts, it is certainthat inadequate ideas arise in
us only fromthe fact that we are a part of a thinking being, of
whichsome thoughts wholly constitute our mind, while others do so
only in part. (my italics; TdEI73)Here, as in the following
passage, truth is related to simplicity (cf. the second part of the
rst quoteto Oldenburg).24. But see Della Rocca, Representation and
the Mind-Body Problem.25. Nothing happens randomly in Spinozas
universe but that sensory ideas appear to occurrandomly in the
singular mind that has no access to all their causes. He writes
inTdEI: (84) In thisway, then, we have distinguished between a true
idea and other perceptions, and shown that thectitious, thefalse,
andtheother ideas havetheir originintheimagination, i.e.,
incertainSpinozaontheHumanMind 19experience is always of singular
things acting on the senses, and no two sensoryimpressions are ever
exactly the same since they depend on the (constantly chang-ing)
condition of the body itself as much as that of the things that
happen to affectit. While the common notions originate from the
mind itself, that is, from its clearand distinct ideas of
properties that all invariably bodies share, ideas of
affectionsdependonmanydifferent successivecauses that arenot
distinctlyperceivedorgrasped. Theideasofthethingsaffectingusare,
therefore, unavoidablycon-fused, subjective and partial, and so are
any general ideas formed on their basis(2p40 s1).26The rst of
Spinozas three main kinds of cognition27is the lowest or
mostimperfect and is called cognition through casual experience
(experientiavaga).28It is the ordinary sensory experience we rely
on in our daily affairs and use as
astartingpointforanyknowledgeofsingularthings,
includingscienceofnature.As dened in the Ethics, it operates with
the inadequate universal notionsderivedfromindividual
objectspresentedtousthroughthesensesinafrag-mentaryandconfusedmannerwithoutanyintellectual
order(persensusmuti-late, confuse, et sine ordine ad intellectum
repraesentatis). Perceptions here followone another according to
what 2p29c refers to as the common order of nature,where the mind
is being determined externallynamely by the fortuitous run
ofcircumstancesto regard this or that (2p29s). Not only are the
ideas, thus, per-ceived inadequate and confused; their occurrence
depends also on habitual asso-ciations between ideas or images and
signs, and so is contingent on our individualhistories
andexperience(2p18s). Theorder inwhichideas arelinkedonthislevelthe
common order of natureis a matter of brute or random encountersand
associations, so it varies fromone person to another. When the
mindperceives things in this way, it typically perceives
themwithout perceivingtheircauses. Itsaffections, Spinozasays,
arelikeconclusionswithout premises(2p28s) and cannot be explained
by or derived from the ideas they happen to belinkedto.Rational
cognition to the contrary is that by which the mind perceives
thingsthrough their rst causes, and which is the same in all men
(e2p18s). It is (or alignswith) the order of the intellectNatures
true objective order. Here, the mind isdetermined internally,
through its regarding several things at the same time, tounderstand
their agreement, their differences and their oppositions. For
wheneversensations that are fortuitous, and (as it were)
disconnected; since they do not arise from the verypower of the
mind, but from external causes, as the body (whether waking or
dreaming) receivesvarious motions.26. Examples of universals or
abstract notions formed in this way are man,being,thing(E2p40s1).
Elsewhere, hementionsthoseof good, bad, order, confusion, hot,
cold,beauty, ugliness, right, and wrong as formed in similar ways,
based on what happens toplease or be useful to us. See 1App.27. I
here ignore the distinction between two different sorts of
knowledge from experiencesee TdIE 19 812 and Ep40.28.
PossiblywithreferencetoBacons notionof randomexperience,
althoughthetermvagus was used by other authors in the peripatetic
tradition known by Spinoza in connectionwith the knowledge of
singular things and universals. SeeAlan Gabbey, Spinozas Natural
Scienceand Methodology, in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed.
Garrett, 14291, 172 ff.20 LilliAlanenit is conditioned internally
in this or another way, then it sees things clearly anddistinctly [
. . . ] (2p29s).29Spinozas remarks onthetwokinds of
adequatecognition, obtainedbyreasonthroughcommonnotions or
byintuitionof formal essences, areverysummary. Adequate ideas are
true and that they are true is evident: one cannot,asserts Spinoza,
have a true idea without, at the same time, knowing that it is
true(2p43. cf. TdIE 35). The second and third kind of cognition
both yield truth andteach us to distinguish truth from
falsity.30How then do they differ? The way
hecontraststhemsuggeststhatreasonisdiscursiveandconcernsgeneralcommonproperties
of things, while intuition is some kind of immediate intellectual
graspthrough which singular essences are seen as they are and in
their relation to Godsor Natures formal essence of which they are
part (cf. Wilson, Spinozas Theory ofKnowledge, 118).The rst kind of
cognitionopinion or imaginationis the origin of falsityand
confusion, yet it is noteworthy that it also contains some
(partial) truth, andeven in some cases certainty. For instance,
that we will die is something we learnonly through experience, yet
there is no doubt about it. Experience is of things intemporal
duration, and opinion, that is, beliefs formed on the basis of
experience,is after all what we live our daily lives by.31The
perspective that really matters
forSpinozassalvationprojectintheEthics,however,isthatofeternityitistheperspective
of true and adequate cognition of unchanging and eternal things.
Trueideas give insight in their objects, which gives joy, and
causes love32of the highestkind: self-loveorself-contentment.
Theselfhereistheonethatinsightinournature as nite parts of Gods
thinking nature reveals to us: so self-love is reallylove of the
innite nature of which one is an integral part.The mind that uses
the right method starts from its disorderly and confusedsensory
cognition of singular things, which reason then reorders and
straightens29. Spinoza refers to the cognition of the rst kind also
as opinion or imagination, andtothesecond, whichproceedsfrom
commonnotionsandadequateideasofthepropertiesofthings, as knowledge
of the second kind or reason (2p40s2). The third kind of cognition
isreferred to as intuition and is said to proceed from the adequate
idea of the formal essence
ofcertainattributesofGodtoanadequateknowledgeoftheessenceofthings
(2p40s2). Thisisillustrated in TDEI as follows: a thing is
perceived through its essence alone when, from the factthat I know
something, I know what it is to know something, or from the fact
that I know theessence of the soul, I know that it is united to the
body. By the same kind of knowledge, we knowthat two and three are
ve, and that if two lines are parallel to a third line, they are
also parallelto each other, etc. Spinoza adds, But the things I
have so far been able to know by this kind ofknowledge have been
very few.30. Cf. Wilson, Spinozas Theory of Knowledge, 89141, 119,
and her subsequent discussionof Spinozas hardline conception of
truth and its consequences, pp. 11921.31. Although Spinoza does not
seem to give much for the rst kind of cognition, in the Ethicsit is
indispensable. In the TEI 20, Spinoza illustrates it with the
following examples: I know onlyfrom report my date of birth, and
who my parents were, and similar things, which I have neverdoubted.
By random experience I know that I shall die, for I afrm this
because I have seen otherslike me die, even though they had not all
lived the same length of time and did not all die of thesame
illness. Again, I also know by random experience that oil is
capable of feeding re, and thatwater is capable of putting it out.
I know also that the dog is a barking animal, and man a
rationalone. And in this way I know almost all the things that are
useful in life (TdIE 19).32. Love, as Spinoza denes it, is joy
accompanied by the idea of its object.SpinozaontheHumanMind 21up in
the light of its common notions, and, presumably, the necessary
general lawsof nature derived from these notions. The end point is
the intellectual intuition orvision of the formal essencethe true
being of God or Natureand the essencesof singular things. Spinoza,
as Margaret Wilsonremarks, says toolittleaboutessence for one to
know what exactly all this is supposed to mean or how the
ascentfrom common notions to intuitive cognition of essences is
supposed to work, butclearly Spinoza thinks of rational knowledge
through common notions as a neces-sary condition for intuitive
science, which is the highest kind of
cognition.33Therearealsoindicationsthathethinksoftherational
scienceofextendedmaterialnatureinterms of amathematical
mechanisticscience, andthat
heenvisagessomethinganalogousforthinkingminds.
HewritesinDeemendationethathetakes true science to proceed from
cause to effect like the ancients but that no oneelse before him
has conceived the soul as acting according to certain laws, like
aspiritual automaton. I understand this metaphor to hold for the
divine intellect orsoul (TdIE 85).I am not concerned here with the
relation between the two higher kinds
ofcognitionasmuchaswiththatbetweentherst,imagination,andthesecond,reason.
Consider the two ways in which ideas making up our minds may be
linked.One is subjective and accidental, and follows the fortuitous
or random order of theaffections of the nite and contingent,
actually enduring body whose idea our mindis. The other is the
eternal order of the intellect, which is the same for all minds
andadequately reects Natures true, objective order. How can a
singular mind
caughtupinitsaffectionsasmuchasbegintohookupwiththelatter?Supposedly,throughcommonnotions,
whichareinvolvedinall ideasofaffectionssinceallaffections are
impressions in the extended body. The common notions must
includemore than merely extension, shape, motion and rest, and
their quantitative expres-sions. The attribute of thought is common
as well and gives us some access to
Godsthinkingnatureandwhateternalintellectunderstands(seequoteatthebegin-ning).
Thought is the vehicle of reason and intuitive cognition of eternal
essencesand their relation to God. The idea perhaps is that each
singular mind in thinkingadequately experiences a glimpse of the
very power by which God (Natura natur-ans) produces the innite
created nature (natura naturans).Spinozagiveslittlehelp, however,
forunderstandinghowthenitemindcaptured in its temporal struggle can
as much as begin, by any activity of its own,to cut loose from its
affections, transcend temporality, and enjoy the contemplationof
the eternal essences and the blessings this procures. At some
point, the perspec-tive changes: God ceases to constitute this or
that mind regarding things from theirtruncatedperspectives.
Atsomepoint, wendthatwhateverpowerofmindorreason we manage to
exercise merges with that of the eternal intellect of which itwas,
all along, but a nite and imperfect expression.Spinozas obscure
account of kinds of cognition deserves a discussion of itsown and
has been considered here only for what it may tell us about his
originalconception of mind and its nature as apart of Gods innite
intellect. His project ofsalvation through intellectual intuition,
where the mind nally becomes one with33. See Wilsons illuminating
paper, Spinozas Theory of Knowledge, 89141.22 LilliAlanenits
object, is where he comes closest too or perhaps even goes beyond
the mostradical of ancient rationalist ethics. It is also the part
of his doctrine that seems tobe the most difcult for us to
understand. Other strands like his account of imagi-nation or the
rst kind of knowledge and of ideas as afrmations or striving
forcesare hard to t with this rationalist project, and seem to
point forward to subsequentradicalempiricism.
Thelastsectionofthispaperlooksbrieyattheaccountofideas and
afrmations.9. IDEAS AS AFFIRMATIONS2p49 asserts: In the mind there
is no volition, or afrmation and negation, exceptthat which the
idea involves insofar as it is an idea. I follow Michael Della
Roccainreadingthisnotmerelyasclaimingthatafrmationandwill
alwaysrequireobjects, but as the stronger claim that an afrmation
or volition is simply a matterof having a certain idea, so is due
to the nature of the idea and nothing else.34What2p49d says is
straightforward: volitions are nothing but ideas. Conversely,
ideas, asDella Rocca explains, are live psychic forces (212). They
compete as it werewhich each other on the basis of the relative
strength of the force with which theyafrm themselves, so that this
force in the end depends on the content of the ideaandtheforceof
thecollectionof otheractual ideasamongwhichtheyafrmthemselves.
However, the force with which the idea is afrmed should be
distin-guished from the striving or desire that it generates in the
mind whose power ofthinking it is an expression of.Here, I differ
from Della Rocca, who contends that it is because all ideas are[ .
. . ] bound up with an agents striving that [Spinoza] sees all
ideas as afrmationsand invokes 2def3 and the notion of ideas as
actions in order to clarify 2p49. Thisreading makes ideas too much
like desires causing our actions. It is true that
ideascanbeseenasexpressingthesamepowerorconatuswithwhicheachthingendeavors
to persist in its own being and is nothing but the actual essence
ofthethingitself (3p7). Thus, likeanyothersingularthings, ideas,
inadequateoradequate, each have their own essence or conatus by
which they persist in whateverbeing and whatever determinate
duration they have. The obscure perception of apassing feeling of
pain or the confused sensory image of the sun as approximatelyof
the size of a football, presumably afrms itself with less force
than the
distinctideasinvolvedinthedemonstrationsofitstruesizeanddistancefromtheper-ceiver.
Yet all ideas alike, considered in themselves, strive to
persevereor rather,the mind of which they are constituent parts
strives to persevere with whateveradequate and inadequate ideas it
happens to have at a given moment (3p9p). I amhaunted by the memory
of the delicious taste and smell of the chocolate meltingin my
mouth: the idea of how good and desirable it is afrms itself more
vividlythan that of the indigestion that might follow from eating
more. What ideas striveforistheafrmationof theirobject ortheaspect
underwhichthat object isrepresentedtheir force or tendency is to
keep it present in mind, and they do this34. Michael Della Rocca,
The Power of an Idea: Spinozas Critique of Pure Will, Nos 37,no. 2
(2003): 20031, 203.SpinozaontheHumanMind 23as longas other
contraryideasideas whosecontents areincompatiblewiththeirsdo not
exclude them. The question of what desires, and through these,
whatactions or events in the world the ideas or beliefs thus
afrming themselves maycause, is a different matter that should, it
seems to me, be considered separatelyfrom that of their force to as
it were maintain themselves on the mental screen.35Whether they
will continue to afrm themselves depends not only on their
speciccontent but also on the extent to which they agree with other
ideas occupying thatverysamescreen.
Ideasarecausedbyandprimarilycauseotherideasbytheirspecic power to
persist, which in its turn depends on that of the ideas that
causeand concur with them.36Ideas derived from the adequate idea of
a triangle havemore power in themselves than those caused by the
eeting sensation of pain, butthe reason for why the sensation of
pain is weaker has to do with the power of theexternal cause of the
affection of the body whose idea it is, perhaps indigestionfrom too
much chocolate or the sting of some insect. The obscure ideas of
pain, onthe other hand, may also surpass in strength that of any
other ideas in your mind,but this is not because of its own power
of afrming itself but rather a consequenceof the damage inicted to
ones body thwarting its power of action, and thereby theminds power
tothink. Whatever power themindhas
togenerateadequatethoughtsisthen,itseems,simplyinhibited.
Theunbearablepainsufferedbyavictim of torture overwhelms her to the
point of wiping out all other ideas from hermind, causing her to
give in to the charge or, if she manages to resist that
tempta-tion, topassout. Butthestrengthofthepain,
whichsoobscuresherpowerofthinking, is not a function of the content
of the obscure idea of the pain itselfitis due, rather, to the
force of external causes (as compared with that of her ownbody) to
affect the state of her body, and through the ideas of these
affections, hermind, destroying, in the end, both her bodys power
to persist and the power ofthinking of her mind whose object that
body is.As I understand it, the cause that is relevant for dening
the power of a thingis that which depends on its very essence and
not on that of any other simulta-neously concurring causes. The
idea of a hoped for increase of your income mayafrm itself with
obsessing force in your mind, but that is not because of the
powerof this idea in itself as much as that of concurring ideas and
desires of increasedpower and ensuing benets.37The cause that
matters when speaking of ideas aretheantecedent
ideasfromwhichtheycanbedistinctlyderived, andthemoredistinct they
are, the greater, presumably, their mental force: the more
adequateideas they cause. Like any other things, ideas have
strivings of their own, and whatideas are striving for qua ideas is
nothing other than to maintain or increase
theirownpowertoafrmthemselves,
andsincethatforcedependsontheircontentalone, one may speculate that
they always, in the end, strive for greater adequacyor perfection
through more connections with other distinct ideas that can
support35. But see Della Rocca, The Power of an Idea, 20812.36.
Thepowerofaneffectisdenedbythepowerofitscause,insofarasitsessenceisexplained
or dened by the essence of its cause. 5ax2, Curley, 597.37. I
discuss Spinozas account of the interplay between ideas, passive
affects, and desires inAlanen, Spinoza on Pride and
Self-Knowledge.24 LilliAlanenthem. But this smacks of teleology
that Spinoza abhors, and may t a Leibnizian,account better than his
own.What Spinoza leaves us with seems to be minds as collections of
ideas withstrivings and forces of their own. In this way, Spinozas
account of mind and ideascan be said effectively to contribute to
the deconstruction of the last remnants
ofthescholasticarchitectureofthemind.
Wheretheysawhierarchicallyorderedfaculties, with reason or
intellect at the top, Spinoza presents us with a power-eldof
ideasaspsychicforcesleavinglittleforustoworkwithwhenit
comestounderstanding the unity of the complex ideas that the human
mind constitutes andits agencywhether it has any.10.
CONCLUSIONAllthingswhethersingularmodesorcompositeindividualshaveapoweroftheir
own by which they strive, we are told, to persist in their being.
Taking onesclue from the axioms of Part Two, thinking is essential
to the being of human minds,and thinking consists in afrming
ideasor ideas afrming themselvesthus com-peting with but also, as
the case may be, joining forces with other ideas to
maintainthemselves in existence. Spinoza avoids the anarchy of a
wild state of confusion, orwar where ideas of varying strength ght
each other, only by his unwavering faithin reasonthe power to use
adequate ideas that the human minds have
becausetheysharein(areparts of) Gods inniteunderstanding.
Adequateideas arecaused by and generate only adequate ideas, so
once a particular mind is able toform them, they will, by their own
impetus, tend to multiply and increase. If
reason(orintellect)thepowertogenerateadequateideasisweakinsingularindi-vidual
minds, whereit
isconstantlyopposedandthreatenedbyoverpoweringconfused affects, it
is, after all, common to all human minds. Moreover, it is the
onlygood thing that there is an innite supply of; instead of
diminishing, as other humangoods tend to do, it grows and increases
in power by being shared by many. HenceSpinozasdeeplyoriginal
ethical
project,38whereself-preservationdictatesthatmenandwomenjoinforcesinpeacefulexistence,
cultivatingtheirreasontobenet fromthiscommongood,
andwheretheanalysisof passionsandtheirmechanisms teaches us
howtocontrol themtomakethat commonendeavorpossible. This common
good that does not diminish but grows by being shared iswhat
Spinoza calls Acquiescentia in se ipsoand is the highest kind of
contentmentthat understanding oneself as part of nature alone can
bring.38. John Carriero gives an insightful account of Spinozas
ethical goal and its similarities withtraditional rationalist
ethics that see understanding as our highest good in The Highest
Good andPerfection in Spinoza,in Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed.
Michael Della Rocca (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, forthcoming).
See also Olli Koistinen, Spinoza on Action, in The
CambridgeCompaniontoSpinozas Ethics, ed. Olli Koistinen(Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2009), 16787. I try to understand, in my
The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable RealityofConfusion,
howthisambitiousethicalprojectaimingatunderstandingrelatestoSpinozasmore
down-to-earth political project. See also Michael A. Rosenthal,
Tolerance as a Virtue inSpinozas Ethics, Journal of the History of
Philosophy, 39 (2001): 53557.SpinozaontheHumanMind 25Copyright of
Midwest Studies In Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell
and its content may not becopied or emailed to multiple sites or
posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express
writtenpermission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.