Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-59

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-59

“They’re very patient,” Nunes said. “They’re spreading… globally, very, very slowly.” “al-Qaeda’s very, very good at seeding people and waiting.”

To be called the Syrian Islamic Commission. This initiative, most likely conceived by Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani, the leader of Jabhat Fath Al-Sham (formerly Jabhat Al-Nusra), could, if actualized, complete the Islamization of the Syrian revolution and its

takeover by Salafi-jihadis.

Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Abu Muhammad Al Julani, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Abubakar Shekau,

Welfare jihad: Dozens of Danish ISIS fighters received state unemployment benefitsPublished time: 24 Dec, 2016 Denmark has discovered that dozens of its citizens fighting for Islamic State have continued to receive cash benefits. According to local media the government somehow expects jihadists to pay the improperly distributed funds back.At least 36 people who are known by authorities to have left Denmark to allegedly to join the ranks of Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) continued to receive welfare payments, according to the Ekstra Bladet newspaper. Thirty-four alleged jihadists received cash benefits from municipal authorities, and two others from private but heavily state-subsidized funds. The newspaper obtained the figures from the Danish Employment Ministry through a freedom of information request.The municipalities and the private funds demanded a repayment of the improperly

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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distributed benefits from the 29 of the alleged jihadists. The seven others have presumably been killed in action. It remains unclear, exactly how the

organizations expect to get the money from jihadists back, who in total have received a hefty sum of 672,000 kroner (around $77,300).Members of the Employment Committee of the Danish Parliament from two opposing sides of the Danish political spectrum have showed a notable unanimity on this matter.“It is totally reprehensible. It is clear that you must be available to the Danish labor market when receiving cash, so you obviously do not travel abroad, and one should certainly not travel to a place where you take part in something like that,” the Ekstra Bladet quoted Karsten Honge of the Socialist People's Party as saying.A representative of the right-wing Danish People’s Party Bent Bogsted expressed almost the same opinion. “They are not available for work, and they cannot be if they are involved in the conflict in Syria, so they must be deprived of cash assistance,” Bogsted said.Denmark’s Employment Minister Troels Lund Poulsen promised to “take action.”“It is totally unacceptable and a disgrace. It must be stopped,” he told Ekstra Bladet. “If you travel to Syria to participate in war, to become an ISIS fighter, then you obviously do not have any right for benefits from the government.” Such an outrageous situation was blamed on both the municipalities’ lack of awareness and sluggishness of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), who failed to issue a warning about the suspicious individuals, according to the minister. Only one of the alleged jihadists out of the 36 was reported to the police by a municipality.It’s not the first time that Danish IS-fighters receiving welfare benefits have been reported. In 2014, PET disclosed information on 28 jihadists, receiving benefits while fighting in Syria. It remained unclear, whether the state managed to get the payments back from the jihadists that time and whether the new number of 36 jihadists included the 2014 figures.At least 135 people have left Denmark to join Islamic State jihad and participate in middle-eastern wars, according to PETs estimates. Denmark is believed to be the second European country after Belgium supplying the most fighters to IS. The overall number of Danish jihadist fighters almost equals the Danish army's 150-soldier unit, deployed in Iraq as a part of the US-backed coalition fighting IS.

Jihadists ‘used UK welfare payments to fund Paris & Brussels attacks’Published time: 25 Nov, 2016 Jihadists accused of carrying out terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels used British welfare payments to fund the assaults, a court has heard.Two Birmingham men handed £3,000 (US$3,730) to Mohamed Abrini – who is thought to be the man wearing a hat in CCTV footage taken at Brussels airport before and after the attack there in March – before he flew to Paris and disappeared.Zakaria Boufassil, 26, from Birmingham, stands accused of making the payment, which was withdrawn from the bank account of Belgian national Anouar Haddouchi, who had been claiming benefits while living in the West Midlands.

Extremism, Heritage, and Religious Institutions





HANI NASIRA 4 days ago Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in 2014. SITE via Reuters TV

Dubai- The insistence on linking terrorism to religious institutions, whether Salafist or Azharist is a big mistake; and accusing the Islamic texts, the heritage, and the old scholars of incenting terrorism is even a bigger mistake. These mistakes turn the eradication of terrorism into a battle with heritage away from terrorism itself, which widely opens the door to linking terrorism to religious institutions.Many of the so-called Egyptian Jihad’s theorists were never been Azhar graduates. Abdul Salam Faraj and Ayman al-Zawahiri have never visited Egypt and do not know anything about its Azhar or its history.We cannot deny that many scholars in Azhar have chosen fanaticism and monopoly of the right and truth, yet it also has many others who practiced renovation, development, and translation. The Azhar and Salafist religious schools include a variety of renovators, reformists, and supporters of woman rights and advancement.In the combat of terrorism, many organizations and individuals focus on outputs, operations, and developments and neglect the radical ISIS-related intellect. They consider that this phenomenon is linked to the Islamic heritage despite the remarkable differences and selectivity from the religious texts and explanations.The problem with the phenomenon of violent extremism and fundamentalism attributed to Sunnis and Shi’ites has been a problem of approach and not of knowledge. The real problem behind Islam-linked terrorism is its attribution to historic and textual bases and not to approach and ideological will, before even reading religious text.It seems that research on terrorism and its relation with the Islamic heritage or religious institutions has been futile because it strays from the real heritage of Islam to politicized Islam.Extremists do not really care about the literature of Caliphate and the Imama concept. Sunni clerics have agreed on denouncing the concept adopted by extremists since the first century hegira and introduced their own concept of “discord rejection” after their sufferance caused by discords and Hussein’s tragedy. They insisted on protecting Islam from the violence intellect.A simple review in the history of Persian influence in the Islamic literature by the end of Umayyad history will mark a profound influence on the literature of both Caliphate and Imama.The system of the modern extremism, particularly its violent practices, seems separated from these literatures and fixed on selecting some texts for its own ideological usage.

December 20, 2016 Special Dispatch No.6717Syrian Opposition Worried By Reports That New Islamic Political Entity, Led By Jabhat Fath Al-Sham, Is Emerging In Northern Syria

Following Aleppo's fall to the Syrian regime and the realization that the opposition's defeat there was caused, at least in part, by the divisions among the various fighting factions, the





Arab press and Arab social media have in recent days featured numerous reports that some of the main fighting factions in northern Syria aim to

declare a military-political entity, to be called the Syrian Islamic Commission. This entity will control all the territory that remains in opposition hands, especially in Idlib province – the last remaining opposition stronghold and the destination of opposition fighters leaving regions where reconciliation agreements expelling them were signed with the regime. This initiative, most likely conceived by Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani, the leader of Jabhat Fath Al-Sham (formerly Jabhat Al-Nusra), could, if actualized, complete the Islamization of the Syrian revolution and its takeover by Salafi-jihadis.This paper will review the reports about the emerging new entity and reactions to these reports.

Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani (image: Aljazeera.net, September 17, 2016) According to reports, in the past week Al-Joulani initiated meetings in Idlib province with the leaders of 12 to 15 military factions, some of them Islamist and some of them part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Among them were: Ahrar Al-Sham, Harakat Nour Al-Din Al-Zinki, Jaysh Al-Islam, Jund Al-Aqsa, Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyya, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, and Sawt Al-Haq. The factions had reportedly arrived at understandings about uniting to form a single military-political state-like entity, with an estimated 100,000 fighters.[1]In this emerging state, the powers are divided among the leaders of the main factions, with Al-Joulani as military commander and main decision-maker, while the entity itself is to be headed by Ahrar Al-Sham commander Abu 'Ammar Al-Omar. The Shura Council is to be headed by Harakat Nour Al-Din Al-Zinki leader Tawfiq Shihab Al-Din.Also according to reports, the factions are, under these understandings, to announce their dissolution and their full incorporation into the new body within a week at most. The faction commanders will relinquish their status and roles, the faction flags will be burned, and the use of the names of the faction will be banned.The entity will have a legislative branch, the Shura Council, comprising the various faction leaders, and will draw up a shari'a-compliant constitution. It will have an executive branch that includes a judiciary in charge of all courts and tribunals, a police force, a Ministry of Religious Endowments, and a Ministry of Defense. It will also establish TV and radio networks.[2]These reports were accompanied by announcements by some faction leaders that they would be merging. Thus, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen commander Abu Bakr tweeted: "Stand by for joyous news from us regarding a coming union that will gladden you and sadden your enemies – a national program that represents the people's revolution..."[3]The new entity was reportedly set to be declared December 18, but at the time of this writing this had not yet happened, indicating that preparations are still underway. Also according to reports, some factions are examining the possibility of a unified operations room overseeing the various battlefronts, as well as the creation of a united military apparatus for operations leading up to the establishment of the united military-political entity.[4]





Syria's Moderate Opposition Fears Islamization Of Syrian Revolution

The Syrian moderate opposition was divided on this emerging new entity. Its supporters included Abu Muhammad Al-'Asmi, of the Free Syrian Army's leadership council, who called it "a rescue plan for the Syrian revolution" and said: "This plan includes the merger of the factions under a single leadership, distant from any ideology. This is despite the Islamic nature of most of the Syrian factions, including the FSA factions." The entity, he added, will be "a purely Syrian faction. Non-Syrian elements, if they exist, will not take leadership positions."[5]Al-'Asmi, however, appears to be in the minority; most of the moderate military and political opposition factions are against the new entity, fearing that it is an attempt by Al-Joulani to take over the other factions and fully Islamize the Syrian revolution. Thus, it was reported that several opposition factions, some part of the FSA and some of them Islamists who oppose the entity and refuse to accept Al-Joulani as leader, were discussing their own merger, but have yet to reach understandings on what its nature would be and whether it would be solely military or political as well.[6]Samir Al-Nashar, a former member of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary Opposition Forces, said that he feared that this Islamic entity would turn Idlib into "Kandahar 2."[7] He said he had sent a clear message to the factions that reportedly intended to join Al-Joulani telling them they had been fooled and that "they will face a holocaust with no one to protect them... All the factions that are forced into joining Jabhat Fath Al-Sham will suffer an unprecedented holocaust in terms of victims and losses... It is not only countries that will oppose this entity, but the Syrian people as well, which rejects such trends."[8]Other oppositionists warned that the merger "will provide a pretext for Russia and the regime to bomb and destroy Idlib and its rural areas, just as they did in Aleppo on the pretext of combating terrorism."[9]Arab supporters of the Syrian opposition also fear the merger, and its takeover by Jabhat Fath Al-Sham. The London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat cited 'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Hajj, an expert on extremist organizations, who said that the emergence of such an entity is "the emergence of the fourth generation of Al-Qaeda," and called it "a warning bell for the international community, because [this entity] is pushing in the direction of a global extremist stream and will eliminate [any possibility of] control in northern Syria." It also cited sources comparing the merger to "putting all the factions into the uniform of those who are condemned to death internationally" which would "eliminate the Syrians' dream of a revolution."[10]

[1] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 19, 2016.[2] Al-Sharq Al_Awsat (London), December 18, 2016.[3] Twitter.com/BBakr70, December 18, 2016.[4] Zamanalwsl.net, December 19, 2016.[5] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 18, 2016.[6] Orient-news.net, December 19, 2016.[7] A reference to the Taliban's takeover of Kandahar, Afghanistan, in the 1990s and its transformation into the Taliban capital.[8] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 18, 2016.[9] Elaph.com, December 18, 2016.[10] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 19, 2016.





Regards Cees***

The commander in chief decided to wrap up the fight against the world’s most notorious terrorist organization in a two-term bow, declaring in his final national security address that al-Qaeda is “a shadow of its former self.”As has been par for the course during President Obama’s administration, al-Qaeda was referred to as a footnote in history, “the most dangerous threat to the United States at the time” of the 2001 attacks but no longer, just a “decimated,” hollowed-out, whimpering terrorist group.Has there ever been such sustained wishful thinking as a counterterrorism policy?On the morning of Obama’s confident address to service members at MacDill Air Force Base, a George Washington University study tallying the affiliation of all terrorism charges brought in the United States from March 2011 to the end of July this year reported that 44 percent of cases had connections to terrorist groups other than ISIS.That falls largely to al-Qaeda and its family of direct relatives and close friends: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and more jihad outlets in places as diverse as Mali and Uzbekistan. They had people on American soil—in most cases, U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents—planning attacks, fundraising and recruiting.So much for “ISIS” beginning every sentence about homegrown jihadists.The administration’s long-running PR effort to relegate al-Qaeda’s current and future global influence and capabilities to an afterthought is nothing new, but escalated as a devastating misinformation campaign as the long-term future of terror became more apparent.At the Pentagon memorial on September 11, Obama declared America has “dealt devastating blows to al-Qaeda.”“Al-Qaeda’s top ranks have been hammered,” he told Marines at Camp Pendleton in 2013. “The core of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the way to defeat.”If “devastating” means killing Osama bin Laden, which Obama has frequently touted, the head of that snake grew back—and not just in terms of inspiration, like we’ve seen with the lectures of Anwar al-Awlaki that still drive Americans to jihad years after his drone death. Ayman al-Zawahiri may not have the charisma of bin Laden—his addresses are like sitting through the calculus class of jihad—but he’s shown a willingness to evolve and take the long-term sustainable growth route around the more impetuous ISIS.Obama adds the qualifier that he means physical devastation for the “core” group, but it’s a distinction without difference. That core has been building a global network, coordinating with powerful franchises, opening new chapters, and training old allies like the Taliban. In the first six months of this year, al-Qaeda’s active West African affiliates had unleashed more than 100 attacks. And on the propaganda front, this year AQAP took up the task of analyzing attacks, even ones claimed by ISIS, in English-language guides that helped lone jihadists see what was done well and what could have been done better.And then, of course, there are the Iran links that Obama might rather forget.In July, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on three senior al-Qaeda members located in Iran in an effort to “disrupt the operations, fundraising, and support networks that help al-Qaeda move money and operatives from South Asia and across the Middle East.” In their 30s and 40s, the terrorists were dubbed “part of a new generation of al-Qaeda” by Treasury. The cooperation between Iran and al-Qaeda is like the war on terror’s





dirtiest little secret: cited in the 9/11 Commission report, target of 2009 Treasury sanctions that included bin Laden’s son Sa’ad, conveniently

ignored in favor of other policy objectives save for oblique references to Iran’s non-nuclear bad behavior.Zawahiri warned on this year’s anniversary that “the events of Sept. 11 will be repeated a thousand times.” As House Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes told CBS on 9/11, “what al-Qaeda started on Sept. 11, 2001, continues to metastasize” as “al-Qaeda’s very, very good at seeding people and waiting.”

“They’re very patient,” Nunes said. “They’re spreading… globally, very, very slowly.”That means growing a new generation of jihadists. An English-language magazine issued by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Al-Balagh, appeared shortly before 9/11. The target throughout its pages? Young people.“The grown men who spend their times playing like kids in the fields of cricket are not your role models,” declared the magazine’s foreword. “Rather, your role models are men, firm in speech and action. Men who lived with their head held high and with their AK aimed at the enemy.”Millennial mujahidin recruiting is also getting a boost from the messages of Hamza bin Laden, Osama’s twenty-something son who has the shot of charisma Zawahiri lacks and who’s eager to inherit the family business. Declaring “we are all Osama” in a July video, Hamza vowed holy war and revenge for his dad’s assassination: “If you think that your sinful crime … has passed without punishment, then you thought wrong.”Any assertion that al-Qaeda has been devastated into an aged, decrepit shell of its jihadi self is simply wrong. Any policy that leans on this conclusion is deadly.

Anticipating Iraq´s Next Sunni Insurgency9 Dec 2016By Emily Anagnostos, Jessica Lewis McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, and Alexandra Gutowski for Institute for the Study of War (ISW)

As Emily Anagnostos and her colleagues see it, when Mosul falls the political conditions that originally spurred Iraq’s Sunni Arabs to arms will still exist. As a result, the inevitable success of anti-ISIS operations will create a space for other Sunni anti-government actors and armed groups to surge again in 2017. Here’s a description of the “permissive environment” that may soon arise.

This article was originally published by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) on 30 November 2016.IntroductionIraq could face another Sunni insurgency after ISIS loses control of Mosul. The U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve has not resolved the political conditions that originally caused Sunni Arabs to mobilize in a non-violent protest movement in 2012-2013. Sunni Arabs in Iraq who are liberated from ISIS’s control will not necessarily be reconciled to the Iraqi Government. The success of anti-ISIS operations in 2016 will open space for other Sunni anti-government actors and armed groups to resurge in ISIS’s absence. Sunni Arabs are displaced in large numbers, which will grow as the Coalition seizes and secures Mosul. Iranian-backed Shi’a militias will exacerbate grievances as they move to clear Sunni-majority villages in northern Iraq and near Tel Afar, a historic stronghold of Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq west of Mosul. Shi’a militias have alienated local Sunni





Arab populations in other cities cleared of ISIS by conducting extrajudicial killings, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of violence against the local

population. A permissive environment is emerging for a Sunni insurgency in the vacuum of control left by ISIS, into which other actors, including al Qaeda, could emerge in 2017.

Sunni Insurgent Groups and ISIS Before Mosul FellIraq stood on the brink of a Sunni insurgency in late 2013 before ISIS began to seize terrain because former Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki reversed the gains of the previous U.S.-led Coalition to reconcile and reintegrate Sunni Arabs into Iraqi politics in 2008. Maliki launched a highly sectarian policy to marginalize Sunni politicians and consolidate control over the Iraqi military the day U.S. forces withdrew. His political actions ignited a year-long Sunni anti-government protest movement that erupted in January 2013 after the near arrest of Rafi al-Issawi, the moderate Sunni Finance Minister, in December 2012.Sunni infighting crippled the Sunni political base in 2013, making it unable to channel or mitigate growing Sunni discontent away from an insurgency. Maliki’s maneuverings compounded these internal fractures, leading to the erosion of the Sunni political alliance, Iraqiyya, throughout 2012. Iraqiyya further split over how to handle Maliki’s administration: Issawi led a boycott of Maliki’s cabinet in January 2013 in solidarity with protests but several Sunni leaders broke rank and returned in March in favor of negotiation. The Sunni political alliance was effectively dead before the June 2013 provincial elections in Ninewa and Anbar Provinces, leaving the protest without an effective channel to a political resolution.Clashes between the government and protesters kindled the growing insurgency and ultimately created the opening for ISIS’s capture of Fallujah in January 2014. Violent government escalations against the protest movement, such as the April 2013 massacre at the Hawija sit-in protest camp, galvanized the movement. The mass arrest of Sunni males in Baghdad after ISIS attacked the Abu Ghraib and Taji Base prisons in July 2013 heightened grievances.Multiple anti-government organizations competed to champion the Sunni cause, harness their discontent, and facilitate a full insurgency. Chief among these competitors was ISIS, rebranded from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Sunni Arabs had rejected ISIS’s predecessor, AQI, and joined the Iraqi Government to defeat it in the Sahwa, or Awakening, movement from 2006 to 2008. ISIS resurged in parallel with the anti-government protest movement and conducted a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) wave campaign in 2012-2013 targeting Shi’a civilians to spark a sectarian civil war that would break the Iraqi state.ISIS’s black flags were present within the protest camps in Ramadi starting in October 2013. AQI’s resurgence and its presence in previously off-limits camps demonstrates that Iraq’s Sunni Arab population became willing to tolerate ISIS’s presence in their midst despite the earlier expulsion of AQI, indicating the virulence of their anti-government sentiment. ISIS’s presence in the camps suggests that ISIS cooperated on some level with other anti-government insurgent organizations that had been present in the protest camps.Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), a neo-Baathist insurgent group, harnessed the 2013 protest movement directly in order to stoke its own insurgency. JRTN infused the anti-government protest movement with revolutionary rhetoric and traditional Baathist branding. ISIS likely relied on its support to infiltrate the protest camps. Other legacy revolutionary groups, such as the 1920 Brigades, another neo-Ba’athist group, and Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Sunni insurgent group, re-emerged as well prior to December 2013. Saddam-era Iraqi Army officers made up the core of JRTN and the 1920 Brigade’s manpower and lent military know-how and leadership to the groups. This experience with





military organization and knowledge of the terrain made each neo-Baathist group a formidable rival to ISIS.

Maliki’s order for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to clear the sit-in protest camp in December spurred the development of an organized Sunni rebellion. The large scale clashes on December 30-31, 2013 between protesters and the ISF in Ramadi signaled the start of an insurgency. The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR) formed in January 2014 as an umbrella to absorb recently-formed local military councils in majority Sunni areas including Anbar, Fallujah, Mosul, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Diyala. The GMCIR formed as ISIS seized control of Fallujah on January 3, but it reflected the degree of preparation by JRTN over the preceding year to cultivate a Sunni insurgency. Another umbrella organization, the Council of Revolutionaries of the Tribes of Anbar (CRTA), also formed in January 2014 in response to the clearing of the Ramadi protest camp.JRTN supported ISIS’s rise because ISIS could further the anti-government cause. JRTN and GMCIR leader Izzat al-Douri, a top Saddam-era deputy, acknowledged on July 17, 2014, following ISIS’s first northern offensive, that ISIS “helped the revolutionaries achieve their goals and were semi-[parallel] with them in facing the Iranian Safavid project in Iraq.” These leaders, nonetheless, remained wary of ISIS’s adherence to their brand of an anti-government but pan-Iraqi insurgency: CRTA leader, Sheikh Ali Hatem, warned jihadists from taking advantage of the revolution in his formation statement on January 3, 2014.The cooperation between ISIS and JRTN over the insurgency came to end likely by the fall of 2014 at which point ISIS began to brutally marginalize and suppress JRTN. JRTN ceased to support ISIS’s means of carrying out the insurgent: JRTN criticized ISIS openly in August 2014 after ISIS targeted Yazidis in Sinjar while the GMCIR, in which JRTN played a dominant role, criticized ISIS for taking the “revolution to a different path” and continuing north, rather than overthrowing the government in Baghdad. In turn, ISIS began to consider JRTN a competitor, especially as JRTN frequently tried to impose its own governance in overlapping territory. In response, ISIS began to systematically assassinate retired Iraqi Army officers, JRTN’s primarily recruitment pool, in Mosul in September 2014, a sign that it had begun to eliminate organized military resistance as a solution to the dispute. ISIS's military dominance forced JRTN to go to ground.

Increasing Sunni Unrest in Late 2016Contemporary U.S.-led Coalition operations to degrade and disrupt ISIS in 2016 may unlock the Sunni insurgency that began as the GMCIR, CRTA, and other smaller groups. This outcome will transpire if conditions are not set to help Sunni Arabs in Iraq to address their original and mounting grievances. The Coalition has attempted to pursue Sunni reconciliation politically in Baghdad, including through a National Guard Law aimed to provide Sunni communities with a local security structure. These lines of effort largely failed because of efforts by Iranian proxies and pro-Iranian political groups.The U.S. and Iraqi Governments are unlikely to be able to address the grievances in 2016, as the Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi government faces continued pressure from sectarian political and militia leaders to maintain the Shi’a-dominated status quo. These leaders could further Sunni distrust in the government. The Iraqi parliament passed the controversial Popular Mobilization Act on November 26, which institutionalizes the Popular Mobilization Units, the bulk of which are Shi’a militias, as part of the ISF. Sunni political leaders boycotted the vote, warning that the law hurt national reconciliation efforts. The law, the language of which remains open-ended, could support local Sunni





security forces by ensuring that they are equally integrated into the new structure. However, Shi’a parties already rebuffed conditions by Sunni

parties to increase the number of Sunni units, suggesting that Shi’a militias, including those charged with sectarian violence, will dominate the future structure of the Popular Mobilization. Meanwhile, former PM Maliki is carving a path to return to the premiership, which would further alienate Sunni Arabs in Iraq from the central government. His intermediate efforts have already resulted in changes that are marginalizing Sunnis, including his facilitation of the dismissal of Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25. This dismissal highlighted the division among Sunni parties in the government, undermining potential Sunni political unity.Sunni political infighting has also emerged on the provincial level ahead of provincial elections. These elections are scheduled for April 2017, but the financial crisis could result in its merger with the 2018 parliamentary elections. The Anbar Provincial Government has made repeated attempts to oust its governor over allegations of corruption and mishandling the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Anbar Provincial Court also issued on October 16 an arrest warrant for Ahmed Abu Risha, who in 2007 succeeded his brother, who was assassinated by AQI, as the leader of the Sunni Awakening, or Sahwa, movement in Anbar that helped the U.S. defeat AQI. The legacy Sahwa elements subsequently resisted ISIS’s first attempt to retake Ramadi in January 2014. A similar dynamic is re-emerging in Salah al-Din Province: the Sunni Jubur tribe dominates local politics, but the tribe is divided on policy, including its relations with Shi’a militias, which constitute a large portion of the security force in Salah al-Din, and the return of IDPs. The divide has resulted in the governorship swapping between the rival branches of the Jubur tribe. This continuous jostling over governance and security arrangements can lend to instability in the province. This divide also appears in federal politics; recently, one Jubur parliamentary member called for the dismissal of Salim al-Juburi, the parliamentary speaker. In Ninewa Province, Sunni Arabs are displaced during anti-ISIS operations, then prevented from returning to villages that Kurdish forces have secured. Sunni Arabs could also be shut out of the post-ISIS administration of Ninewa Province if Shi’a and Kurdish parties dominate security. The failure to create secure, stable and effective local governance could drive Sunni populations to seek alternative ways to protect themselves and redress their grievances, opening avenues for insurgent groups to infiltrate.Sunnis also remain at odds with each other and these intra-Sunni confrontations are already creating opportunities for Sunni insurgents. Unidentified tribal leaders in Ramadi have reportedly allowed the return of known ISIS militants into the city, only months after its recapture by the ISF in January 2016. Suicide attacks in Fallujah in November 2016 suggest that ISIS has already reconsolidated its networks in the city, which was cleared in June, or found residents that remain tolerant to its ideology. Meanwhile, Sunni tribes have carried out violent reprisals on other Sunni civilians who lived in recaptured ISIS-held towns, accusing those civilians off collaborating with ISIS. These divides within Sunni communities will prevent local, national, and political Sunni unity, and will require the same scale of neighborhood-by-neighborhood Sunni reconciliation efforts that U.S. forces carried out in 2007.

JRTN and AQI After ISIS in 2017JRTN’s rhetorical resurgence has already begun. JRTN is seeking to demonstrate that it is the best champion for Sunnis in Iraq over the alternatives of ISIS and the Iraqi Government. JRTN is setting conditions to take immediate advantage of ISIS’s loss in





Mosul in order to reclaim the city and its networks. The group issued a statement on October 17, the day Coalition forces launched operations

against ISIS in Mosul, claiming to have attacked ISIS in Mosul and calling for additional resistance against ISIS. ISIS has been systematically imprisoning or killing civilians and retired Iraqi Army officers who refuse to act as human shields, an indication both that resistance to ISIS is mounting and that ISIS is attempting to decapitate it. Meanwhile, JRTN has continued to criticize ISIS’s methods, including issuing a statement against an ISIS attack at the Prophet’s Mosque in Saudi Arabia in early July, in order to show itself as kinder, more reasonable champion for Iraqi Sunnis.JRTN and its allies are tapping into Sunni disillusionment with the Shi’a-dominated government in order to demonstrate that they are the best alternative for Sunnis. JRTN’s statements on October 15 and 17 rejected any Shi’a militia presence in the city and criticized Iranian presence in Iraq, indicating that JRTN is positioning itself to inherit ISIS’s mantle of Sunni resistance against the government. The GMCIR, on behalf of all armed groups including JRTN, issued a similar statement on October 16 criticizing the Iranian occupation of Ninewa as a way to carry out a “demographic change in Iraq and the region.” The 1920s Brigade warned on November 3 against the presence of Shi’a militias in Mosul during anti-ISIS operations. These statements underscore that JRTN and other insurgent groups are playing on concerns that the Iraqi Government will not be able to protect Sunnis from the Shi’a militias or ISIS.JRTN’s resurgence will have other indicators. JRTN’s signature attack is a targeted assassination from a moving vehicle. Recent reports of drive-by shootings targeting ISIS militants in Mosul likely indicate that JRTN is already on the rebound. Sunni insurgents, particularly JRTN, also have run extensive IED campaigns in the past. Indicators of JRTN resurgence will therefore likely include assassinations of Iraqi security officials, particularly Popular Mobilization elements in charge of securing refugee camps and recaptured areas; IEDs along major roads targeting ISF access to key terrain in northern and western Iraq; and recruitment within the ISF. JRTN will likely recruit more successfully than ISIS among Iraq’s Sunni Arabs in 2016-2017 because ISIS re-invigorated the blood feud and also lost its control over Sunni Arab populations. ISIS will attempt to limit JRTN’s opportunities to resurge by eliminating current JRTN members and possible recruitment pools from among civilians and former ISF officials. ISIS has already executed hundreds of former police and army officers before withdrawing from cities south of Mosul. These efforts will likely lead to increased violence inside Sunni majority areas and places where Sunni IDPs are aggregating, including Kirkuk and Tikrit.Al Qaeda in Syria is also positioning to unify disparate Sunni Arab factions in Iraq and gain popular support in the wake of ISIS. AQ seeks to perform the role of the silent vanguard of Sunni insurgencies, and it will enter Iraq with a low signature to evade the Coalition. AQ may even partner with JRTN the way ISIS did before and just after ISIS broke from al Qaeda to build a network of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq to which AQ can preach. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on Sunnis globally to resist the “Safavid-Crusader” occupation of Iraq in a speech released on August 25, 2016, in which he called for Iraqi Sunnis to resume a “long guerrilla warfare” in the face of territorial losses and urged AQ in Syria to support this rebuilding process in Iraq, indicating al Qaeda’s intent to reinvigorate and reconstitute a Sunni insurgency against Baghdad. Zawahiri’s call for cross-border relations also suggests that AQ will renew efforts to maintain a unified, single organization across Iraq and Syria, as it tried to do before it split from ISIS in 2014.AQ will likely seek to build its networks on top of pre-existing cells along the Euphrates





River Valley in Anbar Province and in Ninewa Province, including in Mosul. AQ will attempt to coopt remnant elements of ISIS that escaped

among the flows of IDPs. Attacks in IDP camps, especially in the Euphrates River Valley and Diyala Province, could signal that AQ or JRTN has infiltrated the camps and is seeking recruits. AQ will conduct outreach among ungoverned Sunni Arab populations, by providing religious classes, infrastructure, and utilities if possible. AQ will portray itself as a local Sunni resistance rather than use the AQ brand, which is a liability that AQ leader Aymen al-Zawahiri has already demonstrated he is willing to avoid. AQ’s resurgence in Iraq will therefore be difficult to track and distinguish from active and vocal Sunni mobilization. The establishment of new organized groups of Sunni resistance fighters is a likely indicator that an AQ resurgence is underway. AQ will target IDP camps as well as civilians in ungoverned portions of major cities. The Euphrates River Valley could be AQ’s main line of effort because AQ likely has latentnetworks there that connect to AQ leadership in Syria.[1]

ConclusionPreventing another Sunni insurgency, particularly one that can be coopted by JRTN and AQ, is a necessary task for the anti-ISIS Coalition. Both JRTN and AQ seek an outcome in Iraq that is antithetical to US interests. Anti-ISIS operations that do not explicitly block AQ and JRTN will instead enable them. The Coalition can prevent another Sunni insurgency if it takes preventative measures that are both military and political. These measures need to include three lines of effort within its current mission: the ISF, IDPs, and Iraqi Government. The Coalition must prepare the ISF in counterinsurgency (COIN) measures, against both the post-Mosul version of ISIS, and resurgent insurgent groups such as JRTN and AQ. Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, commander of Combined Joint Force-Land Component, stated on October 24 that the ISF will start a new training cycle on COIN to combat an insurgent-like ISIS. These efforts will also need to insure the ISF and tribal militias against AQ and JRTN’s influence. The Coalition will also need to ensure that the IDP camps around Mosul are secured with proper security forces and not with Shi’a militias or compromised ISF units, which could inflame sectarian tensions and lend weight to insurgent ideology. Lastly, the Coalition cannot ensure the defeat of ISIS or any insurgent group without resolving the political conditions that allow it to take root. The Coalition must reinvigorate national reconciliation efforts that have fallen to the wayside. ISIS found initial support from Iraq’s Sunnis because it offered an alternative to the government which many Sunnis saw as oppressive. JRTN and AQ will try to do the same. The Coalition needs to ensure that its lines of effort reconcile Sunnis with the government to the point that Sunnis will use political rather than insurgent means to address grievances.The U.S. will need to decide if and how it remains involved in Iraq after Mosul’s recapture, which will likely occur after President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January 2017. The Iraqi Government may set conditions for the U.S.’s withdrawal in Iraq after Mosul, but the U.S. and Coalition should not pursue an immediate drawdown of military forces themselves. Doing so could result in similar conditions that developed in 2012 and 2013 after the U.S. withdrew completely in 2011. Instead, the U.S. should continue efforts to train and advise the ISF in order to help prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups and maintain Iraq’s sovereignty. The U.S. and its international partners should also ensure involvement in resettling IDPs and mediating the reconstruction of cities and their local governing structures. Successful resettlement and reconstruction efforts that earn the population’s trust in the Iraqi Government can prevent Salafi Jihadi





groups from finding openings to resurge. The U.S. should also help address the underlying issues that fueled the Sunni insurgency and remain active in

shaping Iraqi’s political reconciliation efforts and encouraging inclusive governance. The U.S. should have the expectation that it will remain involved in some capacity in Iraq in order to ensure that anti-ISIS gains stick and that it has resolved the conditions that allowed insurgent groups to arise in 2013.Note[1] Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, was active along the Euphrates River Valley southeast of Raqqa City before ISIS seized the area in late 2014. Al Qaeda likely retains latent influence with tribes along the Euphrates River Valley that it can use to resurge if ISIS is defeated. These tribes straddle the Iraqi-Syrian border, which can provide al Qaeda with cross-border access to networks in western Iraq.About the AuthorsEmily Anagnostos is a Research Assistant on the Institute for the Study of War’s Iraq portfolio, where she has focused recently on the Iraqi political crisis. Lewis McFate is the Director of Tradecraft and Innovation at the Institute for the Study of War. Jennifer Cafarella is the Lead Intelligence Planner at the Institute for the Study of War, where she is responsible for shaping and overseeing the development of ISW’s detailed plans and recommendations on how to achieve U.S. objectives against enemies and adversaries and in conflict zones. And, Alexandra Gutowski is a Counterterrorism Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War where she focuses on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in its core terrain of Iraq and Syria.

Hamza bin Laden can be heard encouraging different groups fighting in Syria to unite and attack "worldwide" in undated footage reportedly released by al-Qaida's propaganda arm As-Sahab. Bin Laden's son calls on al-Qaida and ISIS to UNITE to form super terror group. May 2016,

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-59

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