LONDON CONFERENCE IN CRITICAL THOUGHT Birkbeck University of London 29th & 30th June, 2012 http://londonconferenceincriticalthought.wordpress.com/ Twitter: @londoncritical/#londoncritical
LONDON CONFERENCE
IN CRITICAL THOUGHT
Birkbeck University of London
29th & 30th June, 2012
http://londonconferenceincriticalthought.wordpress.com/ Twitter: @londoncritical/#londoncritical
London Conference in Critical Thought
The London Conference in Critical Thought (LCCT) began as many ideas do – in conversation with friends. In this case it was with new friends made at another conference where we all felt that the most interesting panels and papers always seemed to appear at the margins of the event and the margins of disciplinary boundaries more generally. From this we were inspired to find a means of developing and sustaining the sense of community we found on these margins. Central to this vision was an interdisciplinary, non-‐hierarchical, and accessible event which made a particular effort to embrace emergent thought and the participation of emergent academics. While the original call for papers was developed by a small group of committed volunteers, the organising collective soon grew with an enthusiastic response from those who proposed thematic streams and panels. In this way, both the organising collective and the subjects discussed at the conference emerged in a very organic process as academics identified with an event oriented toward a broad interpretation of critical thought. In the spirit of accessibility and the facilitation of and emergent community of academics, we have kept the conference free and decided against the common practice of plenaries and invited speakers. Although the LCCT is not directly affiliated with any specific institution, it would not have been possible in its current form without the generous support of: the Birkbeck Institution for the Humanities, who have provided both financial and administrative support; The Birkbeck School of Law, who have provided financial support as well as the use of School facilities during the organisational process; and Edinburgh University Press, who are providing a reception during which the books of two of our organising collective will be launched. But most importantly, the conference has been possible due to the commitment of the organising collective itself – from writing the call for papers, to designing the program and coordinating volunteers. The LCCT is very much a reflection of the efforts and vision of the collective and conference participants. Next year's LCCT has been agreed in principle to be hosted by the London Consortium – and we look forward to the conversations and friendships that will continue to develop in 2013.
Victoria Ridler and the LCCT Collective
London Conference in Critical Thought
Friday 29th June
9:00-9:30 – Registration
Malet Street 152/153 (this room is open all day)
9:30- 11:00 – Parallel Sessions 1
1. Textual Space/Spatial Text (I. Text) – Malet Street 416
Boukje Cnossen – Reading Territory in Houellebecq's La Carte et le Territoire Octavia Bright – Baudellaire and the Rhizomatic City Johanna Hartley – ‘to' in Contemporary Poetry
2. Critical Art (I) – Malet Street 417
Steve Klee – Rancière Against the Cuts! Activism as Aesthetic Force Theo Reeves-Evison – Art, Professional Ethics and the Great Book of Accounts Sophie Hope – Notes Towards a Secret Service: Critical Art and Employment Contracts
3. Critical Human Rights (I. Human Rights Beyond Marx) – Malet Street G16
Andreja Zevnik – The Proletariat and the right for ‘the common’ Bob Cannon – The Modern Foundations of Critical Human Rights Paul O’Connell – Title TBC
4. Common Life: Critical Perspectives on Authority, Experience and Community (I. Questioning Community: New Articulations of a ‘Common’ Politics.) – Malet Street 541
Leila Dawney – The Idea of the Common Gundula Ludwig – Community as a ‘Body Without Organs’. Post-Sovereign Reformulations of Democracy Slavcho Dimitrov – Shattering the Grounds of Community: Queerness, Corporeality and the Political
5. The Question of the Animal, the City and the World (I. Consumption and the Question of the Animal) – Malet Street 538
Richard Iveson – Cannibals and Apes: Revolution in the Republic Kamillea Aghtan – Wolf-Biters and Over-Groomers: (Self-)Consumption as Ethical Reciprocity Karin Sellberg – Molar Ethics and Aesthetics
6. The Body and Subjectivity – Malet Street 151 Kristina Lepold - Social Integration Through Recognition: Between Normative Consent and Subjection Laura Roberts - Cultivating Sexuate Difference with Luce Irigaray’s Between East and West Erin K Stapleton - An Excess of One’s Own: The Feminist Sovereign in Georges Bataille
11:00-11:30 – Break
London Conference in Critical Thought
11:30-13:00 – Parallel Sessions 2
1. Textual Space/Spatial Text (II. Text & Space) – Malet Street 416
Pedro Castello – The Space of the Magazine Hannah Gregory – Textual Entrances and Crossed Thresholds Matteo Ciastellardi – The Android and the Electric Sheep
2. New Foucauldian Approaches – Malet Street 417
Graham Matthews – Title TBC Attasit Sittidumrong – Michel Foucault’s Theory of Sovereignty in Modern Political Society Michal Givoni – Title TBC
3. Critical Human Rights (II. Human Rights and the Potential of Law) – Malet Street G16
Bill Bowring – Title TBC Sally-Ann Way – Title TBC Joe Wills – The World Turned Upside Down? Socioeconomic Rights and Counter-Hegemony Reger Merino Acuña – Critical human Rights and Liberal Legality
4. Mapping the Concept: Developments in the Productive Power of Critical Theory – Malet Street 541
Tina Richardson – Formulating Systems of Affect: Developing a Methodology for Interrogating and Responding to the Dominant Aesthetic Martin Savransky – Capturing The Social Sciences: An Experiment on Political Epistemology Dan Öberg – Facing Transpolitics: From Image to Operational Formula Julia Roth – Decolonizing Critical Theory
5. The Object Between Time and Temporality (I. Attention to the Object) – Malet Street 538
Sam Barton – Happening Art: Anthropological Approaches to the Art Object Jacob Bard-Rosenberg – Alarm Clocks, Awakening, and the Outsourcing of Capitalist Time Sam Wilson – The Object(s) of Musical Experience: Potentials for Cross-Disciplinary Dialogues Calvin Hui – Fashion, Consumption, History
6. Marx and Marxism Today (I. Politics) – Malet Street 151
Marco Vanzulli – Marxism and Democracy Today Ozgur Yalcin – Inter-State Relations: Furthering National Interests Jonathan Lewis – From Negative Freedom to Recognition: A Change in the Concept of Reification
13:00-14:00 – Break for Lunch
London Conference in Critical Thought
14:00-15:00 – Parallel Sessions 3
1. The Object Between Time and Temporality (II. Roundtable) – Malet Street 416
Chris Wong, Stanimir Panayotov, and [Third participant TBC] discuss “Speculative Realism/ Object-Oriented Philosophy and the Criticality of Critical Thought” (Chair: Matt Mahon)
2. The Question of the Animal, the City And the World (II. Animals in Domestic and Urban Space) – Malet Street 417
Aaron Santesso – The Panoramic Animal: Authenticity and Living Exhibitions Angela Bartram – Art from the Dead: the Moral and Ethical Transformation of the Animal Pet into Cultural Artifact Lucia Vodanovic – Animal-Life in the London Zoo: Architecture, Consumption and Display
3. Thinking Egalitarian Emancipation (I. Thinking Egalitarian Emancipation) – Malet Street G16
Stefano Salvia – Participation, Cooperation, and Common Property: Outlines of a Post-capitalist and Communitarian Idea of (Global) Democracy Ana Azmanova – Egalitarian Emancipation via Structural Non-Domination (or How to Recover the Structural Critique of Domination)
4. Critical Art (II. Curators in Conversation) – Malet Street 541
Paul Pieroni – In Europe, Nobody Knows How to Scream Anymore Mads Led Behrend – Noise Repetition – The Political Potential in Contemporary Music
5. Marx and Marxism Today (II. Visualizing Capital) – Malet Street 538
Sami Khatib – Allegory, Commodity, and Death. Reading Capital with Benjamin Leena Petersen – On the Visual Dimension of Alienation: The Berlin School (Hirdina, Heise, Trebess)
6. Critique of Critical Theory (I) – Malet Street 151
Fernanda Frizzo Bragato – Towards a Theoretical Foundation of Human Rights: An Analysis from Decolonial Thinking Elise Derroitte & Alain Loute – Critique of Critique: On Critical Interventions
15:00-15:30 – Break
London Conference in Critical Thought
15:30-17:00 – Parallel Sessions 4
1. Critical Education and Radical Pegagogy (I. The Institutionalization of Education) – Malet Street 416
Matias Gardin – Evolution of Welfare States 1960-1970: Birth of Education Society in Finland and West Germany Stephen Cowden and Gurnam Singh – The Politics and Pedagogy of Debt: The New Poverty of Student Life Soo Tian Lee – The Tyranny of Structured-ness: Is the Struggle for Education Restricted to Institutional Battlegrounds?
2. Žižek and the Political (I. Žižek and Violence) – Malet Street 417
Petr Agha - Anonymous Democracy – The Legacy of the French Revolution Dasten Julián Vejar – The Mapuche Hunger Strike and The Terrorism Act in Chile: Symptoms of a State and their anti-ethical dimensions
3. Deleuzian Theory in Practice (I. Practices) – Malet Street G16
Marko Jobst – Deleuze, Philosophy and the Missing Architecture Robert Gorny – Who Does Architecture think It Is?: Agencement–Theory and the Form of the City Charles Barthold – What is Deleuze and Guattari’s Political Theory, if There is Any?
4. Critique of Critical Theory (II) – Malet Street 541
Donna V. Jones – The Limits of “Bare Life”: Eurocentrism and the Biopolitics of the Periphery Selamawit D. Terrefe – Critical Theory and Violence: Enabling Projects, Constitutive Elements Dhanveer Singh Brar – The Blackness of Black Studies
5. Critical Art (III) – Malet Street 538 Amelia Groom – Killing Time Without Inuring Eternity Benoît Dillet & Tara Puri – Forging time: Challenging Modernity in Ai Weiwei Oisín Wall – Constructing Surrealism
6. Radical Political Rhetoric (I. Theorising Political Rhetoric) – Malet Street 151
John Roberts – Discourse or Dialogue? Habermas, the Bakhtin Circle and the Question of Concrete Utterances Mark Kelly – The Tactical Polyvalence of Leftism Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis – Being Radical: The Modernist Grounds of Radical Political Rhetoric Giuseppe Ballacci – The Politics of Redescription and Democracy: Going beyond Rorty
7. Cosmopolitanism and the City – Malet Street 540
Daniel O'Gorman – ‘Reorient[ing] the Politics of the State’: Cosmopolitanism and Multidirectionality in Teju Cole’s Open City Rachel Kapelke-Dale – Paris, Paramount: Ernst Lubitsch and the Imaginary Open City Esra Mirze Santesso – Cosmopolitanism and the Metropolis Erdem Ertürk – Olympics: Cosmopolitan Dialectics of the City and the State
London Conference in Critical Thought
Saturday 30th June
(front desk and late registration in Clore G01, Management Centre)
10:00-11:30 – Parallel Sessions 1
1. A Transdisciplinary Approach to Law and
Culture – Malet Street G15 Siraj Ahmed – Colonial Law and the Destruction of Tradition Saroj Giri – Fanon, Violence and the Post-colonials Eddie Bruce-Jones – Oury Jalloh and the Colonial Scene: Law as Reminder
2. The Question of the Animal, the City and the World (II. Animal Life: Beyond Good and Evil) – Malet Street 451
Daniel van Strien – A Marxist Response to ‘The Animal Question’? Hyun Sook Oh – Deleuze and an Ethics of Suffering: Toward the Zone of Indiscernibility of Human and Animal Tom Lee – A Poetics of the Naughty
3. Thinking Egalitarian Emancipation (II. Emancipatory Practices) – Clore 101
John Foran – Taking Power or Re-Making Power? New Political Cultures and Strategies of Opposition in the Americas and Beyond Kevin Gray – The Failure of the Post-1968 Consensus Inigo Wilkens & Andrew Osborne – Abstract of Catalyzing Dissent: Irreversible Noise and Computational Immanence
4. Deleuzian Theory in Practice (II. Corporeality) – Malet Street 415
Anna Chromik – Humoural Assemblages and the Praxis of Corporeal Confluence Aidan Tynan – Deleuze and Alcoholism Dennis Rothermel – Refractions of Crystallinity
5. Sovereignty at the Margins: Critical Theory and Early Modern Encounters with the State (I) – Malet Street 417
Paula Schwebel – Walter Benjamin’s Monadology and the Fragmentation of Sovereignty: A Response to Carl Schmitt Osman Nemli – Hobbes, Foucault and the Shadow of Sovereignty Mauro Senatore – On the Unconditional Heteronomy of the Sovereign
6. Marx and Marxism Today (III. Dialectics) – Clore 102
Vasillis Grollios – Max Horkheimer’s Open Marxism Retrieved. A Defence of His Dialectics Tom Bunyard – Marx, Hegel and the 'Realisation of Philosophy' in the Work of Guy Debord and the Situationist International Ishay Landa – Communism and Consumerism: A New Perspective
7. Critical Human Rights (III. Thinking Beyond The Human of Rights) – Clore 103
Daniel McLoughlin – Human Rights and the End of History Andrew Schaap – Abjection and Agonism: Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of Human Rights Itay Eisinger – Paintballs Against Lynchers – The Israeli media's coverage of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Can Oztas – Race-thinking: Still Setting the Boundaries of Human Rights Law
11:30-12:00 – Break
London Conference in Critical Thought
12:00-13:30 – Parallel Sessions 2
1. Critical Education and Radical Pegagogy (II. Critical Theory and Radical Pedagogy) – Malet Street G15
David Christopher Stoop – Critical Education and the Creation of Situations: From Adorno’s Critique of Halbbildung Towards a Situationist Pedagogical Praxis Kasper Opstrup – Understanding Post-Situationist Struggles in Education: A Comparative Analysis of the Production of Bio-Political Utopias and Revolutionary Subjectivities Then and Now
2. Common Life: Critical Perspectives on Authority, Experience and Community (II. On the Practical and Embodied; Radical Perspectives on the Production and Experience of Community) – Malet Street 451
Tracey Skillington – ‘We Bow Our Heads in Deep Mourning’: Genocide Remembrance Amongst Global Political Communities Thomas Swann – Social Media, Organisational Cybernetics and Non-Hierarchical Community Organisation Adam Gearey – On Martin Luther King Day...
3. Textual Space/Spatial Text (III. Space) – Clore 101
Andrea Vesentini – Rewriting the City, Reading Harry Beck's Tube Map as a Form of Writing Edwina Attlee – Fire Escape / Washing Line Peter Safronov – The Language of Real Estate Boards in Moscow, Kiev and Bucharest Jonathan Stafford – Towards a Spatial Ontology of the Maritime Subject of Modernity
4. Marx and Marxism Today (IV. Abstraction and Value) – Malet Street 415
Simon Choat – Real Abstraction and the Marxism of Alfred Sohn-Rethel Elena Louisa Lange – Failed Abstraction: A Critique of Uno Kõzõ's Reading of Marx's Theory of the Value Form
5. Sovereignty at the Margins: Critical Theory and Early Modern Encounters with the State (II) – Malet Street 417
Erin McElroy – Securitization Through Sovereignty: Anti-Roma Violence in the Nation and Supranation Perveen Ali & Nicolas Blanc – Waning Sovereignty’s New Walls: Contested Mexican American Identity Politics in Ethnic Studies in Arizona Konstantinos Eleftheriadis – Is Radical Queer Politics Transnational? Expanding Transnational Activism Towards Marginality
(session 2 continues on the next page)
London Conference in Critical Thought
13:30-14:30 – Break for Lunch
6. Radical Political Rhetoric (II. Case Studies and Engagements) – Clore 102
Alicia Dominguez Garnelo & Rommy Morales – The Not Reactive Rhetoric of Emergent Social Movements Zinaida Feldman – Not Another Twitter Revolution: Social Media and the Radical Politics of Refusal Anat Matar – The Role of Ethics for Radical Political Discourse Sofia H. Hadjisavvidou – This Silence that Is Not One: Silence as a Tactic in Politics
7. Critical Human Rights (IV. Unworking Disembodied Human Rights) – Clore 103
Anna Grear – Uncanny Disembodiments, an Ethico-Material Turn and the Future of Human Rights Elisabetta Bertolino – Right of Resistance and Human Rights Intactivism: The Mutilated Body of Female Genital Cutting Cecilia Sosa – Narratives of Blood and the Killjoy Sister: Queering Human Rights’ Politics in Contemporary Argentina
London Conference in Critical Thought
14:30-16:00 – Parallel Sessions 3
1. Critical Education and Radical Pedagogy (III.
Critical Pedagogy Now) – Malet Street G15 Jones Irwin – Paulo Freire’s Educational Progressivism and Its Contemporary Significance Sarah Amsler – The Practical Politics of ‘Criticality’ in Higher Education Joyce Canaan – Critical Pedagogy, Public Sociology and Student Activism
2. Common Life: Critical Perspectives On Authority, Experience And Community (III. Dreams of the common; openings, possibilities and concerns ) – Malet Street 451
Daniel Matthews – A Communality-to-Come: Deconstructive Politics and Community Tara Atluri – Pirates and Politics: A Digital Commons or Bill Gates’s Wet Dream? Naomi Millner – An Uncommon Commons: Radicalising the Radical Imagination as a Response to New Enclosures Sophie Ball – Reclaim the Commons: Occupy Everything
3. Textual Space/Spatial Text (IV. Critical Distance) – Clore 101
Ivan Callus – Passions and Agonies of Critical Distance; the All Too Exemplary Case of Maurice Blanchot Saul Anton – Photography, Violence and Sovereign Indifference in Benjamin, Agamben and Barthes James Corby – Critical Distance in the Aesthetics and Politics of Stephen Critchley
4. Deleuzian Theory in Practice (III. Incorporeality) – Malet Street 415
Daniela Voss – The Theory of Ideas: Kant and Deleuze Lee Watkins – Deleuze and Guattari: Creative versus Utopian Thinking Kristien Justaert – Tradition as Repetition: A Deleuzian Perspective on Christian Tradition and Practice
5. Sovereignty at the Margins: Critical Theory and Early Modern Encounters with the State (III) – Malet Street 417
Verena Erlenbusch – Contract and Gift in Hobbes’ Theory of Sovereignty Colin McQuillan – Hobbes’ Absolutism and Kant’s Republicanism Georgios Kolias – The Schmittian Deconstruction of Hobbes’ Leviathan
6. The Object: Between Time and Temporality (III. Temporality as Strategy) – Clore 102
Reuben Bard Rosenberg – Preservation, Restoration and the Politics of the English Constitution in the 19th Century Theodoros Chiotis – Rememory: Temporality and Autobiographical Discourse Matt Mahon – Postcolonial Thought, Temporality, Transdisciplinarity William E Conklin – The Experiential Time of Pre-legality
7. Žižek and the Political (II. Theoretical Interventions) – Clore 103
Gabriel Tupinambá – The Toilet as the Žižekian Vase: On the Implications of the Lacanian Concept of Cause to the Critique of Political Economy Ricardo Camargo – Rethinking the Political: A Genealogy of the “Antagonism” in Carl Schmitt Through the Lens of Laclau-Mouffe-Zizek Chris McMillan – Class Struggle and New Forms of Apartheid: What Does Sexual Difference Tell Us About Urban Slums ?
Evening: Reception [details TBC]
London Conference in Critical Thought
Thanks to Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities and Birkbeck School of Law for their support, Edinburgh University Press, and to the
Stream Organisers, the LCCT Collective, and to Victoria Ridler in particular.
Streams and Coordinators
A Transdiscipl inary Approach to Law and Culture Eddie Bruce-Jones
Radical Pol it ical Rhetoric
James Martin & Alan Finlayson
Common Life: Crit ical Perspectives on Authority, Experience and Community Leila Dawney & Samuel Kirwan
Sovereignty at the Margins: Crit ical Encounters with Early Modern Theories of the State
Verena Erlenbusch, Osman Nemli & Colin McQuillan
Cosmopolitanism and the City Anastasia Tataryn & Erdem Ertürk
Textual Space/Spatial Text
Hannah Gregory & Edwina Attlee
Crit ical Art Oisin Wall
The Object: Between Time and Temporal ity
Sam Wilson & Matt Mahon
Crit ical Human Rights Illan rua Wall
The Question of the Animal, the City and the World
Yoriko Otomo
Crit ique of Crit ical Theory José-Manuel Barreto
Thinking Egalitarian Emancipation
Matthew Cole & Svenja Bromberg
Deleuzian Theory in Practice Craig Lundy
Ž ižek and the Pol it ical
Chris McMillan
Mapping the Concept: Developments in the Productive Power of Crit ical Theory Stephen Connelly
Marx and Marxism Today
Chris O’Kane & Phil Homburg
Crit ical Education and Radical Pedagogy Matthew Charles, Timothy Ivison & Tom Vandeputte
The Body and Subjectiv ity
Daniel Matthews
New Foucauldian Approaches Samuel Kirwin
London Conference in Critical Thought
Friday 29th June
Time /Room
MS 416 MS 417 MS G16 MS 541 MS 538 MS 151 MS 540
9:30-‐11:00
SPATIAL TEXT I
CRITICAL ART I
HUMAN RIGHTS I
COMMON LIFE I
THE ANIMAL I
THE BODY
11:00-‐10:30
Break
11:30-‐13:00
SPATIAL TEXT II
FOUCAULT HUMAN RIGHTS II
MAPPING THE
CONCEPT
THE OBJECT I
MARX I
13:00-‐14:00
Lunch
14:00-‐15:00
THE OBJECT II
THE ANIMAL II
EMANCIPATION I
CRITICAL ART II
MARX II CRITIQUE OF THEORY I
15:00-‐15:30
Break
15:30-‐17:00
EDUCATION I ŽIŽEK I DELEUZIAN THEORY I
CRITIQUE OF THEORY II
CRITICAL ART III
RHETORIC I COSMOPOLITANISM I
Saturday 30th June
Time /Room
MS G15 MS 451 Clore 101 MS 415 MS 417 Clore 102 Clore 103
10:00-‐11:30
LAW I THE ANIMAL III
EMANCIPATION II
DELEUZIAN THEORY II
SOVEREIGNTY I
MARX III HUMANS RIGHTS III
11:30-‐12:00
Break
12:00-‐13:30
EDUCATION II COMMON LIFE II
SPATIAL TEXT III
MARX IV SOVEREIGNTY II
RHETORIC II HUMAN RIGHTS IV
13:30-‐14:30
Lunch
14:30-‐16:00
EDUCATION III COMMON LIFE III
SPATIAL TEXT IV
DELEUZIAN THEORY III
SOVEREIGNTY III
THE OBJECT III
ŽIŽEK II
Evening Reception [details TBC]
[1]
Being Radical: The Modernist Grounds of Radical Political Rhetoric1
Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the
Balkans, UOWM, Greece
Please note: Paper presented at the London Conference in Critical Thought.
Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK, June 29-30, 2012.
Abstract
Radical political rhetoric (RPR) is generally treated as a future-oriented venture
calling for a total break with the past and presuming a sclerosis of the present
order. It owes this usage to a modernist conceptualization of radicality, which,
however, bears etymologically the traces of its past (radix=root). This
conceptualization poses the issue of the extent and limits of the inventiveness or
mere mimesis of RPR in relation to the dominant discourses it seeks to disrupt, as
well as the novelty of its argumentative forms and rhetorical practices. This
article argues that although the investigation of the tropes and modes commonly
deployed in RPR is important in its own right, we can neither appreciate its
potential dynamism nor avert its possible pathologies, if the relation between
future anticipation and present experience within RPR remains unexamined. By
building on Paul Ricoeur’s dialectic of ideology and utopia and his hermeneutics of
historical consciousness, and by reading these in parallel with Reinhart Koselleck’s
conceptual history, the article shows that dominant discourses do not merely
function as distorted representations of political experience. They also pertain to
the legitimation of the present political order, as well as to the integration of
society. Correspondingly, RPR does not only disclose a series of future political
possibilities and open up a space for a critical interrogation of the present. It may
also lead to a form of escapism from the necessities and callings of current
political experience. The article then applies these insights to a brief consideration
of RPR in the context of the eurozone crisis of 2011-2012.
Keywords: Radical political rhetoric; historicality; ideology/utopia; tradition;
Ricoeur; Koselleck
1 I thank the participants and especially Alan Finlayson, Jim Martin, Sofia Hadjisavvidou,
and Aslı Güven for their helpful insights. I am grateful to Terrell Carver for his detailed corrections and insightful suggestions. I also thank Mervyn Frost, Stefan Rossbach, and Mick Dillon for their comments and support on earlier versions of my entanglement with Ricoeur's thought.
[1]
Past Not Yet: The Historicality of Radical Political Rhetoric
It is almost a truism to suggest that radical political rhetoric [RPR] is a clearly
future-oriented venture, involving a successful breaking with the past. This
commonsensical understanding of RPR owes its dynamism to a modernist
noematic shift of radicality. Deriving from the Latin radix [root], the radical
etymologically bears already the traces of its past. In a medieval philosophical
sense [late 14th c.], being radical [radicalis] first meant arising from or having
roots.2 In the spirit of the Renaissance [c. 1650s], the word radical was even
used to connote the return to the root or the source.3 It was Modernity that
marked the noematic metamorphosis of radicality: its literal, lexicalized meaning
now involved a certain passage of its central idea from the opening-up to the
breaking-with; from disclosing a future to wholly departing from the past. Against
Marx's (1982, 137) own admonition, to be radical is not 'to grasp matters at the
root'. Modern radicality still registers the future, but only after and through a
divorce with the past.
This revolutionary meaning first became implicit in everyday communication as
Charles James Fox's 'radical reform' became a current phrase, and the term was
eventually used in its present meaning to describe the political agendas and
rhetorics of the early-19th century British Liberal Party, the 1848 revolutionaries
etc. In parallel with the social and political developments of the 20th century, it
also became a synonym for the unconventional, the revolutionary, the
incontrollable (Kraditor, 1981). The concrete political agenda of radicalism
remained variant and defined in a historically and culturally specific way. In a
manner relevant to the purposes of the present article, its ideological movement
and diversification has been determined a contrario by the agenda of its
occasional adversary, the dominant ideology.4
[2]
Reflecting the protest and civil rights movements' demand for rejecting the
sociopolitical sclerosis of the late 1960s and 1970s, the impressive bibliography
on RPR attests as a whole to this modernist future-oriented emphasis on change
(Auer, 1969; Bosmajian and Bosmajian, 1969; Brandes, 1971; Katope and
Zolbrod, 1970; Miles, 1971; Tanner et al., 1985; Zorza, 1970). A similar
persistence on the functions of critique and change is also typical in the more
recent literature on RPR (Allen and Faigley, 1995; Fairclough, 1992; Morris III
and Browne, 2006; Stewart et al., 1994). Almost exclusively, the focus is on the
tropes, modes or sources of an effective, subversive, transitory and creative RPR.
These are often traced in the symbolic or creative capacity of language itself
(Griffin, 1969; Merelman, 1992), cynic parresia and diatribe (Kennedy, 1999;
Windt, 1972), violence and the disruption of communication (Benson, 1970),
protest songs (Denisoff, 1968), humour (Hodge and Mansfield, 1985), or even
silence (Block de Behar, 1995, 6-9; Hadjisavvidou, 2012).
Exploring the most efficient tropes and modes of RPR is of course important by
itself. Yet, if the historicality (Heidegger, 1962; Ricoeur, 1980) of RPR remains
unexamined, how could it avoid repeating the avant garde (Bürger, 1984)
gestures of the past? Has the idea of an RPR already become a cliché? Or is it
that while RPR represents itself as constituted in a radical break with the
dominant discourses, in fact it stands in direct and discrediting continuity with
them? Could a post-foundational radicalism face up to the contingencies of
history, without giving up the illusion of a 'new beginning' (Blumenberg, 1983)?
With the exception of the hermeneutic strand (Jost and Hyde, 1997), perhaps the
closest theorists have reached to discussing the historicality of rhetoric was with
the debate on the so-called 'rhetorical-situation'. The two leading views, first
coined by Lloyd Bitzer (1968) and Richard Vatz (1973) respectively, discuss the
[3]
context of a historical situation (issue, audience, constraints) either as
determining rhetoric, or as being created by a rhetoric which renders certain
issues salient. The syllogism implicit in this debate is reminiscent of similar
theoretical dualisms (i.e. realism vs. social constructivism) pertaining to whether
reality is discovered or created by the language we use to describe it. However,
both strands in this debate presuppose that the identity of the subjects involved
in a rhetorical situation 'is constituted in a terrain different from and external to
the particular rhetorical situation' (Biesecker 1989).
In my view, this debate presents itself as a dualism between two seemingly
incommunicable and incommensurable ends, due to a limited understanding of
the relation between language and reality. This phenomenal aporia has been
resolved in Paul Ricoeur's (1991b, 462, emphases added) ontological paradox of
creation-as-discovery: 'Through this recovery of the capacity of language to
create and recreate, we discover reality itself in the process of being created. …
[Language] is attuned to this dimension of reality which itself is unfinished and in
the making. Language in the making celebrates reality in the making.' Both
language and our sense of reality are thus shattered and increased in parallel
(Ricoeur, 1978, 132).
Following Ricoeur's work on the dialectic between ideology and utopia and his
hermeneutics of historical consciousness, read in parallel with Reinhart
Koselleck's conceptual history, this article argues that an investigation of the
historicality of RPR involves a) a 'regressive analysis of meaning' (Ricoeur, 1986,
311) with respect to the social functions of and the subtle dialectic between RPR
and dominant discourse, and b) a distinctive reading of what has been given to us
by the past as 'traditionality', 'traditions' and 'Tradition' (Ricoeur, 1988). I argue
that RPR is not only a critical interrogation of lived experience from the vantage
point of an aspired future. It is a projection towards the political future from a
[4]
historical present always already conditioned by the past. In this context, I will
use the subtle dialectic between Koselleck's (1985) meta-historical categories, the
'space of experience' and the 'horizon of expectation' within RPR, to elucidate the
political implications involved in the articulation of future aspirations when this is
done on the basis of history as historicality, the future-being-affected-by-the-
past.
A genetic phenomenology of RPR
Political rhetoric is often regarded as radical by virtue of a) the challenges it
poses to the given order and its dominant forms of discourse, and b) the vista of
possibilities it opens to politics. Both the efficacity and the appropriateness of RPR
are evaluated according to how successfully it meets these functions. Yet, are
these two social functions (challenge and possibility) the only ones served by
RPR? If these are the positive functions of its political imaginary, is RPR free from
any pathology? Furthermore, what is the relation sustained between RPR and the
dominant discourse it seeks to disrupt?
In this first section, I will examine the social functions of RPR in pair with those of
dominant discourse, in order to explore their positive and pathological traits and
show that the functions of these phenomenal adversaries are caught up in a
dialectic that involves both conflict and complementarity. My analysis will be
based on Ricoeur's discussion of ideology and utopia as two limit-ideas, as two
constitutive expressions for any durable society. In his 'regressive analysis of
meaning', Ricoeur (1986, 311) attempts to 'dig under the surface of the apparent
meaning to more fundamental meanings' of ideology and utopia, so that both
their positive and pathological traits will be highlighted. He suggests that ideology
pertains not merely to the functions of distortion but also to those of legitimation
and social integration. Correspondingly, utopia does not only function as an
[5]
opening of future possibilities. It may equally function as a critique of the given
order or even as a form of escape from the current necessities and callings.
In a similar vein, both RPR and dominant discourse pertain to certain
representational qualities and social functions, which are parallel to those of
ideology and utopia respectively (Akrivoulis, 2005). An exploration of their social
functions complements Ricoeur's own genetic phenomenology of ideology and
utopia, to the extent that their subtle dialectic is here examined at the temporal
plane, too. In order to investigate this dialectic, I will briefly follow Ricoeur's
(1998, 61, 76) 'difficult detour' into their initial disproportionality.
As a form of re-evaluating and constructing our political experience and
expectation, a dominant discourse is often criticized as being a deliberately
segmental, selective, inaccurate, or false representation of political reality. In that
sense, a dominant discourse is thought to perform the apparent ideological
function of distortion. Yet, such an understanding of distortion implies the pre-
existence of a real (correct) political experience and expectation that then
becomes dissimulated.5 By distortion here I rather mean the process through
which the present of a political community is uncritically vindicated as
corresponding to what has been given by the past, and through which the
community's symbolic means for the mediation of its temporal existence become
fixed and fetishized (Ricoeur, 1995b, 230). This process is the meeting point of
representation and praxis (Ricoeur, 1986, 10).6 Yet, an understanding of
dominant discourse as mere distortion is but a definition of the concept at the
surface level.
Moving to the next, deeper level of meaning, I reach the legitimating function of
dominant discourse. It is the task of a dominant discourse to legitimate the
community's present by filling in the gap between the present sociopolitical
[6]
ordering that provides society with a specific ideological pattern or Gestalt
(Ordnung) and the individual intellectual representations of this order
(Vorstellung) (Klotz, et al., 2006; Schaar, 1981; Skocpol, 1979; Wolfe, 1977).
The belief in the legitimacy of the given order is always in need of a symbolic
supplement, and it is the role of the dominant discourse to provide it (Ricoeur,
1992; 1989, 170-173; 1987, 41-43; 1991a, 205-206; Habermas, 1975). Hence it
becomes the discourse of the community's political ontology, eventually leading
to its blindness and closure. It ceases 'to be mobilising in order to become
justificatory; or rather, it continues to be mobilising only insofar as it is
justificatory' (Ricoeur, 1997, 307). This occurs when 'schematization and
rationalization prevail' (Ricoeur, 1986, 266), finally leading to the 'stagnation of
politics' (Ricoeur, 1981, 229).
At the third and deepest level in this 'unmasking' of dominant discourse, we find
the function of integration. By providing a shared symbolic system, the dominant
discourse helps to integrate society. Through the codifying function of its
representational modes, the dominant imaginary is maintained by turning its
fundamental ideas into commonly shared opinions. In this symbolic
schematization, it allows the idealization and perpetuation of the existing forms of
political organization and interaction. In other words, a dominant discourse may
function as both distortion and legitimation, because it has already functioned in
an integrating manner at the level of symbolism (Ricoeur, 1982, 116).
Let us now turn to the genetic phenomenology of RPR by discussing its first level
of function, that is, the way it discloses a series of future political possibilities.
RPR provides an alternative imaginary variation on political reality by opening up
a way towards the not-yet. It includes both an anticipation of and a claim for an
alternative future that, although not presently existent, wants to be realized. This
is the utopian 'function of the nowhere' that dialectically relates to Dasein: 'To be
[7]
here, Da-sein, I must also be able to be nowhere. There is a dialectic of Dasein
and nowhere.' (Ricoeur, 1986, 310)
Moving to the second level, we meet RPR functioning as challenge. This function
is the counterpart of the legitimating function of dominant discourse. Whereas the
latter provides the symbolic supplement in need, RPR aims at divulging the
undeclared surplus value. Such a call is not merely 'the fantasy of an alternative
society'. It is a political 'nowhere' that functions 'as one of the most formidable
contestations of what is' (Ricoeur, 1986, 16). We are capable of radically
rethinking the given, because we have already placed our viewpoint in the non-
place of political invention, for 'the shadow of the forces capable of shattering a
given order are already the shadow of an alternative order that could be opposed
to the given order'. It is the utopian function of RPR 'to give the force of discourse
to this possibility' (Ricoeur, 1982, 117-118). This view from the not-yet nowhere
functions as a meta-critical gaze, an epoché, suspending our assumptions about
the past and the present.
At the third deepest level, we may discuss RPR as a form of escapism. If RPR
remains alien to political experience, it may strengthen indifference towards the
realisation of its claim, leading to an 'eclipse of praxis' (Ricoeur, 1991a, 322). In
this case, it may further function as a new dogmatic orthodoxy itself. If RPR fails
to provide the practical conditions for realizing a radical political future, all it could
do is 'project a static future' (Ricoeur, 1995b, 230). Whereas a dominant
discourse may function as distortion because it has already functioned in a
legitimating and integrating manner, this pathology of RPR emerges out of its
most positive trait, that is, its 'function of the nowhere', which has allowed the
reimagination of politics in the first place. In such a case, we could find ourselves
in a position no different from the one in which the distorting function of
dominant discourse has already placed us. It seems that the functional traits of
[8]
dominant discourse and RPR are simply opposed to each other: integration contra
challenge, legitimation contra possibility, distortion contra escapism. Yet, this
subtle dialectic involves both conflict and complementarity. They are
complementary expressions of the Janus face of social imagination.
The (post 9-11) discursive responses to the eurozone crisis offer an apt example
of this subtle dialectic. On the one hand, the rhetorical strategies of the dominant
neoliberal discourse involve, among others, the segmentation, nationalization,
and securitization of the crisis, the parallel securitization of the migration
'problem', the criminalization of dissent, the promotion of neoliberal policy
remedies, etc (Huysmans, 2006). These rhetorical strategies have proven to be
successful especially in those states that most suffer the crisis and have been
held primarily accountable for it (e.g. 'European South'), performing the social
functions described above as ideological (distortion, legitimation, integration). To
a great extent, the dominant discourse has namely managed to a) suppress the
systemic roots of the crisis (distortion); b) legitimize the intervening role of the
neoliberal institutions, numerous anti-popular neoliberal policies that would have
normally involved an unbearable political cost, the walling of state borders, the
adoption of extreme police measures of monitoring and control, and the
exceptional suspension of civil liberties (legitimation); and, finally, c) integrate
society by averting possible insurgencies or even a societal collapse through a
rhetorical mix of fear, insecurity, and no-alternative policy options (integration).
On the other hand, the RPR often employed as a response to this dominant
discourse pertains to the social functions discussed above as utopian (possibility,
challenge, escapism). More often than not, it aims at a) disclosing those
alternatives that have been suppressed or silenced by the dominant discourse,
while at the same time opening up a vista of altogether new political possibilities,
alien to the neoliberal imaginary (possibility), and b) divulging the undeclared
[9]
surplus value of the neoliberal rhetoric on the crisis, exposing its systemic roots,
and questioning the 'inescapability' of the policies so far opted (challenge). At the
same time, though, it c) runs the risk of functioning as a form of escapism, if it
fails to designate a concrete exit from the crisis and a path towards an alternative
political and economic system (escapism).
On what ground should we then count on and value RPR, if it fails to fully escape
its own pathology? It is the task of RPR to 'flight from' and 'return to' the
specificities, necessities and callings of political experience. For as Ricoeur (1982,
124) has asked, 'who ... knows if a certain degree of individual pathology is not
the condition of social change, at least to the extent that such pathology brings to
light the sclerosis of dead institutions?' We always already find ourselves
entangled, yet not helplessly entrapped within the practical circle, in which RPR
and dominant discourse are interacting. Yet this circle is not unavoidably closed,
rigid and immutable. It is our task to turn it into a spiral. The not-yet-realized
horizon of the aspired future may function not only as a critique but also as the
integrating imaginary ground of human emancipation (Koselleck, 2002, 261-264).
This presupposes that our expectations are brought together with the actual field
of lived experience. It is of course important to investigate the appropriate
discursive forms for developing an effective RPR. Of equal importance are also the
imaginary variations of a radical political future. Yet, neither the means nor the
end could escape the utopian pathology of RPR, if we fail to carefully draw our
path towards this radical political future.
traditionality, traditions, Tradition
What then, if any, should be the role of political experience in our path-making to
a different future with RPR? What is the situation we find ourselves in when
claiming for a radical break with the past? How could the claims for a renewed
future become socially meaningful and practically attainable? These are the core
[10]
questions that I tackle in this second section by drawing on Ricoeur's
hermeneutics of historical consciousness read in conjunction with Reinhart
Koselleck's work on the receptivity of the past, to which Ricoeur’s own discussion
is much indebted.
Ricoeur (1988) calls for a practical yet imperfect mediation between past and
future in a pluralistic unity, building upon two regulative concepts developed by
Koselleck (1985): the 'space of experience' and the 'horizon of expectation'.
Ricoeur interprets the dialectic between these two meta-historical categories
under the light of three related topoi, in which these categories were instantiated
by the philosophy of the Enlightenment: first, the belief that the present age has
an unprecedented perspective on the future; second, the belief that these new
times are also accelerating times and that changes for the better are rapidly
progressing faster (Koselleck, 1985, 18); and third, the belief that human beings
are increasingly more capable of making their own history. According to Ricoeur
(1988, 214), although those main categories have been illustrated by these three
topoi of Modernity, they 'stand on a higher categorical level than any envisaged
topoi'. They are meta-historical concepts to the extent that their perseverance
has outlasted the decline of the sparkling topoi of the Enlightenment.
Ricoeur (1988, 212) suggests that the first of these topoi (new times, neue Zeit)
appears to be suspect insofar as hardly could anyone claim for a progressive
distinctiveness of the modern age, Neuzeit. What is distinct in the first topos of
Modernity is exactly the idea of progress that underwrites it, increasing the
distance (l'écart) between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation
(Ricoeur, 2004, 390). The second topos (acceleration of history) is equally
challenged. According to Koselleck, the modern age is characterized by an
increasing distance between the space of experience and the horizon of
expectation. This acceleration of history is 'the infallible manifestation that the
[11]
écart is maintained only while permanently changing' (Ricoeur, 2004, 390). As to
the third topos (mastering history) Ricoeur notes that its vulnerability is divulged
not only by the unintended results of human actions and the contingency of
historical change, but also and most crucially by a cardinal misapprehension of
history itself: our disregarding that we are always already thrown into a history
which conditions both our existence and our anticipations. This is something
against which even Marx himself (1996, 32), one of the preponderant exponents
of this topos, has cautioned us by suggesting that 'men make their own history,
but they do not make it just as they please in circumstances they choose for
themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances, given and inherited.'7
What is downplayed through this topos of modernity is the fact that in 'making'
history we always already find ourselves affected by what has been given to us as
history and by the history we ourselves make. It is only when this final topos
escapes its modern alignment with the idea of progress and recognizes this
'rapport double à l’histoire', that it becomes a truly metahistorical concept
(Ricoeur, 2004, 391).
In that sense, any call for a radical break with the past involves the necessity of
critically re-examining how we relate to tradition. Warning against the aphoristic
assertion that the future is always open and contingent, whereas the past is
always closed, rigid and finite, Ricoeur (1988, 221) counsels that rather than
treat the past as a fait accompli, we have to re-open it as a 'living tradition', so
that its undisclosed possibilities would be revivified. It is our open-ended task to
rhetorically formulate a path towards the realization of a radical future, under the
penalty of our RPR being cancelled as soon as it loses its foothold in experience.
It is also imperative to make sure that this tension is not turned into a schism.
This entails that any claim for a radical future is always already inscribed in the
present and should hence respond to the necessities, callings and commitments
[12]
of political experience. In that sense, there has to be sustained a tensional
relevance between political experience and future expectations within RPR. Even
when RPR projects a radically different future, we still are the heirs of the past;
we are still embedded in given discourses and practices. No matter how distant
our aspirations for the future might seem to be, we would never be in the position
of being 'absolute innovators', but rather we would be 'always first of all in the
situation of being heirs' (Ricoeur, 1988, 221).
Hence the paradox: We cannot struggle for a different political future without
breaking with the sclerosis of the present. But equally we cannot suppose that
our hopes about this future become more meaningful in deficit of any historical
household. This by no means implies, however, that a dominant discourse should
become the criterion of truth for any future claim. This is an immanent danger,
which we will unavoidable face if we 'easily succumb to the sterile antithesis
between a reactionary apologism of the past and a naïve affirmation of progress'
(Kearney, 1991, 57).
Rendering this being-affected-by-the-past more intelligible involves a passage by
way through a clarification of past heritage. Here it is useful to follow Ricoeur's
distinction between three different problems discussed under the headings of
'traditionality', 'traditions', and finally 'Tradition'. First, 'traditionality' (Ricoeur,
1988, 219-221) refers to the transmission of past heritage to future generations.
It is the temporalization of history through a certain dialectics between our being
passively affected by history and our active response to history. On the one hand,
traditionality resists both the total abolishment of the past and the Nitzschean
idea of a hiatus between changing horizons that would dissolve history into a
multiplicity of incommensurable individual perspectives. On the other hand, it
also resists an idealist synchronisation of past and future that would reduce the
diversity of history to the absolute identity of contemporaneous understanding.
[13]
Second, 'traditions' (Ricoeur, 1988, 221) refer to the 'material concept of the
contents of a tradition', that is, the actual transmission of past meanings through
texts and narratives and their reception within the present symbolic order. Here
the consciousness of being exposed to the past becomes supplemented by our
interpretative response to the texts that communicate this past to us. It is
through such (re-)interpretations that what has been independent from the
temporality of Dasein is now appropriated into human existence. Even more
crucially, it is through the transmission of historical meanings that a certain aura
of sociality is added to historicality, surpassing the monadic ontology of
Heidegger's Dasein. Thinking of history as historicality, thus understood and
supplemented, is what conditions the efficacity of the past through collective
memories or narrated stories (Bourgeois and Schalow, 1990, 138).
The third and final category of historical past discussed by Ricoeur (1988, 227) is
'Tradition', defined as 'an instance of legitimacy, [that] designates the claim to
truth (the taking-for-true) offered argumentation within the public space of
discussion'. Here, the above mentioned danger of understanding the efficacity of
the past as an apology for the dominant discourse is more imminent. A
hermeneutics of RPR already involves a critique of ideology insofar as we accept
that the discourses and practices we are always already embedded in are not
mere dogmatic fixations, but ongoing dialectics full of historical continuities as
well as ruptures, internal crises, rivalries and revisions, which themselves open
up a critical space for interpretation.
This interpretation raises, in turn, the question of legitimacy. Here we face two
possible risks relevant to the Gadamer-Habermas polemic. These risks pertain,
according to Ricoeur, either a) to finding refuge in an idealizable but not
realizable future (if we follow Habermas's appeal to an ahistorical ideal of
[14]
undistorted communication), or b) to reading the past as Tradition (if we follow
Gadamer's backward look of inherited pre-understanding). No ideal of undistorted
communication could be possible without a dialogical dimension rooted in the
dialectics between our horizon of expectation and our space of experience
(Ricoeur, 1988, 219-224). It is only upon such a ground that RPR could be
validated, without leading us either to a schismatic negation of the given or to an
unconditional acceptance of the past.
In other words, an effective RPR presupposes that we are not only capable of
genuine intervention and initiative for creating something new (ipse), but also
ourselves made possible and constrained by our material and cultural situations
(idem). This is for Ricoeur (1992, 35; 2000, 23), the moment of 'l'homme
capable'. It is always in the agonistic context (Finlayson, 2009, 21) of our
interaction with others that the capacity to designate ourselves as the authors of
our own actions becomes meaningful. Commonly in calls for a radical break with
the past, we make an intervention and take an initiative that take place in a
historical present which stands exactly at the intersection of Koselleck's two
meta-historical categories. Whereas the space of experience is the past-made-
present through memory, the horizon of expectation is the future-made-present
through hope (Ricoeur, 1995a; Derrida, 1994). Whereas the space of experience
tends to unify its elements and create a solid ensemble of common memories and
narratives, the horizon of expectation tends to expand and proliferate so that
more possibilities will be included in its scheme (Ricoeur, 1988, 215).
Whenever a claim for a radical future is made, this moment becomes the junction
of the 'synchronic' and 'diachronic orders of experience', where the spaces of
experience and the horizons of expectation of 'concretely acting and suffering
human beings' overlap and intersect (Koselleck, 1985, xxii, xiv). The situation is
actually even more perplexing, since the contemporaries of any political
[15]
community pertain to several living generations. In this conjuncture of
heterogeneous dimensions, the historical subject undergoes simultaneously with
others what H.R. Jauss has described as the test of the 'contemporaneity of the
noncontemporaneous' (Koselleck, 1985, 89). As many diverse and often rival
future claims are synchronously voiced by a multiplicity of co-existing
generations, the process of their appropriation may constitute a paradox and in
extreme cases a scandal, at least in so far as this process involves the exercise of
political power, understood both as domination and as the will to live together.
Here, the horizons of expectation disclosed by the present-made and future-
oriented calls for a radical break with the past (one history) meet the
particularities of a multiplicity of spaces of experience. Here, the feasibility of
history meets the 'metacategory par excellence that constitutes the concept of
history itself as a collective singular' (Ricoeur, 2004, 391).
Drawing on Koselleck's conceptual semantics of history, Ricoeur (2004, 392) also
notes this noematic metamorphosis with regard to two events of longue durée:
on the one hand, the birth of the concept of history understood as a collective
singular 'connecting the special histories under a common concept'; on the other
hand, the '"mutual contamination" of the concept of Geschichte, as a complex of
events, and that of History, as knowledge, reception and historical science'. The
conflation of these two conceptual events has finally led to the absorption of the
latter by the former, finally forming 'one event, namely the production of the
concept of "history as such", of "history itself" (Geschichte selber)'.
This 'mutual contamination' is of particular relevance to the investigation of RPR.
It implies a certain shift in the didactic capacity of history, to the extent that
counsel is henceforth expected 'not from the past but from a future which has to
be made' (Koselleck, 1985, 36, 38). The birth of the concept of history as a
collective singular has marked the Hegelian gathering of all special histories into
[16]
one world history, which now appears indistinguishable from the multitude of all
particular memories (Halbwachs, 1952). The old naïve concept of history as a
pretension to truth has been now reappropriated by a new, self-reflexive
experience of history that coincides with modernity. Because of its omnitemporal
character, this modern concept implied that history 'is the history of humanity...
Humanity becomes the total object and the single subject of history at the same
time when history is made a collective singular' (Ricoeur, 2004, 393). What is
really at stake here concerns the ability to make the reconciliatory and
universalistic claims for one humanity coincide, one history for each community,
with the multiple horizons of expectation disclosed by the claims for radical
invention, without necessarily declining the spaces of experience formed by
particular histories.
RPR is inescapably conditioned by the human condition of plurality, which
according to Arendt (1988, 7) is 'not only the conditio sine qua non, but the
conditio per quam' of all political life. Besides agreement, consent or compromise,
it unavoidably faces the challenges posed by human plurality ranging from
difference and disagreement to rivalry and conflict. When claiming for a radically
new future, Ricoeur's 'l'homme capable' intervenes and initiates, guided by the
idea of a common humanity, conditioned by the absence of any differentiation. In
that sense, the ideological vaulting horse is 'nonpolitical inasmuch as it only
brings onstage a single man, an Adam'. But 'Eden is not a political setting'; his
intervention and initiative take place in the fragile stage of the polis; and here 'we
are no longer in Eden' (Ricoeur, 2000, 91).
If ascribing a specific content to the meaning of innovation presupposes a certain
moral judgement, what could then validate our future expectations? Here
Ricoeur's (2000, 154) answer is no other than phronesis, understood 'as practical
wisdom or, still better, as wisdom in judgment'. To be more precise, Ricoeur's
[17]
(1992, 290) practical wisdom is the Aristotelian phronesis reconciled with Hegel's
Sittlichkeit by way of Kant's Moralität. We find ourselves entangled in exactly
such an aporetic and fragile state of affairs, where there are often difficult and
responsible choices not between black and white but between gray and gray. It is
because of its intrinsic relation to the responsibility involved that this situation is
ineliminably fragile. It is because of the ever-present danger that even the best-
intentioned interventions could 'aggravate the evils they claim to cure' (Ricoeur,
1996, 15) that this fragile situation could as well prove to be a tragic one
(Aubenque, 1963, 155-177; Jaspers, 1953). And yet, this fragile riskiness that
brings forth the necessity of practical wisdom is finally what precludes the
possibility of invention ending up into a closed, rigid, absolute and total concept. I
would say that a radical future is accomplished, in a way similar to history, while
pre-empting the unaccomplished; and 'any interpretation adequate to it therefore
must dispense with totality' (Koselleck, 1985, 24).
Back to the future of the eurozone
This article first suggested that although a future-centred study of the tropes and
modes of RPR is important by itself, an investigation of its historicality is central in
appreciating both its potential dynamism and possible pathologies. Following Paul
Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology, the article moved beyond the standard
critique of dominant discourse as a distortion of political reality, and the common
appreciation of RPR as a powerful tool for critique and change. Delving beneath
the surface-level functions of both adversaries to more fundamental ones, the
article explored the paradoxical relationship sustained between them. I have
argued that dominant discourses do not merely function as distorted
representations of political experience. They also pertain to the legitimation of the
present political order, as well as the integration of society. Correspondingly, RPR
does not only disclose a series of future political possibilities and open up a space
[18]
for a critical interrogation of the present. It may also lead to a form of escapism
from the necessities and callings of current political experience.
The horizon of possibilities opened up by RPR is a horizon of expectations aimed
at the future. But these anticipations are already inscribed in the present. They
are 'the future-become-present, turned toward the not-yet' (Ricoeur, 1998, 208).
In that sense, the imaginary of RPR is not only a metacritical gaze from the u-
topos of an aspired future towards the historical present, but also a projection
towards the political future from this present. As always already inscribed in the
present, this projection needs to fully respond to the specificities of political
experience. A certain relevance needs to be sustained between the given and the
anticipated, a relevance that would preserve its tensional character without ending
up into a schism. Even if we were to resort to a radically innovated future we
would still be the heirs of the past, for the temporal distance that would separate
us from this past is always already a transmission generative of meaning. Of
course this does not mean that we should render those legacies a criterion of
truth. It is to connote instead that no matter how distant our future anticipations
might be, we would always first of all be the heirs of our past.8
Of course, the careful designation of the concrete steps towards a radical political
future is not only a challenging but also a historically and culturally specific
venture. It is hence impossible to provide a standard blueprint applicable in any
case. In order to explicate my argument, however, I will return in brief to the
example used in the first section of the article, concerning the dominant discourse
and the RPR employed on the eurozone crisis. Recent political developments in
Europe indicate a rise of the Left, a drift that is, quite interestingly, not confined in
the so-called 'European South'. Admittedly, this could be hardly attributed to the
efficacity of the RPR employed or the appeal of the political agenda of the Left
alone. Furthermore, no matter how appealing this RPR has proven to be, it still
[19]
has not formed powerful majorities within national electorates able to drive radical
reforms. The recent national elections in Greece, for example, where the maxim
dilemma has been 'fear or hope', have shown that people are still more afraid
than hopeful.
Of course, the RPR employed should keep disclosing all those alternatives that
have been shuttered by the neoliberal discourse, and challenge the 'no-
alternative' neoliberal dilemmas. Yet, the political agenda of the Left could be
hardly appealing enough to affect change, if the RPR employed fails to respond to
the necessities, commitments, and challenges posed not only by the eurozone
crisis, but also and foremost by the well-established practices and discourses of
neoliberal capitalism in the post-9-11 era. To be more precise, here follow some
questions that the Left should consider: How would the claim to tolerance and
equality become appealing, when electorates still see migration as a security
threat rather than as the systemic outcome of the workings of neoliberal
capitalism? How would the claim for social solidarity and social justice become
meaningful, when the modern individual still understands itself and its relation to
others as self-centred and self-interested, lastingly embedded in neoliberal
discourses and practices? How would people be able to hope and translate this
hope into a meaningful political claim, if they are still afraid; if, that is, a number
of already securitized issues have not been adequately de-securitized? How would
it be possible to draft efficient development alternatives, when 'development' is
still conceptualized and measured in terms of 'new imperialism'? How would
environmental concerns become meaningful, when the modern subject is no
longer the Latin sub-jectum, literally, 'that which is thrown under' (Critchley,
1999, 51), but the dominant sovereign subject surrounded by a nature always at
its disposal?
[20]
Answering such questions involves difficult decisions. This difficulty proves that
the crisis experienced is not only of an economic nature. Instead, our historical
present will remain, in Ricoeur's (1998, 235) words, wholly a 'crisis', as long as we
fail to bridge the hiatus between our space of experience and our horizon of
expectation. This is a moment of risk and fragility, a political moment, at least
insofar as the hopes and memories of a particular grouping meet the hopes and
memories of another. In a sense, this is also a violent moment since ascribing a
certain noematic content to this new future involves political relations that pertain
to domination and subordination. But this is also a time of Arendtean (1972, 143)
'action' and 'power'. Here the universal meets the particular. The one history
meets the multitude of individual histories, as RPR meets the challenges posed by
the specificities of a multiplicity of distinct spaces of experiences and horizons of
expectations. This aporetic and fragile moment constitutes both a paradox and a
challenge. The invention implicit in RPR is born from this paradox and inescapably
faces this challenge. It is only when RPR is counselled by a public phronesis that
adapts the universal to fit the particular that it can become both socially
meaningful and practically attainable.
Notes
2 The Greeks used the word rhexekelefthos, literally meaning the one who opens up a new
course.
3 Yet, this is not to suggest that such a lexical intervention could reveal any originary
meanings or unimpaired strengths of the word. Instead, I refer to the literal senses of
radical not as the origins of the word, but as the results of its usage having become
customary and lexicalised. My reference to the literal sense of radical neither involves a
conflation of the literal with the originary, nor implies that the word possesses in itself 'a
proper, i.e. primitive, natural, original (etumon) meaning'; because literal 'does not mean
proper in the sense of originary, but simply current, "usual"' (Ricoeur, 1997, 290, 291).
4 Margaret Thatcher has been even described as a 'radical' within the Conservative Party.
[21]
5 My treatment of this 'reality' is based on a reading of The German Ideology (Marx and
Engels, 1970, 46-47), where the 'real' (the way people are wirklich) is equated with the
'actual' and the 'material' rather than the 'correct', as individuals are put together with
their material conditions, the way they operate (wirken).
6 The starting and departure point of Ricoeur's (1986, 172-173) treatment of ideology is
Karl Mannheim's critique. Although he accepts Mannheim's discussion of its
representational qualities, Ricoeur rejects Mannheim’s claim that ideology is a mere
deviation from reality. I concur with Terry Eagleton’s (1992, 109) assertion that the
ideological function of Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge' replaces the Marxist conception
of ideology with 'the less embattled, contentious conception of a "world view"'. Actually, in
both Ricoeur and Mannheim, ideology is treated as more a form of socially constructed
world view than as a system of ideas solely relating to the interests of the bourgeoisie. It
might be also the case that the drift of Mannheim's work comes to downplay concepts of
mystification, rationalisation, legitimation and the power-function of ideas 'in the name of
some synoptic survey of the evolution of forms of historical consciousness' (Eagleton,
2000, 194), thus returning ideology to its pre-Marxist conceptualisation. Yet, this could
hardly be the case with Ricoeur's own account due to the centrality not only of the
distorting but also of the rationalising, legitimating, power-related and mystificatory
manifestations of ideology in his analysis. Terrell Carver (1991; 2009) and Manfred Steger
(2008, 19-43) offer some critical histories of the conceptual mutations of ideology.
7 Re-reading the Brumaire as a short treatise on the performative power of this being-
affected-by-the-past, Carver (2002, 19) is making a similar point: 'The most astonishingly
original and egregiously underestimated of Marx's devices in the Eighteenth Brumaire is
not the idea that people make history albeit under constraints. The novelty is rather the
identification of "circumstances, given and inherited" - not with economic conditions or
relations of production or any such "material" feature of experience - but with something
quite different: "tradition from all the dead generations" weighing "like a nightmare on the
brain of the living".' I briefly return to this theme discussing the historicality of RPR under
the Ricoeurean headings of 'traditionality' and 'traditions'.
8 Interestingly enough, finding refuge to 'radical traditions' may even function as an
apology for one of the dominant discourses (see Salveson, 2011).
[22]
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