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Gradation and EvolutionAuthor(s): Ananda K. CoomaraswamySource:
Isis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1944), pp. 15-16Published by: The
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Ancient American Papermaking Ancient American Papermaking
gives a general botanical account of the tree from which, as
this book so amply demonstrates, the ancient and modern native-type
papers of Aztecs and Mayas are derived.
Such, with inevitable condensation, is the con- tent of VON
HAGEN'S admirable book. Its pages 102 to 115 are taken up with very
rich bibliograph- ical citations, and with the extensive
bibliography. The thirty-two plates are worthy of the text, seven
of them being specimens of ancient-style paper provided for our
inspection and experimentation. Truth to tell, they are wretched
stuff to write on, at least with a metal pen, and probably a quill
pen would operate upon them as badly. But these papers were never
intended to be written upon; on the contrary, it was expected that
they would be either painted upon or else printed upon with clay
stamps such as those shown in Plate 30. Essentially, these clay
stamps represent a process closely akin to printing with movable
type, and the Mayas were using it many centuries before
gives a general botanical account of the tree from which, as
this book so amply demonstrates, the ancient and modern native-type
papers of Aztecs and Mayas are derived.
Such, with inevitable condensation, is the con- tent of VON
HAGEN'S admirable book. Its pages 102 to 115 are taken up with very
rich bibliograph- ical citations, and with the extensive
bibliography. The thirty-two plates are worthy of the text, seven
of them being specimens of ancient-style paper provided for our
inspection and experimentation. Truth to tell, they are wretched
stuff to write on, at least with a metal pen, and probably a quill
pen would operate upon them as badly. But these papers were never
intended to be written upon; on the contrary, it was expected that
they would be either painted upon or else printed upon with clay
stamps such as those shown in Plate 30. Essentially, these clay
stamps represent a process closely akin to printing with movable
type, and the Mayas were using it many centuries before
Europe came to the idea. By moistening their stamps with colored
matter, they printed on cloth, pots, and paper. Incidentally, the
ancient Peruvians also used printing of this sort, but not for
paper books, of which they had none. But they did print designs on
cotton cloth, not only by means of stamps like these but also by
means of cylindrical rollers carrying patterns in relief which were
operated by a rod running through a hole along the axis of the
cylinder.2
Altogether, this is a remarkably instructive book that throws a
strong and revealing light upon a heretofore much misunderstood
problem of American native culture. But why, oh why, must so wise
an auther as VON HAGEN, who has otherwise done so excellent a job,
besmirch his pages with that horrible bastard word, 'Amerin- dian,'
when the use of 'American Indian' would cost him so little
trouble?
2As to this see: P. A. MEANS, Ancient Civilizations of the
Andes, New York, 1931, p. 487.
Europe came to the idea. By moistening their stamps with colored
matter, they printed on cloth, pots, and paper. Incidentally, the
ancient Peruvians also used printing of this sort, but not for
paper books, of which they had none. But they did print designs on
cotton cloth, not only by means of stamps like these but also by
means of cylindrical rollers carrying patterns in relief which were
operated by a rod running through a hole along the axis of the
cylinder.2
Altogether, this is a remarkably instructive book that throws a
strong and revealing light upon a heretofore much misunderstood
problem of American native culture. But why, oh why, must so wise
an auther as VON HAGEN, who has otherwise done so excellent a job,
besmirch his pages with that horrible bastard word, 'Amerin- dian,'
when the use of 'American Indian' would cost him so little
trouble?
2As to this see: P. A. MEANS, Ancient Civilizations of the
Andes, New York, 1931, p. 487.
GRADATION AND EVOLUTION By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY
GRADATION AND EVOLUTION By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY
DR. ASHLEY MONTAGU, in Isis no. 96, p. 364, distinguishes two
explanations of the past and present existence of living creatures
of different species as (1) Gradation, assuming a special crea-
tion of immutable species, and (2) Evolution, assuming the
emergence of species in all their variety and mutability by the
gradual operation of causes inherent in the species and their
environ- ment. He does not say, and may not mean that these two
explanations are incompatible; but the reader is likely to assume
that the doctrine of a creation "in the beginning" and that of the
gradual development of new species are really irrecon- cilable
propositions.
The two propositions are, doubtless, incom- patible if the
mythical account is to be interpreted historically. The serious
mythologist, however, is well aware that to interpret myth as
factual his- tory is to mistake the genre; and that a myth can only
be called "true" when time and place are abstracted.' The object of
the present note is to point out that if the doctrine of special
creation is understood as it has generally been interpreted by
Christian and other philosophers, then Grada- tion and Evolution
are not irreconcilable alter- natives, but only different ways,
respectively ideal and historical, formal and figurative, algebraic
and
1 "Mythology can never be converted into history" (M. P.
NILSSON, Mycenean Origin of Greek Mythology, 1932, p. 31). Cf. Lord
RAGLAN, The Hero, 1936; E. SIECKE, Drachen- kaimpfe, 1907, pp. 60,
61.
DR. ASHLEY MONTAGU, in Isis no. 96, p. 364, distinguishes two
explanations of the past and present existence of living creatures
of different species as (1) Gradation, assuming a special crea-
tion of immutable species, and (2) Evolution, assuming the
emergence of species in all their variety and mutability by the
gradual operation of causes inherent in the species and their
environ- ment. He does not say, and may not mean that these two
explanations are incompatible; but the reader is likely to assume
that the doctrine of a creation "in the beginning" and that of the
gradual development of new species are really irrecon- cilable
propositions.
The two propositions are, doubtless, incom- patible if the
mythical account is to be interpreted historically. The serious
mythologist, however, is well aware that to interpret myth as
factual his- tory is to mistake the genre; and that a myth can only
be called "true" when time and place are abstracted.' The object of
the present note is to point out that if the doctrine of special
creation is understood as it has generally been interpreted by
Christian and other philosophers, then Grada- tion and Evolution
are not irreconcilable alter- natives, but only different ways,
respectively ideal and historical, formal and figurative, algebraic
and
1 "Mythology can never be converted into history" (M. P.
NILSSON, Mycenean Origin of Greek Mythology, 1932, p. 31). Cf. Lord
RAGLAN, The Hero, 1936; E. SIECKE, Drachen- kaimpfe, 1907, pp. 60,
61.
arithmetical, of describing one and the same thing. In these
philosophies causality is taken for
granted; nothing happens by chance. The impos- sible never
happens; what happens is always the realization of a possibility.
But we have to take account of two orders of causes, (1) a First
Cause, in which the possibilities inhere, and (2) Mediate Causes,
by which the conditions are provided in which the possible becomes
the necessary. The First Cause of the existence of things, or in
other words their possibility, is often called "God," but also
"Being," "Life" or "Nature" (natura natu- rans). This First Cause,
whether philosophically "absolute" or mythically "personified," is
the direct cause of the being of things, but only in- directly of
the manner of their being. The manner of their being (according to
which they are dis- tinguished as species) is determined by the
Mediate Causes, known or unknown, of which the result is the
production of the given species or individual at a given time or
place. The category of Mediate Causes does not exclude any of those
forces or tendencies or determining accidents on which the
evolutionist relies as explanations of the observed series; if he
differs from the phi- losopher in ignoring a First Cause, it is
because he is not discussing the origin of life, but only its
variety. Again: if by "in the beginning" we under- stand an
operation completed at a given moment, i.e. at the beginning of
time itself, then, of course, Gradation and Evolution will be
incompatible
arithmetical, of describing one and the same thing. In these
philosophies causality is taken for
granted; nothing happens by chance. The impos- sible never
happens; what happens is always the realization of a possibility.
But we have to take account of two orders of causes, (1) a First
Cause, in which the possibilities inhere, and (2) Mediate Causes,
by which the conditions are provided in which the possible becomes
the necessary. The First Cause of the existence of things, or in
other words their possibility, is often called "God," but also
"Being," "Life" or "Nature" (natura natu- rans). This First Cause,
whether philosophically "absolute" or mythically "personified," is
the direct cause of the being of things, but only in- directly of
the manner of their being. The manner of their being (according to
which they are dis- tinguished as species) is determined by the
Mediate Causes, known or unknown, of which the result is the
production of the given species or individual at a given time or
place. The category of Mediate Causes does not exclude any of those
forces or tendencies or determining accidents on which the
evolutionist relies as explanations of the observed series; if he
differs from the phi- losopher in ignoring a First Cause, it is
because he is not discussing the origin of life, but only its
variety. Again: if by "in the beginning" we under- stand an
operation completed at a given moment, i.e. at the beginning of
time itself, then, of course, Gradation and Evolution will be
incompatible
15 15
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-
Ananda K. Coomaraswamy Ananda K. Coomaraswamy
concepts. As to this "beginning," it must, of course, be
realized that (as ST. AUGUSTINE says) the ques- tion, What was God
doing before he created the world, is meaningless; or to say the
same in other words, that a succession of events in the eternal now
(of which empirical experience is impossible) is as inconceivable
as the notion of a locomotion in the Infinite. What our
philosophers actually un- derstand by "in the beginning" is a
logical, and not a temporal priority. So Meister ECKHART, "as I
have often said, God is creating the whole world now, this instant"
(PFEIFFER, p. 206); and JACOB BEHMEN, "it is an everlasting
beginning" (Myst. Pansophicum, IV. 9). Similarly in the Rgveda:
for, as Professor KEITH very justly remarks, "This creation cannot
be regarded as a single definite act: it is regarded as ever
proceeding" (Harvard Oriental Series, 18. cxxvi). This does not
mean that it is unfinished in principio and ex tempore, but that it
is apprehended by ourselves as a tem- poral sequence and as if
cause and effect could be separated from one another by sensible
periods. "At that time, indeed, all things took place simul-
taneously .... but a sequence was necessarily written into the
narrative because of their sub- sequent generation from one
another" (PHILo, De Opif. Mundi 67),-just as it is necessarily
written into the evolutionist's narrative; what Gradation states
sub specie aeternitatis, the Myth relates sub specie
aeviternitatis, and History sub specie tem- poris. "What is rooted
in the nature of the All is
concepts. As to this "beginning," it must, of course, be
realized that (as ST. AUGUSTINE says) the ques- tion, What was God
doing before he created the world, is meaningless; or to say the
same in other words, that a succession of events in the eternal now
(of which empirical experience is impossible) is as inconceivable
as the notion of a locomotion in the Infinite. What our
philosophers actually un- derstand by "in the beginning" is a
logical, and not a temporal priority. So Meister ECKHART, "as I
have often said, God is creating the whole world now, this instant"
(PFEIFFER, p. 206); and JACOB BEHMEN, "it is an everlasting
beginning" (Myst. Pansophicum, IV. 9). Similarly in the Rgveda:
for, as Professor KEITH very justly remarks, "This creation cannot
be regarded as a single definite act: it is regarded as ever
proceeding" (Harvard Oriental Series, 18. cxxvi). This does not
mean that it is unfinished in principio and ex tempore, but that it
is apprehended by ourselves as a tem- poral sequence and as if
cause and effect could be separated from one another by sensible
periods. "At that time, indeed, all things took place simul-
taneously .... but a sequence was necessarily written into the
narrative because of their sub- sequent generation from one
another" (PHILo, De Opif. Mundi 67),-just as it is necessarily
written into the evolutionist's narrative; what Gradation states
sub specie aeternitatis, the Myth relates sub specie
aeviternitatis, and History sub specie tem- poris. "What is rooted
in the nature of the All is
[in the Myth] figuratively treated as coming into being by
generation and creation: stage and sequence are transferred, for
clarity of exposition, to things whose being and definite form are
eternal" (PLoTINUS, Enneads IV. 8.4). "The be- ginning, which is
thought, comes to an end in action; know that in such wise was the
construc- tion of the world in eternity" (RUMI, Mathnawi, II. 970).
And, finally (for present purposes): "Ne prima ne poscia procedette
lo discorrer di Dio sopra quest'acque" (DANTE, Paradiso XXIX.
20-1).
The concepts, then, on the one hand of an eternal and ideal
pattern or "intelligible world," unextended in space and time, and
on the other of a temporal and' "sensible world" extended in space
and time as an echo, reflection or imitation of the other, are not
alternative, but correlative. Each implies the other; the
uniformity of the in- telligible world is in every way compatible
with the multiformity of its manifestations. A real conflict of
science with religion is unimaginable; the actual conflicts are
always of scientists ignorant of religious philosophy with
fundamen- talists who maintain that the truth of their myth is
historical. Neither of these can be really dan- gerous to anyone
who is capable of thought on more than one level of reference; nor
have we any intention to suggest that Dr. ASHLEY MONTAGU fits into
either of these categories! Museum of Fine Arts, Boston
[in the Myth] figuratively treated as coming into being by
generation and creation: stage and sequence are transferred, for
clarity of exposition, to things whose being and definite form are
eternal" (PLoTINUS, Enneads IV. 8.4). "The be- ginning, which is
thought, comes to an end in action; know that in such wise was the
construc- tion of the world in eternity" (RUMI, Mathnawi, II. 970).
And, finally (for present purposes): "Ne prima ne poscia procedette
lo discorrer di Dio sopra quest'acque" (DANTE, Paradiso XXIX.
20-1).
The concepts, then, on the one hand of an eternal and ideal
pattern or "intelligible world," unextended in space and time, and
on the other of a temporal and' "sensible world" extended in space
and time as an echo, reflection or imitation of the other, are not
alternative, but correlative. Each implies the other; the
uniformity of the in- telligible world is in every way compatible
with the multiformity of its manifestations. A real conflict of
science with religion is unimaginable; the actual conflicts are
always of scientists ignorant of religious philosophy with
fundamen- talists who maintain that the truth of their myth is
historical. Neither of these can be really dan- gerous to anyone
who is capable of thought on more than one level of reference; nor
have we any intention to suggest that Dr. ASHLEY MONTAGU fits into
either of these categories! Museum of Fine Arts, Boston
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURE FROM A MEDICAL
VIEWPOINT
By MAX NEUBURGER
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURE FROM A MEDICAL
VIEWPOINT
By MAX NEUBURGER
WHEREAS the medical literature of the old Orient deals only with
healing by means of drugs and surgery, or through the intervention
of super- natural powers, in the Hippocratic collection the
occurrence of spontaneous healing is for the first time established
as a fact.
Based on this fundamental idea, which forms a dividing line
between theurgic-empiric and scien- tific medicine, the Corpus
Hippocraticum is per- meated by the conception of natural healing
processes, so far as it expresses the spirit of the school of Cos.
For generations this school had studied the course of disease,
favouring methods of treatment adverse to any polypragmasia, and
had gradually developed the theory that diseases, like all natural
events, are subject to certain laws of nature, and that the
organism does not pas- sively sustain injuries received, but
adjusts itself
WHEREAS the medical literature of the old Orient deals only with
healing by means of drugs and surgery, or through the intervention
of super- natural powers, in the Hippocratic collection the
occurrence of spontaneous healing is for the first time established
as a fact.
Based on this fundamental idea, which forms a dividing line
between theurgic-empiric and scien- tific medicine, the Corpus
Hippocraticum is per- meated by the conception of natural healing
processes, so far as it expresses the spirit of the school of Cos.
For generations this school had studied the course of disease,
favouring methods of treatment adverse to any polypragmasia, and
had gradually developed the theory that diseases, like all natural
events, are subject to certain laws of nature, and that the
organism does not pas- sively sustain injuries received, but
adjusts itself
to counteract these injuries. Viewed from this angle, the
disease appears not purely as 7radOo, as a malady, but also-and by
no means least-as 7rovos, that is, as an exertion, an effort of the
body to re-establish the disturbed equilibrium of the functions.
Recovery is thus shown to be the work of nature, whose healing
power alone, or supple- mented by medical aid, achieves the aim.
Nov"owv
vmtOLEc rlTpOl 'Natures are the healers of disease' reads a
Hippocratic sentence, which, rightly inter- preted, expresses an
eternal truth.
HIPPOCRATES' writings give evidence of the most meticulous study
of nature's working in disease, especially in acute, febrile
affections. Fever com- pletes the "coctions" of the vitiated
humours: these, the "materia peccans" are eliminated by means of
secretions and excretion, by sweating, sputum, vomiting, urine,
occasionally by haemor-
to counteract these injuries. Viewed from this angle, the
disease appears not purely as 7radOo, as a malady, but also-and by
no means least-as 7rovos, that is, as an exertion, an effort of the
body to re-establish the disturbed equilibrium of the functions.
Recovery is thus shown to be the work of nature, whose healing
power alone, or supple- mented by medical aid, achieves the aim.
Nov"owv
vmtOLEc rlTpOl 'Natures are the healers of disease' reads a
Hippocratic sentence, which, rightly inter- preted, expresses an
eternal truth.
HIPPOCRATES' writings give evidence of the most meticulous study
of nature's working in disease, especially in acute, febrile
affections. Fever com- pletes the "coctions" of the vitiated
humours: these, the "materia peccans" are eliminated by means of
secretions and excretion, by sweating, sputum, vomiting, urine,
occasionally by haemor-
16 16
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Article Contentsp.15p.16
Issue Table of ContentsIsis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1944), pp.
3-94Front MatterPreface to Volume XXXV: Faraday Drinks a Glass of
Water [p.3]Maimonides' Book for Al-Fadil [pp.3-5]John Landen,
F.R.S. (1719-1790)--Mathematician [pp.6-10]The Need for Studies in
the History of American Science [pp.10-13]Ancient American
Papermaking [pp.13-15]Gradation and Evolution [pp.15-16]An
Historical Survey of the Concept of Nature from a Medical Viewpoint
[pp.16-28]Queries and Answers [pp.28-29]Notes and Correspondence
[pp.29-33]Reviewsuntitled [pp.33-34]untitled [p.35]untitled
[pp.35-36]untitled [pp.36-37]untitled [p.37]untitled
[pp.37-39]untitled [pp.39-40]untitled [pp.40-41]untitled
[pp.41-42]untitled [pp.42-43]untitled [pp.43-44]untitled
[pp.44-45]untitled [pp.45-46]untitled [pp.46-47]untitled
[pp.47-48]untitled [pp.48-51]
Administrative Documents [pp.51-52]Sixty-Fifth Critical
Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the
History of Civilization (To December 1943) [pp.53-94]