Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam

8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam

1/213


2/213

t

AIR

POWER

AND

THE

GROUND

WR

I N

VIETNAM

IDEAS

AND

ACTIONS

by

DONALD

.

MROZEK

Seni or

Resear ch Fel l ow

Ai rpower Resear ch

I n s t i t u t e

Ai r Uni versi t y Press

Maxwel l Ai r

Force

Base, Aabama

36112- 5532

J anuary 1988


3/213

Li brary

of Congr ess

Cat al ogi ng- i n- Publ i cat i on

Dat a

Mr ozek Donal d J

Ai r

Power

and

t he

Gr ound

War

i n

Vi et nam

I ncl udes bi bl i ographi es and i ndex

Vi et namese o n f l i c t

1961- 1975- Aer i al

Oper ati ons

Amer i can I

T i t l e

DS 8 M79 1988 959. 704 348 87- 31931

I SBN

1- 58566- 015- 9

Fust P r i n t i n g J anuar y 1988

Second

P r i n t i n g December 2

Thi rd P r i n t i n g Sept ember

2002

D scl ai mer

Thi s

study represents

thevi ews

of

the

author

and

does

not

necessar i l y

ref l ect

the

o f f i c i a l

opi n-

i on of the Ai r

Uni ver si t y

Center f or Aerospace

Doct r i ne

Research

and

Educati on AUCADRE

or theDepartment of the

Ai r

Force

Thi s p ubl i cat i on has

been

revi ewedby

secur i t y

andpol i c y

revi ew

aut hor i t i es

and

i s

cl eared

f or

publ i c

rel ease

For

s a l e by

t he Superi nt endent

of

Doc ument s

US

Gover nment

P r i n t i n g

Of f i ce

Washi ngt on

D C

20402


4/213

q

Im

cqol z

a i orz


5/213

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


6/213

Chapter

Cont ent s

DSCLAIMER

Page

FOREWORD x

ABOUT

THE

AUTHOR

x

ACKNOWEDGMENTS x

I NTRODUCTION

xv

P RT

ONE

EVERYBODY S

WR

NOBODY S

WR

AIR

POWR

THEORIES AIR

FORCE

THNKING

AND

THE

CONFLICTIN

VI ETNAM

THEPASTWSPROLOGUE

3

The

Thrust of US

Ai r

Power Theor i es

5

The

Ascendancy

of t he

Of f ensi ve

7

Li mted

Wr as

aChal l enge

t o

Doct r i ne

3

Vi etnamandt he Burden of t he

Past 7

Notes

24

INTERSERV CE

DFFERENCES OMM NDND

CONTROL

ANDTHECONDUCTOF

WR

NSOUTHEAST

ASIA

27

I nt erservi ce

Di f f erences i n t he

Post Wrl d

Wr

Context

9

TheSearch

f or Si mpl i ci t y

i n

t he Compl exi ty of

Sout heas t Asi a

Pressures f or Change

8

Doct r i ne and

Compl exi ty

44

Notes

46

WRMAKNG

ANDWROLITICS CIVI LIAN

OFFICIALS

AND

THE

USES

OF

MLITARY

POWR

49

Pol i t i cal

Acti on

as

aCount erguerr i l l a

Wr

50

Competi ng

Vi si ons of t he Vi etnamWr

52

Sel f Def eati ng

Aspect s

of t he

US

Commtment

t o

Count er i nsur gency

57

Wr as Pol i t i cs

6

The

Cont i nuat i on of

Wr as

Pol i t i cs

64

Notes

65


7/213

Chapter

P RTTWO

TWO

THREE

M NY

VIETNAMS

P RTTHREE

REFLECTIONSND

CONCLUSIONS

Page

4

RETHNKING

GROUNDWRF RE

73

Mobi l i t y

versus

Autonomy 74

Fi r epower

and

Fi r ebases 77

Suppl y

Suppor t and Secur i t y

83

Secr et

Bombi ng

and Hi dden War f ar e

86

Hal f - Tol d Tal es

9

Not es 94

5

PRO LEMS

I N

THE

PERFORM NCEOF

TRADTIONAL

ROLES

99

Per si st ence

and

Pr i de

I nte l l i gence and Reconnai ssance 106

Search Rescue

and Evacuat i on

114

Suppor t i ng

GroundCombat

Forces

118

Not es

120

6

THELIMTS

OFINNOVATION

123

Fi xed- Wng Gunshi ps

Squar e Pegs Var i ed Hol es

and

t he

Penkni f e

of

I nnovat i on 125

War and

t he Envi r onment

132

Tact i cal I nnovat i on

and t he

B 52 139

Ground Al t er nat i ves

f o r

Cl ear i ng and

I nt e r di c t i on

145

Sel f - Sustai ni ng

Change

148

Not es 148

7 AIR

POWR NDTHEM IV LENCEOFVETN M

155

War

as

an

Event and

as

a

Process

161

Li m tedWar and Li m ted Commtment 166

Compl exi t y

and

Si mpl i c i t y

171

ManagngWar

and

WgngD pl omacy

175

Between

Ri gi di t y

and

Vac i l l at i on

180

The

I l l u s i o n

of Neut r al i t y

185

Not es

187

I NDEX 193


8/213

LI ST

I LLUSTRATI ONS

Tabl e

1 Rat i o of Enemy t o

A l l i e d Casual t i es

80

2 I mpressi oni st i c

Repr esent at i on of

Decr easi ng Doubt / Di f f i cul t y of

Gunshi p

Fi r e- Suppor t Rol e

and

I ncreas i ng

Doubt /

D f f i c u l t y of

Guns hi p

I nt erdi c t i on Rol e

133

3

Repr esentat i on

of

Area

of

Uncer t ai nt y

on

I nt er di c t or y

versus

Support Rol e

of

Def ol i at i on

137

M s si ons

Sor t i es and

Res ul t s of

Shi ni ng

Brass P r a i r i e

F i r e

and

hu

Dung

111

2 M s si ons Sor t i es and

Resul t s

of Dani el

Boone

Sal em House

and

Thot

ot

113


9/213



10/213

Foreword

Dr

Donal d

Mr ozek s

research

sheds consi der abl e

l i g h t

on

howt he

use of

a i r

power

evol ved

i n

t he

Vi et nam

War Much more

t han

si mpl y r e t e l l i n g

event s

rozek anal yzes howh i s t o r y p o l i t i c s t echnol ogy

and t he compl exi t y of t he war

dr ove

t he

appl i cat i on

of

a i r

power

i n

a

l ong

and

di vi si ve st ruggl e

Mozek

del ves

i nto

a

weal t h

of

or i gi nal document at i on and hi s

schol arshi p

i mpeccabl e

Hi s

anal ysi s

t hor ough and bal anced Hi s concl usi ons a r e

wel l

r easoned

but

wi l l t roubl e t hose who

have

never seri ousl y consi dered how t he

appl i cat i on

of a i r power i s i nf l uencedby

f a c t o r s

f a r

beyond t he

b a t t l e f i e l d

Whether

or not t he reader

agrees

w t h

Mr ozek

t he qual i t y of

hi s

research

and anal ysi s

makes

hi s

concl usi ons i mpossi bl e t o

i gnore

O NC FRYER R

Br i gadi er General

US F

Commander

Cent er

f o r

Aerospace Doct r i ne

Research and Educat i on


11/213



12/213

OUT

THE

UTHOR

Dr

DonaldJ Mozek

Donal d J Mozek

i s

Prof essor of Hi st or y a t

Kansas S t a t e

Uni ver si t y, wher e

he

has t aught si nce

1972

He

ear ned

bot h

hi s M and PhD degr ees

a t

Rut ger s

Uni ver si t y, and hi s d i s s e r t a t i o n study

on

def ense

pol i cy

dur i ng

t he presi dency of

Harry Truman yi el ded a r t i c l e s i n

publ i cat i ons

such as M l i t ar y

Af f ai r s

and The

Busi ness

Hi st or y Revi ew Later

research i n

war t i me

and post war def ense i s s ue s

r esul t ed

i n

a r t i c l e s

i n

such

j ournal s as

t he

Annal s

of

I owa

and

Mi ssour i

Hi st or i cal

Revi ew

I n 1980, hi s a r t i c l e TheCr oat an

I nci dent

The

US

Navy and t he Pr obl em

of Raci al D scr i mnat i on a f t e r

World

War I I appear ed i n

M l i t ar y

Af f ai r s Al so i n

1980,

he

co- edi t ed The Mar t i n

Marauder

and t he Fr ankl i n

Al l ens

:

War t i me Love

S t o r y w t h Robi n Hghamand J eanne Loui se A l l en Newel l

Wth

hi s

col l eague

Robi n

H gham

he has al so

co- edi t ed

Gui de

t o

t he Sour ces of US

M l i t ar y

Hi st or y, i ncl udi ng t he 1981 and

1986

suppl ement ar y

vol umes

Dr

Mozek

has al so

engaged

i n research, publ i shed,

and t aught Amer i can

cul t ure Some of hi s

publ i cat i ons

have f used t he

ar eas of

ml i ta r y and c ul t ur a l

h i s t o r y

I n

1980, hi s essay TheCul t

and

Ri t ual

of

Toughness

i n

Col d

War

Ameri ca appear ed i n Ray Browne ed Ri t ual s and

Cer emoni es

i n Popul ar

Cul t ur e

I n

1984,

The

I nt erpl ay of

Metaphor and

Practi ce

i n t he

US

Def ense

Depar t ment s

Use

of

Spor t

was

publ i shed i n

t he J ournal

of

Amer i can

Cul t ur e,

and

i n 1985, Spor t and t he

Amer i can

M l i t ar y

D ver s i on

and

Duty

appear ed i n t he

cent enni al

i s s ue

of t he

Resear ch

Quar t er l y

f or

Exer ci se andSpor t

Oneof hi s more

recent

sol e- author ed ml i tary hi story

publ i cat i ons e n t i t l e d

The

L im t s

of

I nnovat i on

Aspects of

Ai r

Power

i n

Vi etnam

appear ed i n t he

J anuar y- Febr uar y

1985

i ssue

of

Ai r

Uni ver s i t y

Revi ew

I n

1986,

Ai r

Uni ver s i t y

Revi ew

a l s o publ i shed hi s

essay I n Sear ch

of t he Uni cor n, a di scussi on of t he

br oad

devel opment

of

ml i ta r y re form

movements

si nce

t he

Federal i st

er a

Havi ng

compl et ed

recent

st udi es f ocused

on t he era

of t he

Vi et nam

War

Dr Mozekpl ans

a

book- l engt h essay onUS

def ense

pol i cy a f t e r Worl dWar I I


13/213



14/213

Acknowedgments

Onl y

those who

have had g r e a t

hel p

can

f u l l y appr eci at e howi mpor t ant

t

i s i n

devel opi ng

a

d i f f i c u l t ar gument on

a

cont ent i ous i ssue Per haps onl y

those

persons

wi l l sense t he dept h

of

my

gr a t i t ude t o

Col Kennet h

J Al nw ck

f or mer

d i r e c t o r of

t he

Ai r power

Resear ch

n s t i t u t e

f o r

hi s

ear l y

and

cont i nui ng

i nt e r e s t

i n

t h i s

pr o j ec t

and

t o

Col Donal dD

St evens t hen

d i r e c t o r

of

t he Ai r power Resear ch n s t i t u t e and

commnder

of t he

Ai r Uni ver s i t y Cent er f o r Aer ospace

Doct r i ne

Resear ch and

Educat i on AUCADRE)

have benefi t ed

f r o m

t he t hought f ul suggest i ons and

i ns i ght s

of

Lt Col

Donal dR

Baucomand Col

Denni s

M

Dr ew

who

have gui ded

research i n

t he Ai r power Resear ch n s t i t u t e Thei r

f r i endshi p val ue as

mch

as

t h ei r

advi ce

n t he revi s i on

and

s t a b i l i z a t i o n of

t h i s

st udy f ew persons l abored as

hard-and

had as mch t o l abor

over-asM

Thoms

Lobenst ei n

and

M

Preston

Br yant

of t he

Ai r Uni ver s i t y Pr ess

i n

U DRE

Thei r

d i l i gent

e f f o r t s

cl ose

at t ent i o n t o

wor di ng and a b i l i t y t o cat ch t he t h r u s t of

my

i nt ended ar gument s have mde

t h i s

workmch b e t t e r t han woul dot her w se have

been

t he case

The

s k i l l e d

and

hi ghl y

r esponsi ve s t a f f

of t he Ai r

Uni ver s i t y Li brary mdemny of

t he t a s ks

associ at ed

w t h

devel opi ng t he ar gument s i n

t h i s

work

mch easi er

than s

usual l y

t he

case

i n

any

l ong

pr oj ect

n add i t i on

owe a gr eat debt t o AUCADRE s hi ghl y

pr of essi onal and

capabl e

Document Pr ocessi ng

Center to al l

who

wor ked

on

t h i s

pr oj ect

but especi al l y t o

J o

Ann

Per due and Mar ci a

W l l i ams successi ve

d i r e c t o r s

i n

document

pr ocessi ng

Al so

Dor ot hy

McCl uski e

oversaw

s k i l l f u l l y

t he

t r ansf ormat i on of

t h i s

work

f r o m

a

manuscr i pt

i n t o a

book

The

at mospher e of

s er i ous i nqui ry

and

t he genui ne d e s i r e t o

avoi d mer el y

conveni ent

answer s t o naggi ng quest i ons

mdemy

two year s as a

Vi s i t i ng Resear ch

Fel l ow at AUCADRE s Ai r power Resear ch n s t i t u t e

a per sonal

and pr of essi onal

pl easur e

of a

mos t

hi gh or der The l a s t t hi ng a c i v i l i a n wor ki ng on t empor ar y

ass i gnment

i n a

m l i t a r y

agency

w shes

t o

be

s a cour t h i s t o r i a n

So

t

was

especi al l y

r eassur i ng t o

f i nd

t h a t

t h i s

was t he

l a s t

t hi ng

U DRE

want ed

us

t o be

eyond

t h a t

mus t

not e

my

pr of ound

respect

f o r t he di verse t a l e n t s

sawi n t he Ai r

Force

per sonnel

w t h

whom

wor ked

both

m l i t a r y

and

c i v i l i a n

and

f or t he

modest y

w t h

whi ch

they

carry

t h ei r

a b i l i t y

I nf or mal conver sat i ons w t h a number

of per sons

hel ped met o gai n someadded

f e e l

f o r t he Ai r

Force

as

a

ser vi ce

Wthout

s l i g h t i n g t he i nf or mal i n s t r u c t i o n

r ecei ved f r o m

al l

of

my

m l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n

col l eagues

i n research

amspeci al l y

g r a t e f u l t o

Lt

Col Davi d J

ean and Lt Col

W l l i am

Mack


15/213

The

per sonal

aspects

of

l i v i n g and wor ki ng

i n

Montgomery pr oved t o

be an

unexpect edl y

r i c h

benef i t

of

my t aki ng

a t empor ar y ass i gnment a t Maxwel l

Ai r

Force

Base

s ha l l

al ways remember

t he f r i e n d l i n e s s

and

cour t esy of t he

peopl e

met

dur i ng

these past

two years

Speci al

f ondness

i s reserved

f o r

t he

Montgomery

Tr ack and

Runni ng

Cl ub,

however , and

f o r t he

wel com ng

and

engagi ng

peopl e

met on t he

r un

t was a l s o a pl easur e t o share

my

t i me i n t he Sout h w t h my f aml y,

especi al l y

my parents, somet i mes

i n

person

but more f r equent l y i n

l e t t e r s

Words

can

onl y suggest

what t h e i r cont i nui ng

suppor t means

Thi s work i s dedi cat ed t o t he memory of J oseph J

Mal one,

a f i n e h i s t o r i a n and

genui ne

exper t i n M ddl e

Eastern a f f a i r s

whosepassi ng mademe

r e a l i z e

howmuch

he meant and cont i nues t o mean to

me

usedt o

k i d

t h a t

J oe

Mal one was

t he

man

who

a s chai r man

of

t he Depar t ment of Hi s t or y

a t

Kansas

S t a t e

Uni ver si t y

i n

1972, had t he

good

t a s t e t o h i r e

me

. Actual l y,

t hough,

he was a manwho took

t he

r i s k

of

doi ng

so

Hi s

suppor t

of

my

pr of essi onal

e f f o r t s

di d much

t o

sust ai n

my

b e l i e f

t h a t somet hi ng

mght comeof i t

a l l i n t he

end came

t o

val ue J oe

Mal one

a l l

t he

more i n

t he

cont ext of

my

cl oser s t udi es

of

t he f r u s t r a t i o n s and

pai n

of t he

Amer i can

exper i ence i n

Vi et nam Onl y

t hen di d

appr eci at e J oe s

ser vi ce

t o

our

country i n Worl d

War

and hi s sense of how l i f e out si de t he

ml i t a r y

or t he

gover nment mght al so be

a

r e a l

ser vi ce t o

t he nat i on s

decency a s

wel l

a s t o i t s

s e c u r i t y and pr osper i t y For

t h a t

amgr atef ul t o hi m and f o r t h a t coul d not

f o r g e t hi meven i f t r i e d

7

ON L MROZEK

Vi s i t i ng Resear ch

Fel l ow

Ai r power

Resear ch n s t i t u t e


16/213

I nt r oduct i on

Ul t i mat el y

t h i s study

s

about

a smal l er

Vi et nam

War than

t h a t whi ch

s

commonl y recal l ed

t

f ocuses

on expect at i ons

concerni ng t h e i mpact

of a i r

power

on t he gr ound war

and

on someof

i t s

a c t u a l e f f e c t s but

t avoi ds

maj or

t r eat ment of

some

of

t h e

mos t

dr amat i c

a i r

acti ons

of

t h e

war

such

a s

t he

bombi ng

of

Hanoi

To

many

who

f ought t h e

war

and

bel i eve

t ought

t o

have been

conduct ed on a s t

l a r g e r scal e

o r w t h f ewer r e s t r a i n t s

t h i s

study may seem

al most perverse

emphasi zi ng a s

t

does t h e

u t i l i t y of a i r power i n

conduct i ng

t h e c o n f l i c t a s a

gr ound

war

and

w t hout

t o t a l

expl oi tat i on of

our most awe i nspi r i ng t echnol ogy

J u s t i f i c a t i o n s

f o r

such

a

study may

take

many f or ms

he si mpl est

s

t h a t

a i r

power

cont r i but ed

much

t o

l ower l e v el

c o n f l i c t Al l ow ng f o r

t he

great i mpor t ance

of s t r a t e g i c deterrence t he Uni t ed States w l l s t l l

face chal l enges t o

i t s

own and t s

a l l i e s

i n t e r e s t s

a t f a r

l ower

l e v e l s

of

c o n f l i c t

I n t h e cont ext of these l i k e l y

pr obl ems t h e

Vi et nam

exper i ence as sumes consi derabl e i n t er e s t

Al t hough

t h e chapters i n

t h i s

study a r e i nt ended

t o

f o r m

a coherent and

uni f i ed

ar gument

each al so o f f e r s

d i s c r e t e

mes sages

The chapters a r e not

meant t o

be

d e f i n i t i v e

hey

do

not

exhaust

avai l abl e

document ar y

materi al and

they often

r e l y

heavi l y

on

publ i shed account s or

do

they pr ovi de a

compl et e

chr onol ogi cal

pi ctur e

of t h e uses of a i r power

even

w t h respect t o t h e gr ound war or

i s

coverage

of

areas i n whi ch a i r power was

empl oyed South Vi et nam Laos

Cambodi a and

North

Vi etnamevenl y d i s t r i b u t e d nor

necessar i l y

pr opor t i onat e t o

t h e

e f f o r t

expended

i n

each

pl ace dur i ng

t h e

war

Lastl y

some

may

f i n d

one

o r

anot her

f o r m

of a i r power e i t h er s l i g h t l y or i n s u f f i c i e n t l y

treated

uch c r i t i c i s ms

a r e bes i de t he po i n t f o r t h e obj ecti ves

of t h i s

study a r e t o expl or e a

comparat i vel y

negl ected

theme the i mpact

of

a i r

power ont he ground and t o encourage

further

u t i l i z a t i o n

of

l essons

drawn

f r o m

t he

Vi et nam

experi ence

Part one

exam nes

t h e way i n whi ch i deas about a i r power affected t h e t hi nki ng of

many Ai r

Force personnel about howt o

f i g h t

both

bef or e

and

dur i ng

t h e

Vi et nam

War some

r el evant

c o n f l i c t s w t h i n

t he

Ai r Force t h e re l at i onshi p bet ween

i n t e r s er v i c e

di f f er ences

and

t he

ar r angement s made f o r

command and c o n t r o l and

t h e

t endency

among

bot h

c i v i l i a n s

and

t h e

m l i t a r y

t o

f a i l

t o di f f e r e n t i a t e

bet ween

war a s combat and war as p o l i t i c s

The three chapters do more than

pr ovi de

h i s t o r i c a l

backgr ound They

argue

t h a t t h e Ai r

Force was

nei t her neut ral nor

passi ve

w t h respect

t o t he c o n f l i c t i n Sout heast Asi a These chapters al so argue t h a t Ai r

Force i deas

pr oduced

onl y one s et of st r ongl y

advocat ed

opt i ons f o r

managi ng

t h e

war

he centers

of

c i v i l i a n

aut hor i t y t hemsel ves

became

i mpor t ant

a c t o r s

i n

t h e

war i n

Sout heast Asi a f a r

beyond

mere r eacti on

Pr obl ems

do

not e x i s t i n a

vacuum


17/213

nor

ar e t h e i r di mensi ons under st andabl e

i n

i s o l a t i o n

hey take

on

meani ng

when

they pass

through

t he

l ens of a behol der and t he character of t he w r

i n Sout heast

Asi a

coul d

never

be

establ i shed t o t he gener al agr eement

of al l

par t i es on

t he

a l l i e d

si de

because they

wer e usi ng d i f f er e n t l en s es Further

t h i s

f r u s t r a t i n g

di ver gence i n

t he

per cept i on

of

t h e c on f l i c t

sever el y

compl i cat ed

t he

devel opment

of

a

uni ver sal l y

s a t i s f a c t o r y command and

control

system These

and other

f a c t o r s

show how

pr obl ems

or i gi nat i ng

l ar gel y

i n

t he Uni t ed

States

added

t o

t he

t r oubl i ng compl exi t y

of

an

appar ent l y

Sout heast

Asi an

pr obl em

he

succeedi ng

three chapt er s deal more d i r e c t l y w t h t he conduct of t he war i n

Sout heast Asi a al t hough they ar e f ar

f r ombei ng convent i onal

oper at i onal h i s t o r i e s

Whi l e

t h i s

st udy

does

not

c l a im

t ha t ai r

power i n an y

si mpl e

sense r evol ut i oni zed

gr ound

war f are

nor

t ha t t

di spl aced t r a d i t i o n a l

pri nci pl es

of

w r

w t h some

new

s et

of pr i n c i p l es

t

does

c l a imt h a t ai r power i nc l i nedmany ml i t a r y

l eader s and some

c i v i l i a n s

t o

a l t e r

t h e i r

under st andi ngs

of

what

t he

pr i nci pl es

meant

i n t he

cont ext of

cont empor ar y

oper at i ons

Chapt er s

4

and

6

deal w t h

these

al t er e d

under st andi ngs

t h e i r achi evement s and l i m t s and some of

t h e i r

i mpl i cat i ons

Tr adi t i onal t erms

such as i n t e r d i c t i o n f i r epower

mobi l i t y

and

sur pr i se

make

t h e i r

appear ance

i n t hese chapt er s

but

t he

pr i nci pal

focus t o

f o l l ow

t he ext ent t o

whi ch

t hey r ecei ved a

novel t wi s t i n t he

cont ext

of t he

Vi et nam

and Sout heast Asi an

exper i ences

he

concl udi ng

chapt er pr ovi des an oppor t uni t y f o r

synt hesi s

f o r s t a t i n g

concl usi ons

both

gener al

and

s p e c i f i c

i n

nature

and

f o r

enumerat i ng

r ecommendat i ons

based on

t he l essons of f er ed by

t he

Vi et nam

c o n f l i c t n

assessment of

what

var i ous par t i es have concl uded about t he

Vi et nam

arbecomes

per t i n en t


18/213

PARTONE

EVERYBODY'S

WAR

NOBODY'SWAR

Many

readi l y

accept as a t r ui sm t h a t US commtment t o t h e war i n Vi etnam

l acked

u n i t y , c l a r i t y ,

and

coher ence .

But

f ew ever

s t a t e ,

much

l e s s accept , t h e

cor ol l ar y- t hat t he commtment

of

t h e var i ous p a r t i e s t o t he war was s im la r l y

moot ed

.

Fi xed

poi nt s of

r ef erence

wer e

l acki ng

;

and, w t hout c r i t e r i a f o r

perf ormance t h a t m ght

be

i mposed across t h e boar d

on

c i v i l i a n

and ml i t ar y

agenci es t o det erm ne

m ssi on

accompl i shment ,

t h e

war f e l l

bet ween t h e

cracks.

Wth everybody drawn

i n t o

t he

a c t ,

i t was a war bel ongi ng t o no

one i n

par t i cul ar - per haps

not even Presi dent Lyndon

J ohnson, whose name

was most

of t en af f i xed

t o

t he c o n f l i c t . Fragment at i on of aut hor i t y was paral l el ed by

f r agment at i on

of

responsi bi l i t y

and, equal l y i mport ant , by

f r agment at i on

of t h e

sense

of

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

.

The

a t t i t u d e

al l eged

t o

have gover ned

much

of

US

behavi or

i n t h e l a t e r s t a g e s

of

t h e war- that t h e c on f l i c t not

be

l o s t on

our watch but , by

i mpl i cat i on,

on someone

el se' s- was

t he

f i n a l ,

b i t t e r ,

and

s t e r i l e

i ncarnat i on

of

t h i s

erosi on of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , whi ch i n turn was

born

of t h e i n a b i l i t y

t o

i mpose

a

coherent v i s i o n

of

t he war as a whol e .

The

US

e f f o r t i n Vi et nam was not

an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ,

c u l t u r a l l y , or t echni cal l y

n e u t r a l

response t o ext ernal

pr obl ems

creat ed by an ext ernal enemy Nor

was i t

unaf f ect ed by i t s own

i n t e r n a l

dynamcs- theAmeri canwayof war

whi ch

i ncl uded

a

s p e c i f i c

s et

of

pref erences

f o r d i f f e r e n t

groups

about

how

best

t o

use

ai r

power

.

Thus, what Amer i cans t hought about ai r power

as

t hey approached t he pr obl ems of

Sout heast

Asi a

became a d i s t i n c t pl ayer i n t he c o n f l i c t , af f ect i ng t h e war . Perhaps i t

woul d be

be t t e r t o say pl ayer s i n t he p l u r a l ,

si nce t h e r e

wer e di sagreement s .

Consci ousness of t hese

i deas and t he s e l f - l i m t i n g and s el f - r e s t r a i n i ng qua l i t i e s

t hey

i mpose

i s t he

key

f or t he f u t u r e .

Ot herw se,

we

bi nd our sel ves

t o unt hi nki ng

m suse

of

our

resources,

and

we

r i s k

m si nt erpret i ng

t he s i t u at i o n whi l e

we

unconsci ousl y

prot ect

our l ess- exam ned

predi l ect i ons

.

The m l i t a r y ser vi ces often seemed f a r

more i nt erested i n

j ockeyi ng

w t h one

anot her

t han

t h e s i t u a t i on may

have

demanded, and t h i s r i v a l r y

had several seri ous

e f f e c t s

: ( 1) e f f o r t s t o resol ve c o n f l i c t s over command

and cont rol

and strategy went

on

f ar t oo

l ong,

perhaps t oo l ong t o come t o g r i p s w t h t he r e a l pr obl em ( 2) a

deci si on

once

agreed upon coul d not e a s i l y

be

overt ur ned,

si nce

i t r epresent ed e i t h e r

a

d e l i c a t e

p o l i t i c a l

compromse

or t oo

much

i nvest ed

e f f o r t and sunk cost ; and ( 3)

what ever

t h e r e a l i t y

behi nd

t he servi ce' s mot i vat i ons, t h e ml i t ar y seemed so s e l f -

servi ng

as t o

under m ne t he aut hor i t y t hey coul d have must ered w t h

t h e execut i ve

branch, i n

t h e

momentswhen

i t was open t o advi ce, or

w t h

t h e

Congr ess .


19/213

I n t e r s e r v i c e and i n t r a s e r v i c e

r i v a l r i e s , especi al l y

at

l ower

l e v e l s ,

cannot be

expect ed

t o

vani sh magi cal l y

i n

war t i me

. Thei r

resol ut i on

must

r ecei ve

hi gh

p r i o r i t y i n

peacet i me i f US

forces

a r e t o be capabl e of

handl i ng

t h e

mul t i f acet ed

aspect s of

a

l ow i nt ensi t y

c o n f l i c t

;

and as

such

c o n f l i c t s escal at e t o m d- l evel or

above, t h e damage resul t i ng f romi n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y becomes

even

more ser i ous .

Successi ve

admni st r at i ons

i n t h e Uni t ed

St at es

f a i l e d

t o make

cl ear or

unqual i f i ed

comm t ment s

t o what t hey

w shed

t o achi eve i n

Sout heast

Asi a .

(The

Ni xon admni str at i on, once i t s et get t i ng out of

Vi et nam as i t s

maxi mum

ml i t ar y

and general

pol i cy

p r i o r i t y ,

was a possi bl e

except i on

. )

Even

t h e Kennedy

admni st rat i on qual i f i ed- per haps even cont radi ct ed- i t s own verbal commtment

t o

count eri nsur gency .

I t

di d

s o,

f o r

exampl e,

by

l eapi ng

t o

emer gency

i n s e r t i o n

of

US

combat - capabl e

t roops

t o

buy

t i me

when

t h e accept ed v i ew was t h a t

count er i nsur gency must

be

handl ed s lowy and

gr adual l y

.

That

v i ew

of

e f f e c t i v e

count er i nsur gency a l s o, i n e f f e c t , cont ai ned t h e r i s k

of

l o s s and even

general

f a i l u r e

; but

t h e

Kennedy adm ni st rat i on coul d not swal l ow i t .

The

J ohnson

admni st rat i on, despi t e t he magni t ude of i t s

e s ca l a t i ons , per cei ved t h a t

i t was

engaged i n a

cont i nui ng

p o l i t i c a l process even more

t han

i n wagi ng a

war

; but t here

i s reason

t o

suspect t h a t t he i n t e r p r e t a t i o n gi ven t o

J ohnson' s

l anguage of ml i t ar y

act i ons

i n

Washi ngt on

was

d i f f e r e n t

f rom

t h a t

gi ven

i n

Hanoi

.

Despi t e

t h e de s i r e t o

keep

opt i ons open, an

adm ni st rat i on

must t ake i n t o account

t h a t t he use

of

ml i t ar y

force

at var i ous l e v e l s and i n var i ous combi nat i ons begi ns t o

i mpose c e r t a i n

l i m t i n g q u a l i t i e s

on

i t s f r eedomof

act i on

.

Once

a ml i t ar y opt i on i s

t o

be

consi dered,

i t

must

be

assessed i n t erms

of

bot h i t s ml i t ar y and p o l i t i c a l

e f f e c t s

.

Fur t her , f or al l t h e t a l k of

r esponsi veness

of

ml i t ar y f o r c e s , c i v i l i a n s

and

m l i t a r y

a l i k e

must remember t h a t

t h e r e

ar e l i m t s t o

bot h

t h e r esponsi veness and t h e

f l e x i b i l i t y

of

any

pi ece of bureaucrat i c

machi ner y :

a

t a c t i c can

be changed

f a s t e r i n

t he

mnd

t han

i n

t h e

f i e l d ,

and

a

strategy

can

be

j o t t e d

down

f a s t e r

on

paper

t han

i t

can

be

t r a n s l a t e d i n t o force s t r u c t u r e and depl oyment . Vi et nam i l l u s t r a t e d ,

among

other t h i n g s , t h a t

i deas

and

execut i on

can

be

p e r s i s t e n t l y out of phase . Onewoul d

h e s i t a t e t o say t h a t v i r t u a l l y any

one

pol i cy

shoul d

have

been

mai nt ai ned r a t h e r

t han

r i s k a mess caused by

changes

i n

pol i cy

. Yet t h i s v i ew i s

usef ul

enough

t o

i n v i t e

consi derat i on .

The Vi et nam Wr does not t e l l

us

whet her

we can ef f ect i vel y f i g h t a

count er i nsurgency, si nce

we

wer e never

f u l l y dedi cat ed

t o i t . Count er i nsur gency i s

therefore not a di scredi t ed or

di spr oven

concept . A

simlar

l o g i c

appl i es

t o

many

t e c hn i c a l

and

operat i onal

aspect s

of

t he

war

.

I n s h o r t ,

t h e

subset s

of

t he

war - i t s

pr a c t i c al mat t er s- - can

be

decoupl ed f rom

some

of

i t s t h eo r e t i c al

ones

. Ef f i ci ency

does

not prove

ef f ect i veness

. Ef f i ci ency means

merel y

t he s k i l l f u l

execut i on

of

a

pr edet erm ned

rout i ne

;

ef f ect i veness

suggest s t h a t t h e

rout i ne

had a

u s e f u l purpose

and t h a t

execut i ng

i t

achi eved t he

pr edet erm ned

goal .

But

i nef f ect i veness

i n

Vi et namdoes

not necessar i l y

i ndi cat e probabl e

i nef f ect i veness

el sewhere

.


20/213

CHAPTER

1

Ai r

Power

Theor i es, Ar

Force

Thi nki ng,

and t he

Conf l i ct i n

Vi etnam

The

Past WasProl ogue

Ever si nce the Fi rst Worl dWar , Ai r

Power

has

hel d pol i t i c a l a l l ur e , seem ng

t o

offer

t he pr om se of al most pai nl ess v i c t o r y . Thepr om se has

not al ways

been f u l f i l l e d ,

but

i t

i s part of t he

nat ure

of ai r power t hat i t s real e f f e c t s

are

often d i f f i c u l t t o separat efrom

t hose cl ai med.

W l l i amShawcr oss

Howt h e

Ai r

Force

and

t h e

ot her servi ces

i nt erpret ed

t h e Vi et nam

Wr

depended

l a r g e l y on what t hey t hought about ml i t ar y power

and

i t s empl oyment i n general .

Al t hough

event s i n

Sout heast

Asi a

had

di s c r e t e f e at u r e s , t hey

l ooked

d i f f e r e n t t o

observers accor di ng t o

t h e i r

vari ous perspect i ves . Di f f erent

poi nt s of

v i ew

generat ed

d i f f e r e n t

vi si ons of

war ,

somet i mes

c a l l i n g

f o r cont rar y sol ut i ons .

And

t h e war

on

t h e

ground and

i n t he ai r

over

Vi etnampl ayed

agai nst

t h e war w thi n t h e

m nds

of

ml i t ar y and c i v i l i a n observers as t o whose

vi si on

was

r i g h t

. Thus

Ai r

Force t hi nki ng and ment al i t y became one among many

aut onomous

v ar i abl e s i n

shapi ng

and

i n t e r p r e t i n g

event s

i n

Vi etnam

As

t he

Uni t ed St at es became more

i nvol ved i n t h e

war

i n

Vi et nam i t

l acked

a

coherent under st andi ng

of ai r power-what i t coul d do, what

equi pment

i t r equi red,

what organi zat i on i t needed,

and

what c o n f l i c t s

i t

was

best sui t ed f o r . Nor was t h e r e

even

a commonsense of what ai r power was . D d t h e

term

appl y si mpl y t o

anyt hi ng

t h a t

f lew or

must

i t be

reserved f o r speci al ai r vehi cl es

or gani zed i n

speci al

ways?

At t he same t i me,

despi t e

t he uncer t ai nt i es concer ni ng ai r power and

how

t o use

i t ,

t h e r e wer e

deep- seat ed hopes

about i t s

po t e nt i a l

. The pr om se of

ai r power

pe r s i s t e d,

no

mat t er

what

d i f f i c u l t i e s

had

appear ed

i n

ai r

operat i ons

i n

t h e

decades

before t he Vi et nam Wr .

But

t h e

e f f o r t t o f u l f i l l

t h e pr om se

was

f r agment ed,

broken

among

t he several ml i tary servi ces

and

even

among

f act i ons w thi n them

The

f r agment at i on

so much a part

of

t he

hi st ory

of

ai r

power

came t o bear

on t h e

war i n

Sout heast

Asi a

. Past

debat es

over

ai r power

f ormed

a compl ex

pr ol ogue

t o

Vi et nam

I deas prom nent i n t h e Ai r Force i n t h e

ear l y

1960s wer e r oot ed i n

decades of

t hi nki ng

by ai r power t h e o r i s t s about concept s

and

doct r i nes t h a t wer e a r t i c u l a t e d


21/213

AIR

POWERANDTHEGROUNDWRNVIETNAM

w t h

speci al

force

a f t e r

1947 . These i deas

car r i ed

f orwar d i n a di r e c t l i ne f romt he

i nt erwar

years

i n t o

t he

Vi et nam

e r a

.

Despi t e

t h e

d i v e r s i t y

of

vi ews

w thi n

t he

Ai r

Force,

t h e r e wer e br oad

areas

of consensus

:

t h e

i mpor t ance

of t he s t r a t e g i c

d e t e r r e n t , t he ef f ect i veness of manned bombi ng, and t h e

need

f o r ai r superi ori t y

.

And,

not w t hst andi ng

di f f erences among t h e several s e r v i c e s ,

there

was i n t e r s e r v i c e

accept ance t h a t t he v e r t i c a l di mensi on i n modern

war f ar e

coul d not

be

evaded

. Yet

t h e

c l o s e r

one

adhered t o o r i g i n a l

i deas

about ai r power or

t o

t h e i r

l i n e a l

descendant s, t h e

cl oser

one

came

t o devel opi ng an absol ut e

model

f o r t he use of ai r

power

i n

warfare-one

t h a t m ght

not onl y r un af oul of

compet i ng

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,

devel oped

i n t h e

other

servi ces

or even

among c i v i l i a n s ,

but

a l s o

force t he

r e a l i t i e s

of t h e war a t hand t o conf or m t o t h e expect at i ons of one' s t heor y . The cl oser one' s

vi ews about

war

i n t h e 1960s

conf ormed

t o

ai r

power t heor i es shaped

i n

t he i nt erwar

ye a r s , t he l e s s m ght t hey respond t o novel pressures

and

demands i mposed

by

event s or c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s . The more one i n s i s t e d upon t h e deci si veness

of

one

f o rm

of

ai r

power ,

t h e great er t h e danger t h a t

other f orms

woul d

l angui sh . I n t h i s

way, t h e o r i e s about

ai r

power

and s p e c i f i c Ai r

Force t hi nki ng

about

i t became

pl ayers

i n

t h e

c o n f l i c t s

of t h e 1950s

and

1960s .

The

di sti nct i veness

of

t he

way

of

war advocat ed byUSexponent s of ai r power

i s

i t s e l f

part

of

a

broader

scheme

.

The

a t t r a c t i v e n e s s

of

ai r

power

t o

Ameri cans-even

i n i t s ext r eme or i de al

forms-stems

l argel y f rom i t s

compat i bi l i t y

w t h deep- seat ed

nat i onal t endenci es

and

preferences as t o t h e conduct of

war

. I n

The

Ameri canWy

of

War ,

f o r

exampl e,

h i s t o r i a n Russel l F . Wei gl ey del i neat ed t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c

ways t h e Uni t ed S t a t e s has f ought i t s

war s

. Amer i cans

have

p e r s i s t e n t l y seen

t hemsel ves as out number ed,

whet her

agai nst

more numer ous I ndi ans i n t h e

sevent eent h cent ury, t he so- cal l ed Yel l ow P e r i l of t h e ni net eent h cent ur y, or

t h e

s t e r e ot yp i c a l Chi nese

hordes and

Russi an bear i n t h e t went i et h .

Occasi onal l y,

t h i s

f eel i ng

of

i nsuf f i ci ency

i s

f o r t i f i e d

by

i s o l a t e d

event s

such

as

t he Cust er

massacr e or

perhaps t h e

si ege at Khe Sanh . I n

t h e i r

d e s i r e

t o

o f f s e t t h i s

per cei ved

sense of numer i cal i n f e r i o r i t y , US

l eaders

have devel oped an

i nt ense

rel i ance

on

f i r epower and

t echnol ogy . From i r i n g cannon t o over awe t he I ndi ans i n

col oni al Vi rgi ni a t hr ough t h e compar at i vel y

heavy

use of f i r epower

by Benamn_

Chur ch i n Ki ng P h i l i p ' s

Wr

t o t h e i ncreasi ng carnage of t h e

US

C i v i l War,

these

t endenci es st rengthened .

As

t h e

si ckeni ng

anxi et y

over a t t r i t i o n i n Wrl d

Wr I

was

added t o t h e

stored

memor i es

of

e a r l i e r

wars, bombardment

a i r c r a f t seemed t o

o f f e r

a c l e an , s c i e n t i f i c , and

l i f esavi ng

means

t o a t t ai n

secur i t y obj ect i ves

i n

a manner

t h a t best sui t ed

t h e

nat i on' s pecul i ar st rengt hs

whi l e mn im z i n g

i t s shor t com ngs .

I n p a r t ,

t h e

r i s e of

ai r power

t o i t s

i n t e gr a l

pl ace

i n

US

s t r a t e g y

and doct r i ne

depended

on an

al t ered d i s t i n c t i o n bet ween

combat ant

and noncombat ant

.

Thi s

process began i n t he C i v i l Wr

w t h

W l l i amTecumseh Sherman

and Ul ysses

S .

Grant . Bot h of t hese Uni on general s

accept ed

t h e i dea

of a

peopl e' s

war i n whi ch

t hose

c i v i l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t

suppor t ed

an

enemy' s ml i t ar y

capabi l i t y

became

l egi t i mat e

ml i t ar y

t a r g e t s

as a

prot ot ypi cal

home

front

. Thi s i dea l a t e r became p a r t


22/213

AIRPOWER

THEORES,

AIR

FORCETHNKNG

of a l a r ge r r eeval uat i on of

J om ni an

and Cl ausew t zi an s t r a t e g i c t hi nki ng t h a t l e d t o

a

broadened

sense of perm ssi bl e

conduct

i n

war

. And

on

t h i s ,

t h e

s t r u c t u r e

of

a

s t r a t e g i c

ai r

of f ensi ve was ul t i mat el y

b u i l t

.

Gen

Freder i ck CWyand,

f ormer chi ef of

s t a f f

of

t h e

Army

and t h e

l a s t

head of

t h e US Mi l i t ary

Assi st ance

Command,

Vi et nam

s t y l e d t he US

way

of war

as

part i cul arl y v i o l e n t , deadl y

and

dreadf ul .

W

bel i eve

i n usi ng

' th ings' -art i l lery ,

bombs, massi ve

f i r epower - i n

order t o conserve our s o l d i e r s ' l i v e s . General

Wyand

al so not ed t h a t t he enem es f aced by t he Uni t ed S t a t e s i n Vi etnamdi d

near l y

t he opposi t e,

compensat i ng

f o r a l ack of ` t h i ngs '

by

expendi ng men

i nst ead

of

machi nes

.

z

Theenemy

wer e

not

onl y

peopl e

and

t h e

mat eri el

t hey

coul d

g a t h e r ,

but

t h e very way i n

whi ch

war and i t s pr osecut i on wer e concei ved . Not onl y was

t h e

Uni t ed St at es

a t

war

i n Vi et nam

but

i t s

whol e

way of t hi nki ng about

c o n f l i c t

was at

war ,

t oo .

Ser i ous

ref l ect i on

on

t h e

Korean Wr m ght have

prepared t h e

Uni t ed St at e s be t t e r f o r t he

ki nd

of Vi et cong

and

Nor t h Vi et namese commtment

t h a t

was

encount ered

i n Vi et nam

and

f a i l u r e

t o c a p i t a l i z e on t h a t

e a r l i e r

exper i ence

suggest ed

t h e persi st ence of t h i s

speci al

US

ment al i t y

about war . Act ual condi t i ons

i n t h e

t h e a t e r

of

c o n f l i c t

compr i se

onl y one

part

of

a much broader phenomenon

The d i s t i n c t i v e way

US

s t r a t e g i s t s v i ewwar i s

especi al l y

evi dent i n t h e manner i n

whi ch

t hey

have

l ooked

at

ai r power

and

i t s r o l e i n

combat

.

The

Thrust of US

Ar

Power Theori es

Sever al p e r s i s t e n t

t hemes have

appear ed amd t h e accumul at i on of i deas

about ai r

power i n

Amer i ca,

and

t hese

event ual l y i nf l uenced

t he use of ai r

f o r c e s i n

Vi et nam These

t hemes

deri ve t h e i r

coher ence

l e s s f rom

how t hey

i nt eract ed

t echni cal l y i n t h e event s of t h e 1960s

and

1970s t han f rom

t h e i r

common o r i g i n i n

t h e t hi nki ng done bet ween Wrl d

Wrs

I

and

I I . F i r s t , ai r power ' s proponent s,

especi al l y

t h e

most

ardent ,

have t y p i c a l l y st ressed t he e s s e n t i a l

novel t y

of

t he ai r

age and t he consequent i r r el evance of h i s t o r i c a l exper i ence . The

new

pri nci pl es and

p r a c t i c e s of ai r power supposedl y super seded o l d ml i t ar y

l essons

and

dogmas,

whi ch had a r i s e n i n ref l ect i on

on

t h e charact er

of surface

war f ar e . Newdoct r i nes

f o r ai r power

r i sked

i gnor i ng t he t e s t of exper i ence,

whi ch

obvi ousl y coul d

be

f ormed

onl y i n

t h e past

.

However

much t he

advocat es

of ai r power

woul d l a t e r

seek

evi dence i n i t s

short

h i s t o r y ,

val i dat i on

f o r t h e i r

cont ent i ons

l a y

i n

t heor y

i t s e l f

.

The

emphasi s

on novel t y was a l s o made

possi bl e by

a

corol l ary

feature

so often

di scussed

t h a t

i t

appear s

t o

be

a

separat e

t heme

.

The

advocat es

of

ai r

power

devel oped an especi al l y st r ong dependence upon t echnol ogi cal

i nnovat i on and

a

pecul i ar at t achment

t o

weapons

and

syst ems proj ect ed f o r t he f ut ur e r at he r t han

t hose of t h e more

convent i onal

present .

Al t hough l and power

and

s e a power

t h e o r i s t s

wer e

al so a t t r a c t e d t o t echnol ogy, ai r

ent husi ast s

showed

a s pe c i a l

commtment because t he

movement

and

ser vi ce t hey

fostered owed t h e i r

very

i d e n t i t i e s t o a

compar at i vel y r ecent t echnol ogi cal br eakt hr ough

. Whi l e

t hey

accept ed t he i mpor t ance of ai r

forces

as

a

const ant

and

an absol ute, t hey

i n s i s t e d

on

a d i l i g e n t and

per manent

search

f o r

i mpr oved

a i r c r a f t

and

weapons

t ypes

t o

f u l f i l l


23/213

ARPOWER

AND

THEGROUND

WRNVIETNAM

ai r power ' s pr om se . The wor ds of GenHenr y HAr nol d

shor t l y

a f t e r Worl d

Wr

1 1

exempl i f y

t h i s

t h r u s t

:

The f i r s t

essent i al

of a i r power

necessary

f or peace and securi t y i s t he

preemnence i n

research

.

Wmust

count

on s c i e n t i f i c advances requi r i ng us t o r epl ace

about

one- f i f t h

of

exi st i ng

Ai r

Forces

equi pment each year and

we

must be sure

t h a t

t hese addi t i ons are

t he most advanced i n t he whol eworl d 4

Al t hough

he

want ed

number s,

General

Ar nol d

regarded

i mproved t echnol ogy as

e s s ent i a l . The

r e s u l t

was

a

di m ni shed opi ni on

of

t h e

wort h

of t hose

a i r c r a f t

and

weapons t h a t wer e not of t h e most

recent

and most advanced desi gn .

A

t h i r d

theme

advanced

by

proponent s

of

ai r

power

i n t h i s

count r y

has

been

t h e

essent i al i t y- perhaps t h e domnance- of

t he

s t r a t e g i c a i r of f ensi ve . The best

defense i n a gener i c sense depended upona

force

t h a t coul d proj ect an

of f ense

i n t h e

concret e sense .

For

exampl e, def endi ng

t h e

Uni t ed St at es

seemed t o

r equi re an

ai r

f o r c e t h a t coul d s t r i k e t h e enemy' s

hear t l and

.

I n

t i me,

t h i s

a t t i t u d e proved

compat i bl e

w t h

t h e

f ormal strategy

of

det er r ence

.

But

because i t

had r o o t s i n a

s t r a t e g i c

vi si on

t h a t

consi der ed doi ng

away

w t h sur f ace engagement s, t h e Ai r

Force and i t s

f orebearers

gave consi derabl y l ower p r i o r i t y t o some mat t ers,

such

as

t h e suppor t

of

ground and sea

f o r c e s , whi ch

wer e v i t a l t o t h e Army and

Navy

At

t h e

very

l e a s t ,

t he

Ai r

Force showed

t h i s

pr i o r i t y i n

ways

whi ch

t h e

other

servi ces

f ound

hard

t o

accept .

Four t h, si nce t h e ai r ar ound t h e

wor l d

had no borders, t h e o r i s t s

regarded

i t

as

an

i n d i v i s i b l e medi um

f o r

ml i t ar y

purposes .

They

t hought

t h a t

ai r power shoul d

l i kewse be uni f i ed i n

one

ml i t ar y ser vi ce . I n

f a c t , t h e argument f o r

an aut onomous

ai r of f ensi ve

was

based i n part on t h e i dea t h a t t h e

at mospher e

on t h e one hand and

t h e l and and sea on t h e other

a r e compl et el y separat e t h e a t e r s of

war f ar e

.

Thi s

v i ew

c l e a r l y

suppor t ed

a separat e ai r s e r v i c e , i ndependent

ai r campai gns, and t he

supr emacy of

ai r

force

personnel

i n

cont rol

of

ai r

a s s e t s

dur i ng

j o i n t

operat i ons

.

L a t e r , as pi r a t i ons

of

t h e

var i ous servi ces mat ched t h e way

each force

l ooked at t h e

medi umi n

whi ch i t

operat ed . For

exampl e, basi c

Ai r Force doct r i ne asser t ed t h a t

t he medi um i n

whi ch

ai r

forces oper at e- space- i s an

i n d i v i s i b l e f i e l d of

a c t i v i t y

;

hence,

i t was

necessar y t o preserve t h e i ndependent

command of

ai r

f o r c e s . Thi s doct r i ne

a l s o

i mpl i ed t h a t , i n any

supposed

par t nershi p

among

t h e

s e r v i c e s , t h e ai r component shoul d

be

dom nant

even

whent h e

t heat er

of

operat i ons

was

no more t han r egi onal . Thus, Ai r Force Manual (AFM 1- 2, Uni t ed St at es Ai r

Force

Basi c

Doct r i ne

( 1955) ,

substant i al l y

cont radi ct ed

Army

doct r i ne

expressed

i n

Fi el d Manual (FM

100- 5,

Operat i ons, whi ch cl ai med preem nence f o r t he

ground

f o r c e s preci sel y

because t hey

operat ed

on l and . The

Navy t ook

a

r h e t o r i c a l

mdd l e

ground t h a t

s a t i s f i e d nei t her

t h e Army nor t h e Ai r Force . I n

US

Naval

Warf ar e

Publ i cat i on 10, t he

Navy emphasi zed t h a t

mobi l i t y,

l argel y

by

s e a , enhanced

US

a b i l i t y

t o

put pressure on

enemy

t e r r i t o r y .

Navy

doct r i ne

l e f t t h e exact r o l e

of ai r

power and

ai r

s t r a t e g y

undef i ned,

descr i bi ng i t

as bei ng

i n

t h e process

of h i s t o r i c

devel opment .

5


24/213

AIR

POWER

THEORES, AIR

FORCE

THNKING

A

f i f t h

t heme i s

i n

some r espects

t h e

most

i mpor t ant

. Ai r power ent husi ast s

and

advocat es

t ended

t o

adopt

a

par t i cul ar i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

of

what

ai r

power was

;

t h a t

i s ,

what

i t s dom nant

aspect

was, and

i n what mode i t coul d

be

used

most e f f e c t i v e l y .

They f ocused over whel m ng

a t t e n t i o n on t h e s t r a t e g i c

a i r of f ensi ve

.

Ot her

consi der at i ons- even one so

basi c

as ai r super i or i t y- became

l argel y t h e

f unct i onal

servant s

of

t he ai r

of f ensi ve . Thi nki ng

about

ai r power

i n

a

broader sense

was

not i ceabl y l acki ng .

Per haps

t he case f or a i r power ' s future

si gni f i cance

and

f o r t he

necessi t y of an

i ndependent

ai r force hi nged on

i t s

cl ai m

t o

t h e dom nant s t r a t e g i c

ml i t ar y r o l e . Yet , however genui ne t h e i r commtment t o t h i s

vi si on,

i t s authors

nar r owed t h e unspoken def in i t ion of ai r power

whi l e

seeki ng t o gi ve

i t

r e a l i t y .

Var i ous

t h i n k e r s , t h e o r i s t s ,

and

pract i t i oners of ai r power mani f est ed

t hese i deas

i n

t h e i r var i ous wor ks .

The t hemes meshed, bl ended, and i n t e r a c t e d,

formng

a

general

context

r a t h e r

t han an

a n a l y t i c a l l y

preci se l i s t of

p a r t i c u l a r s i n

t h e

m nds

of

ai r

power

advocat es

; but

t hey al t ered

t he

cl i mat e

i n

whi ch f u t u r e

c o n f l i c t s

wer e

underst ood

.

The

Ascendancy of t he Of f ensi ve

Ger i Wl l i am

Bi l l y Mi t chel l , a

prophet and

mar t yr i n t h e cause of i ndependent

ai r

power ,

somet i mes def ended a f undament al t r u t h

w t h

a

di scom ort i ng mul t i t ude

of i n t e l l i g e n t guesses

.

I n

a

sense,

t h e

need t o

def end t h e i n f a n t ai r

force encour aged

t h e most opt imst ic

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of

debat abl e and compl ex i s s u e s

.

I n Wnged

Def ense (1925) ,

f o r

exampl e, Mi t chel l

sought t o

emul at e

t h e sweepi ng

power

of

Al f red

T

Mahan

by post i ng a whol e

def ense syst em

based on

ai r

power . He not

onl y

procl ai med

ai r

power ' s em nence

as

t h e new and dom nant medi um

of

t r ans po r t a t i on , but al so sawusef ul peacet i me r o l e s f o r

ai r

power

t h a t

supposedl y

made

arm es

and

navi es wastef ul

and

obsol et e .

Yet

t here wer e di f f erences i n

approach

bet ween

Mahan

and

Mi t chel l

t h a t

persi sted

i n

debat es

among

t h e i r

successors decades l a t e r .

For one

t h i n g , Mahan' s work was l argel y h i s t o r i c a l whi l e

Mi t chel l ' s

was

l a r g e l y

predi ct i ve

.

Among

t h e c r i t i c a l

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of

Mahan' s v i ew

of sea power ,

whi ch was

credi bl e and

val uabl e even

f o r

t hose out si de

t h e

naval

f r a t e r n i t y ,

wer e :

0 I t was

nei t her

bound

t o

hi ghl y

s p e c i f i c

t echnol ogi es nor t hr eat ened

by

changes

i n

t echnol ogy .

0Sea- l anes wer e l i m t e d

and

def i nabl e, despi t e t h e vast ness of t he

oceans,

and

t hus

credi bl y

open

t o

di sput e

among

compet i ng power s

.

Seapower not

onl y

deterred enem es but pr omot ed

further

econom c

gr owt h

.

The s i z e

of

a nat i on' s navy shoul d cor rel at e r e a l i s t i c a l l y t o t h e

growt h

of

t h e

nat i on' s shi ppi ng and t h e i mpor t ance of t h e i n t e r e s t s l i nked t o

i t

; and

navy

spendi ng

shoul d

r e l a t e

t o

a measurabl e st andard, mat chi ng

seagoi ng

force w t h

seaborne

i n t e r e s t s

.


25/213

AIR

POWERANDTHEGROUNDWRN

VIETNAM

Un i ke

Mahan, who i nsi st ed t hat

t heor i es

of sea power i n t he

age

of steamgrew

f rom

experi ence

i n t he

age

of sai l , ai r power

t heori sts had r el at i vel y

l i t t l e

experi ence

f rom

whi ch

t o pr oj ect . They

were

therefore compel l ed t o pr edi ct f romt heor i z i ng

and

t o ext r apol at e f romt he

nat ure of avai l abl e technol ogi es . Thus, ai r t heori sts

were

f reed

f rom

the l i m t a t i o n s of ten suggested

by

hi st ori cal

experi ence

. But

because

t hei r i magi nati ons

were unr est r ai ned,

ai r

t heor i sts r an t he

r i s k of

subordi nati ng

st r at egi c thought

t o advances

i n

engi neeri ng

and

technol ogy- a

danger

they

seemed

t o

recogn ze

onl y

re l uct ant l y .

The pr esent was deemed

t o offer

l i t t l e

t hat was appl i cabl e t o t he future, and t he f ai l ures of current technol ogy di d

r el at i vel y

l i t t l e

t o

deter wde-rangi ng opt i msm

about

gr eat and ef f ect i ve weapons

t hat

al ways

seem

ust

around

t he

corner

.

Thi s i ncl i nat i on

tended t o

make

strategy

a

hostage

of

machi nery, and i t i nvi t ed

r el uct ance

t o adapt doctri ne t o experi ence

Dsmssal

of

t he

past

as i r rel evant t o t he f ut ur e

pervaded

Mi t chel l ' s

Wnged

Def ense. Contrasti ng t he age

of

ai r power wth i t s predecessors, Mtchel l wrote

Hndenburg

l ooked

back

t o

Hanni bal ' s b a t t l e of Cannae, andmade h i s di sposi t i ons

t o

f i ght

t he

Russi ans

at Tannenberg

Napol eonstudi ed

t he

campai gns of Al exander

t he Gr eat

and

Genghi s

Khan, t he Mongol

The navi es

drew

t hei r

i nspi rat i on

fromt he b a t t l e of

Act i um n

t he t i me of t he Romans and t he sea f i ght of Traf al gar

I n

t he

devel opment

of

a i r

power,

one

has

t o

l ook

aheadand

not

backward

and

f i gure

out

what i s goi ng t o happen,

not t oo muchwhat has

happened

That i s whyt he

ol der

servi ces

have been psychol ogi cal l y un f i t t o devel op t h i s newarmt o t he

f u l l e s t

extent

practi cabl e

w t h

t he

methods

and

means at hand

9

The

Ar Force s

chroni c

i mpati ence w th

hi s tory or i gi nat ed i n such

t hi nk i ng

.

Moreover,

Mi t chel l ' s

i deas ant i ci pat ed t he

penchant

f or

r econci l i ng apparent

di scr epanci es i n

str at egi c

thought

and theory

wth opt i m st i c pr edi ct i ons

of

new

i nvent i ons .

Thus,

hardware served not

on y t o

carry

out

theory

but

t o

prot ect i t

.

Whatever l essons

experi ence

seemed t o offer, t heor i es cou dal ways be defendedby

weapons yet t o

be

bui l t .

I n prophesyi ng

av i at i on

devel opments,

B i l l y

Mtchel l adopted a tone of absol ute

cert ai nt y,

i r r i t a t i ng

both

ground and sea forces

whi l e

rousi ng t he sp i r i t s of

hi s

f ol l ower s

. I n

Our

Ar Force

( 1921) ,

he contended That ai r shi ps w l l

be

a potent

f act or i n

a l l

commun cati ons i n a

comparat i vel y

f ewyears, there can

be no

doubt .

The words there can

be no

doubt conveyed

t he

cer t i t ude

of a

vi s i onar y,

even

though t he pr edi ct i on

was never

qui t e

f u l f i l l e d

.

1 0

Mi t chel l ' s r o l e may have been t hat of prophet more than

st rat egi st ,

but

hi s

pronouncements

f avored

a

doct r i nal

sl ant

t hat was

a

si gni f i cant

and

i nf l uent i al

part

of

hi s

l egacy t he worl d of ai r power was t oo

new

t o

pay

much

at t ent i on t o ol der

experi ence

and

theory ; ascendancy i n t he age of ai r power woul d

depend

upon

t echnol ogi cal super i or i t y ; and t he mediumof

ai r

woul d encourage a sweepi ng

gl obal perspect i ve, di ct at i ng par t i cul ar st rat egi c concepts and force structures .

Mi t chel l ' s successors

debated t he most ef f ect i ve

way

t o

empl oy

ai r

power

and t he

most

appr opr i at e ways t o assure

and

foster i t s fu tu re w t hi n t he broad

f ramework

of

Mi t chel l ' s

assumpti ons

.


26/213

AIRPOWERTHEORES, AIR

FORCETHNKNG

Such

i deas

m ght

have been

di sm ssed as mer e f oot not es

i n

t h e h i s t o r y of

Amer i can ml i t ar y t hought

had

t hey not

become

c e n t r a l forces

i n

shapi ng

t h e

at t i t udes

and

i n s t i t u t i o n s

of

our nascent

ai r force . What

Mi t chel l

advocat ed

event ual l y became p a r t of the

core of

Ai r

Ser vi ce

t eachi ng

. I n 1921, Maj W l l i am

C Sher man, a f acul t y member at t he

Ai r Ser vi ce

Fi el d

O f f i c e r s ' School ,

underscored

t h e

need

f o r

i ndependence

f romt h e

doct r i nes

of

t h e

other

servi ces : I n

deri vi ng t he

doct r i ne

t h a t must underl i e al l pri nci pl es

of

empl oyment of

t h e ai r

f o r c e ,

we

must

not be gui ded by condi t i ons

sur r oundi ng t h e

use of gr ound

t roops,

but

must seek

our own doct r i ne . . .

i n t h e

el ement

i n

whi ch

t h e ai r

force

operat es

. Such

t hi nki ng

cl ear l y poi nt ed

t owar d commtment

t o

an i ndependent

ai r

campai gn,

st rengt heni ng t he

i nt erdependence

of t he

a i r

of f ensi ve

and

an

aut onomous force

t o

carry i t out .

But

i t al so

suggest ed

an especi al l y

f i r m

v i ew of

doct r i ne as somet hi ng

deeper,

broader,

and

more

endur i ng

t han t he conduct

of

war .

Ai r power t hi nkers t ended t o

base

general doc t r i na l posi t i ons on s p e c i f i c hardware

and syst ems whi l e el evat i ng t he s c i e n t i f i c

pri nci pl es

behi nd

t h e

hardware

t o t h e

s t a t u s of

l aw

. z

The studi es

of

o f f i c e r s i n

t he

Ai r Corps

Tact i cal School

dur i ng t h e 1920s and

1930s c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d a t endency

t o emphasi ze

t h e

ai r

of f ensi ve and a e r i a l

bombar dment ,

and

t h e

Wr

Depar t ment ' s

i nsi st ence

on

a

subordi nat e

r o l e

f o r

ai r

power i n combat st r engt hened t he deep commtment of t hese of f i c e r s t o t he i dea of

an ai r of f ensi ve .

But

not al l ai r o f f i c e r s wer e

suppor t i ve

of t h e

i ndependent

ai r

force

concept .

Suggest i ve

of opposi ng

vi ews gi vi ng ai r

forces

a l e s s c e n t r a l r o l e was a

1928

paper

on

The Doct r i ne

of Ai r For ce, f orwar ded

by

Ai r Servi ce Lt Col C

C

Cul ver .

He

concl uded t h a t t he

ai r

component

.

. .

al ways

suppor t s

t h e

ground

f o r c e s ,

no

mat t er

how

deci si ve i t s

.

. . operat i ons

may

be, nor

how

i n d i r e c t i t s suppor t . Maj

Gen J ames

E . Fechet , who

had

become

chi ef

of

t h e Ai r Corps i n

1927, obj ect ed

t o

t h e

st at ement

as

def ect i ve,

even

i f

i t

di d

conf or m

t o

Wr

Depar t ment

gui del i nes

.

The obj ect i ve of war i s

t o

overcome t he

enemy s wi l l t o

r e s i s t , and

t he

defeat

of

hi s army,

hi s

f l e e t or

t he

occupat i on

of hi s

t e r r i t o r y

i s merel yameans

t o

t h i s endandnone

of them

s

t he t r u e obj ect i ve I f t he

true

obj ect i vecanbe r eached w t hout t he necessi t y of def eat i ng or

br ushi ng

asi de

t he enemyforce

on t he ground

or

water and t he

proper

means

f urni shed t o

subdue t he

enemy s

w l l and bri ng

t he

war

t o

a cl ose, and t he obj ect of war can be

obtai ned w th l e s s destr uct i on and

l ast i ng

after effects t han has heret ofor e been t he case

At

present t he

Ai r Forceprovi des t he onl y

means

f or such an accompl i shment

.

13

Such

not i ons as brushi ng

asi de

h o s t i l e

arm es

conj ur ed

up

vi si ons

of a

r e l a t i v e l y

easy vi ct ory and poi nt ed

even more shar pl y

t o

t h e

w deni ng

gul f bet ween ai r power

t hi nkers

and

t h e

l eaders

of

gr ound

and

naval

forces

.

The Baker Boar d, i n i t s m d- 1934 r e p o r t , w dened t h e

r i f t

. The r e p o r t

expressed

t h e

est abl i shed

vi ew

of t h e Wr Depar t ment as t o t h e Army' s pl ace i n t h e scheme of

defense .


27/213

AR

POWER

AND

THEGROUNDWARINVIETNAM

The i dea t h a t

avi at i on

can r epl ace anyof t he

ot her

el ement s of our armed forces i s f ound,

on

anal ysi s,

t o

be er r oneous

. Si nce ground forces

al one

are capabl e of occupyi ng

t e r r i t o r y ,

o r ,

w t h

cer t ai nt y,

prevent i ng

occupat i on

of

our

own

t e r r i t o r y ,

t he

Army

w t h

i t s

owna i r forces r emai ns t he ul t i mat e deci si ve factor

i n

war

t o

Ai r

power

advocat es

have

f ocused

on

t h i s r emark

preci sel y because' i t

opposed t h e

f ormat i on

of a separat e

and enl ar ged ai r

force . I t

a l s o

provi des an

i n s t r u c t i v e

cl ue

about t h e concept ual under pi nni ng

of

t h e

Army

Fol l ow ng t h e Baker Boar d' s di scour agi ng opi ni on, ai r power

advocat es

r edoubl ed t h e i r e f f o r t s

.

They

r ecogni zed t h a t e s c o r t a i r c r a f t m ght

be

needed and

t h a t

cont rol

of

t h e ai r was a c r i t i c a l v ar i abl e , but t hey pi nned t h e i r great est hopes

on

i ndependent

ai r

campai gns

ai med

at

t h e

deep

sources

of

t h e

enemy' s

strength

and

t h u s

on

t he s t r a t e g i c bomber .

Secret ar y

of

Wr

Harry Woodri ng

approved

a

report

by

t h e

Wr

Depar t ment Ai r

Boar d,

agreed t o by

Gen

George Mar shal l

:

The

bas i s

of

Ai r Power

i s

t h e

bombardment pl ane

. Al t hough

t h i s r e p o r t di d no t s e t t l e t h e

br oader concept ual and s t r a t e g i c

i ssue of t he r e l a t i v e wort h

of

a i r , l a nd, and

sea

f o r c e s , i t di d

pr ovi de

aut hor i t y t o devel op a force t h a t ai r t h e o r i s t s

saw

as t h e

very

h e a r t

of

ai r power .

Thi s

emphasi s

di d not

decl i ne

w t h t he comng of Worl d

Wr

I I . The war di d

much

t o

l i b e r a t e

t he

o f f i c e r s

of

t he ai r

s e r v i c e, bu t t he

r e a l i t i e s

di d

no t conf or m t o

t h e

f ondest expect at i ons of

ai r power

ent husi ast s . And

f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h

ol d

Ai r

Corps vi ews as

current US

defense pol i cy was di st urbi ng

.

Cont r oversi es over pr oper

t a c t i c s

and

t a r ge t i ng f o r bombi ng,

especi al l y

i n t h e Eur opean t h e a t e r ,

o f f s e t

t h e

s a t i s f a c t i o n of

achi evi ng

a de facto

s t a t u s

of

equal i t y

as

an aut onomous servi ce .

I n

f a c t , t h e

war

became a

source

of compl ai nt

f o r

var i ous

ai r

power

p u r i s t s

. They

at t acked t h e deci si ons

t o

rebui l d t h e US

Navy

and conduct

l arge- scal e

ground

operat i ons as f undament al l y

wrong

and

wast ef ul . They ar gued

t h a t

t h e

count r y

woul d ge t be t t e r r e s u l t s

by

expendi ng i t s

resources

ona moremodern

force-the

ai r

arm

The

most

a r t i c u l a t e proponent

of

t h i s

v i ew

was Al exander P . de

Seversky

.

An

a i r c r a f t

desi gner and

busi nessman

as

wel l

as

a t h e o r i s t ,

and l a t e r

a

l e c t u r e r at t h e Ai r

Uni versi t y, de Sever sky sawno v i r t u e

i n

di spassi on .

He

bol dl y cl ai med t h a t

ai r

power coul d br i ng vi ct ory i n

t h e

wor l d war

w t hout much hel p f rom l and and s e a

f o r c e s . He sought t o suppl ant t h e

naval i sm

of Mahan,

whose

per suasi veness was

a

b a r r i e r

t o

f u l l - s c a l e commtment

t o

ai r power . Never t hel ess, de Seversky bor r owed

heavi l y

f rom

Mahan' s

t erm nol ogy

. I n h i s book Vi ct or y Thr ough Ai r Power

( 1942) ,

he

referred

e x p l i c i t l y

t o

passages

f rom

Mahan' s

most

f amous

t e x t

and

el aborat ed

on

t h e

not i on of an

envel opi ng

ai r ocean .

He

wr ot e

of

dr eadnought s of t he ski es

t h a t woul d

wage

an i nt erhem spher i c

war

d i r e c t across

oceans, w t h

ai r power

f i gh t i ng not over

t h i s

or

t h a t l o c a l i t y , but by l ongi t ude and l a t i t u d e anywhere i n t h e

uni nt erpret ed

` a i r ocean' .

But

whi l e imta t ing

Mahan' s

r h e t o r i c ,

de Seversky

depar t ed

f rom Mahan' s t heor i es

. Rat her t han

j u s t

l e a r n

f rom t h e experi ence

of

Wor l d Wr I I , he debat ed t he whol e shape of t h e

war

even as i t was bei ng f ought .

De Seversky cal l ed f or

bol d

depar t ur es i n force s t r u c t u r e

and

strategy . He even

10


28/213

AR

POWER

THEORES, AIR

FORCETHNKNG

cl ai med t h a t ml i t ar y avi at i on i n t h e war had shaped new pr i nci pl es

of

war f ar e .

Thi s

newway

of

maki ng

war

had

t o

be

freed

f r omgr ound and

sea

commanders

who

wer e

f a t a l l y

i nf ect ed w th ol der s t r a t e g i c i deas and, hence,

unabl e t o appreci at e t h e

t r u e r o l e of ai r power . Mi nci ng nowor ds, de Sever sky

descr i bed

ai r power as

a

force

t h a t el udes s t a t i c , ort hodox mnds no mat t er howb r i l l i a n t t hey

may

be Ai r

power

speaks

a

str at egi c

l anguage so new [ despi t e h i s own bor r ow ng from

Mahan]

t h a t

t ransl at i on i n t o t he hackneyed i di omof t he

past

i s i mpossi bl e I t c a l l s not

onl y

f or

new

machi nes

and

t echni ques

of warmaki ng

but

f or new men

unencumbered

by rout i ne

t hi nki ng

.

16

The

vi si onary' s i mpat i ence

w t h

evol ut i onary,

gradual change had cl earl y

not

been

t he excl usi ve property

of Bi l l y

Mi t chel l

.

De

Seversky

coul d not conceal h i s di sdai n f o r

m nds

t h a t subj ect ed t h e cl ai ms

of

ai r power

ent husi ast s

t o

t h e t e s t of i t s present t echnol ogy

.

The c r i t i c s ,

he

compl ai ned,

ar e unabl e t o

see

t h e

p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of ai r power beyond

t h e hor i zons

of i t s

present

equi pment

and

i t s present

t a c t i c s

.

They do not t ake i n t h e f u l l maj est i c

sweep of t h e

i nevi t abl e

progress of a i r c r a f t ; t hey base

t h e i r

t hi nki ng

on

avi at i on

as

we know

i t

t oday ( emphasi s added) .

Al t hough

de Seversky was

r e f e r r i n g

here

s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e

need

f o r

an

i ndependent ai r s e r v i c e ,

h i s

emphasi s on t h e pr i macy

of

t he f u t u r e

was

nonet hel ess t i nged w t h i r ony

.

He

sought

t h e

adopt i on

of a

new

pol i cy based l argel y on a f u t u r e t echnol ogy t o

f i g h t

a

current

war

. De

Seversky

saw

t he

chance

t o ski p i nt ermedi ar y st ages

of

devel opment and reach out bol dl y

beyond t h e

present conf i nes

of

avi at i on

t ypes, and

he

was convi nced

t h a t

t he

nat i on

coul d

do so

dur i ng t h e

current

war ( de Sever sky' s emphasi s)

.

He r eached t h i s

concl usi on p a r t l y

because he saw

t h a t

new

t echnol ogi cal

devel opment s wer e

accumul at i ng rapi dl y .

But

t he i dea of ski ppi ng st ages

a l s o suggest ed a measur e

of

f a i t h

t h a t m ght r un ahead of experi ence .

Wth

exuberant

opt i m sm de

Seversky

pressed

h i s

vi ew

t h a t

a i r c r a f t

w t h

gl obal

c a p a b i l i t i e s wer e at hand . He cl ai med t h a t

rapi d

achi evement s i n r ange

wer e

i n e v i t a b l e , and

he

demanded

t h a t t h e

Uni t ed

S t a t e s throw

i t s e l f

whol ehear t edl y i n to

devel opi ng t h e

best

possi bl e ai r

force

.

Wneed onl y make

t he

assumpt i on of

a vastl y

expanded

avi at i on range-anassumpt i on

f u l l y

j us t i f i ed

by t he s c i e n t i f i c

aeronaut i cal

f acts-and

i nstant l y

t he exposed

posi t i on

of

Ameri ca

becomes

evi dent

Imagine

t he reachof ai r

power

mul t i pl i ed

three t o f i v e

t i mes,

and

t he t a c t i c a l posi t i on of t he Uni t ed States

becomes

preci sel y t he same as t h a t of t he

Br i t i sh

I s l e s

t oday

The

range of m l i t ar y avi at i on i s

bei ng

ext ended so rapi d ly t hat

t he

At l ant i c w l l be

cancel ed

out

as a genui ne

obst acl e

w t hi n two years, t he Paci f i c w thi n t hr ee

years

After

t h a t , i n

f i v e

years

a t

t he out si de,

t he

ul t i mat e

r ound- t he- wor l d

range

of

25, 000

m l e s

becomes

i nevi t abl e

At

t h a t poi nt

anynat i on

wi l l

beabl e

t o

hurl i t s

a e r i a l

mght agai nst any

spot on t he

f ace

of t he

gl obe

w t hout

i nt ermedi ary bases

By

t he same

t oken ever y

count r y

wi l l

be subj ect

t o

assaul t f romany di rect i on

anywhere i n

t he worl d The b ows

wi l l

be

del i ver ed f romt he home bases,

r egar dl ess

of di st ance, w t h al l oceans and

bases

i n

betweent ur ned

i n to

a

noman s l and [ de Sever sky' s emphasi s]

. 18


29/213

AIR

POWER

AND

THE

GROUND

WRNVIETNAM

L i k e

earl i er

a i r t heor i sts, de Seversky was

f ar

l e s s gener ous

i n

hi s est i mat e of

what

t he

ground

and

sea

forces

coul d

gai n

f rom

t echnol ogy

.

He

speci f i cal l y

r ej ect ed

separat e, sea- based avi at i on, part l y

t o

preserve

t he

concept of undi vi ded a i r power

and

part l y

t o st r engt hen t he case f or an

i ndependent

a

Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam

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