Air Intelligence Report, V1N3, Final

8/8/2019 Air Intelligence Report, V1N3, Final

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22 MARCH 19+5OLI NOS

G THE PLANNING OF Page 3NCENDIARY STRIKESMANY TARGETS IN IlIge 8ESTROYED AREAS

G PUZZLES AID~ l ARGET SPOTTING

G JAPS MAY USE


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IlIAIUI If4J . ' . ~ . ; ' ., . ~ . : . ; , ;"=.:...

THE PlANNING BEHIND THE INCENDIARY ATTACKS

l'RAIIIIM:; ADEQUAT!n i l e night bOlllbing would be n.. . uper lence fo r II05t 8-29 crewsi t was no t thought that additional

t raining would be required befaretemporarily dt scont lnu lnc the bt shlevel dayl1sht attaclal. U1 cr. . . .had experience In naVIgation at

4. Vll.1ntenance problems wouldbe ~ i m p l i f i e ~ because of las .. t ra in on en,;ines and a relatlve17eu.tained attack could be carr1.edou t by larger number of 8_29s.HC1If ABrol LOSSES?

But, would i t be possible tocarry ou t Ie - l eve l a t tacks withoutobtainina excessive losses? 'ft1eanswer wa. e ~ e c t s i o n to at tack atnight when th a enemy defenses wouldbe less effeetive. The Japaoesewere n ot belivved capable or p u t ~t ing an efficient night f ightertorce into th e a i r .

By set t ing the . bOlllbing a l t i ~tude r a n ~ from 5,000 to 8.000 feetth e danger t'rOlll a[ltiatrcratt firewould be greatly r e ~ u c e d . AutollIatic weapons f ire was not expectedto be effective above 5,000 teetand heavy t lak accuracy decreasesrapidly below 10,000 feet . Thesealti tudes also would cancel .oatdanger from b a r r ~ e balloons.At night. Formation Flyingwuuld no t be necessary fo r defensive t i re power and th e efficieftCyof an operation would be increasedbecause of add it ional bomb load dueto increased tuel econCll7. Al.so.smaller &IIIlUnttlon load could becarried.

LOft LEVEL ATTACIIS CONSIDEREDOne poSSibility which immedi117 presented i t se l f fo r cOn5id

~ i o n was lo_ leve l at tacks . The,lowing edvant8l5es were disclosed'1. Better weetber conditionspresent a t low 8 1 t i t u ~ e s thanhigh. Winds of 2S to 36 knots

,13 be expected a! I compared toto 180 knots a t 25.000 to 3()('t(l(lIt , ID8king i t unnecessary to l1mbaabi ng app ro ac h diractions totd excessive dr if t . Cloud COQtonI are more favorable a t Ietudes.S. More effect ive us e o f ra _equipment tor naVigation aootng is possible a t law s l t i -iU a! I scope det ini t ion 11 lDuch

, ter .3 . Attacks a t low level wouldi t greater baab loads becausedecreased fuel consUlllpt-1on.

th e beginnIng of March 1945a thorough r e c o n s l ~ e r a t i o nand re-evaluation of th e cap' t ies of th e XXI Bomber Commandad th e factors influencing i t st tor ts revealed tha t unfavorable.. . tiler fo r dayl1gHt precis io n bOlllb-as by high al t i tude formations wa!be biggest obstacle to th e tactics.tng ~ e d .In many i n s t ~ n c e s it Is n e c ~ s -trY to c h a ~ a tactics to meet th e. ~ ' s change or pace. bu t in th isl ie i t was apparent that more 1 m

.. tant th an t he enemy's capabil i ty resis tance was th e weather'SlDdrance to carry ing out e s t a b ~lahed doctrine.

TH: C.G.XXI B.C. Initialso."bOATI r t . . . . . 1'46

I t 15 I n t e ~ e d that thIs weeltly re _port be a source ot Infort:l/ltlon to r eO:l l .ba t cre>rs and stafr officers Who have a1eB1t1Jaate interest In the operations ofthe XXI BCQber Co=and. " I lt hi n t hMal1a1tl1 it shoulll receive th e "il lest pos_1II1ble c1rcll.lotlon ))9J'llIlsstble under theprov1Jl= or All ~ 8 0 _ 5 .In oreler that a Q/U1alI!l or Intell1.genee lMy be included, the report 1 ,l iven an OVerall elasslr1eatiun or Sec_re t , '"lb.en th , n at ur e o f t he Illaterialwarrants, lndividual art ie1., have re .ceived a lower security Classification.The report h so asselllblill that th eCOlDpOnent sectloM may be removed andelreulated or rUell separetely, If POI'.tl0llS are r ' J I J ' ~ u c e d . security regula_tions Illust ba observed and the sourceC r ~ 1 t e d .CorresPondence ragarilina this PUb.lication shauld be eddressell to the Com_lIllrll1111i General, XXI BOIIIber COlll:land

A.PO eM, ci a Postlr.llster, San l"rane1!eo'Ca11torn1a, Attent1on: A1; ot 8, A-e.

J1- "'P ,&:... , -JAl,lES D. GAlICIAColonel, A1r CorpsAC o r 8 , !I-e

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P'LAl\ MOSTLY HIGH

39 P1GFfTm A'M'ACll:S

lJU. Homing alrcrar-t dr opped 6:z:SOO-POund GPs on Yokkaishi. Bomb_in g of this wlbg was done from 5800to e, le o feet . Five aireraft re turned early and one. th e only airc ra ft l os t on th e mission, was mis_sina: fo r un4C11t'n reasons. Sevenaircraf t in a l l landed on Iwo.

Thirty enemy t lghter!l made ato ta l of 39 a tt ac ks a ga in st ouraircraft , mostly in th e target area. ~ i l e th e 8_293 were illuminated byf11 'e s and searchlight!. The enemywas generally unaggressive. Therewere two cases of eoordina ted attacks aga inst the bombers by twoenelay f igbters .

One Nick, followed by four un ldentU'ied single engine figbters.follCllt'e4 one group in !'rCXll 20 1Il1lesou t !'rom th e target . It appearedthat th e Nick. probably radar e_Quipped, was acting 8!1 a guide fortb e others.

C r . rept>..~ t told or . . .108phosphorus ba.b burl t I e l ch bads t reuer . and three poean ballaWhich appeared to t lea t dGlm t rc .l5.ooo tee t . DImQ' aDd d.e01 fUe lwere reported.A sub 150 lI11e. ot t sbore re ported visibil i ty l'8duced to OD8_l1e by wood ao te .

' l ak , both meditm ahd beavyranged trOlll meager to inteMe a was generally lDaccurate. RepoJ"Udeseribed i t as being continuoue17pointed aIl alaO predicted concent rat iot l l . Autoraat1e weapons tt.reW8!l low and th e heaV)' gun f i re waslIost17 above our ai rera t t . SOlIemeager and inaccurate f ire was received trOll naval vusels 1D Is e....

5

73RD WING

286 8-295 BOMB NA60YA ..

The 313th, over th e target al a t er , pu t 3,169 SOO_pounders713 lOO-pounders on th e ci ty.hundred one- of th e 111 alrbor ....beG. There were no losses.Iblng alt i tude was f rom 6,000 to000 tee t .

The 73rd ' 'lIng. l a s t to cOllIe, go t 146 ai rcraf t on the target ,opplng 5,336 SOO_pounders and.,024 lOa-pounders . Two additional1l 'cratt bClllbed Ha_lll8tsu and Shin_

Illain force was toproaches , u t l l1z i ': ! 8 v1Il8.lteions i f POSsible fo r b1sUa1" ' b ~There was everH ev e the attaC ks ' I f ~ l ~ e ~ O ! Ifu l bu t there was al sbl l i ty t h a t some UnfOl': tbes tance might c ause th e pi:ttfa i lu re . This was an ell tt ,

us e for the famed Vl1l hi ~ 1 ~ 1 1 1 0 s e on the heels or th e 9bomber. The plan was d a ~ l ' '- Warch incendiary mission a_bac!r8round of SOUnd aM lI(, gainst Tokyo eame a similarthinking a nd posseSsed ik e aimed at a second great Jap-element of surpr i se . tIle .....e industr ial center __ Nagoya.

By 1930 on th e n igb t of i lRESULTS EXPECTED larch 307 aircraft were airborne tolake th e run. From th e 73rd WingIt s ho ul d b e emphaS1&td,54 were pu t into th e a i r . 'nl.eth e deCision to mix up the S iJ !3 tb suppl1ed il l a th e 314tbagainst th e enemy "a s not I ':.2. Of these. Ie were toreed toio n to throw out the - i ". turn ear ly beeause of mechanicalaI t i tude precision d a Y l 1 g h ~ l r t i c U l t 1 e s . The remaining airwhich already had destrOYed ~ a f t dropped a total of 2 ,494 t on saged more than 20,000 squa:1t incendiary bombS.of the root area of th J

Aircraf t ide. . 'or an hour and 55 minutes.1 n ustry (the U "dnning with 3l4th Wing planes a t~ d ~ { i ~ ; n a ~ es t imated 20 p e r ~ 1 l 9 . 8 ..29s s t reaked across Nagoya.othe 1 d o considerable to ta l of 286 of them bombed i t .r n ustrie.!l.314TH WINGThe res:.J!ts '3Xpected rr.n ig ht in ce nd ia ry missions. . or tb e 42 ai rcraf t &1rborne~ large degree c o m p l e m e n ~ o m th e 314 th onl y three f ai le d t oos e obtained by other methotliomb th e primary. The 39 droppedwas expected th,3t they -ouJteo X 500-pound &-46 IB aDd 721 Xs troy a great deal of the -pound. 1t-.7 IB Visually and byhome factories upon which tM &dar, from 6,000 to 6,eoo fae t .anese are dependent to a 1 Is wing, as di d th e others, foundgree ta r indus t r i a l output. a maximum o f 2 /1 0 clOUd overan effor t to burn Qut cr target . Many reported no clOUd

dustrial faCi l i t ies which 1 curing th e target . No personnelual ly might no t ra te a pI' a11'craft were los t by th e wing.attack. I t was expected td 1 . ~ r u o t i o n of cnmmunicatlOll 313TH WINGdislocation of fa cto ryWould have a very adverse e:th e war capacity' or th e Japit Additionally, it WaSh ~ Coming concurrently tt !reverses in th e Phil ippinesa ~ ~ Iwo JimA t h e ~ e inetlfa i c WOuld undermine tMc u t ~ \ ~ n thei r government todefend eth War successf'ullye homeland.11I1ssi'lbe d'e talls of the Imll1ObtaiOns and analyses of I'llOWin ned a re d is cu ss ed on thel! pages.

night a s p reviou s 1lI1sslons had n ec_essitated flying Snd landing duringthe hours of darkness on the returnto base CrolD Honshu.

The use of incendiary bOlllbsagainst vital urban a r e a ~ on Honshuwas logIcal conclusion once i twas determined that low-level nightbomblll8 would be attempted. ACCOrd_Ingly, the urban areas of Tokyo,Nagoya. Osaka and Kobe were pickedas otjectives. Since one of themajor advantages resulting frOll! th eChange In tactics Would be surprisethe tnlttal erfort was planned toconsist or four separate miSSionson a lt erna te n igh ts , weather per.mitting, against the selected tar_ge t areas. Maxt1llUlll errort frOIDeach wtng Was to be employed In01'(181 to obtatn the maximum reSUltsbeCoffl the enl!T'!y COuld se t u p md- eerrecttve lOW-level defenses. .FIRST MISSION PLANNED

The f i r s t miSSion in the ser_ie s TaS scheduled to t ake P lace on9 M a . ~ c h , 1945, against the urbanarea or TolQto.PiCked crews, ~ e S i g n a t e d

~ h ; ~ ~ ~ : ~ : ; : : S ~ n ~ e ~ ~ e t ~ i P i n _ P f o i ~ ~tack was rixed t lTIe 0 a t ..t 8 r ~ t weather ~ o n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s : h e b ~ . ~ ~ ~ . ~ ... ~ : . , ....'"'; ..;


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WE F/A CLAIMEDu s t Tokyo, then llagoya, nowOSaka __ th i rd on th e l1s tfo r incendiary treatment.intenance had done a Herculean

Ib and on th e night ot 13 Marchaircraft were airb orn e fo r th e,asian. Fifteen ot these even-&lly turned beck. One, tram th e,3th Wing, crashed and burned ort,keotf bu t th e crew was safe. at295 only one railed to return.Mission report figures torCeaka strike at'e 2,043 tonsincendiary bClllbs dropped. Twodred seventy four aircraf t,t th e primary ta rg et v is ua llyby radar. The wings went ove r,e target in order: 314th, 73rd,tho 42 OF 314TH HIT PRDlARYThe 314th hed 45 aircraf t air , of which 42 dropped on th e,ary target frOID 7,000 to 7,800t through 5 to 10/10 cloud. Two

cra f t returned early withouttbing and one which landed on IwoI no t included in th a beabing to _Ils. 73RD MOUNTS 135or the 135 airborne from

ltd "ling, 107 h it th e primary1101';oya _ .. s t . .got, throo'gh 5 to 6 /10 c loudss t rH'e wh 111 burning on tn - 5,800 to 9,600 teet . Four3QUlldron ~ 1 1 2 this photo was 't e ~ o r n i n g af ter th e l 1 - ' e r a f t dropped on Kushimoto,below th o - .9 . In th e low a . n by a 3r d R e e o n n a l ~ a m a , Chichi J1ma end Uj i Ya-Castle Spot Where th e er center of th e photO,lea end one or these also bombed Sr.loke is heav ies t 1s the" primary. The one a1rcrar t, . .sing was from this Wing. Three~ r d u m b ' s and three homing a1r-~ werd a ir bo rn e i n addit ion to main force.

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313TH SENDS 115~ hundred fUteen planes ntth e 313th 'If1n,g go t orf and 107 otth m bClllbed th e primary. One h itShirahama and seven tailed to bomb,of which five were early returns_Eight landed on Iwo Jima.

ONE E/o\ CLAnrEDThirty to 40 enemy aircraft

were observed in the target area.The 25 to 30 attacks maile on the8_29s were reported a s mos tl y inef-fective although one atteopt atr8llllOing was suspected. The r ightgunner of a 73rd ~ i n g a i rc ra f t shotd.O'II'n one ot th e attackers. One in .etfective attack was l:l8de betoreth e IP and. two a t Haha J1ma. TwoJap fighters followed sOIDe of thebombers 100 miles out to se a witb-ou t attacking.

Flak "a s lD8dium and heavy (R -er OSaka, meage r to moderate andi na ccur at e t o a ccur at e. I t appear-ed a t times to be of th e predictedconcentrat ion type. lIeager and io -accurbte fire also was receivedCrom ships in th,! bay. The 30searchlights which were reportedwere ineffective because of cloudSand smoke.The"mals were worse than overTokyv er.1 one a i rc ra f t a t 7,000feet had i ts wina: r ivets loosenedby a violent surface explosionwh ic h l1fted the plane several hUD-drpd feet ." i rs t photographs a!'ter th estriKe, 17 t'ereh show 8 .1 square111l1es of Osaka destroyed


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---.....,;.;;;.-.. - -_.FIRST8-29 TOLANDONIWO

tJ/dWak.;

NAGOYA DAMAGE

CQDpany; 914, Oriental '/Jee'pany; 915, Oriental W e a v ~Plants l 1449. Kanda Ulll't8t:Koto Market. I

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N Target 187, Atsuta r ~ c ~ 11 March thru 17 V,archagoya Arsenal; 247C. Deldor ic Steel , Tsuki31 Plant; 251t~ ~ a l H a r b o l " Facil1 t i e s ; 253, lISion No Date Area Coverage Que.l1tyem ca l plant Target 1799, ---~ a c h l n e r y Company. Kasadera J'R5!"75 10 War 45 Yurume-3asebo 6 ~ , 2 4 , 4 0 Fair to goodarget XXI 4065, Sumltomo 5 ~ ' 7 7 11 t!a.r 45 To\7o 6",0:04",40 Goodals Plant . 5''''8 12 War 45 Nallioya-Osaka 6",24",40" G o o d - ~ 1 8 g o : f a partialsmoke.The Sitoku Pla nt had 5't179 12 "ar 45 NQ60ya 6",24",40 Good part ia l slDokei t s lD8in SUb- a s semb ly , 3 5t.!80 13 Mar 45 ~ ! a g o y a 6".24",40" Faircompletely eut tedJnd.-1I1 5M81 14 \ 'ar 45 Osaka-froto 110 10/10 CloudbUildings w d Ungoye. photograrhYere uestroye 5M82 14 Msr 45 Osaka lbort ive No p h o t o ~ r a p h yIn d t 1 alit: 5VB3 16 l Ia r 45 OsQkn No

cludes ~ r 81 damage .. p h o t o ~ r a t > h ] 10/10 Cloud It . ~ m e r o u s small lnu yPe. bUildings throughout tilt :t .:ihown as in process - ')ullr'nry or 10 "arch 45 . Ige areas .

Li s ted as damaged OJ'were targets: 1342, JepaoIndustry; 1366. Nippon OU1370, SUmida River Bridge,Joban Line. whe re sheds "81'1334. Nisso Stee l Manufectur:panyj 825. Fujikura Elect:Works; 907, Tokyo Gas Compe."1machi Branch; 1350, Tokyopany; 1448, Tsuki j i Market 11II'sa le Warehouse.

Fina l repor t is no t in CIIkrt; led Marinee &Warmya bu t considerable dalll!l.ge . . . .r tint 9-29 to landparent even on th e smoke .. two, on 4 Maroh. Rephotograjils studied. Total ..le d ab1,. b,. the '"burned out was rOUghly 47, . lunteer orewmen, th esquare fee t , concentrated __29 returned to i tef iv e i rr eg u la r- sh ap ed areas". on Saipan. .A. Mar-,'TIiles south of Nagoya Castle. Ie oueraman reoordedae .Tent.Damage to industria l Wincludes 358,000 square t e K I ~ .- , , ~ _ . ~percent of th e to ta l rootterget 1729, Alchl Alrc ra f t ' . ~ ; PHOTOEitoku Plant . Lesser d P l l ' h & & ~ &t?;done to the r o l lowing : ""-

8

At incident occurring on "3M276 on 13 March points up alesson Which shouldn't need reemphu1s: Gunners must keeptheb harnas, attachOO:--all th1s misSion th e l e f twaist blister blew ou t over Ky_ushu and th e gunner was suckedfrom th e aircraft .A parachute "as seen to op_en and it is hoped that th egunner 1s alive __ And reflect_ing on hi s negligence.

l ~ t a l 1 e d photo lnterpretetlon.'" of the post str ike photographsot Tokyo and Nagoya revealsthat in tne farmer city about 16.7square miles were ~ e s t r o y e d . Burnedareas 1n Nagoya ar e estimated tocover 1.63 square miles.

As interesting and encouragingas these figures are, they do no ttell the whole story. The damageassessment report No. 17 on Tokyo,prepared by th e c o m b l n e ~ photo in terpretation sect10ns of th e 3rdPhoto Reconna issance Squadron andth e 35t b PhotCl Tech Unit, and laterSUppll:lment, reveal 1n addition tothe &rea damaged, 16 numbered AirPoree tnr15ets ~ a l l l e g e d or destroyed.L1sted 89 destroyed are: Tar_ge t 910, Rls1D8 SUn Petroleum Ter_minal; 911, Ogura 011 Company" 912Nlsstln Spinning Mill; 913, H ~ t t o r i

LEFTWAIST6t1N#E/fSUCKED FROM 'PLANE


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Then this e x er eh e i s practicedwithout th e ai d or a chart un t l lcrews can f i l l in th e pattern tl'ClIllmemory. XXI Bomber COIICland targetareas a l l have a t ew out st ancUngfeatures partieularlJ r adaptable totb15 method. The exercises shouldbe kept simple by u si ng onl y b as iei ~ e n t 1 t i e a t i o n features.

As soon as tbis pattern hasbeen well establ1sbed in th e mindsof th e erew. quadr an t puz zl es aretn order and " i l l serve as a st1Jllu_lating d evi ce to clinch this knew-ledge. A quadrant puzzle coasisto.of a clue in th e forll or a stnslecheck-point as i t relates to thepon t ion anCl beaaiag or th e 1I1pt in g a i rcraf t .

P'tndlng th e proper COl"J'ect1oDlto th e IP 01" lo cattn a: t hepoint f ' r o ~ the se cl ues can pPOt'idean endless ser le ' ot absorblq ...useful exercisea.Vethods to r laRD!. . 01" . . . . .

in s th is S 7 S ~ aDd saaple pliIS-.wil l be tOUDd on tile tol1GWSal......

l e

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The basic principle 15 to t ra ins to complete a given are . plctrom e clue tn th e form ot on_one or two cheek-points. Tb.ef i r s t learD!, with th e a i ott . t ~ locate the salIent iden

icat ion testlll'es in eacb ot th edrants within a given radius otIP or aira1n,; poInt (figure 1).

_ O ~ V i ~ quadrant puzzles l!o,o f th e less ~ u l l ways to prac~ route a n target l ~ e n t l t l c a ,t).. I t stresses no t Just th e re tion of cheek .po in t s, bu t putsthe relat ion of check -poin tsth e course and th e IP or target .p r o v i ~ e s a particularly helpfulkground fo r th e navigator or

, a r ~ i e r able to p Ick out onlyor two check-points t hr ough t hecover frequent over XXI B.C.Ites a n target areas.The puzzle system Is p r e s e n t e ~as a suggestion to 8_28 facedth e problem of familiarizingwith target areas new to tl'ell.pun les ar e readi1,y a ~ a p t a b l eas useful 8!11 an ai d to ra da ra t ton t ra I ning.

BASIC PRIM::IPLE

An important e o n t r l b l l t ~XXI Bomber Command B...e9s 11performed by th e B..24s or tbIWeather . Reconna is sance SNThese a1rerat't, bsseCI on 0- .been running regular r e e ~missions tnto the Carol!.north to the no t so well knOlll(8l'1as Is lands ..In ttddlt10n to their

l'unctlorts of photograph1nsformations aDd gathering data!ru l 1n ' th e planning o r . ~they heve been observing aalgrapbing areas 1n which lii'o f t'l 'len dly ai rcraf t mightthus add1l18 to th e fi le! ofrescue information.B-2'9s oncrew missions also have betlntlng In th e carolines.On 11 Varch th e acephotos "are taken of Manonuito

whieh 1s In th e n orthe rn car's l i t t l e less than 600 mlleleast 01' Guam. Magur, at thenorthern end of th e atol l . sal]ererlk ar e two of t he l ar ge r1n th e atol l .On Uagur. four or nTtnew huts were observed on the'/fest corner and there were Inew ac t iv i ty by natives or J,Also spotted was a singleJe p a i rc ra f t , believed toor J i l l . which had crashedbeacb. Th.e presence or tl

craf t in t he no rt h er n r.a.rolto th e SUSpicion tha t th ebe trYing to r un r econna is lTruk up Guam lray.


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CLASS PREPARATION

............Suqqe!otions For S2sinTRODUCinG P U l Z l f ~

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/OSlflillI' WAlRCAA,ff/lINEII' OlEs/ , I I ' , t l ' (K ""fi'

FI6.2\- " A C ~ O '/RCAAF 'Third step: A l ine drs"n trOll lposition of the aircraft to th etermines the correction neces_to reach th e IP !'rom the pointieh the check-poin t was sightt1gure 5) .With very l1 t t le practice, thetion of th is line can be ar at wlthout sketching in t4 er prescribed course, IP , andlee ting 11ne. The same simpleetion is followed J!Iolving th e,les based on the target anlS,01 point, MlDel)', recaU1nc

IIh o f th e entire arM picture,t relates to the given c la e tolte the poiDt dASire4.

Begin With a gener00 the V irtues o t theal _tem, streSSing th e v a l U e ~ ~ " ~ t ing cheek-pOints no t as oritems but 8S part ot 1 1 l d ~ pattern. Tel l th e crews 'Ith ink of check-POint! to _to th e route , IP or a ~ l ~ ; : :Start ing n th th e u A few simple... deductions ar ehand. quadrant or one 0/:'" to J!Iolve quadrant puzzles.HeJOe

board quadrant diagrams the solut ion to th e puzzle shownclass to inspect t h e 1 r ' e ~ figure 2:-photos and suggest the Illll11points which occur in each r:t ~ " I I I I I ' ! ! ! ! 'four quadrants arOund tile I" ISing th e l ight l ines p r ' J 1 ~ )rgUide, select th e maln c h e e L ~offered by th e class and 4rIiin wi th chalk or grease PIColored. chalk or pencil , .used t o d i st in gu is h rivenroads, etc . S1multaneoual1:crew member f i l l s in OQllquadr an t b la nk s With thepoints selected.

EX&lCISE

Now repeat th e same Itlth e class t 'Urnishing thepoints, but without reellUI'IIl8pS, photos, or their Cllt'n 4rIFi l l in ally impartant P0111l1class fa i l s t o r ec al l anll, L' First step: Reconst!'uot th et1me permits, have th e Cl'tllll II'se of th e aircraft as 1t shouldin one more blank without..aate to th e check_point by recalsistance. II th e quadrant pattern learnedthe basic exerc is e (figul'e 3 ) .This same process 1sfar exact target and aim1n '- Second s'tep: Locete th e IP onidentif ication exercises, i l l course by recalling i t s rolath e a re a stUdies should be . . to th e check-point (figure 4) .Small radius (one mUe atradius !':rom th e aiming pointly will Suffice) . In thM'clses, le t th e quadran" bearound th e p re sc rib ed axistack.

A't th e beginning or .acIICeeding instruction period,each a r ea p r ev iou sl y coverfllt.ious cQlIb inations can be pt Ias qUick re! ':reshers. A tf/IlXIarks can be given with th tt o "What 10ca11ty is it'':'1a llIarks can be given .. .question "Where and what 18~ target?" However th eurns in pract ical 'maw:obtained P8inlessJ.y by sol'JOant puz zles.

12

Prior to th e inlltruction per_iod, prepare on th e blackboard oron large sheets or paper, a t leastthree boldly drawn circles diVidedinto qU!drants , 1'he vert ical quadrant diVision rep resen ts the prescribed headtng to the I P. So Theyar e Visible Imly to th e instructor,1Ddicate l1ghtly within the quad_rants or th e e i ~ l e s th e IDa in ehk:.Points "ithin the 50-mue radlUS ofXoru (see figure 1). Also draw onthE. blaekboard or on paper l3everalquadrant PUzzles USing strong, obVious check-poinh as cluel3 fo rthu f:lre-t 1e3900.

Crews must r i r s t be given ba_si c exercisell in th e loc:ation ofcheck-points "ithin e l ar ge a reallurroUlxUng th e IP or other strat_egic points on th e route, and nth: 'in a smaller radiu!I or the aimingpoint. For th e purpolles of thistypical exercise, assume that th etarget is 357, the IP is Ko tu, a ndth e prescribed head1D8 to th e IP i s350 degrees. The practice session" i l l cCllcern the cheek-points wi th_in a SO-mile radius of the IP a tKotu.

Notice that although th e a1r.craft is represented as flying onthe proper heading, i t il3 too farto the r ight or le t t of th e check_point.s to intercept th e IP . Insome puzzleJ!l th e aircraft is repre_sented 83 haVing overShot th e IP(Ul!1 f ~ g u r e s 2,6,7 and 8 ).

Have a SuffiCient quantity otcharts and aerial photos or 1II013a1c13it a'laUable to prOVide a set fa reach. crew member. Abo I3UPPly themwith quadrant "blank!" consistingof letter-81ze Sheets on 1I'hict. aC1J.cle diVided into quadrants has"een lI1meographed, aM 1I'ith lIli_eo.graphed Copies or the quadrantpuzzlu to be 130lved. (SeveralP U % Z l e ~ lZl8y be IIl1meographed on oneheet,)

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8/11

suctl t.actics an enelllY 8-29 wasbrou&bt dO'lfn.ODce an attack 15 d1rected aga1n5 t a n enemy airplane, i t mustb . pressed to th e l imit with th ein tent ion or rallDing. Do no t allO'lJa single airplane to escape. (Ed_i t o r i a l no te . On XXI B.C. missionsto date , co1.lUion between 8_295 antit ighters has occur red during onlyOb.e te nth o f one percent of a l l etlelllT attacks. P'ew. it atl1 or thiSsmall percentage of coll1sions couldbe determined .. dallberate f 'U ! l 1np . )

COORDINATED NIGHT FIQRTIBGOw-1na thiS cC*bat, urgene:rnecessi tated indiY1dual co.bat .Hotraver, slnsle airplane does no thave IlUCb chance or succeu againstan a11'p!ane as large all th e 8_29.C'a.bat, iocludlna night t ight-ina, _t be eoordlaated so &II tocooc.ntrata ru e potre ro '!'be .dYaDteae gelDed by tb e adYaoce f1ghterscan be turther a zp lo tte4 to co-

pleta th . I \ ICC" I I . In thill 1IaDD8I'. greater . . . . . . . ot . a1rp1aDescan be ~ a u r ; h t In th e tlAht8Z' net .15

PRESSING THE ATTACKAlthough a .p le i l luminationbe provided by searchlights,t interception 18 bindered byother rae tors_ It is dirt1to shoot down or sat t i re toairplane such a s a B-29 by gun_

Ju,\. how to &0 J.bout knocking'own 8-29' o ~ e r J . p ~ 1. .. preble.whioh 11 ",bing th e Jap. cauUer -able t ro ub le . ! he y' worked ou t a, . angl.. tor their tighter deten-.uni t . and prl" 'nwd thelll.in ....tot "Ine truotlon. . A copy of t he_. oaptur.d in the P hi li pp in e. .l I ,n it . 11.

E

"0 !\:1l1\U'& of X Flying Regllll8ntthe B_29 raid ot 15 June 1944,...,.e4 hits on one a irplane. but ,t he a ir p la n e cUd not b ur s t intoI he deterMined to ra . i t ..up l .n . , . ent into a steepand r in al l1 i nt o a I Ip1n. By

.... ~ AIRCRAFT~ @ . "

pVADRANr PI/lUIlOCATl U '" (()II

~ I'O$/f/Olll,' A/llel/AFT3'\

" ' - - - - - ~[ \- ,,,,,,,,.{ # JI M CAA"__ f " l leN OF"'I" 'eIlA"

'0 '3 t;V,4PAANf PIIUULOCAT{ I.P. AT XOfU

-ij ,.!!!!:/ \ - ' ~ 1 ~ ~ ' j , ~ ; TFlli.6 AIItC/I,MT

IL_


9/11

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Identif icat ion of' enemy a i r p la ne t yp es is no t only extremelyimportant fo r ~ e t e r m i n i n g movecentsand plans of the eneltl1 and fo rproper cCllllbat COl!Llll8nd, bu t th e ap pearance or new a1rplane types (such85 t he p re se nt B-egg) exerts t r e mendous technical influence uponour t ac t i cs , weapons, materiel, etc.I t is vital ly lraportant that rrveryone engaged in air defe nse s tud yconstantly and be thoroughly familia r with IMAteriel ot enemy a i r planes.REX:OGNITIOlI OF' ~ T F : r m eft Erll2Ya l though recogni t1ot l of t r iemor enemy was s1lllple in thobeginning because eDeaY a i r planes kept the i r wing 118bts 0-

t 1 n g u l s h e ~ , it subsequent17 beca.edi t t i cul t becaUSIe th e eMID1 la te rappeared with wing 11shts OD. thus swi ft e c ti oa on OW" par t w.. notposSible.A ll _os or deception tha t th eeMIIlY llll1y adopt in th e future INIt

be taken into cODlideratioa aad. ..aauru to e1azoltJ iha t1 t ica t lanor friend or eDlll1" W It be d.. . i....

(trom 400 to 450 km/hr) during thiscOllb8t, shells from AA guns wereger...!.ally bursting b e h i n ~ th e ta r g' 1 an(! have thus haClpered th e a tt .....:ks by our righters. Fu tu re p lansand treining lllU5t streS5 part1eularly the effectiveness of coordination or th e combine(! COlllbat strengthof AA bat teries Bnd Clying units .~ l y 1 n g units ~ u s t seize opportuni t ies , reterdless of c o ~ b a t

zones, to down enemy airplanes byunhes i ta t ingly penetrating th e b a r ~rages from ou r AA guns. AA bat_ter ies IllUSt temporarlly suspendf l re 'IItlen our f1.ghters ar e pressingin to attack th e e n ~ 7 elrplane.COLLECTING AIRPlArlE U A T ~ I E L

u r i n g th is cOClbat, types of, enemy airplanes par t icipatingin th e raid were no t positive_y recognized even by a ir crews dueto darkness aM other reasons.There WBS, in general, much laxi tyin preservation of crashed enemyairplanes.

17

THOROUGHNESS OF PURSUITAND IH'l'FIiJDING

COOPERATION WITH AA GURSBecause target speeds were hill;h

he areas covered by search_l ights can be very 11.raitedaccording to th e posi t ions in,Ob they are placed. Theref'ore,Its mus t be launched opportuneand immediately again st t a rg e ts,ted by searchlight5. The !Dis. ua t be accompliShed withinshor t time that searchllghtSierfec t ive . In regard to these, ters . constant coordinated t ra in -is eSisential.

C O O P ~ ~ A T I O N WITH SEARCHLIGHTSn order to meet evc,t ion, th e posi t ion of tillCommanding Off icer of the "Imust be se lec ted f rOI l ti l lP oin t o f con tro l ot a11'He should be 1n a pos i t i able him to observe c t lons over th e areas whicllabsolute pro tee t ion .Plans fo r doal1ng wila ir ra1ds taus t provide trll,t lc ipa t ion of f1gh ter uD1

thsn a i r defense tUb'However, sueb par t ielPnot be permitted to tnth e regular d u t i e ~ otPlanes.

'tna.n tugu" I:U..l"pJ.anes - ....a i r a t aoyt1llle. the re lrfltoled SUbstant ial S U c c e s ~ l l a 1 Q t ~ DESrRUCTION OF EHElIY PATMP'IIIDEl'l;Sth i s may be attr ibuted. 'tha t enemy airplanes to n th e ruture th e enemy Myin te rva ls in small n u m b P ~ plan to empioy pat hf inder s t osh ou ld b e credi ted t ePa. le ad th e airplanes, or he MYt r a in ing th e regiment 0 tIit e f l ares , incendiaries or bOlllbingl'tetb," pat hf ioder s t o point ou t targetsAPPLICATION OF DAIL or th e min strength. Therefore,! ...ery effor t must b e IllBde to de -

fiJ" ur ing t h i s 11' t roy th e pathfinders qUickly in" plans were a 1'&14 J'der to hamper th e movements or" l ly earried. ",' be main strength."a as for1llU1ated 't r a in ing . The completenes 11 Do no t be diverted by the enformulatoo during da lly ., approaching from one directiona di ree t bearing on the lIIDd th.?-, lIliss airplanes approachingf a i l u re of a i r defense ot,-",- .uteneously or in waves fromzones during an emergen I,*her directions aM al t i tudes.q ue nt ly , e ve ry means 1 I I U ! ~ 'ized to formulate completeHowever. because aetlllt ions during enemy a ir I ' l ~ ' nemy e1rplanes which ar e f lee-vary grea t ly from conditiol1 in g af ter eluding ou r attacksin g when th e plallB were must be pursued stubbornly endevery Commanding Officer troyed completely before theydecis ions to meet exist i "'eh their baSes. Use Rq . reeon-

t ions llIa1ssance planes (Dinah), e tc . , to r a i l th e enemy from combat zones,r intrude by anticipating th e re-The Commanding Ortictwn route af ter establishing the i rqui ek ly d e ei de Jus t what tIII'turn a ir bases.of th e enemy are and IIWt.t r a t e or dis t r ibute ttl. IRq. reconn81ssance planes wtdchstrength of th e various trai l ing th e enera:y must concordingly. He must displlr_ntly b ro ad ca st t he movements orleadership so as t o . U p l d ~ n e l l l Y in order to allow rair lyt ro l of t he s tr en g th to le te planning aM preparationsever changing s ituat1OD, interception from a l l areas.must no t be jeopardUed b1 h i t My be night, it is vi t -to eX1sting plans illPortant ~ carry ou t these ods a t a l l costs .

~ - P . \ S 3 ~ JLCUJ ,' ....' A" _nd t ire or aF!'ontal p a ~ ~ e s J by a dive andfrontal pass fa O;osttton' to thea el1mb to && na:e reeommendttd Me-rear and belO1t' h i h speed ott ies. Because ot the gsse! tromthe ell811l1 airplanes J p8h tIme tothe f8!l1' require too, !DUecl0.9& !.n. ..... airplane began.W'.1en the ene...... urto t ab evasive a ct io n a ga in st dO.nk1 wo Kimura .... t taek by Jl l18b feinting 8 pasScalved th e enell11 Y hto the l'QSlde of th e turns. At t eIMtant the enemy reversed directions 1t1l11Ul'& drove In directly be low the enemy airplane. He heldhi s pOSlt1oo at elose range and ex pended el l hi s 8DIlUUnltlon In eSingle hurst. F'1re broke ou t Inth e section between the two r ightengines and caused the enemy tcera.sb. NIGHT USE OF TADAN(1./3 q . hollO'lf charge aerialbombs packed in clusters or 76)

' l tnea i t Is difficult to (lawnlal'ge airplanes I par t icular lytb e B-29s. by gunfire aloneand bEeause th e number of rJlids wUIinersesa in th e fUture, plel1S mustbe mata to us e TADAN even a t night.i l l armodng preparetions fo rmachiaa guns and machine e a ~ n o n am_m u n i t ~ o n and TADAR must be complet_ed during th e a ler t so as to beread, fo r changes in th e Situat ion.I t is essential to equip with TADlNrtghtera other t he n t ho se special_iZing as n1ght t ig ht er s i n order toempl07 these to auglll8nt the s tr engthand tbus ensure cOlDplete destruc_tion ,)f th e enelllY.In regard to the use of rADAR~ n ig ht . t he plans of . attack muste c1eviaed af ter establiShing th enumber of enelllY atrpl1. t.nes caU'""t bth e !86rChl1eUts ~ 'JIKPORTANCE OF TRAINING

~ h : U ~ ~ I Y i n g Regiment haa llI1de. . i ts ::e interception! SincebiBb+' t l gh t J ~ ~ ~ t i o b as a specialwent into action i HOtrever. 1 tlI1au.te.) af ter th e - : ~ d g 1 a h t t e l y (e!ht-Vnlng. a ir raid


10/11

The fuze Is estimated andboxes or shells se t a t the v>\riousfuze tlmes are kept at the gun po -s i t ions . Having t he t uz es pre-setgreatly i n c r e ~ e s th e total nu:nberof rounds that can be fired a t anyone target .

F1rlD& shel ls , a l l of "hlchhave been se t to th e sa ce tuze. anda t th e same time leading th e a i r craf t in azimuth and elevation an_gles causes th e f i r s t bursts to ap_pear low and leadine;. Cradually,th e bursts appear to -creep" uptowards th e ai rcraf t .The sketch below shows hOW' thec re ep in g b ar rage "ou ld appear to rth e v ar io us pos It io ns o f the air_craft . The dotted Una representsa l ine or constant !'Uze ,only shellsof t \e same fuze being fired a t anyone burrage pointThlt creeping barrage, althoughforeign to ou r Army antlsircratta r t i l le ry , nas been used by theNavy rOl' ~ o t D e time with good reNI t s .

IlFTHOD EXPLAINEDBasically, th e method employedconsists of continuously computing-h e predicted a Z i ~ u t h and eleYationangles or th e target ai rcrar t and

f 1 r i ~ lIll!Lny she11.!l with pre -u ttuzes a t var ious po in ts along th ee ou rs e o f th e plane.

M A V J ~ W c 1 1 ~

MORE EFFa:rrvETh is ty pe is much !IIore erree.Ye than the usual box barrage,is characterized by bursts thatgenerally low and l ea di ng , t he'e becoming more accurate ande in l ine with th e a i rcra t t asprogresses along coursa. (An,la na tio n of th es e characteris_:8 can be seen by r e1 'e rr ing toaccOlllpanying diagram.Deviations ot burs ts , cO;Qmen-'ate with th e above characteris_'86re reported in si x cases in

~ i n g Con so li da ted F lak ReportsVission No. 29 .

24 (All Aroy)

Northern Area(Hokka1do - """11_1Fighters JAPS

The common type of antiaircraf trage f i re - th e "box bar ragen be recognized by th e wide scat-_ ring of bursts over 8 large areaat the s ky . This type of ! ' ire gen-Empire . .al ly i9 th e most ineffect ive of(HOnshu-Northern Ra iF t h r e e type's usuolly encounteredShoto and Jl:YushU) ontinuous!y pointed, predictedFigh ters entra tlon end barrage)., An aoaly , i , of th e flak-en-ntered reports fo r ~ i s s i o n No.29'Okyo) on 10 February 1945 indi,tes that th e Japanese llI8y be usa ne" type of f ire w1)ich " i l lreferred to as tI. "creeping ba r -e" .

,-

PLANES NO BE."rTER THAN THEIR Puarsit is de .he . rre ' t lo.n. . . or a 0111tary weapon, in quant I' p r1ghterl.tha ""'11 ty and training or tha Soldier USing i t . The on thOed abo"e and their erfectiveness depend to a marked ex ten tt r a i n i ~ program.

bons other documents captured and t ranslatedPh1lip;lines was the diary ot a tormer " ho t J apcOlllbat with a to tal of 200 flYIng hoursl Hisll.0'lt' ObSolete Nate. He had approX1l1lately 20 hOUl'srled him to hi s abcestors. (Q.!r pilota average a t1Itllch ar e in the Plane they w ill f ly In Combat.)

i t "A weapon, be I t bayonet or bomber. is never better than

,I

IIjI


11/11

The fact that two of the bal_loons exploded a t a lt it udes between35 000 and 40,000 teet whi ch waswell above our air craft , would seellto dispel accurate p r o x i ~ i t r fuzesin this instance.AmBOID BELW1't'S SUSPECTED

1. An attack on an avaraaewell-defended target by e slusleaircraf t .2. Rectilinear f l ight by th eattacking aircraft a t COnstaDtspeed and alt i tude OD aD averasecourse over th e t uge t .3 . A ltitude no t lU I than10,000 feet .

The purpose of this study isto show th e relati"nsh1p betweenth e effectiveness of Japanese heavyf lak and th e alt i tude o f a tt ackingB-29s.The matheoatical analysis em_ployed is basad on the followingaS5umpt10[lS :

Another more definite possibil i ty is an 8neroid-bellows mechanism controlling a contact SWitch.'nle aneroid-bellows works on chaMein external pre:h,Yre and, tbere_fore, may be adjusted to operate atg1ven alt i tudes. Such instrumentshave been found on Japanese t reeballoons which landed in t he Uni tedStates , Canada, K:Ulska and th e HawaHan Islan:1s.Available interlll8tiOD on these

balloons is too fragmentary to drawdefinite conclusions as to theirpurpose. It 1s requested that anyadditional int'orlll8tion or othersuch balloon incidents be transmit_ted to Headquarters XXI Bo:nber Command.1 : t I l J i ! E r ~ . . w . ~ a ..enEFP'ECTI1TENESS OF HEAVY PLAKAT DIFFERENT ALTITUDESl ' i D 6 ' J ~ ~ ~

Balloons Over Tokyo

Several Cleans might be employ_to explode such ballo ons. Itballoons ar e ant iaircraft de.(and as stated before this is,ttu1) a proximity fUze might beto detonate them when theynear aircraf t . These fUzesly ar e of the sonic or elec ..c type and er e cons truc ted soexplode upon reaching a givennee troc th e aircral 't . I t isknown thst th e Japanese ar e,cing th1s type of llIeCh8t)1S1lI asbu t they do h av e the ift!orlJl8and t ac i l i t i es to do so .

~ p en lIission Ro. 39 on 4 Karcb,5 f1 ve t ree, wbi te balloons wereorted aseendin,g over T o ~ o . 'nle100n51 were estlmated to be twot in di8lDeter, and each carriedIreetangular black object.nt ree of them exploded level,th th e f or il lst io n o f aircraft00 0 to 28.500 feet) and two ex ..,ed a t estimated alt i tudes of!.ooo to 40,000 . feet . The white:e explosions appeared to go up. .

PROBABLY \'lEATRER DEVICES

I t is possible that these balar e ant iaircraft d ev ic es , b uti s cODsidered unlikely. The,lems involved in accuratelyhing t ree balloon51 againstal t i tude aircraft wwld be exlely dif!1cul t . 'nle magDitudeth e winds a t alt i tudes over th enese 1Il81nlaDd ar e such that efiv e cODtrol of free balloonsns t ou r aircraft Is next to Im. ib le .

Tbe losses refer red to"ere "five pilots and tourmen" ou t or 14 SBaCs at '"Actually only e igh t 4Of'ShiPPing. _C'ombet crews are U J ' ~as Observant -as possible 01.and in te nsity o f antia1J'C:and to report any and a l lt ions made.

A lIlore plausible explal18tiobwhich followed th e dive bGi these balloons would be thatdown Just beyond th e break-up'a7 ar e meteorological devices. tb . a sel1'-destroying element. It-"A s1mila r ba r rage was dUll-ooeon practice in ant iaircrafted a t th e second level of i le ry to send such balloon.:!planes executing glide_bomb... to obtain "wd intorlJl8tiontacks. Then they quickly tt corractions to t i r ing data.tbe b arrag e down to th e 1 devices mayor may no t carry e1,500 _ 3.000 fee t __ the redio transmitter.s te ady d iv e and bomb release.losses are a melancholyto th e effectiveness of t h l l 'Ods." (From JICPOA Flak H....ta r N o.1 , 24 February 1945).

The sketch below sb""S ho'" a creeping barrage me.controlled a t varioos points along th e a i r c r a f t ' s r l beeach point requiring shells of di f feren t fuze t imes. ht ,

NAVY ENCctJUTEits ITIn a strike by Carrier AirGro'lp 7 at HOngKong Harbo r, i n_tense and damagina ant iaircraftf i r , was encountered. ExcerptstrOll. the action report tollow:-Pilots reported that neverhad they seen so mucb or so sccu_rste entiaircraf t t ire or 811 cali_bers.

The Japanese already bave usedthis type or f i re against dive_bOIllb1n,g aircraft , and i t is quiteposUble that th e same lIIetnodsIll1gt.t be employed against our oper_at1on!

-JI'1 r s t, When the 8ttackin,g di_rection was establisbed, the enemyt h r . up a concentrated creepit1llbarrege. about 3,000 feet in depth,

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Air Intelligence Report, V1N3, Final

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