Air Force Review - Vol. 2, No. 2a

AIR FORCE REVIEWVol 2, No 2

EDITORIAL

Flying in the Changing TimesLt Col Jose Tony E Villarete PAF

The Philippine Air Force is 54 years old. Awealth of experience and lessons learned for thepast 54 years of dedicated and exemplary service tothe country and its people provide the PAF withvaluable inputs in the formulation and developmentof doctrines. The preponderance of success storiesin the application of air power in various conflicts allover the world further strengthens the foundation forthe formulation of air doctrines. Voluminous articles,theories, discussion papers and the like arecontinuously written by various air power advocateswhich always provide the necessary lights on ourpath towards doctrines development. However, thefast changing situation in the domestic andinternational scenes, require us to be more watchfuland analytical in our effort to keep our air doctrinesdynamic and relevant to the times.

The ongoing peace process with the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups andthe Communist Party of the Philippines and the call by the new administration for activeparticipation of the AFP in solving organized crimes, notwithstanding the considerablenumber of military operations other than war where the AFP has been actively engage, areto be carefully taken into consideration in the review of existing doctrines and informulating new ones. The PAF has been in the forefront of humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief operations and to some extent in developmental efforts such as theconceptualization of the "Air Force City" in Clarkfield, Pampanga as the hub of theaerospace and air transport industry in the country. The development of PAF bases allover the archipelago is premised on the need to improve our military capabilities and atthe same time spearhead the upgrading of the much needed aviation engineering supportfacilities of the country which became imperative in the implementation of the AFPmodernization program. The PAF should be able to deal with these domestic changes, vis-à-vis the emerging new national policies.

World events will continue to influence changes in the geopolitical landscape of theAsia Pacific region. The new US administration under President Bush has recentlymanifested some significant shifts in US foreign policy in the region. The fast changingrelationship of the US with Mainland China, Japan and Korea would have far-reachingimplications to the region as well as to this country. Needless to say, these developmentswould affect the Philippines and thus, the need to continuously monitor emerging trendsas it relate to doctrine development. As we enter into a new international relations era, thePAF must correspondingly review and develop doctrines and strategies to cope with thechanging times.

In doing so, we must remain open to the vast oceans of new concepts and ideasthat abound in the air power arena today. Technology is a key and critical element to theevolution of air power and should equally be considered along with our past experiencesand air power theories in our trek towards the formulation and revision of doctrines.

In our quest for a Faster, Stronger and Better Philippine Air Force, every airmanshould endeavor to keep pace with the emerging situations both in the country and in theworld. Keeping a vigilant watchful eye over the unfolding events will help us in our effortsof developing dynamic and relevant PAF doctrines. As we fly into new horizons, we mustnot let our mindsets shackle us in chains to the present. Together, let us exploit newconcepts and move towards the future --- the skies.

The Essence of the Air Force Anniversary

For over half a century the Philippine Air Force (PAF) has been celebrating itsfoundation anniversary without fail. Every year, the PAF sought a theme to herald the yearpast and the year to come. The selected PAF anniversary theme contains hollowed wordsthat were crafted to encapsulate the achievements of the Air Force and at the same timeannounce it dreams and plans. More often, these themes approximate prophetic visionsthe man at the helm. This year, the PAF has chosen for itself the theme, "Your First Force;Rising to every Challenge, Whenever, Wherever." The theme fittingly embodies PAF'saccomplishments for the year as the result of its sustained focus on airpower.

DOCTRINE OF AIR POWER

Several of the world's great Air Force, gained their independence from surfaceforces in order to move effectively and carry out so-called independent missions-the mostbeing strategic attack. The PAF became an independent service of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines (AFP) due in part to the influence of the US forces. While it is true that thegrowth of the Philippine military aviation was initially under the aegis of the US forces, thePAF air power doctrine grew to an array of operational requirement unique in thePhilippines.

After World War II, the PAF was organized as an "Air Defense Air Force" whosemission is to conduct prompt and sustained air defense mission in the defense of thePhilippines. Several years after, the PAF had to restructure and redirect its mission so thatit can conduct tactical air operations to neutralize internal threats and limited air defenseoperations to detect, identify, and neutralize external threats whenever possible.

Currently the Air Force rediscovers itself by revisiting the doctrine of the air power.The speed, reach, ubiquity, flexibility, maneuverability, perspective, concentration, andresponsiveness are strength of the air power characteristic of a true Air Force. With speedand reach, the PAF becomes the first force of the government in conflict or nationaldevelopment tasks. Collectively, the product of the strengths of air power makes the PAFunique.

AIR POWER REQUIREMENT

Air power has limitations and weaknesses despite its vaunted strengths. The PAF,however, need to connect the concept of air power to stark realities in order to harness itsstrength. The following are several requirements of the Air Force to make air power usefuland a reality.

The first requirement is the availability of weapons platform-Multi Role Fighters,Long Range Patrol Aircraft, etc. Although the current fleet performs some air power role,the weapons platform stipulated in the modernization program would magnify the currentstrength of the PAF.

The second requirement is to connect the concept of the air power toorganizational development. The force structure of the AFP as well as the PAF mustconform to the requirement of air power. Intelligence is the key of air power application.Air Power Historian Phillip Meilinger claimed "In essence, Air Power is targetingintelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations." Right now, there isno Air Surveillance and Reconnaissance Command that may give out accurate intelligence

report. Additionally, the offensive units of the PAF are often tide up to the groundCommanders thus strike platforms full potentials are not attained.

The other requirement is the ability to acquire reliable Bomb Damage Assessment(BDA). The PAF need to accurately assess the results of the air operations. This dilemmahas been ongoing between the Air Force and the surface forces. A mutual arrangement toresolve such dilemma will redound to the effectiveness of the over-all military operations.

Enhanced air operations is the PAF's raison d'etre as the air arm of the AFP, thePAF should never lost sight that air power doctrine is its essence. Even as the Air Forcecommits life and honor as the country's first line of defense- first force, it will neverabdicate its responsibility to the Filipino people, as their protective carrier and reliefbearer as well.

STRATEGY AND CENTER OF GRAVITYBy Lt Col Francisco N Cruz, Jr. PAF

This author believes that locating the enemy’s centers of gravity should be the firstagenda of the strategist. Attacking the wrong centers of gravity could lead to enormouscosts, human and material. The following research material attempts to give war plannersand strategists adequate doctrinal knowledge on selecting the enemy’s centers of gravitythat could be applicable to both conventional or insurgency wars, specifically to the AFPcampaign against the MILF and the local communist movement. Today, the concept ofcenter of gravity is discussed only in the classroom, never in the war room.

CENTER OF GRAVITY DEFINED

In the realm of physical science, center of gravity (CG) is merely the balancing pointof an object. The CG of a 12” ruler, for instance is 6 inches. If the ruler is made of the samematerial and has the same weight inch-by-inch, it will balance when supported or pivotedat its 6” mark.[1]

In similar vein, aircraft engineers describe the “CG point as the balancing point of theentire length of the airplane, from nose to tail.” The importance of the CG location cannotbe overstressed. If not located in its proper place, it will cause a litany of aerodynamicproblems. Located incorrectly, it can cause the plane to fly very poorly or not at all. If theairplane’s CG is too far behind where it should be, a tail hanging (tail heavy), almostuncontrollable flight will result. A forward CG can make an aerobatic airplane so stablethat aerobatics are almost impossible, except for easier ones such as a loop or a roll. [2]

It was Carl von Clausewitz who first wrote in a militarycontext the concept of center of gravity, in his classic book“On War.” He taught that, “one must keep the dominantcharacteristics of both the belligerents in mind and that out ofthese characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, thehub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.That is the point against which all our energies should bedirected…” For Clausewitz, the enemy’s capital, the seat ofpower and government and the center of communications andadministration, was the CG at strategic level. But at theoperational level the single most important CG is the enemy’sarmy.

In his published work,” A Study of Clausewitz’s Conceptof the Military Center of Gravity, Col John Osgood,a US Armyretired officer, emphasized Clausewitz's[3] premise

that the first task in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s CG, and if possible tracethem back to a single one. Any attack against a target that does not further the statedobjective of destroying the enemy center of gravity, is therefore a waste of time andresource. The US failure to confront the real threat in Vietnam is his example. Hesuggested that the US National Command Authority through the Joint Chief of Staffshould identify a conceptual strategic CG that can be articulated as part of a statement ofgrand and military strategy to support and guide the efforts of the commander within thetheater and area of operations.[4]

Many war strategists after Clausewitz had their own version. Gen Guilio Douhet, thefather of strategic air power chose popular will as the CG based on the theory that the

people would eventually rise up and demand their government to make peace. For BillyMitchell, the target of first importance is the enemy’s army.

WARDEN’S CENTER OF GRAVITY

John Warden’s model provides a logicalfoundation for planning offensive operations.Better known as command and control model, itsuggests that any nation can be seen as asystem having five components, which can berepresented as concentric rings—command,essential production, transportation networks,population, and military forces. Each is part ofthe CG and each represents both strengths andweaknesses. Although rings may be at differentlevels of development, air power allows one tostrike any of them without necessarily hittingenemy armed forces (though defeat of anation’s armed forces may make all of the otherrings vulnerable).[5] The model is actually aspecialized targeting plan.

In this five-ring model, leadership, or command and control is always the principalcenter of gravity: the enemy structure is the most critical element, because leaders are theonly individuals in a country who can make concessions. Air power must attack the CGdirectly or if the center is not vulnerable, to strike critical targets on the periphery. Theultimate goal is to cause some form of strategic paralysis or disruption of the will tofight.[6] It is imperative that all actions should be aimed against the mind of the enemycommand.

Warden elaborated that the essence of war is to apply pressure against the enemy’sinnermost strategic ring -its command.

THE GULF WAR

The Gulf War demonstrates the efficacyof Warden’s model. From the moment the firststrike was launched, Saddam and his forceswould be rendered deaf, dumb and blind. Thebattle plan was the destruction of Iraqicommunication and observation in order todecapitate the Iraqi high command and gainswift ascendancy over Iraqi skies. Iraqi radarsites, command stations, electrical plants andmilitary command posts were to bedestroyed, principally with the might andaccuracy of F-111s and F-117s. The Alliedforces conceived of Pooh Bah’s PartyOperations that called for creating blackouts inIraq. It deploys Kit2 Tomahawk missilescontaining bits of glasses and metals whichwhen exploded would short-outtransformers.[7]

But prior to the air war, the USNational Security Agency (NSA) and theBritish General CommunicationsHeadquarters (GCHQ) planned a jointproject that would surreptitiously employbugs and viruses into the enemy computersystems or command and control networks.Their clandestine agents were indeedsuccessful in inserting some hardware intoa cargo of computer equipment destined forthe Iraqi military, but before the virus wouldknock off network off line, the air warbegan.[8] The first salvo of bombingsrendered the Iraqi air force incapable ofputting up a “token fight” and destroyed themuch-feared Republican Guards’ spirit.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTER OF GRAVITY

Lt Cmdr Jeffrey A Harley, US Navy, in his 1997 thesis entitled “Information,Technology and Center of Gravity,” claimed that CG is the main source of power orstrength, which, if destroyed, causes such a debilitating effect as to terminate the war. Heenumerated four characteristics of CG, which are relevant to the AFP in its strategyformulation:

a. CG remains the enemy’s principal strength. “To weaken a CG is to imperil theenemy’s ability to continue the conflict; to destroy the CG is to produce acascading failure that leads to capitulation.”

b. Each enemy has only one of them, at least at each level of war . In a traditionaldemocratic system, for example, one might expect the will of the people or thecohesion of a coalition to serve as the strategic CG, while operational and tacticalcenters would most likely be the military forces or supporting infrastructure. CGcan change as an operation unfolds or as the corresponding strengths andcapabilities of the two sides alter.

c. What is the most important one for a given level of war normally depends on thenature of the war itself. A war of attrition or prolonged duration (e.g. Vietnam)tends to de-emphasize tactical or operational achievements, while other types tendto downplay strategic CG (since in them the strategic goal may be attainable byoperational success).

d. It is limited or defined by strategy. The level of technology, degree of doctrinaladaptation, and the nature of societal values—such as acceptance of casualtiesversus risk aversion, or more democratic norms versus totalitarian principles—influence the focus of CG.[9]

CENTER OF GRAVITY DECISION MODEL

According to William W Mendel and Lamar Tooke, a strategist should takepainstaking effort in selecting the enemy’s potential center of gravity. “Know your enemyand yourself,” as Sun Tzu taught us. The selection process should pass the dual test ofvalidity and feasibility. In the case of validity, the potential CG should be tested against thecriterion of whether imposing one’s will over it creates a deteriorating effect that prevents

our foe from achieving his aims, and allows the achievement of our aims. As forfeasibility, one must see whether he has the capability to dominate the enemy’s CG.[10]

Mendel and Tooke’s argued that an assessment between forces is required as astarting point for a campaign or operational plan. It will suggest a decision as to whetherone’s strength or capabilities permit attacking the enemy CG directly, at the outset. If notan indirect path to the CG through critical vulnerabilities can be followed. Once it has beendetermined whether to attack the CG or critical vulnerabilities, target lists can bedeveloped. Since the relative strengths and weaknesses of both forces change over thecourse of conflict, the model calls for reassessments, which restarts the cycle.[11] Theseassessment and reassessment invariably require the expertise of intelligence analysts.

KOREAN WAR: OPERATION STRANGLE

The Rail Interdiction Program, better known as Operation Strangle, conducted by FarEast Forces (FEAF) during the Korean War, was perhaps the most fitting textbook exampleof an inappropriate targeting or locating enemy CG. This operation was a dismal failurebecause it didn’t meet the validity-feasibility criteria. Its goal was to paralyze theCommunist transportation system between the 39th parallel and the front lines. The termstrangle indicated that air interdiction would “strangle” the enemy by choking off hissupplies and preventing him from maintaining an army in the field.[12]

The Program was useless as a result of lack of careful analysis and re-analysis, wroteLt Col Michael Kirtland, USAF in his research, Planning Air Operations: Lessons fromOperation Strangle in Korean War. He cited several reasons. Firstly, the enemy was able toovercome the difficulties created by the interdiction effort and FEAF proved slow to reactto enemy tactical changes. The first enemy reaction was to increase the air defensepressure on FEAF Bomber Command attacks on the bridge system. The slow moving B-29s were extremely vulnerable to MiG activity.

Secondly, the enemy proved capable in deception techniques, creating theimpression of destroyed bridges and rail lines when in fact they were in good workingcondition. Bypass bridges were rapidly constructed. Thirdly, the enemy was willing tocommit a vast amount of human resources to the effort of keeping rail lines open.Manpower was an unlimited resource that was used as human transportation. Forexample, 100 men would carry mortar shells on their backs. They were actually able tostockpile supplies for future use thus defeating the purpose of the Program.[13]

Lastly, the communists could concentrate automatic weapons fire and antiaircraftartillery (AAA) along the rail line to provide the best defense. Because of concentratedAAA fire, FEAF bombs had to be dropped from higher altitudes decreasing their accuracy.Originally designed to last 45 days, the campaign was continually extended lasting sevenmonths.[14]

Simply stated the Communist transport systems were not the center of gravity. Theywere not critical to the enemy’s pursuance of the war. The cost of the Operation wasenormous, antiaircraft fires accounted for 243 aircraft lost and another 290 severelydamaged. The cost in human terms was 243 airmen killed or missing and 34 wounded.[15]

CONCLUSION

Having realized the futility of the Rail Interdiction Program, FEAF redirected itscampaign from targeting rail network to targeting North Korean dams which later causedflooding of the country’s rice crops (rail systems eventually) posing threat of massstarvation, and ultimately forcing the North Koreans to negotiate for a truce. With a trueCG pinpointed at the very start of the air offensive, the Korean War could have endedmuch earlier and sufferings could have been minimized.

The Gulf and Korean Wars bear credence to the fourth air power proposition of ColPhilip Meilinger USAF, which states, “in essence, air power is targeting, targeting isintelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.” He explained:

If one does not know air power exists, air power may be ineffective. Intelligence hasbecome a strategic resource. The key to all conflict is intelligence… Being able to strikeanything does not mean one should strike everything. Selecting objectives to strike orinfluence is the essence of air strategy.

The doctrines presented in this article have profound importance in the formulation ofa palatable strategy against the enemies of the State. The powerful Warden’s commandand control model (even though many analysts say is confined only to war betweennations) could arguably be used in an insurgency environment. The reason is that the fiverings are also present in an insurgent force. The fact that Philippine insurgencies havepersisted for decades could have been partly attributed to incorrect selection of CG. Aninsurgency conflict is a battle of the minds not of forces. The Decision Model by Wendeland Tooke is highly recommended for planners. It is not enough that one knows theenemy’s centers of gravity, it is equally important that he has the resources to overpowerthem. This is the essence of strategy.

END NOTES:

[1] RC Planet, Center of Gravity, December 1998[2] Ibid.[3] Ibid.1[4] Col John Osgood US Army, A Study of Clausewitz’s Concept of the Military Centerof Gravity.1[5] Col John A Warden USAF, Employing Air Power in the 21st Century, 1992.[6] Ibid.[7] James Adams, The Next World War (Auckland 10, New Zealand, 1998) p. 4.[8] Ibid., p 9.[9] Lt Comdr Jeffrey A Harley US Navy, Information, Technology and the Center ofGravity, NWC

Review, 1997[10] Ibid.[11] Ibid.[12] Lt Col Michael A Kirtland USAF, Planning Air Operations: Lessons from OperationStrangle in

the Korean War.[13] Ibid.[14] Ibid.[15] Ibid.

ENSURING PAF EXISTENCE THRU BASES DEVELOPMENTLt Colonel Ted Evangelista PAF (GSC)

Airpower did it for the AFP as we dealt the final blow on the MILF’s strongholds. Itis still airpower that is keeping our hopes alive in the Western front with our struggling airassets in constant patrol. Our national leaders have recognized this potent role of the AirForce.

Knowing the strategic role of the PAF, our most important air assets must besecured and maintained. Worldwide, Air Forces are nestled in air bases with the mostimportant collateral facilities for effective functioning.

Development in recent years posed bothopportunities and threats to our peculiar branch ofservice. Whereas, PAF used to enjoy independentand uninterrupted use of the bases, other nationalconcerns have brought out ideas on joint-useconcepts and commercialization of bases. As aresult, Villamor Air Base was reduced to 99.91hectares from 261.82 hectares. Still persistent arenegotiations and top-level talks for the joint use ofFernando Air Base by commercial entities. BenitoEbuen Air Base has shrunk in size in favor of theso called economic development. Wallace AirStation is under similar situation. Antonio BautistaAir Base is likewise under threat with the ATO’splanned expansion of the commercial airport.

Security factors dictates that opening the bases for commercial joint-use conceptis an added risk factor. With this alone, military bases are better off located apart andindependent. But with the government’s thrust towards improved income generation,partly thru sale of government assets, even the armed sector was not spared.

Given these developments, how can we ensure the PAF existence? For one,President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo categorically declared that PAF units and personnelwill not be displaced unless there’s a prepared place for them to go.

Safeguards or safety nets were somehowin placed to allow for displaced PAF units andpersonnel to settle down. Our MOAs withBCDA and concerned agencies stipulatesrelocation of units and replication of facilities.Nevertheless, even with the best of planners,transition and relocations pose a lot ofproblems. Even funds caused untold delayscontributing to the operational troubles for thePAF. Once again, our airmen have displayedtheir Filipino resiliency of adapting to changesafter changes.

On the opportunities side, these developments offered challenges especially to ourplanners in re-engineering the Air Force. If plan will push through, VAB will be the site ofa modern-day hospital to cater to our men and their families. One-storey buildings werealready designs of the past as the shrunk bases give rise to two to four- storey buildings.Even offices have to be designed to maximize available floor space.

Faced with this culture of change, the PAF is left with no option but to maximizeand take advantage of all the opportunities in the horizon. In the same light, the PAF canstart looking for other untapped land areas and reservations from where we can developour bases. Guimaras and available sites in Palawan offer such hopes. Ultimately, perhapswe can still see the time when our air bases will be free from the friendly claws of privateand other government sectors and then we, the airmen, can concentrate on the basicmissions which are the raison d’etres of our existence.

VISION IN TRAINING COMBINED OPERATIONSCol Manuel L Natividad (PAF) GSC

The complex world environment and the sophisticated military capabilities of well-armed nations have removed the time buffer previously enjoyed by the United States thatallowed it to mobilize and train to an adequate level of readiness before engaging incombat operations. As recent events have illustrated, the U.S. ability to deter attack or actdecisively to contain and de-escalate a crisis was not entirely dependent on their combatlevel readiness alone but also in their adept ability in harnessing alliance with other MultiNational Armed Forces towards a common objective. In this concept, the key to fightingand winning is the understanding of how the US train to fight and the familiarity to thepeculiarities of combined and joint operations doctrines of the concerned allied nations.

In the local scene, the development ofCombined and Joint Operations Doctrinefalls under the Directorate for Field TrainingExercises, Office of the Assistant Chief of AirStaff for Education and Training, OA-8. Inrelation to this, the recent RP-US combinedJoint Combined Exercise Training Program,code named TEAK PISTON 01-02, which washeld last January in Clark Air Field,Pampanga and Subic Bay, Zambalesprovided an opportunity for the saidDirectorate to window new doctrines incombined operations.

In the past TEAK PISTON Exercise, delegations from Air Defense Command, 5thFighter Wing, 205th Tactical Operations Wing, 15th Strike Wing, 220th Air Lift Wing, 710thSpecial Operations Wing and other major units represented the Command. Fund supportfor the exercise was released separately to the respective Wings. While the command andcontrol during the course of exercise rest on the shoulders of designated Officer-in-Charge (OICs), who is usually the most senior officer in the delegation per unit. Under thisset up, we felt that the maxim of “centralize training planning and decentralize trainingexecution” is very difficult to achieve. Since each OIC coordinates directly to hisAmerican counterpart, limited interaction can be gained. In this sense, this put morepremium on the improvement of individual skills which defeats the main objective of theexercise which is design to enhance the combat readiness of the unit as a whole.

Upon the inception of the PEAK PISTON 01-02 in January 2001, the Office of theAssistant Chief of Air Staff for Education and Training, A-8 appointed COLONEL DIEGO BDASALLAS as the RP Exercise Director. He exercised both operational and administrativecontrol over the units. This established a more effective communications between the RPand US contingents. Furthermore, this gave more time to individual unit coordinators toconcentrate more in planning, executing, and assessing training.

Take the Lead!

The PAF in TacticalOperations

Capt Enrico B Canaya PAF

Tactical Operations Command(TOC), now in its 3rd year of existence,has been cited for its laudableachievements in the accomplishment ofits mission of providing tactical airoperations for the AFP. The significantlyincrease in combat operations in theMindanao last year, brought the PAF inthe limelight as its fleet of combatassets like the F-5s, OV-10s, MG-520ssupported by the UH-1Hs andSAR helis, Nomads, C-130s, and Photo Reccon aircraft all roared into action. Therelentless waves of airstrikes drove the enemy forces scampering for refuge from thepounding of heavy bombs and rockets. A tell tale sign that the AFP is on the way to crushthem with the Philippine Air Force taking the lead. Despite the limited number of these airassets, the command was able to manage and orchestrate the air operations to optimumperformance. Such event brought this Command to occupy the highly regarded pedestalthat brought the glory for the Philippine Air Force and the Armed Forces as a whole.

The conflict offered an opportunity to enhance future operations to a similar scale.The PAF came to agree that there were still flaws, weaknesses and problems that indeedshould be addressed or corrected in order to enhance future conduct of ISO.

Interoperability issues may be addressedby: (1) requiring Commanders of TacticalOperations Group (TOG) and pilots toaggressively participate in the planning stage ofevery joint operation in order to emphasize thesupremacy of Air Power, now conceded by worldmilitary organizations. TOG Commanders are the“Air Bosses” in their area of responsibility; (2)maintaining a reliable Air-to-Air, Air-to Groundcommunication, and an effective and securedground communication network to ensure timelyand quick reaction and employment of air assetsspecially during Close Air Support (CAS)missions; (3) reviewing, redeveloping and testingdoctrines and their applicability and reliabilityparticularly on interoperability duringjoint/combined operations; and (4) maintainingregular joint exercise with ground elementsthrough AGOS, ORE, Forward Air ControllingProficiency and other related drills.Interoperability means team work.

Anticipation of future requirements in the fieldby: (1) enhancing Maintenance support and field levelcapability at the forward operating bases to minimizescheduled and unscheduled maintenance standdown;and (2) Acquiring Photo Intelligence data andmaintaining a continuous aerial surveillance inpotential target areas. Post Mission Analysis mustlikewise be given utmost importance in order todetermine the effectiveness of operations. BombDamage Assessments (BDA) must be timely andaccurate. It shall determine the accuracy of deliveryand assess the effectiveness of the type of airmunitionused.

The Tactical Operations Command (TOC), willremain as the defining unit of the Air Force and willalways be at the forefront of the AFP’s successes inInternal Security Operation (ISO). With theCommanding General’s rallying call of “faster,stronger, and better” Air Force, the unit will continue toimprove towards the achievement of this goal.

Bomb damage caused by PAF aircraftin operations against MILF.

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND2Lt Mary Pinky C Moises PAF

As darkness creeps in the sky, we remain vigilant in ourtask. As people succumb to the inviting call of sleep, weremain steadfast on our call. We are the guardians of thePhilippine skies, the AIR DEFENSE COMMAND.

“The defender of the Philippine skies” is a title that isdearly treasured by the Air Defense Command. Its existencecompletes the holistic approach of the Philippine Air Forceorganization in the aspect of air power. As in any basketballgame the team target is not only to shoot as many balls forscore but also to strongly defend your position. And, that iswhere the Air Defense Command comes in.

Originally, the Command was christened as the 1st Air Defense Division and wasorganized on 1st April 1962. Four years later, it was renamed as the 1st Air Division with amission “of conducting air operations within its assigned area of responsibility”. In thefateful day of 23 February 1995, the modernization of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) alongwith the modernization of the rest of the Armed Forces was sent to full throttle. Two yearslater, the Air Defense Command was activated as a successor of the 1st Air Division on 01May 1997. Initially, two units were placed under the Command – the 5th Fighter Wing atBasa Air Base, Pampanga and the 580th Aircraft Control and Warning Wing at Wallace AirStation, La Union. Moreover, the Composite Tactical Groups/Squadrons in the Luzon areaoriginally comprised the command. However, due to the changes on the PAF set-up, theCTGs / CTSs were transferred to the 1st Tactical Operations Wing. At present theCommand is on its way pursuing the realization of the 770th Surface to Air Weapons Wingand the Air Traffic Control Group as additional members of its family. Truly, the AirDefense Command had metamorphosed from a small division into a multi-taskedcommand.

The essentiality of the Air Defense Command in the Philippine Air Force and in thecountry is best illustrated in its mission and functions. Its mission is “to defend, secure,and protect the territory of the Republic of the Philippines”. The ADC mission is bestaccomplished in the fulfillment of the following functions: provide active air defense;conduct strategic strikes against enemy forces and installations; conduct combat airpatrol over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG);provide air surveillance, air warning, aircraft control, command and control andcommunications network in support of the PAF Air Defense System; Strategically deploymissiles to area and point defense against enemy air attacks; provide air support tocombat forces in maritime environment; monitor air and surface traffic on territorial airspace, EEZ and KIG; and perform other functions as directed by higher headquarters.

To carry out its mandated task, the AirDefense Command through the Philippine AirDefense System (PADS) is equipped with radarfacilities for early warning and fighter aircraftdetection. The PADS operation has twofunctions namely air defense and air spacecontrol. Furthermore, the Air DefenseOperations consists of the following functions:provide tactical early warning of hostile airactivity; identify all air traffic in the Philippine AirDefense Identification Zone (PADIZ); interceptunknown aircraft penetrating the PADIZ andengage hostile aircraft.

In addition the air space control is also termed as air surveillance management andcontrol. It encompasses the functions of detection, identification and classification,continuous tracking of airborne objects, control and management of friendly air assetsand intercept of unknown airborne objects in assigned area of responsibility.

During peacetime operations, airspace control is maintained through cooperativeand coordinated efforts of both PAF and Air Transportation Office (ATO). During wartime,the Philippine Air Force is the leading agency.

Compared to western air defense standards, the Air Defense Command is like achild struggling to stand on its own feet and running after the more advanced air force ofother countries. For several years we helplessly admired in awe the air assets of ourneighboring nations. The saga of our self-pity and complaints of what we don’t have isnow over. It is true that our air capabilities are limited. It is true that we wait formodernization as a remedy to our earnest desires. But until such time we shall be faithfulto our vision: CREDIBLE AIR DEFENSE FOR A FASTER, STRONGER AND BETTER AIRFORCE. We firmly share the ideas of our Commanding General, Lt Gen Benjamin PDefensor Jr, that future generation will fly and fight in the air more and more years tocome. And, we will fly, we fill fight and we will win for our people, for only then we cansay we have conquered the skies. We shall master the air.

Men of character find a special attractivenessin difficulty, since it is only incoming to grips withdifficulty that we can realize our potentials.Nothing can break the dedication and theperseverance of the men and women of the AirDefense Command.

As our fellowmen are drawn to an invitingsleep of the night, they will be assured in a newtomorrow knowing there is an eye looking up inthe sky…the Air Defense Command.

THE SF-260TP LIGHTATTACK AIRCRAFT

Major JesusMadlangbayan PAF

The intention to beef up the attackcapability of 15th Strike Wing in thewake of the continuous depletion of theOV-10A “Bronco” fleet has led to thereconfiguration of the SF-260TP to theattack mode. The converted SF-260TPs,dubbed as the Turbo Chargers, will thenassume the role as the OV-10’s littlebrother in its ISO missions. It is “LittleBrother” in a way that it can fly information with the Broncos duringairstike missions and expend amaximum payload of 500 pounds of ordnance. The two hardpoints in the underwing cancarry a variety of ordnance, such as; bombs (110/260 lbs), rocket launchers (LAU 68/131),flare dispensers (MK-24), practice bomb dispensers (B-37K), and even M-60 machineguns.

The main advantage of this aircraft is itsagility and superb maneuverability thattranslates to greater accuracy in hittingtargets. The big drawback, on the otherhand, is it being a single engine aircraft, noejection seat, and a history of engine quits.Two incidents of engine quits whileairborne and another two during landing rollled to its grounding in 1999 for more than ayear. Such incidents, according to the resultof the thorough investigation, were causedmainly by -----improper maintenanceprocedures compounded by a series ofincorrect actions on engine discrepancies.Appropriate corrective measures were thenadopted, and the aircraft were later releasedfor operation.

These telltales of engine quits strike a fear among pilots. In reality, however, there isno such thing as a 100% safe engine. There is always that possibility that something mightgo wrong even for the latest and the brand new ones. Thus, for the SF-260TP and anysingle engine aircraft in the world, a balance of good pilotage and good maintenancesystem spells the right formula for safe flying.

In February this year, Lt GeneralBenjamin P Defensor Jr, CG, PAF, approvedthe conversion of the remaining SF-260TPs inthe PAF inventory to attack configuration. Atleast, ten are being projected to be completedby August 2001. The conversion project ishandled by Air Force Research andDevelopment Center under the command ofColonel Jose R Saplan. To date, six SF-260’sincluding the Layang II have satisfactorilycompleted the aerial test fires and otherrelated requirements. Layang II, the flagshipproject of AFRDC, was the first to completethe conversion and has been involved in aseries of test flights and fly-bys since then.

There have been some doubts before and, perhaps even now, as regards to theairworthiness of the Layang II aircraft. Where others don’t dare, Captains Rey Rueca andAris Gonzales came into the picture to test fly and prove the airworthiness of the LayangII. They have now logged in more than 50 flying hours in the aircraft. At the onset of theconversion project, Major Jess Madlangbayan was tapped to spearhead the aerial test fireand evaluation of the Layang II and all the converted SF-260TPs. He formulated the SF-260TP delivery parameters and shared techniques in weapons delivery and airstriketactics. Moreover, the project could not have taken-off without the full support of ColonelL Jose Reyes, the Chief of Air Staff and former A-3, and Col Jose C Nano, A-4, who riskedthemselves by flying a number of sorties during the gunnery evaluation missions at CrowValley Gunnery Range.

With the transfer of the first two SF-260TPs to 15th Strike Wing in April 2001, there isno turning back now. A colorful service awaits these aircraft as they tread the paths of the

legendary AT-28D Trojans and the OV-10A Broncos.

AIR RESERVE COMMAND IN THE NEW MILLENNIUMCol Roberto L Ricalde PAF (GSC)

The year 2000 begins the countdown for the new millennium. Many entities hadtaken forward new programs to be accomplished: concerted efforts for a better future andmost probably reach the goal of success.

For the Air Reserve Command in the Year 2000, has faced all odds and difficulties inthe adjustment to changes in administration and has effectively attained its goal. Theactivities ranges from the implementation of RA 7077 (AFP Reservist Act) which coversmainly on reserve force development; assistance in relief and rescue operations anddevelopment of the PAF affiliated units.

The whole year can be generally considered a fruitful one taking into account thenumerous services rendered to populace, particularly in environmental protection andconservation through tree planting activities in Zamboanga City, Brookes Point & PuertoPrincesa City both in Palawan, Bicol Batangas and Benito Ebuen Air Base, Mactan Island,Cebu; humanitarian services by conducting Medical and Dental Civic Actions in twentyone (21) different areas in the archipelago which benefitted approximately fourteenthousand six hundred ninety four (14,694) patients treated/given free medicines; providedrelief and Rescue Operations in eleven (11) occasions following natural and man-madedisasters/calamities and to top it all is the conduct of reservist and ROTC trainings thatwill form part of the ready reserve units of the Philippine Air Force.

This is your Air Reserve Command ready to respond to the call of service byproviding a faster, stronger and better reserves to provide the base for expansion to ourPhilippine Air Force in case of war, rebellion, invasion, or disaster/calamities.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the officialpolicy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of Australiaor that of the Department of the National Defense, the Philippine air Force of the Government of the Republicof the Philippines. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of thisdocument may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included.

Command and Controlof Philippine Maritime Air Surveillance

Col Dexter O Huerto PAF (GSC)

The aim of this paper is to propose a command and control system formaritime air surveillance for the Philippines. This aim will be achieved through thefollowing objectives:

· To identify the maritime air surveillance needs and tasks for both civil and military;· To identify the difficulties, options and priorities for these needs and tasks;· To envisage a maritime air surveillance concept of operation;· To evaluate the different forms of command and control;· To design a general concept of command and control system for the AFP; and· To determine the optimal organization and arrangements to meet the Philippines’

needs and tasks.

This chapter will provide a strategic overview of the region, which has a directbearing on the Philippines overall national security interests and concerns, addressingaspects of defense, security, economic development and protection. Another aspect thatwill be covered is the international commitment of the Philippine government, in particularconcerning its relationship with other nations and the joint problems confronting them.Considering these threats and risks, a common factor towards addressing these problemscan be viewed by controlling the sea. Again beyond the nation’s control, themodernization program it tried to implement could not be realized due to the economicdownturn in the region.

The second chapter is a discussion of theneeds, tasks and present capabilities of the country’smaritime air surveillance. The basis of the discussionwill address the overall objectives of the AFPModernization Law. These objectives are defence andsecurity of territorial integrity; assistance to othergovernments in economic development andenvironmental protection; and protection of its peoplefrom natural and artificial calamities. Details of variouscivil agencies’ concerns and interests in the maritimeregime are also outlined.

The third chapter is a discussion of basic definitions and principles ofcommand and control. It covers the elements of command and control including;organization, process and facilities. Some new concepts such as the information age arealso briefly discussed.

The fourth chapter explores the different issues regarding the establishment ofcommand and control of maritime air surveillance. These issues include: the utilization ofthe armed forces for maritime air surveillance; the appropriate level of coordination andcontrol; the surveillance requirements; the surveillance resources; the surveillanceproduct and the use of the civil system in contingency operations. Within this baseline,four countries are analyzed and from this analysis conclusions pertinent to the Philippinesare derived.

The fifth chapter is an assessment of the command and control needs of thePhilippines with reference to the different issues discussed in Chapter Four.

The sixth chapter covers the proposed command and control for the Philippines’maritime air surveillance system. The previously discussed elements and basic principlesare applied to develop an integrated approach addressing the overall maritime airsurveillance requirements. Also covered in this chapter is the recommended concept ofoperations and corresponding technologies addressing specific tasks. Finally, the chapterincludes a recommended action plan. The plan sees the establishment of an overarchingorganization and the resultant changes in some military and civil government offices.

The last chapter summarizes all the discussion in previous chapters and reinforcesthe importance of unambiguous and integrated command and control of maritime airsurveillance.

* Book available at OSS,HPAF.


Doctrine Writing HandbookMajor Noel L Patajo PAF

Introduction

In all our daily activities, we follow certain rules and procedures that will make doingthings more smooth and systematic. Just think of a society without rules, there would beanarchy and chaos. Hence, to put everything in order, certain ways of doing things mustbe in place.

The Philippine Air Force (PAF), like any other organization, has its own set of rulesand procedures that guide all Air Force personnel in doing their tasks. This set of rulesand procedures are what we call “doctrines”. A mere discussion of doctrine causes somepeople to shudder, eliciting looks of confusion from some, and looks approachingmockery from others. The varied reactions of PAF officers may have some underpinningreasons anchored to the history of the PAF and the military as a whole.

The intent of this book is to dispel the “academic aura” associated with “doctrine”and present clear steps in the formulation, validation, evaluation, and revision of doctrine.Doctrine is dynamic and as environment, organization, people, and equipment change,doctrine should have parallel rational changes. Hence, every airman, more especially theCommanders themselves must be able to review, revise, validate, and if necessaryformulate new doctrines. Change in doctrine is required but overall doctrine is usuallystable and should require change when major factors such as government policy,weapons systems and enemy threat assessments change.Chapter 1 is about doctrine definition, types, levels, sources and the nature of air powerdoctrine. In this chapter, the framework of doctrine process will be presented. The chapterdiscusses the phases of doctrine process and the doctrine writing process framework.

Chapter 2 of this handbook relates the background of the PAF development as amajor Armed Service, and the PAF’s quest for air power both as a doctrine and practice.Like any air force in the world, the PAF began as a component of the Army. It is thereforeprudent to look back to the history of doctrine development of the Armed Forces. Theformative years of an institution provide insights to the interpersonal values of itspersonnel. This Chapter includes several vignettes relating to the Philippine governmentpreparations for World War II. By knowing the mindset of both military and civilian leadersin that tense era, doctrine writers are able to deduce the “best ways” as adopted by thoseleaders. Doctrinal inclinations by leaders may be discernible from the decisions madeprior to the war. The discussion on the development of PAF as a major service deals withthe appreciation of the AFP to have an independent air force and events in the world thatset the trends for having a separate air force. The PAF quests for air power appreciationdeal with the not so distant efforts of the PAF to write its own doctrine and lately, theappreciation of air power as a part of doctrine development within the AFP ModernizationProgram.

Chapter 3 deals with the AFP Five-Step model of doctrine formulation. It is admittedthat the article of late Brigadier General Isidro B. Agunod AFP, heavily influenced this

chapter.1[1] The process of doctrine formulation will include strategy and policyformulation process as guides for the formulation framework. It is the intent of thischapter to relate the only Research and Development in Doctrine Development written byan air force officer.

Chapter 4 is about Development of Military Doctrine. This chapter shows theframework for consolidation/analysis, development-model-test, revision and validation.This is the “doctrine loop” that distinguishes the writing process from the development ofthe military doctrine.

Chapter 5 deals with the actual doctrine writing processes beginning with theidentification of the tasks, set-up of working party, timetable, establishment of objectives,draft, compiling information to fill the outline, producing and endorsing the draft, printing,submission for approval and distribution.

The queries of several air force personnel to OSS about doctrine indicate that thereare varying degrees of perception and depth of understanding. This handbook utilizes theexperience of OSS as it handles the doctrine development component of the PAFModernization. Whenever possible, comments and suggestions of various officers duringthe countless meetings about doctrine are included and used to inspire and or justifycertain key steps. This research utilizes the various materials for Survey and Research,manuals for Continuous Improvement Process, Strategy and Policy formulations, AFPDoctrine Development Manual, PAF Regulations, SOPs and Circulars, history books like“The Philippine Army 1935-1942” by Ricardo Trota Jose, “Philippine Campaigns” byUldarico Baclagon, Academy Scribe, and “By Sword and Fire” by Alfonso J. Aluit and theProposed PAF Air Power Manual, various papers in the Royal Australian Air Force, RAAFAir Power Studies Centre, Air University Maxwell AFB, and other air power papers andjournals. The paper used various foreign manuals as well as local manuals as referencesand a basis of comparison.

Doctrines can be dynamic and may change according to the type of conflict, alongwith corresponding changes in the environment, political directions about the employmentof forces, and the doctrine of the threat force in particular. The importance in planningand day-to-day operation of military operations cannot be overemphasized. The role ofdoctrine in the life of an organization is influenced by professionals who advocate theessence of documenting the day-to-day activities so that the best way of doing things willbe continually improved.

Through all this, the users of this handbook, especially the doctrine officers, arereminded that steps enumerated are guidance only and not written in stone. Doubtless,there will be better ways for doctrine development and its documentation, but as theimmense task of developing and writing doctrine lies ahead, this handbook serves as theinitial guide.

* Book available at OSS,HPAF.

1[1] Agunod, Brig General, AFP, The R&D of Doctrine Development, AFPJSCSC Pub, 1981.


OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF RADARS:ROLES IN AIR DEFENCE, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, RECONNAISSANCE AND

SURVEILLANCE

‘OUR RADARS’Colonel Fred R Llosa PAF (GSC)

After more than two decades of internal turmoil in the Philippines, almost all theAFP’s resources were used in internal security operations and the external defence of thecountry was relegated to the back seat. Somehow the presence of the United States forcesin the country has provided security umbrella and paradoxically imbued us false hopes ofsecurity.

The departure of the United States forces from the Philippines in 1991, dueto the abrogation of the Bases Agreement by the Philippine Senate and the suddeneruption of Mt. Pinatubo, has left the country devoid of external defence and has becomeopenly vulnerable to foreign incursions and intrusions. The country was left to mend itselfagainst possible external threat, unfortunately, its external defence capabilities were intotal disarray. The fighter element of our external defence, the F-5 Freedom fighters thathas already seen its heydays, is unable to put up a descent deterrence against externalthreats. The four surveillance radars that the Americans has provided us for our externalwarning, has been reduced to only two operational radars with very limited capabilities.The rest of the radars were either deactivated, unmanned or were simply left to decay dueto non-availability of spares or non-availability of funds for repair. The present situation isthe Philippines is left with only two surveillance radar with very limited capabilities andleaving the rest of the country openly bare and unprotected against external incursion.

In 1995 the country woke up to find Chinese structures being put up at the MischiefReef, locally known as Panganiban Reef, just 120 nautical miles off the west coast ofPalawan and well within the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of thecountry. Without the military strength to confront the Chinese, the country wasforced to use diplomatic venues to present the problem at hand without any success.Three years after, the country was again shocked to find Malaysian structures at one of itsnearest shoals southwest of Palawan. Diplomatic protest, the only available course ofaction left for the country, again proved futile. These subtle creeping incursion in ourterritories, when left unabated will one day find us staring at them in our doorstep.

On 23 February 1995, the passing into law ofRepublic Act Number 7898 better known as the AFPModernisation Act gave glimmer of hope to the verylimited external defence capability of the AFP.Unfortunately, however, the Philippines is one of thosehardest hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and thepromise of an unhampered modernisation program wasagain derailed. One of the options left for the AFP,particularly the PAF was for a joint use of highly valuablebut limited resources. On 16 March 1995, The PAF and theATO signed an agreement for the joint use of equipmentand facilities between them in the interest of thePhilippine government.

This book supports this endeavours as joint use if only to optimise the application anduse of such valuable and expensive equipment. This book further recommends that thePAF procured surveillance radars’ optimum utilisation be shared not just for externaldefence or for air traffic control use but also as a source of information that will be usedby other government entities and instrumentalities. This invaluable equipment will becomea national asset more than just a PAF tool.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the Philippines was granted fullindependence by the United States. On 04 July 1946, the American flag, that had reignedsupreme throughout the archipelago for almost five decades, was hoisted down and thePhilippine flag has flown high signaling total independence from foreign dominance eversince.

History will tell that the Philippines was under foreign control since the Portugueseexplorer Ferdinand Magellan discovered it in 1521. Its discovery on 16 March 1521 was thestart of a long colonial rule of the Spaniards that lasted for more than 300 years. Spain’sdefeat by the Americans in the Spanish-American War ended its dominance in thePhilippines and the country was ceded to the Americans in 1898. Thereafter, thePhilippines was the colony of the United States of America until its granting ofindependence in 1946. The rule was shortly interrupted during World War II when theJapanese invaded the country in 1941. 04 July 1946, Philippines was grantedindependence by the United States.

Nonetheless, the true essence of independence was never really experienced by theFilipinos despite its granting in July 1946. The presence of the US bases in the Philippinessymbolises continued dominance of the Americans in the Philippines. Clarke Air ForceBase in Pampanga and the Subic Naval Base in Zambales, two of the US’ largest militaryinstallations outside continental USA, projected US dominance not only in the Philippinesbut also the entire Asia-Pacific region.

The defence umbrella that the US forces shrouded the Philippines supplemented theexisting air defence coverage of the Philippine Air Force. The surveillance radar used bythe PAF and by their USAF counterparts was part of the military hardware that the USgovernment has provided the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The F-86 D/F Sabre Jetsand subsequently the F-5 A/B Freedom Fighters, that performed as the fighter interceptorsproviding the first line of the country’s external defence, were hands down support to thePAF, et gratis.

The Philippine Air Defence Identification Zone (PADIZ)

The extent of coverage by the surveillance radarof the Philippine Air Defence Identification Zone(PADIZ) covers only the whole island of Luzon andthe northern part of the Visayas. The rest of theVisayas and the entire island of Mindanao, includingits adjacent islands, were outside the radarcoverage. Incidentally, the focal point of thiscoverage was noticeably Clarke Air Base and SubicNaval Base. Congruently. the signing of the MutualDefence Treaty (MTD) by the two governments isbased on the principle of mutual security andcooperation, although it is relatively beneficial to thePhilippines. The continued presence of theAmericans up to 1991 however, serve more toproject their dominance in order to protect theirvested interest in this part of the world.

After the abrogation of the US Bases Agreement in 1991and the departure of the USforces from the Philippines, the problem of external defence came to the fore. The PAFwas left with fledging and outmoded F-5 aircraft for air interception and its air defenceradars, mostly non-operational due to lack of spares, were unable to provide thenecessary surveillance coverage. The deterrent factor of the US forces is gone leaving thewhole country openly vulnerable to foreign incursions or invasions. A glaring example ofthis is the Chinese occupation in 1995 of Mischief Reef, which is just 120 nautical milesfrom Palawan Island, well within the 200 mile EEZ of the Philippines.

Old reliable F-5 aircraft as fighter interceptors

The need therefore of a radar system that can provide the desired early warning forthe defence of the entire archipelago is primordial. The importance of a credible airdefence became extremely necessary not only to deter adventurism by other countriesagainst the Philippines, but also to protect its natural resources within its territorialboundary and inside its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Unfortunately however, the economy of the Philippines has been greatly affected bythe Asian economic crisis in 1997. The procurement of a new and sophisticated radarsystem will take up a big portion of the AFP’s already depleted budget. A joint use ofsurveillance radars by the PAF for air defence and by the Air Transportation Office (ATO)for air traffic control is proposed as an efficient and sensible application of scarce radarresources.

Initially, the aim of this paper is to present acomprehensive discussion on the joint use of radarsby both the Philippine Air Force (PAF) of theDepartment of National Defence (DND) and the AirTransportation Office (ATO) of the Department ofTransportation and Communication (DOTC). Ofimportance, there is an existing implementingagreement between PAF and the ATO on the jointuse of equipment and facilities signed 21 August1997. The need for a discussion on the same topicbecomes redundant and irrelevant. This papertherefore, will deal on PAF- procured radar providingmultifarious application not only for the PAF butalso to other government agencies including theATO. This simply means the surveillance radarprocured by the PAF is not just for air defence butwould also be a source of information needed byother government instrumentalities in theaccomplishment of their assigned tasks ormissions.

* Bookavailable at OSS, HPAF.

Air Force Review - Vol. 2, No. 2a

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