Air Force Review - Vol. 2, No. 1

AIR FORCE REVIEWVol 2, No 1

THE ECONOMICS OF

AIR POWER IN EXTERNAL SECURITYLTC ELMER R AMON PAF

The security environment in the Asia- Pacific remainsvolatile and uncertain because of various factors including theoverlapping claims in the South China Sea. Most if not all ofthe six countries claim ownership of part or of the wholeSpratly Island Group are relentlessly pursuing their ownrespective interests. These countries include a hegemonicgiant, considered to be pushing its position in spite bilateraland multilateral accords such as the UNCLOS. The pronouncedinterest of the United States to stay in the region is consideredby other countries as constant. There is a perception that theirpresence will guarantee protection to its long-standing ally,the Philippines. On the contrary, even with the benefit of aMutual Defense Treaty of 1947, there is no help expected based on experience in the

past.

Learning from the neglect of the country’s external capability, the AFPModernization program, enacted in 1995, was envisioned to enhance the capability ofthe AFP to be a credible force that can defend the sovereignty and territorial integrityof the country. The law outlines the principles of total defense, defense-in-depth andan active defense as strategies for national defense. It calls for the enhancement ofthe capability of the air force and the navy as well as the army to address both theexternal and internal security concerns of the country.

Recent world developments after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack,makes security concerns a priority endeavor for most nations. In the local front, thecommunists, terrorists, the secessionist rebels, the Abu Sayaff bandits, as well as theperpetrators of transnational crimes continue to inflict a heavy toll on the economy.As a result, the AFP has stepped up its security measures to respond to this new waveof terrorism as well as to avert the international terrorist organization establishmentof links with the local rebel groups.

Nevertheless, the external situation has remained an immediate concern ofthe AFP. As the priority policy in the modernization procurement and equipmentupgrade have been affected, there are quarters in the establishment that believe ashift is forthcoming in the emphasis from external to internal. However, that remainsdebatable since the overall outlook in the Asia- Pacific remains uncertain to thewhole region.

The expected vast mineral and oil reserves in the disputed territory and itsimportance as a navigational sealane are the primary interest for claims on theislands. For example, the Malampaya Project is a 4.5 billion-dollar project that has anundersea pipeline that delivers gas to power plants in Batangas province south ofManila. Malampaya has a confirmed reserve of 78 billion cubic meters of gas and 85

million barrels of condensate. Aside from the Malampaya site the Department ofEnergy announced last quarter 2001 the approval for drilling of at least seven oilwells in the country. In 2002, there are at least six ongoing offshore oil drillingprojects including three in Palawan, one in Mindoro, one in Sulu and another inCotabato. The recent completion of the Malampaya Project off the coast of Palawan,renews the importance of the security requirements in the western front. While itmay not be the only site of oil and natural gas reserves in the disputed area, it is stillone of the most important considerations. It is no wonder then that the claimantcountries adamantly hold on to their interest in these islands and is likely to remainso for long.

The Philippines continues to recognize the dangers that are posed by disputesover South China Sea, and the economic opportunities of a peaceful and secureenvironment. It is then strategically sound to defend these economic projects, as,mandated by our constitution. These reasons make it imperative for our governmentto do whatever it takes to address the issue. It is completely irrational to leave it tochance, and risk a security lapse. While diplomatic means could be an option to easetension in the area, adequate force capability is needed to back-up the diplomaticinitiatives.

The question is, how then are we going to defend ourselves? And with what?It is disadvantageous if the Philippines downgrades the country’s defenses in thewestern front, because other claimant countries could take advantage of theweakened security posture. If the imbalance is not corrected, dire consequenceswould include an easy kill for the enemy and a loss by default by the country. As aconsequence of a weak air force, whatever political, military and economic gains wehave achieved, will be all for naught. Is this what our country deserves? Certainly notand we are not about to give up!

Credible Air Power stands as the one option that will project defense-in-depthor the main attack platform for air defense. For instance, a squadron composed of 8single-seat and four dual-seat f-16s, a land based radar and twosurveillance/reconnaissance aircraft could also be used for command and control.The requirements are surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, for the meantime, willbe beefed up with our present attack helicopters and transport aircraft. By the timewe are engaged in the defense acquisitions would be forthcoming.

On the whole, the cost of this fleet of aircraft is modest, considering the needto guard the 4.5 billion dollar project and similar other projects underway worth anestimated 26.3 trillion dollars. If this falls on deaf ears, are we then willing to takethe risk? Either way we are already taking great risk. Until we are able to address ourimmediate concern of external defense, we cannot hope to achieve peace as well assecure environment for economic growth. It is imperative to address the immediatethreats to our economic assets through well-considered but decisive and credible airpower development.

COMMANDER'SCORNER:

Our OwnBattleplan

Upon my assumption in 2000, I adjusted the PAF from being a credible airforce to power that defines victory in peace or war. This vision, well founded on thetenets of air power, is underwritten by the PAF Modernization Program.

To move towards that vision, I laid down three operational imperatives thatapply to the broad range of our missions: brilliance in the basics, completion of thecore, richness in results. All three had been defined for the guidance of our airmen.The overall strategy, however, that holds the three imperatives in relationship withother factors, has not been fully explained.

To henceforth set the rule heading of the Air Force, I unveiled at the start ofthis year the FIRST FORCE Strategy, the PAF Strategy for 2002-2007. Its mainfeature is the declaration of the PAF’s core and shared competencies are thecapabilities that render our service special and unique, that only we can best deliver,and which identify the Air Force. They form part of any modern Air Force’s basicdoctrine. The shared competencies, on the other hand, are the capabilities commonand essential to all major services. They include the development and application ofdoctrine, modern weapons systems, established bases, trained personnel and rightorganization.

Both core and shared competencies lie at the heart of our air power strategy.Unfortunately, all these years they have not been properly identified. As a result,while we have been gallant in service, we have been unable to call our shots and bestpossible “plays.” We have been content to merely serve our ‘functions” such as airlift,close air support, search and rescue, and others, which have relegated us mostly to asupport role, and made us dependent on the hope that with new acquisitions, we willfly better. It’s time to face realities. The truth is, no matter how modernized webecome, no matter how much we develop, as sought by RA 7898, we can neveremerge truly victorious without first developing and perfecting our own “signatureplays” and winning moves- using all available resources and opportunities.

These “ signature plays,” these identified core competencies, are the mainfocus of the First Force strategy, whose ultimate aim is to progressively transform thePAF into the lead force in military missions as non-military engagements. For easierrecall, I have embedded them in the very title “FIRST FORCE”: Force projection,Information advantage, Rapid response and mobility, Strategic impact, Tacticalsynergy, Force generation and support, Organizational brilliance, Research andapplied innovation, Control of stations, and Empowered quality workforce.

By design, the first five (FIRST) are the PAF’s core competencies- the definingstrengths we must painstakingly develop, as well as the desired outcomes we mustattain in all missions. But just as important will be our focus on the next five(FORCE), which underline our shared competencies. All of them are to be regarded asour key result areas. All of them are the PAFs’ principal means and ends.

The “FIRST FORCE” will henceforth be the primary reference point for alloperational plans, and it is ideal for PAF commanders, officers, and airmen couldcommit them to memory like Air Force personnel in other countries remember theirs.The yearly operational targets will change, but these ten bearings, these ten points inthe PAF’s battle plan must stay.

FIRST FORCE STRATEGY 2002“Our strategic vision is for the Air Force to define total quality and culture ofexcellence through air power”

LT GEN BENJAMIN P DEFENSOR JR

The idea that the Philippine Air Force fills the role in leading military andnonmilitary operations was intensified by the noteworthy achievements at the end ofthe year. However, the beginning of 2002 is a remarkable pronouncement of a newstrategy aimed to significantly develop the Air Force in transforming into the nation’sFirst Force on the avenue of Air Power. A highly decisive, flexible, and versatile

quality Air Force capable and ready to lead in military and non-military roles in thesecurity, defense, and development of the nation.

The PAF Vision

“Philippine Air Force defining victory in peace and conflict”.

The PAF envisions a modernized Air Force as the leading force in thepreservation of national sovereignty and the protection of territorial integrity as wellas the principal partner in national development effort of the government. As such,the imperatives lie on the capability thrust and operational dynamism of the Air Forcethrough the pool of airpower-driven airmen and highly trained competent leaders. Inparticular, the key factors in carrying out this vision is essentially founded on theorganization’s brilliance in the basics completion of the competencies, and therichness in results despite the availability of meager resources at hand. Yet, the AirForce will continue to be faster, stronger, and better organization in service to thecountry and people.

A quality Air Force defining victory in peace and conflict–this is the PAF Visionfor a total span of five years, starting 2002.

The PAF Objectives

The PAF establishes objectives in the accomplishment of its mandated missionwith emphasis on air power application. First, the decisive defeat of all armedinternal threats through the application of applied operational doctrine in all kinds offorce engagement. Second, the projection of air power s the nation’s first line ofdefense in protecting national territory and maintaining territorial integrity. Third,the protection of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) through active air defense. Fourth,the contribution to regional peace and stability through pursuing bilateral defenseagreements within the region. Fifth, PAF will support and assist lead governmentagencies though progressive non-traditional engagement. Finally, to establish PAF asFirst Force in most missions through its established core competencies.

The PAF Operational Concepts

In pursuit of its objectives, the PAF acknowledges fundamental requirementsto First Force Strategy as follows:

Active Air Defense is the capability based on decisive airpower paradigm asapplied to protect national territory, to deter enemy aggression, and to suppressenemy forces.

Dynamic Interoperability is the synergistic optimization of forces engaged intheater for the effective accomplishment of PAF mission. It speaks of air power as a‘force multiplier” in any armed engagement.

Integrated Support entails sustainability of logistical requirement vis-à-visavailable resources in any PAF engagement.

Joint Security is a collective commitment in the course of operations inter-linked with other military forces, government agencies, non-military units, generalpublic, and allies.

Non-Traditional Engagement constitutes, socio-economic ventures, and reliefand recovery efforts of the PAF serving as the primary partner of the government innational development and progress.

Key Result Areas and Operational Targets

Force Projection

In peacetime, the Air Force will actively participate in securing the MalampayaProject through intensified maritime air patrols over zoning and security andeconomy to optimize resources. On operations against terror, the Air Force willproactively participate as well as support international peacekeeping effort. Finally,PAF will expand the role and capability for search and rescue in times of crisis andcalamities.

In times of conflict and increasing threat, PAF will project air defense throughbetter radars, more fighters, and integrated Philippine Air Defense Control Center(PADCC) and Air Defense Alert Center (ADAC). The Air Force will interdict strongholdsof terror and conflict and will support government effort against criminality andlawlessness in order to encourage foreign investors in the country. In the light ofInternal Security Operations (ISO), PAF will employ and lead a new strategy based onair power operational application and provide active assistance and support to alliesthrough bilateral defense cooperation.

Information Advantage

In the new era, information closely associated with technology is a decisivemilitary tool. In this regard, the PAF will establish an Air Force-wide informationadvantage through inter/intra command connectivity. It will include the acquisitionof modern platforms such as sensors, radar system, and aircraft. Similarly, the AirForce will integrate the management systems of personnel, logistics, and finance.Moreover, PAF will upgrade technical intelligence capability and will likewise developcomputer security.

Rapid Response and Mobility

The PAF will adopt a wide-fast-response strategy in all scenarios andconditions of emergency, calamity, and distress. In order to achieve suchundertaking, the Air Force will maintain above 75 percent operational readiness ofaircraft under its inventory. Moreover, the adoption of new doctrine will effect the fullutilization of air assets such as Sikorsky and Bell helicopters for combat and searchrescue, and the PAF reservists and civilian volunteers for rapid response tasks andresponsibilities will also be organized to support the Air Force. In tactical operations,PAF will increase the employment of SF-260 TPs. Also, quick reaction teams from710th Special Operations Wing (SPOW) will be organized and employed fro combat inareas as required.

Strategic Impact

As a result of the country’s growing dependence on aerospace andtechnological advances, PAF is envisioned to have the best potential and leverage inthe future. Hence, the Air Force’s effort should gear towards its transformational rolein the future. In line with this, the PAF will develop strategic impact by establishingnew PAF doctrine covering strategic, tactical, and operational levels. The Air PowerInstitute will be activated to pursue doctrine development and further the study ofair power application. Moreover, PAF will endeavor in enhancing air powerconsciousness among AFP personnel including concerned decision-makers in variousgovernment agencies. The PAF will push for the increase capabilities of Air ForceResearch and Development Center (AFRDC), as well as the establishment of a repaircenter of aircraft. Likewise, selected air bases and stations will be offered to selectedcommercial aerospace industries as growth centers.

Tactical Synergy

In jointness, the PAF produces the best synergistic effects–the AFP’s firstforce multipliers. In this regard, the PAF, guided by operational doctrine of decisiveforce engagement, will increase participation in joint exercises for greaterinteroperability. To optimize the advantages of cross training, the Air Force willactively partake in bilateral defense training such as the RP-US Balikatan. PAF willalso increase the number of search and rescue and survival training for civilianvolunteers ready to tap in any eventuality. Likewise, the reservist training programswill be redesigned for purposes of better application and field expertise. PAF willcontinue to increase exposure to non-traditional activities in support to governmentand nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, PAF will pursue special projectswith other law enforcement agencies to sharpen operational readiness to respond topeace and order.

Force Generation and Support

Force Generation and Support means any activity that sustains PAFoperational readiness as a fighting force. It covers three areas, namely: Resource andFinancial Management, Focused Acquisition, Upgrade and Maintenance, andEnlistment of Support. The Air Force will adopt IT Project Management and ITDelivery of Services. Likewise, changes in the procurement system will be institutedto implement a PAF wide cost-cutting strategy and to focus financial resources tocore requirements. The procurement of quality personnel will be pursued to optimizeexpertise and competency. Eventually, PAF will upgrade aircraft and aircraftarmaments support facilities to provide more capable weapons and support systemsfor tactical units. Additionally, the Air Force will push through with the acquisition ofmore fighters and transport aircraft and the commissioning of additional helicopters.However, upgrade will not only include equipment but also personnel in terms oftraining to keep the aircraft properly maintained.

Organizational Brilliance

Organizational brilliance in the Air Force means simplicity, flexibility, andresponsiveness. Most of the time there exists, in all units, alignment between andamong resources, systems, doctrines, structures, objectives, mission, and leadershipdirections. In order to make intensified air campaigns in the South, the Command will

establish a 4th Tactical Operations Wing in Davao to cover the whole area of EasternMindanao. Likewise, the Air Force will make further response through the activationof the 740th Combat Wing that will lead in Internal Security Operations (ISO) incertain areas of the country. Additionally, the 724th Explosive Ordnance Disposal andthe 726th K-9 Squadrons will be fully constituted for other special operationpurposes.

Research and Applied Innovation

Air power is the great provider that allows all dimensions as well as otherforces and agencies to optimize their respective contribution to national security.Behind the rise of air power is research and development or innovation. For thispurpose, the Air force will break more boundaries with more of its developedprecision guidance systems, critical aircraft and aerospace ground supportequipment, aerial bombs and warheads, and automatic grenade launcher systems.Likewise, several conversion projects will be undertaken through the resourceful AirForce Research and Development Center (AFRDC).

Command and Control of Stations

The PAF aim is to project not only the name and discipline of its airman, butalso the Air Force culture in every air base and station and a culture that is high-stepping with the times reflective of effectiveness, efficiency and modernity. On theother hand, the relatively long period for base development will not in any wayhamper the mandated mission of the PAF. Yet, the Air Force will continue to projectadditional bases and alternate stations in the western front. Eventually, the Air Forcewill continue to project additional bases and alternate stations in the western front.Eventually, the Air Force culture of excellence will surface in all PAF bases.

Empowered Quality Work Force

Given the expanding capabilities of the Air Force, every airman has to besteeped in the basics of air power, trained and motivated well, provided qualityresponsive education, and given the appropriate support systems to do his job andfulfill his purpose in the PAF. Hence, PAF has to provide the best to the airmen sothey can give their best to the Air Force in return. In line with this endeavor, the AirForce will provide airmen better opportunities for training locally and abroad.Increase exchanges with foreign counterparts on matters of expertise will also beundertaken to advance their careers and broaden their mindset. Likewise, theCommand will intensify the culture of excellence within the organization for theairmen to appreciate the basics of air power.

In a nutshell, the FIRST FORCE Strategy responds to the challenge to makethe Air Force the nations LEADING FORCE through a majority of airpower applicationsand best performance. Significantly, the inherent role of air power in the preservationof our national security and territorial integrity essentially propels the PAF in comingout with the FIRST FORCE Strategy. As stressed by Winston Churchill the rationalebehind the existence of the Air Force: “Not to have an adequate air force in thepresent state of the world is to compromise the foundations of national freedom andindependence…”

DEFINING DOCTRINE

By Major Noel Lacambacal Patajo PAF

Assistant Chief, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, GHQ

Doctrine is like a compass bearing; it gives us the general direction of ourcourse. We may deviate from that course on occasion, but the heading provides acommon purpose to all who travel along the way. This puts a grave burden on thosewho formulate doctrine, for a small error, even a minute deviation, in our compassbearing upon setting out, may place us many miles away from the target at the endof the flight. If those who distill doctrine from experience or devise it from logicalinference in the abstract fail to exercise the utmost rigor in their thinking, the wholeservice suffers.

I. B. HOLLEY, Jr

The preceding statement underscores the importance of doctrine and remindsus of the heavy responsibility of doctrine writers. Such responsibility, I suspect, maybe the underlying reason why it is difficult to find dedicated doctrine writers not onlywithin the Air Force but also within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).Recently, the Commander-in-Chief, Her Excellency, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo reminded the AFP of the importance of doctrine. The orders are clear and it isno longer needed to repeat what the over-all Commander desires regarding the AFPdoctrine.

began when then DeputyChief of Staff for Operations, J3spearheaded the effort to printseveral set of manuals per majorservices. The effort was the“general direction” for the AFP. TheOffice of Special Studies of the AirForce, with guidance from J3 andthe Office of the Assistant Chief ofAir Staff for Operations, A-3,handled the Air Force manualwriting and publication. Throughthe years, these manuals serve asthe sole reference of the Air Force.

When the AFP modernization began to take shape in the early 1990s, doctrinewas not a major component. It was only during the subsequent deliberations thatdoctrine, as basis of modernization, became the acknowledge reference. The AFP, aswell as, its major services has the manuals of the late 1970s to refer to. As such, it isfair to say that the AFP modernization has been anchored on doctrine. Currently, it isthe Deputy Chief of Staff for Education and Training, J8 that is responsible fordoctrine component of the AFP Modernization. Why is J8 handling doctrinedevelopment now when J3 used to be the main office responsible for doctrine

development? This is one aspect of AFP doctrine development that I intend todiscuss in the future paper.

But, what is doctrine? When I was still very much involved in doctrinedevelopment and overseeing the Air Force side of doctrine development, almost allOfficers with varying rank level ask the same question. I believe that such questionwas posited not because of ignorance but of worry that doctrine definition has beenblurred by time, technology, theories and most of all of their experiences.

The Nature of Doctrine

Doctrine is a body of principles in any branch of knowledge. It is based on anaccumulation of knowledge gained through experience, study, analysis, and test.

Doctrine is dynamic. It varies from time to time, situation to situation. Assuch, it is considered to be the best way of doing things in the present period.

Military Doctrine

Military doctrine is officially believed and taught as the best way to conductmilitary affairs. It is an authoritative statement of principles for the employment ofmilitary resources designed for continuing applicability in war and peace. It isfounded primarily on the result of accurate analysis and interpretation of experience.In areas where there is no real experience to draw on, doctrines are formulated fromthe extrapolations of experience based on sound judgment, logic, intuition, andsometimes ‘gut feeling’.

Military doctrines can be very dynamic and should change accordingly withthe type of conflict, along with corresponding changes in the environment, politicaldirections about the employment of military forces, and the doctrine of the threatforce in that particular conflict.

Categories of Military Doctrine

Military doctrines are divided into three categories: Environmental, Joint andCombined.

Figure 1: STRUCTURE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Environmental Doctrine. Environmental doctrine is a compilation of beliefs about thebest employment of military forces within a particular operating medium. The ArmedForces operate in three different environments – land, sea, and air – each withdistinct nature and characteristics. The uniqueness of each environment calls forseparate and specific doctrine that embodies the beliefs on how to use land power,sea power, and air power in their respective environments. Environmental doctrine isalso known as Single Service Doctrine.

Joint Doctrine. In relation to air power, joint doctrine provides guidance foremployment of PAF forces engaged in joint operations with the other major services.It prescribes the best way to integrate and employ air forces with land and navalforces in joint military operations. Responsibility for the development of doctrines forcertain types of joint operations is assigned to individual major services. The majorservice having primary responsibility for the development of doctrine for jointoperations does so in consultation and coordination with the other services.

Combined Doctrine. Combined doctrine establishes the principles, organization, andprocedures agreed upon between the AFP and allied forces in combined operations.This type of doctrine is normally developed to support mutual defence treaties,agreements, or organizations and promotes compatible arrangements foremployment of AFP forces in combined operations. In relation to air power, combineddoctrines serves as a guide for the application of air power doctrine to combinedoperations, and describes the best way to integrate and deploy air forces with alliedforces in coalition warfare.

Inter-relationship. In modern warfare, the key to victory is jointness in planning andoperations. However, fundamental to joint operation is single-service expertise.Therefore, single service doctrine is the backbone of joint and combined doctrine. Itis only when single service doctrine is strong that the synergy of land, air and seapower can result in optimum combat power.

Figure 2: The Levels of Doctrine

Levels of Doctrine

Strategic Doctrine. Strategic doctrine states the fundamental principles foremployment of air forces to attain national objectives in peace and war. It serves as a

reference or authority for all other doctrines; information for instruction in militaryservice schools; material for public and internal information programs; and positionsto support budgetary procurement programs. It establishes the framework andfoundation for the effective use of air power.

Operational Doctrine. Operational doctrine establishes principles and rules governingorganization, direction, and employment of air forces in the accomplishment of basiccombat operational missions in conventional and unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency and special operations, and various military tasks consonant with militarypreparedness. It embodies the concepts and principles derived from the strategicdoctrines, serving as a guide for the air force in the organization and employment ofits forces to perform its function in a particular type of conflict with authorisedentitlements.

Tactical Doctrine. Tactical doctrine establishes detailed tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTP) that guide the use of specific weapons to accomplish specificobjectives. It represents guidance on how the air force should be employed inengagements and battles. It should address how to accomplish tactical objectivesand how combat situations such as threat, weather, terrain, and available weapons,influence tactics.

Inter-relationship. The three levels of doctrine are interrelated. In air power doctrine,for example, they are neither mutually exclusive nor rigidly limited to preciseboundaries.

I am convinced that AFP officers will continue to search for the definition ofdoctrine. From the foregoing, allow me to echo Winston Churchill, who said: Thosewho are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictionsupon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of dailyaffairs than those who are merely taking short views, and indulging their naturalimpulses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day.

Military Air Power noted “The clarity and therefore the utility of doctrine is adirect product of how well language is used in writing.”

Notes:

1. Major Noel L Patajo PAF, Philippine Air Force Doctrine Writing Handbook,Canberra 1999.

2. Lt Col Charles M Westenhoff, USAF, Military Air Power The Cadre Digestof Air power Opinions and Thoughts, Maxwell AFB, October 1990

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL VIABILITY OFEMPLOYING NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN AIRFORCE OPERATIONS

LTC NESTOR P DEONA PAF (GSC)

“Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, notupon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”

Giulio Douhet

Introduction

Today’s emerging warfare is characterized by two interrelated trends. One is thelimited nature of conflict that gives premium on minimizing non-combatant casualties aswell as collateral damage. The other is speed and precision, which entails the reduction ofunintended or undesired effects through accuracy or by weapon especially designed toavoid such effects. The Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict have proven how the accuracy ofweapons delivery systems limited the collateral damage that could otherwise have beenprohibitive.

The conduct of warfare has evolved through the centuries that wars were fought.In the Second World War, we have seen the maximization of weapons lethality with the useof nuclear weapons on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Weapons havebecome so lethal that it has even threatened the very existence of the planet. The fear ofmass destruction thus provided the shift towards weapon that minimize rather thanmaximize lethality.

Thus, the emergence on non-lethal technologies has the potential to alter thecharacter and conduct of military operations. The interest in non-lethal weapons sprungfrom the need to have options appropriate to the changes in the threat environment andthe expanding roles of the military. Though traditional enemies remain, there will beadversaries amidst high-density civilian populations against whom we need new methodsin applying force. Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) therefore are extremely important as part ofthe scheme in addressing the changing nature of conflict.

Evidently, the emerging concept of non-lethal warfare is attractive to politicalleaders and policy makers alike. Such a concept emphasizes the promise of waging amore humane war since it conserve life, resources and the environment. Thus, theprospect for this new generation of weapons resonates strongly with popular opinion thathas grown increasingly averse to casualties as a consequence of military operations.Moreover, the relative reversibility of the effects of non-lethal weapons on targetscompared to the longer lasting effects of lethal conventional weapons complement theformer’s growing acceptability in military operations other than war.

The Need for Non-Lethal Weapons

The need for NLW in the Philippine Air Force is justified by several compellingreasons. First is the limited nature of warfare as well as the changes in the strategicsetting and the threat environment where the demand to minimize casualties and collateraldamage is increasing. Second is the expanding role of the military that now include

fulfilling missions in a variety of non-combat operations such as transitional crimes,peacekeeping operations and support to police operations. Third are the evolvingdomestic security threats where non-traditional actors such as civil society, interestgroups, organized crime and terrorist groups are becoming key players. Fourth is thepublic sensitivity to the use of excessive force and aversion to casualties, thus, demandsa conflict that is civilized and humane. Lastly is the enemy’s predilection to using humanshields, hostages and minors as a deterrent as well as a political trap against thegovernment.

Applications in Air Force Operations

The application of NLWs is a novel approach to minimize casualties and collateraldamages in specialized Air Force operations. Thus, its introduction is in harmony with thegovernment’s aversion to the use of excessive force and the public’s sensitivity tocasualties and collateral damages during the conduct of military operations.

Undeniably, NLWs can be introduced and applied in sertain PAF operational rolessuch as counter insurgency, peacekeeping operations, support to national policeoperations, support to other government agencies and civil disturbance operations.

Selected PAF Missions and Applicable Non-Lethal Technologies

NLTTechnology/

PAFMissions

Psyops/

Psywar

Acoustics

Lasers

Barriers

Riotcontrolagents

Opticals

electromagnetics

Counterinsurgency

+ + + + +

Counterterrorism

+ + + + + + +

Peacekeeping operations

+ + + + +

Counterdrug

+ + + +

Non-combatevacuation

+ + +

Disasterrelief

+ +

Civildisturbanceoperations

+ + +

Grounddefense

+ + + + + +

NLWs are not viewed as a substitute for lethal force. This suggests that forcesequipped with lethal and NLWs shoul remain close enough for mutual support. It wasemphasized that the employment of NLWs does not mean no zero casualties but rather anattempt to avoid fatalities and collateral damage.

Criteria for Integration

Several criteria for the integration of NLWs to the PAF were identified. These arepolitical acceptability, operational utility, safety and cost effectiveness. Politicalacceptability enumerates the strategic rationale and advantages of NLWs. Whileoperational utility prescribed the operational capabilities and desired qualities for NLWs tobe acquired, safety, factors in suitability in situations where it is difficult to distinguishbetween friend or foe. Cost effectiveness strikes a balance between the desired effectsand affordability given the constraint in the Air Force’s budget for weapon acquisition.

Conclusion

The employment of NLWs in PAF operations is viable in the strategic and tacticalsense. The main rationale for the use of non-lethality at the strategic level is theenhancement of the political utility of force. Hence, NLW is attractive to political leadersand policy makers alike. The strategic utilization of NLW can enhance the flexibility ofcommanders as well as present more options for national decision-makers in conflict andcrisis situations. In a tactical environment, NLWs are well suited in addressing the threatposed by an ill-defined adversary especially when the use of lethal forces will result tounacceptable consequences.

In any armed confrontation, incidental and accidental casualties could not beavoided. The employment of non-lethal weapons does not guarantee a bloodless situation.It just minimizes the bloodshed.

Neither are non-lethal weapons perceived to replace lethal arms in the foreseeablefuture. At this time it cannot be a substitute to the PAF’s conventional forces and lethalweapons capabilities. However, NLW can be integrated into the PAF capability tocomplement existing weapons in the Air Force inventory. What the Air Force could do is tosystematically employ them to amplify their effects and reduce the reliance on lethalmeans.

Hence, to meet the challenges of ambiguous situations, the PAF must considernon-lethal weapons options. Non-lethal weapons make available to the PAF forces a wider

range of responses to difficult and critical situations. More than that, non-lethality helpsavoid criticism that would result from non-combatant casualties and thus enables the PAFto maintain the moral high ground.

Recommendations

The Air Force should take an active role in the long term planning and advocacyfor the application of non-lethal capabilities. It may be appropriate for the Air Force toengage in undertaking the assessment of NLWs for specific mission needs.

It is also proposed that non-lethal doctrines should be integrated with existingmilitary doctrines to enhance the utilization of current military capabilities at hand.Similarly, the integration of non-lethality as a component of the PAF’s armed capabilitywould require doctrine to govern their appropriate employment in future Air Forceoperations.

The PAF’s choice and acquisition of non-lethal systems must be based on thefollowing factors: First is the availability of the system and if it is deliverable. Second isthe compatibility of the non-lethal systems to existing weapon systems and trainingprocesses. Last is the employability of the system to effectively save lives and contributeto mission accomplishment.

Given the strategic and tactical viability of employing NLW in PAF operations, it isproposed that NLW development functions be absorbed by the Weapons SystemsDevelopment Directorate (WSDD) of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, A-5. thisdirectorate shall have the primary responsibility of advancing the PAF NLW Program,making further studies on NLW applications and monitoring latest developments in non-lethal technology.

To evaluate the operational employment of NLWs, the 710th Special OperationsWing could be designated as a test unit. The wing has been at the forefront of the PAF’sinvolvement in unconventional operations such as counter-insurgency, counter terrorism,counter-drug and civil disturbance control where NLWs employment fits in.

LTCOL NESTOR P DEONA PAF (GSC) was formerly the Director OSS, HPAF, currently, heis the Secretary of Air Staff, HPAF.

TO THE PAF FIGHTERSBy 1LT CHIVAL CARLOS F ESCALANTE PAF

As technology allowed man to fly at altitudes which would not have otherwisebeen reached by his natural means, so are parallel advances making possible theincrease in his sensory abilities. Already we have equipment that allow us to hearacross distances and to see through walls. And one relevant landmark development isthat of a portable see-in-the-dark gadget – the Night Vision Goggles (NVG).

This device is fast finding indispensable application most particularly in the military.NVG actually isn’t as novel as, perhaps, the e-bomb or bio cloning, but its currentemployment in tactics is yet to be realized especially in our own air force.

Though undoubtedly beneficial these devices are, its compatibility with ourpresent aircraft stands to be thoroughly considered before an assessment of itsapplicability can be readily made.

Night vision equipment actually saw its roots as early as the Second World War duringwhich special scopes were used with the illumination from infrared lamps. This capabilityallowed a special advantage as various night operations went on unhindered under thecover of darkness. However, the scopes that were used, then, were laboriously heavy andthe infrared lamps could be transported only aboard a vehicle. Eventually, the advantagethat had once been enjoyed was eroded by the enemy’s own discovery of the scope’stechnology. Not only did the infrared light sources give-away their positions, but its sheerimmobility especially against restricting terrain obstacles proved to be its biggestlimitation.

Thus evolved development of NVG’s that were capable of operating even underpassive lighting conditions, i.e. allowing the user to view in the dark using only ambientlight energy available. These first generation of NVG’s were mostly used in the 1960’sduring the Vietnam conflict.

Basically, the NVG gave the naked eye a glimpse of a poorly litobject by amplifying the little light energy in the ambient environmentinto a visible image. The gadget is useless under total darkness. Whathappens is a photo cathode in the NVG converts traces of light energyit captures into electrical energy. This electric charges are amplifiedthrough an electronic intensifier tube into magnitudes enough toproject an image in the phosphorescent screen. The image on thisscreen is, then, focused through an ocular lens which makes theimage visible to the user. Therefore, one does not actually “seethrough” an NVG but “looks at” a processed image.

Generation one NVG’s can be easily bought in the U.S. forpersonal use costing anywhere between Php 20,000 to Php 35,000.But the only NVG’s allowed, however, for military aviation purposesare the generation III types. Commonly referred to as either the AVS-9or F-4949, these goggles are more compact and amplify light moreeffectively. F-4949’s have been in use since the early 1990’s whichshould give us an idea of how adept its users are by now with itsoperation.

Pilots using F-4949’s are trained to adapt to the inherentlimitations of these devices. Images seen through an NVG is amonochromatic green (purposely so, as this is the color to which thehuman eye is most responsive). Users commonly expect acompromise in image clarity and sharpness granting that ambientlighting is no dimmer than at least one thousandth times a full-moonlitevening or that it is not totally dark.

The most debilitating handicaps, especially for pilots, are the limited field of vision(FOV) of the F-4949 which is confined to 40and the compromised perception of depth.Research is still underway to improve FOV to at least 100. But for now, pilots have tomake a continuous sweep from left to right in order that as wide a field is monitored aspossible.

As for the sense of depth, pilots are trained to make do with various visual “hints”they see by their goggles to judge distances. Landings are either performed with closecockpit crew coordination and an elaborate computer-aided landing approach system.Otherwise, a pilot is required to flip-up and turn-off his goggles and land by moreconventional visual aids.

The issue, then, as to whether the F-4949 currently in use by USAF are presentlyapplicable to PAF aircraft, more particularly the fighters, ultimately rests on theoperational compatibility of these devices with our aircraft cockpits. Various criteriaultimately point to at least two questions: 1) Are the cockpit lightings sufficient for thefighter to satisfactorily monitor his instruments and manage his cockpit?; and 2) is thecanopy transparent enough to allow the transmission of adequate infrared radiation to bepicked-up by the NVG?

The S-211, atleast,operateswith redinteriorlampswhich istypical ofall aircraftdesignedfor nightflying. Bydesign, thespectralrange F-4949’s is between 625 nanometers to 950 nanometers. Therefore, the imaging ofred-lit objects such as cockpit instruments should, at least, be no problem. Acomplication may perhaps may be the ISIS D211 sighting system whose targeting reticlemay either be invisible or produce unwanted glare to the NVG user. The latter, however, ismore likely and is, as a matter of fact, the lesser of these two evils if indeed nighttimeweapons delivery should actually be launched.

The second question, admittedly, cannot be as readily answered. Most canopies,though visually transparent, have been known to block of a good amount of infrared lighton which NVG’s are heavily dependent. Either our canopies be subjected to spectralevaluation or an actual NVG be directly tested on them at night.

Admittedly, this study alone cannot provide an over-night conclusion as towhether our fighters are ready to embrace NVG as part of their tactics. The device maynot provide the same impact as an on-board aircraft radar or a satellite-assistedsurveillance system as aspired under our modernization thrusts. However, its relativecost presents this gadget as a practical complementary measure, if not a stopgap, towardsimproving the PAF’s effectivity in accomplishing its mission.

REFERENCES:

1. Maj Stephen C. Hatley USAF. “NVG’s Don’t Fly at Night Without Them”. USAFFlying Safety Magazine, Sept 2001. pages 4-9.

2. http://www.night-vision-goggles.com

3. http://nightsee.com

A PREVIEW OF THE PAF WOMEN PILOTSBy 1LT LILIAN VICTORIA F DELA CRUZ PAF

In an apparent move to provide equal opportunity the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, opened its doors in the early 90s tofemale who wanted to become aviators.

To date, the Philippine Air Force has women pilots who are with the combat,instructor, rescue, tactical and transport fields. Since accepting female pilots into its fold,the number of female pilots in the Philippine Air Force continues to grow. Starting withonly two females in 1994, the Air Force now has a total of 25 female pilots since 2000.However, the figure has been trimmed down to 23 following the deaths of two females intragic accidents in 2001.

When the Philippine Air Force opened its doors for female pilots, it initially wantedthem to be involved with administrative and instruction flights. This explains why womenpilots from the fist two classes of the PAF Flying School that had women were assigned asinstructor pilots with the then 100th Training Wing.

It was only in December of 1996 that the Air Force welcomed female pilots into itsother flying units like the 220th Airlift Wing and the 505 Search and Rescue Group. Theyear after that, four out of the five female graduates of the PAF Flying School 97-Bravocarved history a new in the Philippine Air Force. The Air Force made an unprecedented

Move of allowing female pilots to join the 15th Strike Wing as combat pilots flying theMG520 attack helicopters and the OV10A bomber planes.

Recently, the 5th Fighter Wing made historywhen 2Lt Cecile Bernabe was accepted in thefighter jock’s kingdom as its first fighter pilot.

Studies within the Command have been madeto assess the feasibility of women pilots,particularly those who are being utilized as tacticalpilots.

For the female pioneers of the 15th Strike Wing,there was some apprehensions when they firstreported to the Wing in June 1998. they hadseveral questions in mind. Will they be able to seethrough their Combat Crew Training? Can they fitinto the bastion of the male combat pilots, whohave been for years been used to having only menin the 15th Strike Wing?

Their entry was actually well met as everything including combat flyingundergoes change and female pilot officers are now welcomed in the Wing.

Their entry was not about providing a point or making statement. They merelywanted to be treated as equals, like any other pilot trainee.

Then 2Lt Maribelle Belila and 2Lt Lilian dela Cruz were among the first of the fourwomen who initially saw deployment in Zamboanga after they were checked out as pilotsof the MD520MG helicopters in March 1999.

Lieutenants Mary Grace Baloyo and Ma Rita Reduta, meanwhile were checked outas Combat Ready Pilots of the OV-10A Bronco aircraft seven months later. Their firstdeployment was in Palawan.

Life, they believed, would never be easy as it involved tremendous adjustments. Ittook time before they saw deployment because modifications had to be made, particularlycomfort rooms in the deployment areas. But then these concerns were swiftly soonaddressed.

Following the modifications made to suit bothgenders, the female pilots are no longer restricted toone Advance Command Post (ACP). They have beenall over deployment areas in Mindanao-Cagayan deOro, Cotabato, Davao, Jolo, Palawan, Pulacan,Sanga-Sanga and Zamboanga.

They have also flown combat missions fromKauswagan to Camp Abubakar in 2000, during theheight of the Armed Forces campaign against theMoro Islamic Liberation Front.

In 2001, they were also actively involved in various military campaigns to thwartthe Abu Sayyaf Group.

FIRST FORCE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR

THE MALAMPAYA PROJECT2LT CHRISTOPHER ALLAN M MENDOZA PAF

The Malampaya gas fieldwas discovered by Shell PhilippinesExploration (SPEX) in 1992.However, it was not easily exploreddue to Shell Philippines Explorationservice contract with OccidentalPhilippines. Nonetheless, whenShell acquired the remaining fiftypercent (50%) of OccidentalPhilippines' interest in the servicecontract, it paved the way for thedevelopment of the MalampayaNatural Gas Project. The totalinvestment required in thedevelopment of the MalampayaProject amounted around US$4.5billion. This project represents thelargest and most significantindustrial investment in Philippinebusiness. With explorationsconfirming the presence of 85million barrels of condensate and atleast 2.5 trillion cubic feet of naturalgas, the operation of the project willsuccessfully supply gas availablefor power plant operations for thenext 20 years.

This is equivalent to 30% of the country's petroleum requirement for the sameperiod which will surely allow the government a savings of around US$4.5 Billion. On theother hand, the project will not only improve the country's energy requirement but it isalso expected to provide additional revenues in the amount of US$8.07 Billion. This isentirely based on a scheme where the government gets 60% of the total net proceeds asstipulated in the contract. In addition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines could alsobenefit from the Malampaya power project that will provide revenue stream for the defenseestablishment in line with its Modernization Program. A bill has been filed in Congressallocating to the AFP Trust Fund the share of the government from taxes and chargescollected from the Malampaya project.

However, a major consideration associated to Malampaya operation is the securityand protection of the area of operation specifically related facilities and platforms. In linewith this, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 72establishing safety and exclusion zones around the area of the Malampaya operation. Inaddition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines was mandated to undertake the necessarymeasures in the implementation and enforcement of the established safety and exclusionzones.

The establishments of safety and exclusion zones prohibit the conduct of certainactivities within the area without authorization from the Department of Energy (DOE), theDepartment of National Defense (DND) and Shell Philippines, respectively. Moreover, aninter-agency committee was established to develop comprehensive strategy and plan inthe effective implementation and enforcement of safety and exclusion zones. However, themain responsibility lies with the Armed Forces of the Philippines as mandated by thePresident and as beingthe defense force in thecountry.

The securityrequirements by theoperation of theMalampaya Natural GasProject in the establishedsafety and exclusionzones demand control ofthe air spaces, surfaceand sub-surface in thearea in order to deterhostile intrusion. Theconcept of a joint securityforce will cover areas ofpossible threat and will bestationed near the facilities and platforms. Likewise, regular naval patrol and maritime airsurveillance will be provided in the safety zones and adjacent exclusion areas.Undeniably, the western area of the Malampaya station, which is an international sea-lanecommunication, is vulnerable to covert intrusion in any form of attack. Furthermore, theongoing activities near the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) pose another peril in the securityof the Malampaya operation. Worst, is the intensified terroristic activities deeply involvedin economic saboteurs such as the recent attack of World Trade Center and thedestruction of Brazil's oil rig.

The estimated Hydrocarbon deposits broken down as oil is about 1.748 billionbarrels (US$26.220 Trillion) and as gas approximately 16,766 billion cubic feet (US$46Billion). Hence, security must be provided for unhampered exploration. The Philippine AirForce has the primary concern of securing the country's outer zone of defense thatinvolves active air defense. However, in the light of the Malampaya operation, there arestill important aspects of air power application aside from tactical operations such assearch and rescue missions, airlift operations, counter air operations, close air supportand interdiction. Certainly, the development of air power as the primary defense postureof the country has limited its application in the internal security operations.

Today, the Philippine Air Force struggles a strategic shift in the employment of airpower capability towards external defense. The role of air power is inherently associatedin the preservation of our national security and territorial integrity. The current securityrequirement of the Malampaya Gas Project illustrates the necessity of paradigmatic shiftfrom internal concerns to external concerns. Indeed, the project is situated at a strategicdoorway - characteristically adjacent to a critical area of sea-lane of communication andtransportation.

Though limited in resources and capability, the PAF continue to provide air assetscommitted in securing the Malampaya area in performing maritime patrols.

The serious issue regarding the limitedcapability of the PAF to provide effective securityfor the Malampaya needs to be addressed by theNational Government and Congress through theimmediate acquisition of modern equipment.Moreover, the AFP must fully realize theimportance of air power application as the vitalcog of our national defense posture. In the globalscene, the current war against terrorism waged bythe United States against Afghanistan affirms thedecisiveness of air power application in thesettlement of modern armed conflict. Moreover,the painful and costly lessons of history duringWorld War I and II, Korean War, Bosnian War andthe Gulf War attested to the success of air power.The outbreak of war in Mindanao tailored by thesecessionists group confirmed the airworthiness

of the PAF roles as an independent and distinct force in the suppression of enemy forces.

In conclusion, the Philippine Air Force defines air power encompassing bothmilitary and economic endeavor. As a result, the PAF addresses both internal and externaldefense and serves as the partner of the government in national development efforts.Now, it's about time for the government to look for alternative sources of funds toimplement the PAF Modernization Program to address in particular the Malampaya projectand in general the Philippine sovereignty.

1 SPEX, "Malampaya Deep Water to Gas Project Brochures and Pamphlets", p. 3

2 Department of Energy and US DNR Technical Assistant Division

VIP FLYING IN AN UNFRIENDLY ENVIRONMENT

BY CPT DANIEL M ESPIRITU PAF

FLYING THE PRESIDENT INTO THE HEART OF SIERRA MADRE AND THE CORDILLERA’S

Flying the highest figure in the landis the job of the pilots and crew of the250th Presidential Airlift Wing. It is thePresident’s thrust to personally assess theneeds of the least privileged Filipinopeople in the most remote part of thecountry. This intention sometimes doesnot give much options to the presidentialpilots especially in flying to a place withprobably the most unfriendlyenvironmental condition in thearchipelago.

The unit’s mission is; “to provide safe, secure and effective air transportation tothe President of the Republic of the Philippines, immediate members of his/her family,visiting heads of state and other local and foreign VVIP’s”. Flying the President requiresthe highest degree of safety, the ultimate achievable comfort, and maximum security. Thisis the very reason why the original word “efficient” is changed to “effective” in the 250th

PAW mission statement although it has been the usual word for several years. It is mainlybecause the word effective justifies the unit’s firm stand in mission accomplishment.Although to be effective and to be efficient is at the same time the primary consideration,efficiency can be traded off to effectiveness if the situation requires so. A firm stand thatexplains the doctrine of conducting ocular inspection and probing flight prior to the realMcCoy.

Ocular inspection on the planning aspect of a presidential engagement is a generalassessment of all the landing zones (LZs) and surrounding environment on intendedplaces of engagement. It covers selection and clearing of the safest and widest LZ,determination of fuel requirements based on the actual nature of LZs and other aspectsessential to flight planning and performance of the mission. The inspection might be doneby land or by air possibly involving a non-250 PAW air asset. On the other hand, probingflight is done to determine the actual time en route, to check suitability of LZs and toconfirm if recommendations during the ocular inspection regarding improvement of thechosen landing spots have been done accurately. The flight requires the use of the sametype of aircraft to be used on the real McCoy. This procedure on VVIP flying obviouslyinvolve extra efforts and additional resources to the extent of considering “back-ups to theback-up” but it guarantees the unit with 101% successful mission accomplishment. Therecent visit of the President in the mountainous regions of Northern Luzon was indeed agreat challenge on the part of the 250th PAW, but with the employment of the right doctrineand with the unlimited tactics and skills of the Presidential pilots, the mission is a clearsuccess.

TACTICS WILL COME ALONG AS SITUATION CALLS

In the world of reality, there are times that even the most ideal doctrine can neverbe employed. This is proven consistent in the field of helicopter flying wherein terrain,weather condition, time constraint, limited resources, security situation, otherenvironmental factors are the most likely the common causes.

It was timed with most unpredictable trend of weather when the visit of thePresident took place in the rugged terrains of Sierra Madre and the Cordillieras from 29December 2001 to 11 January 2002. The visit covered the provinces of Benguet, IlocosSur, Abra, Ifugao, Kalinga and the Pacific side of Isabela. It was on this pressing timewhen the Bluebirds, without intent, have overridden the ideal procedure in VIP flyingwhich calls for the formulation of a tactical approach in VIP flying called, “the Round-Robin maneuver”.

WHEN THE LESSER EVIL IS THE LAST OPTION

(THE ROUND-ROBIN MANEUVER)

In situations very far from the ideal, usually the flight commander is being pressedto the wall and made to choose the lesser evil as the last option. However, it should be anoption that still could guarantee safe and successful mission accomplishment. The post-christmas Sierra Madre- Cordillera presidential mission is a scenario wherein the Round-robin maneuver is best applicable.

This new tactic in VIP flying “the round-robin maneuver”, isespecially suited for mountainousregions as best described by therugged terrain, high pinnacles andnarrow ridges of the Sierra Madre andthe Cordillera. It is a maneuveremployed in multiple helicopteroperation that rotates the members ofthe flight in the sequence of take offsand landings in areas of limited space.In this scenario the other members of the flight drop their passengers at the primary LZbefore proceeding to the alternate LZ. The primary aircraft and the last aircraft to land willoccupy the primary LZ. The Round-robin maneuver does not cater only to space-limitedLZ’s, but it also increases the leverage in fuel reserve and lessen the airborne exposure ofthe VIP since it significantly reduces en route and loiter time. It also satisfies theconsideration that the back-up aircraft (“B”) should always be at the side or nearest to theprimary aircraft (“A”), either airborne or on the ground, due to its role as back-up andsecurity aircraft.

By protocol, in multiple helicopter operation, the primary aircraft (“A”) lands first,followed by the back-up aircraft (“B”) carrying close-in-security personnel, then thesecondary aircraft (“C”), followed by the tertiary (“D”) etc. Oftentimes protocol in thesequence of landing is being waived in space-limited LZ’s. However, the proximity of “B”

to the primary aircraft must never be waived as much as possible due to its securityfunction.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

Definition:

Primary aircraft - aircraft that carries the VVIP designated as “A”.

Back-up aircraft – back up to the primary aircraft that carries close in and SRU(Special Reaction Unit, PSG) personnel designated as “B”.

Secondary/Tertiary aircraft - back-up to the back-up aircraft that carries other VIPsdesignated as “C”, “D” etc. They will be rotated to act as “B” on the round-robin concept.

Primary LZ – landing zone and parking position for the primary aircraft while theVVIP is in the place of engagement. It must be on or near the place ofengagement.

Alternate LZ – alternate landing spot and parking position for other members of theflight after dropping their passengers at the primary LZ in mountainous areaswherein there is no access for land vehicle to the primary LZ.

From the first departure point to the first itinerary, with a primary LZ that can onlyaccommodate two or only one aircraft, C, D, etc. should take off ahead of A and B to avoidslowing down of A and B prior to landing. This technique will give enough time for C, D, Eetc. To drop passengers at the primary LZ (wherein “A” and “B” will later make full stoplanding) before proceeding to the alternate LZ. It also allows C, D, E, etc. To makeadvance route and weather recon for the primary and the back-up aircraft. It furtherfacilitates the role of other VIPs with the flight, like military commanders and local officialswho are designated to receive the President on site.

During the takeoff to the seconditinerary, A and B musttake off first so that C, D,E, etc. can pick-up theirassigned passengers atthe primary LZ. Uponcompleting engine start,C, D, E etc. shallairborne immediatelyand make a “pattern”along the final approachof the pick-up zone.After take off, B followedby A, will then proceedand land ahead on the

next LZ. After unloading its passengers, B must transfer to the alternate LZ, providingspace for C, D, E, etc. to drop their passengers before they transfer to the alternate LZ.This time, the last aircraft to land will make full stop and occupy the space at the side ofthe primary aircraft and then become the new back-up aircraft. The new “B” shall nowswitch function and callsign with the original back up. In short, the proximity of an aircraft

to the primary aircraft will determine which aircraft will serve as the new back up that willtake effect as soon as all aircraft have landed. Posting of placards beside each aircraft asenlarged manifest will solve possible complications in loading for the next itinerary. Sameseries of procedure shall be applied to the succeeding itineraries.

Employment of the Round-robin concept will provide significant maneuveringflexibility and considerably reduce en route and loiter time. In the sense, it lessens fuelload requirement thereby increasing the much needed engine power available for a safehigh altitude and confined landing. Furthermore, this maneuver reduces the exposure ofthe President to unnecessary risks when airborne in such mountainous areas ofoperation.

COUNTERING TERRORISM:AIR COMMANDO AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS

CPT OTTO THOMAS AM PACIA

HISTORY AND PROFILE

According to Rudolf Levy in a manual for Crisis Management (1978), terrorism isnot a new phenomena; its use for various reasons has been practiced for many centuries.History and legends have shown that terrorism with guerilla warfare and hostagestrategies have been in use with varied degrees of success practically since the beginningof the history of man. As early as 512 BC, military leader Darius was defeated by guerillaactivity by the native Scithians. Alexander the Great was known to devise specialstrategies to combat terrorism and guerilla activities. The Roman Empire has its problemswith continued subversive activities and terrorism. Since the invention of gunpowder andwith it the firearm, the bomb and the booby-trap, terrorism has become a sophisticatedtactic used together with military operations often used as a political tool. Terrorism hasundergone a series of reorganizations and redefinitions.

TERMS:

Terrorism – the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals,often political or ideological in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation or coercion. Itusually involves a criminal act often symbolic in nature and intended to influence anaudience beyond the immediate victims. A systematic use of terror especially as a meansof coercion.

Anti-terrorism – preventive measures taken to reduce the probability of a terrorist actoccurring.

Counter terrorism – are offensive reactive measures taken to respond to terrorist actsincluding gathering of information, and threat analysis.

Crisis Management Teams – concerned with the plans, policies. procedures, techniques,and controls for dealing sudden violent acts of terrorism.

Special Operations – are actions conducted by specially trained organized, and equippedmilitary and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychologicalobjectives by non-conventional means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas.

Commando – a military unit trained and organized as shock troops especially for hit andrun raids into an enemy territory.

Proactive – plan of action ahead of time.

A contemporary terrorist very seldom acts on his own, he belongs to a group or anorganization, is motivated by some sort of political philosophy and in all cases embracessome cause. There is, in most cases a theoretical – political or religious program ofmotivation to justify the existence and the tactics of the organization. The present terroristorganizations in most cases have capable leadership, professionally trained in the art ofscience of the “fifth column” warfare.

In many cases these terrorist or guerilla organizations serve as fronts for otherpolitical or foreign which may not wish to be directly identified with the particularterrorist activity or cause.

Today’s terrorist/guerilla activities are generally identified within four basiccategories:

1. Nationalistic Movement. Fight for independence from foreign domination,freedom movements and self determination movements.

2. Right Wing. Since the end of World War II, there have been a number of rightwing organizations here and abroad. However, the use of terrorism against thegeneral population has not been used extensively. Normally the right wingterrorism is directed at a particular group of people. In many cases the rightwing ideology is further identified with Nationalist Movements.

3. Left Wing. A survey of world terrorist activities has produced a proof thatmost of the terrorist activities are directly identified with left wingorganizations and communist international movements. Fundamentalists/Extremist/Separatist – In a guise of promoting religious beliefs and ideology,this group has ingrained within their offspring the world of violence andmachismo.

Terrorist activity is aimed at the general population by which the terroristorganization seeks to influence or destroy the established system. Terrorist acts havea direct influence on the social structure; it erodes the trust in the established socialsystem and fosters insecurity among the people, showing that their presentgovernment is inept in the matters of security and cannot defend them or provideadequate protection.

PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST

In combating terrorism, we must first of all get into a terrorist’ mind. We mustdetermine who they are, what their motives are and how would they possibly accomplishtheir indoctrinated threat to our society. Since terrorism has not only been a localizedissue, it has garnered greater perspective in civil society when the World Trade Center hasbeen hit twice through the use of an aircraft.

A terrorist could be categorized as Crazy, a Criminal or a Crusader. Today’s terroristhas probably had training in the use of weapons, explosives, booby-traps, small groupfighting, as well as in the specialized tactics of hijacking (sea jacking), assassinations andkidnapping. The terrorists receive these instructions together with political andideological indoctrination at training camps in Libya, South Yemen, North Korea, Russia,Cuba, Afghanistan and a number of other places. Today’s terrorism is internationalizedand the Socialist World Organization is supporting the terrorist movements with theirtrained leaders, advisers, and monetary support. The terrorist groups operate throughoutthe world with continuous contact with the “Mother Organization”.

CRISIS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Shown below is the crisis conceptual framework base on the DND-AFP CRISISMANAGEMENT DOCTRINE: The Proactive Stage includes the following: Prediction (ThreatAnalysis); Prevention (Operation Security, Personnel Security and Physical Security);Preparation (Planning, Organizing, Training, Equipping, Maintaining Readiness). Once acrisis situation erupts, reactive stage starts. It includes the following: Implementation ofthe Contingency Plan, Initial Action, Action, then either Negotiation or Tactical ActionIntervention then finally Post Action.

PROACTIVE ACTIVE REACTIVE

Prediction

Prevention

Preparation

IMPLAN ofContingencyPlan

Initial Action

Action

-Negotiation

-Tactical Action

Preparation

andSubmission ofPOR

CRISIS ACTION PLAN

Military units must have a Crisis Management Action Plan to enable them to reactin cases when crisis incidents occur. Generally military commanders plan, organize, train,equip and maintain operational readiness. They must organize negotiation, operations,service support and a public affairs group. They will provide procedures for theirimmediate activation when the need arises.

Once a situation arises, we simply cannot be caught flatfooted. The MOVE,SHOOT, COMMUNICATE, SEE and other prerequisites are being addressed to as of thiswriting. And since we do have an effective, potent and readily deployable force to conductcounter terrorist operations and other types of special operations throughout the country,training must be sustained to sharpen further our S5 (SKILL, SPEED, STRENGTH,STAMINA and STABILITY). The Air Force’s Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) are alreadycapable of the following: conducting hostage rescue operation involving group ofhostages, particularly in urban and rural settings; be deployed within short noticeanywhere in the country; conduct special operations and infiltrate or exfiltrate by air andland.

Currently, the need to develop and fine tune our anti-hijacking capability is a mustin the next two to three years which must be addressed to. The desired modern andsophisticated equipage is not a “nice to have” thing but necessary tools to accomplishour mission which is to neutralize terrorists. We must likewise have real time intelligenceonce a crisis is there.

Countering terrorism is to foresight the worst possible scenarios of terrorism likebiological and chemical warfare, suicide bombers, and other means of creating trouble.This we have been preparing for. But one message remains the same and that on our endour will to fight these threats couldn’t be eroded for we have the sincere and dedicatedpeople who will give trouble makers what they deserve.

References:

Crisis Management for US Marshall (1978)

Info kit on the Course on Internal Armed Conflict (NDCP)

Update on the Trends of Terrorism (OA-2)

DND-AFP Crisis Management Doctrine

THE 205TH TACTICALHELICOPTER WING ON THEECONOMY OF FORCE

1LT JASON T BUERANO PAF

From a distance they look like birds flying in flocks darkening the skies, but asthey come closer, you will see not birds, but a dozen UH-1H (Huey) helicopters gallantlyflying in formation, off to perform a single mission. But those golden days of the “Hueys”in the 1980’s have long gone. The drastic decrease of UH-1H helicopters in the earlynineties attributed to its aging frame and the difficulty in the availability of its vitalcomponents slowly depleted the number of the Huey helicopters in the Air Forceinventory. The 205th Tactical Helicopter Wing being the home of the Hey, adapted with thesituation and made a good strategy in the deployment of the remaining twenty three (23)UH-1H in their fleet. With the AFP’s need of utility helicopters to carry personnel andlogistics and to bring them to places where other means of transportation cannot reachand fix-wing aircraft cannot land, the 205th THW is indeed facing a great challenge inaccomplishing its mission of conducting Tactical Air Operation to support AFP forces andperform socio-economic flights to support the government in nation building.

With limited air assets and logistics to support the operation of eight (8) ArmyDivisions and Three (3) Marine Brigades and with more than 7,100 islands to cover, thetask seems difficult to meet. Thus, 205th THW have come to economize the use of itsassets by strategically deploying them parallel with the AFP’s ground forces distributionand in a manner in which each of them can promptly support the other in cases where agreater number of Hueys are needed. This in turn maximizes the use of our remainingassets in answering all needs. Current situations in Mindanao where massive troopsdeployment has been going on, have resulted in three (3) Army Divisions and three (3)Marine Brigades simultaneously conducting sustained combat operations to end thelawless activities of the Abu-Sayaff Group, the need for Huey helicopters increases in thisarea. Reacting on this matter, the 205th THW sent an additional three (3) more aircraft fromthe Visayas to augment this need, thus the total number of Huey helicopters in the southwas increased to ten (10). This ,means that the 205th THW is in the position of providingthe best that it can in areas where it is needed most, but at the same time, not under-estimating the situation on secondary targets by deploying five (5) aircraft in Luzon, two(2) in Palawan and six (6) in Visayas.

The PAF, sensing the greater need for Utility Helicopter has come to acquire anadditional five (5) UH-1H helicopters through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and madea program to upgrade and recover more Huey helicopters from the 410th MaintenanceWing storage. The arrival of five (5) UH-1H helicopters from the EDA will strengthen the205th THW capability. With a total of twenty-eight (28) Huey helicopters now under ourinventory, we are able to provide better service to the AFP and Country. In line with theground troops disposition, 205th THW is planning to deploy the 28 aircraft in the followingdistribution.

LOCATION UNIT NO OF ACFT AFP GROUND FORCESDISTRIBUTION

LUZON

CJVAB

TARLAC

LUCENA

CAUAYAN

PALAWAN

207TH THS 8

2

1

2

1

2

Three (3) Army Division

VISAYAS

ILOILO

BACOLOD

TACLOBAN

MBEAB

208TH THS

210TH

210TH/208TH

8

2

2

2

1/1

Two (2) Army Division

MINDANAO

CAGAYAN DE ORO

DAVAO

COTABATO

JOLO

ZAMBOANGA

208TH

206TH

206TH/208TH

12

2

2

2

2

3/1TOTAL 28

The integration of the newly acquired five (5) UH-1H helicopters and thecompletion of the ongoing Huey upgrading and recovery at 410th MW combined with theexcellent managerial expertise of our Commanders, the 205th THW will soon bounce backto its golden years; a Wing accomplishments, a force to reckon with and a partner innation building, provider of faster and better services to the nation

TThhee CChhiieeff

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BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE L REYES O-6444 AFP is a distinguished member of thePhilippine Military Academy Class of 1973. He is also a graduate of various local andinternational courses such as Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering, Master in NationalSecurity Administration, Safety Officer Course and Squadron Officer Course in Maxwell,Alabama, USA. He was a recipient of the Distinguished Graduate Award for exemplaryperformance when he completed his Defense Management Course in 1984 and CGSC in1993, respectively. Further, he attended several seminars such as InternationalHumanitarian Law, Visiting Forces Agreement, UNCLOS, Conflict Resolution and DisasterManagement to name a few.

A well-experienced pilot and bemedalled officer, BGEN REYES held numerouscommand and staff positions both in the Air Force and the AFP. His career is ripened withnumerous field assignments and combat experience from the northernmost to thesouthernmost part of the country. Among them were as Chief for Plans and Program (L-5),AFP LOGCOM, Director, DME (A-6), Commander, CASF 10, Director for Operations, 15th

SW, Chief, Division Staff, 3AD, Commander, Task group Valentine, Commandant of PAFFlying School, Secretary Joint Staff, GHQ AFP and Chief of Operations (A-3).

In his previous position as Secretary Joint Staff, he made remarkable GHQ Staff actions.And as Chief of Operations (A-3), he outstandingly pushed up operational readinessposting the highest OR rates of PAF air assets.

He assumed the position as Chief of Air Staff last 01 December 2000, succeeding BGENLamberto E Sillona. He is concurrently the Chairman of various PAF boards and SpecialCommittees. He is also an Ex-officio member of the PAF Modernization Board and Vice-Chairman of the PAF Doctrine Board, respectively. He is the youngest General in thewhole AFP today. His friends and classmates dub him as the "Epitome of Excellence".

Q. How do you see your role as the Chief of Air Staff in the overall operations of thePhilippine Air Force today?

A. Basically, the role of the Chief of Air Staff remains the same as it was before, thatis, primarily to supervise, direct, coordinate and orchestrate the work (not the staffofficers) of the coordinating and special staffs in order to carry out the CG, PAF’sintentions. There are also times that I decide within the level entrusted by the CG. Onenotable change now, is that the operations of the PAF have become a bit complex dueto the advent of additional roles the Air Force has portrayed for the last few years.CMO, Sports, Special Operations, Rescue and other socio-economic activities allrelated to nation building have taken larger roles in the PAF’s overall operations. Withmore roles to perform amid limited assets and resources, we have to make do on whatwe have.

Q. How do you relate your present position with your previous positions both in theheadquarters and in the field?

A. The position of CAS compels me to view things on a macro level. I am nowdirectly involved in the wider scope of decision-making with the end view of attainingwhat is good for the whole Air Force and not just for a single unit in particular. Youhave to see the bigger picture first before casting your share in top-level decisionmaking or policy making. Unlike in the field where all you have to do is focus inaccomplishing your unit’s mission, here at HPAF as CAS, you have to deal with a lot ofvariables to be able to satisfy the PAF needs in its entirety.

Q. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo stressed the importance of the AFP doctrinesin her speech during the AFP Anniversary (Dec 2001), as the Chief of Air Staff, how doyou see your role in the doctrine development of the PAF?

A. As Vice-Chairman, PAF Doctrine Board and an Ex-Officio Member of the PAFModernization Board, it is but fitting that I assume an active role in the doctrinedevelopment of the PAF. Doctrine Development stands as one of the maincomponents of PAF Modernization. As such, the PAF Doctrine Board and its sub-committees are assured of my full support in the furtherance of appropriate doctrinesfor the PAF. In fact, I was the advocate of the Night Surface Attack Doctrine and theSpecial Operations Training Doctrine at 15th Strike Wing wherein we have introducedthe use of new tactics for the OV-10 aircraft to further increase its effectiveness incombat. Lately, the reconfiguration of the SF-260TP into a light attack mode which Ihave fully supported, hence a formulation of new applicable doctrine, is anothermanifestation of my commitment to this field. I firmly believe that continuous doctrinedevelopment is one area that should be given more focus for salient reasons thatcannot be overemphasized.

Q. As Head and Members of various boards/committees in the Air Force, what isyour perception on the PAF Modernization priorities?

A. We have to be very realistic in setting up our priorities. What do we urgentlyneed and what resources are available? We should be aware of the present economiccondition of the country and from there; we can gauge on how far we can go. Thequestion is: do we have enough funds for the multi-million dollar priority list? If thiscould not be realizable within the next 5 years or so, then we have to reprioritize andopt for the attainable ones. We need modern equipment suited for current operationsand near future situation, i.e. ISO, maritime patrol, transnational & terrorists threatsamong others.

Q. What are your future plans both in your career and your leadership in units ofPAF and AFP?

A. Life and career is a journey. It is a journey through rough and sometimessmooth roads. Of my 33 years in the service, I have traversed a lot of those roads andperhaps lucky enough to be a survivor. I don’t have any specific plans for theremaining 5 years of my career. What I have are broad ones. My personal outlook is towork the hardest and give my best shot on every assignment entrusted to me. Oneshould not expect rewards, promotions, recognition or any form of accolades in doingthings for he might get deeply frustrated. If you get recognize for a job well done, it'sfine; if not, fine too. The idea is to go on positively come what may…anyway it is goodfor your heart.