Air defence identification zone: Japanese national threat perception of a rising China

Methods and Research Practice Paper

Air defence identification zone: Japanese national threat

perception of a rising China

Telli Diallo

s 1815946

20 June 2014

Word count: 7143

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Table of contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………….. 3

Chapter 1 –Theoretical framework……………………………………………… 5

Chapter 2- Case Study ADIZ……………………………………………………. 9

-2.1- Japan’s Perceptions and Response to China’s Rise…………………………11

Chapter 3 The U.S as a balancing Nation………………………………………… 17

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..18

Appendix…………………………………………………………………………….. 20

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………… 21

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Introduction

China has undergone a transformative economic development in

the last three decades, ascending from an impoverished third

world country to the second largest economy in the dominant

capitalist system of the post Cold War period. This spectacular

economic rise has not only aroused admiration rather it has

conjured scepticism and suspicion among certain scholars of

international relations and policy-makers. These pessimists

regard the re-emergence of China as a potential hegemon in East

Asia as a threat to the international order, disbelieving the

Chinese leadership’s declaration of pursuing a peaceful rise.

The United States and her allies in Asia, in particular Japan,

figure prominently among the core sceptic group wary of the

Chinese intentions. They point to the growing assertiveness of

China in unilaterally making usurious claims regarding the East

and South China Seas and the corresponding Air Defence

Identification Zone (ADIZ). This paper aims at analyzing the

extent of the Japanese national security threat perception

associated with the rise of China. Much has already been

written about the rise of China and its implications for the3

world at large in general and the East Asia region in

particular. I intend to analyze the rise of China from a

Japanese perspective due to Japan’s economic status in the

region, and the pivotal role it plays in the three-pronged

strategy pursued by the more vocal and activists leaders of

East Asian countries: (1) maintain US preponderance by

facilitating its continued forward military presence in East

Asia and its strategic dominance globally; (2) socialize and

integrate China peacefully into the East Asian security order

as a responsible regional Great Power; and (3) cultivate

regionalism as the basis for a putative security community that

can ensure peace in the long run. 1 Furthermore Japanese

perspective is even more interesting because the security

treaty between the U.S and Japan furnishes the United States

with a compelling and legal raison d’être for a very

significant military presence in the region.2 In scrutinizing

the level of threat to the Japan national security associated

with the rise of China, this paper will endeavour to constrict

the academic debate focalising solely on the military

preparedness of Japan in the event of an escalation involving

China and the probability for the United States to be embroiled

in a confrontation between China and Japan.

1 Evelyn Goh, “How Japan Matters in the Evolving East Asian Security Order,” International Affairs vol. 87, no.4(2001): 888.2 Idem: 888.

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The paper is broadly subdivided in three sections starting with

a theoretical framework section that will introduce the

theories and guiding concepts through which I intend to analyze

the security threat to the Japanese national security. This

section is briefly followed by a single case study describing

the core issue of contention between China and Japan, serving

as a bridge between the theoretical framework and the second

chapter of the paper dealing with the Japanese perceptions of

and responses to China’s rise. This second chapter thus

concentrates on the internal balancing efforts of the Japanese

government namely the military preparedness of Japan will

generally be of a more comparative nature by using a

quantitative approach to equate the militaries of our two

antagonists. Variables such as Gross Domestic Product, funding

for the armed forces and military capabilities are used to

depict a balance of power between Japan and China. The final

chapter focuses on the role of the United States as an extra-

regional balancing power in East Asia. This part will rely

mostly on the US-Japan Security Treaty. It is more qualitative

in nature as this part of the paper is contingent upon formal

declarations and a US centred security alliance. It deals with

the second sub-question of this paper relating to the

probability of the embroilment of the United States in a

conflict between Japan and China. The external balancing

section is thus a complementary part to the Japanese internal

balancing efforts in hedging against the incremental

assertiveness of China by adding a qualitative approach flavour

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to an overarching quantitative approach based on a comparison

of military capabilities.

The main argument of this paper is that although an overt

confrontation between Japan and China is highly improbable due

to a mutual economic interdependence, an incremental Chinese

assertiveness in the East China Sea compounded by a Japanese

fear of military entrapment or a US abandonment in light of an

increasing Sino-American economic interdependence and declining

US global power, Japan will seek to adopt a more independent

security posture by upgrading its military capabilities,

increasing its military budget and diminishing its overreliance

on the US to guarantee its national security. This independent

Japanese posture does not necessarily lead to a confrontation

or war between Japan and China as both countries are highly

interdependent economically.

Theoretical framework

In this section of the paper I will provide an elaborate

description of the various strands of structural realism or

neorealism. It is more appropriate to start with a general

classification before we start delving into the offensive-

defensive dichotomy of structural realism. Kenneth Waltz is

regarded as the founding father of structural realism or

neorealism as he endeavoured to transform classical realism

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into a scientific theory with the publication of his

influential book Theory of International Politics in 1979. Whereas

classical realists emphasized human nature as the cause of the

continuous struggle for power, structural realism points to the

anarchical nature of the international system as the reason for

security competition and inter-state conflict. The concept of

anarchy, which is central in structural realism, refers to the

lack of an predominating authority above states. This means

that states have no authority above them at the international

level that can mediate among them or guarantee their security

as it is the case within a nation-state where a state has

sovereignty or simply the ability to make binding rules within

its own territory. At the international level there is no

authority higher than the state that can subjugate the state

into behaving in a certain way or refraining from acting in

another way. This lack of a central authority at the

international level is the predominant cause of the security

dilemma since states have to guarantee their own security and

survival. In order to guarantee its own security and survival,

a state is pressured to increase its defensive capacities in

order to repel aggression from other states thereby forcing

other states also to increase their capacities as a response to

the former state relative power increase. The distribution of

power or capabilities is one of the variables that structural

realists accentuate besides the anarchical nature of the

international system as shaping international outcomes such as

war and peace, alliance politics and the balance of power. As

mentioned above, Kenneth Waltz, the founder of structural

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realism, is widely classified as a defensive realist and those

writing explicitly as defensive realists claim his lineage.3

The offensive realism strand of structural realism is proudly

represented by John J. Mearsheimer who has explicitly set up

offensive realism in opposition to Waltz’s work, which he

considers the structural umbrella of defensive realism as a

whole.4

Structural realism diverged from classical realism by

emphasizing the anarchic nature of the international system and

the distribution of power between the composing units. Although

the neorealist theory is broadly based on the same core

assumptions of a state-centred, security-seeking actors in an

anarchic system, we can further subdivide this theory into two

strands with diverging views regarding the extent to which

states are bent on either maximizing their power relative to

others or just seeking enough power to guarantee their

survival. The power-maximizing strand of structural realism is

the one pioneered by John Mearsheimer. In general, offensive

realism is more pessimistic than defensive realism and claims

that anarchy provides strong incentives for expansion. This

theory affirms that all States strive to maximize their power

relative to other States because only the most powerful States3 Eric J. Hamilton and Brian C. Rathburn, “Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Defensive and Offensive Realism,” Security Studies vol.22, no.3 (August 2013): 441.4 Ibid: 441.

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can guarantee their survival.5 Anarchy is thus seen as a

determining variable pushing a state to adopt an expansionist

policy in circumstances where the benefits outweigh the costs

and perpetually seeking to increase their power relative to

other states. Offensive realism does not take into account the

intentions of States whether they are benevolent or malign and

only consider the relative distribution of power between

states. We can conclude from this reasoning that offensive

realism sees the world as a dangerous place and not as a place

where states are simply competing for power. If a state fails

to keep up and increase its power relatively to that of other

states, it stands the chance of being overrun by a more

powerful State. The pursuit of power is according to the

offensive realism strand a zero-sum game competition.

Defensive realism on the other hand is less pessimistic in its

assumptions over the driving forces behind a State pursuit of

power. Although both strands share a commonality of their

assumptions, being that both are part of the structural realism

paradigm, defensive realism differs markedly from offensive

realism by taking into account the intentions of States whether

they are benevolent or maleficent towards other states.

Defensive realism holds that the international system provides

incentives for expansion only under certain circumstances.6

Defensive realism places a greater emphasis on the security

dilemma than does offensive realism. It contends that the

5 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Seeking Security Under Anarchy:Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security vol.25, no.3(Winter 2000/01):128.6 Ibid:129.

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pursuit of power maximization will inadvertently push other

states also to increase their power which will lead to an arms

race of military capacity build-up. In contrast to offensive

realism that sees power maximization as the means to achieve an

end, defensive realism suggests that states ought to generally

pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security.7

Moderation is deemed prudent as an increase of power to

guarantee the security and survival of the state may produce

for instance the unintended outcome of an arms race. Defensive

realism presents a slightly more optimistic view of

international politics in which States strive to maximize

relative security, not relative power.8 The primal difference

between offensive and defensive realism relates to the amount

of power necessary to guarantee a state survival. Offensive

realism claims that there is no limit to the amount of power a

state can strive to attain as the maximization of power is the

essential guarantor of the survival of a state in the anarchic

realm of international politics. Defensive realism refutes this

assumption by claiming that a power-maximization policy will

trigger the security dilemma mechanism leading the lagging

states to pursue a more hawkish policy with the objective of

also increasing their power relative to other states. Defensive

realism cautions against power-maximization as it decreases the

security of the power-maximizing states rather than increasing

their level of security. According to offensive realism, states

7 Ibid:129.8 Eric J. Hamilton and Brian C. Rathburn, “Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Defensive and Offensive Realism,” Security Studies vol.22, no.3 (August 2013):443.

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must strive to maximize their security by seeking just enough

power to repel aggression and not too much to ignite balancing

efforts from other states.

Since my intention with this paper is to analyze the extent of

the Japanese national security threat perception associated

with the rise of China, it is essential to draw a general

distinction between neorealism and neoclassical realism on one

part and balance of power versus balance of threat theory on

the other. The distinction between neorealism and neoclassical

realism lie in on the phenomena each seeks to explain with

neorealism pertaining to international outcomes such as the

likelihood of hegemonic war while neoclassical realism seeks to

explain why different states or even the same state at

different times pursue particular strategies in the

international arena.9 As this distinction clarifies, we can

thus affirm that neorealism is concerned more with abstract

phenomena at the international level of analysis or systemic

analysis while neoclassical realism deals with state level

analysis such as the foreign policy or military doctrines

pursued by an individual state. As the research question

indicates, this paper is concerned with an analysis that falls

within neoclassical realism’s purview. The second distinction

that we need to make is whether states essentially balance

against a relative increase of power of other states or do they

balance only against those states that they consider to form a

threat to their own security and survival. This is the balance9 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. “Seeking Security Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security vol.25, no.3 (Winter 2000/01): :133.

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of power-balance of threat dichotomy. Balance of power theory

was developed by Kenneth Waltz and argues that states will

balance against an increase of power of other states. The

balance of power theory can be illustrated by the balancing

coalitions formed during the Napoleonic Wars by various

countries to counter the hegemonic ambitions of the French

Empire. The coalitions were not formed solely to counter a

threat in particular but more generally on the overwhelming

military preponderance of the French army. The purpose of

state balancing is to “reduce or match the capabilities of a

powerful state or threatening actor” which can be further

subdivided into internal, referring to a build-up of military

capabilities and external balancing which relates to the

formation, maintenance, and development of formal alliances.10

Moreover balance of power theory maintains that the balancing

nations always aligned themselves to the weaker side with the

aim of checking the growing power of the stronger side. The

reasoning behind this alignment was that the contributions of

the weaker states were more valuable primary by joining the

counterbalancing forces coupled with the fact that those states

that were deemed weaker had much to fear from the growing power

of those nations against which they were balancing. From this

we can conclude that in the present North-eastern Asian region,

many states would be aligning themselves with for instance

China to balance against the dominant US power and influence in

the region. Since this is not what we are observing in

10 Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, “Japan’s Shifting MilitaryPriorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise,” Asian Security vol.10, no. 1 (2014):3.

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Northeast Asia, we have to turn to other theories in order to

explain why the Asian countries are aligning themselves with

the dominant US power to counter the rising power of the

People’s Republic of China. One theory that can shed more light

in this strange phenomena is the balance of threat theory

developed by Stephen Walt, a neoclassical realist. Balance of

threat theory is the neoclassical realist equivalent to the

neorealist balance of power theory. The neoclassical balance of

threat theory maintains that states generally balance against

those states that pose an immediate threat to their survival.

This theory makes a clear distinction between a powerful state

that is deemed benevolent from a state whose intentions are

regarded as maleficent. The balancing efforts of Japan and

other countries in Asia against the rise of China must be seen

in this light. Japan and other Asian countries do not consider

the overwhelming power of the US military in their region as a

threatening force. The intentions of the United States are

somehow more reassuring to these countries as they have chosen

a cooperative rather than a confrontational posture towards the

US presence while the rise of China combined with its recent

assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in the East and

South China Seas is viewed with suspicion.

Case study: Air Defence Identification Zone

This part of the paper will start with a brief outline of the

origin and rationale behind the establishment of air defence

identification zones before analyzing the peculiarities of

China’s ADIZ and the possible implications for the regional

security of Northeast Asia. It is however more appropriate to13

start with a definition of what an air defence identification

zone entails. Air defence identification zones (ADIZ) are

designated areas of non-territorial airspace where States

impose reporting obligations on civil and military aircraft.11

We can trace the origin of the air defence identification zone

to the North American continent during the early years of the

Cold War as a security measure with the specific aim of

countering a feared strategic air attack.12 The United States

and Canada were the first nations to establish an air defence

identification zone in 1950 under supervision of the North

American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). This defensive

mechanism expanded to the Northeast Asian countries of Japan,

South Korea and Taiwan in the aftermath of the Second World War

and the outbreak of the Korean War. In contrast to China which

only recently as November 23rd 2013 established an ADIZ, the

defensive mechanism has existed for over half a century in

Northeast Asia. This makes us wonder why has there been such a

commotion over a defensive mechanism that has been part of the

regional security architecture for such a long period. In order

to appraise the contentions surrounding China’s ADIZ, I will

try to analyze the variables setting China’s recent ADIZ’s

requirements apart from the existing ADIZs in the North-eastern

Asian region. The United States adopts a narrow approach to

ADIZ obligations by imposing reporting obligations only upon

those aircraft intending to enter US territorial airspace while

11 Christopher K. Lamont, “Conflict in the Skies: The Law of AirDefence Identification Zones,” Air and Space Law vol. 39, no.3(2014):192.12 Ibid:189.

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on the other hand, China takes a wider approach to reporting

obligations through a demand that all aircraft penetrating

China’s ADIZ report their flight plans and positions to

national authorities.13 The divergent conception of an air

defence identification zone pertains to the different

objectives pursued by both states. The United States uses the

ADIZ as a self-defence mechanism whose purpose is to detect an

airborne attack on its territory. It is for this reason that

the US is not inclined on imposing rigorous reporting regimes

upon aircrafts not intending to enter its territorial airspace.

China’s objectives with the creation of air defence

identification zone differs markedly from those of the United

States. The extensive reporting obligations can be regarded as

a Chinese mechanism to certify its administrative control over

all aircrafts within its ADIZ whether or not they intend to

enter the Chinese territorial airspace and thereby support

China’s claims to sovereignty over airspace and subjacent

maritime territories. The backlash of China’s air defence

identification zone results from the fact that the area of its

ADIZ covers zones that are heavily disputed among several

countries in the region since the ADIZ covers most of the East

China Sea and the disputed Senkaku/Daioyu islands, besides

partially overlapping with the air defence identification zones

of both Japan and South Korea.

As various fields of international politics or the

relationships among the states comprising the international

system is regulated by rules, norms, regulations and regimes it

13 Ibid:190.15

is therefore convenient to address whether there is an

international legal basis regulating air defence identification

zones. This undertaking is crucial in analyzing whether the

establishment of an air defence identification zone allows

states to exercise a limited sovereignty outside of their

territorial airspace. The core dispute on this matter

gravitates around the question as to whether or not the

reporting regime established through an ADIZ constitutes a

restriction for air navigation in non-territorial airspace.14

In general the major provisions regulating international

airspace over international waters, the 1944 Convention on

International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), the 1958

Convention on the High Seas, the 1958 Convention on Territorial

Sea and Contiguous Zone, and the 1982 United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adhere to the free navigation

principle and oppose any impediment on such provisions by any

state to restrict the air traffic in airspace beyond their

territorial seas. The airspace above the high seas is

considered as open areas over which all nations have open and

equal access. This means that no nation could claim sovereignty

over such areas and could not impose legal rules that other

states had to adhere to. The sovereignty of a state is

exclusively limited to its territory and or territorial waters.

Therefore we can assert that a State has no international legal

basis on which to base its claims for an exclusive air defence

identification zone.

14 Ibid:19216

Air defence identification zones were originally conceived as a

pragmatic defensive mechanisms and were justified on the

grounds of military necessity as an early warning system

against a feared strategic air attack and were invoked by about

a dozen States during the course of the Cold War.15 The

rationale behind accepting this arrangement is evident as

states could not afford to await unknown aircraft entering

their sovereign airspace to insure whether the aircraft has

hostile motives such as a surprise bombardment of strategic

infrastructure or a pre-emptive attack. One could also argue

that the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles

would render the effectiveness of air defence identification

zones obsolete. The above mentioned reasoning can be used as a

counterargument against the Chinese claim that its ADIZ is

intended to enhance its national security from a potential

airborne attack emanating from the East China Sea. I have

included the case study of the air defence identification zone

in this paper in order to illustrate the perceived

assertiveness of the Chinese government to make usurious claims

relating to the East China Sea. Such a change of Chinese policy

in its regional surroundings ranging from a non-confrontational

stance to the overt threat of use of force does not dispel

doubts on the minds of wary politicians and policy makers in

Japan and South Korea. The suspicions of the Japanese are not

unfounded considering their nation’s previous militaristic

occupation of mainland China and Korea. There is still tangible

evidence of resentment among those nations and peoples that

15 Ibid:196.17

endured Japanese occupation and the humiliation associated with

it. For this reason, Japan is mindful of the rising nationalism

in China and has tried in the past to atone for its previous

transgressions in China by providing a significant Official

Development Assistance to China despite China’s economic rise

and the recent tensions between the two countries. This section

will be further elaborated on in the following chapter dealing

with the Japanese efforts to balance against their perceived

threat associated with a rising and assertive China in

Northeast Asia.

Japanese perceptions and responses to the rise of China

In this section of the paper I will focus on the various

policies of the Japanese government in her attempts to muster a

response to the increasingly assertive posture of China in the

North-eastern Asian region. In my research to analyze the

Japanese policies towards China great emphasis will be placed

on the remilitarization of Japan by comparing the gross

domestic products and the military expenditures of Japan to

that of China. Furthermore I will also examine Japan’s efforts

to enhance its security by increasing its cooperation with

other regional players and diminishing its reliance on the

United States. To gain a full picture regarding the Japanese’s

perceptions of a rising China it may be useful to complement

the quantitative data of military and economic capabilities

with qualitative data reflecting the views of the Japanese

population in general and that of different ministries such as

the departments of defence and the ministry of international

trade and industry (MITI). The qualitative approach will enable18

us to prove that the Japanese views and attitude towards China

are not homogenous even in a small circle as the executive

branch of government. Before embarking on the quantitative

comparison of the military capabilities of China and Japan, I

will elaborate on the aforementioned Japanese Official

Development Assistance to China (ODA) as a Japanese foreign

policy tool aspiring to mend relations between both countries.

According to  Kae Yanagisawa, the director general of the East

and Central Asia and the Caucasus Department of the Japan

International Cooperation Agency, Japan is the largest donor of

Official Development Assistance to China. His remarks are

substantiated by an OECD estimate of funds allocated to China

for nearly 800 million dollars in development assistance to

China while an article on People’s Daily Online, a Chinese

Communist Party website raises this amount to be akin to 1,98

billion US dollars.16 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

asserts that Japanese ODA to China includes large-scale

economic infrastructure projects, such as the building of

roads, airports and power stations, as well as infrastructure

projects in medical and environmental areas that have all

played a significant role in the realization of China's current

economic growth.17 The economic assistance extends beyond the

scope of infrastructural projects as Japan has provided

16 Isaiah Stone Fish, “Aiding and Abetting: Why is the U.S. Still Giving Aid to China?,” Accessed June 16,2014, http://headlinedigest.com/2013/07/aiding-and-abetting-why-is-the-u-s-still-giving-aid-to-china/.17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Overview of Official Development Assistance to China,” Accessed June 16, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/china/.

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training to Chinese nationals and has also dispatched Japanese

experts to China to assist in the implementation of Chinese

projects financed through the ODA. Although Japan has persisted

in granting preferential loans to China in order to amend

relations since the normalizations of the 1970s, there are more

and more voices protesting against such practices since China

is seen as outperforming Japan in the economic sphere with its

near two digits growth and assertive stances in East Asia while

Japan is mired in a sluggish growth starting in the so-called

Lost Decade of the 1990s.

Another consequence relating to China’s assertive policies in

East Asia is inextricably linked to the rising nationalism in

Japan. According to Japanese government surveys, 2001 was the

first time that the number of Japanese who held no affinity for

China exceeded the number of Japanese who held affinity for

China while 42 per cent of the population was in favour for the

revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution allowing the

country to ‘normalize’ its military.18 The growing

discontentment in Japan, coupled with fears of a rising and

assertive China will in the long run lead to a more hawkish

Japanese stance as politicians will use inflammatory rhetoric

to gain popular fervour. This is already noticeable as the

Conservative Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has vowed to

repeal Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, thereby ending

more than six decades of self-imposed pacifism after its

overwhelming victory in the 2012 general elections. The issue18 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise ofChina: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,” Security Studiesvol. 15, no.3. (2006):35.

20

of amending the constitution was a decisive and crucial element

in the LDP’s victory against the centrist Democratic Party of

Japan (DPJ) which was in favour of upholding the status quo. We

ought to perceive the Japanese desire to amend its constitution

and abrogate Article 9 in the light of neoclassical defensive

realism. As I explained in the chapter dealing with the

theoretical framework upon which this paper is based,

neorealism does not provide an adequate provision to analyze

the Japanese responses to the perceived threat posed by a

rising China. It is evident that Japan is not balancing against

China’s increase of power and influence in the region but

rather against the threat it senses that China poses to its own

national security illustrated by the recent establishment of an

air defence identification zone overlapping with its own and

covering the disputed area of the Senkaku/Daioyu islands.

China’s military build-up as such could not be interpreted as

posing a direct threat to Japanese national security if China’s

military capacity only reflected its growing economic power

without the formal shift in Chinese policy of advocating its

readiness to use military force. Japan’s preponderant concerns

relate however to China’s modernization of its conventional and

nuclear capabilities, its continuing double-digit increases in

defence expenditure, the general lack of transparency in its

military planning, and signs that its neighbour is now willing

to project power beyond its immediate borders.19 It is this

shift to an overt confrontational stance that raises suspicion

19 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision,”International Affairs vol. 85 no. 4(2009):5.

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in Japan about the Chinese mercurial intentions with its

military build-up.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

has estimated that China’s defence spending increased between

2001 and 2005 by 57 per cent while Japan’s military

expenditure did not change significantly from 1989 to 2002.20

The defence spending increase of China is a direct result of

its continued economic growth for over three decades in

contrast to the Japanese sluggish growth of less than one per

cent since the so-called Lost Decade of the 1990s. In

comparison to other regional states, China’s military build-up

and expenditures are by far the highest and most consistent. A

complete comparison of both countries military and economic

capabilities is included in the appendix at the end of this

paper. From that comparison one cannot but conclude that Japan

has been altogether overshadowed by China. As neoclassical

realism posits that domestic politics also plays a part in

determining the extent and intensity of the balancing efforts

of a nation, it is essential to look at the divergent

priorities pursued by various ministerial departments within

the Japanese government before I proceed to analyze the general

policy that Japan is developing in order to balance against the

perceived threat posed by a rising China. The economic rise of

China does not only present challenges to Japan, but it also

provides opportunities. This duality is perfectly illustrated

by the divergent positions held by various Japanese ministerial20 Robert Hartfield and Brian L. Job, “Raising the Risks of War:Defence Spending Trends and Competitive Arms Processes in EastAsia,” The Pacific Review vol.20 no. 1 (March 2007):5.

22

departments. The Japanese ministry of defence will for instance

adopt a sceptical view regarding the economic rise of China as

the proceeds of economic growth will in part serve to fund the

Chinese military leading to an expansion of its power-

projecting capabilities which can pose a threat to the Japanese

national security in the event of an escalation between the two

countries in regard to the disputed islands of the East China

Sea. In contrast, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

(METI), can consider the growth of the Chinese economy as being

beneficial to the Japanese economy due to the strong

interdependence of both economies. A growth in China may well

lead to a increasing demand of Japanese products as China is

Japan’s largest trading partner and such a growing

interdependence may well help to defuse the rising tensions

between East Asia’s two largest economies.

Since defensive realism is more optimistic than offensive

realism in arguing that states are not necessarily balancing

against power by pursuing a power-maximization policy but

rather that States are security maximizing, the balancing

efforts of Japan must thus be seen as directed at enhancing the

Japanese national security in the region. National security is

according to this strand not predicated on military capability

alone, but national security can similarly be enhanced by

engaging in mutual cooperation. As it has been mentioned

earlier, the rise of China can be interpreted in many ways

either as an opportunity or as a challenge. In the economic

domain Japan has tried to pursue a policy of cooperation with

23

China however there is still a latent anxiety that this

relationship is turning into a relationship of asymmetric

interdependence weighted towards China as China is replacing

Japan as the largest trading partner of the majority of East

Asian countries. The Japanese fear that a growing economic

interdependence will render them vulnerable as a potential

conflict with China could easily derail their modest economic

growth. Proponents of this argument point to the accommodating

posture of South Korea towards China. I refute this rationale

since the accommodating posture of South Korea is mainly due to

its geographic proximity to China and the incredible influence

that China has on the North Korean regime. Moreover the

Japanese economy is much larger than South Korea’s which will

make it harder for China to exert an economic pressure on Japan

if Japan were to adopt a more hostile attitude towards China.

On the political and military spheres, Japan is in essence

aligned to the United States and Japan rely heavily on the US-

Japan Security alliance to guarantee its national security.

Nevertheless Japan is also conscious that it runs the risk of

entrapment in US military strategy vis-à-vis China and becoming

dragged into an unwanted Sino-US conflict, especially over

Taiwan or that the US might consider that its interests are

best served by emphasizing ties with a rising China rather than

with a stagnating Japan.21 As a result, Japan has two

available policy options. It can either choose to be

cooperative with China and try to socialize and reintegrate the

21 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Response to China’s Rise:Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision,”International Affairs vol. 85 no. 4(2009):10.

24

Chinese peacefully into the regional economic and security

order as a responsible power or by forming a regional coalition

of nations dreading a potential hegemony of China in the

region.22 Both options have merits as well as risks. The

cooperative options would enable the Japanese to develop closer

economic, political and strategic relations which could

convince China to pursue a moderate course of actions as China

could peacefully regain its rightful place as the leading

regional nation and thereby placing a constraint on the Chinese

willingness to use excessive military power to dominate the

region. The cooperative optional policy has the merit of being

less confrontational and can serve as a confidence-building

mechanism by allowing a deepening of interactions and dialogue

to coordinate policies and work out issues of high value to all

participants. The risks attached to such a policy preference is

the free-rider problem as none of the states in East Asia has

the necessary capacities to guarantee that China will not

defect and pursue its interests unilaterally at the detriment

of other nations in the region. This problem can be overcome by

implicating the United States as a participant nation to any

future regional framework to hedge against any possible Chinese

defection. Moreover regional integration is complicated due to

the fact that both Japan and China have divergent views of what

it entails as Japan sees integration as a way to balance

against China with the support of the United States while China

seeks an integration with the objective of institutionalizing

its growing power and leadership without extra-regional

22 Evelyn Goh, “How Japan matters in the evolving East Asian security order,” International Affairs vol. 87 no.4 (2011):7.

25

interference on the part of the United States. Japan can play a

crucial part in overcoming this stalemate by reassuring Beijing

that its security treaty with the United States and recent

remilitarization are not entirely devoted in containing China’s

rise but that they are instead a natural historical progress

preventing Japan from reassuming a belligerent posture in East

Asia while enabling it to relatively increase its participation

in her own self-defence capabilities in these hard times of

defence cuts in spending in the United States. The relatively

low military expenditure as a percentage of GDP of one percent

is a good testimony to this fact. This leaves us with a second

option in which Japan opts for pursuing a confrontational

policy and forming an alliance with the other regional nations

fearing a resurgent China. This options is in my view more

counterproductive as it will only harden the Chinese view and

further antagonize an already distrustful Chinese regime

viewing all policies enacted by the US allies in the region as

measures intended to contain China’s rise and prevent it from

reclaiming its rightful place as the regional hegemon. It is

clear to say that Japan faces a dilemma in navigating between

the available policy options of either pursuing accommodation

by cooperating with China or privileging a confrontational

stance by attempting to build an alliance with other regional

states. As Evelyn Goh argues, the paradox of Japanese

remilitarisation is that the strengthening of the US–Japan

alliance may indicate containment, but the weakening of the

alliance may well cause an insecure Japan to remilitarize even

26

faster.23 In sum, all the options that Japan has in regard to

China require active US involvement either as a monitor and

deterrent force or as an extra-regional power that can mitigate

the Chinese fears of containment and as a benign arbiter

capable of pressuring its regional allies in certain

circumstances permitting accommodation rather than balancing.

The United States as a balancing nation in East Asia

This part of the paper will deal exclusively with the role of

the United States as an extra-regional balancer in the East

Asia security dynamics. As aforementioned in the introduction,

the second sub-question that this paper will deal with is the

probability for the United States to be embroiled in a

confrontation between China and Japan. In the previous chapter

I had already mentioned that Japan is dependent on the United

States for its national security due to the comprehensive US-

Japan Security Treaty concluded at the end of the second World

War.

The US-Japan Security Treaty reflects an unequivocal imbalance

of power between the two contracting nations. This is made

explicitly clear by the fact that while the United States is

obliged under the provisions of the treaty to defend Japan in

the event of an attack, Japan is under no such obligation in

the event of an attack on the United States.24 This unequal23 Ibid:11.24 David M. Potter, “Evolution of Japan’s Post-war Foreign Policy,”5

27

nature of security obligations can be explained by the fact

that Japan had to accept such an arrangement as it was a

defeated nation and was pressured to renounce building up a

considerable military in order to avoid the repetition of its

pre-war militaristic empire building in East and Southeast

Asia. As an occupied nation until 1952, its national security

was provided by the occupying nation, the United states. This

is the infamous Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, stating

that the nation “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on

justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign

right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling

international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding

paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be

maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” As

previously mentioned the United States has the obligation to

defend Japan in the event of an attack while Japan has no such

obligation. Thus we can deduce from this treaty that in the

event of a Sino-Japanese conflict that the United States

legally speaking has no other option but to come to Japan’s

aid. To an offensive realist this arrangement would seem very

odd considering that they claim that states are striving to

maximize power in order to ensure their own survival. Since

Japan has abided by such arrangement we can only affirm that

Japan is pursuing a defensive realist policy.

Critics may refute this assertion by pointing to the debate

raging on in Japan over the possible abrogation of Article 9 to

allow the country to rearm. Moreover they can also claim that

the only reason that Japan acceded to the diktat of the United

28

states following the conclusion of the Second World War was

because the country was at the losing end of the battle. We can

substantiate this assertion by pointing to the different

reactions of the two allied nations relating to the

establishment of the Chinese air defence identification zone.

The United States only made a declaratory commentary condemning

such a practice although it directed its civilian airlines to

comply with the Chinese demands. Japan on the other hand

dismissed the Chinese justifications of enhancing its national

security and claimed that China was acting belligerently with

the aim of staking a claim over the disputed East China Sea

islands of Senkaku/Daioyu. Notwithstanding its infamous pivot

to Asia, the United States does not consider the dispute over

the East China Sea islands or the establishment of China’s air

defence identification zone a vital interest over which it is

prepared to wage a war. The role of the United States as an

offshore balancing nation and the sole remaining superpower in

the post Cold War era is to maintain the status quo in the

region. The status quo can be maintained if the United States

chooses appeasement over direct confrontation with China by

communicating to China that the US presence or pivot to Asia is

not intended as an encirclement or a means to contain the rise

of China on the one hand while reassuring the Japanese of the

US continued support in guaranteeing its national security,

which would attenuate the Japanese fears of having to fend for

themselves. Another way the US might be able to defuse the

tension in East Asia is to convene an international conference

to regulate and codify air defence identification zone and

29

thereby diminishing the risk of conflict by creating standard

rules and regulations.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to analyze the extent to which the

Japanese national security is perceived to be under threat due

to China’s growing military assertiveness as a consequence of

its exceptional economic performance for over three decades. In

order to answer this question I decided to focus exclusively on

the military preparedness of Japan in the event of an

escalation involving China and the probability for the United

States to be embroiled in a confrontation between China and

Japan. The main conclusion of my research is that an overt an

overt confrontation between Japan and China is highly

improbable due to a mutual economic interdependence. The issue

of the air defence identification zone and the dispute over the

Senkaku/Daioyu islands are just the latest skirmishes between

Japan and China jockeying for leadership in East Asia and they

will not lead to a full blown conflict between both nations.

Japan might decide that its present overdependence on the

United States is detrimental to its own security and will

attempt to make some indispensable changes such as increasing

its defence budget and or abrogating the pacifist clause of its

constitution in light of the growing Chinese assertiveness.

China on the other hand is just testing the waters to see how

far it could go by flexing its muscles in order to revise the

present status quo in East Asia to reflect its regained

prominence in the region. The United States’ foreign policy in

30

the region is the determining variable of whether these two

countries will come to blows as it has the capacity as an

offshore balancer to accommodate China on the one hand and

still guarantee the Japanese national security by communicating

to China its willingness to defend Japanese vital interests

such as the free navigation of high sea lanes.

31

Appendix

Com parison of M ilitary and Econom ic Capacities Japan China

127.253.075 Total Population 1.349.585.83853.608.446 M anpower Available 749.610.77543.930.753 Fit For M ilitary Service 618.588.627247.746 Active M ilitary Personnel 2.285.00057.900 Active M ilitary Reserves 2.300.000

M ilitary capacity1.595 Total Aircraft Strength 2.788671 Total Helicopter Strength 856767 Total Tank Strength 9.150

3.057 Total Arm ored Fighting Vehicle Strength 4.788196 Total Self-Propelled Gun Strength 1.710492 Towed Artillery Strength 6.24699 Total M ultiple Launch Rocket System Strength 1.770131 Total Navy Ship Strength 5201 Aircraft Carrier Strength 116 Subm arine Fleet Strength 690 Frigate Strength 4545 Destroyer Strength 240 Corvette Strength 929 M ine W arfare Craft Strength 1196 Patrol Craft Strength 353

Econom ic Capacity49.100.000.000 Annual Defense Budget (USD) 126.000.000.000

1% M iltary Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 4%1.268.000.000.000 Reserves of Foreign Exchanges and Gold (USD) 3.341.000.000.0004.576.000.000.000 Purchasing Power Parity (USD) 12.260.000.000.0003.024.000.000.000 External Debt (USD) 728.900.000.0005.960.000.000.000 GDP (USD) 8.360.000.000.000

Sources: CIA FactBook, SIPRI and GlobalFirePower Year: 2012

32

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