AICE International History 1945-1991 Topic Three The Crisis of Communism Kevin R. Sacerdote Mandarin High Jacksonville, FL.

AICE International History 1945-1991 Topic Three

The Crisis of Communism

Kevin R. SacerdoteMandarin High

Jacksonville, FL

The Sino-Soviet Split

Origins and Main Features

Kevin Sacerdote (Content) copyright 2006 www.brainybetty.com (Design) 3

Background

• “In 1944-1945 Mao wanted to create the best possible balance of power for China in the international environment: leaning neither toward Moscow nor toward Washington…[but] Washington did not take him seriously…For Mao this was both an end to his hopes and a personal insult. He proclaimed a policy of leaning on the USSR” (Zubock, 1996, p. 213)


Background“Zhou Enlai’s reason for supporting “non-alignment”-

they were, of course, those of Mao Zedong-also had to do with the fear of hegemony, which from China’s perspective could come from either the U.S. or the

U.S.S.R. Washington had continued to support Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jeshi) and the Chinese

Nationalists after they had fled to Taiwan in 1949…But Mao was not prepared to rely, for deterrence

against this danger, solely on the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance. It made sense, therefore, for China to align

itself with nationalists in former colonial and dependent regions” (Gaddis, p. 126)


Death of Stalin

• March of 1953• Moscow’s ‘iron fist’ begins to weaken• “A totalitarian party state, can function at its best…

only with full-scale terror and a leader who completely adheres to the principles of absolute power and control” (Powaski, p. 214)

• “Totalitarianism cannot exist forever without changes in attitude and relaxation of the terror mechanism that usually occurs with the death of a leader” (Powaski, p. 214)


Arnold Toynbee’s

“Dominant Minority” Theory (Powaski, p. 214)

• A new “dominant minority” emerges after the revolution (Vanguard of Bolsheviks)

• “Step by step it becomes independent from the revolution and seeks to establish control”

• “The new elite in the post-revolutionary society demand the natural privilege of their high status: personal safety”

• “They want more security in the international arena. They do not want all-out wars, for defeat can undermine their power” (Especially true about Khrushchev & his peaceful coexistence with the USA)


Arnold Toynbee’s

“Dominant Minority” Theory (Powaski, p. 214)

“By the end of the 1950’s Moscow was more inclined to manage international relations in

its own interests than to stick to the principles of revolutionarism ”

“Here was the source of the ideological differences between Moscow and Beijing. Mao was in his prime. His revolutionary absolutism was quite young and could

function at its full capacity”


Khrushchev’s Thaw & Mao’s Thoughts About It

“When Khrushchev and others began to soften the regime, Mao was on the way

to tightening control and dragging peasant China into the projects of

Socialist construction. He simply could not afford any rapprochement with the U.S., for détente with the West would have inevitably loosened his grip on

Chinese society” (Powaski, p. 215)


Mao Mid-1950’s

• Feels Khrushchev is turning his back on Lenin and Trotsky’s World Revolution

• Mao also wants world recognition as the leading Communist in the post-Stalin era– Especially in the eyes of the emerging Third

World Countries– Once again he feels that the USSR is only out for

themselves and has turned its back to the concept of world revolution

• Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin is proof


Afro-Asian Conference

“Tito, Nehru, Zhou [convened] the first conference of ‘non-aligned’ nations at Bandung in Indonesia, In April, 1955: Its purpose was to expand autonomy by encouraging neutrality in the Cold

War. Among those invited was Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who

would soon prove to be the most skilful of all practitioners of ‘non-alignment.’ ”

(Gaddis, p. 126)


Bandung Conference (April 1955)


Bandung Conference: 1955

“The April 1955 Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia had its origins in an

initiative taken by the leaders of five Asian states- Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma,

and Sri Lanka- but during its preparation the conference developed into the biggest and most influential gathering of Third World leaders held during the colonial era…the

importance [of the conference] was timing: coming right after the French withdrawal

from Indochina and at a time when several African countries seemed headed for

independence” (Westad, p. 99)


The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance

• Signed by Stalin & Mao February 14, 1950

• Soviets promised technical help and $300 million in loans– Far less than the Chinese expected– Mao stated that, getting money from Stalin

was like taking “meat out of a tiger’s mouth” (Powaski, p. 83)

– The Soviets retained rights over the Manchurian rails and bases in Port Arthur and Darien


The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance

“The Sino-Soviet partnership was based on three elements:

1. Party

2. Military, and3. Economic Relations” (Luthi, p. 32)


Friendship With The CPSU

“Unlike the East European states, China voluntarily joined [the

socialist camp] on the assumption that only the anti-capitalist and

anti-imperialist Soviet Union would support the PRC in its struggle to

regain prosperity and international standing”

(Luthi, 19)


Taiwan Strait Crisis One (1954)

• China felt that there was NO prospect for a Sino-American reconciliation at the Geneva Conference in July of 1954 (WHY?)– J.F. Dulles & the South Vietnamese concern– China fears that the Nationalists & USA were

going to attack mainland China

• September 3, 1954: China “shells” TWO of the TWENTY-FIVE Nationalist Islands (all of which were between five and twenty-five miles from mainland China): Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu ( Matsu)


Taiwan (Formosa) Strait


Taiwan Strait Crisis One (1954)

The strong U.S. stand during the crisis was “designed not only to prevent the humiliation

of Jiang Jeshi, but also to drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the

Soviets. By threatening to conduct a nuclear war with china, Eisenhower and Dulles purposely tried to put the Soviets in a

position where they either would have to abandon their Chinese ally or risk nuclear

devastation from the far superior U.S. nuclear arsenal” (Powaski, pp. 112-113)


Taiwan Strait: Crisis One (1954)

“Despite these agreements, the Soviets did not give the Chinese all the support they

expected to receive during the offshore island crisis…determined to put more

emphasis on domestic reform, Khrushchev and Bulganin quickly signaled their interest in improving relations with the West…the

lack of Soviet support for China during the crisis proved to be a major reason for the

subsequent Sino-Soviet split” (Powaski, p 113)


Trouble Pending

“It was only Mao’s ideological radicalization, still inchoate in 1955, and Khrushchev’s de-

Stalinization in early 1956…that set a train of events in motion which

eventually undermined the alliance”(Luthi, p. 45)


De-Stalinization v. Peaceful Coexistence (with the USA)

“At the end of 1957, the CCP confidentially notified the CPSU that it

no longer supported peaceful coexistence…Nevertheless, in 1956-

1957, peaceful coexistence never grew into a point of disagreement in the way

de-Stalinization did”(Luthi, p. 79)



De-Stalinization PLUS Peaceful Coexistence

• Too much for the Chinese to swallow• “China’s positive evaluation of

Khrushchev’s pursuit of peaceful coexistence evaporated because of…

1. Deadlock in the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks,2. The October events in Poland and Hungary, and 3. The U.S. decision to introduce tactical nuclear

missiles in Taiwan…4. Talks suspended on December 12, 1957…it was

a turning point that would lead to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.” (Luthi, p. 48)


De-Stalinization: A Catalyst For Schism

• February 25, 1956: Khrushchev’s Four-Hour Speech

• “The twentieth congress [of the CPSU] established the ideological foundation for the disagreements that would rock the Sino-Soviet partnership in the years to come. Most importantly, de-Stalinization threatened to undercut Mao’s domestic position” (Luthi, p. 46)


De-Stalinization: A Catalyst For Schism

“The eight CCP congress in September [1956] introduced policy REVERSALS

and checks on Mao’s freedom of political action, though the Chairman

still enjoyed preeminence among Chinese leaders”

( Luthi, p. 46)

Mao Despises De-Stalinization


China’s Reaction to De-Stalinization

“Mao could never forgive Khrushchev for his “secret speech” denouncing Stalin without

consulting the Chinese. He believed that de-Stalinization was a grave error, perhaps even

a challenge to his own authority. And Khrushchev’s vision of nuclear bipolarity

became anathema for Mao, because it relegated China to a secondary position in

the pecking order of great powers” (Zubok, 2007, p.136)


Mao on De-Stalinization

“The sword of Stalin has now been discarded by the Russians…We

Chinese have not thrown it away…Stalinism is just Marxism…with

shortcomings…the so-called de-Stalinization thus is simply de-Marxification, it is revisionism”

(Luthi, p. 63)


Mao’s Cult of Personality Strengthens

“The seventh CCP congress in 1945 had agreed to build up Mao’s personality cult in order to create a rallying point for the party and the masses in the impending civil war, but the party

convention also made clear that the Chairman still had to submit to

collective leadership” (Luthi, p. 44)


Mao’s Cult of Personality Strengthens

“The 1945 agreement unraveled when Mao, in the second half of 1955, abused his by now full-fledged personality cult to push through the Socialist High Tide (a.k.a. Little Leap Forward) accusing his fellow

leaders of walking like a ‘woman with bound feet’ and of ‘Right deviationist

mistakes.’”(Luthi, p. 44)


The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958)

“The Chinese resumed the bombardment of the offshore islands in an attempt to force a resolution of Taiwan’s status” (Powaski, p. 125)

– Khrushchev warns the US that he will defend the Chinese

– Eisenhower ignores Khrushchev and sends the U.S. Seventh fleet to escort Nationalist Chinese supply ships from Taiwan to within three miles of the offshore islands

– Khrushchev’s diplomatic support was offered AFTER it became obvious that the U.S was not preparing to attack China. (Powaski, p. 125)


The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958)

China was upset by the “lackluster support” that they received with this crisis AND the “Soviet tilt toward

India in the Sino-Indian border dispute…but the Chinese were angered even more by the termination

of Soviet nuclear assistance in 1959, a move that convinced Beijing that Moscow could not be trusted”

(Powaski, p. 146)

Khrushchev was “horrified by Mao Zedong’s insistence that the Soviet Union must risk nuclear war with the

U.S. to advance the communist cause” (Powaski, p. 146)


Mao’s “Logic” on Nuclear War

“The whole world has 2 billion 700 million people, possibly it will lose a third; or even more, possibly it will lose half…but there will be another half; the imperialists will be hit completely, [and] the whole world will become socialist”

(Luthi, p. 77)


The Soviets About a Nuclear Confrontation

“ The Soviets shared neither Mao’s opinion that the imperialists were warmongers nor his belief that the Soviet Union had reached nuclear parity” (they would not until 1969)

(Luthi, p. 77)

Is it any wonder that Khrushchev changed his mind about giving Mao an

“A” bomb?

Mao – Khrushchev Split

• The crushing of the Hungarian uprising

• Problems in East Germany and Poland

• Viewed by Mao as failures by the USSR to contain reactionary forces


Sino-Soviet Split

“The turning point came sometime in 1957-1958, after Khrushchev

denounced Stalin as a criminal, and Mao proclaimed his Great Leap

Forward policy and unleashed an anti-rightist campaign. One country shut the doors to concentration camps and the

other opened them” (Powaski, p. 215)

Conference of Communist Parties - 1957

• Mao called on the USSR to abandon “revisionism” (Khrushchev had denounced Stalin)

• Mao declared that an international revolution could not be achieved by working along side “class enemies” (the Western Capitalists)

• Mao believed that the USSR was initiating détente with the West, further isolating China


November 1957

• World Conference of Communist Parties• Mao hails the USSR’s new missiles as the source to

become more aggressive against Western imperialism

• Mao asks Khrushchev to share missile technology• “From 1957 to 1959, the Chinese received the

technology for the medium-range R-12 missile and cruise missiles” (Zubok, 2007, p. 136)

• The Soviets even promised the Chinese a working sample of an atomic bomb

Conference of Communist Parties - 1957

• Deng had ultimately embarrassed the Soviets

• Out-argued Mikhail Suslov, leading Soviet theorist

• PRC presented themselves as the “real” leaders of the international revolutionary Communism

Khrushchev’s Beijing Visit

• In 1958, Khrushchev visited Mao• Mao had apparently deliberately made Khrushchev feel

uncomfortable

1) Khrushchev’s hotel had no air conditioning and was plagued by mosquitoes

2) Mao had arranged for one round of talks in a swimming pool, embarrassing Khrushchev, who had to put on a rubber ring


August 20, 1959

“Khrushchev, however, began to rethink the Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation…the tactical bomb was ready and about to be shipped…[but] on August 20, 1959 the Kremlin leaders sent a letter to Beijing…that they would not provide them with a prototype of the Bomb”

(Zubok, 1996, 228)


October 1959 (10th Anniversary of the PRC)

“Khrushchev proposed the unilateral cuts of Soviet troops…in October 1959, immediately after his

triumphant trip to the U.S.. Evidently, the Soviet leader believed he was arriving in Beijing in triumph.

He had obtained from President Eisenhower a commitment for a conference of great powers in

Paris on Germany and Berlin. Mao Ze-dong, however, openly mocked what seemed to look like the second edition of the Yalta-Potsdam ‘system’…

the Chinese blamed him for accommodating the U.S. at their expense…Khrushchev lost his temper, and the meeting degenerated into an angry exchange”

( Zubok, 2007, p. 137)

After Stalin 1953-1956

• Sino-Soviet relations entered a “honeymoon” period

• New Soviet leaders appeared willing to supply further loans and technology to China

• Treaties were made more equal

• Facilitated easier credit for the PRC



April 1960

“The Chinese Communist daily Renmin Ribao published the article, ‘Long Live Leninism’ – the opening salvo in the Chinese campaign against Khrushchev’s ‘revisionism and appeasement of

imperialists’…[it] stressed the inevitability of wars as long as imperialism existed”

(Zubok, 1996, 232)

All of this as Khrushchev was still toying with the idea of peaceful coexistence and

disarmament with the U.S.


July 1960

The “Chinese leaders…directly and openly opposed the foreign policy of

the CPSU…In July of 1960, Khrushchev decided to withdraw all Soviet

specialists from China”(Zubok, 1996, p. 233)


Sino-Soviet Split

• By 1963 the Soviets view China as a security risk– China was passing out leaflets in Algeria

that said: “Russians are Euro’s” (due to their ‘peaceful coexistence’ stance with the west)

– While Che Guevera criticized both China & the USSR for standing by and bickering while their Communist comrades in Vietnam were dying


Wasted Opportunities Due to the Split

• Limited sharing of technology

• Limited spread of a united Communist Ideology

• Looking ridiculous to the emerging countries– Poor timing due to the rash of

decolonization


The Sino-Soviet Rift Grows

“The Soviet-Chinese rift was brought into the open by Khrushchev at the Twenty-second Congress of the

Soviet Communist Party, which convened in Moscow October 17-31, 1961…Khrushchev

denounced Albania and its leader Enver Hoxha, who refused to accept de-Stalinization, but everyone

knew that the primary target of attack was Mao” (Powaski, p. 146-147)

Later, in September, 1963 the Chinese condemned the ‘errors’ of the 22nd congress

Mao – Khrushchev Split

• Public: International allies

• Private: Ideological enemies


Reasons for the Sino-Soviet Schism

1. Complex set of issues, much more than the popular “wedge theory”

– The USA became a wedge between China & the USSR-playing one off of the other

2. Historical negative feelings, especially due to expansionism, atmosphere of distrust

3. Stalin’s desire not to have a single unified China (geopolitical), it might wake the ‘sleeping giant’

4. Stalin’s desire to prolong the Korean War, he rebuffs China’s request for peace; not enough backing from the USSR throughout the war & Why does Stalin want the war to continue (mistrust)

5. China’s dissatisfaction with economic “assistance”

*Information from O.A. Westad’s: Brothers in Arms (1998)


Reasons for the Sino-Soviet Schism6. China’s “little brother” syndrome7. Soviets stop supplying missile technology8. Ideological PACE and METHODS: China is full-

steam ahead with world revolution, as Khrushchev puts on the breaks

9. Khrushchev’s wish for “peaceful coexistence” with the U.S.A. versus Mao’s feelings about confronting American imperialism (Mao considers this Marxist Revisionism, which he hates)

10. NOTE: Remember the United Nations will not formally recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) until 1971, and the USA will not have full diplomatic relations with the PRC until Jan. 1st, 1979.

*Information from O.A. Westad’s: Brothers in Arms (1998) & Larres & Lane, (2001)


Reasons for the Sino-Soviet Schism

11. Outside ‘enemies’ kept the Chinese population unified and orderly; Chinese nationalism fueled the ‘us versus the world’ philosophy

12. Soviets withdraw Soviet Nuclear Technical Assistance in 1959

13. Soviets back India in a border dispute with China (Twice)

14. China’s Cultural Revolution15. Khrushchev’s De-Stalinization Policies

16. China’s treatment of Slavs living in Xinjiang – 67,000 many of Russian heritage fled to Soviet Kazakhastan in

1962) (Luthi, p. 214). – Probable Sino/Soviet Border skirmishes were NOT a big deal

when relations between the two were positive

Why did the Split Occur?

• Mao thought that the Soviets were retreating ideologically and militarily — from Marxism-Leninism and the global struggle to achieve global communism, and by apparently no longer guaranteeing support to China in a Sino-American war; therefore, the roots of the Sino-Soviet ideological split were established by 1959.


• The USSR was astonished by the Great Leap Forward, had renounced aiding Chinese nuclear weapons development, and refused to side with them in the Sino-Indian War (1962), by maintaining a moderate relation with India — actions deemed offensive by Mao as Chinese Leader.

• Hence, he perceived Khrushchev as too-appeasing with the West, despite Soviet caution in international politics that threatened nuclear warfare.


• Sino-Soviet split manifested itself indirectly; arguments between the CPSU and the CPC criticized the client states of the other; China denounced Yugoslavia and Tito, the USSR denounced Enver Hoxha and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; but, in 1960, they criticized each other in the Romanian Communist Party congress.

• In October 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they again argued openly. In December, the USSR severed diplomatic relations with the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania, graduating the Soviet–Chinese ideological dispute from between political parties to between nation-states.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver_Hoxha


• Beijing had begun trying to displace Moscow as the ideological leader of the world Communist movement. Mao (and his supporters) had advocated the idea that Asian and world communist movements should emulate China’s model of peasant revolution, not Soviets model of urban revolution.

• “The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung” and the book Dawn Out of China stated that his intellectual accomplishment was “to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form... in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream”, which the Soviet government banned in the USSR.


• Mao thought that the Soviets were retreating ideologically and militarily — from Marxism-Leninism and the global struggle to achieve global communism, and by apparently no longer guaranteeing support to China in a Sino-American war; therefore, the roots of the Sino-Soviet ideological split were established by 1959.


• The USSR was astonished by the Great Leap Forward, had renounced aiding Chinese nuclear weapons development, and refused to side with them in the Sino-Indian War (1962), by maintaining a moderate relation with India — actions deemed offensive by Mao as Chinese Leader.

• Hence, he perceived Khrushchev as too-appeasing with the West, despite Soviet caution in international politics that threatened nuclear warfare.


• Sino-Soviet split manifested itself indirectly; arguments between the CPSU and the CPC criticized the client states of the other; China denounced Yugoslavia and Tito, the USSR denounced Enver Hoxha and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; but, in 1960, they criticized each other in the Romanian Communist Party congress.

• In October 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they again argued openly. In December, the USSR severed diplomatic relations with the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania, graduating the Soviet–Chinese ideological dispute from between political parties to between nation-states.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver_Hoxha

The Crisis of Communism

China


Chinese Communism in Crisis Under Mao

“Terrorization had always been Mao’s panacea whenever he wanted to achieve anything”

(Chang, p. 416)

The “Blooming of the Hundred Flowers”

1957 – 1958(Mao is Aged 63-64)



The Socialist High Tide Policy• Announced by Mao in July 1955

– From Autumn 1955 to Spring of 1956– Theme was the shift towards co-operativization – 14.2 % of peasant families were involved in co-

op’s and early collectivization in 1955 ( 16.9 million out of 120 million peasant families)

– By May of 1956: 91% of peasant families were in co-op’s and 62% were on collectives

– A shift from small privately-owned farms were replaced by Large co-op’s and collectives

– Source: High Tide of Terror (Time Magazine March 5, 1956)


Collectives (Luthi, p. 43)

“The results of the Socialist High Tide resembled those of Soviet collectivization. Many collectives lacked

experienced leadership, know-how. And technology for large-scale farming. Although poorer peasants

willingly joined…well-off peasants, who had worked hard to improve their lot, experienced

collectivization as expropriation. Although Mao’s collectivization did not call for the smashing of the

rich peasants as Stalin’s had done, most of the peasants fell silent after some resisters had been

labeled and ostracized”


Blooming of the Hundred Flowers(Chang, p. 417)

• “On 27 February 1957, Mao delivered a four-hour speech to the rubber-stamp Supreme Council announcing that he inviting criticism of the Communist Party” – “Few guessed that Mao was setting a trap”– “We want them to speak out…let all those ox

devils and snake demons…curse us for a few months”

– “He was casting a long line to bait fish”– “How can we catch the snakes if we do not let

them out of their lairs?”


Blooming of the Hundred Flowers(Chang, p. 417-418)

• “ Mao’s trap was extremely successful…Dissent was thus kept rigidly fragmented, so a popular uprising was impossible”

• “On 6 June 1957…a hundred flowers is over”• “Mao [had] set a quota for victims between 1

and 10 percent of ‘intellectuals’…as a result, at least 550,000-plus people were labeled as “Rightists”


Blooming of the Hundred Flowers(Chang, p. 420 & 421)

• “Parallel with theatre came executions. Mao revealed later to his top echelon that one province, Hunan, ‘denounced 100,000, arrested 10,000, and killed 1,000”

• “The huge publicity was intended to instill fear in rural schools”

• “Most rightists were deported to do hard labour in remote areas, Mao needed labour, particularly to open up virgin lands”

• “You are here to redeem your crime! Don’t dare to make trouble, or look for ways to be lazy…many died of malnutrition, illness, cold, overwork and in accidents”


The Hundred Flowers Campaign

• NOTE: Some argue that Mao really was making a move towards de-Stalinization with this campaign, and it was not a preconceived plot by Mao– “The failure of the Hundred Flowers

Campaign convinced Mao that not only was de-Stalinization incorrect but, paradoxically, China also needed more political and economic development along Revolutionary Stalinist lines” (Luthi, p. 47)


The Great Leap Forward1958 - 1961

“Half of China May Well

Have To Die”(Mao is Aged 64 – 67)


The Great Leap Forward1958 – 1961

• “The goal of the leap was for China to ‘overtake all capitalist countries in a fairly short time, and become one of the richest, most advanced and powerful countries in the world” (Chang, p. 426)

• “The press was Mao’s voice, not the public’s” (Chang, p. 427)

• “Sputnik fields mushroomed. They were usually created by transplanting ripe crops from a number of fields into a single artificial plot. These were the Maoist equivalent of Potemkin fields” (Chang, p. 427)



• “The key difference [was] that Mao’s plots were not intended to fool the ruler, but instead produced by the ruler for the eyes of his distant underlings, grassroots cadres from other collective farms…Mao wanted them to see these Sputnik fields and then go back and make similar claims, so that the state could say: ‘since you produced more, we can take more” (Chang, p. 427)



“In the summer of 1958, Mao pitch-forked the entire rural population into new and larger units called

‘People’s Communes.’ The aim was to make slave-driving more efficient…the first commune

Chayashan Sputnik… laid down every aspect of its members’ lives…All the 9,369 households had to

‘hand over entirely their private plots…their houses, animals and trees. They had to live in dormitories…

The communes were de facto camps for slave laborers… Mao even toyed with getting rid of

people’s names and replacing them with numbers…one peasant described the situation as worse than

under the Japanese occupation” (Chang, p. 434)



• “As part of his Leap, in 1958 Mao also tried to turn the cities into slave-labour camps by organizing urban communes…this did not work out” (Chang, p. 436)

• “[This] famine which was nationwide, started in 1958 and lasted through 1961, peaking in 1960…the regime’s own statistics recorded average daily calorie intake fell to 1,534. According to a major apologist for the regime, Han Suyin, urban housewives were getting a maximum 1,200 calories a day” (Chang, p. 437)


1959-1960 Chinese Famine



• “Close to 38 million people died of starvation and overwork…the figure was confirmed by Mao’s No. 2, Liu Shao-ch’I (Chang also lists how these numbers were determined on p. 438)

• “This was the greatest famine of the twentieth century- and of all recorded human history. Mao knowingly starved and worked these tens of millions of people to death. During the two critical years of 1958-59, grain exports alone, almost exactly 7 million tons, would have provided the equivalent of over 840 calories per day for 38 million people-the difference between life and death” (Chang, p. 438)


1959 – 1960 Famine

“The 1959 famines were largely a rural problem, but they were not as deadly as those in 1960. Bo Yibo claimed that

25 million people suffered from famines in 1959. Chinese statistics published in the 1990’s suggest that 310,000 people died of famines in 1959, compared with

a staggering 13.5 million in 1960” (Luthi, p. 117)

The Tibetan Concern

“To Tibet, as to the whole of China, Mao’s rule brought

unprecedented misery” (Chang, p. 457)




The Tibetan Concern (Chang, p. 453)

“Mao was determined to take Tibet by force…Stalin’s reply was: ‘It’s good

that you are preparing for an attack…Stalin also advised flooding Tibet and other border regions with Han Chinese (bring the 5% up to at least 30% Han)”


The Tibetan Concern (Chang, pp. 453 & 454)

“During 1950-51, 20,000 Chinese Communist troops forced their way into Tibet…a staggering 15 to 20 percent of all Tibetans- perhaps half of all adult

males- were thrown into prison, where they were basically worked to death…prisoners were flogged with wire whips as they pulled the heavy ploughs…

corpses were dragged down from the mountains and buried in a big pit, and the relatives were then

summoned and told: ‘we have wiped out the rebel bandits, and today is a day of festivity. You will

dance on the pit of the copses”

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

Initiated 1965-66

Brings China to the Brink of Civil War!


Cultural Revolution

• “In November 1965, Mao was finally ready to launch the Great Purge he had been long planning, to ‘punish this Party of ours” (Chang, p. 503)

• “Under Mao, everyone had to do humiliating ‘self-criticisms’ in public, but not Lin [Biao]…Mao expected him to come through for him in times of need…[Lin] invented the ‘Little Red Book’… as a mechanism of indoctrination…it was out of pure ambition that Lin stood by Mao…[Lin] was a man ‘who specializes in hate, in contempt, in thinking the worst and basest of people…in scheming and doing other people down (from his wife’s diary)” (Chang, p. 504-505)


The Red Guard


Cultural Revolution: May 1966

“Badges started appearing with Mao’s head on them…some 4.8 billion were manufactured…the Little Red book

was handed out to everyone (further pushing him as a cult of personality)” (Chang, p 514)

He first went after schools and universities, the “hotbeds for activists…students were told to condemn their

teachers…for poisoning their heads with ‘bourgeois ideas…the young were told that their role was to

‘safeguard’ Mao (Chang, p. 514)


Cultural Revolution: May 1966

• June 2: “A group from a middle school, in Peking put up a wall poster which they signed with the snappy name of ‘Red Guards,’ to show they wanted to ‘safe guard’ Mao…Mao ordered schooling suspended fro 13 June…on 18 June scores of teachers and cadres at Peking University were dragged in front of crowds and manhandled…On 5 August… the first known death by torture took place…the headmistress…was kicked and trampled by the girls, and boiling water was poured over her. She was ordered to carry heavy books back and forth; as she stumbled past, she was thrashed with leather army belts with brass knuckles…they were not told to stop-which meant carry on” (Chang, p. 517)


Cult of Personality


Cultural Revolution

• “Mao directed his Red Guards to fan out into society at large…on 23 August he told the new authorities: Peking is not chaotic enough” (Chang, p. 518)

• “Red Guards broke into homes where they burned books, cut up paintings, trampled phonograph records and musical instruments-generally wrecking anything to do with ‘Culture’…many of those raided were tortured to death in their own homes… [or] were carted off to makeshift torture chambers…in August-September (1966) in Peking alone, 33,695 homes were raided and 1,772 were tortured or beaten to death…they confiscated tons of gold, silver, platinum and millions of dollars in hard currency” (Chang, p. 519-520)


Cultural Revolution: ‘Sent to the Countryside’

• To make people get back to the “roots” of Chinese Communism

• “In Peking, nearly 100,000 were expelled (to rural areas) in less than one month” (Chang, p. 521)

• “By mid-September 1966, the country was thoroughly terrorized and Mao felt confident enough to start stalking his real target” Party officials” (Chang, p. 522)


Cultural Revolution

“Mao called the purge a fight against the ‘four olds’:

1. Old Cultures

2. Old Customs

3. Old Habits, and

4. Old Thoughts…the olds extended to old paintings, old books, antiques, and museum exhibits…nearly four hundred thousand people were killed” (Hanes, Volume II p. 294)


Impact of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on the Schism

• Initiated in China between 1965 – 1966

• “Besides aggravating anti-Americanism in China, the Cultural Revolution raised animosity toward the Soviet Union to new heights…Fistfights broke out between Chinese and Soviet civilians in Moscow and Beijing” (Powaski, p. 159)

• “In 1969 military combat would erupt between the ground forces of the two nations along China’s Manchurian border with Soviet Siberia” (Powaski, p. 159)


Purge: Mao v. Stalin

“ Stalin had carried out his purges using an elite, the KGB, who swiftly hustled their victims out of sight to

prison, the gulag, or death. Mao made sure that much violence and humiliation was carried out in

public… the first senior official tortured to death was the minister of coal, on 21 January 1967. Mao hated

him because he had complained about the Great Leap Forward… He was exhibited in front of organized crowds, and had his arms twisted

ferociously backwards in the form of torment known as being “jet-planed”

(Chang, p. 523-524)


Post GLF & CR Concerns

• The Taming of the Red Guard– Following July 1967 “radical Red Guard factions

used weapons stolen from local PLA munitions depots to clash with each other and PLA throughout China” ( Reardon, p. 145)

– “Following this upsurge in internal chaos, Jiang Qing (Mao’s fourth wife and her fourth husband) reluctantly made a self-criticism; Mao…finally agreed that the civil war within China’s urban areas had to be controlled…After September 1967 the more radical members of the Central Cultural Revolution…were purged, and the Chinese military [and Zhou] …took direct control over Chinese society” (Reardon, p. 145)


Post GLF & CR Concerns

• “From a political economic view, the Cultural Revolution ended with Premier Zhou reassuming responsibility for the routine affairs of the state on 13 September 1971 following the death of Marshal Lin Biao (plane crash)” (Reardon, p. 149)

• “Mao was physically and mentally unprepared for Lin Biao’s failed military coup d’etat. (Reardon, p. 152)

• “China gained global legitimacy after reassuming its UN seat on 25 October 1971” (Reardon, p. 149)


Zhou Enlai

• “In December 1971, Zhou Enlai argued, ‘we can’t think all things from capitalist countries are bad” (Reardon, p. 157)

• “Mao designated Zhou Enlai as his successor in January 1972…[but] Zhou was being treated for bladder cancer” (Reardon, pp. 165-166)

• “As early as 1973, Zhou Enlai explored the establishment of a special zone within China...tax-free, attracts foreign capital that bring raw materials to establish factories, which in turn utilizes Taiwan’s cheap labor and fees to produce commodities that are sold abroad” (Reardon, p. 165)


Gang of Four The Abbreviated Leftist Response 1974-1976

• Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing led an anti-Zhou campaign, they “rejected Zhou’s use of the international marketplace and advocated the semi-autarkic (self-reliant) strategy of the Cultural Revolution” (Reardon, p. 167)

• “By the mid-1970s the politics-in-command coalition took advantage of Zhou’s worsening condition to initiate the Anti-lin, Anti-Confucius Campaign and an anti-rightist campaign” (Reardon, p. 167)


Zhou Enlai & Deng Xiaoping

• “Dying of bladder, colon, and lung cancer, Zhou with Mao’s approval appointed Deng Xiaoping on 1 February 1975 to take charge of State Council work…Deng reiterated the Four Modernizations… [and told the USA] ‘we want to study and absorb world-class technology. As our economy develops, the prospects of our foreign trade will broaden…[Jiang Qing] denounces Deng ” (Reardon, pp. 176-177)

• Zhou Enlai dies on January 8th, 1976


Post-Mao

• “By April 1976, the stage was set for Deng’s removal. Deng’s major-patron, Zhou Enlai, had died in January; Mao’s directives (with a push from his bride) supporting Anti-Rightist Movement were published on 3 March” (Reardon, p. 180)

• “Following Mao’s death on 9 September 1976 and Jiang Qing’s downfall a month later, China began to exorcise the ghosts of Mao Zedong. Hua Guofong joined the majority of policy elites to excoriate the gang’s ‘ultra-leftist’ policies…[Hua] approved the arrest of Jiang Qing and company on the night of October 6, 1976” (Reardon, p. 181)



Deng Xiaoping


The Rise of Deng

• “Deng Xiaoping made his successful comeback at the Third Plenum (a full assembly) of the Eleventh Party Congress in 1978, after having been purged by Mao in the Cultural Revolution in 1965 and again in 1976”(Marti, p. xi)

• “The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 and the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee in November 1993 form the ‘bookends’ of Deng Xiaoping’s efforts at modernizing China” (Marti, p. 207)


Deng Xiaoping

“Deng set China on the path of modernization, and that to ensure that the process survived him, he actively manipulated the inexorable generational change under way within the

party, government, and army…this he did in late 1991 and 1992 when he effected a

‘Grand Compromise’ among the party factions: elders, conservatives, liberals, regional leaders, technocrats, and the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” (Marti, p. xii)


Deng’s Grand Compromise: Part 1 of 3(Marti, p. xii)

1. The PLA would support Deng’s reforms, the primacy of the party, and the unity of the state;

• Thus the elders and conservatives would be ensured party control of a unified state and the funds to support it, but would have to compromise with reformers on the issue of central economic planning [ The PLA was perhaps the key ]


Deng’s Grand Compromise: Part 2 of 3 (Marti, p. xii)

2. In return, the provincial party chiefs would ensure that revenues would be remitted to the central government:

– The technocrats would be free to pursue capitalist economic policies and modernization without hindrance from ‘leftist’ ideologues, but would have to submit to party discipline, and:


Deng’s Grand Compromise: Part 3 of 3 (Marti, p. xii)

3. The central government, in turn, would finance the Army’s continued modernization:

• The PLA which has been undergoing a process of professionalization and depoliticization since 1985, would be guaranteed funds for continued modernization and would have a voice in party policy, but would have to submit to the party’s authority.


Democracy Wall: Late 1978• Beijing democracy activists were allowed to record news

and ideas on a designated wall in the city from December 1978.

• In line with the party's new policy of "seeking truth from facts," the activists were encouraged to criticize the Gang of Four and failed government policies.

• But the CCP became dismayed as more and more posters began to call for a complete overhaul and even the abolishment of the CCP.

• As the current leadership and policies came under fire, a new wave of party intolerance at political dissent began. Overnight, the wall was torn down.

• Two of the more prominent leaders of the poster movement were placed on public trial and given heavy jail sentences.

• BBC News Special. Retrieved June 24, 2008, from China's Communist Revolution: A glossary Web site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/democ.htm


Tiananmen Square, June 4, 1989

“The death of an outspoken member of the Communist Party, Hu Yao Bang, sparked a

mass demonstration of mourning students in Tiananmen Square, which was open to the

public… Demonstrators soon began to call for greater democracy and liberalization within the CCP. And for the first time in Chinese history, the

demonstration was captured live on television and broadcast around the world.”

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/tiananmen.htm




“The authorities' response was initially lenient, but eventually martial law was

declared and police entered the square. Still the activists were not ejected, and

on 30 May students erected the "Goddess of Democracy" statue,

cheered on by members of the police. Eventually the CCP became impatient”




“The demonstration was a grave embarrassment as it came during a Sino-

Russian summit. On 4 June 1989 the cordial atmosphere came to an end. Under the

orders of Deng Xiaoping, troops and tanks of the People's Liberation Army stormed into Tiananmen Square and ended the peaceful

protest with a massacre in which thousands were killed.”



Falun Gong

• Falun Gong says its philosophies and slow-motion meditation exercises aim to promote good health and moral living. It purports to be a spiritual movement.

• The Chinese government has been concerned by the group's ability to organize and says it is an "evil" cult controlled by its U.S.-based founder Li Hongzhi and it spreads superstition and malicious fallacies to deceive people.

Source: http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/falungong/


Falun Gong

• While Beijing has arrested and imprisoned hundreds of Falun Gong members since the movement was outlawed in 1999, followers continue to protest around the world and in Hong Kong where the sect is still a legally registered society.

• The debate surrounding Falun Gong's status as a harmless organization or evil cult continues with the Chinese government remaining implacable.

Source: http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/falungong/


Deng’s Legacy“Like the other watersheds in Chinese

history, only with the passage of time will be the significance of Deng’s

actions in 1992 become evident. As for Deng, his health was failing him and

after 1994 he gradually withdrew from politics and left it to his chosen

successors to carry on. He died in 1997. History will now debate his

legacy” (Marti, p. xvi)

Communism in Crisis: The Soviet Union

Troubles Within

the USSR and

Eastern Bloc


Ongoing Concerns Within the U.S.S.R.

• Human Rights & Liberties Violations– KGB Harassment / “Big Brother”

• Gulags• Forced Labor• Political Purges• Show Trials• Fear within a single party state

• Lack of an orderly system of succession for their leaders (confusion factor)


Crisis Within the Soviet Sphere of Influence

Sign of Things to Come!• February 25, 1945:

– Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia– Concept of “Free Elections” off the board?– Future impact on the Eastern Bloc?

• March 5th, 1953: – Death of Stalin, successor and his policies

will no doubt impact the Eastern Bloc


The East German Uprising of 1953

• June 17, 1953• “ Was the first real mass uprising

within the Soviet sphere of influence. It provided poignant and indelible images of unarmed citizens of East Berlin as they challenged Russian tanks with fists and rocks. But the revolt was quickly suppressed” (Ostermann, p. XV)


Crisis Within the Soviet Sphere of Influence“In June 1956, riots broke out in

Poland…Khrushchev ousted the Stalin-era Polish leaders. He installed a new

communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who promised worker

reforms…Khrushchev quickly became uncomfortable with the reforms…Khrushchev chose not to force the

issue.” ( Hanes, Vol. II, pp. 193-194)


Discontent in Hungary: 1956

• Students push for changes starting in Budapest

• Demonstrations turn violent ( Oct. 23rd )• Imre Nagy states they will leave the Warsaw

Pact• November 4th Khrushchev responds with

force– 200,000 Soviet troops and 5,500 tanks launch a

surprise attack– Eisenhower does not want to risk nuclear war and

stays away


Discontent in Hungary: 1956“Close to thirty thousand Hungarians and several thousand Soviet troops were killed.

In addition, over two hundred thousand Hungarians fled into neutral Austria…the

Soviets arrested and later executed Nagy…The Hungarian revolt and resulting massive

Soviet response caused major repercussions. The incident weakened Khrushchev’s standing at home. Soviet

communist hardliners blamed Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin speech for the turmoil in Eastern

Europe”(Hanes, p. 196)


The Impact of the Soviet Invasion of Hungary

“At dawn, on November 4, 1956, Russian communism showed its true character…Hungary has laid bare

the great Russian lie…In Hungary, Russia demonstrated that her program is simple. Infiltrate a target nation (as she did in Bulgaria and Rumania, for example); get immediate control of the police

force (as she did in Czechoslovakia); initiate a terror which removes all intellectual and labor leadership (as she did in Latvia and Estonia); deport to Siberia

troublesome people (as she did in Lithuania and Poland”

(Michener, pp. 1-2)


The Impact of the Soviet Invasion of Hungary

“From this point on it is difficult to imagine native-born communists in

Italy or France…or America…trusting blindly that if they join the Russian orbit their fate will be any different”

(Michener, p. 2)


Prague Spring, 1968

“A brief thaw in Cold War communist policies when in 1968

Czechoslovakia’s Communist Party leader, Alexander Dubcek,

sought to modernize communism with certain democratic reforms, including greater freedom of the

press”(Hanes, p. 252)


Prague Spring, 1968

• 1966: Czechoslovakia’s economy was in trouble– Government shifts control of industry from

central to local control– Did not help, frustrations and

demonstrations are sparked

• 1968: Dubcek is appointed the Communist Party leader– Dubcek offers new reforms, including

freedom of the press


Prague Spring, 1968

• Other Communist leaders fear Dubcek’s reforms and call on Brezhnev to step in

• July 1968: Brezhnev demands that Dubcek back off his reforms

• Dubcek continues with his reforms• Brezhnev sends in “Warsaw Bloc” forces• Dubcek arrested and taken to Moscow• Hardliners are put in Prague to lead the

“Czechs” (Hanes, Vol. II, pp. 267-268)


Prague Spring, 1968

“The party was now officially endorsing…a unique experiment in democratic

Communism: ‘Socialism with a human face’ as it became colloquially known…the

Czechoslovak Communist Party [over a ten year transition] would allow the emergence

of other parties with whom it would compete in genuine elections. These were hardly

original ideas, but publicly pronounced from the official organs of a ruling Communist

Party they triggered a political earthquake. The Prague Spring had begun.”

(Judt. P. 441).


Bibliography

BBC News Special. Retrieved June 24, 2008, from China's Communist Revolution: A glossary Web site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/democ.htm

CNN.com In-Depth Specials. Retrieved July 3, 2008, from Falun Gong: China's Dilemma Web site: http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/falungong/ (2003)

Chang, J. & Halliday, J. (2005). Mao: The unknown story. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

Crockatt, R. (2001). The Vietnam war and the superpower triangle. In K. Larres & A. Lane (Eds.), The Cold War: The essential readings (pp. 139-158).London, England: Blackwell.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/democ.htm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/democ.htm

http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/falungong/


Bibliography

Finnegan, G. Gary Finnegan. Retrieved June 24, 2008, Web site: http://garyfinnegan.blogspot.com/2008/06/tiananmen-square-19-years-on.html

Gaddis, J.L. (2005). The cold war: A new history. New York, NY: Penguin Books

Hanes, S.M. & Hanes, R.C. (2004). Cold war almanac: Volume 2. Detroit, MI: Thomson Gale.

Judt, T. (2005). Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945. New York, NY: The Penguin Press.

Luthi, L.M. (2008). The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

http://garyfinnegan.blogspot.com/2008/06/tiananmen-square-19-years-on.html

http://garyfinnegan.blogspot.com/2008/06/tiananmen-square-19-years-on.html


Bibliography

Marti, M.E. (2002). China and the legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From communist revolution to capitalist evolution. Washington, D.C.: Brassey.

Michener, J.A. (1975). The bridge at Andau: The compelling true story of a brave, embattled people. New York, NY: Fawcett.

Ostermann, C.O. (2001). Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German question, and the first major upheaval behind the Iron Curtain. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press.

Powaski, R. (1998). The cold war: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1997. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.


BibliographyReardon, L.C. (2002). The reluctant dragon: Crisis cycles in

Chinese foreign economic policy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Westad, O.A. (1998). Brothers in arms: The rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Westad, O.A. (2007). The global cold war: Third world interventions and the making of our times. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zubok, V. (2007). A failed empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill, NC: University of Chapel Hill Press.

Zubok, V. & Pleshakov, C. (1996). Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

AICE International History 1945-1991 Topic Three The Crisis of Communism Kevin R. Sacerdote Mandarin High Jacksonville, FL.

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