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DOI: 10.1177/2277976013493570

2013 2: 189Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy Walter Chambati

Zimbabwe after Redistributive Land ReformThe Political Economy of Agrarian Labour Relations in

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Editor’s Introduction 189

Article

The Political Economy

of Agrarian Labour Relations inZimbabwe after RedistributiveLand Reform

Walter Chambati

Abstract

This article examines the reconfiguration of agrarian labour relationsin Zimbabwe following extensive land redistribution since 2000. Basedon field research, it shows that the new forms of labour utilization thathave emerged are structured around new land ownership and materialconditions, within a more diversified agrarian economy. The new agrar-ian structure is characterized by reduced supplies of wage labour, asmore of the previously land-short peasants are now self-employed onthe land they gained, while part-time wage-labour provision has grown

in the differentiated capitalist farms, which have been largely unableto enforce labour tenancy relations. Agrarian politics are increasinglyfocused on class struggles between capital and labour, in general, andthe competition for resources between the different modes of farming.

Keywords

agrarian labour, redistributive land reform, agrarian structure, farmlabour tenancy, production relations

Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy

2(2) 189–211© 2013 Centre for Agrarian Research

and Education for South (CARES)SAGE Publications

Los Angeles, London,New Delhi, Singapore,

Washington DCDOI: 10.1177/2277976013493570

http://ags.sagepub.com

Walter Chambati a researcher at the African Institute for Agrarian Studies(AIAS), Harare, Zimbabwe and PhD candidate at the School of Public andDevelopment Management, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa.Email: [email protected].








190 Walter Chambati

Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, 2, 2 (2013): 189–211

Introduction

This article explores the transformation of Zimbabwe’s agrarian labour relations by the extensive land redistribution that has occurred under the

Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) since 2000. New forms of

labour utilization have emerged, structured around new land ownership

and material conditions, within a more diversified agrarian structure.

The latter is characterized by reduced supplies of wage labour, as more

of the previously land-short people are now self-employed on the land

they gained, while part-time wage-labour provision has grown in the dif-

ferentiated capitalist farms, which have been largely unable to enforce

labour tenancy relations.

Until 1999, agrarian labour relations in Zimbabwe were structured by

the labour reserve system that emerged from settler-colonial land dispos-

session, entailing the supply of wage labour by landless and land-short

peasants in the Communal Areas to large-scale commercial farms

(LSCFs). This labour reserve system had once been interpreted as a case

of ‘proletarianisation of the African peasantry’: land dispossession wasconsidered to have ‘irreversibly’ undermined the social reproduction of

the peasantry and fuelled a linear process of proletarianization towards

the capitalist sector (Arrighi 1970). It has been argued, however, that

while land dispossession dented the autonomous social reproduction of

the peasantry, this process was uneven and incomplete, leading to a per-

pertual ‘semi-proletarianisation’, whereby petty-commodity production

by peasants on small plots continued to exist and combined with wage

labour on the farms and beyond (Moyo and Yeros 2005). In this context,

agrarian labour relations were super-exploitative, entailing extremely

low wages and repressive practices, such as the labour residential tenancy

system which tied residency to farm employment.

Today, the qualitative changes in Zimbabwe’s agrarian relations have

been analyzed in terms of a tri-modal agrarian structure, comprising an

expanded peasantry, the tripling of small and medium-to-large capitalist

farms and the reduction of agro-industrial estates (Moyo 2011, 2013).These competing modes of organization of production are based on

differentiated forms of land control and wage-labour relations, as well

as differing degrees of integration into markets (ibid.). Overall, the

structure and orientation of agricultural production has shifted towards

the increased production of food, with the partial recovery of export








The Political Economy of Agrarian Labour Relations in Zimbabwe 191

Agrarian South: Journal of Politic al Economy, 2, 2 (2013): 189–211

production (ibid.). The tri-modal structure is further driven by differen-

tiated access to farming inputs and commodity markets, as well as

contract farming as a means of financing agriculture (ibid.). This has been accompanied by competing modes of accumulation, from ‘below’

and ‘above’, and on-going social differentiation.

Agrarian politics are increasingly focused on class struggles between

capital and labour, in general, and the competition for resources between

the different modes of farming. The partial dismantling of the labour

tenancy system by the new land ownership and tenure patterns (Chambati

2011, 2013) has substantially reduced the dependency on a few LSCFsfor wage employment and increased the bargaining power of farm labour

against super-exploitation. It has also generated favourable conditions

for farmworkers to organize and defend their residential rights in the

farm compounds.

A series of studies undertaken by the African Institute of Agrarian

Studies (AIAS) in Harare have explored the new labour relations at an

aggregate level, capturing broad patterns in the supply of family farm

labour and wage labour to an increased number of differentiated capital-ist farms, as well as the improvement in the residential rights of workers

on capitalist farms (Chambati 2011, 2013; Chambati and Moyo 2004;

Moyo et al. 2009). This structural transformation has been missed by

numerous studies which have been narrowly focused on production out-

comes (Masiiwa and Chipungu 2004; Richardson 2005) and formal

employment ‘development’ (Magaramombe 2010; Sachikonye 2003).

This present article extends the AIAS macro analyses above by con-

ducting a micro-level study of a peri-urban area in Goromonzi District,

Mashonaland East Province.1 The study provides further insight into the

qualitative shifts in the labour regime following land redistribution,

based on better understanding of the specificities of the district.

Changing Agrarian Structure andProduction Relations

In Goromonzi, the FTLRP introduced two of the three competing modes

of organization of production, namely the peasantry and small-to-large

capitalist farms. The agro-industrial estates which constitute the third








192 Walter Chambati


farm category are relatively minor in the district. The FTLRP extended

land access to over 1,673 peasant households and 849 small to large

capitalist farms, which now occupy 200 former LSCFs (about 44 percentof the best land) with higher agro-ecological potential (Table 1).

Previously, the ownership of about 257 LSCFs was dominated by white

farmers, although the racial mix, consisting of 33 percent black owner-

ship, was higher than elsewhere (MLRR 2012). These new patterns of

land ownership were influenced by the close proximity of Goromonzi to

Harare and well-developed public infrastructures that fuelled intense

competition for land by urban middle classes.The land beneficiaries are more ethnically diverse than other districts,

as about 19 percent had their Communal Areas homes or kumusha in

Goromonzi, compared to over 30 percent in other districts (AIAS 2007).

Thus, the ethno-regionalism which influenced land allocations in other

districts (Moyo 2011) was largely absent in Goromonzi.

The A1 resettlement scheme increased the land owned by the peas-

antry and the number of farm households in the district, adding to the

already existing Communal Areas. However, the share of land held byA1 and Communal Area farmers in the district, at 45 per cent, is less than

the national average of 79 per cent (Table 1, Moyo 2011: 512). The land-

holders in the A1 sector include those who originated in the Communal

Areas (61.3 per cent), urbanites (29.2 per cent) and former LSCF workers

(6.3 per cent) (AIAS 2007).

The category of capitalist farmers, namely those who hire most of

their labour and produce for the market (Moyo 2013) and comprising of small and large capitalist farms, has grown substantially in terms of land

ownership and number of farm households. The small capitalist farmers

that own land in the old small-scale commercial farms (SSCFs) and the

small and medium A2 farms control 19 per cent of the land (Table 1).

The large capitalist farm sector, including the remaining black and white

LSCFs plus large A2 farms, now occupies a relatively large proportion

of land (29 per cent) (Table 1), compared to other districts at an average

of 3.5 per cent (Moyo 2011: 512). Urban connections are most prevalentin capitalist farms, with 39 per cent of beneficiaries originating in urban

areas, but the majority (52 per cent) coming from Communal Areas

(AIAS 2007). This sector has expanded the pre-2000 employer base for

farmworkers.









T a b l e 1 : E m e r g i n g A g r a r i a n S t r u c t u r e i n G

o r o m o n z i D i s t r i c t : E

s t i m

a t e d L a n d h o l d i n g s ( 2 0 1 2

)

F a r m

c a t e g o r i e s

F a r m s / h o u s e h o

l d s

A r e a h e l d ( h a )

A v e r a g e F a r m

s i z e ( h a )

2 0 0 0

2 0 1 2

2 0 0

0 *

2 0 1

2 *

2 0 0 0

2 0 1 2

N o

%

N o

%

h a

%

h a

%

P e a s a n t r y

C o m m u n a l

A 1

1 9 , 9

7 6

9 8 . 6

2 0 , 9 7

5

1 , 6 7

3

8 8 . 8 7 . 1

7 8 , 0

6 6 . 3 9

3 1 . 0

7 8 , 0

6 6 . 3

9

3 2 , 4

3 7 . 6

3

3 1 . 7

0

1 3 . 1

7

3 . 9

1

3 . 7

2

1 9 . 3

9

S u b - t o t a l

1 9 , 9

7 6

9 8 . 6

2 2 , 6 4

8

9 5 . 9

7 8 , 0

6 6 . 3 9

3 1 . 0

1 1 0 , 5

0 4 . 0

3

4 4 . 8

7

3 . 9

0

1 1 . 5

6

M e d i u m

O l d S S C F

S m a l l A 2

2 4

0 . 1

2

4

7 7

8

0 . 1 3 . 3

2 , 0

6 8 . 4 5

0 . 8

2 , 0

6 8 . 4

5

4 3 , 6

4 5 . 8

0

0 . 8

4

1 7 . 7

2

8 6 . 1

9

8 6 . 1

9

5 6 . 1

0

S u b - t o t a l

2 4

0 . 1

8 0

2

3 . 4

2 , 0

6 8 . 4 5

0 . 8

4 5 , 7

1 4 . 2

5

1 8 . 5

6

8 6 . 2

0

7 1 . 3

0

L a r g e s c a l e

L a r g e A 2

L S C F

2 4 0

1 . 2

7

1

8

9

0 . 3 0 . 4

1 5 5 , 4

3 7 . 0 0

6 1 . 8

2 7 , 2

0 6 . 4

9

4 3 , 9

4 8 . 0

5

1 1 . 0

5

1 7 . 8

4

6 4 7 . 6

5

3 8 3 . 1

9

4 9 3 . 8

0

S u b - t o t a l

2 4 0

1 . 2

1 6

0

0 . 7

1 5 5 , 4

3 7 . 0 0

6 1 . 8

7 1 , 1

5 4 . 5

4

2 8 . 8

9

6 4 7 . 7

0

4 9 3 . 8

0

A g r o - e s t a t e s

C o r p o r a t e

4

0 . 0

2

4

0 . 0

2

3 , 6

0 5 . 0 8

1 . 4

3 , 6

0 5 . 0

8

1 . 4

6

9 0 1 . 2

7

9 0 1 . 2

7

P a r a s t a t a l

6

0 . 0

3

9

0 . 0

4

5 , 6

0 4 . 7 0

2 . 2

7 , 6

6 8 . 7

0

3 . 1

0

8 0 0 . 6

5

8 2 9 . 1

5

I n s t i t u t i o n s

3

0 . 0

1

3

0 . 0

1

7 , 6

3 7 . 7 9

3 . 0

7 , 6

3 7 . 7

9

3 . 1

0

2 , 5

4 5 . 9

3

2 , 5

4 5 . 9

3

S u b - t o t a l

8

0 . 0

4

8

0 . 0

3

1 2 , 0

4 2 . 5 9

4 . 8

1 8 , 9

1 1 . 5

7

7 . 6

7

1 , 4

1 5 . 9

5

1 , 4

2 5 . 4

5

T o t a l

2 0 , 2 5 3

1 0 0

2 3 , 6 2

6

1 0 0

2 5 1 , 6 1 9 . 7 1

1 0 0 . 0

2 4 6 , 2 8 5 . 3 2

1 0 0 . 0 0

1 2 . 4 2

1 0 . 4 2

S o u r c e : C o m p i l e d

b y a u t h o r f r o m

M L R R

d a t a s h e e t s ( 2 0 1 2 ) ;

f r a m e w o r k a d o p t e d f r o m

M o y o a n d Y e r o s ( 2 0 0 5 ) ;

h e c t a r a g e s d o n o t t a l l y d u e t o

r o u n d i n g

o f f , t

h e a b s o r p t i o n o f s o m e

a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n t o u r b a n r e s i d e n t i a l l a n d a n d s o m e m i s s i n g d a t a o n f a r m

s i z e s .








194 Walter Chambati


Agro-estates in Goromonzi, which include private agribusiness com-

panies, state farms and church and trust institutions control about

8 per cent of the land area and have the largest average land size, at1,425 hectares (Table 1). These agro-estates are vertically integrated into

global market chains, they are highly capitalized and also have an agro-

industrial element.

Land tenure and the forms of land control are differentiated amongst

the three modes of organization of production. In the Communal and

A1 resettlement areas, customary and state permit tenure, respectively,

assign to the peasantry the right to use the land in perpetuity. Landownership in the A1 scheme is not governed by custom, but village

heads appointed by the chiefs in Goromonzi mediate some agrarian

relations. In the capitalist sector, the A2 farms and the LSCFs, land

rights are derived from 99-year state leases and freehold property,

respectively. Yet, land control is also derived from informal land leasing

between landholders and former LSCFs, farmworkers and agribusiness

firms, a practice confirmed by 27 per cent of beneficiaries in the district

(Moyo et al. 2009: 35).The differentiation in farm structure is also reflected in the production

relations, choice of commodities and integration in commodity markets.

Peasant production, which is organized around family labour, is charac-

terized by food production (maize and small grains) for own consump-

tion and surplus sales in domestic markets. The small and large capitalist

farms produce a mix of food and export commodities, including maize,

soyabeans, horticulture and commercially oriented livestock (AGRITEX

District annual reports 2011). Capital intensive crops, such as wheat,

seed maize and barley, are the preserve of large capitalist farms (ibid.).

Tobacco is grown by all producer classes, but the larger share of the land

area under the crop is found in capitalist farms through their more pro-

nounced links to contract farming (ibid.).

Since the FTLRP in Goromonzi redistributed more than 70 per cent

of the land acquired to capitalist farms and retained a relatively large

base of LSCFs, the district has a relatively large number of land short people, as their average landholding is only a fifth of that found nation-

ally (Table 1, Moyo 2011: 512). Land shortages are thus more acute in

the Communal Areas of Goromonzi, which continue to provide full- and

part-time farm labour. About 10,000 land short labourers and their

families are also resident in 257 farm compounds (Interview District










Extension Officer, 6 June 2012). This suggests that the labour reserve

dynamics of the past that were driven by land shortages and which com-

pelled the peasants to enter the labour market still operate in Goromonzi,more so than in other areas where peasants got the larger share of the

land redistributed.

Agrarian Labour Relations in Capitalist Farms

The forms of labour mobilization, utilization and remuneration of workers are differentiated amongst the new range of capitalist farms,

largely due to the scale of their production, sources of finance and man-

agement practices. There are an estimated 10,500 full-time and 16,000

part-time workers on 962 capitalist farms in the district.2 Approximat-

ely 65 per cent of the workers are resident in the farm compounds,

while much of the part-time labour is recruited from Communal Areas,

A1 farms and the compounds.

Farm Scale and Labour Utilization

The large capitalist farms have the highest number of wage labourers, at

30 full-time and 45 part-time workers per farm. These are associated

with high arable land utilization rates, high levels of capital investment,

such as irrigation facilities, and large cropped areas. For instance, at the

top end of the large-scale farms, Glen Avon Farm, with 360 hectares,

cultivated over 50 hectares of tobacco under irrigation (since 2004) and

employed 90 permanent workers and an average of 80 seasonal workers

annually. In contrast, the small capitalist farms with high land utilization

rates are associated with the employment of small batches of permanent

workers, averaging less than 15 workers per farm. This is exemplified by

the case of MN, who holds 59.5 hectares (of which 30 hectares are

arable) on Banana Groove Farm and employs 10 permanent workers.This farm cultivates 20 hectares of tobacco, 10 hectares of maize and

0.2 hectares of greenhouse horticultural crops and this is combined with

a 26 sow piggery project.

Professional farm managers were recruited in large capitalist farms,

such as Glen Avon, to oversee the operations, while small capitalist








196 Walter Chambati


farms were personally managed by the owners, as was the case at MN’s

farm. In Goromonzi, less than 15 per cent of the small capitalist farms

hired farm managers (AIAS 2007). The large capitalist farms had wider sources of finance for farming. The financing of operations at Glen Avon

farm derives from contract farming with a large tobacco merchant, who

has been providing secured credit averaging US$500,000 annually since

2009, as well as personal savings and retained farm profits. Small capi-

talist farms such as MN financed their farm production from middle

class urban wages, farm profits and past savings.

Forms of Labour Utilization and its Sources

The large capitalist farms hired seasonal labourers on fixed-term con-

tracts, ranging between one and eight months during the rainy season,

while small capitalist farms hired part-time labour in the form of piece-

workers for a daily wage. Piecework is either task-based, whereby

the wage rate is tied to completing a certain task, such as weeding a parti-cular land area (around 0.06 hectares); or time-rated, which entails working

for a specific amount of time (normally an eight-and-half-hour day).

Specialist part-time labour groups which were formed by former

farmworkers to provide services, such as tobacco curing and grading,

were also used in small capitalist farms. They perform tasks over a short

time period and receive their payment as a group. Such groups were

engaged by 16 per cent of the small capitalist farms in Goromonzi

(AIAS 2007). The formation of these groups is another way in which

farmworkers organize to resist low formal wages and bargain for more

by using their skills (Chambati 2011, 2013).

The farm compounds which guaranteed labour supplies for the former

LSCFs were restructured by land redistribution, tenure reforms and state

policy, which allow farmworkers to retain residency irrespective of their

employment. This affected the mobilization of labour for the capitalist

farms. Land redistribution meant that large capitalist farms inherited theentire farm compounds as individual landholders, while small capitalist

farms share it as a group.

Yet, the labour residential tenancy of the past is perpetuated in the

farm compounds located on the remaining LSCFs and agro-estates.

Labour in the large-scale capitalist farms is mobilized from farm workers










resident in the compounds (those left by white LSCFs) through the appli-

cation of the labour residential tenancy system. At Glen Avon Farm, for

instance, all the workers resident in the compound were obligated to provide wage labour, as the owner argued that the costs incurred in the

maintenance of the compound and in social service provision3 were to

benefit only the resident workforce (Interview Glen Avon, 31 July 2012).

In fact, one worker who refused to comply with this was evicted in 2007,

with the assistance of the local police. The large farms are thus able to

deploy their political connections and sole control of the farm compound

to evict defiant farm labourers.By contrast, the farm compounds of the former LSCFs that are now

occupied by small capitalists serve multiple employers. The compounds

are inherited by the land beneficiaries in whose plots they lie, but state

policy enjoins the small capitalist farms to share the farm compound

with others in the same former LSCF. This presents farmworkers with a

relative degree of freedom to choose where to sell their labour power.

Farmworkers in the compounds of small capitalist farms are also

being compelled to work in return for residency, but they resist suchlabour provision. On Banana Groove Farm, less than 10 per cent of the

former farmworkers were employed on a permanent basis by the

20 small capitalist farms, whilst the remainder were employed in piece-

work in multiple sites within and outside the farm.

This has resulted in the implementation of ‘employment audits’ in the

compounds concerned, to examine where the different farmworkers are

employed, with a view to resolve labour shortages. Such audits occur in

meetings which compile lists of compound residents not employed on

the farm. After such a meeting on Banana Groove farm in October 2011,

12 farm labourers were targeted for eviction, but they refused to leave

with the support of their colleagues (Interviews, 2 August 2012). The

farmworkers sought assistance of a non-governmental organization,

Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS), which success-

fully obtained a peace order against the farmers at the Goromonzi

Magistrate Court, which stopped the planned evictions.The new situation has also resulted in new practices, whereby small

capitalist farmers, unable to enforce the labour residential tenancy, are

constructing new farm compounds on their own plots to accommodate

the workers independently. For instance, MN built a compound com-

prised of five two-room houses for 10 permanent workers in 2010, after








198 Walter Chambati


experiencing labour shortages (Interview MN, Banana Groove Farm,

31 July 2012). According to MN, the compound ensured consistent and

reliable labour supplies, as residency depended on working on the farm.The construction of new compounds was observed in only two small

capitalist farms out of the 30 surveyed in 2012.

Another practice observed on many small capitalist farms is the provi-

sion of residency to new workers at the homestead of the employer.

89 per cent (or 49) of new farm workers surveyed in Goromonzi were living

at the homesteads of their employers (AIAS 2007). This type of labour

tenancy, however, differs from the social segregation established on the pre-vious white LSCFs. In these new arrangements, workers share several ame-

nities with their employers, including water, sanitation and energy.

The inherited labour force in the large capitalist farms is supple-

mented by part-time labourers from A1 farms and Communal Areas.

Workers with no prior LSCF work history, including landless extended

family members, are found to be permanently employed in small capital-

ist farms. Out of 87 small capitalist farms surveyed in Goromonzi, only

20 were hiring former farmworkers in their permanent workforce (AIAS2007). Kinship ties are also used by farmworkers in the compounds to

organize themselves to sell their labour services in group piecework such

as weeding.

Agrarian Wages and Benefits

Agricultural wages after the FTLRP have remained repressed and the

lowest among other formal employment categories. The statutory

minimum monthly wages for permanent and seasonal farmworkers,

which are determined through collective bargaining, have doubled from

US$30 in 2009 to US$59 in 2012 (LEDRIZ 2012). Few large capitalist

farms, such as Glen Avon, utilized collective bargaining agreements,

which place workers into different skills grades in the determination of

farm wages, while small capitalist farms used employers’ discretion andnegotiations at the farm level. The monthly wages paid to permanent

workers in the small capitalist farms in 2012 ranged from US$40 to

US$100.

The small capitalist farms linked to export crops such as tobacco and

horticulture and which had access to more capital, paid higher wages,










averaging US$80 (for example, MN of Banana Groove Farm), compared

to those with limited resources who focused on food production, paying

US$40 on average (for example, CK, Melfort of Secuta Farm). The farmwages for permanent workers in the small capitalist farms also reflected

hierarchy at the workplace. For instance, on MN’s plot at Banana Groove

Farm, the general hands from the piggery section earned US$75 per

month, compared to those in the field crop section, who earned US$60,

while the supervisors of the two sections earned US$100 and US$70,

respectively.

Collective bargaining excludes the wages of pieceworkers, which arenegotiated by the employer and employee. Since 2010, they ranged from

US$3 to US$5 per day in Goromonzi. The daily wage rates are differen-

tiated on the basis of the kind of tasks performed and the crops involved.

Arduous tasks, such as weeding, commanded a higher wage rate of

US$5 per day, in comparison to US$3 for less demanding tasks, such as

planting maize and soybeans, while most tasks in tobacco production

received US$5 per day. Competition for labour during peak periods leads

to wage bidding amongst capitalist farmers that raise wages for tasks pegged at US$3 to US$5 (Interviews, Lot 3 Buena Vista, 2 August 2012).

The non-payment of wages was a recurrent complaint in interviews

with farmworkers, while the agricultural workers’ trade union, GAPWUZ,

also claims that non-payment of wages is its ‘biggest challenge’ in

the dollarized economy (The Worker , 1 February 2012). Wage conflicts

are also pervasive across numerous economic sectors in the country.4

The situation is, however, differentiated across farms, as farmworkers

employed on capitalist farms with a steady cash flow—through, for

example, contract farming—receive wages on time. The farmers attribute

the non-payment of wages after 2009 to the dollarization of the economy,

the loss of Zimbabwe Dollar savings, credit shortages (The Sunday Mail ,

29 May 2011) and low commodity prices (Interviews, 31 July 2012).

Farmworkers have resisted low wages or infrequent payments by

quitting permanent employment and transitioning to piecework, as

well as absconding from work to gain extra income in piecework.According to KN, who quit his permanent job as a tractor driver on an

A2 farm, after not receiving wages for three months in 2010, piecework

frequently earns money for food, while the waiting period for wages is

shorter (Interviews, KN Buena Vista, 8 August 2012). Some large capi-

talist farms, such as Glen Avon, have introduced monthly attendance








200 Walter Chambati


allowances of US$10 to reduce worker absenteeism (Interview, Glen

Avon Farm, 2 August 2012).

The capitalist farmers are increasingly using labour saving techno-logies, such as herbicides, to reduce labour requirements and wage

outlays. Herbicide use reduces the cost of weeding a hectare of maize

from US$120 to US$11 and the labour requirement from 25 to 3 workers

(Interviews, District Agricultural Extension Officer, 8 July 2012).

The seasonal labour force at Glen Avon Farm was thus reduced from

110 to 80, between 2009 and 2010.

Various other strategies are being devised by employers to attractlabour. Offering meals to pieceworkers, beyond their daily wages, was

also observed in small capitalist farms in Goromonzi. Those farmers

unable to provide food were being forced to search for cheaper farm

labour in Communal Areas (Interview with JM, Lot 3 Buena Vista Farm,

6 June 2012). Permanent workers also received a food ration, which was

normally 20 kilogrammes of maize grain per month, in most capitalist

farms (Interview with MN, 31 July 2012).

Free residence in the compounds is also part of the farm wage struc-ture that is being received by labourers in both capitalist and family

farms, as well as in the homesteads of employers. The farmers that do not

provide residence to permanent and seasonal employees are by law sup-

posed to offer an allowance of US$35 per month (GoZ 2012).

Agrarian Labour Relations in Family FarmsAgrarian labour relations in family farms are substantially different from

those in capitalist farms, insofar as over 90 per cent of their labour is

derived from the immediate and extended family (Langyuito 2005). The

farm labour in the 1,673 A1 farms in Goromonzi is mainly provided by

about 6,000 self-employed family labourers, although some also hire in

labour to augment family supplies. Some family farms (5 per cent) also

divide their labour between own production and wage labour in thecapitalist farms to mobilize financial resources for food production

(AIAS 2007). Semi-proletarianization of labour thus persists, although

with more autonomy deriving from increased land access.

By 2006, the majority of peasant households (80.2 per cent) in

Goromonzi had established themselves on their family plots in the










redistributed LSCFs and had constructed houses and other related social

amenities (AIAS 2007), enabling them to engage in autonomous self-

employed farming.Family farm labour is drawn from the nuclear family, including young

children who are allocated tasks such as planting and herding livestock,

while sometimes landless extended family members are co-opted to

increase the labour supplies of the nuclear family on a permanent and

temporary basis (Moyo et al. 2009). Such recruitment, which is consid-

ered by some as ‘helping struggling relatives’, is exemplified by JT, a

family farmer on Xanadu B Farm, who recruited his nephew from nearbyEpworth High Density suburb whose income from informal employment

was failing to meet the costs of social reproduction. The nephew was

offered a place to stay on the farm in 2010, alongside contributing labour

with his wife to the family farm (Interview with JT, Xanadu Farm,

3 August 2012). Thus, kinship networks are also central in the mobiliza-

tion of labour in family farms.

Reciprocal labour exchanges are also a key feature of the organization

of production in Goromonzi. Groups of family farms team up to work onone of the participants’ plot, in activities such as weeding and this is

reciprocated among all the group members. These labour exchanges

were mostly organized around groups of family farmers who knew each

other prior to the FTLRP and originated themselves from the same

villages in the Communal Areas of Goromonzi. Some family farms also

divide their labour between their A1 plots and Communal Areas plots

that they still maintain. Up to 6 per cent of the A1 farmers in Goromonzi

did this (Moyo et al. 2009: 30).

The family farms can be differentiated according to those who also

hire in labour to supplement the family during peak agricultural periods;

about 83 per cent of the family farms in Goromonzi hired in labour

(AIAS 2007). The most common form of hired labour amongst the

family farms is piecework in weeding and harvesting. Only 33 per cent

of the family farms hired permanent labour (ibid.).

Part-time labour is mobilized from the farm compounds in familyfarms that were not allocated to any particular land beneficiary and are

considered state property. Farmworkers in these compounds are also

forced into mandatory labour provision, while those who refuse are

evicted. Employment audits again are implemented by family farmers to

identify defiant farm labourers. At Dunstan A1 farm compound, less than








202 Walter Chambati


16 per cent of the farm workers were employed on the farm as permanent

workers, whilst the remainder were pieceworkers on the farm and

elsewhere in the 2011–12 season (Interview, 6 June 2012). Five farmworkers (or 8 percent of the households) were evicted from Dunstan

Farm, after an employment audit by 30 A1 farmers, led by the sabhuku

(village head). The residential rights of the farmworkers were later

restored with the assistance of ZIMRIGHTS in the courts of law.

Land Rentals and Labour Exchange Relations

In the interstices between family and capitalist farming, there are new

intermediate forms of agrarian labour relations involving families which

rent and/or exchange land for labour and incomes in cash or kind, due to

differentiated access to land, labour and farming resources. This involves

less than 5 per cent of landless farm workers who largely provide hired

labour services from the compounds and other areas (communal and peri-urban areas), on both capitalist and family farms. This relation

involves an element of landlordism, as suggested by Moyo (2011).

Some farmworkers were provided with small plots of land in capital-

ist farms for independent production to complement wages, as was the

case in some former LSCFs (Vhurumuku et al. 1998). The large-scale

Glen Avon farmer allocated to his 170 farmworkers about 13 hectares to

share amongst themselves and to grow maize, ostensibly to make them

‘feel like they have a stake on the farm and build their loyalty’ (Interviews,31 July 2012). There is differentiation in the plot sizes received by farm-

workers, as senior workers were allocated double the land size than that

received by the general workforce. These plots of land are worked by the

farmworkers and their families outside the employment hours.

Small plots ranging between 0.04 and 0.5 hectares were being

accessed by part-time workers in the compounds. The former senior male

workers commanded larger land sizes, as they lived in the spacious sec-

tions of the farm compound, while the lowly skilled workers (mostly

females) who resided in the dormitories at Dunstan and Xanadu B farms

had the smallest plots and others had none (Interviews, 22 July 2012).

Approximately 36 per cent of the former farmworkers surveyed in 2006

farmed small plots in the farm compound, while also selling their labour










(AIAS 2007). The workers on these farms also ‘encroached’ onto grazing

lands communally owned by family farmers to harvest thatching grass

and firewood for sale and own consumption, as well as sand for brick making (Interviews, CM, Dunstan farm, 17 July 2012).

The freedom to choose what to produce in the small compound plots

varies. In the capitalist farms, maize and vegetable production was domi-

nant, as before 2000 (Vhurumuku et al. 1998), while in the family farms,

cash crops such as tobacco are also cultivated. Eight per cent of the farm

workers on Dunstan Farm grew tobacco in the 2011–12 season. The

extension of crops grown is attributed to the freedom obtained in thecompounds after the FTLRP as one farmworker said that:

we are now free. The white farmers are gone and we can do all these things

that he didn’t allow us to do. The country is now ours; there is no need to be

afraid of each other. The settlers are our fellow black colleagues (Interview,

CM Dunstan Farm, 16 July 2012).

The farm workers have been resisting efforts by farmers to stop themfrom producing tobacco, as they are no longer selling their labour

(Interview, WP Dunstan Farm 6 June 2012) and continue to grow tobacco

on the strength of the peace order against their evictions obtained from

the courts (discussed earlier).

In the family farms, the first type of exchange entails former farm-

workers being offered small plots of land in return for labour supplies.

These kinds of exchanges were observed amongst a few farmworkers in

the compounds. At Dunstan farm, only one out of the estimated 60 farm-workers provided labour to a family farm in return for one hectare of

land in the 2011–12 season, while this involved 5 per cent of the workers

at Xanadu B Farm. Family labour time of the farm workers is divided

between the exchange plots and the A1 farms that extend the land to

them. Landless farmworkers were reluctant to enter into these exchanges,

as family farms had a tendency of offering them land requiring clearing

every season (Interview, PG Dunstan Farm, 31 July 2012).

The second type of exchange involves the recruitment of extended

family members to work on family farms, not for a wage but for a share

of the output and food and housing, during the duration. The family

farms provide the agricultural inputs and their own labour, which is then

supplemented by the labour of relatives. This was observed in MC’s








204 Walter Chambati


family farm, which cultivated tobacco and maize on four and two hect-

ares, respectively. Two nephews that were recruited from the Communal

Area to augment nuclear family labour (comprising of the husband, wifeand two adult sons) were given 450 kilogrammes of tobacco for their

labour efforts in 2011–12 season, from the total of 3,000 kilogrammes

harvested (Interview, MC, Lot 3 Buena Vista, 2 August 2012).

The third type of exchange involves resource constrained family

farmers who are not able to utilize all their land and thus lease part of

their land to other landless households in return for a share of the crop on

a seasonal basis. The agricultural inputs and labour to farm the land pro-vided by the family farmers is supplied by the landless households. The

output from these lands is shared according to ratios agreed by both

parties, or through the discretion of the landless households. Farm

workers use family labour to work on this land accessed from family

farmers, while other landless households, such as rural civil servants

(for example, teachers), recruit pieceworkers to complement family sup-

plies. The discretionary crop shares obtained by family farmers from

leasing part of their land were normally low. For instance, a familyfarmer who leased one hectare of land during the 2011–12 season was

offered four per cent of the 3,500 kilogrammes of maize harvested by the

landless household (Interview, Dunstan Farm, 8 June 2012). These low

shares were accepted by the family farmers, as they obtained ‘some-

thing’ from the land, which they would otherwise not reap if the land lay

idle and ‘kept their land productive and prevented threats of land dispos-

session by the state’ (ibid.). The family farmers, however, bargained for

more when the shares were negotiated with landless households. This is

illustrated by a case in which a family farmer received 60 per cent of the

tobacco output from the one hectare plot leased to a farm worker house-

hold during the 2005–06 and 2006–07 seasons (Interview, WP, Dunstan

Farm, 8 June 2012).

Labour Organization on Farm Compounds

Land redistribution substantially dismantled the territorial monopoly

held by the former LSCFs and their spatial segregation, which previ-

ously allowed political and economic domination over adjacent areas

(Moyo 2011). Within the reconfigured local power relations, farm










workers now deploy their own social networks around new land owner-

ship patterns and kinship relations, to organize their homes and commu-

nity and to resist super-exploitation and varied forms of deprivation,including of their residential rights. Furthermore, various external agents,

such as political parties and NGOs, attempt to mobilize farm workers in

the social struggle to improve their material conditions towards the polit-

ical agendas of the former.

This new context has undermined the excessive political and social

control that was exercised by white farmers, in both work and off-work

relations, through local unaccountable governance systems. Inaccuratelycalled ‘domestic government’ (Rutherford 2001), they were repressive

and largely built on the dependency of workers on a single employer for

both employment and residency. Such dependency relations were diluted

by the FTLRP, placing farmworkers in a better position to organize their

struggles against the new capitalist farms.

This politics is structured mainly around the farm compounds, which

have become active sites of organizing by former and new farm workers

to advance their social, cultural and economic interests. The organizationis influenced by the hierarchal order generated in the work relations,

which differentiates them on the basis of labour skills, as well as gender,

leadership positions in local organizations and access to and control over

land.

The senior workers that previously mediated work and off-work rela-

tions between white employers and black employees (Amanor-Wilks

1995) have remained influential in the organization of labour after 2000.

They continue to occupy the so-called ‘compound leader’ position that

was responsible for resolving conflicts in the farm compound. These

existing leadership structures are recognized widely and are mandated to

inform the sabhuku, as was the case with the conflicts at Dunstan farm.

In small capitalist farms, where there is no traditional authority, the com-

pound leaders are very influential and also undertake some functions of

the sabhuku, such as granting permission for burial rights in the farm

cemetery (Interview, AK, Banana Groove, 31 July 2012).The application of labour residential tenancy by farmers implies that

the farm compound is a contested space in which workers mobilize

themselves to defend their land and residential rights. The farm labour

community relies on state institutions such as courts to restore residency

in the compound, as was done by the farmworkers at Dunstan and








206 Walter Chambati


Banana Groove Farm and also resorts to physical confrontation with

the farmers to resist evictions. Farm workers in different compounds

sometimes share information to support the resistance to evictions. For instance, the farmworkers evicted from Dunstan Farm were alerted of

the legal services of ZIMRIGHTS by colleagues at neighbouring Banana

Groove Farm.

The formal and informal worker committees that are geared towards

responding to labour grievances have their roots in the farm compound.

For instance, at Banana Groove Farm, the former senior farm workers

organized the workers to boycott employers with a known history of non-payment of wages (Interviews, AK, Banana Groove, 13 July 2012).

The workers refuse to board the trucks of these employers when they

come to recruit labour. Such employers are forced to go and seek labour

from places far away from their farms. Farm workers canvass for support

for election into formal workers’ committees in the compounds. The

formal work committees were responsible for organizing work strikes

experienced in October 2009, over unpaid backdated salary increments

in the large farms. At Glen Avon farm, the workers committee, with theassistance of GAPWUZ, organized work stoppages during the beginning

of tobacco planting season to force their employer to pay the salary

increments which had been agreed. The presence of unions in the new

farms is, however, weak and capitalist farmers tend to dominate the

collective bargaining process (Chambati 2011, 2013).

Agrarian labour politics is also influenced by the integration of farm

workers into the wider community through various social and economic

processes in the former LSCFs. As such, the stark difference between

farmers and workers defined by race, wealth and culture that existed in

the past (Loewenson 1992) is dissipating in the new farms, because of

the increased social integration across class in the absence of racial seg-

regation. Familial relations are evolving through inter-marriages between

the communities of farmworkers and land beneficiaries, as some workers

now have sons- and daughters-in-law among land beneficiaries. These

relations consolidate the social structures of farm workers, as well as providing a source of land and augmenting the family labour supplies of

the land beneficiaries (Interviews, Xanadu B farm, 4 August 2012).

Over time friendships have also developed between family farmers

and farmworkers through socializing in the same places, including

belonging to the same church and school development committee, or










drinking beer in the informal bars dotted around the farm compounds.

At Dunstan and Xanadu B farms, both farmworkers and family farmers

patronised the informal bars run by farmworkers and had joint socialsoccer teams. The children of farmworkers and family farmers at Dunstan

farm attended the same new government primary school established in

the former farm house. This is partly attributed to the emerging cordial

relations as observed by one farmworker who said that: ‘we are getting

used to each other [farmworkers and land beneficiaries] over time and

conflicts between us are declining’ (Interview, Xanadu Farm, 4 August

2012). The friendship networks are used to mobilize farm labour by thefarmers, as well as negotiating land access by farm workers (Interview,

Xanadu Farm, 4 August 2012).

Political party mobilization is also a platform of integration for the

land beneficiary and farmworker communities. The Zimbabwe African

National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is most active in mobiliza-

tion of the political constituency in the new farms of Goromonzi. The old

and new farm compounds have been added to the party structures of

ZANU-PF, alongside the villages of land beneficiaries. Participation in political party structures by farmworkers also served to further their

material interests. Two farmworker youths on Dunstan Farm, active in

ZANU-PF structures, were being earmarked for the one hectare land

allocations that were being planned by the village committee (Interview,

Extension Officer, 17 August 2012). Other farmworkers also reported

receiving subsidized farming inputs distributed through ZANU-PF party

structures (Interview, 6 July, Dunstan Farm). Quite crucially, some farm-

workers also noted their participation created hopes against their evic-

tion from the compounds through protection from local party leadership

who are influential in the social structures of family farmers.

The other major political party, the Movement for Democratic

Change—Tsvangirai (MDC-T), which actively mobilized white LSCFs

and farmworkers in the early 2000s, during the referendum and land

occupations (Sadomba 2008), in defence of the jobs of farm workers, is

not as visible as ZANU-PF. However, the returns from the 2008 electionsreflect the presence of the MDC-T, as it won 21 per cent of council seats

in the former LSCFs, while ZANU-PF won the rest of the wards (ZESN

2008).

Finally, there is also the question of social integration pertaining to

the farmworkers of former migrant origin. In resettled communities with








208 Walter Chambati


people of diverse ethnic backgrounds, social integration occurs over

time (Barr 2004). Farm workers of foreign migrant origin, with different

social and cultural practices, could therefore be expected to take longer to be integrated into the new communities.

Farm workers seek to preserve their identity and belonging through

various forms of social and cultural mobilization. For instance, migrant

workers express cultural practices of their countries of origin, such as the

nyao dances of the Nyanja and Chewa people of Malawi, Zambia and

Mozambique. The farmworkers at Dunstan Farm had their nyao society

which practiced religious rituals every Sunday within the confines of thefarm compound prior to 2000. About 15 of the 60 farm worker house-

holds at Dunstan Farm are part of the nyao society.

The sense of identity and belonging of migrant workers at Dunstan

Farm is being threatened by the restriction of this cultural practice by the

sabhuku. The farmworkers were restricted from practicing the nyao

dance in 2003, as it was considered to conflict with the spirit mediums

which are part of the cosmology in rural Zimbabwe (Interview, Village

Head, Dunstan Farm, 16 July 2012). Apparently, farmworkers have beennegotiating for accommodation of this cultural practice with the local

traditional authorities over a period of time and have sometimes gotten

permission to practice during national holidays between 2003 and 2011.

The nyao dance is being slowly integrated into the cultural practices of

the land reform communities. At Dunstan farm, about five individuals

from amongst the family farmers also joined the nyao society dominated

by farm workers. The rituals of the nyao dances are now being practiced

on a monthly basis at Dunstan Farm since 2011. The court peace orders

that the farmworkers won against evictions by land beneficiaries are

used to consolidate these cultural rights.

Conclusion

Land redistribution reconfigured the labour reserve of the past by releas-

ing landless and land-short peasants into self-employment in various

forms of petty-commodity production in the enlarged family-farm sector.

This also shifted the supply of wage labour to an increased number of

differentiated capitalist farms. The semi-proletarianization of labour










persists, as poor peasants participate in wage labour markets to mobilize

scarce resources for their own farming, but they do so with more auton-

omy derived from increased land access. Furthermore, in a district suchas Goromonzi, where land shortages are more acute in the Communal

Areas than other districts, land short peasants continue to supply wage

labour to the diverse range of capitalist farms.

In general, the agency of farm labourers has been strengthened par-

ticularly through the weakening of the residential labour tenancy system

and the relations of dependence that it generated. New farmers are unable

to exercise the social and political control over workers that former LSCFs exercised and this allows for active mobilization and resistance

to super-exploitation in the capitalist farms by labourers. Nonetheless,

super-exploitative tendencies continue, through low wages and residual

farm compound labour tenancy in some capitalist farms. Thus, the farm

compound remains a contested space and site of resistance over the

control of labour between farm workers and the new capitalist farms.

The micro-analysis pursued in this research exposes the dynamism and

variations of the new agrarian labour relations that exist across districts.The new agrarian structure in Goromonzi, for instance, is unique from the

outcomes elsewhere, insofar as it has retained a larger base of LSCFs and

allocated most of the land acquired under the FTLRP to capitalist farmers,

rather than to land-short peasants. The micro-analysis also illuminates the

local labour processes, such as wage formation and struggles between

capital and labour, that are not captured in aggregated analysis.

As the process of social differentiation within and across the three

modes of organization of production proceeds apace, driven by unequal

access to farming resources and commodity markets, future research

should explore the on-going re-organization of agrarian labour pro-

cesses, including the trajectory of semi-proletarianization and its atten-

dant political struggles.

Notes

1. The present study draws on a 2006 baseline survey of 695 landholders and173 farmworkers in Goromonzi district, supplemented by further qualitative

surveys in 2012.

2. The labour estimates are derived from average labour per farm in the differ-

entiated capitalist farms observed in the district by AIAS (2007), which were

then applied to the new agrarian structure constructed in Table 1.









210 Walter Chambati


3. These include electricity, first aid clinic and pre-school.

4. There have been numerous conflicts over wages between civil servants and

the government since 2009; see The Herald , 9 October 2012.

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