Agrarian Law Case DigestsStephanie Q. Dandal18 July 2015Daez v.
CA
Facts: Petitioner Daez owned a 4.1685 hectare land in
Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by the respondent
farmers Soriente et al. The problem arose when the land was
subjected to the OLT pursuant to PD 27 as amended by LOI 474. Thus,
the land was transferred to the ownership of beneficiaries on
December 9, 1980.
On May 31, 1981, private respondents made an affidavit under
duress stating they are not tenants but hired workers. Hence, Daez
apllied for exemption of OLT claiming her land is untenanted and
the cancellation of the CLTs. (not majorly related to the topic)In
their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her
husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of
agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14)
hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10)
hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential landsin
Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare
landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in
Meycauayan.
DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina:
Denying Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding
that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner
being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7)
hectares.
DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong Leong affirmed the assailed
order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of
the subject land. Disregarded the affidavit of the farmers under
duress.
Court of AppealsSustained the decision of both DAR
secretaries
Supreme CourtDenied their prayers and sustained the
decisions
Main Issue Related to our topicExemption of the 4.1685 riceland
from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her,
Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.
DAR Regional DirectorMarch 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director
Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject
riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to
retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual
tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by
law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.
DAR SecretaryAffirmed the decision of the regional director.
Appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
Office of the PresidentRuled in favor of Daez or her heirs and
rendered judgment authorizing the retention of the 4.1685 hectare
of land. Still denied the application of the children. Hence the
appeal in CA.
Court of AppealsReversed and set aside the decision of the
Office of the President.
Issue: WON Daez may retain the disputed 4.1685 hectares land
Held: Petitioner Daez has the right to retain the 4.1685 hectare
land pursuant to her right of retention under 6657. The decision of
the Office of the President is reinstated.
Ratio:Read Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657Paez was denied the right to
choose what she wants to retain.
THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by
FERNANDO CAYABYAB,petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by MANUEL
SISON,respondents.Facts: This is a petition for review of the
decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals upholding an
order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico,
setting aside the previous orders of his predecessors who had
issued certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and
corn lands of the late Dr. Jose Sison without due regard for the
right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of their shares if
they did not own more than seven (7) hectares of rice or corn
land.
Certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr.
Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. the heirs of
Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform,
Conrado Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land
transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."Minister Estrella ordered an
investigation of the case which revealed that the landholdings of
the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided
among his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition dated April 2, 1966. Consequently, the acting MAR
District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the
cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had been
issued to the petitioners-tenants. However, a Reinvestigation
Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended that the landholdings be
included in the Operation Land Transfer.Petition filed by Manuel
Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for
exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer was denied. Motion for reconsideration was denied as
well.After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the
individual heirs, an order was issued on September 7, 1988 by
Secretary Juico, modifying the orders of his predecessors. He ruled
that the ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison are
exempt from the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes,
Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are
entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their
ricelands, since they are not owners of more than seven (7)
hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison
are not entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands from
the Operation Land Transfer because they each own more than seven
(7) hectares of other agricultural land.ISSUE: Whether or not the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform has the authority to cancel
certificates issues?RULING:Petitioners contention that the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority or jurisdiction
to cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been
issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance,
recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within
the Secretarys administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D.
27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to
retain their ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares)
and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly
ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which
had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS.
TERESITA V. SALVADOR, RESPONDENT.Facts: Respondent alleged that she
is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140 issued by virtue of Free
Patent No. (VII-5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino
Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador that petitioners acquired
possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her
predecessors-in-interest and that despite several verbal and
written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the
subject land.In their Answer petitioners interposed the defense of
agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased
husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and
permission of respondent's predecessors-in-interest, siblings
Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and
Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and
share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a
tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that
it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC. The
Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court remanded the case to the MTC
for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship
exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration
arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was served by the
parties' submission of their respective position papers and other
supporting evidence. On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the
reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10,
2003. On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between
the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or
her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy
relationship.ISSUE: WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS
OF THE SUBJECT LANDRULING: Agricultural tenancy relationshipdoes
not exist in the instant case.
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites
are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest
is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. In
this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship
exists between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the
affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. The statements
in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient
to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.
As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking.
Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence
was submitted to show that respondent's predecessors-in-interest
consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Self-serving
statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the
landowner; independent evidence is necessary.
Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of
harvest. The affidavits of petitioners' neighbors declaring that
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in
the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should have presented
receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of
harvest and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them
and the landowners.
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was
the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of
254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are
watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang
community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights
over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in
December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional
Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from
Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought
the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the
ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian
Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under
the CARP.
The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory
acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of
the property contending that the area was not appropriate for
agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes
of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters,
who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled
against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of
DARAB.
Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by
CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a
watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657
Ruling:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from
its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels
of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for
watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility
that needs to be answered now.
Roxas and Co., Inc. v. CAFacts: Petitioner Roxas and Co. Is a
corporation that owns 3 haciendas in Batangas, which the government
wishes to acquire under the Comprehensive Agrarian Law (CARL).
Before the effectivity of the law, the petitioner filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to EO 229, which served as guidelines to
the comprehensive agrarian program. The two other haciendasBanilad
and Palicowere placed under compulsory acquisition by the DAR in
accordance with the CARL.
Hacienda Banilad and PalicoDAR sent invitations to Roxas and Co
in order to discuss the results of the DAR investigation, finding
both Banilad and Palico qualified under the CARP. For Hacienda
Palico, DAR sent a letter of acquisition to Roxas and Co at their
offices in Manila, while for Hacienda Banilad, DAR addressed the
notices to Jaime Pimintel, caretaker of the said hacienda. It was
petitioner Pimintel who attended all the proceedings regarding the
two haciendas. Hence, during trial, Roxas and Co claimed that they
were not informed of the acquisition proceedings on their two
haciendas.
DAR then opened a trust account in favor of petitioner Roxas and
Co. These trust accounts were replaced by DAR with cash and Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds. Meanwhile, petitioner Roxas
applied for the conversion of the haciendas from agricultural to
non-agricultural. Despite this, DAR proceeded with the acquisition
of the two haciendas. It then issued and distributed certificate of
land ownership awards (CLOA) to farmer beneficiaries.
Hacianda CaylawayAlthough Hacienda Caylaway was initially
offered for sale to the government, Roxas and Co sent a letter to
DAR secretary withdrawing its offer. According to Roxas, the
reclassification of Caylaway from agricultural to non agricultural
was authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. Also, the
municipality of Nasugbu where the haciendas are located had been
declared a tourist zone. Roxas also argued that the land is not
suitable for agricultural purposes.
DAR secretary denied Roxas withdrawal of his VOS. According to
the secretary, the withdrawal can only be based on specific grounds
such as unsuitability of soil for agriculture, slope of the lad is
over 180 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.
Despite the denial of the withdrawal of the VOS, petitioner
still filed an application for conversion with the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), which submitted the case to the Secretary of DAR for
resolution. The DAR secretary dismissed the case.Roxas and Co went
to the CA on appeal. CA dismissed appeal claiming that petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issues:
1. WON the court can take cognizance of petitioners petition
despite failure to exhaust administrative remedies2. WON
acquisition proceedings against the petitioners were valid3. WON
the court can rule on whether the haciendas may be reclassified
from agricultural to non agricultural
Ruling:
1. Yes. Petitioners action falls under the exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies sine there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for the petitioners at
this point. The CLOAs were already issued despite the fact that
there was no just compensation.2. Acquisition proceedings against
petitioners violated their right to due process. First, there was
an improper service of the Notice of Acquisition. Notices to
corporations should be served through their president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors or partners.
Jaime Pimintel, to whom the notice was served, was neither of
those. Second, there was no notice of coverage, meaning, the
parcels of land were not properly identified before they were taken
by the DAR. Under the law, the land owner has the right to choose 5
hectares of land he wishes to retain. Upon receiving the Notice of
Acquisition, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of
its estate were subject to compulsory acquisiton. Third, The CLOAs
were issued to farmer beneficiaries without just compensation. The
law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP
bonds. DARs opening of a trust account in petitioners name does not
constitute payment. Even if later, DAR substituted the trust
account with cash and LBP bonds, such does not cure the lack of
notice, which still amounts to a violation of the petitioners right
to due process.3. Despite all this, the court has not jurisdiction
to rule on the reclassification of land from agricultural to non
agricultural. DARs failure to observe due process does not give the
court the power to adjudicate over petitioners application for land
conversion. DAR is charged with the mandate of approving
applications for land conversion. They have the tools and
experience needed to evaluate such applications; hence, they are
the proper agency with which applications for land use conversion
are lodged. DAR should be given a chance to correct their defects
with regard to petitioners right to due process. Petitioner
dismissed.
Note: Pertinent section although not mentioned in the case is
Sec. 20 of the LGC on power of LGU to reclassify land. However, the
code also provides that the CARL prevails over LGC provisions.
Heirs of Jose Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines
Facts: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria
Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land
located in Tambo,IliganCity. Said spouses were childless, but
Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another
woman. When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio
administered the subject property and sold the subject property to
Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was
notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954.
Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and
a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.On May 15,
1954, Hilaria died.Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed
as special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular
administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the administrator of
the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action
against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject
property. The decision stated thatthe subject property was the
conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that
the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject
property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and
the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of
the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in
it.Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law
mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to
farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under
the said program.However, only the heirs of Gregorio were
identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the
landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that
it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the
agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law
was violatedEventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private
respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject
property. ISSUE: Whether or not the e failure of the administrative
body to give written notice that the property bought by the
ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the
heirs due process.
RULING: YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of
agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production, implying
that there was no need for an actual notice. The importance of an
actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform
program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods
roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due
process of law.Since land acquisition under either Presidential
Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the
extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law
must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal
provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for
acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In
the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by
the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and
investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its
agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper
procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.In
addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of
the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale
executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste wasregistered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the
whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste
by virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the reason to
feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject
property.Moreover, DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and
not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of
Deleste. Althoughtax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
constructive possession. Petitioners right to due process of law
was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is
subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian
reform program.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
I.THE FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously
(11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with
MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda
Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court howeverdid not order outright land distribution.
Voting 6-5, the Court noted thatthere are operative facts that
occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore.Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or
[choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) toimmediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and
legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the
FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in
the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks,
as the case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Court decision.
II.THE ISSUES
(1)Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?(2)Is
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?(3)Cant the Court order that
DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLIs SDP?(4)Is the date of the taking (for
purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?(5)Has the 10-year
period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under
CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus
the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have
fully paid for the lands or not?(6)THE CRUCIAL ISSUE:Should the
ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be
reconsidered?
III.THE RULING
[The CourtPARTIALLY GRANTEDthe motions for reconsideration of
respondents PARC, et al.with respect to the option granted to the
original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to
remain with petitioner HLI,which option the Court
therebyRECALLEDandSET ASIDE. Itreconsidered its earlier decision
that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, andUNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land
distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1.YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact
doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the
suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to
invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made
by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force
and effect of laws.Prior to the nullification or recall of said
decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must
be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine
should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.The
majority stressed that the application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain
the benefits and homelots they received under the stock
distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or
not.]
2.NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on
the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it
wasnot raised at the earliest opportunityand that the resolution
thereof isnot the lis motaof the case. Moreover, the issue has been
renderedmoot and academicsince SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700.The majority clarified that in its July
5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that
there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may
justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3.NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of
Hacienda Lusita cover the full6,443 hectares and not just the
4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of
the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of
agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained
to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its
mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting
to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were
supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the areato be awarded to each FWB in the July 5,
2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are
roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are
considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily
result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB
the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR
leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case
the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure
the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR,it is
the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified
FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding
thatthe 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been
validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by
intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita
Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate
80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The
Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of
the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare
land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4.YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLIs SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation,the date of
taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP)
since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise,
these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through
the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP,
that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of
coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the
contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the
notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI
is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the
cases cited to justify this position involved the stock
distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case.The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that
the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can
file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian
court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to
review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.]
5.NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded
lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the
qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be
transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
theissuanceandregistrationof the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the
EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the
instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point isthe issuance of the EP or
CLOA, andnot the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the
option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then
all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since,
at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to
persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6.YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI
should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified
FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the
subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in
HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this
33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is
unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs.Control
means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the
common shares and other voting shares.Applying the formula to the
HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the
majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital
shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short
of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control
over HLI.]
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao
Facts: The DUMLAOS were co-owners of a 32 hectare ricelands in
Nueva Vizcaya which was placed under OLT by virtue of PD27 (note
that actual date of taking was not stated.)
The DAR made a preliminary valuation on 16 hectares (2 lots) and
payments were made to the DUMLAOs by Landbank. The DUMLAOs filed a
complaint before the RTC to determine just compensation, and
requested the appointment of 3 commissioners to make the
determination.
The DAR moved to dismiss claiming that the RTC does not have
jurisdiction. The RTC eventually recognized the case and ordered
payment at 6,912.50 per hectare for one lot & to follow the
amount provided for in the Land Valuation Summary and Farmers
Undertaking for the other lot. The DUMLAOs was claiming market
value of 109,000 per hectare.The DUMLAOs appealed to the CA which
ruled in their favor, which noted that the time of taking was not
certain. The CA held that after the passage of RA No. 6657, the
formula relative to valuation under PD No. 27 no longer
applies.
Under PD 27 and EO No. 228, the formula for computing the Land
Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn lands is:
2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.
Under the CARL, it is provide:Sec. 17. Determination of Just
Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties,
its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
ISSUE: Which law should be followed to determine just
compensation
Ruling: (1) The just compensation due to respondents should be
determined under the provisions of RA No. 6657.The Court has
repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to
the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance
with said law, although the property was acquired under PD No. 27.
The latter law, being thelatestlaw in agrarian reform, should
control, as held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel
T. Domingo.
Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD
27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the
Act also provides Sec. 7. Priorities. The DAR, in coordination with
the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and distribution of
all agricultural lands through a period of ten (10) years from the
effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as
follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or
abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the
owners for agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the
government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be
acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this
Act, with the implementation to be completed within a period of not
more than four (4) years.
This demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the
properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the
landless.
DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time makes it inequitable to follow the
guidelines provided by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228.Hence, RA No. 6657
should apply.
NOTE HOWEVER that the CAs act of setting just compensation in
the amount ofP109,000.00 would have been a valid exercise of this
judicial function, had it followed the mandatory formula prescribed
by RA No. 6657.However, the appellate court merely chose the lower
of two (2) values specified by the commissioner as basis for
determining just compensation, namely: (a)P109,000.00 per hectare
as themarket valueof first class unirrigated rice land in the
Municipality of Villaverde; and (b)P60.00 per square meter as
thezonal valueof the land in otherbarangaysin Villaverde.
This is likewise erroneous because it does not adhere to the
formula provided by RA No. 6657 under Section 17, as implemented
through DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) - LV= (CNIx 0.6) + (CS x 0.3)
+ (MV x 0.1), where: LV = Land Value CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
(2) The taking of the properties for the purpose of computing
just compensation should be reckoned from the date of issuance of
emancipation patents.
The nature of the landatthattimedetermines the just compensation
to be paid.
(3) The DUMLAOs are entitled to payment of just compensation on
their entire landholdings covered by Operation Land Transfer,
except for the five hectares of retention area each of them are
entitled to (RIGHT OF RETENTION).The determination of just
compensation is judicial in nature.TheDARs land valuation is only
preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner or any other interested party.In the exercise of its
functions, the courts still have the final say on what the amount
of just compensation will be.
A reading of Section 18of RA No. 6657 shows that it is the
courts, not theDAR, which make the final determination of just
compensation.
Also, to wait for theDARvaluation despite its unreasonable
neglect and delay in processing the four properties claimfolders is
to violate the elementary rule that payment of just compensation
must be within a reasonable period from the taking of
property.While the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine in a preliminary manner the amount of just compensation,
the circumstances of this case militate against the application of
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES
JORJA RIGOR-SORIANO AND MAGIN SORIANO, NAMELY: MARIVEL S. CARANDANG
AND JOSEPH SORIANO, Respondents.
Facts: Marivel Carandang and Joseph Soriano are the children of
the late Sps. Jorja Rigor- Soriano and Magin Soriano, the owners of
the two parcels of land located in Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.
The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and
were valued by the Land Bank and the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) at P10,000.00/hectare. Contending that such valuation was too
low compared to existing valuations of agricultural lands, the
heirs commenced an action for just compensation. They asked that a
final valuation of the properties be pegged at P1,800,000.00, based
on Administrative Order No. 61, Series of 1992 and R.A. No.
6657.
The RTC ordered Land Bank to pay the heirs the amount
P1,227,571.10 as just compensation.
Land Bank appealed to the CA. The CA denied the petition.
Hence, Land Bank appealed to the Supreme Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, both parties entered into an
agreement re-evaluating the cost of the parcels of land. Thus, Land
Bank submitted a manifestation informing the High Court that the
parties have already filed their Joint Motion to Approve submitting
their Agreement dated November 29, 2012.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present appeal to the Supreme Court
should be dismissed?
Ruling:
The appeal should be closed and terminated.
CIVIL LAW: compromise; contract
The Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and
voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their
dispute in this case. Under Art. 2028 of the Civil Code, a
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the
objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or
extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation.
As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent.
However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between
the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is
approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a
compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and
principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and
conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy and public order. A review of the terms
of the Agreement, indicates that it is a judicial compromise
because the parties intended it to terminate their pending
litigation by fully settling their dispute.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.SPOUSES PLACIDO
ORILLA and CLARA DY ORILLA,respondents.
Facts: Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the
owners of Lot No. 1, 11-12706, situated in Bohol, containing an
area of 23.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 18401. In the latter part of November 1996, the
Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(DAR-PARO) of Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land Valuation and
Acquisition dated November 15, 1996 informing them of the
compulsory acquisition of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act
[RA] 6657) forP371,154.99 as compensation based on the valuation
made by the Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner).Respondents
rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the Provincial
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Provincial DARAB)
conducted a summary hearing on the amount of just compensation.
Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the valuation made by the
petitioner.After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision
which rendered fixing the just compensation of the land of
petitioner subject matter of the instant action atP7.00 per square
meter. Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and
solidarily indemnify the petitioners their expenses for attorneys
fee and contract fee in the conduct of the appraisal of the land by
a duly licensed real estate appraiser Angelo G. Fajardo of which
petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for the approval
of the Court.
After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision dated
November 20, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered fixing the just compensation
of the land of petitioner subject matter of the instant action
atP7.00 per square meter, as only prayed for, which shall earn
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same
shall have been fully paid. Furthermore, respondents are hereby
ordered to jointly and solidarily indemnify the petitioners their
expenses for attorneys fee and contract fee in the conduct of the
appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real estate appraiser
Angelo G. Fajardo of which petitioner shall submit a bill of costs
therefor for the approval of the Court.On March 13, 2001,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action18forcertiorariand prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction. It questioned the propriety of the
SAC Order granting the execution pending appeal. Respondents and
the presiding judge of the SAC, as nominal party, filed their
respective comments on the petition.In its Decision dated July 29,
2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground
that the assailed SAC Order dated December 21, 2000 granting
execution pending appeal was consistent with justice, fairness, and
equity, as respondents had been deprived of the use and possession
of their property pursuant to RA 6657 and are entitled to be
immediately compensated with the amount as determined by the SAC
under the principle of "prompt payment" of just
compensation.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated February 5, 2003. Hence, this appealISSUE: THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED
TO EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC
BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, EVEN
THOUGH THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT IS SATISFIED BY THE PAYMENT
AND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE PROVISIONAL COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION
16(E) OF RA 6657, UPON SUBMISSION OF THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF
"LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, ET
AL.," G.R. NO. 118712, OCTOBER 6, 1995 AND JULY 5, 1996, AND NOT BY
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE
SAC.RULING: In this case, do good reasons exist to justify the
grant by the SAC of the motion for execution pending appeal? The
answer is a resounding YES.The expropriation of private property
under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, being a
means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers,
envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually
till. As an exercise of police power, it puts the landowner, not
the government, in a situation where the odds are practically
against him. He cannot resist it. His only consolation is that he
can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the
property taken by the government. As expected, the landowner will
exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he
can only be entitled to "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by
rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is
merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.In light of
these circumstances, the SAC found that the valuation made by
petitioner, and affirmed by the DAR, was unjustly way below the
fair valuation of the landholding at the time of its taking by the
DAR. The SAC, mindful also of the advanced age of respondents at
the time of the presentation of evidence for the determination of
just compensation, deemed it proper to grant their motion for
execution pending appeal with the objective of ensuring "prompt
payment" of just compensation.Contrary to the view of petitioner,
"prompt payment" of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere
deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation
determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the
landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set by RA
6657.Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to
the market value of the property, broadly described as the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property
as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it
being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the
takers gain but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to modify
the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, and ample.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No.
6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in
cash and bonds the amounts respectively earmarked, reserved and
deposited in trust accounts for private respondents, and to allow
them to withdraw the same. Petitioner DAR maintained that
Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making
power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR
maintained that the issuance of the Certificate of Deposit by the
Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA
6657.
Issue: Whether or not the opening of trust accounts is a valid
payment for just compensation
Ruling: It is very explicit from the provisions of RA 6657 that
the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does
it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in
any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust account
among the valid modes of deposit that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from
which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In
sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant
an expanded construction of the term deposit.
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
Facts: These are four consolidated cases questioning the
constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act(R.A. No.
6657and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No.
3844).Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social
Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the
State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844
was enacted in1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in1972 to provide
for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. In1987, President Corazon Aquinoissued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD
27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered
by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In1987,P.P.
No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP)
was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing themechanicsfor its
(PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions.[Two of the
consolidated cases are discussed below]G.R. No. 78742: (Association
of Small Landowners vs Secretary)The Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is
comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short,
they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs
Juico)Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform
laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation.Manaay also questioned the provision which states
that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.ISSUE:1. Whether
or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.2.
Whether or not there is a violation of due process.3. Whether or
not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be
in terms of cash.Ruling: 1. No. TheAssociation had not shown any
proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law,classificationhas been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
followingrequirements:(1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions;(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3)
it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) it must
apply equally to all the members of the class.Equal protection
simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The Associationhave not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must
be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will
not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion
is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary,
it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners
as part of the agrarian reform program.2. No. It is true that the
determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like
the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and
the government even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through
appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention
is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the
just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of
just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to
court and the determination of the latter shall be the final
determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:Section 16
(f):Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter
to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a
concept intraditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian
reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO R. TANTOCO, SR., MARIA R. TANTOCO, ZOSIMO
TANTOTCO, MARGARITA R. TANTOCO and PACITA R.
TANTOCO,petitioners,vs. HON. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, GEN. TRIAS, CAVITE, REGISTER OF DEEDS
FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE and THE DAR REGION IV DIRECTOR,
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. who died and was
substituted by his heirs while this case was still pending before
the DARAB Adjudication Board for Region IV, and his co-petitioners,
namely, Maria R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco, Margarita R. Tantoco and
Pacita R. Tantoco, were the former owners of a vast track of land
with an area of 106.5128 hectares, situated at San Francisco,
General Trias, Cavite and previously registered in their names
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33404 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
At about that time, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was
already considering the land in question for compulsory acquisition
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Francisco Tantoco,
Sr., for and in his own behalf and in behalves of his
co-petitioners, declared the productive nature and agricultural
suitability of the land in dispute and at the same time offered the
same to the DAR for acquisition under the Voluntary Offer To Sell
(VOS) scheme of the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).
Obviously welcomed by the DAR, the offer was immediately acted
upon. Hence, after processing the acquisition of the same 100
hectares under the VOS scheme of Republic Act No. 6657, the DAR
issued on August 30, 1993 a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) in favor of private respondent Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Association (ARBA) of San Francisco, General Trias, Cavite and its
53 members. In turn, on the basis of the same CLOA, the respondent
Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. CLOA-1424 in the name of
ARBA and its 53 members and accordingly cancelled the Tantocos' TCT
No. T-402203.The Tantocos filed their petition for cancellation of
TCT N. CLOA-1424 and the reinstatement of their TCT No. T-402203.
Impleaded in the same petition as additional respondents are the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite and the DAR Region IV
Director.
The land in question is within the on-going industrial estate
development site per land use plan of the Municipality of General
Trias, Cavite; that it has been planted to sugar and declared as
such for taxation purposes. In an Order dated September 1, 1986 of
the then Minister of Agrarian Reform Heherson Alvarez, the same
land was declared outside of the purview or ambit of Presidential
Decree No. 27; that the property is within that portion of Cavite
that has been declared as an industrial zone in the CALABARZON
area, reason for which the price of real properties thereat has
greatly appreciated, "so much so that almost all persons, including
owners, investors and farmers became interested, and even
pseudo-claimants are speculating to make a windfall profit on
whatever real property they could lay their hands on"; that the
approval of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law on June 10, 1988,
coupled with the knowledge that the area has been declared part of
the industrial zone of Cavite, persons unknown to petitioners begun
to claim to be tenants or farmholders on said land, when in truth
and in fact, petitioners never had any tenant/farmworker thereon,
and neither did the petitioners give their consent for anyone to
farm the same "which is suitable for sugarcane, residential or
industrial purposes and not for rice or corn or other industrial
products"
Coupled with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and
eventually a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
respondents, particularly ARBA, "from negotiating, selling or
otherwise disposing of said land, or any part or portion thereof",
the petition prays for a judgment: (a) declaring TCT No. CLOA-1424
as null and void from the beginning and ordering its cancellation;
(b) reinstating the petitioners' TCT No. T-402203, or issuing a new
title to them; and (c) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cavite to
effect said mandate, plus damages and attorney's fees.
In its Answer, respondents ARBA denied the material allegations
of the petition, and averred, among other things, that the subject
land is planted to several crops such as rice, corn, bananas,
vegetable, etc.; that the farmer-beneficiaries listed in TCT No.
T-CLOA-1424 are qualified beneficiaries as provided for in Section
22 of Republic Act No. 6657; that due process the coverage under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the land in
dispute.
Both the petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appealed to
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) at Quezon City, where their
respective recourses were consolidated and docketed as DARAB Case
No. 6385.
In time, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
followed by a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and a
Submission, to which a corresponding Opposition was interposed by
respondent ARBA.Eventually, in its Resolution of September 6, 1999,
the DARAB denied petitioners' motions "for lack of merit", saying
that "no new matters are adduced by the movants which will warrant
a reversal of the board's decisionISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DARAB ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED JULY 1,
1998, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACTS
BY THE REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR IN HER DECISION DATED JUNE 17,
1997.
RULING:
NO.
The Court made a thorough review of the evidence on record and
found nothing therein to substantiate petitioners' posture. It may
well happen, as it normally does, that a piece of evidence may be
viewed differently by different fora. Certainly, however, if an
appellate agency, like the DARAB, did not adoptin totothe finding
of facts made by a subordinate office, and even disagrees with
them, more so when, as here, the disagreement is well-explained, We
are at loss to understand how grave abuse of discretion, as
understood in law and jurisprudence, may be imputed to the
latter.Finally, petitioners presently question the legal competence
and authority of the four (4) DARAB members who signed and
promulgated the assailed decision. It is petitioners' thesis that
all four (4) of them are political appointees of former President
Fidel V. Ramos. As such, and pursuant to Executive Order No. 1,
allegedly issued by the incumbent President soon after assuming
office on June 30, 1998, whereunder all political appointees of the
former President were deemed terminated from office, said members
had ceased to be such effective July 1, 1998. Prescinding
therefrom, petitioners contend that the decision under review which
was promulgated on July 1, 1998, "is null and void" for lack of
legal authority on the part of the same four (4) DARAB members who
signed and promulgated the decision.As indicated below their
respective names, DARAB members Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P.
Quijano and Sergio B. Serrano are all Assistant Secretary in the
Department of Agrarian Reform, the first being at the same time
Vice Chairman of DARAB, while the last two (2) are members of the
same Board, while member Artemio A. Adaza, Jr., was then the DAR
Undersecretary.In the absence of a showing by the petitioners, and
none has been made by them, that the four (4) DARAB members are
non-career officials, the challenge on their legal authority to
sign and promulgate the assailed decision must simply fall.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, petitioner,vs.DARAB,
et.al.,respondents
Facts:
The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education
institution owned and run by the estate located in the town of
Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilag,
Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an
agricultural school in Mindanao.In the early 1960's, it was
converted into a college until it became what is now known as the
CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. On January 16,
1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao
Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of
what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares
was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the
petitioner.Several tribes belonging to cultural communities,
opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands
forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were
granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school
was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a
livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under
which the land resources of the University were leased to its
faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written
contract. The faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of
five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how,
practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each
group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice
projects. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use
participant's fee. It was expressly stipulated that no
landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the
faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as
a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity
program to utilize available land, train people in modern
agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and
staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU reservation to
earn additional income to augment their salaries.
Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix
Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio
Pelayo and other complainants (respondents). Obrique was a Physics
Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the
lowland rice project.
In 1986, the agri-business project for the production of rice,
corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training
Project was discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on
the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the
complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. The
CMU later launched a self-help project called CMU-Income
Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources,
mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide
socio-economic and technical training in actual field project
implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts
were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served
with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the
rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to
termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
ISSUES:1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and
decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
coverage of land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious
errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari
and affirming the decision of DARAB.
Ruling:
DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING
IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A.
6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is
limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP.
More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and
controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the
aforementioned program. It does not include those which are
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary
for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up
experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers,
etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and
adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the
CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and
exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its
purposes.
SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT
COMPLAINANTS ARE TENANTS: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Where the
quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not
entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous
interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order
private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order
segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding
that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an
erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or
exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP.
Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not
entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS
OF SCHOOL. As to the determination of when and what lands arefound
to be necessaryfor use by the CMU, the school is in the best
position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the
problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which
the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the
Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or
discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so
manifest as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse
of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication
Board. The Court declared the decision of the DARAB and the Court
of Appeals as null and void and hereby orders that they be set
aside, with costs against the private respondents.
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education,
Culture and Sports
Facts: Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision
of CA which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of
189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros
Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental,
respectively.OnOctober 21, 1921, these lands were donated by
Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in
the name of respondent DECS.
DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to
crop year 1993-1994.The contract of lease was subsequently renewed
for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year
1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.
June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and
regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for
Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.
After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a Notice of
Coverage to respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by
CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the
farmer beneficiaries.Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to
OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional
Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.
August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the
recommendation and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to
facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to
qualified beneficiaries.
DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which
affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.
Aggrieved DECS filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of
Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.ISSUES:1. Whether or
not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic
Act No. 6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL)NO2.
Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable
for agriculture as possible.Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the
coverage of CARP.The program shall: cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, allpublicand private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a)All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture.No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken
after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account,
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;(b)All
lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as
determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;(c)All other
lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and(d)All private lands devoted to or suitable for
agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that
can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c): agricultural land- land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
agriculture or agricultural activity- means the cultivation of
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of
livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons
whether natural or juridical.
The records of the case show that the subject properties were
formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS.From that time until
they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands
continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit
part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government.There is no legislative or presidential act, before and
after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land.Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification
of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture.
-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that
all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo
Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively
used for educational purposes.
-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage
because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as
school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation.Further, to be exempt from the coverage,
it is the landper se,not the income derived that must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
Ruling:
I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not
exempted.Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands
which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the
purposes of their exemption:
c)Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense,school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools
for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of
this Act. x x xx x xx x xIn order to be exempt from the coverage:
1) the land must be actually, directly, and exclusively used
andfound to be necessary;and2) the purpose is for school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public
or private schools for educational purposes.The importance of the
phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to be
necessarycannot be understated. The words of the law are clear and
unambiguous.The plain meaning rule orverba legisis applicable.Where
the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case ofCentral Mindanao
University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board,wherein we declared the land subject exempt from CARP
coverage.However, DECS reliance is misplaced because the factual
circumstances are different in the case at bar.1st, in theCMUcase,
the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the
public domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos
P. Garcia under Proc. No. 476 for the use
ofMindanaoAgriculturalCollege(now CMU).In this case, however, the
lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain suitable for agriculture.2nd, in theCMUcase, the
land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school sites and campuses.Although a portion of it
was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte
Phils., Inc.) under a Management and Development Agreement, the
undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine
Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with
direct participation of faculty and students.The retention of the
land was found to be necessary for the present and future
educational needs.On the other hand, the lands in this case were
notactuallyandexclusivelyutilized as school sites and campuses.
They were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for
educational but business purposes.Also, it was the income and not
the lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of
the schools.
II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were
not qualified beneficiaries.The identification of actual and
potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657:
SECTION 15.Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in
coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as
organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees,
tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of
the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the
BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:(a)names and
members of their immediate farm household;(b)owners or
administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial
relationship;(c)location and area of the land they work;(d)crops
planted; and(e)their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid
or wages received.A copy of the registry or list of all potential
CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay
hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it
shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable
hours.
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were
potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties.Further,
onNovember 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage
placing the subject properties under CARP.Since the identification
and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of the CARP,it behooves the
courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own
determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion committed by the administrative agency.In this case,
there was none.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion
of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed
to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil
the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy.The
objective of the State is that: landless farmers and farmworkers
will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice
and to move the nation toward sound rural development and
industrialization.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The decision datedAugust 30,
2000of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands
under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.
Milestone Farms, Petitioner v. Office of the President,
Respondent
Facts:
Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1)
to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2)
to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs,
and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of
said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect. In May 1993, petitioner
applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare
property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz
Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of
1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion
of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine
raising from CARP coverage.
Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.
DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted
an ocular inspection on petitioners property and recommended the
exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the
coverage of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by
Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary.
Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry
against Balajadia and company before the MCTC. MCTC ruled in favor
of Milestone
RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only
240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by
Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property
to be covered by CARP.
Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of
Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for
reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of
Director Garilao.
CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire
property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier,
without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the
appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion
order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the
316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf
courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of
153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the
property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to
162.7373 hectares.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly
Secretary Villas Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the
property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the
remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states
that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby
lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is
hereby declared covered by the CARP.
ISSUE:Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from
the coverage of CARP
Ruling:
No.
When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said
that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting
the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in
full force and effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that
the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP,
as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is
not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry
raising.
LUZ FARMS,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,respondent.
Facts:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A.
No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).On January 2, 1989, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied
in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).On January 9,
1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial
Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a
corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11,
Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as
promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).Hence,
this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be
declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ
of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining
public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are
made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry
raisers.This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to
deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31,
1989. (Rollo, p. 98).Later, however, this Court in its Resolution
dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing
and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of
P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p.
119).The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989
(Rollo, pp. 131-168).On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General
adopted his Comment to the petition as his MemorandumISSUE: The
main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections
3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith. RULING: The petition is impressed with merit.The
question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the
adoption of the ConstitutionIt is generally held that, in
construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the
constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the
convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was
preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms
of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding
of the people when they ratified it. It is evident from the
foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms"
is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of
the State.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as
the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and
void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
NAPOLEON