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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993
NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP.,
petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T.
LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV, respondents.
Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or
industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board and its precursor agencies 1 prior to 15 June 1988, 2 covered
by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988? This is the pivotal issue in this petition for
certiorari assailing the Notice of Coverage 3 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform over parcels of land already reserved as townsite
areas before the enactment of the law.
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the
owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba,
Antipolo, Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares
and 2.7080 hectares, or a total of 125.0078 hectares, and embraced
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31527 of the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside
20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo,
San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod
Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the
areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their
properties into low-cost housing subdivisions within the
reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation
(EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied
for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances
by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The necessary
permit for Phase I of the subdivision project, which consisted of
13.2371 hectares, was issued sometime in 1982; 4 for Phase II, with
an area of 80,000 hectares, on 13 October 1983; 5 and for Phase
III, which consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April
1986. 6 Petitioner were likewise issued development permits 7 after
complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later
became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL, for brevity),
went into effect. Conformably therewith, respondent Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), through its Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer, issued on 22 November 1990 a Notice of Coverage on
the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which
consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately
registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.
EDIC also protested to respondent Director Wilfredo Leano of the
DAR Region IV Office and twice wrote him requesting the
cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.
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On 17 January 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa
Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA, for the brevity), filed a complaint
against NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to
restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by
SAMBA members. 8 The Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained
petitioners from proceeding with the development of the
subdivision. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint; it
was denied. Instead, the Regional Adjudicator issued on 5 March
1991 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB); however, on 16 December 1991 the DARAB
merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further
proceedings. 9
In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian
Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage.
Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on
the protest-letters, thus compelling petitioners to institute this
proceeding more than a year thereafter.
NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to
respondent DAR for including undedeveloped portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They argue that
NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when
they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for
the townsite reservation.
Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General
dispute this contention. They maintain that the permits granted
petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply
with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957,
otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the
NATALIA lands from agricultural residential was ever filed with the
DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion. Moreover,
public respondents allege that the instant petition was prematurely
filed because the case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners
before the DAR Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated.
Respondents conclude, as a consequence, that petitioners failed to
fully exhaust administrative remedies available to them before
coming to court.
The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of the
Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearances as well as the
Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim
of public respondents, petitioners NATALIA and EDIC did in fact
comply with all the requirements of law.
Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the
Lungsod Silangan Development Corporation, the agency tasked to
oversee the implementation of the development of the townsite
reservation, before applying for the necessary permits from the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. 10 And, in all permits
granted to petitioners, the Commission stated invariably therein
that the applications were in "conformance" 11 or "conformity" 12
or "conforming" 13 with the implementing Standards, Rules and
Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence, the argument of public respondents
that not all of the requirements were complied with cannot be
sustained.
As a matter of fact, there was even no need for petitioners to
secure a clearance or prior approval from DAR. The NATALIA
properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation. Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the
townsite reservation for the purpose of providing additional
housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect
converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural
lands provided all requisites were met. And, in the case at bar,
there was compliance with all relevant rules and requirements. Even
in their applications for the development of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision, the predecessor agency of HLURB noted that petitioners
NATALIA and EDIC complied with all the requirements prescribed by
P.D. 957.
The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957
applied to all subdivisions and condominiums in general. On the
other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a
basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law
and a special law, the latter prevails. 14
Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not
contest the conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision which have already been developed. 15 Of course, this
is contrary to its earlier position that there was no valid
conversion. The applications for the developed and undeveloped
portions of subject subdivision were similarly situated.
Consequently, both did not need prior DAR approval.
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We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
"agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." 16
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this
limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are
"arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands." 17
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language
be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval
of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today,
the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost
housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be
gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action
to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The
enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may
have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact
that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit
of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside
the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to
non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules
and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands
to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land"
thus
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or
forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town
plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities
prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial
use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error
to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a
query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion 19
that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter
alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for
townsite purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the
proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural
lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No.
6657. " Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the
coverage of CARL.
Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust
administrative remedies in the instant petition, suffice it to say
that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ
from those of petitioners. The former involve possession; the
latter, the propriety of including under the operation of CARL
lands already converted for residential use prior to its
effectivity.
Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public
respondents acted on their letter-protests, this after sitting it
out for almost a year. Given the official indifference, which under
the circumstances could have continued forever, petitioners had to
act to assert and protect their interests. 20
In fine, we rule for petitioners and hold that public
respondents gravely abused their discretion in issuing the assailed
Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by of lands over which they
no longer have jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of
Coverage of 22 November 1990 by virtue of which undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL
coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE
MARI B. PONCE (OIC),Petitioner vs. DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T.
SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9,
series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by
respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing
agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS)1 their landholdings to petitioner DAR
to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for
raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz
Farms v. Secretary of DAR,2 this Court ruled that lands devoted to
livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain
provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in
the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with
petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.3
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of
Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was
devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to
the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the
CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the
withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting
papers they submitted in connection therewith.4 Petitioner ignored
their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,5
which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands
used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15,
1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the
following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1
hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the
landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock
infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be
excluded from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and
advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of
their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire
landholding is exempted from the CARL.6
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
issued an Order7 partially granting the application of respondents
for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention
limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No.
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9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for
grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for
infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents
landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their
entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively
to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.8 They filed a notice of
appeal9 with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the
reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which
provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the
land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz
Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the
coverage of agrarian reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the
impugned Order of petitioner DAR.10 It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O.
provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of
land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the
constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the
determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being
contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to
exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the
government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09,
Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order
of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as
it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that
petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program
of the government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of
DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock
raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL,
petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area
of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to
its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands
under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends
that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous
landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock
farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform
program.
Petitioners arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in
nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have
been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to
regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated
rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance
due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions.
However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force
and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.12 They
may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do
not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative
discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of
a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.13
The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used
to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the
Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the
scope of their regulations.14
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as
it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate
livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention
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limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,
inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that
livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and
do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural
activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different
from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this
enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as:
animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and
blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other
supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water
tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances.15
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms
which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed
A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR16 reiterated
our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held
that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered
by the CARL.17 We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No.
6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private
agricultural lands, the term "agricultural land" does not include
lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could
not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform
as these lots were already classified as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at
bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have
been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus
exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing
the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has
received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting
their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage
by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in
this contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to
prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in
this case.Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early
as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in
Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of
the Philippines.18 Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact.
Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle
after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that
respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed
that what the CARL prohibits is theconversion of agricultural lands
for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL.
There has been no change of business interest in the case of
respondents.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction
that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial
change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the
previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress
seeks to supersede an earlier one.19 In the case at bar, after the
passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 788120 which
amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law
changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and
"commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.21 With
this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the
provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987
Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the
coverage of agrarian reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must
be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot
amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to
and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict
between an administrative order and the provisions of the
Constitution, the latter prevails.22 The assailed A.O. of
petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it
enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended
by the 1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September
19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182332 February 23, 2011
MILESTONE FARMS, INC., Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Amended Decision2 dated October 4, 2006
and its Resolution3 dated March 27, 2008.
The Facts
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960.4
Among its pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the
raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by
purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to
sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other
livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the
corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or
acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks,
equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-products of
said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock,
and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and
other livestock as may be authorized by law.5
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock,
poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990,
this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform6 that agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the
exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T-410434) M-15750, (T-486101)
M-7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T-274129) M-15751, (T-486103) M-7309,
(T-486104) M-7310, (T-332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311,
(T-486106) M-7312, M-8791, (T-486107) M-7313, (T-486108) M-7314,
M-8796, (T-486109) M-7315, (T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and
located in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, from the coverage of the CARL,
pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz
Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR
A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the
exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and
swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994,
petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No.
9.7
Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and
Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular
inspection on petitioners property and arrived at the following
findings:
[T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry
is 258.8422 hectares; the area which served as infrastructure is
42.0000 hectares; ten (10) hectares are planted to corn and the
remaining five (5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that the
livestock population are 371 heads of cow, 20 heads of horses,
5,678 heads of swine and 788 heads of cocks; that the area being
applied for exclusion is far below the required or ideal area which
is 563 hectares for the total livestock population; that the
approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes
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with an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below
the allowable 10% variance; and, though not directly used for
livestock purposes, the ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and
the five (5) hectares devoted to fishpond could be considered
supportive to livestock production.
The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the
LUCECs findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director Percival
Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27, 1994,
exempting petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from CARP.8
The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
(Pinugay Farmers), represented by Timiano Balajadia, Sr.
(Balajadia), moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but
the same was denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated
November 24, 1994.9 Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed a
letter-appeal with the DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as
Civil Case No. 781-T.10 The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but
the decision was later reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
80, of Tanay, Rizal. Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in
its Decision11 dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling,
ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate portions of
the property covered by TCT Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its
Resolution12 dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants
therein failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given
the fact that their counsel of record received its October 8, 1999
Decision; hence, the same became final and executory.
In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881,13
which was approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands
devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from
the coverage of the CARL. On October 22, 1996, the fact-finding
team formed by the DAR Undersecretary for Field Operations and
Support Services conducted an actual headcount of the livestock
population on the property. The headcount showed that there were
448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine.
The DAR Secretarys Ruling
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
(Secretary Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only
240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by
Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property
to be covered by CARP.14
Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to
be excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock,
poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took
effect. He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle
submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were
registered in the name of petitioners president, Misael Vera, Jr.,
prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while
204 were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more
weight to the certificates rather than to the headcount because
"the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by
petitioner as of June 15, 1988."
Applying the animal-land ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every
head of cattle/carabao/horse) and the infrastructure-animal ratio
(1.7815 hectares for 21 heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126
hectare for 21 heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary
Garilao exempted 240.9776 hectares of the property, as follows:
1. 86 hectares for the 86 heads of cattle existing as of 15 June
1988;
2. 8 hectares for infrastructure following the ratio of 1.7815
hectares for every 21 heads of cattle;
3. 8 hectares for the 8 horses;
4. 0.3809 square meters of infrastructure for the 8 horses;
[and]
5. 138.5967 hectares for the 5,678 heads of swine.15
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Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 submitting
therewith copies of Certificates of Transfer of Large Cattle and
additional Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle issued to
petitioner prior to June 15, 1988, as additional proof that it had
met the required animal-land ratio. Petitioner also submitted a
copy of a Disbursement Voucher dated December 17, 1986, showing the
purchase of 100 heads of cattle by the Bureau of Animal Industry
from petitioner, as further proof that it had been actively
operating a livestock farm even before June 15, 1988. However, in
his Order dated April 15, 1997, Secretary Garilao denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.17
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal18 before
the Office of the President (OP).
The OPs Ruling
On February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision19 reinstating
Director Dalugdugs Order dated June 27, 1994 and declared the
entire 316.0422-hectare property exempt from the coverage of
CARP.
However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision filed by farmer-groups Samahang Anak-Pawis ng
Lagundi (SAPLAG) and Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution20 dated
September 16, 2002, setting aside its previous decision. The
dispositive portion of the OP resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision subject of the instant separate motions
for reconsideration is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao, as reiterated in another Order of 15 April
1997, without prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and
verification proceedings that DAR, thru the appropriate Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake pursuant to Rule III (D) of
DAR Administrative Order No. 09, series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.21
The OP held that, when it comes to proof of ownership, the
reference is the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle.
Certificates of cattle ownership, which are readily available being
issued by the appropriate government office ought to match the
number of heads of cattle counted as existing during the actual
headcount. The presence of large cattle on the land, without
sufficient proof of ownership thereof, only proves such
presence.
Taking note of Secretary Garilaos observations, the OP also held
that, before an ocular investigation is conducted on the property,
the landowners are notified in advance; hence, mere reliance on the
physical headcount is dangerous because there is a possibility that
the landowners would increase the number of their cattle for
headcount purposes only. The OP observed that there was a big
variance between the actual headcount of 448 heads of cattle and
only 86 certificates of ownership of large cattle.
Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA.22
The Proceedings Before the CA and Its Rulings
On April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary
evidence presented, the property subject of the application for
exclusion had more than satisfied the animal-land and
infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also
found that petitioner applied for exclusion long before the
effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that
petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry,
and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP coverage.
Petitioner was held to have actually engaged in the said business
on the property even before June 15, 1988. The CA disposed of the
case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the Office of the President dated September 16, 2002
is hereby SET ASIDE, and its Decision dated February 4, 2000
declaring the entire 316.0422 hectares exempt from the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby REINSTATED
without prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and
verification proceedings which the Department of Agrarian Reform,
through the proper Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake
pursuant to Policy Statement (D) of DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.23
-
Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without
the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate
court then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR
Conversion Order No. CON-0410-001624 (Conversion Order), granting
petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare
property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The
portions converted with a total area of 153.3049 hectares were
covered by TCT Nos. M-15755 (T-332694), M-15751 (T-274129), and
M-15750 (T-410434). With this Conversion Order, the area of the
property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to
162.7373 hectares.
On the CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for
Reconsideration were filed by farmer-groups, namely: the farmers
represented by Miguel Espinas25 (Espinas group), the Pinugay
Farmers,26 and the SAPLAG.27 The farmer-groups all claimed that the
CA should have accorded respect to the factual findings of the OP.
Moreover, the farmer-groups unanimously intimated that petitioner
already converted and developed a portion of the property into a
leisure-residential-commercial estate known as the Palo Alto
Leisure and Sports Complex (Palo Alto).
Subsequently, in a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration
on Newly Secured Evidence pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No.
9, Series of 199328 (Supplement) dated June 15, 2005, the Espinas
group submitted the following as evidence:
1) Conversion Order29 dated November 4, 2004, issued by
Secretary Villa, converting portions of the property from
agricultural to residential and golf courses use, with a total area
of 153.3049 hectares; thus, the Espinas group prayed that the
remaining 162.7373 hectares (subject property) be covered by the
CARP;
2) Letter30 dated June 7, 2005 of both incoming Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Bismark M. Elma (MARO Elma) and
outgoing MARO Cesar C. Celi (MARO Celi) of Baras, Rizal, addressed
to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II of Rizal,
Felixberto Q. Kagahastian, (MARO Report), informing the latter,
among others, that Palo Alto was already under development and the
lots therein were being offered for sale; that there were actual
tillers on the subject property; that there were agricultural
improvements thereon, including an irrigation system and road
projects funded by the Government; that there was no existing
livestock farm on the subject property; and that the same was not
in the possession and/or control of petitioner; and
3) Certification31 dated June 8, 2005, issued by both MARO Elma
and MARO Celi, manifesting that the subject property was in the
possession and cultivation of actual occupants and tillers, and
that, upon inspection, petitioner maintained no livestock farm
thereon.
Four months later, the Espinas group and the DAR filed their
respective Manifestations.32 In its Manifestation dated November
29, 2005, the DAR confirmed that the subject property was no longer
devoted to cattle raising. Hence, in its Resolution33 dated
December 21, 2005, the CA directed petitioner to file its comment
on the Supplement and the aforementioned Manifestations. Employing
the services of a new counsel, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit
Rejoinder,34 and prayed that the MARO Report be disregarded and
expunged from the records for lack of factual and legal basis.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly
Secretary Villas Conversion Order of November 4, 2004, the
appellate court had to acknowledge that the property subject of the
controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373
hectares. In the same token, the Espinas group prayed that this
remaining area be covered by the CARP.35
On October 4, 2006, the CA amended its earlier Decision. It held
that its April 29, 2005 Decision was theoretically not final
because DAR A.O. No. 9 required the MARO to make a continuing
review and verification of the subject property. While the CA was
cognizant of our ruling in Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Sutton,36 wherein we declared DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional,
it still resolved to lift the exemption of the subject property
from the CARP, not on the basis of DAR A.O. No. 9, but on the
strength of evidence such as the MARO Report and Certification, and
the Katunayan37 issued by the Punong Barangay, Alfredo Ruba
(Chairman Ruba), of Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, showing that the subject
property was no longer operated as a livestock farm. Moreover, the
CA held that the lease agreements,38 which petitioner submitted to
prove that it was compelled to lease a ranch as temporary shelter
for its cattle, only reinforced the DARs finding that there was
indeed no existing livestock farm on the subject property. While
petitioner claimed that it was merely forced to do so to prevent
further slaughtering of its cattle allegedly committed by the
occupants, the CA found the claim unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the
CA opined that
-
petitioner should have asserted its rights when the irrigation
and road projects were introduced by the Government within its
property. Finally, the CA accorded the findings of MARO Elma and
MARO Celi the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions in the absence of evidence proving misconduct
and/or dishonesty when they inspected the subject property and
rendered their report. Thus, the CA disposed:
WHEREFORE, this Courts Decision dated April 29, 2005 is hereby
amended in that the exemption of the subject landholding from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby
lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is
hereby declared covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
SO ORDERED.39
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.40 On
January 8, 2007, MARO Elma, in compliance with the Memorandum of
DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres, tendered another
Report41 reiterating that, upon inspection of the subject property,
together with petitioners counsel-turned witness, Atty. Grace
Eloisa J. Que (Atty. Que), PARO Danilo M. Obarse, Chairman Ruba,
and several occupants thereof, he, among others, found no livestock
farm within the subject property. About 43 heads of cattle were
shown, but MARO Elma observed that the same were inside an area
adjacent to Palo Alto. Subsequently, upon Atty. Ques request for
reinvestigation, designated personnel of the DAR Provincial and
Regional Offices (Investigating Team) conducted another ocular
inspection on the subject property on February 20, 2007. The
Investigating Team, in its Report42dated February 21, 2007, found
that, per testimony of petitioners caretaker, Rogelio Ludivices
(Roger),43petitioner has 43 heads of cattle taken care of by the
following individuals: i) Josefino Custodio (Josefino) 18 heads;
ii) Andy Amahit 15 heads; and iii) Bert Pangan 2 heads; that these
individuals pastured the herd of cattle outside the subject
property, while Roger took care of 8 heads of cattle inside the
Palo Alto area; that 21 heads of cattle owned by petitioner were
seen in the area adjacent to Palo Alto; that Josefino confirmed to
the Investigating Team that he takes care of 18 heads of cattle
owned by petitioner; that the said Investigating Team saw 9 heads
of cattle in the Palo Alto area, 2 of which bore "MFI" marks; and
that the 9 heads of cattle appear to have matched the Certificates
of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner.
Because of the contentious factual issues and the conflicting
averments of the parties, the CA set the case for hearing and
reception of evidence on April 24, 2007.44 Thereafter, as narrated
by the CA, the following events transpired:
On May 17, 2007, [petitioner] presented the Judicial Affidavits
of its witnesses, namely, [petitioners] counsel, [Atty. Que], and
the alleged caretaker of [petitioners] farm, [Roger], who were both
cross-examined by counsel for farmers-movants and SAPLAG.
[Petitioner] and SAPLAG then marked their documentary exhibits.
On May 24, 2007, [petitioners] security guard and third witness,
Rodolfo G. Febrada, submitted his Judicial Affidavit and was
cross-examined by counsel for fa[r]mers-movants and SAPLAG.
Farmers-movants also marked their documentary exhibits.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Formal Offers
of Evidence. Farmers-movants and SAPLAG filed their objections to
[petitioners] Formal Offer of Evidence. Later, [petitioner] and
farmers-movants filed their respective Memoranda.
In December 2007, this Court issued a Resolution on the parties
offer of evidence and considered [petitioners] Motion for
Reconsideration submitted for resolution.45
Finally, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by
the CA in its Resolution46 dated March 27, 2008. The CA discarded
petitioners reliance on Sutton. It ratiocinated that the MARO
Reports and the DARs Manifestation could not be disregarded simply
because DAR A.O. No. 9 was declared unconstitutional. The Sutton
ruling was premised on the fact that the Sutton property continued
to operate as a livestock farm. The CA also reasoned that, in
Sutton, this Court did not remove from the DAR the power to
implement the CARP, pursuant to the latters authority to oversee
the implementation of agrarian reform laws under Section 5047 of
the CARL. Moreover, the CA found:
Petitioner-appellant claimed that they had 43 heads of cattle
which are being cared for and pastured by 4 individuals. To prove
its ownership of the said cattle, petitioner-appellant offered in
evidence 43 Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle.
Significantly, however, the said Certificates were all dated and
issued on November 24,
-
2006, nearly 2 months after this Court rendered its Amended
Decision lifting the exemption of the 162-hectare portion of the
subject landholding. The acquisition of such cattle after the
lifting of the exemption clearly reveals that petitioner-appellant
was no longer operating a livestock farm, and suggests an effort to
create a semblance of livestock-raising for the purpose of its
Motion for Reconsideration.48
On petitioners assertion that between MARO Elmas Report dated
January 8, 2007 and the Investigating Teams Report, the latter
should be given credence, the CA held that there were no material
inconsistencies between the two reports because both showed that
the 43 heads of cattle were found outside the subject property.
Hence, this Petition assigning the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
LANDS DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK FARMING WITHIN THE MEANING OF LUZ FARMS
AND SUTTON, AND WHICH ARE THEREBY EXEMPT FROM CARL COVERAGE, ARE
NEVERTHELESS SUBJECT TO DARS CONTINUING VERIFICATION AS TO USE,
AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH VERIFICATION, MAY BE ORDERED REVERTED TO
AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION AND COMPULSORY ACQUISITION[;]
II.
GRANTING THAT THE EXEMPT LANDS AFORESAID MAY BE SO REVERTED TO
AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION, STILL THE PROCEEDINGS FOR SUCH PURPOSE
BELONGS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE DAR, BEFORE
WHICH THE CONTENDING PARTIES MAY VENTILATE FACTUAL ISSUES, AND
AVAIL THEMSELVES OF USUAL REVIEW PROCESSES, AND NOT TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES COMPLETELY
UNRELATED TO REVERSION [; AND]
III.
IN ANY CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE
IS NO LONGER BEING USED FOR LIVESTOCK FARMING.49
Petitioner asseverates that lands devoted to livestock farming
as of June 15, 1988 are classified as industrial lands, hence,
outside the ambit of the CARP; that Luz Farms, Sutton, and R.A. No.
7881 clearly excluded such lands on constitutional grounds; that
petitioners lands were actually devoted to livestock even before
the enactment of the CARL; that livestock farms are exempt from the
CARL, not by reason of any act of the DAR, but because of their
nature as industrial lands; that petitioners property was
admittedly devoted to livestock farming as of June 1988 and the
only issue before was whether or not petitioners pieces of evidence
comply with the ratios provided under DAR A.O. No. 9; and that DAR
A.O. No. 9 having been declared as unconstitutional, DAR had no
more legal basis to conduct a continuing review and verification
proceedings over livestock farms. Petitioner argues that, in cases
where reversion of properties to agricultural use is proper, only
the DAR has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the same; hence, the CA, in this case, committed serious errors
when it ordered the reversion of the property and when it
considered pieces of evidence not existing as of June 15, 1988,
despite its lack of jurisdiction; that the CA should have remanded
the case to the DAR due to conflicting factual claims; that the CA
cannot ventilate allegations of fact that were introduced for the
first time on appeal as a supplement to a motion for
reconsideration of its first decision, use the same to deviate from
the issues pending review, and, on the basis thereof, declare
exempt lands reverted to agricultural use and compulsorily covered
by the CARP; that the "newly discovered [pieces of] evidence" were
not introduced in the proceedings before the DAR, hence, it was
erroneous for the CA to consider them; and that piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.
Finally, petitioner submits that, in any case, the CA gravely erred
and committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that the
subject property was no longer used for livestock farming as shown
by the Report of the Investigating Team. Petitioner relies on the
1997 LUCEC and DAR findings that the subject property was devoted
to livestock farming, and on the 1999 CA Decision which held that
the occupants of the property were squatters, bereft of any
authority to stay and possess the property.50
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On one hand, the farmer-groups, represented by the Espinas
group, contend that they have been planting rice and fruit-bearing
trees on the subject property, and helped the National Irrigation
Administration in setting up an irrigation system therein in 1997,
with a produce of 1,500 to 1,600 sacks of palay each year; that
petitioner came to court with unclean hands because, while it
sought the exemption and exclusion of the entire property, unknown
to the CA, petitioner surreptitiously filed for conversion of the
property now known as Palo Alto, which was actually granted by the
DAR Secretary; that petitioners bad faith is more apparent since,
despite the conversion of the 153.3049-hectare portion of the
property, it still seeks to exempt the entire property in this
case; and that the fact that petitioner applied for conversion is
an admission that indeed the property is agricultural. The
farmer-groups also contend that petitioners reliance on Luz Farms
and Sutton is unavailing because in these cases there was actually
no cessation of the business of raising cattle; that what is being
exempted is the activity of raising cattle and not the property
itself; that exemptions due to cattle raising are not permanent;
that the declaration of DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional does not
at all diminish the mandated duty of the DAR, as the lead agency of
the Government, to implement the CARL; that the DAR, vested with
the power to identify lands subject to CARP, logically also has the
power to identify lands which are excluded and/or exempted
therefrom; that to disregard DARs authority on the matter would
open the floodgates to abuse and fraud by unscrupulous landowners;
that the factual finding of the CA that the subject property is no
longer a livestock farm may not be disturbed on appeal, as
enunciated by this Court; that DAR conducted a review and
monitoring of the subject property by virtue of its powers under
the CARL; and that the CA has sufficient discretion to admit
evidence in order that it could arrive at a fair, just, and
equitable ruling in this case.51
On the other hand, respondent OP, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), claims that the CA correctly held that the
subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as
substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising;
that the issues presented by petitioner are factual in nature and
not proper in this case; that under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, questions of fact may be raised by the parties and
resolved by the CA; that due to the divergence in the factual
findings of the DAR and the OP, the CA was duty bound to review and
ascertain which of the said findings are duly supported by
substantial evidence; that the subject property was subject to
continuing review and verification proceedings due to the then
prevailing DAR A.O. No. 9; that there is no question that the power
to determine if a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with
the DAR Secretary; that pursuant to such power, the MARO rendered
the assailed reports and certification, and the DAR itself
manifested before the CA that the subject property is no longer
devoted to livestock farming; and that, while it is true that this
Courts ruling in Luz Farms declared that agricultural lands devoted
to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the
CARP, the said ruling is not without any qualification.52
In its Reply53 to the farmer-groups and to the OSGs comment,
petitioner counters that the farmer-groups have no legal basis to
their claims as they admitted that they entered the subject
property without the consent of petitioner; that the rice plots
actually found in the subject property, which were subsequently
taken over by squatters, were, in fact, planted by petitioner in
compliance with the directive of then President Ferdinand Marcos
for the employer to provide rice to its employees; that when a land
is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not
agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and
disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs
jurisdiction; and that, inasmuch as the subject property was not
agricultural from the very beginning, DAR has no power to regulate
the same. Petitioner also asserts that the CA cannot
uncharacteristically assume the role of trier of facts and resolve
factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower
tribunals; that MARO Elma rendered the assailed MARO reports with
bias against petitioner, and the same were contradicted by the
Investigating Teams Report, which confirmed that the subject
property is still devoted to livestock farming; and that there has
been no change in petitioners business interest as an entity
engaged in livestock farming since its inception in 1960, though
there was admittedly a decline in the scale of its operations due
to the illegal acts of the squatter-occupants.
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Let it be stressed that when the CA provided in its first
Decision that continuing review and verification may be conducted
by the DAR pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, the latter was not yet
declared unconstitutional by this Court. The first CA Decision was
promulgated on April 29, 2005, while this Court struck down as
unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way of Sutton, on October 19,
2005. Likewise, let it be emphasized that the Espinas group filed
the Supplement and submitted the assailed MARO reports and
certification on June 15, 2005, which proved to be
-
adverse to petitioners case. Thus, it could not be said that the
CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate
of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and
effect.
While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the
complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice, and due process,54 the same is not without
exception,55 such as this case. The CA, under Section 3,56 Rule 43
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in the interest of justice,
entertain and resolve factual issues. After all, technical and
procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not suppress,
substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the
rules may thus be allowed to attain the prime objective of
dispensing justice, for dispensation of justice is the core reason
for the existence of courts.57 Moreover, petitioner cannot validly
claim that it was deprived of due process because the CA afforded
it all the opportunity to be heard.58 The CA even directed
petitioner to file its comment on the Supplement, and to prove and
establish its claim that the subject property was excluded from the
coverage of the CARP. Petitioner actively participated in the
proceedings before the CA by submitting pleadings and pieces of
documentary evidence, such as the Investigating Teams Report and
judicial affidavits. The CA also went further by setting the case
for hearing. In all these proceedings, all the parties rights to
due process were amply protected and recognized.
With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioners
arguments fail to persuade. Its invocation of Sutton is unavailing.
In Sutton, we held:
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as
it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate
livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within
the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or
tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A
great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form
of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment
like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and
other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms
which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed
A.O.59
Indeed, as pointed out by the CA, the instant case does not rest
on facts parallel to those of Sutton because, in Sutton, the
subject property remained a livestock farm. We even highlighted
therein the fact that "there has been no change of business
interest in the case of respondents."60 Similarly, in Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Uy,61we excluded a parcel of land from CARP
coverage due to the factual findings of the MARO, which were
confirmed by the DAR, that the property was entirely devoted to
livestock farming. However, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc.,
represented by Carmen Z. Arnaiz v. Office of the President;
Department of Agrarian Reform; Regional Director, DAR Region V,
Legaspi City; Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR Provincial
Office, Masbate, Masbate; and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer,
DAR Municipal Office, Masbate, Masbate,62 we denied a similar
petition for exemption and/or exclusion, by according respect to
the CAs factual findings and its reliance on the findings of the
DAR and the OP that
the subject parcels of land were not directly, actually, and
exclusively used for pasture.63
Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch
for its own livestock is fatal to its cause.64 While petitioner
advances a defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants
of the subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we find it
surprising that not even a single police and/or barangay report was
filed by petitioner to amplify its indignation over these alleged
illegal acts. Moreover, we accord respect to the CAs keen
observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating
Teams Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that
the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured
outside the subject property.
Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or
Exemption are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
cases which are well within the DAR Secretarys competence and
jurisdiction.65 Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure provides:
-
Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over
matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and
administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive
prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the
DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
x x x x
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for
livestock, swine, and poultry raising.
Thus, we cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily
strip the DAR Secretary of his legal mandate to exercise
jurisdiction and authority over all ALI cases. To succumb to
petitioners contention that "when a land is declared exempt from
the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time
the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is
entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction" is dangerous,
suggestive of self-regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary
who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or
exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual
circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and
applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit parenthetically,
Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into residential
and golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area
originally claimed as exempt from CARP coverage because it was
allegedly devoted to livestock production. lawphil 1
In sum, we find no reversible error in the assailed Amended
Decision and Resolution of the CA which would warrant the
modification, much less the reversal, thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals
Amended Decision dated October 4, 2006 and Resolution dated March
27, 2008 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R.
VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN
JOAQUIN,respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.
QUIASON, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin,
et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to
decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary
of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform
program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of
1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year
Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of
which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for
non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and
tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap
making, small scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological
and sea farming research center,and other progressive feasibility
concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific
and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur
and to establish a housing project for provincial government
employees;
WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired
either by purchase or expropriation to implement the above program
component;
WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic)
present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the
same pilot development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur,
through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate
cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N.
San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and
P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided
by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.
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Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the
issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear
at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground
of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order
dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court
of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the
trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated
January18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order,
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss.
Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins
asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the
complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order
dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii)
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February
26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to
dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to
restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and
thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur
claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation
proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the
petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the
approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However,
the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of
Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners
for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to
non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins
asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on
the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the
property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series
of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the
questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints.
However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the
proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained
the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the
classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the
resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the
power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that
the condemned property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking
thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public
use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage,
convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v.
Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461
[1987]).
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The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage
of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and
craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong
v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage
in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in
sum the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its
exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the
provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must
comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands
of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners
raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can
expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use
of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282
hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square
meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform
program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need
under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public
purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a
balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the
expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome
the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of
the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision
is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to
the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the
Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local
government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment,
pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized
by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74
L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the
power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or
impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local
governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed.
1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited
authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the
limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly
expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which
provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public
use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that
local government, units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no
provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly
subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals
could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of
Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years
from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible
and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to
the
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affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:
Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals
that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian
reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from
its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4
(k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot
be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform
to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for
the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian
Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions
of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication
(Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d.
241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals,
etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these
projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In
effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to
be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking
has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United
States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90
L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest.
Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no
matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign
unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto
(Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as
sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated
sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in
general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the
basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their
property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as
unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just
compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever
was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305
[1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA
528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those
laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private
respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the
just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision
of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies
the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the
trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c)
requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural
use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it
sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion
to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158228 March 23, 2004
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary,
ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN,petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 64378, which reversed the August 30, 2000 decision of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the Resolution dated May
7, 2003, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of
an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe,
Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros
Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were
donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly
Bureau of Education).2 Consequently, titles thereto were
transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 167175.3
On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing
from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of
lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop
years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year
2004-2005.4
On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to
be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a
petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage
with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.5
After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of
Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are
now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a
conference with the farmer beneficiaries.6 Then, MARO Piosa
submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who
recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the
coverage of the landholdings.
On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres
approved the recommendation, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the petition
is granted. Order is hereby issued:
1. Placing under CARP coverage Lot 2509 with an area of 111.4791
hectares situated at Had. Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Lot
817-D with an area of 77.7671 hectares situated at Brgy. Gen. Luna,
Sagay, Negros Occidental;
2. Affirming the notice of coverage sent by the DAR Provincial
Office, Negros Occidental dated November 23, 1994;
3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Negros
Occidental and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers of Sagay and
Escalante to facilitate the acquisition of the subject landholdings
and the distribution of the same qualified beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.7
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Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. 8
Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform.9
Hence, the instant petition for review.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1998 (CARL).
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable
for agriculture as possible.10 Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out
the coverage of CARP. It states that the program shall:
" cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture."
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken
after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account,
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific
limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or
suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.
Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land," as "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." The term "agriculture" or "agricultural activity"
is also defined by the same law as follows:
Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity
means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.11
The records of the case show that the subject properties were
formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time
until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands
continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit
part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government.12 Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential
act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying
the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the
classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture.
Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the
ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with
Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs
and renovations of schools in the nearby locality.
Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject
hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are
not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or
campuses, as they are in fact
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leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt
from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived
therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes.
We agree with the petitioner.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which
are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of
their exemption, viz:
x x x x x x x x x
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act.13
x x x x x x x x x
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be
exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly,
and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose
is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes."
The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary" cannot be understated,
as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words
in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law
are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba
legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where
the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.14
We are not unawar