[G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005]LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE
T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.D E C I S I O
NTINGA,J.:This is aPetition for Review[1]dated December 6, 1996
assailing theDecision[2]of the Regional Trial Court[3]dated July 5,
1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private
respondents the amount ofP30.00 per square meter as just
compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents
properties under the land reform program.The facts follow.On May
14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial
court for the determination of just compensation for their
agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were
acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
(PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank.
With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as
co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.After trial, the
court rendered the assailedDecisionthe dispositive portion of which
reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents,
particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by
petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State
under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00)
per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same
lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat,
Pampanga.Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered
to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.SO ORDERED.[4]DAR and
Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were
denied by the trial court in itsOrder[5]dated July 30, 1996 for
beingpro formaas the same did not contain a notice of hearing.Thus,
the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land
Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the
assailedDecisionbecame final and executory.Land Bank then filed
aPetition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,[6]citing
excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the
petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the
failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of
hearing was due to accident and/or mistake.[7]The affidavit of Land
Banks counsel of record notably states that he simply scanned and
signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005,
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or
unmindful that it had no notice of hearing[8]due to his heavy
workload.The trial court, in itsOrder[9]of November 18, 1996,
denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in
law due to its own negligence.In the instant petition for review,
Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a
notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable
negligence and does not make the motion for reconsiderationpro
formaconsidering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the
denial of its petition for relief from judgment was
erroneous.According to Land Bank, private respondents should have
sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their
properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation directly with the trial court.
Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that
PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in
the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private
respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time
of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value
thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.Private respondents
filed aComment[10]dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks
failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for
reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which
resulted in the motion being declaredpro forma,does not constitute
excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land
Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has mastered
the intricate art and technique of pleading.Land Bank filed
aReply[11]dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations
demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion
for reconsideration.The Courtgave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[12]Both
parties complied.[13]The petition is unmeritorious.At issue is
whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes
excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from
judgment.Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:Sec. 1.Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case praying that the
judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.As can clearly be
gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from
judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be
one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against.[14]Measured against this standard, the reason profferred
by Land Banks counsel,i.e.,that his heavy workload prevented him
from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice
of hearing, was by no means excusable.Indeed, counsels admission
that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration
for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of
hearing speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any
manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.The failure to
attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed
by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have mastered the
intricate art and technique of pleading.[15]Indeed, a motion that
does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a
mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty
to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the
presiding judge.[16]The trial court therefore correctly considered
the motion for reconsiderationpro forma.Thus, it cannot be faulted
for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment.It should be emphasized at this point that
procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by
the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal
interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases
of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and
their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt,
procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and
rationalize the pursuit of justice.[17]Aside from ruling on this
procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues
presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question
of just compensation.Land Bank avers that private respondents
should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation
instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the
trial court.The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not
entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a
letter[18]to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation
summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and
requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just
compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting
private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial
court.At any rate, inPhilippine Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals,[19]we declared that there is nothing contradictory between
the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first
refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to
judicial proceedings.In accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to
determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the
lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such
determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The
resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under
agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial
function.[20]Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of
the case as the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice.Land Banks contention that the
property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October
21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27,ergojust
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of
that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise
erroneous. InOffice of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of
Appeals,[21]we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not
take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take
effect on the payment of just compensation.Under the factual
circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents
has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No.
6657 (RA 6657)[22]before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and
EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling
inParis v. Alfeche.[23]Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly
relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination
of just compensation, reads as follows:Sec. 17.Determination of
Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.It would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228
considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for
a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full
and ample.[24]In this case, the trial court arrived at the just
compensation due private respondents for their property, taking
into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the
highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of
its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly
determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents
in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing
jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISIONJOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in herG.R. No. 170220capacity
as Assignee of FEDERICOC. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAYTAEDO and EMILIO
A.M.SUNTAY III,Petitioners,Present:Panganiban,C.J. (Chairperson),-
versus -Ynares-Santiago,Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr.,
andChico-Nazario,JJ.LAND BANK OF
THEPHILIPPINES,Respondent.Promulgated:November 20, 2006x
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xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005
Amended Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530,
which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch
46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339
and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as
determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD);
(b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for
reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita
V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply
with the March 31, 2003 Order.The facts of the case are as
follows:Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee[2]of
Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land
located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area
of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)[3]of the Registry of Deeds of
OccidentalMindoro.In 1972, a portion of the said property with an
area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)[4]and Executive Order
No. 228 (1987).[5]The land was thereafter subdivided and
distributed to farmer beneficiaries.The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at
P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor
of Lubrica.On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and
Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro
covered by TCT No. T-128[6]of the Register of Deeds of Occidental
Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares
or a total of 210.2331 hectares.Lot2 was placed under the coverage
of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and
valued the same at P1,512,575.05.Petitioners rejected the valuation
of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative
proceedings for determination of just compensation.OnJanuary 29,
2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at
P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and
P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).[7]Not
satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed onFebruary 17, 2003, two
separate petitions[8]for judicial determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, acting as aSpecial Agrarian Court, docketed as
Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No.
R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46
thereof.Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the
Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657 (1988)[9]and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that
LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the
PARAD.OnMarch 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[10]granting
petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which
reads:WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation
Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby
ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to
Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit
the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and
bonds, as follows:1.In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P
51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;2.In
Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the
amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.Such deposit
must be made with the Land Bank of thePhilippines,Manilawithin five
(5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this
court of her compliance within such period.Let this order be served
by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.SO
ORDERED.[11]LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution[12]datedMay 26, 2003.The following day,May 27, 2003, the
trial court issued an Order[13]directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco,
LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the
amounts.Thus, onJune 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.[14]OnJune 27, 2003, the appellate court
issued a 60-day temporary restraining order[15]and onOctober 6,
2003, a writ of preliminary injunction.[16]OnMay 26, 2004, the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[17]in favor of the
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE,
premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the
instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Order datedMarch 31, 2003, Resolution datedMay 26,
2003, and Order datedMay 27, 2003are hereby AFFIRMED. The
preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and
DISSOLVED.SO ORDERED.[18]The Court of Appeals held that the trial
court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally
determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to
make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just
compensation.It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to
further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took
possession of the properties and distributed the same to
farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.LBP moved for reconsideration
which was granted.OnOctober 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered
the assailed Amended Decision,[19]the dispositive portion of which
reads:Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula
in the case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling
justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our
judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby
VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and
acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in
the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the
Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the
just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly
in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May
26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.SO ORDERED.[20]In the
Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate
deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is
improper because it was erroneously computed.CitingGabatin v. Land
Bank of the Philippines,[21]it held that the formula to compute the
just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross
Production x Government Support Price.Specifically, it held that
the value of the government support price for the corresponding
agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time
of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is,
onOctober 21, 1972when landowners were effectively deprived of
ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27.According
to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of
P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for
palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of
P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of
the taking in 1972.Hence, this petition raising the following
issues:A.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THECASE IN A WAYNOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND
BANK OF THEPHILIPPINESVS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO.
127198, PROM.MAY 16, 2005; and[22]B.THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT
BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.[23]Petitioners insist that the determination of just
compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated
properties at the time of payment.Respondent LBP, on the other
hand, claims that the value of the realties should be computed as
ofOctober 21, 1972when P.D. No. 27 took effect.The petition is
impressed with merit.In the case ofLand Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad,[24]the Court ruled thus:Land Banks contention that the
property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October
21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of
that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise
erroneous. InOffice of the President, Malacaang,Manilav. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take
place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on
the payment of just compensation.TheNatividadcase reiterated the
Courts ruling inOffice of the President v. Court of Appeals[25]that
the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the
effectivity of P.D. No. 27 onOctober 21, 1972but seizure would take
effect on the payment of just compensation judicially
determined.Likewise, in the recent case ofHeirs of Francisco R.
Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[26]we held that expropriation of
landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the
effectivity of the Act onJune 15, 1988, but on the payment of just
compensation.In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of
their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just
compensation therefor.The parcels of land were already subdivided
and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately
depriving petitioners of their use.Under the circumstances, it
would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to
compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the
taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering
that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already
benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet
been transferred in their names.Petitioners were deprived of their
properties without payment of just compensation which, under the
law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from
its owners.[27]The transfer of possession and ownership of the land
to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank.Until then, title remains with
the landowner.[28]Our ruling inAssociation of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[29]is
instructive, thus:It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the
emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that
he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was
to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a
full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative.It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation
also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section
1 that:All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full
owners as ofOctober 21, 1972of the land theyacquiredby virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)it was obviously
referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives
and full payment of just compensation. x x xThe CARP Law, for its
part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.Until then, title also
remains with the landowner.No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.We also note that the expropriation proceedings
in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the
agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the
just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be
settled.Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under the said law.Indeed,
R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No.
228 having only suppletory effect.[30]InLand Bank of
thePhilippinesv. Court of Appeals,[31]we held that:RA 6657 includes
PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and
distribute to the landless.And to facilitate the acquisition and
distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be
adhered to.Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally
determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.In
determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
considered.The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property
as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.[32]Corollarily, we held inLand Bank of the Philippines
v. Celada[33]that the above provision was converted into a formula
by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to
wit:Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable
Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)Petitioners
were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date,
they have not yet received just compensation.Thus, it would
certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on
the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering
the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable
length of time.That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228,
is important considering that just compensation should be the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.[34]WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
isGRANTED.The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 isREVERSED and SET
ASIDE.The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian
Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to
deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the
PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion
for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing
Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department
Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, isREINSTATED.The
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46,
acting asSpecial Agrarian CourtisORDEREDto proceed with dispatch in
the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute
the final valuation of the subject properties based on the
aforementioned formula.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP.,respondents.G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., ET AL.,respondents.FRANCISCO, R.,J.:It has been declared
that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the
underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny
justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on
his side.1As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:. . . social
justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his
hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called
upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But
never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according
to the mandate of the law.2In this agrarian dispute, it is once
more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its
resolution.Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank
of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon
motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered
consolidated.3Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents' Petition forCertiorariandMandamusand ruled as
follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
forCertiorariandMandamusis hereby GRANTED:a) DAR Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declarednullandvoidinsofar as it
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in
cash or bonds;b) Respondent Landbank is ordered
toimmediatelydeposit not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in
trust" with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the
names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash
and in government financial instruments within the parameters of
Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. YapP 135,482.12
Heirs of Emiliano SantiagoP 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;c) The
DAR-designated bank is ordered toallow the petitioners to
withdrawthe above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final
determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; andd)
Respondent DAR is ordered to
1)immediatelyconductsummaryadministrative proceedings to determine
the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the
petitioners15 days from noticewithin which to submit evidence and
to 2) decide the caseswithin 30 daysafter they are submitted for
decision.4Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution
dated January 18, 1995,5denying their motion for
reconsideration.Private respondents are landowners whose
landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).Aggrieved by the alleged
lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation
and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a
Petition forCertiorariandMandamuswith prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity
of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 19926and DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,7and sought to compel
the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings
to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and
the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for
private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.Through
a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this
Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for
proper determination and disposition.As found by respondent court ,
the following are undisputed:PetitionerPedro Yapalleges that "(o)n
4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of
petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of
Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries
collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a
certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and
P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the
parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively,
and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the
names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without
notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement
of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash
and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).The above
allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.PetitionerHeirs of Emiliano Santiagoallege that the
heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land
located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares
covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago;
that in November and December 1990, without notice to the
petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed
Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to
the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least
25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional
Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in
the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank
reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago.
(ANNEX "E";Rollo,p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying
rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's
Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the
LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).The above allegations are not disputed by
the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it
was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of
Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect
any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p.
99).Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation
(AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties
located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in
San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel
covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a
summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the
property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in
Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was
rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation
for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay
or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34
fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to
the first trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX
"G"). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco,
Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay
is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with
an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were
issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered
on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR
to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a
trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount
of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been
previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)The above
allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that
respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in
the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to
it (Rollo, p. 100).8Private respondents argued that Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of
trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation
for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as
provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.9Private respondents also
assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked",
"deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names
as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or in bonds.10Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that
Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making
power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11Moreover, the DAR
maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the
Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and the ruling in the case ofAssociation of Small Landowners in the
Philippines,Inc.,et al.vs.Hon.Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12For its part, petitioner
Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits
was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were
also used.13On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the
assailed decision in favor of private respondents.14Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the
same.15Hence, the instant petitions.On March 20, 1995, private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No.
118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended
to delay the finality of the appealed decision.16The Court,
however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to
file their comments.17Petitioners submit that respondent court
erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of
trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in
holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right
to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited
in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for
just compensation.Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners
maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way
excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus,
in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form
of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely
exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.The contention is
untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:Sec. 16.
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx xxx(e) Upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, uponthe deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or in LBP bondsin accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis
supplied)It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor
can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form.
If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the
valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be
fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is
no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term "deposit".The conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment.18In this regard, it must be stressed that the function
of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this
is that administrative regulations cannot extendthe law and amend a
legislative enactment,19for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And
in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails.20In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the
limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein,
petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because
these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision
of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in
striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and
void.Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private
respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust
in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving
the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the
negative.The contention is premised on the alleged distinction
between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 1821of
the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner
to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the
final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the
LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount
deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of
rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only
provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the
property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention
petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of
"Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform".22The last major challenge to CARP is that the
landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a
well-accepted principle of eminent domain.xxx xxx xxxThe CARP Law,
for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.xxx xxx xxxHence the argument that the assailed
measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.Notably,
however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in
discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:. . . despite
the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under
RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of
Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just compensation
is not always required to be made fully in money" even as the
Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium
for the payment of just compensation is money and no other" the
Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . .
.that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation."23(Emphasis supplied)We agree with the observations
of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely
recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment
other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled
rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before
the title to the expropriated property is transferred.The attempt
to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation
under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties,
is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible
expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough
for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by
withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in
exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association"
case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on
private respondents, which the Court must rectify.Hence, we find it
unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under
Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes
of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The
immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is
deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he
should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we
reiterate the cardinal rule that:. . . within the context of the
State's inherent power of eminent domain,just compensation means
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking.Without prompt payment,compensation
cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.24(Emphasis
supplied)The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored
to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the
true freedom of the farmer.25But despite this, cases involving its
implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets.
Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally
emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due
time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this
objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on
the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws
are also entitled to protection.26WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises
considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
appealed decision is AFFIRMEDin toto.SO ORDERED.Regalado, Puno and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.Footnotes1 Gelos v.
Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608. 615 (1992), quoting Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy.2 Ibid, p. 616.3 Rollo, p. 7.4 Rollo, pp. 122-123.5
Rollo, p. 149.6 which provides formulas for the valuation of land
expropriated under RA 6657.7 which provides for the opening of
trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of depositing in an
accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land
expropriated by the DAR.8 Rollo, pp. 109-111.9 Sec. 16. Procedure
for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition of
private lands, the following shall be followed:xxx xxx xxx(e) Upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.10 Rollo, p. 111.11 Sec. 49. Rules and
Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall have the power to issue
rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry
out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take
effect ten (l0) days after the publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.12 Rollo, pp. 111-112.13 Rollo,
p. 112.14 Rollo, p. 107.15 Rollo, p. 149.16 Rollo, p. 63.17 Rollo,
p. 67.18 Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission 212 SCRA 425, 432
(1992).19 Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission 202 SCRA 507, 54
(1991)citingTeoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589
(1970),citingSantos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 (1960); Animos vs.
Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 (1989).20
Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162
SCRA 628 (1988).21 Sec. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The
LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed
upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP in accordance with the
criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as
the just compensation for the land.22 175 SCRA 343.23 Decision,
Court of Appeals, p. 14.24 Municipality of Makati vs. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 207, 213 (1990)citingCosculluela vs. The Hon.
Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 393, 400 (1988); Provincial Government
of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, 302 (1987).25 175
SCRA 343, 392.26 Mata vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 748, 753
(1992).
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070REFORM, represented by
SECRETARYJOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Present: Petitioner,
Davide,C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, - versus - Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and
Garcia,JJ.DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T.SUTTON-SOLIMAN and
Promulgated:HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents. October 19, 2005x - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
xDECISIONPUNO,J.: This is a petition for review filed by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4,
2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the
Constitution. The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate,
inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow
and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then
existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents
made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1]their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.On June
10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took
effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.On December 4, 1990, in anen
bancdecision in the case ofLuz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2]this
Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are
not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we
declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar
as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian
reform.In view of theLuz Farms ruling,respondents filed with
petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3]On December 21, 1992, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected
respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to
cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary
that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.On April 27,
1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of
their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they
submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their
request.On December 27, 1993, DAR issuedA.O. No. 9, series of
1993,[5]which provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of
June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the
following retention limits,viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e.,1
hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the
landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock
infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be
excluded from the operations of the CARL. On February 4, 1994,
respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as
final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under theLuz
Farms doctrine,their entire landholding is exempted from the
CARL.[6] On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao issued an Order[7]partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the
retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner
exempted1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes,
and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner
ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and
placed under Compulsory Acquisition.Respondents moved for
reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should
be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their
motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9]with the
Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and
validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio
between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified
for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR
A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of theLuz Farms casewhich declared
cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the
impugned Order of petitioner DAR.[10]It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, does not run counter to theLuz Farms caseas the A.O.
provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of
land is being used for cattle-raising. However,the issue on the
constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the
determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It
declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the
intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock
farms from the land reform program of the government. The
dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE,premises considered, DAR
Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is herebyDECLAREDnull
and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated
09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian
Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the
agrarian reform program of the government isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.SO
ORDERED.[11] Hence, this petition. The main issue in the case at
bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,
which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands
devoted to livestock raising. Invoking its rule-making power under
Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O.
No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a
landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private
agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform.
Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that
some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural
farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the
agrarian reform program. Petitioners arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in
nature,i.e.,the power to make rules and regulations. They have been
granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate
the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated
rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance
due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions.
However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force
and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.[12]
They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that
they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of
administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body
concerned.The fundamental rule in administrative law is that,to be
valid, administrative rules and regulationsmust be issued by
authority of a law andmust not contravene the provisions of the
Constitution.[13]The rule-making power of an administrative agency
may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or
by the Constitution.Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended.Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the
scope of their regulations.[14]In the case at bar, we find that the
impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The
A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention
limit for their ownership. However,the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,inter
alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-
raising. The Court clarified in theLuz Farmscasethat livestock,
swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall
within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or
tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A
great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form
of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment
like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and
other technological appurtenances.[15]Clearly, petitionerDAR has no
power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded
its power in issuing the assailed A.O.The subsequent case ofNatalia
Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16]reiterated our ruling in theLuz Farmscase.
InNatalia Realty,the Court heldthat industrial, commercial and
residential lands are not covered by the CARL.[17] We stressed anew
thatwhile Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall
cover all public and private agricultural lands,the term
agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, inNatalia
Realty,even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which
arearable yetstill undeveloped,could not be considered as
agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were
already classified as residential lands. A similar logical
deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to
raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as
industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian
reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O.,
it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some
unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural
lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian
reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention.The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to
prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in
this case.Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early
as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in
Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of
the Philippines.[18]Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact.
Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle
after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that
respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed
that what the CARL prohibits is theconversion of agricultural
landsfor non-agricultural purposesafter the effectivity of the
CARL.There has been no change of business interest in the case of
respondents.Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory
construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without
substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption
of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law,
Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one.[19] In the case at bar,
after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No.
7881[20]which amended certain provisions of the CARL.
Specifically,the new law changed the definition of the terms
agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its
coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry
and swine-raising.[21]With this significant modification, Congress
clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with
the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.In sum, it is
doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony
with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or
extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be
consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an
administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the
latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was
properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the
coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987
Constitution.IN VIEW WHEREOF,the petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
103302 August 12, 1993NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS
AND INVESTORS CORP.,petitioners,vs.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION
IV,respondents.Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.The Solicitor General
for respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:Are lands already classified for
residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor
agencies1prior to 15 June 1988,2covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? This is the
pivotal issue in this petition forcertiorariassailing the Notice of
Coverage3of the Department of Agrarian Reform over parcels of land
already reserved as townsite areas before the enactment of the
law.Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the
owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba,
Antipolo, Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares
and 2.7080 hectares, or a total of 125.0078 hectares, and embraced
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31527 of the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Rizal.On 18 April 1979, Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in
the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite
areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which
were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA
properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.Since private landowners were allowed to develop their
properties into low-cost housing subdivisions within the
reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation
(EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied
for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances
by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The necessary
permit for Phase I of the subdivision project, which consisted of
13.2371 hectares, was issued sometime in 1982;4for Phase II, with
an area of 80,000 hectares, on 13 October 1983;5and for Phase III,
which consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April
1986.6Petitioner were likewise issued development permits7after
complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later
became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
(CARL, for brevity), went into effect. Conformably therewith,
respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity),
through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued on 22
November 1990 a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307
hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the
notice of Coverage.EDIC also protested to respondent Director
Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and twice wrote him
requesting the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.On 17 January
1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc.
(SAMBA, for the brevity), filed a complaint against NATALIA and
EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners
from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.8The
Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from
proceeding with the development of the subdivision. Petitioners
then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was denied. Instead, the
Regional Adjudicator issued on 5 March 1991 a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB); however, on 16 December 1991 the
DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for
further proceedings.9In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent
Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside
the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent
Director took action on the protest-letters, thus compelling
petitioners to institute this proceeding more than a year
thereafter.NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion
to respondent DAR for including undedeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They
argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural
lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential
fiat for the townsite reservation.Public respondents through the
Office of the Solicitor General dispute this contention. They
maintain that the permits granted petitioners were not valid and
binding because they did not comply with the implementing
Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," in that
no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from
agricultural residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other
words, there was no valid conversion. Moreover, public respondents
allege that the instant petition was prematurely filed because the
case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before the DAR
Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated. Respondents conclude,
as a consequence, that petitioners failed to fully exhaust
administrative remedies available to them before coming to
court.The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of
the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearances as well as the
Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim
of public respondents, petitioners NATALIA and EDIC did in fact
comply with all the requirements of law.Petitioners first secured
favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan Development
Corporation, the agency tasked to oversee the implementation of the
development of the townsite reservation, before applying for the
necessary permits from the Human Settlements
RegulatoryCommission.10And, in all permits granted to petitioners,
the Commissionstated invariably therein that the applications were
in "conformance"11or "conformity"12or "conforming"13with the
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence,
the argument of public respondents that not all of the requirements
were complied with cannot be sustained.As a matter of fact, there
was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior
approval from DAR. The NATALIA properties were within the areas set
aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite reservation for the
purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning
population of Metro Manila, it in effect converted for residential
use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites
were met. And, in the case at bar, there was compliance with all
relevant rules and requirements. Even in their applications for the
development of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, the predecessor
agency of HLURB noted that petitioners NATALIA and EDIC complied
with all the requirements prescribed by P.D. 957.The implementing
Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all
subdivisions and condominiums in general. On the other hand,
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a basic
tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a
special law, the latter prevails.14Interestingly, the Office of the
Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which have already been
developed.15Of course, this is contrary to its earlier position
that there was no valid conversion. The applications for the
developed and undeveloped portions of subject subdivision were
similarly situated. Consequently, both did not need prior DAR
approval.We now determine whether such lands are covered by the
CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
"agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act andnot classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."16The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this
limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are
"arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands."17Based on the
foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their
inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the
areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing
subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned
from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to
restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The
enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may
have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact
that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit
of the CARL.Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are
outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL
by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised
Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural
Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses,18DAR itself defined "agricultural
land" thus . . .Agricultural lands refersto those devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as
mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, andnot classified in
town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent
authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or
industrial use.Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15
June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was
therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.Be that as it may,
the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion19that lands covered by
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637,inter alia, of which the NATALIA
lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be
developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing
agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning
and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. " Not being deemed
"agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.Anent
the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative
remedies in the instant petition, suffice it to say that the issues
raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ from those of
petitioners. The former involve possession; the latter, the
propriety of including under the operation of CARL lands already
converted for residential use prior to its effectivity.Besides,
petitioners were not supposed to wait until public respondents
acted on their letter-protests, this after sitting it out for
almost a year. Given the official indifference, which under the
circumstances could have continued forever, petitioners had to act
to assert and protect their interests.20In fine, we rule for
petitioners and hold that public respondents gravely abused their
discretion in issuing the assailed Notice of Coverage of 22
November 1990 by of lands over which they no longer have
jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, the petition forCertiorariisGRANTED. The
Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by virtue of which
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed
under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J.,
Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ.,
concur.#Footnotes1 National Housing Authority and Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission; see C.T. Torres v. Hibionada, G.R. No.
80916, 9 November 1990, 191 SCRA 268.2 Date of effectivity of R.A.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988.3 Annex "H", Petition;Rollo, p. 33.4 Annex "A",
Petition;Rollo, p. 26.5 Annex "C", Petition;Rollo, p. 28.6 Annex
"E", Petition;Rollo,p. 30.7 Annexes "B", "D" and "F",
Petition;Rollo, pp. 27, 29 and 31.8 Complaint, p. 3;Rollo, p. 68.9
DARAB Resolution, 16 December 1991, p. 8;Rollo, p. 82.10 Renamed
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) per E.O. No. 90,
dated 17 December 1986.11 Annexes "A" and "C", Petition;Rollo, pp.
26 and 28.12 Annex "B", Petition;Rollo, p. 27.13 Annexes "D" and
"E", petition;Rollo, pp. 29-30.14 National Power Corporation v.
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXV, G.R. No. 72477, 16 October 1990, 190
SCRA 477.15 Comment, p. 8;Rollo, p. 63.16 Sec. 3 (c), R.A. 6657.17
Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51, Citing Record, CONCOM, 7
August 1986, Vol. III, p. 30.18 DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1990.19 Opinion No. 181, Series of 1990.20 Rocamora v.
RTC-Cebu, Br. VIII, G.R. No. 65037, 23 November 1988, 167 SCRA
615.
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR.,
JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO
SALAMAR,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M.
REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES,respondents.Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance for petitioners.Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique
Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private
respondents.PARAS,J.:Before us is a petition seeking the reversal
of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals**on
March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated April
29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reading as follows;WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court
on November 5, 1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is
hereby rendered:1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is
inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law,2. Declaring
that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the
farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and3. Ejecting from the
land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian,
Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando
Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding
themselves.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (p. 31,
Rollo)The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case
consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are
situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.Private
respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these
lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions
of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of
Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).On June 18, 1981, private
respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon.
Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D.
Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein
petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and
all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders
issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead
lands.Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative
defenses of July 8, 1981.Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs
filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the
lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being
issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed
their opposition dated August 4, 1982.On November 5, 1982, the then
Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV,
Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region,
Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint
and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.On January 4,
1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to
which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.Thus,
on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted
decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the
same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.On appeal to the
respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment
rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:WHEREFORE, finding no reversible
error thereof, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained
through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under
P.D. 27.The question certainly calls for a negative answer.We agree
with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping
social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the
social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such
contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the
enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Thus,The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and
protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of
land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and
plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of
life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to
the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right
to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of
comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the
welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the
satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA
45)In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects
the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the
tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is
Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
provides:Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of
agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands.Additionally, it is worthy of
note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso
supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by
homestead patents like those of the property in question,
reading,Section 6. Retention Limits. ...... Provided further, That
original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who
still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision
of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and
Regalado, JJ., concur.Footnotes** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia
and concurred in by Justices Josue N. Bellosillo and Venancio D.
Aldecoa, Jr. of the Fourth Division.
READ THIS FOR HACIENDA LUISITA
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/november2011/171101.htm
roXAS & CO,
INC.,Respondent.x------------------------------------xROXAS&CO.,INC.,Petitioner,-
versus
-DAMBA-NFSW,Respondent.x------------------------------------xDAMBA-NFSW
REPRESENTED BY LAURO V. MARTIN,Petitioner,- versus -ROXAS &
CO.,
INC.,Respondent.x------------------------------------xDAMBA-NFSW,Petitioner,-
versus -ROXAS & CO., INC.,Respondent.G.R. No. 149548G.R. No.
167505Present:PUNO,C.J.,CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO
MORALES,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DELCASTILLO,ABAD,
andVILLARAMA,JJ.Promulgated:December 4, 2009G.R. No. 167540G.R. No.
167543G.R. No. 167845G.R. No. 169163G.R. No. 179650
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD
E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.The main subject of the seven
consolidated petitions is the application of petitioner Roxas &
Co., Inc. (Roxas & Co.) for conversion from agricultural to
non-agricultural use of its threehaciendaslocated in Nasugbu,
Batangas containing a total area of almost 3,000 hectares.The facts
are not new, the Court having earlier resolved intimately-related
issues dealing with thesehaciendas.Thus, in the 1999 case ofRoxas
& Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[1]the Court presented the
facts as follows:. . . Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation
and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway,all located in
theMunicipalityofNasugbu, Batangas.Hacienda Palico is1,024 hectares
in areaand is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 985.This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466,
0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354.Hacienda Banilad is1,050 hectares in
area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration
Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390.Hacienda Caylaway is867.4571 hectares in
areaand is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and
T-44665.x x x xOnJuly 27, 1987, the Congress of
thePhilippinesformally convened and took over legislative power
from the President.This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.The Act was signed
by the President onJune 10, 1988and took effect onJune 15,
1988.Beforethe laws effectivity, onMay 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.]
filed with respondent DAR avoluntary offer to sell [VOS]Hacienda
Caylawaypursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.Haciendas Palico
and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR
in accordance with the CARL.x x x xNevertheless,onAugust 6, 1992,
[Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a
letter to the Secretary of DARwithdrawing its VOSof Hacienda
Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangasallegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to non-agricultural.As a result, petitioner informed
respondent DAR that it wasapplying forconversionof Hacienda
Caylawayfrom agricultural to other uses.x x x x[2](emphasis and
underscoring supplied)The petitions inG.R. Nos. 167540and167543nub
on the interpretation ofPresidential Proclamation (PP) 1520which
was issued on November 28, 1975 by then President Ferdinand
Marcos.The PP reads:DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON
ANDTERNATEINCAVITEPROVINCEAND THEMUNICIPALITYOFNASUGBUIN BATANGAS
AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESWHEREAS,certain areasin
the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate
in Cavite Province andNasugbuin Batangashave potential tourism
valueafter being developed into resort complexes for the foreign
and domestic market; andWHEREAS,it is necessary to conduct the
necessary studies and tosegregate specific geographic areasfor
concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in
developing their tourism potential;NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area
comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite
Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province asa tourist zone under
the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism
Authority(PTA)pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.The PTA
shallidentifywell-defined geographic areas within the zone
withpotential tourism value, wherein optimum use of natural assets
and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration
of efforts and limited resources of both government and private
sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign
exchange as well as other tourist receipts.Any duly established
military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded
from this proclamation.All proclamation, decrees or executive
orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified
accordingly.(emphasis and underscoring supplied).The incidents
which spawned the filing of the petitions inG.R. Nos. 14