G.R. No. 158228 March 23, 2004DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as
represented by its Secretary, ROBERTO M.
PAGDANGANAN,petitioner,vs.DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS (DECS),respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This
petition for review oncertiorariseeks to set aside the decision1of
the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
64378, which reversed the August 30, 2000 decision of the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, as well as the Resolution dated May 7, 2003,
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.In controversy
are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area
of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros
Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental,
respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the
late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of
Education).2Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the
name of respondent DECS under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
167175.3On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing
from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of
lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop
years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year
2004-2005.4On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others,
claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject
lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Escalante.5After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a
"Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject
lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for
a conference with the farmer beneficiaries.6Then, MARO Piosa
submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who
recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the
coverage of the landholdings.On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional
Director Dominador B. Andres approved the recommendation, the
dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
premises considered, the petition is granted. Order is hereby
issued:1. Placing under CARP coverage Lot 2509 with an area of
111.4791 hectares situated at Had. Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental
and Lot 817-D with an area of 77.7671 hectares situated at Brgy.
Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental;2. Affirming the notice of
coverage sent by the DAR Provincial Office, Negros Occidental dated
November 23, 1994;3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office of Negros Occidental and the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officers of Sagay and Escalante to facilitate the acquisition of
the subject landholdings and the distribution of the same qualified
beneficiaries.SO ORDERED.7Respondent DECS appealed the case to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the
Regional Director.8Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition
forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals, which set aside the
decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.9Hence, the instant
petition for review.The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case
is whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).The general policy
under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as
possible.10Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of
CARP. It states that the program shall:" cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, allpublicand private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture."More specifically, the following lands
are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:(a) All
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval
of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by
law, the specific limits of the public domain;(b) All lands of the
public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;(c) All other lands owned by
the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and(d) All
private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of
the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
thereon.Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land," as "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." The term "agriculture" or "agricultural activity"
is also defined by the same law as follows:Agriculture,
Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of
such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations
done by persons whether natural or juridical.11The records of the
case show that the subject properties were formerly private
agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were
donated to respondent DECS. From that time until they were leased
to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be
agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the
public domain being owned by an agency of the
government.12Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act,
before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the
said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the
classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture.Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage
on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of
lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly
and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the
repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby
locality.Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands
subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the
same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school
sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the
landper se,not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.We agree
with the petitioner.Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the
types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well
as the purposes of their exemption, viz:x x x x x x x x xc) Lands
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary
for national defense,school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools
for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of
this Act.13x x x x x x x x xClearly, a reading of the paragraph
shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land
must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to be
necessary;"and2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes."The importance of the phrase
"actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to be necessary"
cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do
by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions.
The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain
meaning rule" orverba legisin statutory construction is applicable
in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.14We are not unaware of
our ruling in the case ofCentral Mindanao University v. Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,15wherein we declared the
land subject thereof exempt from CARP coverage. However, respondent
DECS reliance thereon is misplaced because the factual
circumstances are different in the case at bar.Firstly, in
theCMUcase, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land
of the public domain because it was reserved by the late President
Carlos P. Garcia under Proclamation No. 476 for the use of Mindanao
Agricultural College (now CMU).16In this case, however, the lands
fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.Secondly, in theCMUcase, the
land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it
was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte
Phils., Inc.) under a "Management and Development Agreement", the
undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine
Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with
direct participation of faculty and students. Moreover, the land
was part of the land utilization program developed by the CMU for
its "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP), a
multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity
program.17Hence, the retention of the land was found to be
necessary for the present and future educational needs of the CMU.
On the other hand, the lands in this case were
notactuallyandexclusivelyutilized as school sites and campuses, as
they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for
educational purposes but for the furtherance of its business. Also,
as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract
of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the
repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality.Anent the
issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP,
we disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not.At
the outset, it should be pointed out that the identification of
actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657,
which states:SECTION 15.Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in
coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as
organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees,
tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of
the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the
BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:(a) names and
members of their immediate farm household;(b) owners or
administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial
relationship;(c) location and area of the land they work;(d) crops
planted; and(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid
or wages received.A copy of the registry or list of all potential
CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay
hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it
shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable
hours.In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers
were potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject
properties.18Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under
CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries
are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
the CARP,19it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in
substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency.
In this case, there was none.The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless
farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the
underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to
liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its
benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and,
ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less
certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest
consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation
toward sound rural development and industrialization."20WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No.
64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated August 30, 2000
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under
CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.
an reform program.On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No.
129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the
Resolution states:WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has
adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the
vital components of which includes the establishment of model and
pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops,
soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale
technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of paris,
marine biological and sea farming research center,and other
progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide
the necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and
fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for
provincial government employees;WHEREAS, the province would need
additional land to be acquired either by purchase or expropriation
to implement the above program component;WHEREAS, there are
contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial
Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot
development center;WHEREFORE . . . .Pursuant to the Resolution, the
Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis
R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against
Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as
Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial
Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V.
Panga.Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for
the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to
appear at the hearing of the motion.The San Joaquins moved to
dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price
offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon
the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages
that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ
of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.The San Joaquins
filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion
to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in
the order dated February 1990.In their petition before the Court of
Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and
void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and
(c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to
dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the
order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the
amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an
order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ
of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.In its
answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that
it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings
under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and
that the expropriations are for a public purpose.Asked by the Court
of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor
General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code
(B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office
of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General
expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the
plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing
project.The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial
court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to
non-agricultural land.Hence this petition.It must be noted that in
the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal
of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy
of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the
nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.The Court
of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned
resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when
the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings
until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the
authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the
classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the
resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.Modernly, there has been a shift from the
literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public
use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The
old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used
by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.)
before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional
requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use"
means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project
(Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).The expropriation of the property
authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose.
The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the
direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of
Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to
the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture,
fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the
farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held inSumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461,
"Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."It
is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its
exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the
provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.The
Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with
the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San
Joaquins.InHeirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220,
petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism
Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land
Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding
that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of
8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the
land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there
was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether
the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or
engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the
expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome
the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of
the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision
is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to
the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.The
Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the
Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local
government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment,
pp. 14-15;Rollo, pp. 128-129)It is true that local government units
have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v.
Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true
that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may
retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise
thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence,
262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated
power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power
must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power
or in other legislations.Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was
promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:A local government unit may,
through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government,
units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land
Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to
non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to
the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest
provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify
the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in
expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, which reads:Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the
lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes,
the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with
due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws,
may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and
its disposition:Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully
paid his obligation.The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision
sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the
agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5)
years from its award."The rules on conversion of agricultural lands
found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a
parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be
devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on
the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is
limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the
land owners or tenant beneficiaries.Statutes conferring the power
of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249,
176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).To sustain the Court of Appeals
would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department
of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use.Ordinarily, it is the legislative
branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether
the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public,
the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts
defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only
when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation
to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin
City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8
ALR 585).There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes,
no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign
unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto
(Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as
sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated
sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in
general term.The fears of private respondents that they will be
paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations
of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as
unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just
compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever
was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305
[1987]). As held inMunicipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528
[1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those laid
down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private
respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the
just compensation for their property.WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.The decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial
court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private
respondents.
G.R. No. 127198 May 16, 2005LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and
JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME
and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN,respondents.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:This
is aPetition for Review1dated December 6, 1996 assailing
theDecision2of the Regional Trial Court3dated July 5, 1996 which
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the
amount ofP30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the
States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land
reform program.The facts follow.On May 14, 1993, private
respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the
determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands
situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named
as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the
petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered
tenants of the land.After trial, the court rendered the
assailedDecisionthe dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against
respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents
Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject
of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the
amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just
compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located
at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.Respondent Department
of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the
cost of suit.SO ORDERED.4DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions
for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in
itsOrder5dated July 30, 1996 for beingpro formaas the same did not
contain a notice of hearing.Thus, the prescriptive period for
filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to
file a timely appeal and the assailedDecisionbecame final and
executory.Land Bank then filed aPetition for Relief from Order
Dated 30 July 1996,6citing excusable negligence as its ground for
relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of
merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for
reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or
mistake.7The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record notably
states that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for
Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no
notice of hearing"8due to his heavy workload.The trial court, in
itsOrder9of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief
because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.In
the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure
of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of
work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion
for reconsiderationpro formaconsidering its allegedly meritorious
defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from
judgment was erroneous.According to Land Bank, private respondents
should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of
their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation directly with the trial court.
Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that
PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in
the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private
respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time
of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value
thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.Private respondents
filed aComment10dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks
failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for
reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which
resulted in the motion being declaredpro forma,does not constitute
excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land
Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has
"mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading."Land Bank
filed aReply11dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity
considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised
in its motion for reconsideration.The Courtgave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.12Both parties complied.13The petition is
unmeritorious.At issue is whether counsels failure to include a
notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land
Bank to a relief from judgment.Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides:Sec. 1.Petition for relief from
judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in
the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the
remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds
of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to
be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against.14Measured against this standard,
the reason profferred by Land Banks counsel,i.e.,that his heavy
workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for
reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means
excusable.Indeed, counsels admission that "he simply scanned and
signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005,
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or
unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" speaks volumes of his
arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute
excusable negligence.The failure to attach a notice of hearing
would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by
a lawyer who claims to have "mastered the intricate art and
technique of pleading."15Indeed, a motion that does not contain the
requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper.
The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much
less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.16The
trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for
reconsiderationpro forma.Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying
Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment.It should be emphasized at this point that procedural
rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts
and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal
interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases
of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and
their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt,
procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and
rationalize the pursuit of justice.17Aside from ruling on this
procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues
presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question
of just compensation.Land Bank avers that private respondents
should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation
instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the
trial court.The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not
entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter18to
the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted
by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference
for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however,
was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a
petition directly with the trial court.At any rate, inPhilippine
Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,19we declared that there is
nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions
of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation. The first refers to administrative
proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.In
accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary
manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian
reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for
the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.20Thus, the trial did not err in
taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.Land
Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of
agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of
PD 27,ergojust compensation should be based on the value of the
property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993,
is likewise erroneous. InOffice of the President, Malacaang, Manila
v. Court of Appeals,21we ruled that the seizure of the landholding
did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would
take effect on the payment of just compensation.Under the factual
circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents
has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No.
6657 (RA 6657)22before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and
EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling
inParis v. Alfeche.23Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly
relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination
of just compensation, reads as follows:Sec. 17.Determination of
Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.It would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228
considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for
a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full
and ample.24In this case, the trial court arrived at the just
compensation due private respondents for their property, taking
into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the
highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of
its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly
determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents
in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing
jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. 170220 November 20, 2006JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her
capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAEDO and
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,Petitioners,vs.LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended Decision1of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004
Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian
Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31,
2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26,
2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c)
the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land
Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003
Order.The facts of the case are as follows:Petitioner Josefina S.
Lubrica is the assignee2of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels
of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental
Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)3of the Registry of
Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said
property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the
land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
(1972)4and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).5The land was thereafter
subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at
P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor
of Lubrica.On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and
Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro
covered by TCT No. T-1286of the Register of Deeds of Occidental
Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares
or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the
coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered
by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.Petitioners rejected
the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary
administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation.
On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just
compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No.
T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No.
T-128).7Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17,
2003, two separate petitions8for judicial determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed as
Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No.
R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46
thereof.Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the
Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657 (1988)9and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that
LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.On
March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order10granting
petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which
reads:WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation
Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby
ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to
Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit
the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and
bonds, as follows:1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P
51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;2. In
Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the
amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.Such deposit
must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within
five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify
this court of her compliance within such period.Let this order be
served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the
movants.SO ORDERED.11LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in
a Resolution12dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27, 2003,
the trial court issued an Order13directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco,
LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the
amounts.Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.14On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued
a 60-day temporary restraining order15and on October 6, 2003, a
writ of preliminary injunction.16On May 26, 2004, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision17in favor of the petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered,
there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated
March 31, 2003, Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May
27, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We
previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.SO ORDERED.18The
Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to
deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there
is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing
of the final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there
is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that
the DAR already took possession of the properties and distributed
the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.LBP moved for
reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision,19the
dispositive portion of which reads:Wherefore, in view of the
prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We
hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to
effect the reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be
reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED,
and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with
the end in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in
congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin.
Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is
(sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation for the
expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the
mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in
the case of Gabatin.SO ORDERED.20In the Amended Decision, the Court
of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value
of the expropriated properties is improper because it was
erroneously computed. CitingGabatin v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,21it held that the formula to compute the just
compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production
x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of
the government support price for the corresponding agricultural
produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal
taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October 21,
1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over
their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court
of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300
which are the prevailing government support price for palay and
corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31,
the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking
in 1972.Hence, this petition raising the following issues:A. THE
COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO.
127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and22B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT
BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.23Petitioners insist that the determination of just
compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated
properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other
hand, claims that the value of the realties should be computed as
of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.The petition is
impressed with merit.In the case ofLand Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad,24the Court ruled thus:Land Banks contention that the
property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October
21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of
that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise
erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not
take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take
effect on the payment of just compensation.TheNatividadcase
reiterated the Courts ruling inOffice of the President v. Court of
Appeals25that the expropriation of the landholding did not take
place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but
seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation
judicially determined.Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of
Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,26we held that
expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place,
not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the
payment of just compensation.In the instant case, petitioners were
deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the
just compensation therefor.1wphi1The parcels of land were already
subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby
immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the
circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the
petitioners to compute the just compensation using the values at
the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment,
considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have
already benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not
yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of
their properties without payment of just compensation which, under
the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away
from its owners.27The transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains
with the landowner.28Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform29is
instructive, thus:It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the
emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that
he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him
was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a
full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative." It
was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation
also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section
1 that:All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full
owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)it was obviously
referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives
and full payment of just compensation. x x xThe CARP Law, for its
part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.We also note that the expropriation proceedings
in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the
agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the
just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled.
Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of
this process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the
applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only
suppletory effect.30In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,31we held that:RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the
properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the
landless.1wphi1And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution
thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered
to.Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally
determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In
determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property
as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.32Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Celada33that the above provision was converted into a formula by
the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:Land
Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x
0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)Petitioners were
deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they
have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly
be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the
failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance
with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is
important considering that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.34WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a)
the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just
compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26,
2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and
(c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco,
respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the
March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian
Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian
Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of
the subject properties based on the aforementioned formula.SO
ORDERED.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBANChief JusticeChairpersonMA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate JusticeROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate
Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O
NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief
Justice
G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP.,respondents.G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., ET AL.,respondents.FRANCISCO, R.,J.:It has been declared
that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the
underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny
justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on
his side.1As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:. . . social
justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his
hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called
upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But
never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according
to the mandate of the law.2In this agrarian dispute, it is once
more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its
resolution.Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank
of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon
motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered
consolidated.3Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents' Petition forCertiorariandMandamusand ruled as
follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
forCertiorariandMandamusis hereby GRANTED:a) DAR Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declarednullandvoidinsofar as it
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in
cash or bonds;b) Respondent Landbank is ordered
toimmediatelydeposit not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in
trust" with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the
names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash
and in government financial instruments within the parameters of
Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. YapP 135,482.12
Heirs of Emiliano SantiagoP 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;c) The
DAR-designated bank is ordered toallow the petitioners to
withdrawthe above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final
determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; andd)
Respondent DAR is ordered to
1)immediatelyconductsummaryadministrative proceedings to determine
the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the
petitioners15 days from noticewithin which to submit evidence and
to 2) decide the caseswithin 30 daysafter they are submitted for
decision.4Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution
dated January 18, 1995,5denying their motion for
reconsideration.Private respondents are landowners whose
landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).Aggrieved by the alleged
lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation
and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a
Petition forCertiorariandMandamuswith prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity
of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 19926and DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,7and sought to compel
the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings
to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and
the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for
private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.Through
a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this
Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for
proper determination and disposition.As found by respondent court ,
the following are undisputed:PetitionerPedro Yapalleges that "(o)n
4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of
petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of
Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries
collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a
certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and
P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the
parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively,
and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the
names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without
notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement
of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash
and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).The above
allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.PetitionerHeirs of Emiliano Santiagoallege that the
heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land
located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares
covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago;
that in November and December 1990, without notice to the
petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed
Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to
the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least
25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional
Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in
the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank
reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago.
(ANNEX "E";Rollo,p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying
rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's
Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the
LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).The above allegations are not disputed by
the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it
was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of
Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect
any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p.
99).Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation
(AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties
located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in
San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel
covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a
summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the
property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in
Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was
rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation
for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay
or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34
fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to
the first trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX
"G"). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco,
Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay
is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with
an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were
issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered
on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR
to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a
trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount
of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been
previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)The above
allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that
respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in
the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to
it (Rollo, p. 100).8Private respondents argued that Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of
trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation
for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as
provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.9Private respondents also
assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked",
"deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names
as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or in bonds.10Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that
Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making
power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11Moreover, the DAR
maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the
Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and the ruling in the case ofAssociation of Small Landowners in the
Philippines,Inc.,et al.vs.Hon.Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12For its part, petitioner
Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits
was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were
also used.13On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the
assailed decision in favor of private respondents.14Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the
same.15Hence, the instant petitions.On March 20, 1995, private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No.
118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended
to delay the finality of the appealed decision.16The Court,
however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to
file their comments.17Petitioners submit that respondent court
erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of
trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in
holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right
to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited
in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for
just compensation.Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners
maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way
excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus,
in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form
of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely
exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.The contention is
untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:Sec. 16.
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx xxx(e) Upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, uponthe deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or in LBP bondsin accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis
supplied)It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor
can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form.
If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the
valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be
fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is
no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term "deposit".The conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment.18In this regard, it must be stressed that the function
of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this
is that administrative regulations cannot extendthe law and amend a
legislative enactment,19for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And
in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails.20In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the
limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein,
petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because
these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision
of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in
striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and
void.Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private
respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust
in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving
the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the
negative.The contention is premised on the alleged distinction
between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 1821of
the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner
to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the
final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the
LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount
deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of
rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only
provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the
property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention
petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of
"Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform".22The last major challenge to CARP is that the
landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a
well-accepted principle of eminent domain.xxx xxx xxxThe CARP Law,
for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.xxx xxx xxxHence the argument that the assailed
measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.Notably,
however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in
discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:. . . despite
the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under
RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of
Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just compensation
is not always required to be made fully in money" even as the
Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium
for the payment of just compensation is money and no other" the
Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . .
.that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation."23(Emphasis supplied)We agree with the observations
of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely
recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment
other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled
rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before
the title to the expropriated property is transferred.The attempt
to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation
under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties,
is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible
expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough
for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by
withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in
exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association"
case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on
private respondents, which the Court must rectify.Hence, we find it
unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under
Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes
of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The
immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is
deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he
should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we
reiterate the cardinal rule that:. . . within the context of the
State's inherent power of eminent domain,just compensation means
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking.Without prompt payment,compensation
cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.24(Emphasis
supplied)The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored
to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the
true freedom of the farmer.25But despite this, cases involving its
implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets.
Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally
emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due
time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this
objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on
the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws
are also entitled to protection.26WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises
considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
appealed decision is AFFIRMEDin toto.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P.
ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE
JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL,
REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE,
HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E.
NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T.
PATIO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN,
CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO,Petitioners,vs.DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC.,Respondents.D E C I S I O
NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of
the Resolutions1of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and
28 August 2003, respectively.The factual and procedural antecedents
are as follows:The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the
recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land
located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their
respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers
presented below:PetitionersTCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLOTCT No. T-287/EP No. A-0376751.7833
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814TCT No.
T-829/EP No. A-0272932.00000.1565
3. RONGIE D. AGUILARTCT No. T-913/EP No. A-0272953.1441
4. TACIANA D. AGUILARTCT No. T-944/EP No. A-0272964.2405
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUANTCT No. T-302/EP No. A-0378093.3082
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.TCT No. T-290/EP No.
A-0356763.1437
7. EDGAR DUENASTCT No. T-949/EP No. A-0376584.0128
8. MARIO P. ERIBALTCT No. T-952/EP No. A-0378362.3087
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIATCT No. T-950/EP No. A-0378442.0950
10. RUBEN A. IBOJOTCT No. T-928/EP No. A-0378731.5737
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRETCT No. T-909/EP No. A-1593482.2670
12. HILARION V. LANTIZATCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674TCT No.
T-401/EP No. A-0378254.55260.4579
13. ANSELMO LOPEZTCT No. T-973/EP No. A-0378404.4939
14. TERESITA NACIONTCT No. T-900/EP No. A-0378492.2140
15. CHARIE E. NASTORTCT No. T-825/EP No. A-0378293.9291
16. NELSON L. NULLASTCT No. T-396/EP No. A-0378262.7491
17. CARLITO S. OLIATCT No. T-910/EP No. A-0376731.7954
18. ROBERTO T.PATIOTCT No. T-912/EP No. A-0378606.4266
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHATCT No. T-914/EP No. A-0378302.2143
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINOTCT No. T-923/EP No. A-0378484.5322
21. PATERNO P. SAINTCT No. T-954/EP No. A-0378134.3223
22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, andTCT No. T-891/EP No.
A-0378803.7151
23. JOEMARIE VIBOTCT No. T-893/EP No. A-0378271.31852
The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are the
surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of
land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur,
with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as
follows:(Deceased) Registered OwnersTCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)
1. MANUEL S. GONZAGATCT No. T-920/EP No. A-0378324.1953
2. RAFAEL PATIOTCT No. T-929/EP No. A-0378613.00783
The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this
Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have been
denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other
persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same
were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other
occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.HMI acquired such
forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales
Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No.
P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total
area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:Lot No.Area(in hectares)
Lot No. 1620, Pls 428.52
Lot No. 1621, Pls 411.64
Lot No. 1622, Pls 4487.47
TOTAL527.834
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275was issued
mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.HMI,
through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308
hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI
allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the
landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.In
1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a
parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of 527.8308 hectares
covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved
the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the
entire landholdings.HMI, through its representatives, actively
participated in all relevant proceedings, including the
determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the
Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an
undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering
the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of
Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons,
which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at
the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed
that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of
Assignment.In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was
conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs
and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to
petitioners, among other persons.In December 1997, HMI filed with
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region
XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage
under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former
landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said
area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was
untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17
petitions, which were later consolidated, sought for the
cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares
which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the
coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree
No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were
untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.On 27 November 1998,
after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD
rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to
petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and
corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations
between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took
effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March
1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team.
Petitioners TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners
appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.After the DARAB denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the
Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The
Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:A perusal
of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one
of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of
Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign
for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.6Petitioners filed a
"Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of
Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted
to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court
of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed
Resolution:Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution
promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition for
certiorari.We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the
resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed
to show that their belated submission of the special power of
attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal requirements
set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized
special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on
non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in
the case at bar.More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in
view of the Supreme Courts ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338
SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice
in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The
attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the
same.Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping
was executed without the proper authorization from all the
petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist
thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.Par. 2, Sec. 5 of
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended
states:"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice x x x"It is, thus, clear that the Motion for
Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be
dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special
power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petitions defect,
the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still
has not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign
the same.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7Petitioners now file this present
Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further
reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which
become indefeasible one year after their registration.The petition
is impressed with merit.1awphil.netPetitioners have sufficiently
complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure concerning the Certification Against Forum shoppingRule
7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the
filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other
tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed
to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies
would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now
provides:Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues
in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his afo