Agenda 10:00 11:00 Securing wireless networks 11:00 11:15 Break 11:15 12:00Patch Management in the Enterprise 12:00 1:00 Lunch 1:00 2:30 Network Isolation.

Agenda

10:00 11:00 Securing wireless networks

11:00 11:15 Break

11:15 12:00 Patch Management in the Enterprise

12:00 1:00 Lunch

1:00 2:30 Network Isolation using IPSec and Group Policies

2:30 2:15 Break

2:15 3:30 Detecting the Hacker

3:30 Q&A

Wireless LAN Security

Paul Hogan

Ward Solutions

Session Prerequisites

Hands-on experience with Windows 2000 or Windows Server 2003

Working knowledge of networking, including basics of security

Basic knowledge of WLANS

Level 300

This sessions are about…

…about operational security

The easy way is not always the secure way

Networks are usually designed in particular ways

In many cases, these practices simplify attacks

In some cases these practices enable attacks

In order to avoid these practices it helps to understand how an attacker can use them

This sessions are NOT …

a hacking tutorial

Hacking networks you own can be enlightening

HACKING NETWORKS YOU DO NOT OWN IS ILLEGAL

…demonstrating vulnerabilities in Windows

Everything we show stems from operational security or custom applications

Knowing how Windows operates is critical to avoiding problems

…for the faint of heart

The Sessions

The Network

External LAN

IIS 6.0Windows 2003

IASPKI

Access Points

ISA Server Firewall

MOMSM

Why Does Network Security Fail?

Network security fails in several common areas, including:Network security fails in several common areas, including:

Human awareness Policy factors Hardware or software misconfigurations Poor assumptions Ignorance Failure to stay up-to-date

Human awareness Policy factors Hardware or software misconfigurations Poor assumptions Ignorance Failure to stay up-to-date

Session Agenda

WLANs and WLAN issues

WLAN Deployment models

Out-of-box

Block SSID / MAC address filtering

WEP

WPA (WPA-PSK)

WLAN and Windows Server 2003

Wireless LAN – Good News

“Cheap, easy to deploy, high performance radio based technology that does not respect the physical

parameters of a building”.

“Cheap, easy to deploy, high performance radio based technology that does not respect the physical

parameters of a building”.

Wireless LAN – Bad News

“Cheap, easy to deploy, high performance radio based technology that does not respect the physical

parameters of a building”.

“Cheap, easy to deploy, high performance radio based technology that does not respect the physical

parameters of a building”.

Wireless LAN

By 2006, 60% of Fortune 1000 companies will be deploying wireless networks

By 2010, the majority of Fortune 2000 companies will be heavily dependent on wireless networks.

Gartner Group 2003

Wireless Network

AccessPoint (AP)

Database Servers

Corporate Servers

Corporate Network

And Now a Warning…..Corporations turning to wireless, for operational flexibility without considering the security issues, may be carelessly sacrificing the integrity of their systems…

Lets go for a drive “Drive by hacking”

Ward Solutions independent analysis

Completely non obtrusive

ToolsLaptopWiFi PCM network cardOrinoco driverNetstumbler software

Results65 % Networks not encrypted55 % NO access controls45 % Broadcasting network name

What can be done

Interception

Monitoring

Insertion

Packet Analysis

Broadcast Monitoring

Access Point Cloning

Jamming

Denial of Service

Brute Force

Reconfiguration

WLAN Deployment: Toaster Install

Out of Box

Connected to Network

Default SSID

No Security configurations

Could this be happening to you

WLAN Deployment: SSID / Mac Filtering

So I blocked SSID and have MAC locking

Limitations of MAC Address Filtering Scalability - Must be administered and propagated to all APs. List

may have a size limit. No way to associate a MAC to a username. User could neglect to report a lost card. Attacker could spoof an allowed MAC address.

SSIDs can be determined even if blocked

Limitations of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) WEP is inherently weak to due poor key exchange. WEP keys are not dynamically changed and therefore vulnerable

to attack. No method for provisioning WEP keys to clients.Generations of WEP APs that filter weak IVs Change keys frequentlyWEP Cracking tools Airsnort Dwepcrack Aircrack + aireplay +

WLAN Deployment: WEP

VPN Connectivity PPTP L2TP Third PartyIPSec Many vendorsPassword-based Layer 2 Authentication Cisco LEAP RSA/Secure ID IEEE 802.1x PEAP/MSCHAP v2Certificate-based Layer 2 Authentication IEEE 802.1x EAP/TLS

Possible Solutions

WLAN Security Type Security Level

Ease of Deployment

Usability and Integration

IEEE 802.11 Low High High

VPN Medium Medium Low

Password-based Medium Medium High

IPSec High Low Low

IEEE 802.1x TLS High Low High

WLAN Security Comparisons

Defines port-based access control mechanism

Works on anything, wired and wireless

Access point must support 802.1X

No special encryption key requirements

Allows choice of authentication methods using EAP

Chosen by peers at authentication time

Access point doesn’t care about EAP methods

Manages keys automatically

No need to preprogram wireless encryption keys

802.1X

A specification of standards-based, interoperable security enhancements that strongly increase the level of data protection and access control for existing and future wireless LAN systems

Goals Enhanced Data Encryption (TKIP) Provide user authentication (802.1x) Be forward compatible with (802.11i) Provide non-RADIUS solution for Small/Home offices WPA-

PSK

Typically a software upgrade and Wi-Fi Alliance began certification testing for interoperability on Wi-Fi Protected Access products in February 2003WPA2

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

WEPs IV only 24 bits and so are repeated every few hours WPA increased IV to 24 bits repeated 900 years

WPA alters values acceptable as IVs

Protects against forgery and replay attacks

IV formed MAC address

TSC

TKIP: New password generated every 10,000 packets

WPA-PSK Passphrase

WPA 802.ii1 recommend 20-character password

Crack is brute force based

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

802.1x and PEAP

WLAN - 802.1X using EAP/TLS

Domain Controller

DHCP

Exchange

File Server

Certification Authority

RADIUS (IAS)

Server Certificate

Laptop

Domain User/Machine

Certificate

EAP Connection

1, 2, 63, 5, 7

4

Best Practices

Use 802.1x authentication

Organize wireless users and computers into groups

Apply wireless access policies using Group Policy

Use EAP/TLS and 128 bit WEP – 802.1x PEAP

Set clients to force user authentication as well as machine authentication

Develop a method to manage rogue APs such as LAN based 802.1x authentication and wireless sniffers.

Microsoft

Securing a wireless LAN Security Strategy

Securing wireless LANs with PEAP and Passwords

Questions and Answers