AFPAK: NATO and the way ahead, 2013 COL Larry Kinde, US Army, GCMC Regional Program Director, Black Sea-Eurasia 15 Jan, 2013 This presentation contains personal views, which do not necessarily reflect USG policy. Speaker is not in the role of official spokesperson.
AFPAK: NATO and the way ahead, 2013. COL Larry Kinde, US Army, GCMC Regional Program Director, Black Sea-Eurasia 15 Jan, 2013. This presentation contains personal views, which do not necessarily reflect USG policy. Speaker is not in the role of official spokesperson. Aim. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
AFPAK: NATO and the way ahead, 2013
COL Larry Kinde, US Army, GCMCRegional Program Director, Black Sea-Eurasia15 Jan, 2013
This presentation contains personal views, which do not necessarily reflect USG policy. Speaker is not in the role of official spokesperson.
Aim
• Understand current situation
• Discuss the way ahead – ISAF– NATO– Afghanistan, and for the Alliance
• Integrate observations (Security Force Advisor Team, Afghan National Police, 2010-11, Ghazni)
• Discussion – throughout – welcome your views
2
3
Agenda
• Current Assessments• “How Insurgencies End”• Taliban status/motivations/objectives
• Broad Area Overview / Indices / Trends
• NATO challenges• Options• Your Views
• Strategy / Policy Process overview• Cost• Current strategy crossroads• Requirements for success
I. Afghanistan
II. Operations
III. Strategy
IV. Way Ahead
4
Area OverviewPashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan (heritage.org)
• Trends positive since 2011
• Still a major world supplier
• Major funding source for INS
5
Indices- Afghanistan
• UN Human Development Index: – 172 of 187
• Transparency International Corruption Index– 180 out of 182
Right Direction?• Positive opinions relatively constant• Some recent higher negatives
6
Stay or go?
7
Number of Afghan Asylum Applications, 2011-2011
ISAF – Current Overview
• Stability– Several international agreements to support long-term results– May: US-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement– May: Chicago summit, NATO/ISAF support through 2017– July: Tokyo summit, linking reforms in governance and rule-of-
law with sustained financial assistance through 2015– 87%of Afghans living in areas moving to ANSF control
8
• Security– Blunted summer offensive– Continued ANSF transition to security lead– Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) up 1% Apr-Sept; shortened poppy
harvest– EIAs down 3% from Jan-Sept 2012 vs same in 2011– EIAs now outside populated areas; cities more secure– Insider attacks – growing trend – measures in place to control
ISAF MISSION
9
• Mission: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
• ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency,
• support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),
• and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development
• in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.
Governance
• Legitimacy and Effectiveness
10
Violence
Time
High
Low
• Security forces• International• Domestic
• Governance • International• Domestic
Where is Afghanistan now?
11
ISAF – as of 1 Jan 2013
Troop Strength:130,386
12
PRTs – 1 Jan 2013
Process underway of handing over responsibilities to AFG organizations
May 10 Jun10 Aug10 Sep10 Nov10 Jan11 Feb11 Apr11.000
.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
4.000
4.500
Average (1-6 scale)
May 10
Jun1
0Aug
10Sep
10Nov
10Ja
n11
Feb11
Apr11
Jun1
1Aug
11Oct1
1Dec
11Feb
12.000
.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
4.000
4.500
5.000 Average (1-6 scale)
Evaluation Process - example
•Data (colored charts etc, e.g. CUAT) •In-person assessments
Regular Assessments:Key Terrain Districts and Add’l Interest DIstricts
Ajiristan
Transition to ANSF lead
17
• Conventional Operations:• 90% partnered• 85% ANSF led
• SOF Operations:• 83% partnered • 83% ANSF led
Inteqal - Transition
18
Tranche 1 Sept 2011
Tranche 2 Jan 2012
Tranche 3 May 2012
Tranche 4 Districts in 12 Provinces; 87% of AFG
Dec 2012
Tranche 5 Remainder – 100% of AFG
July 2013
Enemy-Initiated Attacks• Last 3 months: 13% lower than previous year• But…2012 still higher than 2009, pre-surge
19
Executed IED attacks• IEDs- principal INS attack mode• 2012: 17% decrease over 2011
20
Insider Attacks
21
Attacks on ISAFPersonnel
Attacks on ANSFPersonnel
• Statistically - minor• Psychologically – major• Interaction altered; force
protection measures emplaced
• Reasons, ISAF investigation:• Infiltration (6%)• Co-option (14%)• Personal Motives (38%)• Unknown – INS related (4%)• Unknown – pending (38%)
Example – Khogyani District Ctr• 4 ‘sleepers’ infiltrated; took over station at night• Stole property, burned buildings, kidnapped 12• 10 tortured & killed; 2 escaped; Station later rebuilt
• ADT – Jangal Bagh farm• Major $500k project• Stalled w/o security OPs• Police resources strapped• Solution – OP for Ghazni ‘ring’ plus private security
• PRT – Road expansion• IEDs & threats stalled work• Contractor tried to hire own• CoP explained PD 62• Work continued w/approved
private security• Also Moqur & Qarabagh
Stability Ops ‘Players’ - Examples
American FootballPlay stops / startsRigidly defined positionsSeparate teams & phases offense / defense / etcMostly one-nation sport
Soccer / ‘Futbol’ / FootballPlay continuousRoles vs positionsSame team – lightning
transitions World sport
‘Futbol’ / soccer; not American football
33
“How Insurgencies End”
• RAND study on 89 insurgencies• Not predictive; indicates • Some findings:
– 0 of 89 ended in unambiguous success– Insurgencies last on average 10 years—government
chances of “winning” increase over time– State sponsorship is critical—withdrawal usually leads to
crippling of insurgency– Government better off without external intervention/support– Attacks on civilians eventually backfire– “Anocracies” don’t often succeed (15%)– Tipping points—desertions, defections, infiltrations, civilian
reporting
34
Status of Taliban
• Largest of 8 insurgent factions• Well resourced -- much by Pakistan’s ISI• Sanctuary in Pakistan for command, logistics, planning,
training, recruitment, treatment, recuperation• Many unhappy with ISI influence over movement• Older leaders being replaced by younger more militant • Believe cause is just; some uneasy about certain tactics• Locals provide food and shelter – thru fear or support• Support more a function of government weakness,
* From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”
35
Agenda
• Current Assessments• “How Insurgencies End”• Taliban status/motivations/objectives
• Broad Area Overview / Indices / Trends
• NATO challenges• Options• Your Views
• Strategy / Policy Process overview• Cost• Current strategy crossroads• Requirements for success
I. Afghanistan
II. Operations
III. Strategy
IV. Way Ahead
36
Strategy/Policy Process
• Strategy – ends+ways+means– What is to be done? (ends)– How will it be done? (ways)– What resources? (means)
• Premises– Proactive– Must know end state
• “If you don’t know where you’re going…”
– Balance ends-ways-means– Risk introduced when out of balance– Policy gives end state – Clausewitz– Hierarchical… National -> military -> theater…
• Where does Alliance policy fit in? – Comprehensive; Based on thorough analysis
From H. Richard Yarger, “Towards a Theory of Strategy”, US Army War College, Sept 2005.
+ Process – complex in democracies+ Alliances – complexity multiplied
37
Taliban Motivations
• Multiple and variable by individual• Five main clusters of motivations
– Retaliation for perceived military aggression by foreign forces
– Resistance to perceived invading infidel forces that threaten Afghan and Islamic values and culture
– Resistance to officials regarded as dishonest, corrupt, and unjust who benefit from impunity
– Exclusion from power or resources– Social and economic security for poor (possibly motivation
for over half the insurgent fighters)• Also expediency (coercion or intimidation) or
opportunists (criminal purposes)
* From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”
Example - Defections• Sept 2010 – 4 from Moqur; feigned illness, left
with police ranger, weapons
38
39
Taliban Objectives
• Withdrawal of foreign troops• Establishment of Sharia Law
– Enforcement of law and order– Harsh punishments– Change constitution (but not saying how)– Honest government– Resist immoral western practices specifically related to
women• Force hijab wear• Separation of men and women, limit girls’ education and
women’s jobs, movement, and freedom
* From U.S Institute of peace Special Report “Dangerous Liaisons with Afghan Taliban”
40
Current NATO StrategyEnd state: • Extremism and terrorism no longer a threat to stability; • ANSF self-sufficient; Afghan government extends good governance,
reconstruction, and development to benefit all its citizens • (NATO—3 Oct 08 – reaffirmed in subsequent summits)
Ways / Lines of Effort: • Train and develop ANSF & security institution building• Help strengthen Afghan institutions to establish rule of law, protect
human rights, and promote shared values• Assist Afghan-led counter-drug efforts• Improve unity of effort• Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)• Deepen engagement with Pakistan
Way Ahead post 2014? • ? ? ?
41
Current US Options
• Key issue: Immunity for US troops, or else withdrawal
• If forces remain, options discussed (LWJ, 10 Jan 2013) – 6,000: CT, one base, limited training / logistical support for ANSF– 10,000: + limited training, JTAC. Similar to 2003-2004.– 20,000: + second base, QRF for ANSF, limited patrolling