Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies · 2019-12-05 · 1 Acknowledgements By publishing several reports in recent years, Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies has provided

Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies

Ethnic Groups and Distribution of Political

Power in Afghanistan

Modifying or Changing of the Political System

Constitutional & Political System Reform Studies V

© 2019 Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) is an independent research institute,

founded on October 2012 with a goal of providing scientific and academic ground for

assessment of the strategic issues of Afghanistan in regional and international levels.

Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies strives to help the society in improvement and

development of democracy, security, peace, good governance and other matters through

conducting independent researches, translating and publishing books and scientific

papers, convention of national and international gatherings and conferences.

Disclaimer

The analysis provided in this study are solely those of the author and do not reflect

viewpoint of AISS.

Ethnic Groups and Distribution of Political Power in Afghanistan:

Modifying or Changing of the Political System

Authors: Sediqa Bakhtiari and Mohammad Mahdi Zaki

Publishing No: AISS-P-026-2019

Circulation: 1000 Copies

Date Printing: 2019, Kabul

Address: Qala-e-9 Borja, Kart-e-Parwan, Kabul Afghanistan

Contact Number: (+93) (20)2232881

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ___________________________________ 1

Executive Summary ___________________________________ 2

Section One _________________________________________ 5

Research Plan ________________________________________ 5

Problem Statement ____________________________________ 5

Methodology __________________________________________ 9

Section Two ________________________________________ 12

Afghanistan’s Political Structure and Ethnic Participation since

2001 ______________________________________________ 12

Ethnic Dividend and Power Distribution ____________________ 12

Elites and Power (distribution of power among social forces) _ 21

Discrimination against Non-Muslim Citizens ______________ 24

Section Three _______________________________________ 29

Reform Modification ___________________________________ 30

Changing the Current Political System _____________________ 31

Political Parties _____________________________________ 31

Arguments about the Political Stability/Instability __________ 33

Multi-ethnic Structure of the Afghan Society ______________ 34

Public Demands _____________________________________ 34

Section Four ________________________________________ 36

Alternative Models for the Current Political System _________ 36

II

Parliamentary System ___________________________________ 36

Electing the President by the Parliament and his Symbolic Role 37

Selection of the Prime Minister by the Parliament __________ 38

Empowered Political Parties ___________________________ 38

Vertical and Horizontal Distribution of Power (Functional and

Geographical) _______________________________________ 38

Coordination between Legislative and Executive Branches ___ 39

Preventing Individualism and Despotic Actions of the Executive

Branch ____________________________________________ 40

2) Presidential System with a Separate Executive Branch _______ 40

Parliamentary System as an Ideal System _________________ 50

Regulated Economy __________________________________ 51

Localizing Security and Empowering Provincial Councils ____ 51

Decentralization; to attract wider political Satisfaction _______ 56

Accommodating Discourse on the System Change __________ 56

International Community’s Accommodation of the Political

System Change ______________________________________ 57

Weak Ethnic-Oriented Political Parties ___________________ 58

Loya Jirga’s Complicated Organizing Criterion ____________ 59

Taliban and the Political System __________________________ 60

Section Five ________________________________________ 62

A Critical Review of Changing the Political System _________ 62

Ambiguity and Lack of Consensus among Political Coalitions on the

Political System Change _________________________________ 65

III

Ethno-Centric Power Bases, and its Contradiction with a Democratic

Political Participation ___________________________________ 65

Overlooking Vertical Power-Sharing _______________________ 67

A Review of Top to Bottom Power-Sharing among Ethnic Groups 67

Suggestions ___________________________________________ 69

1

Acknowledgements

By publishing several reports in recent years, Afghanistan Institute

for Strategic Studies has provided the opportunity to discuss

political system reform. Some of AISS’s research reports are as

follows: “Afghanistan’s Constitution and Society in Transition:

Assessment of public opinion and proposals for a constitutional

amendment (2016); The Challenging Path towards Democracy in

Afghanistan: An Assessment and Critique of National Debates on

Alternative Political Systems in Afghanistan (2017); Electoral

Reform and the Experience of Parliamentary Elections in

Afghanistan (2018); The Myth of Afghan Electoral Democracy;

and the Irregularities of the 2014 Presidential Election (2019). This

research has focused on the discussion of ethnic groups and

political system in Afghanistan. Writers of this research are

grateful to the Afghanistan Institute of Strategic Studies for

providing this opportunity and hope that this research would

contribute to the current discussion.

The authors sincerely thank all the interviewees for their

information and comments. We hope this report will be able to

reflect well on their concerns and comments. We also sincerely

thank to Professor Muhammad Nazif Mohib Shahrani, Indiana

University; Dr Davood Azami, Journalist and Researcher; Dr

Mohammad Baqir Zaki, Gawharshad University, Dr Yaqub

Ibrahimi, Carleton University and Mr. Zalmai Nishat, AISS

research fellow, who provided their valuable comments to improve

the initial version of the report.

2

Executive Summary

The main question of this research is: has the predicted political

system in the constitution been successful and satisfactory in

sharing political power among different ethnic groups. Or if the

system has failed to be satisfactory; what are the characteristics of

an appropriate system that is in harmony with social and political

realities of the country; and what changes or reforms should be

introduced to improve political participation of different ethnic

groups?

This is a qualitative research report which was done from

March to July of 2019. We conducted in-depth interviews with

people from different fields including specialists, senior

government officers, members of parliament, representatives of

presidential tickets, representatives of political parties, researchers,

members of the independent commission for overseeing the

implementation of the constitution, two participants of the Bonn

Conference, two participants of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and

some participants of Doha and Moscow Conferences.

In general, participants of this research are divided into two

categories. First, those who support system reform; and second,

those who support system change. Despite their varying

viewpoints, they all have criticized the current political system for

concentration of power around the president. However, their

recommendations to solve this problem are different. They believe

Afghanistan is transitioning to democracy, and decentralization of

power leads to political crisis. As a result, supporters of

modification think delegating part of the president’s authority to

the vice presidents can be sufficient; while supporters of system

change believe that the current system (close to presidential

system) is not an appropriate system for a multi-ethnic Country.

For some supporters of system change, a parliamentary system is

3

favorable, because it provides more opportunities of political

participation for different political groups. Meanwhile, some

supporters of system change suggest three deputies for the

president; they believe that the current system, with four key

positions can reflect and keep four major ethnic groups (Pashtun,

Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek) satisfied. A third group of change

supporters suggest a presidential system with an executive branch

to solve the issue of power-sharing among ethnic groups. A fourth

group suggest federalism to solve power issues among ethnic

groups, and stress on changing the power balance between the

capital and provinces as well. They believe this system will allow

for local decision-making, so it is better for a multi-ethnic country.

However, there seems to be further discussion needed on

some topics among those who raise the discussion of political

system change: lack of consensus among presidential tickets on

favorable political system; lack of a precise picture of a favorable

political system; confining the overall interest of an ethnic group

to the interests of a few leaders; insisting on setting ethnic quota;

ignoring other ethnic groups and focusing only on four major

groups; indifference toward sharing power between capital and

provinces, are some of the major critiques this research has

encountered in their suggestions.

This research has indicated that power on the basis of ethnic

affiliation, and quotas have intensified discrimination and lowered

satisfaction among ethnic groups. Sharing government positions

among ethnic leaders is not the solution for sharing power; on the

other hand, elimination of these leaders has also brought

dissatisfaction. So, discouraging this mode of power-sharing can

be a new solution. In addition, establishing a constitutional court

can pave the way to prevent concentration of power and violation

of constitution. This court can alleviate some of the problems

regarding interpretation of constitution and prevent its violation.

4

Additionally, this research has found out that to increase

satisfaction, there should be operational and geographical power-

sharing. Without horizontal power-sharing, satisfaction cannot be

increased and trust cannot be restored. Its mechanism is explained

in detail in the “Mechanisms of Changing the Political System”

section.

Eventually, the issue of power-sharing among ethnic groups cannot

be solved solely by changing the political system. Establishing a

system where power is shared fairly among ethnic groups requires

minimum standards without which a democratic system that relies

on citizens’ votes is unimaginable.

Raising citizens’ awareness to increase their political

participation is very important, because in some cases, elders have

considerable influence on voting, and even trade votes; while in

other cases, threats undermine peoples’ will to vote. Examples of

such problems were rampant in 2017 parliamentary election that

need special attention.

On the other hand, based on statistics, the number of

participants in the elections have been shrinking. This indicates

peoples’ waning trust in democratic and electoral processes.

Widespread frauds of the past elections have undermined peoples’

trust. There should be specific mechanism to restore peoples’ trust,

so that they don’t give up on voting due to lack of transparency in

the elections.

5

Section One

Research Plan

Problem Statement

In an ethnically diverse society like Afghanistan, ethnic identity

operates as a prominent and effective component in the political

system. In the relation between the government and ethnic groups

in Afghanistan, the government has either ignored ethnic diversity,

or completely obliterated ethnic groups. Historically, this has

resulted in divergence and eccentricity from the central

government.

Afghanistan’s government formed in the mid-eighteenth

century and was run by the Durrani tribe. After that, the Durranis

have kept themselves in power, though this has not been without

the suppression of other ethnic groups. As a result, discrepancies

between the central government and the provinces, especially with

the government and non-Pashtun ethnic groups, continued for long

periods. This ethnic divide of the governments benefited Pashtuns

in general, and Durranis in particular (Ahadi, 1995). However,

during the reign of the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA), different ethnic groups were given more attention and

chances to take part in the government. During this time, other

ethnic groups’ languages were formalized, and the government

executed cultural programs.

After citizens protested against the Afghanistan People’s

Democratic Party government, uprisings were shaped against the

6

occupation of the Soviet Union forces all over the country.

Although at the beginning these opposition groups were united due

to a common foreign enemy, as this enemy left Afghanistan, the

groups were divided along ethnic lines. After the collapse of Dr.

Najibullah’s government, Sebghatullah Mujaddadi took over for

two months. His government fell, and Jammiat Islami Party, a

majority Tajik group, took over the government. The central

government could not control the entire country during this period,

and as a result different parties controlled different parts of the

country. Among the groups were Taliban that controlled the south-

west regions of the country and slowly expanded their territory.

The guiding principle of this group was Islamic jurisprudence and

the Pashtunwali code. In addition, the lost Pashtun political

dominance over other ethnic groups was another factor in the

formation of this group.

Following the collapse of the Taliban regime and formation

of the new government, non-Pashtun ethnic groups that had been

marginalized earlier became hopeful and gained rights to

politically participate. After a decade and a half, it seems that this

hope is fading and has reached its lowest point since the

establishment of the new government. (Zaki, 2019).

Regional authorities are dissatisfied with the concentration

of power in the executive body, specifically around the president;

but with the talks of de-concentration of power, these complaints

have often been labeled as struggles for political partition. Previous

research conducted at the Afghanistan Institute of Strategic Studies

(AISS) indicates a lack of autonomy for regional administrations.

Governors’ authority is ambiguous, especially when it comes to

budget planning and financial issues. In short, the presidential

7

system has intensified regional administrations’ objections

regarding autonomy in solving regional/local issues. (Neshat and

colleagues, 2017).

Not only have we witnessed growing signs of

dissatisfaction among political elites of other ethnic groups, but

also people’s criticism of Ghani’s ethno-centric decisions are

increasing. On the other hand, some Pashtuns also show their

dissatisfaction with the current situation. They believe that after the

Taliban, Pashtuns’ absolute political dominance has been

challenged. Although Ashraf Ghani has remedied this challenge to

some extent, there still remains a potential to reach the ideal

situation for Pashtuns (Zaki et al, 2018).

Because of the growing dissatisfaction, a change of the

political system has been the topic of discussion among Pashtun

and non-Pashtun political elites for years. This is a clear indication

of a serious need for change, and if it continually gets ignored, it

will intensify tensions even more. This research will look at the

building blocks of the current system. Additionally, this research

will review the ineffectiveness of the current system and will

discuss the suggestions of presidential tickets’ alternative models

to the current system.

Specifically, this research will focus on the following questions:

1- What has the Bonn Conference’s result been - as a post-

Taliban building block of the current political system - to

manage different ethnic groups’ political participation?

2- Does the prognosis government in the Constitution back up

fair power-sharing among different ethnic groups? If yes,

how?

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3- If the current system cannot provide fair power-sharing

methods among different ethnic groups, what alternatives

exist?

4- To change the political system, what opportunities and

threats exist?

5- What characteristics must a system have to enable fair

power-sharing among ethnic groups, considering

Afghanistan’s unique political and social situation?

6- If a system change seems to be the solution for fair political

participation, what procedures should be undertaken for this

change?

This research follows two of AISS’s previous research projects

regarding change/modification of the political system. In a mixed

research named “Constitution and Transitioning Afghan Society;

General Suggestions for Constitutional Modification” is discussed.

This research discusses in detail the articles of the Constitution in

need of change. A part of it is dedicated to the topic of ethnic

groups’ political participation and political system modification.

The participants of this research that was published in 2016, have

explained their desire for power-sharing at all levels. Some of the

participants in the research believe that concentration of power

around the president has led to exclusion of other ethnic groups

from power. This research also presents alternative models like the

parliamentary system, semi-presidential system, and federalism

(Ahmadi, Mohammadi, Erfani, 2016).

In the qualitative research “the Long Walk of Democracy

in Afghanistan: Alternative Models for Political System in

Afghanistan” are discussed, along with several other reasons for

widespread corruption in the 2014 presidential election. We have

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categorized arguments around two main themes; 1) supporters of a

strong centralized presidential system; and 2) supporters of

decentralization of power in Afghanistan. The first group believes

a strong centralized system will ensure political cohesion and

ethnic unity. On the other hand, the second group argue that a

centralized system cannot represent different ethnic groups in the

Distribution of power, and is not appropriate for a multi-ethnic

country like Afghanistan (Neshat, Erfani, Mohammadi, 2016).

In a more detailed research that we have previously

published, the political participation of ethnic groups in the post-

Taliban political structure is discussed at length. A reason for

conducting this research was the topic of modification of the

political system that has gained momentum in the 2019 election.

Despite causing tensions among team members, some candidates

emphasize on this topic more widely in their campaigns. In this

research, however, we discuss disadvantages of the current

political system regarding power participation of different ethnic

groups. Following that, alternative models by different presidential

tickets are discussed with their advantages and disadvantages.

After reviewing the alternative models, opportunities and

challenges of changing the system are also discussed.

Methodology

We have used a qualitative research method, in which specialists

from different spectrums and government officials [who were

relevant to the topic of system change] are interviewed from April

to July of 2019. Presidential tickets’ representatives that have been

interviewed, have suggested different political models. The

10

interviewees are from four major teams: State Builder team that is

led by the current president, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani; Stability

and Convergence led by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah; Peace and

Moderation led by Mohammad Hanif Atmar; and Abdul Latif

Pedram’s team. The reason these teams were chosen is because of

the specific programs they have about the topic of the political

system. The second group, are representatives of political parties

who follow the topic of political system in their Party’s agendas.

The third group are researchers specializing in the topic of political

structure and model. Additionally, MPs and members of the

Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of

Constitution have been interviewed for this research. Further, two

participants from the Bonn conference, and two from the

Constitutional Loya Jirga, in addition to participants of

Moscow/Doha conferences are interviewed too.

11

Interviewee No

Presidential tickets both

supporters and oppositions to

political system change

1. State Builder

2. Peace and Moderation

3. Stability and

Convergence

4. Abdul Latif Pedram

1

Two participants from Bonn Conference 2

3 participants from Constitutional Loya Jirga 3

Member of Independent Commission on Overseeing the

Implementation of the Constitution

4

Political party representatives

1. Hezb-e Islami

2. Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami

3. Hezb-e Jammiat-e Islami

4. Hezb-e Junbish-e Milli

Islami

5

Participants of Moscow Conference 6

A participant of Doha Conference 7

5 Members of parliament 8

Researchers

1. Ashraf Rasooli

2. Nabi Mesdaq

3. Sayed Askar Mousavi

4. Mahiyuddin Mahdi

5. Ali Wardak

9

24 people Total

12

Section Two

Afghanistan’s Political Structure and Ethnic

Participation since 2001

Ethnic Dividend and Power Distribution

Ethnicity in the 2001 Bonn Conference

In December 2001 after the collapse of Taliban’s Islamic Emirate,

various military and political groups’ representatives (with support

from the international community) gathered in Bonn, Germany, to

discuss Afghanistan’s political structure. Participants of this

conference were Northern Alliance1, Cyprus group2, Rome group3,

and Peshawar group. They signed the Bonn agreement and founded

the current political system. The interim government was formed

based on the 1964 Constitution (without king & Parliament), which

insisted on founding an inclusive and multi-ethnic government. To

select the transitional government, the interim government

consisted of 30 cabinet members, Independent Commission of

Emergency Loya Jirga, central bank, and Supreme Court, all of

whose task was to convene an emergency Loya Jirga within six

months. Cabinet members were selected from different ethnic

affiliations, of which 11 were Pashtun, 8 Tajik, 5 Hazara, 3 Uzbek,

and the 5 remaining seats were designated for other minor ethnic

groups, all working under Hamid Karzai as the head of the interim

1 - The Northern Alliance consisted of non-Pashtun groups that fought against the Taliban. 2 - Cyprus Group: those who had close ties to Iran, however the name was selected after they held a meeting in Cyprus 3- Peshawar group: consisted of all Pashtuns living in Pakistan 4 -Rome group: supporter of former king Zahir Shah

13

government. (Anwari, 2011) One of the participants of the Bonn

Conference simplified the bases of these Distributions as follows:

We all agreed to keep all the ethnic groups content. As per

data from the United States and Germany, we [Hazaras]

were 25% of the total population; but later we were

accepted as 20% of the population. Pashtuns made up

38%, Tajiks 27% and Uzbek 12% of total population. The

goal was to form a stable government, but instead, power

was divided based on ethnic affiliations. (A participant of

the Bonn conference, May, 2019).

According to the Bonn agreement; the interim government was

assigned to convene a Constitutional Loya Jirga within 18 months

and a presidential election within two years. The Bonn agreement

also emphasized citizens’ social freedoms, like freedom of speech,

women’s rights, human rights, and rights to choose the future of

the country based on Islamic principles, democracy, pluralism, and

social justice. (Bonn Agreement) (Temporary agreement until

formation of permanent government institution).

The Bonn agreement had special consideration for different

ethnic groups’ participation in the post-Taliban political structure

of Afghanistan. Although all interviewees support the positive

stance of the Bonn agreement, at the same time they criticize the

post-Bonn government in failing to provide grounds for fair

participation of different ethnic groups in the political structure.

But some interviewees argue that the Bonn agreement solidified

the unofficial principle of Pashtun dominance in the government.

They also believe Zalmai Khalilzad, the United States’

Ambassador, played a crucial role in this:

14

The Bonn agreement’s power-sharing was what all ethnic

groups wanted. Pashtuns being the largest ethnic group

demanded the biggest share; and their demand was

supported by foreigners (Abdul Latif Pedram, presidential

candidate, March 2019).

After the 9/11 incident, US Department of State gathered

Afghan intellectuals who were mostly Pashtuns. Zalmai

Khalilzad lobbied for Pashtuns and said they are the

majority. He added that jihad has led to eccentricity

(Mahiuddin Mahdi, researcher, April, 2019).

Another researcher criticizes the Taliban’s absence in the Bonn

conference and argues that the Northern Alliance took the biggest

share:

The Bonn conference caused some problems that we are

still bearing the burden of. The Taliban accepted defeat,

and stated that they no longer claim exclusive power; but

the United States did not accept this. Taliban who were

not invited to the Bonn agreement came back stronger.

Another party that was not invited was Islamic party. The

Bonn conference’s goal was not to defeat Taliban, but to

build a government; but instead, they divided the

government among different ethnic groups. Qanoni

claimed most of the share, which led to Cyprus Group

receiving less, and the Rome Group was left hopeless. As

a result, the Northern Alliance received 7 seats in the

cabinet (Nabi Mesdaq, June, 2019).

Constitutional Loya Jirga: Political Structure and Ethnic

Groups’ Demands

A post-Taliban political structure was expected to be formed at the

Bonn conference, but the exact form of a political system was not

decided on. In June 2002, after six months of the interim

government, the emergency Loya Jirga’s participants selected

15

Hamid Karzai as the head of the Transitional Government.

Deciding on the form of the country’s political system was one of

the main topics of the Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirga.

Ashraf Rasooli, a member of the Commission for Drafting the

Constitution says:

Fatima Gillani, Mr. Azimi and I were in charge of Kabul

zone (Kabul, Panjshir, and Parwan provinces) to survey

the public about what type of political system they

wanted. More than 85% of people wanted a Prime

Minister. We delivered the survey to the Commissions’

Chief of Staff; when announced, it had gotten distorted.

We protested against this and said that our reports insist

on a parliamentary system. The model we proposed had

been extracted from 1964 Constitution which had a prime

minister, but was rejected (Ashraf Rasooli, Researcher,

2019).

Mohiyudin Mahdi says that our surveys showed clear support from

participants for a parliamentary system. He adds that different

drafts of the Constitution for different political structures were

written, all ready to be presented before Loya Jirga members for

further discussion; but only the constitutional draft for the

presidential system was presented to the members for approval that

caused much criticism of the Loya Jirga as well (Mohiudin Mahdi,

researcher, April 2019). ‘The Making of a Constitution’ is a book

that gives further details about the discussion of political structure

in the constitutional Loya Jirga, and reports that political structure

was the topic of this Jirga’s discussion for the first three days.

While most non-Pashtun participants support a parliamentary

system, Pashtun participants, however, support a presidential

system, for the sake of national unity. (Shahrani, 2009, p.10) When

the constitutional draft for the presidential system was presented,

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270 out of 500 members boycotted Loya Jirga, and thus it

prolonged. Meanwhile, with Zalmai Khalilzad’s middling in the

process, under the pretext of a need for political stability, a

centralized presidential system was forced on the Loya Jirga

members (Neshat, Erfani, Mohammadi, 2017 page 11).

The Constitution has defined all three branches (executive,

judicial and legislative) of government separately, but has brought

them under the control and leadership of the president (Article 64

of Afghanistan Constitution). The Constitution has named each and

every ethnic group as: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen,

Baloch, Pashai, Nooristani, Aimaq, Arab, Kyrgyz, and Qizilbash,

Barahawi, and other minorities. (Article 4). Persian and Pashto

being the official languages, other distinct regional languages also

have been recognized. (Article 16). The Constitution has tasked the

government to maintain unity and justice amongst all ethnic

groups, and dedicate development to all regions equally (Article 6).

Also, the Constitution has prohibited any discrimination among the

citizens (Article 22). Regarding regional governance, the

Constitution insists on a strong center-oriented governance for

social, economic, and cultural quick recovery. Also, it has given

selective power to the regional administrations for national revival,

and has assigned the government to hold free and direct elections

for the selection of district council members, village council

members, and mayors. (Article 141 of constitution).

In addition to the nature of the political structure, national

languages, national anthem, using the word “Afghan” for all

citizens, were sensitive topics of the Loya Jirga that led to

prolonged discussions (The Making of a Constitution, 2005).

17

System in Light of Ethnic Power Distribution

One of the main objectives of this research is to understand how

ethnic groups see their participation in power. Data reveals that

people and their ethnic leaders see their political participation

problematic in this political system. In other words, they believe

the current system has not been able to properly represent and

reflect their interests in the political structure. Our data shows that

several issues have contributed to this dissatisfaction, and will be

discussed here.

Power Centralism

In this section we have assessed power concentration in light of

three levels of distribution: power distribution based on geography,

distribution of operational power, and distribution of power along

social forces lines.

Centralized Power in the Capital (along the Geographic Lines)

There are two options regarding geographic power-sharing. First,

a centralized structure where there is a strong central government

that controls everything. Second, power is shared between the

central government and regional peripheries. Each of these have

separate rights and responsibilities. In simpler words, in the second

option, power is shared with regions.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a centralized system with

regards to geographic power-sharing. Our data indicates that too

much reliance on the central government to make decisions has led

the local political and social entities to feel powerless with regards

to local issues:

18

People wait for the capital to make decisions for them.

When an attorney says we have thousands of unsolved

cases; it is a sign of limited regional power/authority

(Latif Pedram, Presidential Candidate, April 2019).

Studies about Afghanistan’s political structure have linked political

stability to decentralization of power. Political stability requires a

balance of power between the capital and regions. As a result, it

becomes necessary that Kabul commits to sharing power with

regional governmental institutions and empower local municipals,

provinces, and districts (Thier & Worden, 2017).

Centralized Power in the Executive Branch

Another aspect of concentration of power is in the operational

dimension. From this perspective there are three models of political

systems: parliamentary, presidential, and mixed. In the presidential

system, both the president and members of parliament are elected

through direct voting by citizens, and the president is the head of

the country, in addition to managing the executive branch. But in

the parliamentary system, parliament is the center of power, from

which administrative power is derived. Members of parliament are

elected directly by citizens. In this system, the president will have

a symbolic role; instead, the prime minister is in charge of the

executive branch. In a mixed system, both the president and MPs

are elected through direct voting by citizens, while the prime

minister is still in charge of the executive branch.

Operational concentration of power was criticized from two

perspectives by the interviewees. First, concentration of power

around the president; second, a lack of constitutional clarification

for the rights and responsibilities of the deputies of the presidents.

19

Concentration of power from an operational standpoint has been

criticized by the interviewees. This criticism has two dimensions:

first, concentration of power in the executive branch, mainly

around the president; second, the ambiguity in the roles and

responsibility of the two vice presidents. Concentration of power

around the president has been emphasized as one of the main

problems of the current system:

It is unjust to concentrate power in a war-torn country. Is

our judicial system independent? Not at all. Concentration

of power does not allow this (Ashraf Rasooli, Researcher

and Advisor at the Ministry of Justice, April 2019).

I have said this many times that the amount of

power/authority our Constitution gives to the president is

more than that of a king. It is contradictory to say

discrimination is banned, but still gives all the power to

one person. It is contradictory to claim all the branches

are independent, yet gives unlimited power to the

executive branch (Sayed Askar Mousawi, Researcher,

April 2019).

According to Afghanistan’s Constitution, the president can

exercise judicial, legislative, and executive power. In the chapter

about the president, article 64 of the constitution, the president has

the following authorities: leadership of armed forces; decision-

making regarding sovereignty; appointment and dismissal of

armed forces’ personnel, senior officials, ambassadors; as well as

establishment of commissions. The majority of interviewees

believe that concentration of power around the president should be

handled, because [this issue] has made it difficult to differentiate

between the three branches of the government. As stated earlier, on

top of the president’s control of the judicial system, some

20

interviewees believe the president has been oblivious to the

legislators’ approvals too.

In our current political system, in many cases, the

parliament has ratified a certain bill, but the president has

reverted it with a presidential order later. For example,

parliament’s decision concerning the status of a minister

is dealt with oblivion from the president. We have distinct

measures for temporary supervision, but the president

does not follow it; because the president is above all three

government branches. The president knows he will make

the final decision (Representative of Stability and

Convergence, June 2019).

According to a previous study by AISS (Ahmadi, Mohammdi and

Erfani, 2016) a strong concentration of power in the presidential

palace has led to Distributions of power along ethnic lines. Civil

society also has reported on the eccentric actions of the executive

branch, with total oblivion to the legislative branch’s decisions. An

example would be the president’s indifference towards

endorsement of bills that are passed by the parliament. Another

example would be the president’s decisions to keep impeached

candidate ministers as acting ministers; which is a clear indication

of the president’s indifference towards the legislative branch’s

decisions (Mazedi and Reja, 2016).

The second issue our interviewees have pointed out is the

distribution of power inside the presidential palace; in other words,

the authorities of the president’s deputies are not clearly defined by

the Constitution. The Constitution has pointed out to the deputies

of the president in several articles. In these articles, these are the

conditions and criterion for becoming a vice president: taking

charge on special occasions such as the president’s death, or

21

resignation; and the limits of power and authority that a vice

president can exercise. But lack of clarity in the authorities of a

vice president has led to ambiguities inside the presidential palace

too.

There is a lack of clarity in the Constitution about the

authority that two deputies of the president can have. This

has led the president to hold all the power. This is a

problem. If we continue with the current system, we ought

to have distinct working sector for each vice president

(Representative of Stability and Convergence, May

2019).

Representatives of several presidential tickets have also stressed

the need for constitutional clarity of the jurisdiction of the

president’s deputies and sharing of power among the deputies and

the president.

Elites and Power (distribution of power among social forces)

Based on social resources, power is distributed in two ways: one is

among the elites, and another is pluralistic power distribution. In

the first case, power rotates among a few political elites, and the

common people do not have access to it. In the second case, a

mechanism is designed to share power among the mass of people,

and give opportunity to different groups to represent different

interests and compete on serving their interests.

Some of our interviewees believe an exclusive group of

political elites has monopolized power in Afghanistan. These elites

have some common characteristics that differentiate them from the

rest of the population. Thus, power is never shared with common

citizens, instead it rotates in the same circle (of elites).

22

A distinct characteristic of this group is their traditional

political and social base, which is seen in the form of their presence

in different governmental positions – elective or non-elective

positions in the post-Taliban era. Having social and political base

means they derive their social dignity from ethnic support. This

traditional social position has given them credibility and has

enabled them to represent their ethnic group. But this never means

they are legitimate representatives of their people.

For the last two decades this symbolic credibility and

wealth has been slowly transferred to their family members and

children. In simple words, they transfer their political credibility

as well as accumulated wealth to their next generation. (Zaki,

2019).

Thus, some of the interviewees believe that political power is

concentrated around a few political elites. Power and advantage

rotate between these few elites. On the contrary, ordinary citizens

and other members of ethnic groups have not been part of this

Distributions of power.

We don’t have anything by the name of political party in

Afghanistan, instead what we have are groups that aim at

enriching and saving the fortune of their leader. They act

as agencies of dealing power…but they don’t share this

power with the people; just the shepherds hold the power.

What have they done for their ethnic groups? People have

lost trust in them, and on the president; because the

concept of delivering service is ambiguous for people

(Sayed Askar Mousavi, researcher, May 2019).

These leaders have hindered people’s participation in the political

structure.

23

Presence of a certain leader in the political structure does

not reflect his people’s participation. If a certain

individual has accumulated wealth, it does not mean the

economic situation of his ethnic group has improved.

Their presence in the political structure does not

guarantee to solve the power Distributions issue among

different ethnic groups in Afghanistan (Latif Pedram,

Presidential candidate, March 2019).

Some people believe these ethnic leaders’ presence in the political

structure is symbolic and a token used by the government to show

diversity. They also believe that the real power lies in the

president’s hands, while these ethnic leaders’ power is decreasing

– even the leaders who work in senior government positions.

Why have we not been able to develop in the past 17

years? Because none of us believed in peace and

conciliation. And because political elites or those who

could do something, did not believe in this principle. They

did not care about peoples’ deepest concerns, that’s why

they never found a solution. Their main goal from

entering any presidential coalition was to remain in

power. For example, General Dostom who helped Ahraf

Ghani to succeed was discarded right away after Ghani

became the president; because Ghani did not care about

Dostom’s demands. This caused a confrontation. The

reality is, that we must realistically accept the role ethnic

leaders play in Afghanistan’s political arena

(Representative of Stability and Convergence, May

2019).

Shortcoming in the Constitution

Some of the issues in the current political structure stems back to

two issues in the Constitution. First, ambiguity in which institution

24

should interpret the Constitution; and second, discrimination

against non-Muslim citizens.

Ambiguity of Constitutional Oversight

According to article 121 of the Afghanistan constitution, the

Supreme Court has been given the power to interpret and oversee

executive orders, treaties, conventions, and assess other law

conformities with the Constitution. While article 157 of the

Constitution has ordered establishment of an Independent

Commission to Oversee the Implementation of the Constitution.

This duality has led to many criticisms.

The Constitution needs to be modified in specifying any

institution for Constitution protection. The Constitution

has pointed out two major institutions for interpretation

which is ambiguous, inexpressive and flawed.

Independent Commission on Overseeing the

Implementation of the Constitution does not have any

authority whatsoever. We just offer consultation if we are

asked. And sometimes, even when we offer our opinion,

nobody listens to us (Abdullah Shafai, member of

Independent Commission on Overseeing the

Implementation of Constitution and researcher, May

2019).

Discrimination against Non-Muslim Citizens

Article 62 of the Constitution clearly expresses that a presidential

candidate must be a Muslim. This article not only prohibits non-

Muslim citizens from being nominated for presidency, but also

discourages them from political participation in a sense.

25

Our Constitution contradicts human rights. According to

our Constitution, Sikhs do not have a chance to become

president. Afghanistan’s situation is worsening because

of [I’m the majority, you are a minority] mentality (Sayed

Askar Mousavi, researcher, May 2019).

A representative of the Sikh community in the parliament who we

have interviewed for this study, labels this article of the

Constitution as discriminatory:

I was a member of the Loya Jirga. We were 3 Sikhs, out

of 503 members. We discussed the discriminations of

article 62, and the fact that our Constitution supports a

republic system, so we should not emphasize on a

majority-minority mindset. We tried our best, but nobody

listened to us; and this article was approved with the

majority of votes. We are a minority, and might not want

to rule the country, but it does not mean this article is fair

and just (A Sikh MP, June, 2019).

Government and Ethnic Favoritism

Our interviewees have pointed out two main types of ethnic biases

by the government. The first type of bias comes from the political

structure: discrimination in policy-making like ethnic quota in

certain sectors. An example is the Kankor exam quota. According

to this policy a specific quota is set for Kochis in seven out of eight

educational zones Afghanistan is divided into. This is to say ¼ of

Bamyan, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Balkh, Herat, Khost, Kapisa,

Kunduz, Paktia universities’ admission capacity belong to Kochis.

The quota is given for certain educational majors, like medicine,

engineering, economy, law, agriculture, and computer science.

26

Some of our interviewees think this is a step backward in the

process of becoming a nation.

Ethnic issues are like womens’ issues; they cannot be

solved by an executive order. I don’t understand the logic

behind educational quota? These policies are a step

backward in the process of us becoming a nation (Abdul

Latif Pedram, presidential candidate, March 2019).

Another issue which has raised the question of different ethnic

groups’ participation in political decision-making is the issue of

government’s intervention in Ghazni province’s parliamentary

election in 2019. In this year, due to the reluctance of Pashtun

residents of Ghazni to participate in the election, all the winners

were Hazaras. Pashtuns protested this. In 2016, through a

legislative order, the president issued a new version of election law.

According to the new law; the Independent Election Commission

could divide a province into electoral zones only for parliamentary

elections. However, in the previous parliamentary election (2005)

each province was a single electoral zone (Article 11).

As a result, this change was implemented only in Ghazni province.

The Independent Election Commission divided Ghazni province

into three separate electoral zones for 20 October of 2017

parliamentary elections. This decision was announced on

25/06/2018 which says: after comprehensive sessions with people,

related authorities, social activists, and due to vast problems of last

election, and based on section 2, article 35 of election law, a special

delegation (who went to Ghazni on 28th May) has decided to divide

Ghazni province into three electoral zones to bring justice and

implement fair representation codes (Adeli, 2018).

27

In Ghazni province, all the winners were from one ethnic

group, since the other ethnic groups did not participate in

the election. Now when it is in the best interest of the

presiding team to change the policy, they do it. I assure

you that in the coming election we will have majority

representatives from Pashtun ethnicity, while two or three

will be Hazara and Tajik. One ethnic group sends

representatives with five thousand votes and the other

with only a hundred. There are plenty of opportunities to

misuse the Constitution, and all are because we did not

take appropriate decisions in the past when we had the

chance (Representative of Junbish party, July 2019).

Thus, when the government exceptionally sets an electoral quota

for a certain province, it affects the voting power of citizens who

consider it as their political and civil right; and representatives of a

certain ethnic group do not get elected only because of his/her

affiliation to that particular group.

Second type of ethnic bias is not implemented through official

government policies. On the contrary, it is enforced by top

government officials. Our interviewees have asserted that certain

groups misuse their government positions and authorities to

forward their ethnic agenda. Nepotism and appointments to

government positions based on recommendation of someone is an

example of this type of bias.

The government is monopolized. Widespread corruption

has widened the gap between the government and people.

Favoritism in all affairs is visible. All government

appointments are based on either personal relationships or

ethnic affiliations (Sayed Askar Mousavi, researcher,

April 2019).

As a result of ethnic and political appointments, people lose their

trust on government institutions, and this widens the gap between

28

people and the government. This situation not only deprives some

people of access to justice due to their ethnic affiliations, it also

stops meritocracy from taking root and renders an inefficient

structure. Above all these, ethnic quota discourages nationalistic

spirit among citizens, because deprivation of some people from

rights and privileges of citizenship due to ethnic affiliation will

widen the gap among citizens and encourage an environment of

mistrust.

Weak Political Awareness

Monitoring institutions have reported widespread fraud in previous

elections. Part of the fraud was made possible by the people, due

to their unawareness of political rights such as voting. For example,

according to reports from Creative Associates International (2012),

widespread ID card selling to the presidential candidates is a

violation of election law and voting rights, which consequently

affect citizens’ rights to participate in power.

People are poor and unaware of their rights. They vote in

return for money, sacks of rice, or flour. Members of

parliament get selected based on who offers Qabili (an

Afghan dish) (Sayed Askar Mousavi, April 2019).

Another barrier to citizens’ participation are their disbelief to

impact election results. Part of this disbelief and hopelessness

comes from actions/activities of the governments since 2001.

At first candidates made big promises, so people voted;

but after winning the election, they did not fulfill any

promises. Consequently, part of the voters lost their trust

on the power of their vote (Nabi Mesdaq, researcher, May

2019).

29

Section Three

Reform or Change of the Political System

Almost all of our interviewees believe they have lost the game of

power, and are sidelined. When every side thinks they are losers

and are discontent with the current situation, the main question is

what alternatives exist to the current political structure, so as to

minimize this discontent?

As inefficiency of the current political system is obvious,

the first step is to look for alternative models. We have categorized

our interviewees in this research into two groups; first, those who

want the current system to be changed and replaced; second, those

who want to modify the current system. Both groups criticize the

current structure, and suggest different solutions.

The first group, those who support system modification,

believe the current system should be kept in place, but some parts

should be modified, such as presidential power should be shared.

The second group, those who want the system to change,

believe that the system itself is the source of all problems; we must

change the system to allow for vertical and horizontal power-

sharing.

30

Reform Modification

Although the supporters of system modification criticize

concentration of power, they want to keep the current presidential

system in place. The modifications they suggest is in the

presidential power/authorities.

The Bonn agreement gave most of the power to the

president, and established a strong central government.

But the problem was in the balance of power among the

parliament, the president, and the Supreme Court. The

president’s power should be limited, to allow for two

other institutions to have relative control over the

president (Nabi Mesdaq, researcher, May 2019).

According to system modification supporters, one of the ways

to limit the president’s power is to clarify the responsibilities

of the vice presidents.

The strongest point the supporters of system modification

suggested is that Afghanistan is transitioning, and a strong

central government is necessary.

With the current disruptions and dissonances in

Afghanistan, we require a strong centralized presidential

system. I may recommend another system ten years from

now, but not now. We are on a nation-building mission

(Representative of Islamic party, April 2019).

A supporter of system modification describes the transition:

Before the Constitutional Loya Jirga, in the Loya Jirga

Commission, the political system topic was hot. Since

there was no government institutions, or strong political

parties, we preferred the system not to be parliamentary.

Democracy was new in Afghanistan, so we said the

system should be concentrated. I still believe it is too early

31

for a parliamentary system in this country. (Member of

Constitutional Commission, April 2019).

This group also believe that a parliamentary system require

inclusive and strong political parties, contrary to the current

political parties that are inefficient and leader-centered.

One of the reasons not to change the current system is that

we do not really have any political parties. A party’s

leader remains in the position as long as he is alive (A

member of the Independent Commission for Overseeing

the Implementation of the Constitution, April 2019).

Another reason system modification supporters claim against

the system change to parliamentary is that the current

parliament is weak and non-coherent, and its discrepancies

inside has led to dullness of its administrative work.

Supporters of system modification believe that with a weak

legislative body, we cannot expect a parliamentarian system

to work for this country.

Changing the Current Political System

While a political party’s inefficiency and the need for political

stability are the reasons supporters of system modification offer in

opposition to the system change, supporters of change respond as

follow:

Political Parties

Anti- established to system change believe that with a

parliamentary system the inefficient and weak political party

leaders and Jihadi leaders will be empowered by the parliament,

which leads to deprivation of other independent individuals from

32

power. In other words, a parliamentary system is not possible

without strong democratic parties. Meanwhile, supporters of

system change blame the current system for political parties’

weakness. They believe that both the current political

establishment and international community have actively opposed

political parties’ growing role. One representative of a political

party says:

It is not in the favor of senior government officials to let

political parties grow strong. Because strong political

parties form a goal-oriented parliament, but they also

weaken independent individuals. Additionally, western

countries also oppose political parties, they believe these

parties have the potential to become Islamic

fundamentalists or leftist (A representative of Wahdat

party, April 2019).

A representative of the Junbish party says:

We acknowledge the inexistence of strong and trans-

ethnic political parties in Afghanistan. But if we don’t let

them play a role, how can they become strong? Existent

political parties have survived without any support from

the current system. The first step is to let the parties play

a role in the elections. In recent years, political parties

have tried to play a role in the elections, but president

Karzai always reiterated that he opposes political parties

and does not belong to any; which in itself weakened their

presence. When political parties are allowed to play a role

in elections, each will strive for a greater share of power

and participation; thus it will be more inclusiveness and

more people from across all provinces will participate

(Representative of Junbish party, July 2019).

33

Arguments about the Political Stability/Instability

Anti- established of system change believe that if the political

system is decentralized, power islands will emerge. They argue that

currently Afghanistan needs a central decision-making authority.

Meanwhile, the supporters of system change believe that power

islands have already emerged under the current system. They

further explain the method by which provincial councils can

monitor and evaluate the performance of governors or any other

regional authority. One of the supporters of the current system

voices his opinion:

To change the system, first legal grounds should be

prepared. For example, words are not enough to say we

empower provinces. Everything and everyone must act in

accordance to set rules and procedures; and be held

accountable. Only then people can trust and start to

understand the power of their vote; and hold accountable

those whom they have voted for. If an appropriate legal

framework is implemented, no one can monopolize the

power of an entire province, because nobody is above law.

In the presidential system, local governors had authority,

but did not take any responsibilities or were not held

accountable in front of people. The president was skeptic,

and trusted no one, so he tended to monopolize power;

this situation led to the emergence of power islands. If it

was a parliamentary system, where law governs affairs,

provincial councils had the legal rights to monitor the

governor’s activities and performance. When law rules,

nobody can monopolize the power and act beyond the law

(Former MP, July 2019).

In addition to all the arguments by supporters of both sides,

supporters of change offer more reasons to better justify the logic

behind changing the system.

34

Multi-ethnic Structure of the Afghan Society

Supporters of system change believe that the presidential system is

not an appropriate model for a multi-ethnic society like

Afghanistan and cannot prepare grounds for fair participation of all

ethnic groups in the political structure.

The presidential system is not an appropriate system for a

multi-ethnic, multi-language country like Afghanistan.

Thus a large majority (mostly non-Pashtuns) strive for a

system which ensures participation of all ethnic groups

(Representative of Junbish party, July 2019).

Our previous research ‘The Long Walk of Democracy in

Afghanistan’ also confirms this fact; that the presidential system is

not an appropriate system for a multi-ethnic society like

Afghanistan. This system cannot represent all ethnic groups

(Neshat, Erfani, Mohammadi, page: 38, 2017).

Public Demands

Another reason supporters of system change suggest in support of

their stance is that people and political parties demand a system

other than presidential. A survey by the constitutional Loya Jirga

and Constitutional Commission states that the majority of non-

Pashtun representatives demanded a system other than the

presidential system. Changing the system has also been the agenda

of some political parties’ activities. In the 2009 presidential

election, Dr. Abdullah spoke about changing the system to

parliamentary and suggested a two-step program for this change.

But after the 2014 presidential election crisis that led to the creation

of the chief executive position, discussions of system change

35

became even more serious. In the coming election, some

presidential tickets also discuss the prospect of changing the

system. According to the findings of a previous research by AISS,

51% of people want the current presidential system to change

(Ahmadi, Mohammadi and Erfani, page: 60, 2016).

36

Section Four

Alternative Models for the Current Political System

Parliamentary System

In the parliamentary system, legislators are the focus of all political

upheavals, and executive power flows from it to all other law

enforcement agencies. The legislative branch monitors all activities

and operations of the executive branch; and the executive branch is

politically accountable to them. Thus, the mechanism has been

designed in a way to allow someone from within the parliament to

be selected by them (named prime minister) to run the executive

branch instead of the president. The prime minister is then

responsible to gain the confidential vote of the parliament members

for his/her programs and cabinet. The parliament can vote to

impeach the administration or any member of the administration

which may lead to taking away his/her authority. Although there

are many types of parliamentary systems, they have a common

characteristic – be it republic or kingship – which is that the

president has a symbolic role. In a parliamentary system, the

president is elected by the parliament, whose job is to intervene

only in acute and critical political situations. For example, the

president may exercise power when one cabinet has resigned and

another one is being formed.

What is important in a parliamentary system is the existence of a

network of political parties, each of which represent a certain

section of the society. These political parties, through nominating

37

candidates with their diverse plans and programs, represent

different needs of the society.

For some of our interviewees, a parliamentary system is an ideal

system for Afghanistan. From their point of view, less

concentration of power in the executive branch means more

political participation by different political parties; which also

curbs autonomous decision-making and despotic actions. The

specifications of this parliamentary system will be discussed

further in the coming sections.

Characteristics of Suggested Parliamentary System

Electing the President by the Parliament and his Symbolic

Role

The president’s role in a parliamentary system is symbolic.

Representatives of presidential candidate tickets who support the

parliamentary system suggest that the president should be

appointed either by the parliament or provincial councils. One such

suggestion regarding rotation of presidential power among

different ethnic groups is thus:

The president’s position should be symbolic, in which

wise men from different ethnic groups can participate in

rotation. Administrative power should be given to the

prime minister and he/she should be accountable to the

parliament. The president can be appointed by either the

parliament or provincial councils (Representative of

Jammiat e Islami party, April 2019).

38

Selection of the Prime Minister by the Parliament

In this system, the prime minister is selected by the parliament, and

is accountable to them; he/ she also exercises executive power.

Empowered Political Parties

One of the components of a parliamentary system is the existence

of a network of empowered and active political parties. Despite

widespread objections regarding activities and goals of the existing

parties, supporters of the parliamentary system believe that

changing the system to parliamentary and empowering political

parties, will change parties’ standing alongside ethnic lines and will

encourage them to be more active in political decision-making1.

Vertical and Horizontal Distribution of Power (Functional

and Geographical)

Supporters of a parliamentary system believe that this system will

help in the delegation of executive power (which is concentered

around the president in the presidential system) to legislators. Some

of them also believe that changing the system requires a thorough

review and modification of the federal and state’s relation and

power balance. In other words, some of the executive, legislative,

and judicial power should be delegated to states/provinces. Thus,

they want a horizontal and vertical distribution of power.

Power should be distributed horizontally among the

president, prime minister, and the parliament, and

vertically among the provinces along judicial, executive

and legislative lines. Some legislative power should also

1 More reasons are presented in changing the system section.

39

be delegated to provincial councils like monitoring and

legislation (Representative of Jammiat e Islami Party,

April 2019).

Thus, supporters of the parliamentary system argue that since the

administration is made up of parliament members, and parliament

itself is made up of different political parties, these parties will feel

more empowered and will have influence and control over the

administrative body.

Advantages of the Parliamentary System

Greater Opportunity for Broad Based Political Participation

As indicated earlier, the supporters of the parliamentary system

argue that this system can solve the distribution of power issue

among different political parties. Since changing the system to

parliamentary will allow the party with the majority of seats to form

the administration. In such a system, political parties will have the

opportunity to compete and participate.

Coordination between Legislative and Executive Branches

As the prime minister and his/her cabinet emerges from within the

parliament or from a coalition of parties, the possibility of

coordination between the legislative and executive branches of the

government is higher. On the same note, the possibility of

disagreement looms bright if an agreement cannot be reached on a

certain issue among the parties inside the parliament.

40

Preventing Individualism and Despotic Actions of the

Executive Branch

Supporters of the parliamentary system believe that a change in the

system from presidential to parliamentary will empower a wider

spectrum of players to play a role. While in the presidential system

power is concentrated around the president, in the parliamentary

system power is delegated to an entire institution. On the other

hand, changing the system will change the tyrant and person-

centered image of the administration. In a parliamentary system,

the cabinet gains legitimacy from the parliament; thus, the

parliament can impeach or even dismantle the cabinet. At the same

time parliamentary system supporters praise its ability to prevent

tyranny and concentration of power in one position.

It is very dangerous that the Constitutional Loya Jirga has

put the president in charge of all three branches, which is

the source of most disagreements. In fact, the power

should not concentrate around a single person, because it

has the potential to turn into a dictatorship

(Representative of Peace and Moderation presidential

ticket led by Hanif Atmar, April 2019).

2) Presidential System with a Separate Executive Branch

While some supporters of changing the system welcome the

parliamentary system, they are skeptic of a sudden change to the

parliamentary system – because this system, in order to be efficient,

has some prerequisites. As representatives of Peace and

Moderation as well as Stability and Convergence, presidential

tickets have informed us of their intentions to create a presidential

41

system with a separate executive branch. One such supporter tells

us something in retrospect:

Historically, Afghanistan has always had a prime

minister; be it Zahir Shah’s kingship, or while people’s

party presided; or even during the Taliban era; someone

was traditionally selected as a prime minister to deliver

services while the president managed bigger issues

(Representative of Peace and Moderation presidential

ticket, April 2019).

Characteristics of a Presidential System with a Separate

Executive Branch

Participants will explain important characteristics of this system:

Appointment and Dismissal of the Prime Minister by the

President

One of the main characteristics of the presidential system with a

separate executive branch is that the president has the authority to

appoint and dismiss the prime minister with or without the

parliament’s approval. While representatives of both Peace and

Moderation led by Hanif Atmar, and Stability and Convergence

presidential tickets say a prime minister will be appointed with or

without the parliament’s approval, one member of the Peace and

Moderation presidential ticket says that the prime minister’s

appointment and dismissal does need parliament’s approval.

One of the interviewees expresses the following about the prime

minister’s criterion:

The prime minister’s position does not belong to a certain

ethnic group. He can be an intellectual and wise person

appointed by the president after consultation with the

deputies of the president and grand consultative council.

42

The criterion for the prime minister should be clear in the

Constitution; like level of education, and experience in

governance. The president can dismiss the prime minister

since he/she has appointed him/her (Representative of

Peace and Moderation presidential ticket, April 2019).

Proposing Cabinet Members to the Parliament for Approval

by the Prime Minister

In this system, the prime minister, with consultation of the

president and his deputies will select members of the cabinet and

propose them to the parliament for a vote of confidence. A

representative of the Peace and Moderation presidential ticket says

all cabinet members are proposed to the parliament as a team to get

approved or disapproved as a whole. He believes this method will

prevent exploitation in voting.

The president should order the prime minister to select

his/her cabinet members and propose it to the president

first. The parliament can then vote for both the prime

minister and his/her cabinet members as a team. If MPs

have an objection or consideration for any of the

candidates, they can disapprove the whole team. But the

president cannot dismiss or appoint a minister

(Representative of Peace and Moderation, April 2019).

Incorporation of the Prime Minister’s Jurisdiction in the

Constitution

Having experienced the National Unity Government, supporters of

the presidential system with a separate executive branch insist on

incorporation of the Prime Minister’s Jurisdiction in the

Constitution. All of the interviewees recall difficulties that the

Chief Executive Officer – Dr. Abdullah – has faced in exercising

43

his power due to a lack of Constitutional support. Interviewees also

criticize and insist on modifying the Constitution to delegate

constitutional authority to the deputies of the president. Regarding

the prime minister’s domain of authority, except for one

representative, all others generalize about entrusting a part of the

president’s executive power to the prime minister.

Political Parties’ Quota in the Parliamentary Election

Supporters of this system insist on changing the election laws to set

a quota to include political parties in the parliamentary elections.

They believe setting a quota for political parties will empower

them, and is a prelude to a parliamentary system.

Entrusting Executive and Budgetary Authority to the Local

Administrations

Centralization of power is one of the main disadvantages of the

current system. To solve this problem, supporters of changing the

system have presented their plans to entrust executive power and

budgetary planning power to administrations. One such person

from the Peace and Moderation presidential ticket who was

appointed as a minister, and then as a governor expresses that local

directorates should be supervised by the Governor, not the

ministries. He explains it thus:

We are committed to empower governors. Governors

should have implementation power. We plan to grant a

part of the budget, and executive power to the provinces.

Currently, all the provincial directorates’ (agriculture,

economy, education) budgets are set by the ministries,

which is not helpful for provinces. Local authorities

should be empowered, but central authorities must

maintain the right to monitor the budget expenditures

44

(Representative of Peace and Moderation ticket, April

2019).

Advantages of the Presidential System with a Separate

Executive Branch

Possibilities of Power-Sharing among Four Major Ethnic

Groups

Those who support this system argue that this system is inclusive

enough to accommodate representatives of four major ethnic

groups (Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, and Uzbek) in four key

government positions.

We want to bring a system that can accommodate

representatives of all ethnic groups. In Loya Jirga it was

decided for the president to have only one vice president,

but it was not enough, so we added one more; it still could

not represent the four major ethnic groups. Thus, we insist

on replacing the current system with a system that can

accommodate all four ethnic groups. Temporarily we

agreed on a president with two deputies and a chief

executive officer that represents all four major ethnic

groups (Representative of Stability and Convergence

ticket, April 2019).

An Executive Prime Minister Will Decentralize Power

Supporters of this system argue that since most of the power is

concentrated in the president’s hands, he cannot manage

everything alone. Since decentralization of power is possible in the

parliamentary system, it is an advantage. One representative of a

presidential ticket describes it as:

The president should not be kept busy with routine tasks

like appointing and dismissal of district administrators.

45

Currently, the president signs the appointment of second

grade civil servants. This keeps the president very busy.

In fact, the president should be a symbol of unity; and

entrust certain power to the deputies of the president, and

the prime minster. Deputies of the president should design

policies and submit to the prime minister for execution

through the president. The prime minister should do the

task of budgeting for ministries and his/her authority

regarding appointment should also be clear

(Representative of Peace and Moderation ticket, April

2019).

Assessment of the National Unity Government

After the election crisis of 2014, where the second round’s election

results remained unclear, the National Unity Government

agreement was signed after meddling by John Kerry, the then

United States’ Secretary of State. According to this agreement,

Ashraf Ghani was announced to be the president and Dr. Abdullah

became the Chief Executive Officer. They agreed to have equal

rights in appointing ministers and senior officials. They also agreed

to modify the Constitution for an executive prime minister

(National Unity Agreement 2014). But a Loya Jirga was never

held.

Since there is a staggering similarity between the current system

and a presidential system with an executive prime minister, almost

all of our interviewees said it has been a failure. Mohammad

Nateqi, a member of the monitoring board on implementation of

National Unity Government agreement explains:

All the power remained with the president; since the chief

executive position was not supported in the Constitution,

and the fact that the Constitution was not modified to

accommodate it. Dr. Abdullah’s supporters were also not

46

firm enough in their support (Mohammad Nateqi,

Member of Monitoring Board on Implementation of

National Unity Agreement, April 2019).

Besides all these, there are other reasons for the National Unity

Government’s failure. A representative of the Junbish party

believes that the president’s individualistic decisions and his lack

of commitment to the agreement are the reasons behind the

administration’s failure. Another representative of Wahdat party

believes that the chief executive position and the president’s

position are constitutionally in contradiction, and the position of

chief executive was created hastily.

The National Unity Government was a failure because the

agreement was not implemented. The National Unity

Government could have been successful if the president

had entrusted some power constitutionally to the chief

executive, and he himself managed bigger issues like the

country’s foreign relations. But unfortunately, the

president stripped his main partner off of his authorities

and was unfair in his dealings with the chief executive.

With this, the president introduced himself as a source of

all troubles to the people (Representative of Junbish party,

July 2019).

Creation of the chief executive position was a hasty

decision, thus the president is in ambush to dismantle it.

This position was not part of the government’s structure

and was even in contradiction to the structure

(Representative of Wahdat party, April 2014).

On the other hand, a representative of the State Builder presidential

ticket argues that the president succumbed to this agreement to

prevent war and bloodshed. Thus, creation of the chief executive

position was basically a mistake and is the source of existing

problems.

47

Ashraf Ghani created a position for Dr. Abdullah, since

he said he did not want bloodshed and wanted them to be

part of the government. But it was a mistake and it created

all the existing problems (State Builder presidential ticket

representative, June 2019).

Since the National Unity Government that had a chief executive

was a failure, supporters of changing the system want an executive

branch whose prime minister’s authority and power comes from

the Constitution.

Presidential System with Three Deputies

This system is also suggested by the representatives of both Peace

and Moderation, and Stability and Convergence presidential

tickets; similar to the presidential system with a separate executive

branch.

Characteristics of a Presidential System with Three Deputies

for the president

Supporters of this system has voiced the following characteristics

for such a system.

Outlining the Job Description of the president’s deputies

As with other systems, supporters of this system also want

constitutional authority for the deputies of the president based on

distinct working sectors like security, economy, and legislative.

Representative of Peace and Moderation ticket put it as follows:

In the current administration, authority and power have

been delegated to the deputies of the president. General

Dostom has been stripped of his position. Sarwar Danesh

only reads legislative issues; and Abdullah’s power has

been delegated by the president too. So the president

48

makes all the decisions. We must specify the extent of

power and authority of each deputy of the president. We

suggest a third deputy position to the president, which

makes it easier for the president to assign each one to a

distinct sector (Representative of Peace and Moderation

ticket, June 2019).

Dispensation of Budgetary Planning and Executive Power to

Local Administrations

Some supporters of the presidential system with three deputies to

the president want vertical and horizontal power-sharing, similar to

the supporters of the presidential system with a separate executive

branch. They inform us of their plan to share executive power and

budgetary planning power with the local administrators.

Advantages of Presidential Power with Three Deputies of the

President

Possibilities of Power-Sharing with Four Major Ethnic Groups

One of the main objections of the supporters of the presidential

system with three deputies of the president on the current system

with two deputies of the president is that this system does not

reflect power-sharing with four major ethnic groups. They believe

the presidential system with three deputies of the presidents will

solve this issue.

Basically, we have four major ethnic groups with many

more minor groups; but the current system’s senior

positions are only three – the president and two of his

deputies. This system is defective and people are not

convinced; thus they are unsatisfied. If we had three

deputies of the president in the current system, people

would have been convinced and felt reflected

(Representative of Stability and Convergence, July 2019).

49

Power Distribution and Limiting Presidential Power

Supporters of this system want power to be shared vertically as well

as horizontally. They want the power and authority of the

president’s deputies to be specified in the Constitution; they also

want the executive power to be shared with local administrations.

4) Federal System

Federalism is a type of political system which combines two modes

of government, federal and local, in a single political system. In

other words, it insists on sharing power vertically, geographically

or along ethnic lines, or combined. These two levels of the

government have their distinct and specific jurisdiction, in which

they exercise power. None of them can intervene in the other’s

jurisdiction. In simpler words; first, federalism has two levels of

government: one federal and the other autonomous local

government. Second, power and responsibility is shared between

these two levels of the government. Third, regional administrations

have special rights and responsibilities. Fourth, a special

mechanism exists for solving disputes between the regional and

federal governments, as well as local and district authorities (Aqa

Bakhshi and Afshari-rad, 2004. Page 240-241).

Federalism is a mode of governance which averts dangers

related to partition in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. This

system will keep the cohesion of multi-ethnic and multi-cultured

societies by merging components of economic, political, and

military potentials; but at the same time, it grants certain cultural,

social, and political freedom and autonomy. Federalism grants

50

power to the local administrations to solve internal issues, which in

return raises responsiveness and accountability. Federalism can

perform better economically, because different geographic

locations require distinct economic policies. In a federal system,

economic policies and supportive actions can be taken using

distinct legal frameworks, which is easier than centralized systems,

where local policies are made and is implementable based on broad

country-wide economic policies.

Changing the system to federalism is one of the oldest

suggestions, mostly taken serious by Junbish and Wahdat parties

(Rasooli, 2007. Page 228). Federalism was proposed in the

constitutional Loya Jirga as well. One of the interviewees named

Abdul Latif Pedram, who is a presidential candidate too, initially

had proposed this system. He also serves as chairman of Kangara-

e-meli political party, and has been a stern supporter of federalism.

Characteristics of the Federal System

Characteristics of the federal system purposed by Abdul Latif

Pedram are:

Parliamentary System as an Ideal System

Abdul Latif Pedram prefers the parliamentary system when it

comes to horizontal power-sharing; but he thinks the presidential

system can also work out.

It is best if a federal system is parliamentary. If not, the

president elects the prime minister. All I mean is that

power should be shared. (Abdul Latif Pedram,

presidential candidate, March 2019).

51

Regulated Economy

Abdul Latif Pedram criticizes the current economic system and

prefers a regulated economic system for economic growth.

The result of a liberal mentality is joblessness in our

country. We need a regulated economic system in

Afghanistan. Amartya Sen stresses on the moral values in

development. The private sector should be regulated.

Right now our government does not monitor the market;

it is a mistake to introduce free market in a country like

Afghanistan. Government knows this fact but still lingers

to customize. We have always said that this system cannot

bring economic equality and growth; for example, in the

past 18 years, the growth rate has barely been two point

something. We generate poverty not wealth, and I want

this free market to change. We must create opportunities

for the poor; or if we cannot do this, we at least can keep

the inflation rate at check. (Abdul Latif Pedram,

presidential candidate, March 2019).

Localizing Security and Empowering Provincial Councils

In vertical power-sharing, Pedram believes that security affairs

should be localized; but the Army should be administered by the

central government. Every province should have their local police

force. Pedram also insists on the empowerment of provincial

councils, so that they appoint and dismiss local authorities. These

empowered provincial councils of different provinces then

combine and form regional or state parliament.

52

Advantages of Federal Government

Pedram explains advantages of federalism:

The reasons why our political system should change to

federal. 1) Power should not concentrate around one

person and federalism prevents that. 2) In order for the

government to be efficient, it must be responsive to

solving issues; because people cannot wait long. 3) For

the central government to be efficient, it cannot and

should not micromanage. For example, the general

attorney complains about too many unsolved cases and it

shows a limitation in decision-making for local

authorities. 4) Since each region has their own distinct

culture and traditions, federal laws can solve differences

easily. Thus, it is the most efficient system in a multi-

cultural and multi-ethnic country. Let the law be

democratic and reflect peoples’ needs.

Pedram further argues that the federal system will increase

peoples’ participation, since power is shared with local

administrations. Subsequently, regional administrations can solve

local issues more efficiently, and the central government should

manage foreign affairs. Another advantage is that the Constitution

gives authority to regional governments to pass laws in accordance

with the citizens’ distinct cultures, traditions, and specific social

needs. Thus, people will feel their differences are respected.

However, the central government can impose certain general rules

that will be compulsory for all states to follow and respect.

53

Procedures for Changing the Political System

The Constitution contains two types of codes: one, flexible to

change; and the other, inflexible to change. Codes that are flexible

to change can be modified by the authorities that can modify

ordinary laws and procedures; in simpler words, the same rule

applies to the flexible codes and ordinary laws. But the conditions

to modify inflexible codes are harder and the procedure for their

modification are explained in the Constitution itself. The reason for

inflexibility of some codes are for them to remain stable and

durable. But no code can be completely inflexible. Since the

Constitution should remain compatible with changes in the society,

it must predict procedures for modifying it (Danesh, 2003- page

76- 87).

Afghanistan’s Constitution is inflexible to change in a way

that it requires difficult conditions to be met in order to modify it.

Chapter 10 of Afghanistan’s Constitution explains the conditions

and authorities for its modification.

Reform Authority

In other countries, constitutional modification is carried out by

either the parliament or through a referendum. In Afghanistan

however, the constitutional Loya Jirga is the main body for

approval or modification of the constitutional codes (Danesh, 2003

page 80-82) (Article 111 of Afghanistan Constitution). On the

same note, article 110 of the Afghanistan’s Constitution also refers

to Loya Jirga as an embodiment of the peoples’ will. Members of

the constitutional Loya Jirga are selected by parliament members

and members of the provincial and district councils. According to

54

this article, ministers, members of the Supreme Court, and the

Attorney General can participate, but have no voting rights.

Modification Procedures

In every country, constitutional modification passes four stages.

First, suggestion for modification is made. Second, the need for

modification is assessed. Third, the necessary draft of modification

is prepared. And forth, it is sent for final approval. According to

article 150 of Afghanistan’s Constitution, a delegation from the

government, National Council, and Supreme Court ordered by the

president will prepare the draft. For this draft to be approved, the

president will order convening constitutional Loya Jirga. If 2/3 of

all the members of Loya Jirga approves it, it will turn to code, and

is implementable through presidential order. (Article 50 of the

Constitution).

Conditions for Modification

Ordinary laws do not require special conditions to be modified. But

the Constitutional codes have special conditions to be modified,

and these conditions are brought in the code itself (Danesh 2003.

Page 84).

Two special conditions that codes can be modified with:

Time limit: some codes come with a certain time limit

that no one can modify. Article 146 of Afghanistan’s

Constitution puts a time limit on the constitutional

codes and also prohibits modification in emergency

conditions.

55

Content limit: The Constitution also prohibits

modification of special and beneficial articles. In some

Constitutions the political system, religion, sect,

democratic values, and basic human rights are not

subject to any modification. The reason behind the

content limit is to solidify the pillars of the system,

especially political and legal values (Danesh, 2003

page 82). Article 149 of Afghanistan’s Constitution

prohibits any modifications to the principles of Islamic

rules, and changing the Islamic republic system. Legal

codes can only be modified to bring improvements in

the legal system. Holding Loya Jirga for any

constitutional modification is impossible now, since

we are approaching the end of the provincial council

tenure; in addition, district councils have not been

formed yet. (Article 49 of the Constitution).

A member of the Independent Commission on

Implementation of the Constitution states: According to the

Constitution, Loya Jirga consists of the head of provincial and

district councils, ministers, members of the Supreme Court,

the attorney general, and members of parliament. Convention

of Loya Jirga is legally impossible due to absence of 1/3

members of the upper house. These absent members are

district council heads (district council elections were never

held) and provincial council heads (whose tenure is ending)

(A member of the Independent Commission on the

Implementation of Constitution, April 2019).

56

Regardless of complications of holding a Loya Jirga and its

possible outcomes, the representatives of the presidential tickets

insist on its inauguration in this research.

Opportunities and Threats: Changing the Political System

Opportunities

Decentralization; to attract wider political Satisfaction

Supporters of a system change believe that decentralization can

alleviate some grievances of non-Pashtun ethnic groups in regards

to political exclusion from power.

We want to replace the current system with a system that

can accommodate representatives from four major ethnic

groups into top government positions. Our society does

not tolerate logic of elimination (Representative of

Stability and Convergence ticket, April 2019).

If we have three deputies of the president, people will be

more convinced; because now people feel eliminated.

Apparently, the presidential system with a separate

executive branch is attractive and acceptable for people

because it can accommodate representatives from the four

major ethnic groups (For MP, April 2019).

People feel eliminated from political power in the current system,

and this encourages the society to change in the hope of altering

the situation, say supporters of system change.

Accommodating Discourse on the System Change

Supporters of change believe that discussions on changing the

system start among the political elite; most presidential tickets who

57

were for centralization of power, have included supporters of

system change in their tickets. This is a promising sign of

inclusiveness and seriousness of this discussion.

The sternest oppositions of system change have now

understood the inefficiency of centralization of power,

and design future programs in such a way to reflect

power-sharing, because this is what people want

(Representative of Junbish party, July 2019).

International Community’s Accommodation of the Political

System Change

Supporters of change believe that there is a positive outlook from

the international community on the prospect of political system

change in Afghanistan, and their support will be catalyst to this

change.

The international community have welcomed a system

change and have shown a green light (Latif Pedram,

presidential candidate, March 2019).

The ice has been broken by both the international

community and presidential tickets in showing a

willingness for more power-sharing; while this was not

the case in 2014 (Muhiudin Mahdi, researcher, April

2019).

In conclusion, both international pressure groups and domestic

players show exceptional support for political system change.

58

Challenges of the System Change

Despite the opportunities in changing the political system, there are

some challenges as well.

Historical Opposition of Pashtun Political Elite to

Decentralization of Power

One of the biggest concerns among the supporters of system

change is the historical opposition of Pashtun political elite to

decentralization of power.

Pashtuns in Loya Jirga supported and insisted on the

presidential system, with a strong control over

peripheries. The same people lobby for centralization of

power and argue that decentralization of power will lead

to inefficiency in governance in Afghanistan. I don’t see

any other challenge other than this, and believe that

power-sharing will bring equality in service delivery all

over Afghanistan, and will increase peoples’ satisfaction

(Former MP, July 2019).

Weak Ethnic-Oriented Political Parties

Earlier in this research, we brought arguments from supporters and

oppositions of system change. In particular, strong and coherent

political parties are crucial to the establishment of a parliamentary

system in the country. Representatives of political parties say lack

of quota in the elections for political parties has led to weakening

of the parties which are a prerequisite for a parliamentary system.

59

The current system hinders political parties. It could be

our problem, but we try our best to change this condition

in which parties are more active in forming presidential

tickets, but are discarded after the election and when the

government is formed. The reason is the presidents’

inclination to weaken political parties and the electoral

system. We believe changing the current system is good

for the country. (A member of Wahdat party, April 2019).

Another critique on the political parties is their activities, which are

mostly along ethnic lines. On the other hand, political parties argue

that with changing the electoral system to include parties, their

policies and activities will change to be more inclusive.

We acknowledge that all parties are weak and ethno-

centric in Afghanistan, but how can they grow and

become inclusive if there is no support? Let’s make no

excuses and start supporting political parties to become

strong. In recent years, parties have lobbied to get quotas

in the election, but president Karzai denied, and

announced publicly that he does not belong to any

political party and actually is against them; this further

discredited and weakened the political parties. When

parties are given a quota, they will expand their activities

to cover more provinces in the hope to get more votes and

play an important role in politics (Representative of

Junbish-e-Mili party, july 2019).

Loya Jirga’s Complicated Organizing Criterion

One of the challenges to change the political system are the

conditions that are stated to conduct Loya Jirga in the Constitution.

Some people who participated in this research think the

organization of Loya Jirga as simple and basic. The conditions to

organize Loya Jirga is explained in article 110 of the Constitution.

60

Participants of Loya Jirga shall be members of the upper and lower

houses, and provincial and district councils’ heads. But the tenure

for provincial council has ended and an election for district

councils has never been held. While district and provincial

councils’ heads make up 2/3 of the upper house, they have not been

elected yet; so the upper house continues with the previous

members.

Taliban and the Political System

The ongoing peace talks with the Taliban has overshadowed the

upcoming election, the Constitution, and the type of political

structure as a result. Although there is no official statement from

the Taliban regarding what type of political system they prefer,

those who have been to Doha and Moscow conferences believe that

the Taliban want to establish an Islamic Emirate.

I am skeptic of the Taliban’s intentions and ideology. In

the Doha conference, they freely expressed their support

for an Islamic Emirate system, and even went on to say

‘whoever does not support Islamic Emirate are not

Muslims’ (MP and participant of Doha Conference, July

2019).

The Taliban do not support an Islamic Republic system;

including them in the political structure will be the end of

everyone else, including other Pashtuns, because they

only want an Islamic Emirate (Representative of Stability

and Convergence presidential ticket, June 2019).

Mr. Wahid Muzhda states that Taliban do not believe in

electing a leader through an all-encompassing election

that we have had in the past 18 years. He believes, Taliban

61

refer to 39:91 of the Quran, Hal o Aqd counsel selects the

political leader. (Zaki M. M., 2019).

Although all of the interviewees have expressed their concerns

regarding the Taliban’s insistence on forming an Islamic Emirate,

one representative of the Peace and Moderation presidential ticket

emphasizes ‘that a peace settlement with the Taliban should

precede political system change’.

The presidential candidate’s coordination council in which

all 13 tickets are members, insist on a precedence of peace to

election and say they will even boycott the election for the sake of

peace. They believe peace is a precondition for a transparent

election (Hussaini, 2019).

1 Verse 9, Sura Zamar: Are those equal, those who know, and those who do not know?

62

Section Five

A Critical Review of Changing the Political System

So far, we have discussed the logic and reasons behind a change in

the political system. Now we will critically review this trend.

Political

Group

Objection to

Current System

Desired

Political

System

Key Argument

Desired

Political

System’s

attributes

Supporters

of System modification

State Builder

team, with Asharaf

Ghani as

leader

Over

concentration of Power

around the

President

The current

Presidential System with

some

modifications in the

Presidential

powers

Afghanistan is

transition period and

decentralization

of power can lead to

instability,

however in the current system

power has been

concentrated around the

President, this

power should be limited by

definition of

powers of the deputies of the

President

The current

system with proper

distinction of

power for the president and his

deputies in

Constitution

Supporter of

political system

change

Satiability

and Convergence

team with

Abdullah Abdullah as

leader

Over concentration

of Power

around the

President

Incompatibility of the

Presidential

system with the multi-

ethnic society

of Afghanistan

Parliamentary

System

Parliamentary

system by providing a

political system

that the power is not concentrated

around the president can

ensure the

participation of all political

groups and

eliminates

Selection of the Prime

minister by

the Parliament

and making

President

position a symbolic one

Ensuring the political

parties

participation in elections

63

aristocracy and

tyranny

Satiability and

Convergence

team with Abdullah

Abdullah as

leader and Peace and

Moderation

team

Over concentration

of Power around the

President

Incompatibility of the

Presidential

system with the multi-

ethnic society

of Afghanistan

Presidential System with

three deputies

of the President

A system with four key

position can

ensure the participation of

four major

ethnic groups, Pashtuns, Tajiks

and Hazaras and

Uzbeks

The president can appoint

and dismiss the Prime

minister with

or without Parliament’s

permission.

The prime minister can

compose the

cabinet in

consultation

with president and the

deputies and

ask for the parliament

vote on them.

Modification of the

Constitution

and recognition of

the political

parties share in parliament

Satiability

and Convergence

team with

Abdullah Abdullah as

leader and

Peace and Moderation

team

Over concentration

of Power

around the President

Incompatibility

of the Presidential

system with

the multi-ethnic society

of Afghanistan

Presidential

System with the Executive

Prime

Minister

Distribution of power

among the

President and the Prime

minister can

eliminate the concentration

of power

around the President

In current

system,

President

cannot resolve all

the issues,

existence of the Prime

Minister can

ease the execution of

Distribution of

power between the President and

the Prime

minister and loosen the

concentration of

power around the President.

64

programs

and will let the President

to focus on

security and foreign

affairs.

Latif Pedram Over concentration

of Power

around the President

Centralized

concentration

of power

Incompatibility of the

Presidential

system with the multi-

ethnic society

of Afghanistan

Federalism Federalism can distribute

the power at

local level and increase

citizen’s

participation.

Local

governments can deal with

the local

issues better and the

central

government can deal with

the foreign

affairs

Federalism

can be a

proper political

system for multi-culture

and multi-

ethnic countries, the

Constitution

can recognize the

differences

and let each state pass

laws

acceding to their needs

Localized management

of security

Authorization of local

governments

Establishment

of provincial

parliaments

65

Ambiguity and Lack of Consensus among Political Coalitions

on the Political System Change

There seems to be issues and ambiguities among the supporters of

political system change that we will assess in the following

paragraphs.

Among the supporters of system change, there seems to be

no clear picture or definition of a system which can replace the

current one. For some supporters this is a temporary demand, in

which they only stress on accommodating representatives of the

four major ethnic groups in top government positions.

Thus, disagreements exist even among members of a single

presidential ticket regarding a system change. Like in the

interviews of this research, one can find contradictory comments

about an ideal system from different representatives of the same

ticket. These contradicting views have their roots in poor and

ambiguous definition of an ideal system among team members. A

vivid example is the Peace and Moderation presidential ticket led

by Hanif Atmar, where disagreements exist between the leader and

his deputies regarding an ideal system that has gone viral in the

media recently.

Ethno-Centric Power Bases, and its Contradiction with a

Democratic Political Participation

For the first time power was shared based on an ethnic orientation

in the Bonn conference (even though it was disproportionate). This

event preceded all other unofficial sharing of power based on

ethnicity in the governmental institution like ministries. But after

two decades, this method has neither been satisfactory for ordinary

66

citizens, nor for parties or political elites, and has failed to reflect

their participation in power (Zaki, Bakhtiari and Wafaey, 2018).

This method of power-sharing has only weakened the

political structure of the country. The majority of interviewees

believe that prominent ethnic leaders have only had symbolic roles

in power, and have been used as political tokens to show diversity

and inclusiveness. Hence, real power lies in an exclusive circle

from one ethnic group, which has complicated the power-sharing

issue even further (Neshat, Erfani, Mohammadi, 2017).

On the other hand, the limited power of these ethnic leaders

are all used to mobilize their trusted ones or a follower into the

administration. Those who do not have access to these leaders or

are not in their circle, have no chance of participating in the

political structure and are ignored/eliminated. The result is that

very few and selected ones get into the system. The consequences

of sharing power along ethnic lines is that a few who are related to

these leaders get into the system, and the rest remain outside of the

power structure.

The ethnic power-sharing concept itself is the biggest

barrier in front of the democratic participation of people in various

political and social functions. For example, setting ethnic-based

quota in Ghazni province’s election or the Kankor exam will result

in different treatment of people based on their ethnic affiliation and

deprive them of their true and deserving rights.

This method of power-sharing, the inclusion of four major

ethnic groups in the power system has become a dominant

mentality. This mentality is clearly seen among some supporters of

67

system change, which eventually will result in the elimination and

ignoring rights of other minor ethnic groups.

Overlooking Vertical Power-Sharing

The majority of change supporters have often overlooked sharing

power geographically; their main focus is sharing power

operationally. In other words, supporters of system change have

given less importance to the balance of power between capital and

regions. This indicates a poor understanding of power-sharing in

the capital and among political elite, even among the supporters of

system change.

A Review of Top to Bottom Power-Sharing among Ethnic

Groups

Supporters of system change also ignore the cultural and political

components of power-sharing and have a top to bottom view of it.

In a patriarchal society like Afghanistan, one cannot solve the

political participation of ethnic groups merely by changing the

political system. In such a society, some cultural components are

strong barriers to a democratic structure, or any change. These

ominous components eventually overwhelm individual freedom in

the political participation and force their political decisions to be

ethno-centric, despite their reluctance to vote for the same

incompetent person. This situation perpetuates ethnic tyranny.

In addition to cultural components, peoples’ economic

situation is another factor in their political participation. Poverty

also affects peoples’ decisions, which is very pervasive in

Afghanistan. People’s selection of inapt representatives has been a

68

factor of poverty and lack of voting power awareness. Accordingly,

a comprehensive solution for power-sharing among ethnic groups

seems to be very important. A top to bottom view of changing the

system is not the solution; instead a situation conducive to political

participation of all citizens with freedom and awareness of rights is

the solution. Any comprehensive solution should consider the

century-long political culture of this country. Democracy cannot be

promoted in a country that has experienced tyrant regimes which

often deprived people of their democratic rights by merely

changing the political system. Promotion of democracy requires a

culturally conducive society. It requires citizens to be aware of their

rights and actively support it. In recent years, poverty and lack of

awareness of constitutional rights have overshadowed peoples’

active participation in the elections, as well as political decision-

making.

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Suggestions

As discussed throughout this paper, the power-sharing dispute

among different ethnic groups cannot be solved only by changing

the regime or political system. It is a multidimensional issue and

the solution should also be multidimensional.

Critiquing Ethnicity-Based Power

This research indicates that setting quotas or sharing power based on

ethnic affiliation has increased discrimination and decreased peoples’

satisfaction. Power-sharing among leaders of ethnic groups is not the

solution in this country; people will feel eliminated and remain

dissatisfied. Thus, a solution should be developed for sharing power

justly.

Founding of a Constitutional Court

Protection and preventing violations of the Constitution requires a

foundational institution and an interpretive source, to monitor the

laws derived from it. Different institutions in different countries

carry out this job, where some of their decisions are binding and

some need consultation. Some countries have delegated this

authority to the Supreme Court, but the main concern that arises is

a balance of power which will be distorted. Some countries have a

separate referee for this job which is linked to none of the three

branches (Habibzada and Nekogoftar Safa, 2008).

In some European countries, an institution by the name of

Constitutional Court is assigned to protect and monitor

implementation of the Constitution, whose decisions are binding.

70

This court has been given special rights and authorities to

handle and monitor all affairs related to the Constitution and

control deviations/violation. (Barendt, 1998).

Afghanistan’s Constitution has tasked two institutions – one,

the Supreme Court, and the other, the Independent Commission of

Monitoring Implementation of the Constitution – to work in

parallel to Interpret the Constitution. However, founding a

Constitutional Court can solve this issue. With due authority, this

court can handle all issues related to interpretation of the

Constitution and violation of it:

- Interpretation of the Constitution

- Revocation of drafts by the president that are against the

Constitution

- Electoral complaint management

- Monitoring the political parties

Geographic and Operational Distribution of Power

Most people insist on the operational distribution of power,

whereas they ignore the geographic distribution. In this method,

power will be shared only in the capital and often among leaders of

different ethnic groups.

Decentralization also requires distribution of power along

geographic lines. It is impossible to keep people convinced and

restore their trust on the central government without horizontal

distributions of power. (An explanation of how it is done is under

the method of changing the system section).

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Creation and Reinforcement of Cultural and Social Ground for

Democracy

As discussed earlier, changing the system alone will not be enough

to solve power-sharing issues. Certain benchmarks are needed to

establish a democratic system where people feel enfranchised and

power is shared justly among ethnic groups.

It is very important to raise peoples’ awareness regarding

their political participation rights. In many cases peoples’ votes are

influenced by elders, either bought, or sometimes blackmailed to

cast for a certain person. The 2017 parliamentary election was

packed with such examples, so it needs to be taken seriously.

On the other hand, data suggests that people have grown reluctant

to vote overtime, compared to previous elections. This can a sign

of their waning trust on elections and other democratic processes.

Widespread corruption in elections is another factor in peoples’

fading trust. To gain people’s trust again, there must be specific

solutions so that they do not deprive themselves of voting rights

due to lack of transparency.

72

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74

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75

Authors Biographies

Sediqa Bakhtiari

Sediqa is doing a PhD in cultural sociology at the University of

Tehran; her research focuses on politics and war from a

sociological perspective. She had special interest in social research

while studying for her Masters at the same university. She wrote

her Master’s thesis on immigration and changing the perception of

manhood in the minds of Afghan men. She has coauthored the

“Transition to Adulthood: Sexual Attitude and Behavior of Afghan

Youth” research with the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Meanwhile, she has cooperated with the Ministry of Urban

Development and Housing in urban studies; in addition, she has

worked with the Research and Evaluation Unit of Afghanistan.

Mohammad Mahdi Zaki

Mahdi has done his Master of International Relations at Ege

University in Turkey. His Master’s thesis was on security and

Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Currently, he is doing another

Masters in Human Rights at the University of Oslo in Norway; this

time, his thesis is about Afghanistan government’s sources of

legitimacy. He has worked as a researcher for the Afghan Institute

of Strategic Studies; Research and Evaluation Unit of Afghanistan;

and Arganon Research Institution. His research interests are peace

and security, foreign policy, and human rights.

76