Afghan - Seizing the Initiative

8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative

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A Tactical ProblemA Tactical Problem

Perceived and Real ObstaclesPerceived and Real Obstacles

How Attack Co, 1How Attack Co, 1--503D IN (ABN)503D IN (ABN)

Overcame themOvercame them

Long Term RecommendationsLong Term Recommendations

OutlineOutline


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Experience is the ability to recognize aExperience is the ability to recognize amistake when you make it again. Four times inmistake when you make it again. Four times inthe last century the U.S. has to come to thethe last century the U.S. has to come to theend of a war, concluded that the future of manend of a war, concluded that the future of manand the world had changed for the better andand the world had changed for the better and

turned inward, unilaterally disarming andturned inward, unilaterally disarming anddismantling institutions important for ourdismantling institutions important for ournational security giving ourselves a sonational security giving ourselves a so--calledcalledpeace dividend. Four times we chose topeace dividend. Four times we chose toforget history.forget history.

Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates,Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates,November 2007November 2007


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The ProblemThe ProblemIt is dangerous to discount the vast andIt is dangerous to discount the vast and

salient tactical lessons provided by historicalsalient tactical lessons provided by historical

countercounter--insurgencies based on their eventualinsurgencies based on their eventual

politicalpoliticalcapitulation and defeatcapitulation and defeat


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The ProblemThe Problem

One of the major problems in Afghanistan is largely tacticalOne of the major problems in Afghanistan is largely tactical insurgents have regained theinsurgents have regained the tacticaltacticalinitiativeinitiative

In order for the U.S. to take it back will require a fundamentalIn order for the U.S. to take it back will require a fundamentalshift in the way we fight in Afghanistan as a theatershift in the way we fight in Afghanistan as a theater

An overAn over--reliance on TTPs translated from Iraq will lead to areliance on TTPs translated from Iraq will lead to aprotracted conflict and an overall strategic defeatprotracted conflict and an overall strategic defeat


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Perceived and RealPerceived and Real

ObstaclesObstacles


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Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles

The level of physical fitness required toThe level of physical fitness required tooperate dismounted in Afghanistan is notoperate dismounted in Afghanistan is notattainable or sustainableattainable or sustainable Too much gear to carryToo much gear to carry

Safest place to be is in the truckSafest place to be is in the truck

Insurgents are used to the altitude andInsurgents are used to the altitude andterrain and hence superior as dismountedterrain and hence superior as dismountedcombatantscombatants

ANSF have begun to believe and perpetuate thisANSF have begun to believe and perpetuate thismythmyth

Anything smaller than a platoonAnything smaller than a platoon--sizedsizedfriendly element will be overrun andfriendly element will be overrun anddestroyeddestroyed


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No matter how tough you think youNo matter how tough you think you

are, youll never get up thoseare, youll never get up thosemountains.mountains.

--Platoon Sergeant,Platoon Sergeant, from thefrom the

unit we replaced in sectorunit we replaced in sector

FitnessFitness


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Historical Precedent:Historical Precedent:

SovietSoviet--Afghan War (1979Afghan War (1979--1989)1989)

Within the first 3 years ofWithin the first 3 years of

combat most of the effectivecombat most of the effective

kinetic operations werekinetic operations wereshouldered by paratroopsshouldered by paratroops

and SPETSNAZ forces dueand SPETSNAZ forces due

to the unsuitability of theto the unsuitability of the

majority of the Soviet 40thmajority of the Soviet 40thArmy to dismounted warfareArmy to dismounted warfare


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Your physical fitness levels must be at aYour physical fitness levels must be at apoint where it is no longer a consideration.point where it is no longer a consideration.You are not fit in order to survive; you areYou are not fit in order to survive; you arenot fit to excel at a physical task; you are fitnot fit to excel at a physical task; you are fit

because it allows you to bring to the battlebecause it allows you to bring to the battlethat critical component of being athat critical component of being aCommander and a Leader. You are fitCommander and a Leader. You are fitbecause you must retain the greatest abilitybecause you must retain the greatest abilityto lead, command, to inspire, to think, toto lead, command, to inspire, to think, toplan, and to accomplish your mission.plan, and to accomplish your mission.Everything else is for show, and thereforeEverything else is for show, and thereforemeaningless.meaningless.

D.MD.M. Day. Day

FitnessFitness


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A Co, 1A Co, 1--503 IN (ABN) was503 IN (ABN) was

able to overcome thisable to overcome this

perception by training with aperception by training with a

combination of CROSSFIT,combination of CROSSFIT,body armor runs and roadbody armor runs and road

marching incorporating anymarching incorporating any

and all hills around postand all hills around post

We found the APFTWe found the APFTinadequate for gauging realinadequate for gauging real

world fitness requirementsworld fitness requirements

FitnessFitness


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Perceived ObstaclesPerceived ObstaclesFitnessFitness


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We adopted a tactic weWe adopted a tactic we

coined offensivecoined offensive

disruption utilizing squad todisruption utilizing squad to

sectionsection--sized elementssized elements

mutually supported inmutually supported in

traveling overwatch in thetraveling overwatch in the

high ground regardless ofhigh ground regardless of

mission type or objectivemission type or objective

We were able to outWe were able to out--march,march,outout--maneuver and outflankmaneuver and outflank

dismounted enemy elementsdismounted enemy elements

and always held the initiativeand always held the initiative

Insurgent SuperiorityInsurgent Superiority


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Offensive DisruptionOffensive Disruption

Maneuver is the essence of every tacticalManeuver is the essence of every tacticaloperation. It is the use of movement inoperation. It is the use of movement incombination with fire (or fire potential)combination with fire (or fire potential)employed to achieve a position of advantageemployed to achieve a position of advantage

with respect to the enemy. The commanderwith respect to the enemy. The commanderemploys those techniques that avoid theemploys those techniques that avoid theenemys strength, focus on enemyenemys strength, focus on enemyweakness, and conceals the companys trueweakness, and conceals the companys trueintentions.intentions.

parapara 44--29, FM 3.2129, FM 3.21--10,10,The InfantryRifle CompanyThe InfantryRifle Company


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Offensive DisruptionOffensive Disruption

In late September 2007, 1In late September 2007, 1stst and 2and 2ndnd PLT, AttackPLT, AttackCompany were tasked to react to an ambush on HHC,Company were tasked to react to an ambush on HHC,11--503503rdrd, and clear the high ground to the West of a, and clear the high ground to the West of aroad nicknamed Ambush Alleyroad nicknamed Ambush Alley over 6 km of mountainous terrain, the Company encounteredover 6 km of mountainous terrain, the Company encountered

dozens of hasty and semidozens of hasty and semi--permanent fighting positionspermanent fighting positionswithin as close as 100m of the roadwithin as close as 100m of the road

wellwell--used goat trails that could facilitate quick infil and exfilused goat trails that could facilitate quick infil and exfilto and from the ambush lineto and from the ambush line

Based on the relatively good upkeep of theseBased on the relatively good upkeep of these

positions and combat detritus, it was clear that thepositions and combat detritus, it was clear that thehigh ground had not been cleared by friendly forceshigh ground had not been cleared by friendly forcesany time recentlyany time recently units had been employing the same mounted TTP as theirunits had been employing the same mounted TTP as their

primary method of movement through the area time and timeprimary method of movement through the area time and timeagainagain

VignetteVignette


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Moving Flank ScreenMoving Flank Screen

Throughout its 15Throughout its 15--month deployment, A/1month deployment, A/1--503503regularly used dismounted flank screens as itsregularly used dismounted flank screens as itsprimary method to protect vehicle convoys through:primary method to protect vehicle convoys through: areas that were historical ambush sitesareas that were historical ambush sites

where the terrain significantly facilitated that possibilitywhere the terrain significantly facilitated that possibility

Where IEDs were the most likely threat, theWhere IEDs were the most likely threat, theCompany would employ dismounts in front of theCompany would employ dismounts in front of theconvoy in a large V shapeconvoy in a large V shape clearing the ground immediately in front of the lead vehicleclearing the ground immediately in front of the lead vehicle

searching for possible paths for command wire leading fromsearching for possible paths for command wire leading fromthe initiation point to the roadthe initiation point to the road

Attack Co also used simulated (and actual) vehicleAttack Co also used simulated (and actual) vehiclebreakdowns to mask a dismount point or to drawbreakdowns to mask a dismount point or to drawSIGINTSIGINT the unit always operated under the assumption that thethe unit always operated under the assumption that the

convoy was being watchedconvoy was being watched


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Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles


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The UK approach to Cold WeatherThe UK approach to Cold Weatheroperations is to master theoperations is to master theenvironment and maintain tempo ofenvironment and maintain tempo of

operations. This is simply described inoperations. This is simply described inthe maxim Survive to Fight, ratherthe maxim Survive to Fight, ratherthan fighting to survive.than fighting to survive.

MAJ R.J.MAJ R.J. CantrillCantrill,,Royal MarinesRoyal Marines

Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesMentalityMentality


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Quality gear and equipment that suitsQuality gear and equipment that suitsdismounted operationsdismounted operations Shortcomings of the ACU patternShortcomings of the ACU pattern

Shortage of helicopter assets to facilitate airShortage of helicopter assets to facilitate airassaultsassaults FixedFixed--wing Air Force platforms move too quicklywing Air Force platforms move too quickly

to adequately support infantry with overwatchto adequately support infantry with overwatch

Burden of rotary wing logistical support wasBurden of rotary wing logistical support wasplaced on private contractors in Russian Miplaced on private contractors in Russian Mi--8s8s

OverOver--emphasis on SIGINT and a lack ofemphasis on SIGINT and a lack ofspecific HUMINTspecific HUMINT


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A/1A/1--503 often relied on the traditional A.L.I.C.E. pack with503 often relied on the traditional A.L.I.C.E. pack withTactical Tailor (TT) customizations or bought MulticamTactical Tailor (TT) customizations or bought MulticamTT rack systems for their equipment and ammunitionTT rack systems for their equipment and ammunition Not only are these systems more comfortable and efficientNot only are these systems more comfortable and efficient

during dismounted movements, their patterns were more suitedduring dismounted movements, their patterns were more suited

to the environmentto the environment ACU pattern and construction were a major hindrance in the fieldACU pattern and construction were a major hindrance in the field

The IOTV is longer and bulkier than its IBA predecessorThe IOTV is longer and bulkier than its IBA predecessorand the shape is not built to facilitate a rucksackand the shape is not built to facilitate a rucksack The construction is meant for easy removal in case of a soldiersThe construction is meant for easy removal in case of a soldiers

submersion in water but its quick release wire system issubmersion in water but its quick release wire system isEXTREMELY uncomfortable over the shouldersEXTREMELY uncomfortable over the shoulders

A/1A/1--503 paratroopers willingly paid out of pocket for503 paratroopers willingly paid out of pocket forcivilian hiking boots which stood up better to the rigorscivilian hiking boots which stood up better to the rigorsof dayof day--toto--day movement through the mountainsday movement through the mountains

EquipmentEquipment


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Lethality vs. SurvivabilityLethality vs. SurvivabilityThe dynamic relationship between lethalityThe dynamic relationship between lethalityand survivability has existed in warfare forand survivability has existed in warfare formillenniamillennia it is a question of risk; but whenit is a question of risk; but whenthese two principles are in balance, threatthese two principles are in balance, threat

elimination becomes as fluid as water overelimination becomes as fluid as water overstone.stone.

Tactics, equipment and training that focusesTactics, equipment and training that focuses

on kinetic neutralization of enemy forces byon kinetic neutralization of enemy forces bydefinition delivers the highest level of truedefinition delivers the highest level of truesurvivability to friendly forces.survivability to friendly forces.


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Components ofComponents of

Soldier LethalitySoldier Lethality ManeuverManeuver

SpeedSpeed

AgilityAgility

Accurate aim of the primary weapon systemAccurate aim of the primary weapon system Quick, smooth reQuick, smooth re--loadload streamlined kitstreamlined kit

configurationconfiguration

Situational AwarenessSituational Awareness

FriendlyFriendly EnemyEnemy

TerrainTerrain

AuditoryAuditory

MissionMission--specific combat conditioningspecific combat conditioning


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Components ofComponents of

Soldier SurvivabilitySoldier Survivability Resistance to point and blunt traumaResistance to point and blunt trauma

Resistance to ballistic traumaResistance to ballistic trauma

Medical training and quality of lifesavingMedical training and quality of lifesavingequipmentequipment

Speed of first response medical treatmentSpeed of first response medical treatment Equipment must be easy to removeEquipment must be easy to remove

Speed of travel to advanced levels of traumaSpeed of travel to advanced levels of trauma

carecare


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Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesEquipmentEquipment

The ACU in its natural environmentThe ACU in its natural environment


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MOLLE RucksackMOLLE Rucksack


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Army Issue IOTVArmy Issue IOTV


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Army Issue BootsArmy Issue Boots


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A.L.I.C.E. packsA.L.I.C.E. packs

MulticamMulticam

RackRack


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MulticamMulticam

RacksRacks

CivilianCivilian

RucksackRucksack

TT modified ALICE packTT modified ALICE pack

w/ civilian sleep padw/ civilian sleep pad


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Tact. Tailor MALICE PackTact. Tailor MALICE Pack

with civilian sleeping padwith civilian sleeping pad

Civilian bootsCivilian boots

Multicam RackMulticam Rack

SystemSystem

EquipmentEquipment


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Coordination with Air Force atCoordination with Air Force atCompany level is difficultCompany level is difficult AirAirSupport often will not work with onSupport often will not work with onthe ground leaders and willthe ground leaders and willconsequently take commands fromconsequently take commands froman Air Force JTAC miles awayan Air Force JTAC miles away

Attack Helicopters:Attack Helicopters: terrain is easily covered by slowterrain is easily covered by slow

moving attack helicoptersmoving attack helicopters

ability to take fire commands fromability to take fire commands fromground commander makes it the bestground commander makes it the bestplatform for destroying the enemyplatform for destroying the enemy

Afghanistan needs more AttackAfghanistan needs more AttackHelicoptersHelicopters

Artillery is King in Afghanistan:Artillery is King in Afghanistan: ability to call for fire (CFF) evens outability to call for fire (CFF) evens out

any enemy ambush and causesany enemy ambush and causesenemy to break contactenemy to break contact

absence of indirect support is knownabsence of indirect support is knownto the enemy; regularly stage theirto the enemy; regularly stage theirattacks in areas with dead space inattacks in areas with dead space inartillery coverageartillery coverage

Joint FiresJoint Fires


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11--503 IN (ABN) had to503 IN (ABN) had tofight for aviation supportfight for aviation support often there were not enoughoften there were not enough

birds or they did not arrivebirds or they did not arrive

in a timely manner, cedingin a timely manner, cedingthe initiative to the enemythe initiative to the enemy

A/1A/1--503 had to make the503 had to make themost of assets when theymost of assets when theygot themgot them

Company minus airCompany minus airassault in Aug 2007assault in Aug 2007resulted in the mostresulted in the mostsuccessful operation ofsuccessful operation ofthe entire deploymentthe entire deployment

Aviation AssetsAviation Assets


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Operational VignetteOperational Vignette

1250z: 1/A, 2/A and Headquarters1250z: 1/A, 2/A and Headquarterselement Air Assault intoelement Air Assault intosuspected enemy staging areasuspected enemy staging area

1350z: A Co (1350z: A Co (--) begin to ascend the) begin to ascend themountain during darknessmountain during darkness

1600z: A Co (1600z: A Co (--) reaches Hilltop 2653) reaches Hilltop 2653and 2/A sets up OP in supportand 2/A sets up OP in supportof 1/A and HQ movementof 1/A and HQ movement

1815z: 1/A and HQ reach patrol1815z: 1/A and HQ reach patrolbase site on ridge east of A/2base site on ridge east of A/2

1830z: 1/A 240B gun position hears1830z: 1/A 240B gun position hearsnoises and observes threenoises and observes threepersonnel with weaponspersonnel with weapons

1845z: Small 1/A and HQ element1845z: Small 1/A and HQ elementmaneuvers to engage personnelmaneuvers to engage personnel

1850z: Enemy fighter confuses US1850z: Enemy fighter confuses US

interpreter for a Taliban fighter;interpreter for a Taliban fighter;A Co engages the enemyA Co engages the enemycombatantscombatants

NEXT DAY: Sensitive SiteNEXT DAY: Sensitive SiteExploitation (SSE) finds threeExploitation (SSE) finds threeenemy KIA and the largestenemy KIA and the largestweapons and equipment cacheweapons and equipment cachefound in Eastern Paktika in OEFfound in Eastern Paktika in OEF

VIIIVIII

LEGENDLEGEND

1/A DESIGNATOR1/A DESIGNATOR

2/A DESIGNATOR2/A DESIGNATOR

DISMOUNTEDDISMOUNTED

MOUNTEDMOUNTED

CACHE SITECACHE SITE

Movement to Contact and Hasty AmbushMovement to Contact and Hasty Ambush


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Lessons LearnedLessons Learned

Keys to success:Keys to success: Air Assault capabilityAir Assault capability

Mutually supportedMutually supported

Small unitSmall unitmovementsmovements

Dismounted nightDismounted nightoperationoperation

Result:Result: Discovery andDiscovery and

disruption of enemydisruption of enemytraining/staging areatraining/staging area


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Historical Precedent:Historical Precedent:Algeria (1954Algeria (1954--1962)1962)

General Challe sought to remove local support and safeGeneral Challe sought to remove local support and safe--havens from insurgent bands at all costs throughhavens from insurgent bands at all costs throughsaturation of enemy lines of communication (LOCs) andsaturation of enemy lines of communication (LOCs) andoperational areas by aggressive light infantry andoperational areas by aggressive light infantry andparatroopsparatroops


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Lack of timely, accurateLack of timely, accurateintelligence is a notoriousintelligence is a notoriousproblem in Waziri tribalproblem in Waziri tribalareasareas

But A Co, 1But A Co, 1--503503rdrdssaggressiveness andaggressiveness andpursuit of combatantspursuit of combatantsanywhere they soughtanywhere they soughtsafesafe--haven diminishedhaven diminished

enemy morale and bredenemy morale and bredpsychological uncertaintypsychological uncertainty

Caused inCaused in--fighting andfighting anddisrupted recruitmentdisrupted recruitmentpotential among localpotential among local

populacepopulace

Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesIntelligenceIntelligence


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Effects AchievedEffects Achieved

Oshakay in JUN07: These Americans are different.Oshakay in JUN07: These Americans are different.

Gayankhel in SEP07: Do not go there, you will beGayankhel in SEP07: Do not go there, you will bekilled.killed.

Spera in MAR08: These Americans look strong.Spera in MAR08: These Americans look strong. Spera in MAR/JUN08: The Americans are in theSpera in MAR/JUN08: The Americans are in the

mountains and we dont know where they are andmountains and we dont know where they are andthe ASG are setting up checkpoints. We cant move.the ASG are setting up checkpoints. We cant move.

Spera in JUN08: We are outside the village. We areSpera in JUN08: We are outside the village. We are

hungry. We asked the villagers for food and theyhungry. We asked the villagers for food and theywould not help. What should we do?would not help. What should we do?

SIGINTSIGINT


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Effects AchievedEffects Achieved

Gayankhel in SEP07: Numerous SubGayankhel in SEP07: Numerous Sub--Commanders and insurgents seek out theCommanders and insurgents seek out theProgram for Strengthening Peace andProgram for Strengthening Peace andReconciliation (PTS) because they have lostReconciliation (PTS) because they have lostthe will to fightthe will to fight

Spera in MAR08: HUMINT source points outSpera in MAR08: HUMINT source points outthe location of a Taliban and foreign fighterthe location of a Taliban and foreign fightersafesafe--house just inside the border of Pakistanhouse just inside the border of Pakistan

resulting in a HIMARS strike that neutralizesresulting in a HIMARS strike that neutralizesmany high level leaders of Al Qaeda inmany high level leaders of Al Qaeda inAfghanistan. Several of these leaders wereAfghanistan. Several of these leaders wereforeign fighters.foreign fighters.

HUMINTHUMINT


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EquipmentEquipment

RecommendationsRecommendations


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Stuff That WorksStuff That WorksMulticamMulticam

MulticamMulticam in its natural environmentin its natural environment


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Rucksacks/Assault PacksRucksacks/Assault Packs

Tactical TailorTactical TailorMALICE 3MALICE 3

EberlestockEberlestockSkycraneSkycrane


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BDS Tactical Split FrontBDS Tactical Split Front

MolleMolle Chest RigChest Rig


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ParacleteParaclete Special OperationsSpecial Operations

Hard Plate CarrierHard Plate Carrier


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Tactical Tailor Basic 3LTactical Tailor Basic 3L

Hydration CarrierHydration Carrier


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RaichleRaichle Ranger GTXRanger GTX


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Long TermLong Term



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There needs to be a shift in focus and mentality: think like aThere needs to be a shift in focus and mentality: think like a

guerilla. Roadways and lines of communication equalguerilla. Roadways and lines of communication equal WesternWestern

development in the countryside. So regardless of arms anddevelopment in the countryside. So regardless of arms and

armament within a convoy, insurgents will always view them asarmament within a convoy, insurgents will always view them as

soft, easy targets. A big enough bomb can destroy an upsoft, easy targets. A big enough bomb can destroy an up--armoredarmored humveehumvee or flip an MRAPor flip an MRAP fixing a convoy in the killfixing a convoy in the kill

zone. Therefore,zone. Therefore, convoys are always vulnerableconvoys are always vulnerable either protecteither protect

them with CAS, CCA, and dismounts moving parallel to the roadthem with CAS, CCA, and dismounts moving parallel to the road

or use them as bait to conduct movements to contact onor use them as bait to conduct movements to contact on youryour

terms (with dismounts in the high ground). Unfortunately, weterms (with dismounts in the high ground). Unfortunately, we

have gotten to the point in this war where the last thing thehave gotten to the point in this war where the last thing the

enemy expects to see are U.S. Soldiers, with all their kit, in theenemy expects to see are U.S. Soldiers, with all their kit, in the

mountainsmountains use that to your advantage! As long as you keepuse that to your advantage! As long as you keep

your signature light and your movements discreetyour signature light and your movements discreet youare theyouare the

hunter!!hunter!!

Tactical Success inTactical Success in

Afghanistan in 150 words:Afghanistan in 150 words:


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Long TermLong Term


Units operating largely dismountedUnits operating largely dismountedneed equipment tailored to that end:need equipment tailored to that end:

Body armor or plate carrier that moreBody armor or plate carrier that more

comfortably facilitates a heavy rucksackcomfortably facilitates a heavy rucksack Better quality uniform that tears less easilyBetter quality uniform that tears less easily

Multicam has been fieldMulticam has been field--tested andtested andpreferred by combat infantry units inpreferred by combat infantry units inthe field as a superior patternthe field as a superior pattern

Light infantry units should be authorizedLight infantry units should be authorizedto make the switch to Multicam orto make the switch to Multicam orsomething similar to MARPATsomething similar to MARPAT


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Long TermLong Term


Expand the responsibility of lightExpand the responsibility of lightinfantry/airborne/air assault/cavalry forcesinfantry/airborne/air assault/cavalry forces standardize a functional fitness programstandardize a functional fitness program

modeled on CROSSFIT/road march combinationmodeled on CROSSFIT/road march combinationdesigned specifically for frontline, Combat Armsdesigned specifically for frontline, Combat Armssoldierssoldiers

give light infantry and standard line units a moregive light infantry and standard line units a moreaggressive and kinetic role in combataggressive and kinetic role in combat

Depart from the COP concept until increasesDepart from the COP concept until increasesin available manpower and return to thein available manpower and return to theAirmobile/LRRPAirmobile/LRRP--style unit and mission setstyle unit and mission set increase Army aviation assets significantlyincrease Army aviation assets significantly


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Long TermLong Term


Theater school teaching offensiveTheater school teaching offensivedisruption and its tactical advantagesdisruption and its tactical advantages

Precedent: Brits FTC in Malaya andPrecedent: Brits FTC in Malaya and

Americans Recondo in VietnamAmericans Recondo in Vietnam None of our current preNone of our current pre--deploymentdeployment

training centers are able to accuratelytraining centers are able to accuratelyduplicate Afghanistans altitude andduplicate Afghanistans altitude and

terrain so units arrive unpreparedterrain so units arrive unprepared A school in theater would better prepareA school in theater would better prepare

line infantry units for the rigors they willline infantry units for the rigors they willendure during their deploymentendure during their deployment


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Long TermLong Term


Improve BottomImprove Bottom--Up Information FlowUp Information Flow

Better unfiltered contact between soldiersBetter unfiltered contact between soldiers

at the tactical level and decision makers atat the tactical level and decision makers at

the strategic levelthe strategic level

Only a network can defeat a networkOnly a network can defeat a network

Better dissemination and promotion ofBetter dissemination and promotion of

tactical academiatactical academia--style journalstyle journalsubmissions from Captains and belowsubmissions from Captains and below


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Long TermLong Term


Sustainable ANSF training based on the levelSustainable ANSF training based on the level

of technology they will be relying uponof technology they will be relying upon

Who will provide air support and logistics after weWho will provide air support and logistics after we

are gone?are gone? Shifting their focus to dismounted, light infantryShifting their focus to dismounted, light infantry

missionsmissions their lighttheir light--skinned vehicle convoys areskinned vehicle convoys are

soft, easy targetssoft, easy targets

Strengthening their NCO corpsStrengthening their NCO corps Current Embedded Tactical Training TeamsCurrent Embedded Tactical Training Teams

(ETTs) are inconsistent in quality and level(ETTs) are inconsistent in quality and level

of knowledge and experienceof knowledge and experience


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Long TermLong Term


I didnt carry out my tactics in Malaya byI didnt carry out my tactics in Malaya by

raising masses of local troops and puttingraising masses of local troops and putting

them all in British uniforms and giving themthem all in British uniforms and giving them

enormous loads to carry so that they becameenormous loads to carry so that they becamecompletely immobile. We did it by equippingcompletely immobile. We did it by equipping

them and training them as near as possiblethem and training them as near as possible

to the enemy they had to compete with in ato the enemy they had to compete with in a

particular terrain. This applied not only toparticular terrain. This applied not only tolocal forces but also to British units.local forces but also to British units.

Field Marshal Templer, 1968Field Marshal Templer, 1968


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Long TermLong Term


An Air Force platform that is designedAn Air Force platform that is designed

specifically to move slowly and supportspecifically to move slowly and support

infantry movementsinfantry movements

Need more ANeed more A--10C Warthogs or AC10C Warthogs or AC--130s in130s in

theatertheater

Greater focus on current conflict thanGreater focus on current conflict than

present allocations allowpresent allocations allow


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The tactical war in Afghanistan is entirelyThe tactical war in Afghanistan is entirely

WINNABLE. The points discussed in thisWINNABLE. The points discussed in this

briefing are purposely apolitical and arebriefing are purposely apolitical and are

simply meant to highlight changes we cansimply meant to highlight changes we can

make right now with existing technology,make right now with existing technology,

resources, and personnel as the fightingresources, and personnel as the fighting

force built to win our Nations wars.force built to win our Nations wars.

ConclusionConclusion


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QuestionsQuestions

Afghan - Seizing the Initiative

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