Afghan Media Consumption Among Glaswegian Diaspora

Afghan Media Consumption Among Glaswegian

Diaspora

A Quantitative Study

Sanjar Qiam, MSc

Centre for Cultural Policy Research

University of Glasgow

01, August 2008

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Table of Contents

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………… 03

Literature Review ………………………………………………………………….. 05

Methodology ………………………………………………………………. 16

The Research Process ……………………………………………… 17

Survey Findings and Analysis …………………………………………………….. 21

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………. 36

Appendix …………………………………………………………………………... 38

Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………….. 40

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Introduction

This study of the Afghan community in Glasgow examines media

usage and patterns of audience habits with a focus on

consumption of ‘Afghan Media’1. The survey data is the basis of

the analysis that links diasporic Afghans with mass media. The

research project also aims to analyse media and consumption

variations on the basis of the demographic data to determine

the affect of gender, class, ethnicity and UK social

structure.

The experience of diasporic identity is central to the Afghan

community of Glasgow. The intensification of Islamic identity

1 Afghan media is referred to all media contents produced for Afghans; itcould be by Afghan producers inside or outside Afghanistan or byinternational broadcasters inside or outside Afghanistan. The literaturereview provides a detailed breakdown into five tiers to what is referred toas Afghan Media. see pages 14 - 153 | P a g e

in Afghanistan and the wider Muslim world, and the response of

the global community, in particular Britain, have resulted in

the creation of a diasporic Islamism with similar features to

Afghan Islamism but different political goals2.

Glaswegian Afghans are members of a British minority that

remains socially, culturally and economically disadvantaged

with low economic efficiency as well as low life standards in

a national comparison.3 The community has also established

substantial differences to its home country in their way of

living. The impact of media on such a group is, in many ways,

an interesting focus of study. The identity of Afghans in

Glasgow is shaped and transformed by their location, language,

religion, culture and position in history. The significance of

their presence in British society, which has vastly different

cultural and material consumption and organisation, is

overwhelmed by the diapora’s self-construction both through

media consumption and the identity they brought with them.

‘Diasporism’ is the most significant identity determinant of

Afghans in Glasgow. Among many other aspects of life,

experiences of sexuality and gender differ drastically in the

UK from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the attitude of Glaswegian

Afghans to both remain conservative, changing little from

those brought with them from Afghanistan. Social class also

constitutes an axis of multiple attributions for Glaswegian

Afghans. Class belonging is related to their background in

Afghanistan, because of the immediacy of immigration

experience. The Glaswegian Afghans surveyed here are first2 On Afghan diasporas’ aspirations and views see pages 31 3 Scotland 2001 Census 4 | P a g e

generation immigrants of the last fifteen years. They

predominantly come from a middle class Afghan background,

mostly with a strong element of rural identity, thus forming

part of the lower working class in Glasgow.

It is particularly interesting to study the diasporic media

consumption in the context of the post Taliban media boom. The

diaspora has become a commercial and political marketing tool:

the BBC established an international Persian television4

channel in 2008 with a budget of £15m per annum to cater to

the Persian speaking community worldwide and the US government

has given more than £10 million to Voice of America’s Farsi

television station5 and a further £ 8 million to improve Radio

Farda6. In addition, a joint television station of Afghanistan,

Tajikistan and Iran is due to be launched soon to cater for

regional and transnational audience (Media news, 2008).7 Afghan

private media has also developed strategies and mediums to

reach the diasporic audience. Diaspora participation in Afghan

media is seen as commercially gainful. The Pashtoon television

station, Khyber, is the first of its kind in Afghanistan,

4 Nigel Chapman Director of BBC international on Persian TELEVISION, Retrieved July 28, 2008, from http://er.bsysmail.com/go.asp?/.pages.071025.overtoyou/bBBC001/u05ZZA/x6IFV51

5 AboutFast facts of VoA Farsi TVTELEVISION, Retrieved July 28, 2008, from http://www.voanews.com/english/About/FastFacts.cfm

6 About Radio Farda in English, Retrieved July 28, 2008, from http://www.radiofarda.com/inenglish.aspx

7 Media News in Farsi, Retrieved July 28, 2008, from http://www.medianews.ir/fa/2008/07/09/persian-language-tv.html 5 | P a g e

Pakistan and worldwide. The station aims not to be attached to

a locality and to appeal to a global Pashtoon audience.8

Diasporas are politically seen as agents whose influence could

result in political and religious moderation. The transformed

identity of diaspora is perceived as multiplicity of

crossovers and mixes. Numerous Afghan media outlets have

received grants from various sources to target and integrate

diaspora in Afghan ‘mediascapes’. The injection of diasporic

diversity and perceived liberal Islamic views could persuade

Afghans in the home country to ease their views of Islam and

allow for a more circumstantial interpretation. The image of

an Afghan businesswoman in western dress driving a sports car

to a multi national mosque in London could affect an Afghan

man’s attitude toward his wife who rarely leaves home and

never without a man.

The media representation of the diaspora with the political

weight attached to it creates ‘mediascapes’ of imaginary

homelands. The mediascapes according to Marie Gillespie

(Gillespie 1995: 24) become the site of desires for change

which are transferred to the living ‘ethnoscapes’.

I developed an interest in Glasgow’s Afghan community after

moving to the city to undertake an MSc. in media management.

During my stay in Glasgow and through social observation I was

struck by how the Afghan community had remained culturally

more traditional, with conservative Islamo-political views

8 About Khyber TVTELEVISION, Retrieved July 28, 2008, from http://www.avtkhyber.com/website/about.htm 6 | P a g e

when compared to some parts of Afghan civil society9 and

Afghans I know in Kabul. This contradiction between identity

principals and the structure of cultural sphere of Glasgow

encouraged me to explore how media tastes and patterns shapes

diasporic Afghan character. Theories of identity formation and

the effect of culture in the process are well rehearsed in

cultural literature. I wanted to study the use of media among

Afghan diaspora and then connect the findings with the

theories of mass media and identity relation.

I chose Glasgow as a sample to survey diasporic Afghan media

habits. The research question I asked was: Do Diasporic Afghans use

mass media to sustain their shared sense of identity? The methodology used

in this research aims to link the micro social issues of

routine media consumption with the macro diasporic issues of

identity and culture.

Literature Review

Diaspora is a sense of dual belonging; a physical connection

with the territory of residence and a bond, often cultural,

with another nation. Afghan diaspora in the UK is a dispersed

group made up of those who arrived in the UK during the three

9 Afghan civil society is a loose term and different to what is commonlyknown as civil society. It is best described as a group which is not purelyinspired by Islamic sentiments, unlike the government. Afghan civil societyis the space which has embraced the most diverse actors. The institutionalactors include NGOs, media, women's organizations, business associations,individual academics and writers, coalitions and advocacy groups. Thefunction of this group is administered liberally in comparison with stateand clergy sponsored institutions. 7 | P a g e

decades of war, seeking work and better living conditions.

Cohen argues that the voluntary or involuntary dispersal of

emigrants can lead to an idealization of the country they have

left possibly combined with a collective memory and myth about

it (Cohen, 1997:172). Sporadic media articles could be found

with heated expression of nationalism by diasporic Afghans

although it is hard to investigate further largely due to a

lack of statistical information about diasporic Afghans’

patterns of nationalism. However, diasporic communities

throughout Europe continue to rely on imagined communities

which are usually closely connected with already existing

national states, some of which, e.g. Turkey and Algeria,

actively attempt to retain the emigrated population’s

connection to the homeland (Pedersen, 1999: 64).

Cohen (Cohen, 1997: 180) defines diasporic relationship as a

strong and long-lasting ethnic group consciousness, which may

be extended to include other members of the same ethnic group

residing in other countries. A problematic relationship to the

society in which they now live is similarly often found.

The issue of diasporic identity within the western world has

moved to the front of the political debates in the last few

years. Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka, 2003: 198) argues that the

largest feature underlying the debate and current

controversies surrounding migration are the themes of culture

and identity, citizenship and loyalty.

The role of media in forging collective identity has long been

realised and used. David Morley has noted the role of radio in

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sustaining the British Empire. In his Christmas 1932 message

to the Empire, transmitted on the BBC, King George V said “I

speak now from my home and my heart to all of you. To men and

women so cut off by snows, the desert or the sea that only

voices out of the air can reach. To all, to each, I wish a

Happy Christmas.” Here we see one aspect of the crucial role

of broadcasting in forging a link between the dispersed and

disparate listeners and the symbolic heartland of national

life, and of it is role in promoting a sense of communal

identity. (Morley, 2000: 105). Nikos Papasterdiadis has argued

that when communities and nations are dispersed, their social

meanings and values change. In such circumstances ‘the symbols

and narratives of the nation can only resonate if they are

admitted to the chambers of the home’ (Papasterdiadis, 1998:

4).

There is a direct correlation between diaspora media usage and

their wider social condition. The negative valuation of

British social space can have important consequences for media

use. In Moores’ (Moores, 1996: 47) study of a British Asian

family, the father had explicitly agreed to install satellite

television as a bribe to keep his young sons indoors within

the safe boundaries of the home and family unit. Clearly, the

father sees more moral value in satellite television than in

the social space of Britain, adding the growing concerns about

the dangers posed to young children by strangers in the UK.

Christiansen (Christiansen, 2004: 194) argues that families

from ethnic minority are far less likely to watch the national

channels of their present society, due to their greater9 | P a g e

tendency to watch satellite television. This was confirmed by

British (Gillespie, 1995; Gillespie and Cheesman, 2002),

Sweden (Weibull and Wadbring, 1998), Germany (Eckardt, 1996)

and Denmark (Carøe and Sell, 2000) supplemented with

quantitative investigations by Mikkelsen (Mikkelsen, 2001). In

Sweden, ownership of satellite dishes is reported to be up to

twice as frequent among ethnic minorities (Weibull and

Wadbring, 1998: 54). Audiences of transnational media can have

varied motives and interests for consuming material produced

behind their national boundaries. In a survey of Bulgarians’

motives for adopting satellite television, Maria Bakardjieva

concludes that they range from “understanding of the Truth”,

to learning about “the aesthetics of the world” (Bakardjieva,

1992: 448). One thing is clear: satellite technology generates

a “tension zone” between the local, daily environment and the

screen reality. ‘The local environment is often seen

fleetingly, where global events – war in Iraq ... are

portrayed as coherent, if often violently foreshortened

visions for our gaze’; ‘the irony is that the general becomes

clear through [media] representation whereas the immediate is

subject to the fragmenting effects of our limited experience’

(Peters, 1997: 82); John Durham Peters call this the “Bifocal

Vision” (Peters, 1997: 79-81).

The tension which could potentially grow from media and spread

throughout various elements of diasporic social life is only

strengthened by the irreconcilability of international media

and local environment. This tension is triggered by the

general lack of satisfaction that diaspora gain from local

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programmes. The study of ethnic minority views of British

broadcasting conducted by James Halloran (Halloran 1995: 23)

reported considerable dissatisfaction from British media among

diaspora.

Another similar study conducted by Sreberny and Ross of a

Bangladeshi group in Burnley found strong preference for cable

and satellite services. One respondent express his preference:

“these new cable companies have got Asian programmes, the BBC

will have to catch up … compared with cable the BBC is forty

years behind” (Sreberny and Ross, 1995:50).

A survey of British viewers conducted by the Independent

Television Commission found that ethnic minority households

were more likely than white British to access overseas media,

even though British media such as BBC2 had introduced several

Asian casted programmes (Cumberbatch and Woods, 1994: 20).

A diasporic group whose economic and cultural conditions vary

and who differ from the mainstream host society are less

likely relative to the host society to consume mainstream

media. The social positioning of the Afghan diaspora in

Glasgow and their contribution to local society need to be

understood in order to explain their media consumption. Media

consumption is portrayed by Christiansen as a social practice

in which a complex problem area such as multiculturalism and

immigrants’ social integration appears in concrete form

(Christiansen, 2004: 203). We can usefully explore the

relationship between patterns of media consumption and

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patterns of residence (Morley, 2000: 126). “Mobile

Privatisation” is a framework used by Raymond Williams

(Williams, 1989: 26) to explain activities which are centred

within the physical boundaries of residence, which is

different than retreating privitisation ‘It is not living in a

cut off way’(Williams, 1989: 26) James Carey (Carey 1989) has

studied the effect of media technologies in reshaping

‘communities … not in place, but in space, mobile, connected

across vast distances by appropriate symbols, forms and

interestes’ (Carey, 1989:160). Technologies provide the

“mobility” means, however the locality drives and directs it

or, in Williams phrase, the locality drives the privatisation.

Moores uses the journey analogy for describing media

consupmtion ‘we need to specify the kind of “journeys” that

are made. Who chooses to go where, with whom and why?’

(Moores, 1993: 623). Transnational “journeys” have been

something that has concerned communities and nation states,

espicially among ethnically diverse groups. In Iran and other

Midde Eastern and Central Asian countries, the possession of

satellite dish (DBS) is a criminal offense. DBS and

international viewership is not only the concern of oppressive

regimes but to show it is a source of concern in western

liberal democracy I quote part of French Ministry of Social

Affairs report:

The number of DBS (satellite dishes) is constantly

growing, particularly in banieues … the various

channels broadcast in Arabic, which could undermine

years of literacy classes and other efforts at

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Gallicising on these people (refering to ethnic

minorities). Moreover, the religious content of

certain programmes will probably increase the

Islamisation of the Banlieues. 10

The compression of time-space for diaspora has different

meanings: the geographical distance of diaspora not only

shapes the consumption of media but also forms the politics of

culture. A study of television viewing by Green in remote

parts of Australia shows how physical distances of audience

retain a clear and obvious pertinence. The introduction of

satellite television to remote and regional Australia

connected the country: as one of the respondents put it “as it

is now, the rest of Australia could disappear and we’d be the

last to know. The lack of outside communication in the town is

very frustrating and tends to make the town insular and self-

centred” (Green, 1998: 32) the mean of communication effects

time-space in this remote area in a way that is distinct from

the rest of the country with peculiar consequences for the

local community.

Given the tribal and rural structure of Afghanistan; it is ‘a

society exclusively dependent on oral communication, in which

there is no sense of time separate from space, it is

impossible to conceive of remote strangers as consociates:

their very distance in space allocates them to a

correspondingly different status in time’ (Narvaez, 1986:

10 cited in Morely 2000: 157

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129). When member of a rural society like Afghanistan disperse

across the globe, the space created between the individual and

the consociates is not separated by time largely due to modern

communication technologies that function as a “contractionist”

medium creating a sense of spatially continuous locality.

The conflict in Afghanistan has not come to any solution,

despite attempts by international community to achieve peace.

The situation is made even harsher by natural disasters such

as famine, drought and internal displacement. Wars and

poverty are two of the root causes of Afghan immigration to

Britain. Much of Afghan immigration to the UK today has been

motivated by what David Harvey (Harvey, 1989: 4) calls

“flexible accumulation” and other such contemporary modes of

globalizing capital (Clifford 1994, 331). However, just as

there was a distinction to be drawn in the historical diaspora

between the entrepreneurial “middlemen minorities” and the

“proletarians”, there are two kinds of class relations

involved here (Esman 1986, 336-37). Thus, at one level,

diasporic movement is a cause of the globalisation of capital

in the sense identified by Joel Kotkin (1992): ‘The continuous

interaction of capitalism with dispersed ethnic groups—not

just the staid history of financial flows or the heroic

stories of nation builders—constitutes one of the critical

elements in the evolution of the global economy’ (Kotkin,

1992: 17). The control over both government projects and

international aid investment in Afghanistan attained by the

“expatriate Afghans” are classic cases in point. Several

ministers, advisors and hundreds of directors have been

14 | P a g e

recruited from Afghans abroad. President Karzai and his

brothers used to live and do business in the US before his

return to Afghanistan. Much of the private media is also owned

by “expatriate Afghans” with the exception of, a handful of

small outlets.

Karim Karim(1998) in his paper presented to the XXI biennial

conference of the International Association for Media and

Communication Research in Glasgow suggested that we can even

think of such diasporic communal networks as ‘a third tier of

inter-regional connections’, after world organizations and

nation-states. Indeed, the Moby Capital group owns Tolo

television, Lemar television, Radio Arman and several

marketing agencies. It was set by three Australian-Afghan

brothers with funding from USAID. An Australian Broadcasting

Corporation (ABC) television report on 13 November 2006 by

Trevor Bormann covers the Australian reared Mohsenis’ family

business: “As well as Tolo TV, they run a radio station,

publish a magazine, and there are plans for a million dollar

feature movie.” Bormann adds “This from a family with

absolutely no media experience anywhere else.” The Mohsenis

did not work in media in Australia, in attempting to explain

their success Bormann offers “… with the help of a new

generation of entrepreneurs, schooled and skilled abroad”.

Ariana Television and the Afghan Wireless Communication

Company are owned by an Afghan-American. At this level,

diasporic membership can be “a source of real power, both

political and economic, in the world system” (Friedman 1997,

85), and ‘diasporic consciousness and style of life well

15 | P a g e

adapted to the new opportunities presented by globalization’

(Cohen 1997, 165).

Yet, for many Afghans, their diasporic movement is an effect

of global investment patterns and international inequalities.

For instance among the Afghan community of Glasgow there are a

few dozen Afghans who avoided deportation after their requests

to remain in Britain were refused. They found employment in

black labour market, usually in the construction and food

industry, and attempted to make as much money as possible

before being caught and sent back to Afghanistan. Among them

is a university graduate who finished a Master degree at the

University of Glasgow. Such structured class and economic

differences are in tension with mythic notions of common

ethnic origins and cultural belonging (Sinclair and

Cunningham, 2000: 21). The situation of Afghan illegal workers

in Glasgow and other major British cities could be best

explained in the framework of global capital and ‘flexible

accumulation’. David Morley writes on the issue of post-

modern, upper-class ‘migrancy’: the contradiction of people

who have come from dominant-class origins in peripheral

nations and become complicit in “a rhetoric which submerges

the class question and speaks of ‘migrancy’ as an ontological

condition” (Morley 1996, 347). While it might be true that

“the rich also cry” and have their own forms of alienation, it

is clearly a fallacy to identify the diasporic experience

exclusively with the subaltern and to not observe the dangers

of a naive postmodernist culturalism (Sinclair & Cunningham,

2000:18).

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In a New Yorker report on January 20, 2003 Jane Kramer gives an

account of the kind of people from Afghanistan who came to the

UK and the benefits they can potentially bring to their new

society. She writes of a woman named Afsana:

‘Among refugees, England is the destination of

choice. It is doors are ajar, if not entirely open;

it is pockets are deep, if not actually stuffed with

cash; and it is big cities are so polyglot that no

one who survives the trauma of what is by all

accounts a humiliating and very dangerous journey

will find himself entirely alone’.

Afsana is an “immigrant” straight out of the stereotypes. The

arrival of continuous waves of immigrants to the UK, escaping

oppression and war and looking for a better life, has been a

matter of concern for the British Home Office and wider public

opinion. The burden placed on the welfare system by immigrants

leads to a popular belief that Britain is being targeted by

the poor.

It is almost impossible for ordinary Afghans to make it to the

UK. The journey is long, dangerous and full of traps, if using

the services of a human trafficker, fees in excess of £ 6000

are required and often out of reach for ordinary Afghans.

Afghans who left the homeland during the war and were granted

residence in the UK were generally rich and resourceful enough

to break the poverty circle and run away. Some Afghan migrants

have made the most of the new opportunities presented to them

in Britain. Kramer reminds us of Afghans, including women, who

17 | P a g e

used the expertise they gained in Afghanistan when they

arrived in Britain:

‘Shakiba Habibula … today, a research fellow at the

London School of Tropical Medicine; Najiba Kasraee … a

producer and writer at the BBC World Service who

broadcasts childrens’s stories to the Farsi speaking

world; Seema Ghani, who came as a medical student and

[now] … devoted herself to an orphanage and a health

clinic for women and children she had founded with her

first British pay check’11

The prolonged conflict in Afghanistan has prioritized the

homeland-diaspora relationship both directly, through family

and friends, and indirectly through media. It appears that

throughout the diasporic cultural history immigrants are

closer to their homeland in times of crisis than in times of

peace. Dona Kolar-Panov (Kolar-Panov, 1996) studied the

Croatian diaspora in Australia in the light of the war in the

former Yugoslavia. The study traces gradual and often nervous

formation and reinvention of Croatian cultural (diasporic)

identity which, in turn, became fully fledged diasporic

nationalism, through the use of media, during Balkan wars.

Further, according to The last few decades have witnessed

numerous bloody ethnic clashes in all four continents diaspora

had played a strong role in most of the clashes; among others.

Khaching Tololyan (Kokot, Tölölyan and Alfonso, 2000) is cited

in Huntingdon (Huntingdon, 1996: 274) “diaspora has played a

major role on both sides of the prolonged struggles between11 Jane Kramer, January 20, 2003, New Yorker report18 | P a g e

Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in supporting Armenians,

Croatians and Chechens in their conflicts. Through television,

faxes and electronic mail, the commitments of diaspora are

reinvigorated and sometimes polarised by constant contact with

their former homes; “former” no longer means what it did”.

The sociocultural influence of media consumption among

diaspora is an issue which deserves some deliberation. I would

caution against a uni-dimensional approach to media influence.

Paddy Scannell argues that the political outlook which

conceives media as a tool of representation as an approach

which “systematically misunderstands and misrecognises it is

object” (Scannell, 1986: 156 and 136) argues that broadcasting

is not to be understood as ‘form of social control… cultural

standardisation or ideological misrepresentation … [but] as a

public good that has unobtrusively contributed to the

democratisation of everyday life most notably through it is

promotion of a “communicative ethos” of more inclusive and

extensive forms of sociability among it is audiences’12.

The relationship between Afghan media and the Afghan diaspora

could be characterised less as one of inclusive sociability

and communicating through a public good medium and more as one

of an obtrusive politicisation. The positive social

contribution of diaspora via Afghan media cannot be understood

unless media is seen as a forum for community representation.

The representational role of transnational media has been

reinforced by the politically driven mushrooming of

international broadcasters and the financially-motivated12 Scannell, 1986:13619 | P a g e

establishment of private channels. Afghan media seeks a

diaspora audience and its participation in order to broaden

their reach. The content of Afghan media discussed below is

yet another indication to the extent it is influenced by power

and politics.

Lila Abu-Lughod argues that transnational television has had a

profound democratising effect in Egypt. Abu Lughod writes that

television’s central importance is that it ‘brings a variety

of vivid experiences of the non-local into the most local of

institutions, the home’ (Abu-Lughod, 1995:191) also confirmed

by Meyrowitz (Meyrowitz, 1985) and Papasterdiadis

(Papasterdiadis, 1998). She notes that when Nobel prize

winning author Naguib Mahfouz lamented the decline of the

traditional public sphere in the form of the Cairo coffee

house, where people would go to listen to storytellers, he

‘forgets that this older form of entertainment, with the

imaginary non-local worlds it conjured up, was only available

for men’ (Abu-Lughod, 1995:191).

Islam is an integral part of Afghan culture and is a strong

element shaping Afghan media content. Diasporic Afghans,

despite their physical distance from Afghanistan, remain

within the meticulous details of Islam. Afghan media provides

the platform for Afghan Islamic discourse in the UK. Afghans

connect through media to discuss faith and to communicate

Islamic practices. Islamic teachings could prevent Afghans

from progressing to assimilate into British society, by

internalising and sharing some of the secular-western values.

Western values, in sharp contrast with Islam and Afghan20 | P a g e

culture, have a strong emphasis on the right of women to

equality, and the right of the individual against conformity,

yet Islam does not grant the individual the right to

personally decide their choice of food, drink, dress code,

behaviour and thought. In British society human rights are

highly regarded as a code of conduct and the individual is the

decider of their own faith. In Islam, human nature and the

rights of conduct are ultimately derived from the final

revelation of Allah to Mohammad as given in Quran. Unlike

Christians and Jews, Muslims live strictly by teaching of

Islam; for instance the first article of Afghan constitution

assures nothing in Afghanistan could be contrary to Islam and

Sharia. Islam is safe from criticism because Islamic states

have outlawed criticism but also the teaching of Islam

prohibits individual Muslims from questioning and allowing

others to question, even in the UK and the rest of Europe.

Islam endorses cruelty13 and deplorable treatment of women is

instructed by Islam on numerous occasions14. The right to free

expression is not substantiated by Islam and censorship is a

common practice in Afghan media. Peter Mandaville argues that

the influence of Islam on diasporic media is not always a

source of threat. The media provides channels for new or

previously disenfranchised voices of Muslim diaspora

13 As for the man or woman who is guilty of theft, cut off their hands to punish them for their crimes. That is the punishment enjoined by Allah. (Quran, Surah 5: 38)

14 Men have authority over women because Allah has made the one superior to other and because they spend their wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient. As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them and them to bed apart and beat them. (Quran, Surah 4:34)21 | P a g e

(Mandaville, 2001:169). Both activists and Islamists have

exploited the media for their own benefit. An outright refusal

of Islam by disenfranchised groups of Muslims might result in

their alienation and a narrower reach of their message, while

an acceptance of Islam as a faith system but allowing moral

autonomy and situational interpretation might be more of a

common practice among diaspora. Peter Mandaville (Mandaville,

2001: 169) argues that media offer spaces for communication in

which the identity, meaning and boundaries of diasporic

community are continually constructed, debated and re-

imagined. Such a role could only be materialised if free and

honest debates are not overshadowed by Islamic principles.

Discretionary discourses, reserving expressions which might be

deemed un-Islamic, by diaspora in media allow the flow of

communication but might not be the place to re-imagine

boundaries.

Of particular interest is how media outlets have made use of

the market potential of the diaspora. Media organisations have

created markets out of dislocated peoples, even if it is

assumed that diaspora redefine their cultural identities in

hybrid terms. The dichotomy of Afghanistan and British

diasporic media cultures develop in the intersection of

national, regional and transnational spaces. I divide the

media used by the Afghan diaspora, under the term Afghan

media, into five tiers:

National: produces content in and for Afghanistan also

made available to diaspora through technologies. Example:

Ariana, Tolo and Tamadon television stations22 | P a g e

International: produced by foreign media organisations

for Afghans in and outside Afghanistan. Example: BBC

Persian, RFE/RL, Ashna

Transnational: interpreting the mainstream for Global

audience. Ariana in US, Farda in Sweden

Local: interpreting the mainstream for a diasporic

locality – example Radio Ariana Holland.

Community: produced locally in Afghanistan: Radio Zafar,

Radio Amu, Radio Sahar and etc; available for the locality

in Afghanistan through FM signal and globally on the

internet for smaller diasporic unit – a specifically

locally affiliated version of diaspora.

Afghan media of each tier are of various sizes, levels of

professionalism, success and lifespan. They employ different

technologies and have different entrepreneurial, cultural and

political goals. What they all have in common is that they

address Afghans or a particular ethnic, linguistic or

religious group.

Afghan media, produced and targeted at national market, is

influenced by diasporic culture. The most popular television

programme in Afghanistan - Afghan Star15 – is an imitation of

Britain’s ‘The X Factor’. Afghan television schedules, copying

popular western genre, and are full of reality shows, soap

operas and paranormals. Television stations such as Tolo and

Ariana, set the standard for style and genre and are run and

owned by diasporic Afghans. The managers of the television15 http://www.afghanstar.tv 23 | P a g e

stations are influenced by western media which they have been

exposed to since childhood. When any of these television

stations are launching a new programme, it is often inspired

by western programme ideas. Quite often the television station

brings an Afghan or foreign media consultant who lives in the

west to oversee the initial launch period. The projection of a

pro-modern tenor is partly a populist approach to increase

ratings but also another method of self-censorship, something

regularly practiced by media. Serious current affairs

programmes such as 6.30 and Haqiqat on Tolo and Ariana

stations have caused tension on several occasions with the

authorities and warlords. Stations and producers of

investigative programmes have been threatened and harassed

when programmes challenge an authority, Nassir Faiz producer

of Haqiqat programme is currently in the custody of NDS

(National Department for Security) a move condemned and

labelled illegal by the Afghan parliament too. Entertainment

programmes, on the other hand, are raising little social,

governance or cultural controversy. It is more often at a

‘soft’ entertaining level. In the short term, self-censorship

helps to avoid conflict but in the long run, as Silverstone

argues, it gives rise “to anti-politics of withdrawal from the

public sphere … of conformity, self-interest and exclusion”.

(Silverstone, 1997:14)

Methodology

Do Diasporic Afghans use mass media to sustain their shared sense of identity?

Acquiring a reasonable answer needs more than theoretical

24 | P a g e

speculation about Afghan diaspora and patterns of media

consumption. The objective of the empirical investigation will

be to analyse media consumption patterns and assess activity

and passivity, choice and control, creativity and constraints.

The research will combine creative problem-solving abilities

with analytic rigour.

Cultural studies, media studies and diasporic theories are

used to supplement the survey questioning. Media audience

studies by scholars such as Stuart Hall and John Fiske having

pioneered the field moved the study to follow the method of

assessing a link between media consumption and cultural

identity. The research uses both qualitative and quantitative

methods of investigation. The study benefited from a

questionnaire method of reaching a larger number of

informants, and, therefore, evidence based legitimacy for the

findings The questionnaire was distributed using a random

probability sampling method: meaning, data was collected from

those who volunteered.

The research involved 47 respondents in the survey. The data

was used to make analysis of how the media consumption

patterns can vary within diasporic audience. A smaller group

of 3 people were interviewed to collect qualitative data. The

aim of the open-ended interviews was to complement the

analysis drawn from quantifiable information, as well as

understanding the underlying reasons for audience habits.

Interviews were unstructured but, wherever possible, focused:

interview schedules were not used but nor was the open to

25 | P a g e

indefinite length. The purpose of the interview was to gather

insights in order to make better sense of the data collected

by the survey.

Media is at the centre of culture in contemporary social life,

and this is particularly true for diapsoras. The survey

questions aimed to understand the context of media use. The

research questions are designed to find as much information as

possible about informers’ creative lives. The questionnaire

(see Appendix pp. 38) covers, among other things, personal

communication, cultural and media venues, taste and

preferences, social activities, media product ownership and

social contacts. The first part of questionnaire was designed

to acquire personal data, in order to construct a demographic

analysis, to address the difference between lower class and

middle class diaspora media consumption and tribal politics,

the effect of assimilation and secular notions of equality.

In conducting the research, lessons learned from previous work

to produce analysis in a particular locale was taken into

consideration. For example the work of (Gillespie 1995);

(Lull 1988b, 1991); (Gray, 1992); (Hobson, 1980) and (Morley,

1986).

Any quantitative approach to audience study is hindered by

generalisation. No sampling quantitative method could be

developed to reach the entire target. The use of qualitative

method, along with cultural and diasporic theories has reduced

the reliance on quantitative findings. The qualitative method

offers a different perspective to the study of the audience,

26 | P a g e

i.e. the active choice of the consumer. In order to make any

diasporic and cultural analysis of Glaswegian Afghans’ media

consumption, it is imperative to assess the recreational

meaning of media content for the audience. The recreational

use of the audience is informed by different processes through

which the audience appropriate, accept and reject the media.

In fact, the connection of both qualitative and quantitative

findings with macro issues such as politics, economics,

culture and language could be more valid by observing and

investigating the creativity and underlying assumptions in

audience choice. Qualitative and quantitative methods are

interwoven in this research. Observational interviews offer

individual insights while the survey data generalises the

group’s media patterns.

For the purpose of this study, the diasporic Afghan is aged

over 18 and includes both men and women. The participants are

drawn from both the working and middle classes with the

knowledge of one of Afghan languages, Farsi or/and Pashto. The

Farsi language dialect spoken in Afghanistan is referred to as

Dari or Farsi-Dari. In this research, I refer to it as Farsi.

The choice of city was made on the basis that Glasgow has the

largest Afghan community in Scotland. Glasgow is also the city

where I study and I have the most knowledge of among British

cities.

The Research Process

The questionnaire proved to be an intimidating method to

survey Afghan diaspora. Only those who personally knew the

27 | P a g e

questionnaire administrator or were outgoing to bond and talk

in a first encounter responded less hesitantly. Informants

were specifically intimidated by the depth the survey was

investigating: they were happy to talk about scattered bits

and pieces of their media usage, but some of them hold back

when alerted by the curiosity of the researcher to investigate

further. Some informants’ reservations to share their

experiences in depth was apparent in both the questionnaires

and interviews. It would be safe to state that the use of

structured interviews as an alternative to questionnaires

would have also been hindered by hesitance of some informants.

Having that said, it is worth mentioning that the Afghan

community in Glasgow is probably fairly resentful towards

questionnaires and forms, this relates to their broader

experience of dealing with British bureaucracy as asylum

seekers, Afghans have to fill out a lot of forms, while they

come from a communal culture where state bureaucracy does not

exist or is not of concern to them. Filling out forms is a

collective activity for most Afghans and assistance is

provided by the Afghan Scottish Society. Volunteers help

fellow Afghans to fill out forms for employment, migration,

social benefits, health care, housing and other requirements

Although an attempt was made to make the questionnaire short

and compact, a shorter version might have gathered more

responses at the cost of shallow analysis of the group media

usage.

Group over-politeness in the preparatory stage of research

tended to raise false expectations of the number of28 | P a g e

respondents who might take part in the research. It was

initially thought that around 100 respondents could be

reached. It was wrongly understood that the group is open and

available to provide information due to the cultural

expectations of a helpful behaviour. A culturally determined

mindset among those participating in the survey can also

encircle a group determined “reasonable” response, ignoring

evaluation based on personal beliefs. Such rationalisation of

responses results in gathering ungenuine data, a risk that the

study bears.

A total of one hundred and fifty respondents were identified

in and around Glasgow who could be reached by questionnaires.

Majority of which, forty seven respondents participated in the

survey. The majority of respondents were Pashtoon. Majority of

Afghans living in Glasgow, although are Pashtoons, other

ethnic groups such as Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and Baluch also

took part. Attempts were made to include families from

different social classes, but the educated middle-class, by

Afghanistan standards, was the group most willing to take

part. It was more difficult to reach women, and the women

surveyed are those who either have a responsibility outside

home or are outgoing and influential housewives. It was hard

to reach women through their husbands, though some success was

achieved. Husbands were confident that they could speak for

their wives and women in general, and seeking women’s views

brought little contribution to the survey when balanced

against the time and effort to get in touch with them.

Youngsters under 18 were not included in the survey when

29 | P a g e

designed, nevertheless it proved easier to access youngsters

and they were more communicative and open than their parents.

All questionnaires returned were in Farsi, English

questionnaires were not preferred by respondents.

Figure 1: Surveyee Profile

ID

#

AGE SEX OCCUPATION YEARS IN THE

UK1 48 M ARCHITICT NO RESPONSE2 23 M STUDENT 23 24 F STUDENT NO RESPONSE4 25 F STUDENT NO RESPONSE5 37 F UNEMPLOYED 76 35 M PhD ECONOMICS NO RESPONSE7 43 M PhD LITERATURE NO RESPONSE8 32 M STUDENT NO RESPONSE9 NO RESPONSE NO RESPONSE NO RESPONSE 610 45 F HOUSEWIFE NO RESPONSE11 42 M UNEMPLOYED NO RESPONSE12 22 M STUDENT NO RESPONSE13 31 M SHOPKEEPER NO RESPONSE14 48 M UNEMPLOYED NO RESPONSE15 21 M STUDENT NO RESPONSE16 51 M PENSIONER NO RESPONSE17 31 F UNEMPLOYED NO RESPONSE18 30 M UNEMPLOYED 519 47 M UNEMPLOYED 120 65 M PENSIONER 121 47 M UNEMPLOYED 922 19 F STUDENT NO RESPONSE23 24 M SOLDIER 2024 26 M NO RESPONSE 1425 23 M UNEMPLOYED 826 36 M DRIVER 8

30 | P a g e

ID

#

AGE SEX OCCUPATION YEARS IN THE

UK27 32 M SHOPKEEPER NO RESPONSE28 56 F FORMER DOCTOR NO RESPONSE29 30 M ARCHITICT 1230 44 M BUSINESSMAN 131 42 M DRIVER NO RESPONSE32 34 M UNEMPLOYED 933 25 M UNEMPLOYED 1234 48 F HOUSEWIFE NO RESPONSE35 20 M STUDENT 236 52 M FORMER ARMY OFFICER NO RESPONSE37 22 M STUDENT 238 45 M SHOPKEEPER 1039 NO RESPONSE M WRITER 340 31 M INTERPRETER 841 21 M UNEMPLOYED 542 28 M DRIVER NO RESPONSE43 36 M MECHANIC 1244 34 M DRIVER 445 29 F HOUSEWIFE 746 41 M CARPENTER 947 28 F HOUSEWIFE 12

The research includes three open interviews. Three out of six

originally contacted came forward to participate after

anonymity was ensured. Interviewees had previous acquaintance

with the researcher and were first contacted by telephone.

Three declined the request on the assumption that they did not

have much information to share about their media use. Two

potential interviewees with no previous acquaintance with the

researcher are among those contacted. They raised more

31 | P a g e

concerns than those with prior acquaintance. Although

informants were assured of the anonymity, they asked questions

such as: ‘Do you need to record our names and addresses. Will

anything we say affect our status in the UK? Why do you need

to record us? Will the University of Glasgow share it with the

Home Office?’ Particular concerns were raised about any knock

on effect of the information provided by respondents, whose

asylum cases are still awaiting responses, regarding their

state in the UK as refugees and the case they had presented to

the Home Office. One of the interviewees said

‘the case I have presented to home office is a complex

retell of my life; they [Home Office] are reviewing my

asylum request for the last two years and I have to go

for questioning every month and provide the same

answers every time to similar but differently asked

questions… every month they seek information on me and

I do not want them to find anything new. It could

negatively affect me and my family here.’

They were also concerned about being recorded despite the

fact they were assured it was for the researcher’s own

reference. As a result, it was decided not to record

interviews and instead relied on note-taking during

sessions which came as a relief for those participating in

interviews. Concerns of potential interviewees were not

limited to practical personal information. Some expressed

doubts about the outcome of the research despite it being

explained to them that the information was to be used

solely for the purpose of the researcher’s degree32 | P a g e

requirements. It was asked whether the interviews benefit

them and Afghans in anyway. Those who consented to be

interviewed were at ease to speak openly. Interviews were

carried out in public places during or after a social

event. The choice of location helped to keep the

interviewee at comfort and consequently open, but it also

made it difficult to keep him focused. The interviews, on

average, lasted ninety minutes. All interviews were carried

out in Farsi.

Figure 2: Interviewee Profile

Interviewee A Interviewee B Interviewee

CResidence

PlaceGlasgow Glasgow Glasgow

Origin in

AfghanistanLogar Sarobi Parwan

Gender M M MAge 38 26 42Language Pashto/Farsi Pashto Farsi

Occupation Taxi DriverJobless,

Graduate

Jobless,

PoetEthnicity Pashtoon Pashtoon TajikResidence in

UK7 years 2 years 10 years

Survey Findings and Analysis

33 | P a g e

Glaswegian Afghans who took part in the survey are of a wide

age group with the youngest being 19 years old and the oldest

65 years old. The median age of participants was 32 years old.

The median is the middle age in the age range of respondents -

an equal number of older group falls above it as well as an

equal number of younger groups below it. The median age is not

the average age.

Figure 3

Survey participants have lived in Britain from one to twenty

years. The median of respondents’ residence in the UK is eight

years with an average of 10.5 years. The median of UK

residence is the middle number of years the informants have

spent in the UK in the range provided by total respondents.

This proved to be a sensitive or difficult question to ask and

21 respondents did not provide a response.

Figure 4

34 | P a g e

As obvious from ‘Figure 5’ women are underrepresented in this

research for the reasons discussed in the methodology section.

Figure 5

Survey participants come from diverse backgrounds, however the

majority are unemployed or studying. Some respondents were not

sure about their occupation and unwilling to discuss it. This

includes the two largest groups of respondents, i.e.

unemployed and student. They felt that providing their

occupation details along with some other personal information

might compromise their anonymity even if they did not give a

name or address. Most of the unemployed and some of the

students are on a key benefit scheme which officially means

they should not be working while some of them take work in the

unofficial Black labour market or help out with family

businesses. Respondents who identified themselves as a PhD,

student, a former officer or former doctor are effectively

unemployed. They maintain the designations from Afghanistan

because they are perceived as lifestyle rather than job. A

tendency exists among respondents to mention their former

designation as their occupation, but they were encouraged to

only provide one title for their occupation and that it should

be the job they have now.

35 | P a g e

As outlined in the literature review, it was concluded that

there is a strong correspondence, on one hand, between

diaspora occupation and social class and, on the other, media

consumption and lifestyle. On the contrary, the analysis does

not find any noteworthy correlation between occupation and

media consumption or the broader lifestyle. This could be

explained by respondents’ occupational experience in

Afghanistan and the common employment challenges and

opportunities they face in the UK. The group is predominantly

from the rural middle class in Afghanistan but there are some

urban middle class and urban upper working class among the

respondents too. The rural middle class of Afghanistan is

defined as an educated individual who had been to university

in Kabul and could have had a job in Kabul but his family, or

at least a big part of the family, lives in the village and he

would consider the village as home or original home. The rural

middle class tends to be politically and socially

conservative. Respondents have a collective experience where

they had to abandon their former occupations of Afghanistan

while they carry an idealisation and myth about it. Their

struggle to establish their professional careers in the UK has

left most of them unemployed or studying. Some have managed to

find some manual jobs Social benefits in the UK are another

element which influences respondents’ occupation. This did not

exist in Afghanistan and social benefits homogenises groups

professional experiences. The differences between Afghanistan

occupation has been overshadowed by the collective myths and

idealisation. Afghanistan occupations have changed to mythical

36 | P a g e

ideals. A homogenised occupational experience has no

significance on media consumption differences.

Figure 6

Afghan media is heavily consumed by respondents, they reported

using one or another medium to receive Afghan content, with

81% of respondents accessing more than one medium of

television, radio, book, newspaper, magazine or online media.

Twenty one percent used more than three mediums to receive

Afghan contents. Television is by far the most common form of

medium; some 87 percent of respondents come in contact with

Afghan media via Television. Radio is the second most popular

medium with 57% regular access to radio, and 51% read Afghan

books; that are books in Farsi or Pashto from Afghanistan or

about Afghanistan.

37 | P a g e

Figure 7

When asked to name their favourite media outlet, participants

produced a diverse range of outlets. Twenty seven respondents

listed 20 different outlets, the remaining 20 respondents

either did not give a station or it was counted invalid due an

error. The most popular outlet was the BBC, among the first

three choices of which ten respondents. However, the

information about the BBC channel was not specific. It was

also not clear whether respondents were referring to BBC

programmes in English or for Afghanistan, with the exception

of one respondent who stated BBC Scotland. The second most

popular outlet was Ariana television followed by Radio Salam

Watandar. The fourth choice was the British newspaper ‘The

Sun’.

Figure 8

Indicate top three media outlets you

use?  Respondent

Percen

tINVALID 12 26%

BBC 9 19%

38 | P a g e

NO RESPONSE 8 17%ARIANA 7 15%SALAM WATANDAR 4 9%SUN 3 6%SKY 2 4%THE MIRROR 2 4%GUARDIAN 2 4%STV 2 4%ITV 1 2%BAKHTAR 1 2%DAILY MAIL 1 2%METRE 1 2%ARMAN FM 1 2%RADIO WATANDAR 1 2%MUJAHEED 1 2%CAPITAL 1 2%CLYDE 1 2%BBC SCOTLAND 1 2%RADIO FOUR 1 2%RADIO AZADI 1 2% Total Number of outlets 20  

The survey also found that Afghans respondents maintained

extensive personal contact with Afghanistan. 62% telephone

Afghanistan to talk with family and friends at least once a

week and 28% call twice a month. Diasporic contact with

Afghanistan is through both interpersonal communication and

mass media. It is hard to establish the relationship between

the level of Afghan media consumption and the level of

personal communication. The survey data suggests the level of

both British and Afghan media consumption. An analysis of the

39 | P a g e

relation between general media use and personal contact with

Afghanistan yields no particular pattern.

This is an area of interest for those Afghan media outlets

targeting diasporic communities. Given the difficulties of

establishing personal communication, in Afghanistan, the

precariousness of the postal system and mobile phones are also

limited to a few urban centres with low quality and high

costs. Afghan outlets are attempting to bring personal

communication to mass communication, a feature already popular

in Afghanistan and are an important issue of marketing in

order gain diasporic participation. Linking mobile phone and

other forms of person to person communication with mass media

brings revenues to the media outlet. The radio or television

station either charges a premium on the caller or broadcasts

the message for a fee. Personal advertisement in the form of

obituary, classified advertisings, marriage and other ceremony

announcements, and many other public service announcements

(PSA) are a good source of revenue for the stations. This way

the diaspora can contact their families, community and the

radio and television stations with better quality and for a

smaller fee than mobile phone.

In addition to the substitutive relationship between media and

phone communication, there is also the possibility of a

complementary character between media and interpersonal

communication. Interviewee B personal experience describes

such a link:

40 | P a g e

‘I call my family in Afghanistan at least once a week

on average, it could be more frequent but sometimes I

do not talk with my family for up to three weeks… I

call if I hear something in the news; like I called

them last week after seeing reports and pictures of a

suicide attack in Kabul … I wanted to make sure they

were all fine. I know “the sound of the drum is loud

farther” [an Afghan proverb meaning negative events are

amplified in the distance] they [the media] make things

sound worst than they are… it is also useful to keep up

with the news, the family might not tell you all about

the general situation or might not know.’

The extensive interpersonal relations that exist between the

Afghan community in Glasgow and their relatives in Afghanistan

creates a flow of communication and information which places

Afghan media messages and contents of Afghan media about

Afghanistan in a particular context. This extensive

interpersonal link reshapes media content and makes it

relevant to a diasporic context. The effect of such a mediated

media is far greater than an isolated use of media. There is

also a counter explanation for the relationship between

interpersonal connection and extensive Afghan media use by

abandoning the active approach to media use and audience

selectivity and assuming that Glaswegian Afghans are dogmatic

in their media use. Glaswegian Afghans live under certain

cultural and personal circumstances, the effect of

selectivity, choice and personal communication is shaped by

41 | P a g e

diasporic values, beliefs and habit under peculiar cultural

and personal circumstances.

Figure 9

Survey participants were heavy media users: thirty three – or

70% of- respondents consume more than 50 hours of media a

week.. Twenty eight percent of respondents used more than 40

hours of Farsi and Pashto media a week, while 23 percent use

used more than forty hours of English media and 32% use

between 30 to 39 hours. Fifty three percent of respondents

consumed a mix of languages, predominantly Farsi and Pashto

with English or another foreign language.

42 | P a g e

Figure 10

The extent of media use is connected with the audience

interpretation of the content. The heavy use of media by

respondents could be explained by a relatively light reading

on content. Interviewee C, while talking about television at

his home, said:

‘The television set at home is switched off for a good

part of the day but my wife switch it on in the

afternoons to watch her favourite soap… it is on in the

evening and watching television is a family activity in

the evenings. I try minimising kids viewing in the

evening and my wife try to keep occupied with chores

during the day so she does not get stuck with the

television. Television in this country could be a waste

of time, newly arrived families with no job and not

many friends here spend most of their time watching

television… children and my wife watch television on

holidays and weekends.’

43 | P a g e

From what C is describing it could be understood that passive

television viewers spend more time than interpretive and

engaged viewers. Similarly, women and children who seem to be

reading less on television are more frequent viewers. The

questionnaire cross tabulation also showed a tendency among

female participants towards slightly more frequent media use.

The table below shows the use of media according to

respondents’ gender. On average, women consume 34.5 hours of

media per week Compared to men who, on average, use 25 hours

of media. Figure 10 shows the relationship between gender and

time spent with media.

44 | P a g e

*40 Hour s or mor e m ore = 49 bas ed on th e 9 numb er differen t betwee n each c oded val ue

**less t han 9 = >1

*** Valu e averag e for ba nd A is driven f rom aver age of 2 0 and 49 hours

Value av erage fo r band B is driv en from average of >1 to 29 hour s

Value av erage fo r band C is driv en from average of 0

Figure 1 1

Glaswegian Afghans have a distinct relationship to that media

content aimed at diaspora. The production of such content and

text is isolated from the consumption. On the other hand, the

broader British media is more connected with everyday affairs.

Thirty two percent of respondents said they consumed 30 hours

of British media, especially television and video content.

Some 60% of respondents reported owning a collection of

English video CDs or DVDs. Interviewee ‘A’, on the purposes of

his media use, said

‘During the day when I am working I have my car radio

on… tuned to BBC, Clyde or Radio Four. I listen to a

lot of music and try to understand talk shows on Radio

Four to improve my English. When I am home I usually

spend time with children in the living room watching

English television. I often listen to BBC Afghanistan

or another Pashto or Dari station [alone]… I would like

to stay aware of Afghanistan issues and the coverage in

45 | P a g e

British television is bias and for entertainment

purposes of British audience… my wife also listens to

Afghan radio stations during the day.’

It is, perhaps, that British media seems to be more for

entertainment and passing time, but it is also used for

practical purposes too. Throughout the interview with ‘A’, it

became apparent that he used British media, especially radio

in his car, to listen to traffic news, weather forecast, local

events, community information, learning English and general

education. Whereas the use of Afghan media is more like a

ritual, an activity connected with an idealised home. The

content of Afghan media is more subject to interpretation. The

light use of Afghan media could be explained by the concept

put forth above regarding the connection between

interpretation and the extent of media use. Interviewee ‘A’ on

the use of Afghan media added

‘I would like to see my children and other Afghan

children using more Afghan programs. Using Afghan

media would improve their language skills as well as

educate them about their country and people…

especially programs about ethics and morality would

help children grow up as Afghans… a relative of mine

who lives in London records morning programs on

Afghan media for his children. They can not catch up

with the morning programs, because of time

difference. Then he plays the programs for them at

the evening. His children are very polite and kind

and they speak better Dari and Pashto than I do. They46 | P a g e

sometimes imitate radio presenters and talk with a

formal language for example “at this morning press

review program we will look at Kabul morning papers;

Hewad is out this morning in colour print and

broadsheet binding. The front page is editorial” the

children could imitate an entire program. Sometimes

they ask me what editorial is or broadsheet binding

is and I frankly do not know… People who use Afghan

media talk about issues that we would not normally

discuss.’

Both Afghan and British media shape Glaswegian Afghans lives

in ways that extend their characteristic values, and styles

that are already in place. A possible lack of influence of

Glasgow on its Afghan community could be attributed to a

stalled transition of their diapora’s characteristic values.

Survey participants have spent a median of 8 years in the UK,

while only 11% have contact or friendship with white Britons,

an substantial number, 50%, of the respondents are only in

contact with other Afghans while 23% have contact with more

than one social group. Figure 12 displays social contacts

among Afghans.

Diasporic Afghans in Glasgow are starting to shape a

community, similar to other ethnic minorities. The community

is created as a result of social interaction, individuals and

groups with home diasporic Afghan socialise are within their

boundaries and those outside the boundaries directly and often

conversely effects diasporic Afghan. Despite most of the

community members come from educated middle class background47 | P a g e

and they choose to live in a liberal society but their

aspirations and world views are traditional and conservative.

These conservative views are formed in the process of

establishing relationship and interaction with other

individuals and groups in Glasgow. Diasporic Afghans’

aspirations are similar to those of other Muslim minorities

and the general Muslim community. Aspirations of a Glaswegian

Afghan with a university degree and middle class experience in

Afghanistan are contrary to their Afghan counterpart. For

instance, the presence of British troops in Afghanistan is one

of the issues of the most concern to the British Muslim

community and in particular Afghan diaspora. The General

consensus among Glasgow community seems to be in favour of

withdrawing British troops from Afghanistan. Afghan Scottish

Society was among the organisers of Scotland against the war

parade in March 2008. This is sharply different than public

opinion in Afghanistan. A survey conducted in 34 provinces of

Afghanistan by The Asia Foundation (TAF) in 2006 discovered

that the majority of Afghans do not want foreign troops to

leave.

Figure 11

48 | P a g e

Glaswegian Afghans are making good use of media technologies:

38 respondents, 81% of the total participants, own more than

one media device and 43% own more than three media devices

Figure 13 illustrates the ownership of media devices.

From the results of this survey, it appears that media can

smoothly infiltrate traditional groups. The use of media

devices and content reception is predefined as well as other

routine domestic activities including the function of viewing

spaces, children viewing and women access and control of

media. Media could also be hindered by tradition and it is use

limited to certain aspects of it is features. There is also a

positive sides media and it is technologies could challenge

conformity and transform culture when it challenges dogma and

fosters free expression.

49 | P a g e

Figure 12

Value Frequency

Percentag

eMORE THAN ONE MEDIA DEVICE 38 81%Television set 37 79%MORE THAN TWO DEVICES 31 66%VHS/DVD/CD player 28 60%Radio 27 57%Satellite 25 53%Broadband 21 45%MORE THAN THREE DEVICES 19 40%Cable 6 13%NO ANSWER WAS PROVIDED 1 2%

Although respondents said they were extensive media users, at

the same time, they are pluralist in the choice of medium,

channel and language. A little over half of the respondents

used media in English or another foreign language. The single

largest group of respondents used 32% between 30 to 39 hours

per week of English programmes. Respondents were quite

pluralistic about the space and people they use media with:

66% used media alone and with either their family or friends,

while 47% of respondents consumed media alone as well as with

both family and friends. Multiple spaces of media, especially

50 | P a g e

television viewing, allows the audience to appropriate

programmes for each viewing space. All three interviewees used

public home spaces, private spaces and family home space to

view television or video in general depending on the type of

programmes. It became apparent in the course of the

interviews that interviewees refrain from watching unknown and

unrated western television programmes with their families due

to the fear that it may contain sexually explicit scenes or

nudity. All three interviewees, similar to some survey

respondents, watched western made films but preferred watching

alone or with male friends. The television programmes and

channels that are watched collectively at home are confirmed

to be free; of nudity; often not trusted by producer or BBFC

recommendation but personal experiences. British and Western

in general, represented in Hollywood movies, standards of

evaluation of nudity and sex do not seem to be trusted by

interviewees. In the case of unexpected nudity or a sexual

scene, the family male controls the remote and he would fast

forward the video or change the television channel.

The questionnaires also showed the lowest consumption form is

watching western programmes with the family: only 19% of

respondents consume western media in family circles. The

difference in usage is perhaps linked with the apprehension

about the perceived effect of media. A general anxiety was

expressed by interviewees about the effect of media, which

seemed limited to western content. The heavy use of Afghan

media is not perceived as ‘dangerous’ as western media and it

51 | P a g e

is negative effect on vulnerable groups i.e. children and

women.

Figure 13

Respondents are also pluralist in consuming media content;

they have access to a wide and diverse number of media genres

from news and current affairs programmes to art and comedy

programmes. Fifty seven percent of respondents consume more

than five genres of programmes.

52 | P a g e

Figure 14: Type of Media Content Consumed

News and current affairs programmes are the most popular: 81%,

- 38 respondents - stated news and current affairs programmes

in Farsi or Pashto among the genre of programmes they used;

while English news and current affairs programmes were

favoured by 47%. Afghan music programmes were second, with 79

% saying they listened to Afghan music. The third most popular

programme was western-produced feature films with 55%. The

least popular genre was western art and literature with 9%.

The globalisation reach of news programmes showed an

interesting dilemma in this survey. Why is it that Afghan

current affairs programmes that are not produced to target

Glaswegian Afghans, but rather primarily for a homeland Afghan53 | P a g e

audience, how these programmes could attracted an unintended

audience from a better resourced British media? Glaswegian

Afghans are connected to Afghan media because of their

interest in the region. Realities, speculation, trivial events

and rumours are covered differently by Afghan media and

British media and the Afghan coverage appeals to Glaswegian

Afghans. It is not only the cultural meaning of news and

current affairs which differs in a culturally sensitive media

viewing but also the meaning of entertainment, music and

education differs too. Interviewee ‘C’ describes why he

follows news and current affairs.

‘I was not very interested to be aware of events under

Taliban; I decided with myself that the war has been

going on for too long and nothing was changing, same

fighting was continuing day in and day out. Things

have changed now, events in Afghanistan are important

for everyone and in a way it is interesting to listen

to news… once you are a regular news listener then it

become a habit; for me it is a habit.’

The language diversity of Afghanistan is not well represented

in Afghan in all five genres of media including international

broadcasters transmitting into Afghanistan. BBC Afghanistan

and the Afghan state broadcaster RTA (Radio Television

Afghanistan) broadcast a few hours – off peak – for minorities

but the services are said to be underresourced. In interviews,

respondents said that language is an important determinant of

audience loyalty. According to C:

54 | P a g e

‘I usually tune to radio stations which are in Dari,

although I understand Pashto. Some radio stations have

mixed Dari and Pashto programmes which I listen to but

I do not go looking for Afghan programmes in Pashto…

it is easy to understand when the station is in Dari;

I do not like stations which are bilingual; it feels

very crowded in the station.’

Minority languages such as Uzbeki, Turkmani and Baluchi are

not mixed in Afghan media in the same way that Farsi and

Pashto are. Minority languages are spoken by a big part of

Afghan population – for example, Uzbeki is the first language

for around three million Afghans - and a large part of

diaspora. Interviewee C quoted an Afghan Uzbek acquaintance in

Glasgow who watches television programmes from Uzbekistan

because he is comfortable with the language.

Conclusion

In the last few years diasporic Afghans have become even more

interested in Afghan media. This research shows extensive use

of Afghan media by diasporic Afghans in Glasgow. Glaswegian

Afghans also maintain vigorous personal contact with their

relatives in Afghanistan. The apparent reasons are their

interest in affairs of their home country and the

technological improvements which make such a connection both

feasible and cost effective. Nevertheless, the analysis

presented in this research points to a direction with complex

relationship between research informants and media use.

Glaswegian Afghans’ consumption is not taking place in a

55 | P a g e

vacuum but effected by their diasporic experiences and

aspirations. The existence of this context underlies the use

of Afghan media and also an important factor when we try to

understand the effect of media and audience consumption

habits.

Media interpretation is also crucial in the discussion of

diasporic interest and engagement with content and the media

itself. Diasporic society is a tight knit for those who opt to

live within it. The interpersonal connection effects the media

message, it is reshaped to make it relevant for diasporic

problems. The meaning of media content for diaspora depends on

their level of education, occupation and contact with other

diasporic Afghans in Glasgow and with family and friends in

Afghanistan.

Media usage patterns were not found to be connected with

diaspora’s social class in Afghanistan. Contrary to the

emphasis on significance of class in former home and diasporic

identity, outlined in the literature review; no particular

link was found between working class, urban middle class and

rural middle class media consumption. Diasporic Afghans with

various backgrounds from PhDs and writers to students and

labourers used media not much different from each other. This

could be partly due to the small number of survey

participants, preventing the research to find patterns to

group participants. It could be argued that the context of

diasporic audiences have an effect on their media use, perhaps

greater than Afghan class background. The heavier use of media

than the British average as well as the extensive use of56 | P a g e

British media by Afghan diaspora reinforces the significance

of media use context and interpretation. The patterns of

British media use vary between respondents depending on their

professional statue, social interaction and free time. The

context of British media consumption relates to the

interpretation which could be made by audience, their

knowledge of English and attitude to Britain and Afghanistan

are important.

Diasporic Afghan background shapes their identity and cultural

practices in Glasgow. Extensive interpersonal communication

with family and friends in Afghanistan and strong connection

with each other inside Glaswegian Afghan community, have

strong influence on diasporic identity and are as a result of

their Afghan background. Glaswegian Afghans’ experiences and

aspirations bear influence from their Afghan background; the

experiences of the survey written above under the ‘Research

Process’ shows the attitude and sociability of Glaswegian

Afghans maintains Afghanness.

Appendix: Questionnaire

WHICH MEDIA ARE USED BY THE AFGHAN COMMUNITY OF

GLASGOW?

This questionnaire aims to gather data for a survey to explore mediause patterns among Glasgow’s Afghan community. My name is Sanjar Qiam and I am a Master’s student at Centre for Cultural Policy Research (CCPR) in the University of Glasgow. This questionnaire is in connection with the requirements of my dissertation and the data gathered may inform future publications. It will take less than 10

57 | P a g e

minutes of your time to fill this out. If you want to share more about your media use, that would contribute greatly to my study. Further contribution will take the form of interviews; in which caseyour contribution can remain anonymous as in this questionnaire. I will happily call you back to arrange a time at your leisure if you leave your contacts with this questionnaire; alternatively I could be reached on (+44) 079 48 25 4642 or [email protected] ; add: 22 Winton Drive D3, Glasgow, G12 0QA. Please write details

Age: Sex: Occupation:

How long have you been living in UK:

1. Indicate top three media outlets you use?

A.……………………………………………………….B………………………………………………………C……………………………………

Please encircle more than one option if appropriate

2. How often do you call family and friends in Afghanistan?

A. Once a week B. Twice a month C. Once a month D. once every

three months

3. Which ethnic group has the largest number of your UK

contacts and friends?

A. White British B. Afghans C. other ethnic minorities

D. Other, ………..

4. How do you socialise in the UK?

A. With Afghans and in Afghan setting B. With White British and

in Afghan Setting

58 | P a g e

C. With Afghans and in British setting D. With White

British and in British Setting

E. Other, please give detail

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

5. Which of the following media equipment do you have at home?

A. TV set B. VHS/DVD/CD player C. Satellite D. Cable E. Radio

F. Broadband

6. Which Afghan media do you access?

A. TV B. Radio C. Books D.

Newspaper/Magazine E. Online media

Please mark circles as it applies

7. How often do you attend each of the following venues?

Museum Cinema Concert Library Other, ………..

Once a weekOnce a MonthOnce in threemonthsOther, please specify

8. Which of the following media collection do you have at home?

Video Audio Magazine/Newspaper

Books Other, ………..

FarsiPashtoEnglishOther, please specify

59 | P a g e

9. How many hours of media in each of the following languages do you use in a week?

40 Hours or more

Between 30 to 39

Between 20 to 29

Between 10 to 19

Less than 9

Farsi and PashtoEnglishArabicOther, please specify

10. With whom do you use media?

Alone Family FriendsFarsi/Pashto mediaBritish/Non-AfghanmediaComment:

11. Which type of media content do you use?

News/currentaffairs

Documentary

Featurefilm

Comedy

Culture/Art/Literature

Music

Other,…

Farsi/PashtoEnglish/western

Please provide any extra comment that you feel is important:

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