Adverse Selection and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century Marine Insurance Chris Kingston Amherst College May 2008
Jan 04, 2016
Adverse Selection and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century Marine Insurance
Chris Kingston
Amherst College
May 2008
Overview
In 1720:• Underwriting by private individuals
By 1844:• In Britain: Lloyd’s of London (a marketplace for individual
underwriting)• In US, France, Holland: Joint-stock marine insurance
corporations
Agency Problems in Marine Insurance
For Underwriters:• Moral Hazard: potential for fraud • Adverse Selection: merchants had better information about risks
“Concealment of circumstances, in matters of insurance, especially in time of war, [is] constantly practiced; the temptations to it [are] great; and the impositions, indeed the robberies, to which insurers, in England, are thereby daily subject, [are] various and enormous...''
(Weskett 1781)
Agency Problems in 18C Marine Insurance
For Underwriters:• Moral Hazard: potential for fraud • Adverse Selection: merchants had better information about risks
Information (and “trust”) were crucial:• Ship arrivals & sailings• Political & military developments• Characteristics of the ship, captain & crew• Reputation of merchants and underwriters
For Merchants:• Underwriters’ Insolvency• Litigiousness: would they pay?
“An insurer ought to be constantly casting about for the earliest, the best, and the most circumstantial intelligence… in order to guard against concealments and misrepresentations…
it is far more material to him to regard the quality than the quantity of the risques which he undertakes.”
… and yet…
“with the keenest penetration and judgement, it will rarely happen that he is on an equal footing, as he ought to be, with the insured.”
(Weskett, 1781)
Timeline
1400s 1700 1720 1750s 1790s 1815 1844
Early underwriting in Italian City states
Private underwriting in Britain, France, Holland, etc.
Bubble Act (1720): two corporations chartered in London
Development of Lloyd’s
Timeline
1700 1720 1750s 1790s 1815 1844
Private underwriting in Britain, France, Holland, etc.
Bubble Act (1720): creation of 2 corporations in London
Development of Lloyd’s
Repeal of Bubble Act 1824
First attempts to set up marine insurance in America
Private underwriting in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, …
Movement to joint-stock corporations in America
Model
• Many merchants, who undertake voyages which fail with probability
• Successful voyages yield income I. (Failure yields zero).• Merchants have initial wealth W and VNM utility function u()
[u > 0, u < 0]
Order of play:• Merchants learn types ~ U[ , ] [0,1]• Merchants choose private or corporate underwriters• Private underwriters learn merchants types with probability ,
where
= the proportion of merchants who chose private underwriters• Private underwriters fail with probability > 0
Model
• Corporations premium = pc
• Private underwriters premium =
if is observed
pP otherwise
• Competition drives pc and pc to levels which yield zero expected profits
• Define
up(): the expected utility obtained by a type- merchant who chooses private underwriters
uc(): the expected utility obtained by a type- merchant who chooses corporate underwriters
Lemma 1:
For any given values of pP, and ,
up() < 0
For any given value of pc,
uc() = 0
Proposition 1:
Two kinds of (Perfect Bayesian) equilibria:
• All insure with corporations
or
• Good risks insure with private underwriters,
Bad risks insure with corporations (“lemons” logic)
Britain: A Lemons Problem?
“… it is impossible that the acting director or secretary of a [corporation], should possess the same knowledge, as to the nature and extent of every new description of risk, … as 1,500 underwriters, mostly men of commercial habits, and consequently commercial knowledge, daily collected together for the purpose of communicating and receiving intelligence … who concentrate the scattered rays of information, as it were, into one focus at Lloyd's. On this conviction the public offices, very wisely, refuse to take what they do not understand”.
(Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 1810. Speech by Joseph Marryat).
Institutional Change (Equilibrium Selection) in the US:
Philadelphia premia during the Quasi-War with France
Institutional Change (Equilibrium Selection)
Equilibrium selection in Britain (?)
Equilibrium Stability in Britain: The War of 1812
Conclusion
• Multiple equilibria “Path-dependence” arising from
• Exogenous shocks• Bubble Act• US Revolution• Napoleonic Wars
• Endogenous evolution• Development of Lloyd’s in Britain: informal, later
formal• Role of learning