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Advancing Soft Kill CapabilityAdvancing Soft Kill Capability Through Improved Payload
PositioningPositioning
Steve KercheySteve KercheySenior Business Manager - Naval
The information in this document is the property of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd and may not be copied or communicated to a third party or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd.
This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Chemring Countermeasures Ltd, no warranty or representation is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Chemring Countermeasures Ltd or any of its subsidiary or associated companies.
Topics
Soft Kill Background
Current IR decoy capabilities
Advanced IR threats
Future IR decoy capability
Optimisation of capability through Trainable LaunchersOptimisation of capability through Trainable Launchers
ConclusionsConclusions
Questions
08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures
Requirements of a Passive Countermeasure S tSystem
1. To provide advice to the Command (launch time, Shipparameters) in order to maximise P (Probability Escaping Hit)parameters) in order to maximise PEH (Probability Escaping Hit).
2. To provide a payload, which individually, or in combinationi h h l d i l d d d hwith other payloads, gives relevant and adequate, and enough
representation of the target from the missile’s perspective andsufficient life to cover typical engagement duration.
3. To deploy payloads to a position/pattern such that the allthe payloads are in the Seeker gate, replicate or improve targetrepresentation OR obscure own ship OR confuse the operatorAND result in the missile missing the intended target.
5. Minimise the Need for Ship Manoeuvre
4. To minimise contribution to ship signature.
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Improvement in EW Capability
Improved
Improved Launcher
Rounds Improved EW C2, SI and Launcher
System ,
Algorithms
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Chemring Countermeasures
Ship Layered Defence – The ProblemyASM Threats:
Sea Skimming Mach 1 Mach 1 threat: Ship will have 90 SecReaction Time:
. Sea Skimming Mach 1
. Sea Skimming Mach 1-3+
. High diving
Mach 1 threat: Ship will have 90 SecMach 2 threat: Ship will have 45 SecMach 3 threat: Ship will have 30 Sec
. Target Detection . Manoeuvre for weapon arcsThreat Response:
. Target Detection
. Classification
. ROE AssessmentWeapon Assignment
. Manoeuvre for weapon arcs
. Fire
. Kill assessmentRe-engage/Reseed if needed
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Chemring Countermeasures
. Weapon Assignment . Re-engage/Reseed if needed
Ship Layered Defence S d ti
ConfusionChaff
Jammers
DistractionChaff
Active Decoys
SeductionChaff
Active DecoysJammers
Siren ADR
JammersyJammersIR Materials
Sea ViperSea Viper
Seawolf
Range
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Goalkeeper
Chemring Countermeasures
From a Soft Kill Perspective Mk 41 VLS Primarily designed for Cold War hard kill AAW using Standard SM Series missiles. Adapted for anti surface and anti land. Now has 4 pack for ESSM and Soft kill Active
$Nulka Round (in the order $500,000)
HMS Daring fires Sea Viper - May 11. The first T45 firing was completed 3 years after the ship commissioned, but this is not unusual with such complex weapon systems.C t ti t £2 5bCost estimate - £2.5bn
CENTURION Trainable Launcher System has been designed primarily for EW Soft Kill with 130mm countermeasures. Advanced ASMD Passive countermeasure response. Concept to initial firing 15 months. Concept to production 4 years!!
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Chemring Countermeasures
Augmenting Hard Kill - Pec, Peh, Pes Curves PPe
Prob
Pec = 1 - ((1-Peh).(1-Pes ) )
bability off Escaping hit
Rather than further improve hard kill, hi h ill f l f
Target Difficulty
which will reap from law of diminishing returns, work on
improving soft kill which has had less impro ement o er the last 10 earsTarget Difficultyimprovement over the last 10 years.
Match Threat Diversity with Defensive Diversity
08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures
CCM 216 Distraction Deploymentp y
RF Seduction – Changing from Large Single Burst Payload to
Missile DirectionWind
Burst Payload to….
Missile DirectionWind Direction
Chaff Bloom
Chaff Payload
and Drift
Chaff Payload Deployment
Payload FlightControllable Firing Parameters
Payload Flight
Launcher Azimuth Angle
Launcher Firing Time
08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures
….to 5+ Variable Range Payloads
Missile Direction
Wind Direction DirectionDirection
Ships
Chaff Bloom and Drift
pTrack
Chaff Payload Deployment
Controllable Firing Parameters
Launcher Azimuth Angles
Sub-munition Flight Flight Time – Electronic
Launcher Firing Time
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Chemring Countermeasures
Current Naval IR Decoy CapabilityCurrent naval IR decoys consist of 5 mortar launched sub-munitions containing bursting charge and
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sub munitions containing bursting charge and phosphorous leaves.
Fixed firing interval
Sub-munitions generally use a pre-determined fuze.
TALOS
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Chemring Countermeasures
Current Naval Decoy LaunchersRounds deployed from fixed angle launchers.
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angle launchers.
Multiple launchers orientated at different azimuth angles gare required to give coverage around a ship.
All launchers tubes at one fixed elevation angle –typically 45 degrees.yp y g
To achieve a given azimuth firing angle the ship may
d t b dneed to be manoeuvred.
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Decoy Against Reticle Type Seeker
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Advanced IR Threats- Imaging infrared seekers are becoming an increasing threat t l l tfto naval platforms.
- Advanced image processing capabilities with the ability to discriminate between target ship and decoys.
- Gated tracking with the use of a guard gate
- Aspect ratio analysis of objects identified by the seeker.
I i i ti fi ld f h- Image processing is a very active field of research.
- Many varied techniques available.
- Further advances are being made all the time.
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Example Of A Decoy Against an IIR Seeker
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Future IR Decoy Capability- Future IR naval decoys will need to be placed so that IR seekers see patterns that
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make it hard to reject with simple techniques.
- IR decoy rounds fired from fixed angle tubes have very limited ability to form a specific pattern.
- Chemring Countermeasures is developing a variable range round and a fully trainable launcher to maximise payload placementlauncher to maximise payload placement accuracy.
The aim is to form decoy patterns that areThe aim is to form decoy patterns that are more ship signature representative against sophisticated threats.
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Chemring Countermeasures
CENTURION® CoverageCENTURION Coverage
800 600800 600
100
Ship
00
Elevation determined by launcher design
Range determined by countermeasure
Range determined by countermeasure
Azimuth coverage limited by ship’s structure
Elevation Azimuth
08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures
Algorithm OptimisationNeed to consider ship speed and heading, wind speed and bearing, threat bearing and closing speed and many other g g g p yparameters to calculate solution.
Launch parameters need to be calculated very quicklyLaunch parameters need to be calculated very quickly.
A human operator will not be able to calculate all the parameters quickly enoughparameters quickly enough.
Complexity of the problem and timing requirements dictate that a fast computer algorithm will be needed.
This is essentially a multi-dimensional optimisation problem y p pthat the algorithm controlling the deployment of the decoys will have to solve.
08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures
Desired PatternThe pattern should walk the seeker off the ship without triggering the guard gate
Th tt i ti d h th t th l t d i b i t f llThe pattern is timed such that the last decoy is burning out or falls into the sea (which ever occurs first) when the missile is arriving at the ship’s position.
Use decoy as early as possible without allowing the seeker a chance to reacquire.
Ed f S k FOVEdge of Seeker FOV
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CENTURION Against IIR Seeker
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08 September 2011
Chemring Countermeasures
CENTURION® - Key Design Features• 12 Rounds – vertically stored to minimise firing and training forces• Target unloaded weight <1000Kg• Deck Footprint <2.2m diameter• Reaction time <3 sec - worst case
B k d tibilit ith i ti d• Backward compatibility with existing rounds• Stabilised in ship’s heading, pitch and roll• Low RCS Signature• Low RCS Signature• High Through Life Capability Management upgrades• WLC and Supportability addressed in design• WLC and Supportability addressed in design
• COTS Components• AR&MAR&M• Safety• Training (Maintainers and Operators)
08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures
Operational Advantages of CENTURION®
• Area coverage minimises the need for ship manoeuvre
• Optimal solution to high weight of attack
• Maximises soft kill effectiveness
• 3 axis placement accuracy with variable range rounds• 3 axis placement accuracy with variable range rounds
• All soft-kill munitions available for all engagements
• Increases payload placement accuracy by compensating for ship movement thereby maximising ship signature replication
• Low angle firings to achieve ballistic trajectory and therefore significantly reduced flight times for Distraction
• High angle firings for steep attack threats
Maximises Contribution to Platform Protection08 September
2011Chemring Countermeasures
Maximises Contribution to Platform Protection
Prototype Bravo Launcher
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Chemring Countermeasures
Prototype Bravo Launcher
08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures
Conclusions- IIR missiles are becoming an increasingly sophisticated threat.- Variable range rounds fired from a trainable launcher offerVariable range rounds fired from a trainable launcher offer potential to be able to place decoys in such a way that they are much harder to distinguish from the ship.- To place the decoys in an effective pattern requires an algorithm that needs to solve a complex multi dimensional
ti i tioptimisation.- Modelling has shown that a trainable launcher with variable range rounds offers a significant improvement in capabilityrange rounds offers a significant improvement in capability.
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Chemring Countermeasures
Thank you for your attentiony yFor further details and briefing
The information in this document is the property of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd and may not be copied or communicated to a third party or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd.
This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Chemring Countermeasures Ltd, no warranty or representation is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Chemring Countermeasures Ltd or any of its subsidiary or associated companies.