8/22/2019 Admin Law Case 2nd Week ( Revised) http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/admin-law-case-2nd-week-revised 1/28 SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996] ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. * D E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially granted. The questioned Orders and writs directing (1) “reinstatement” of respondent Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of “President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,” and (2) payment of “salaries and benefits” which said respondent failed to re ceive during his suspension insofar as such payment includes those accruing after the abolition of the PCC and its transfer to the PUP, are hereby set aside. Accordingly, further proceedings consistent with this decision may be taken by the court a quo to determine the correct amounts due and payable to said respondent by the said university. The background of this case is as follows: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17, 1974. During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotis m and dishonesty. The administrative cases, which were filed with the Office of the President, were subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, § 3 (e) and R.A. No. 992, § 20-21 and R.A. No. 733, § 14 were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan. On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed against him. The informations alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which was intended for the College, and construction materials worth P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the College as his personal and family driver. [1] On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, § 13, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting President on May 13, 1977. On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS. Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six (6) years. On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Isabelo T. Crisostomo, not guilty of the violations charged in all these three cases and hereby acquits him therefrom, with costs de oficio. The bail bonds filed by said accused for his provisional liberty are hereby cancelled and released. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the accused
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ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.*
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially granted. The questioned Orders
and writs directing (1) “reinstatement” of respondent Isabelo T. Crisostomo to
the position of “President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,” and
(2) payment of “salaries and benefits” which said respondent failed to re ceive
during his suspension insofar as such payment includes those accruing after the
abolition of the PCC and its transfer to the PUP, are hereby set
aside. Accordingly, further proceedings consistent with this decision may be
taken by the court a quo to determine the correct amounts due and payable to
said respondent by the said university.
The background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the
Philippines on July 17, 1974.
During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases
were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles,
misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression
and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotis m and dishonesty. The
administrative cases, which were filed with the Office of the President, were
subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, § 3 (e) and R.A. No. 992, § 20-21 and
R.A. No. 733, § 14 were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan.
On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed
against him. The informations alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay
kubo, which was intended for the College, and construction materials worth
P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the
College as his personal and family driver.[1]
On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office
pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, § 13, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr.
was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting
President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he
was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term
of six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Isabelo T. Crisostomo, not guilty of theviolations charged in all these three cases and hereby acquits him therefrom,
with costs de oficio. The bail bonds filed by said accused for his provisional
liberty are hereby cancelled and released.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the accused
has been suspended by this Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said
accused is hereby ordered reinstated to the position of President of the
Philippine College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, from which he has been suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement,
he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are
hereby cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) were
likewise dismissed on August 8, 1991 on the ground that they had become moot
and academic. On the other hand, the administrative cases were dismissed for
failure of the complainants to prosecute them.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court amotion for execution of the judgment, particularly the part ordering his
reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the payment of his
salaries and other benefits during the period of suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the
trial court on March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President Corazon C.
Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the
expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr.
Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five nominees considered by the President of
the Philippines for the position.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, through respondent Judge
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another order, reiterating her earlier order for
the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of PUP president. A writ of
execution, ordering the sheriff to implement the order of reinstatement, was
issued.
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff stated that he had executed
the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did
not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the
Philippines first. This led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was
set on May 7, 1992. On May 5, 1992, petitioner also moved to cite Department
of Education, Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro Cariño in contempt of
court. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petitionfor certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R. No. 27931), assailing the two orders and
the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a temporary
restraining order.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the
PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court, and enjoining further
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-2329-2331.
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision,[2]
the dispositive portion of which is set forth at the beginning of this
opinion. Said decision set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by
the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing afterthe conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and
benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioner’s suspension
until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded to the trial
court for a determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted
the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had
intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was
being “abolished” rather than “converted” and that if the PUP was intended to
be a new institution, the law would have said it was being “created.” Petitioner
claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and,
hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as president.
In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained,
reinstatement is no longer possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1437
by the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine
College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted
what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of
Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion
of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish adepartment or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one,
the lawmaking authority says so. He cites the following examples:
E.O. No. 709:
§ 1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Trade and Industry, hereinafter
referred to as the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Trade established pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 721 as amended, and the existing Ministry established
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 488 as amended, are abolished together
with their services, bureaus and similar agencies, regional offices, and all other
entities under their supervision and control. . . .
E.O. No. 710:
§ 1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
hereinafter referred to as the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Public Works
established pursuant to Executive Order No. 546 as amended, and the existing
Ministry of Public Highways established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 458
as amended, are abolished together with their services, bureaus and similar
agencies, regional offices, and all other entities within their supervision and
control. . . .
R.A. No. 6975:
§ 13. Creation and Composition. - A National Police Commission, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission, is hereby created for the purpose of effectively
discharging the functions prescribed in the Constitution and provided in this
Act. The Commission shall be a collegial body within the Department. It shall be
composed of a Chairman and four (4) regular commissioners, one (1) of whom
shall be designated as Vice-Chairman by the President. The Secretary of the
Department shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission, while the Vice-
Chairman shall act as the executive officer of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
§ 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the
present National Police Commission, and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the
nucleus of the integrated Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police,
shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The
Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be the national police
force and in lieu thereof, a new police force shall be established and constituted
pursuant to this Act.
In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:
§ 1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted into a
university to be known as the “Polytechnic University of the Philippines,”
hereinafter referred to in this Decree as the University.
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier provided:
§ 1. The present Philippine School of Commerce, located in the City of Manila,
Philippines, is hereby granted full college status and converted into the Philippine
College of Commerce, which will offer not only its present one-year and two-year
vocational commercial curricula, the latter leading to the titles of Associate in
Business Education and/or Associate in Commerce, but also four-year courses
leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Science in Business in Education andBachelor of Science in Commerce, and five-year courses leading to the degrees of
Master of Arts in Business Education and Master of Arts in Commerce,
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not “one
and the same institution” but “two different entities” and that since petitioner
Crisostomo’s term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC,
petitioner’s term expired upon the abolition of the PCC. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court of Appeals took into account the following:
a) After respondent Crisostomo’s suspension, P.D. No. 1341 (entitled
“CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS”) was issued on April
1, 1978. This decree explicitly provides that PUP’s objectives and purposes cover
not only PCC’s offering of programs “in the field of commerce and business
administration” but also “programs in other polytechnic areas” and “in other
fields such as agriculture, arts and trades and fisheries . . .” (section 2). Being a
university, PUP was conceived as a bigger institution absorbing, merging and
integrating the entire PCC and other “national schools” as may be “transferred”
to this new state university.
b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university head is
substantially different from that provided by the PCC Charter. The PUP President
“shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Education and Culture after consultation with the University
Board of Regents” (section 4, P.D. 1341). The President of PCC, on the other
hand, was appointed “by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees” (Section 4, R.A. 778).
c) The composition of the new university’s Board of Regents is likewise different
from that of the PCC Board of Trustees (which included the chairman of the
Senate Committee on Education and the chairman of the House Committee on
Education, the President of the PCC Alumni Association as well as the President
of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines). Whereas, among others, the
NEDA Director-General, the Secretary of Industry and the Secretary of Labor are
members of the PUP Board of Regents. (Section 6, P.D. 1341).
d) The decree moreover transferred to the new university all the properties
including “equipment and facilities”:
“. . . owned by the Philippine College of Commerce and such other National
Schools as may be integrated . . . including their obligations and appropriations . .
.” (Sec. 12; Italics supplied).[3]
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution
and to create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum
of a school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
The Court of Appeals also cites the provision of P.D. No. 1341 as allegedly
implying the abolition of the PCC and the creation of a new one — the PUP — in
its stead:
§ 12. All parcels of land, buildings, equipment and facilities owned by the
Philippine College of Commerce and such other national schools as may be
integrated by virtue of this decree, including their obligations and appropriations
thereof, shall stand transferred to the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
provided, however, that said national schools shall continue to receive theircorresponding shares from the special education fund of the
municipal/provincial/city government concerned as are now enjoyed by them in
accordance with existing laws and/or decrees.
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by
the PCC were being “transferred” to the PUP but only that they “stand
transferred” to it. “Stand transferred” simply means, for example, that lands
transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the
new name of the institution.
But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP
could not be ordered by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437had been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities
and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and
authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of
incumbents who were not reappointed. P.D. No. 1437 provides:
directly apply to ERC’s current efforts to establish a new
organization. Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, however,
will have suppletory application to the extent possible in regard
to the selection and placement of employees in the
ERC.[2]
(Emphasis supplied)
On 5 November 2005, KERB sent a letter to the Commissioners stating the
KERB members’ objection to the Commissioners’ stand that Civil Service laws,
rules and regulations have suppletory application in the selection and placement
of the ERC employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or
change the ERB’scharacter as an economic regulator of the electric power
industry. KERB insisted that RA 9136 merely changed the ERB’s name to the ERC
and expanded the ERB’s functions and objectives. KERB sent the Commissioners
yet another letter on 13 November 2001. KERB made a number of requests: (1)
the issuance of a formal letter related to the date of filing of job applications,
including the use of Civil Service application form no. 212; (2) the creation of a
placement/recruitment committee and setting guidelines relative to its
functions, without prejudice to existing Civil Service rules and regulations; and (3)
copies of the plantilla positions and their corresponding qualification standards
duly approved by either the President of the Philippines or the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
Commissioner Barin replied to KERB’s letter on 15 November 2001. She
stated that Civil Service application form no. 212 and the ERC-prescribed
application format are substantially the same. Furthermore, the creation of a
placement/recruitment committee is no longer necessary because there is
already a prescribed set of guidelines for the recruitment of personnel. The ERC
hired an independent consultant to administer the necessary tests for the
technical and managerial levels. Finally, the ERC already posted
theplantilla positions, which prescribe higher standards, as approved by theDepartment of Budget and Management. Commissioner Barin stated that
positions in the ERC do not need the prior approval of the CSC, as the ERC is only
required to submit the qualification standards to the CSC.
On 5 December 2001, the ERC published a classified advertisement in the
Philippine Star. Two days later, the CSC received a list of vacancies and
qualification standards from the ERC. The ERC formed a Selection Committee to
process all applications.
KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its members,
filed the present petition on 20 December 2001. KERB later filed an UrgentEx Parte Motion to Enjoin Termination of Petitioner ERB Employees on 2 January
2002. However, before the ERC received KERB’s pleadings, the Selection
Committee already presented its list of proposed appointees to the
Commissioners.
In their Comment, the Commissioners describe the status of the ERB
employees’ appointment in the ERC as follows:
As of February 1, 2002, of the two hundred twelve (212)
ERB employees, one hundred thirty eighty [sic] (138) were
rehired and appointed to ERC plantilla positions and sixty six
(66) opted to retire or be separated from the service. Thosewho were rehired and those who opted to retire or be
separated constituted about ninety six (96%) percent of the
entire ERB employees. The list of the ERB employees
appointed to new positions in the ERC is attached hereto as
Annex 1. Only eight (8) ERB employees could not be appointed
to new positions due to the reduction of the ERC plantilla and
the absence of positions appropriate to their respective
qualifications and skills. The appropriate notice was issued to
each of them informing them of their separation from the
service and assuring them of their entitlement to “separation
pay and other benefits in accordance with existing laws.”[3]
The Issues
KERB raises the following issues before this Court:
29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the
Resolutions[2]
dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and
reclassification of certain personnel positions in the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution dated 11 September 2002 of
the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as
follows:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy . The
last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. These special
provisions state:
1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding
and within the limits of their respective appropriations as authorized in this
Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make
adjustments in their personal services itemization including, but not limited to,
the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices:PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by
such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective
offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations
for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, and training
information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central and
regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals,
periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary expenses for the employment of
temporary, contractual and casual employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and transportation
allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and employees as may be
authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and
auditing rules and regulations. (Emphases supplied)
On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then
Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Reciña and Commissioners Nasser A.
Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia,
promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an
upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission, to wit:
WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided
special provisions applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy, particularly on organizational structures and authorizes the same to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective officesto fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their
personnel and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the
personnel services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item
or creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers
and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or
adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpanded
balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective offices;
WHEREAS, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved
Joint Resolution No. 49 adopting internal rules implementing the special
provisions heretoforth mentioned;
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby
approves and authorizes the upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate
To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same
resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated
from savings under Personnel Services.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR
“collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of
funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: oneAttorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one
Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II.[8]
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the
DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin
Diokno denied the request on the following justification:
… Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it
effectively involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services.
The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of
Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a
bureau or regional office, a level even higher than the one previously denied.
The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director
IV, SG-28, in the Central Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and
change the context from support to substantive without actual change in
functions.
In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to
elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to
offices, we reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the twelve (12)
positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the
Field Operations Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-
28 in the Central Office.
As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM
Secretary dated 10 December 1997, directing the latter to increase the number
of Plantilla positions in the CHR both Central and Regional Offices to implement
the Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human
Rights Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws.
(Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the
creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot begiven favorable recommendation.
Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the
Compensation Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management
is directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position
classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996,
that this Department has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the National Government.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine
the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand
on the matter .[9]
(Emphases supplied)
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated
29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of
the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank
and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying
After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an
assiduous scrutiny of the records in the case at bar, it is the Court’s opinion that
the present petition is imbued with merit.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases
that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of .[13]
Here, petitioner,
which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper
level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and
file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commission’s savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for
Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in
the rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the
CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA’s request to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s personality
to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon themerits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical
concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised
in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and
due process.[14]
We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the
DBM is a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification,
creation and collapsing of plantillapositions in the CHR.
Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and
For Other Purposes, or theSalary Standardization Law , dated 01 July 1989, whichprovides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM that
shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification
System. Thus:
SEC. 2. Statement of Policy . -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be
given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable
work. For this purpose, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is
hereby directed to establish and administer a unified Compensation and PositionClassification System, hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all government
entities, as mandated by the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 4. Coverage. – The Compensation and Position Classification System herein
provided shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time
basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial
institutions.
The term “government” refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial
Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall notbe limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts,
tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges
and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term
“government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions” shall
include all corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the
National Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions
perform governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the
long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the
coverage thereof, as defined above, encompasses the entire gamut of
government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as
erroneously held by the Court of Appeals. The word to administer means to
control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state.[15]
The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted
not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case
of Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Jesusito L. Buñag,[16]
this Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation,
allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without
the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular . In
the words of the Court –
Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a
compensation and benefits scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the
review of the Department of Budget and Management. However, in view of the
express powers granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of the review
authority of the Department of Budget and Management is limited. As stated
in Intia, the task of the Department of Budget and Management is simply to
review the compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or entity
concerned and determine if the same complies with the prescribed policies and
guidelines issued in this regard. The role of the Department of Budget and
Management is supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the
proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to PRA
officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in
accordance with applicable laws.
In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[17]
we held that the DBM has the sole
power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification
system of the national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit ,[18]
the Court held that although the
charter[19]
of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverageof the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification
Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system
established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This
Court intoned:
It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution
affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted
to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive
the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to
ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the
requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s compensation system “conforms
as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” (Emphasissupplied.)
As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the
imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation
of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant
to the mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management
shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and
expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget,
preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetaryprocess, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of
government operations, administration of compensation and position
classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and
evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications. (Emphasis supplied.)
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the
upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the
CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or
approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its threeletters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from
now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a
The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-
Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys
fiscal autonomy.[20]
Palpably, the Court of Appeals’ Decision was based on the mistaken premise
that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX
of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus:
Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and
26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission onElections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and
fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant
of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which
shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an
Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent
central monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as
provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic
and planning agency. (Emphasis ours.)
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly
clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As
expressed in the oft-repeated maxim e xpressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others .
Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an
end to what is implied.[21]
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside
control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to
allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant
to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to
time.[22]
InBlaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,[23]
it is understood that it is
only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,[24]
we explained:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary,
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on
Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch
that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by
them in the course of the d ischarge of their functions.
. . .
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutionalduties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is,
nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share
the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all
government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute
and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification
and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as
the Compensation Standardization Law .[25]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is theprovision of Rep. Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.”[26]
Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has
expressly provided that any form of adjustment in the organizational structure
must be within the parameters of the Salary Standardization Law.
The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the
basic causes of discontent of many civil servants.[27]
For this purpose, Congress
has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization
Law and to ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is part of the
system of checks and balances or system of restraints in our government. TheDBM’s exercise of such author ity is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is
pursuant to the paramount law of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and
the Administrative Code.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary
Standardization Law of “providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to
base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions,” the DBM, in the
case under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the
reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal
rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the
General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify
its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “ no organizational unit or
changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by
the President .” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the
creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR.
Anent CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG -26 to
Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28,
in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context
from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to implement and
administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of
an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute isaccorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.
In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals ,[28]
we echoed the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nation’s
coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the President’s alter ego, knows from
where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of
an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in
the entire government in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11
September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29
March 1999 of the Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is
REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated
04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and
Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the
Department of Budget and Management are disallowed. No pronouncement as