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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003]
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA,
ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA,
EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
[1] dated 21 December 2001 which
affirmed with modification the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission promulgated 30 March 2001.
[2]
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services,
Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services,
Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor
practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of
tenure and the perpetuation of the Cabo System. They thus prayed
for reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration of
their regular employment status.
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the
scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective
affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were
dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted
clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10)
remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their
alleged employment with respondent firm.
In substance, the complainants averred that in the performance
of their duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and others,
they were employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They
further maintained that when respondent company replaced them and
prevented them from entering the company premises, they were deemed
to have been illegally dismissed.
In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion
to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action,
there being no employer-employee relationship between complainants
and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and that respondents Lipercon
Services, Peoples Specialist Services and Interim Services being
bona fideindependent contractors, were the real employers of the
complainants.
[3] As regards the corporate officers, respondent insisted that
they could
not be faulted and be held liable for damages as they only acted
in their official capacities while performing their respective
duties.
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision
ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their
former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due
regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the
exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed
upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already amounted to
an aggregate of P1,810,244.00.
[4]
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in
contrast with the negative declarations of respondent companys
witnesses who, as district sales supervisors of respondent company
denied knowing the complainants personally, the testimonies of the
complainants were more credible as they sufficiently supplied every
detail of their employment, specifically identifying who their
salesmen/drivers were, their places of assignment, aside from their
dates of engagement and dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter
that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between the
complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the
latters decision.
In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC subsequently denied
for lack of merit respondents motion for consideration.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the contending
parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of
some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor
Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo
Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative
value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to
undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court
dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. In the
same Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and
Rolando Nieto were declared regular employees since they were the
only ones subjected to cross-examination.
[5] Thus -
x x x (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to
ferret out the truth between the
opposing claims of the parties thereto. He did not submit the
case based on position papers and
their accompanying documentary evidence as a full-blown trial
was imperative to establish the
parties claims. As their allegations were poles apart, it was
necessary to give them ample
opportunity to rebut each others statements through
cross-examination. In fact, private
respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were subjected to rigid
cross-examination by
petitioners counsel. However, the testimonies of private
respondents Romero, Espina, and
Bantolino were not subjected to cross-examination, as should
have been the case, and no
explanation was offered by them or by the labor arbiter as to
why this was dispensed with.
Since they were represented by counsel, the latter should have
taken steps so as not to
squander their testimonies. But nothing was done by their
counsel to that effect.[6]
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the
Court of Appeals; that, instead, the favorable judgment of the NLRC
be reinstated.
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should
not have given weight to respondents claim of failure to
cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor
cases are decided based merely on the parties position papers and
affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings
that may be
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filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules of
Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by
putting them on the witness stand to be cross-examined because the
NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor
Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor.
In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented that since
the other alleged affiants were not presented in court to affirm
their statements, much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits
should, as the Court of Appeals rightly held, be stricken off the
records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence. With respect to Nestor Romero, respondent points out that
he should not have been impleaded in the instant petition since he
already voluntarily executed a Compromise Agreement, Waiver and
Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00. Finally, respondent
argues
that the instant petition should be dismissed in view of the
failure of petitioners[7]
to sign the petition as well as the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, in clear violation of the
principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.
[8]
The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of
giving evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure of
the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of
cross-examination.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the
Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited case
of Rabago v. NLRC
[9] squarely
grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use
of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for
cross-examination. In that case, we held that the argument that the
affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for
cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence
are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative
bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of
position papers only.
In Rase v. NLRC,[10]
this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled
that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify
and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the
summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make
mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC[11]
succinctly states that
under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the
interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to deviate
therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound
by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application,
i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The
submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,
[12] that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is
mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot
find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal
prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of
an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission,
the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings
are not even required as the cases
may be decided based on verified position papers, with
supporting documents and their affidavits.
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly
impleaded in the instant case, we only need to follow the doctrinal
guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC
[13] which outlines the parameters for valid compromise
agreements, waivers
and quitclaims -
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public
policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement,
it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It
is only where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will
step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with
full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration
for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
In closely examining the subject agreements, we find that on
their face theCompromise Agreement
[14] and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
[15] are devoid of
any palpable inequity as the terms of settlement therein are
fair and just. Neither can we glean from the records any attempt by
the parties to renege on their contractual agreements, or to
disavow or disown their due execution. Consequently, the same must
be recognized as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly,
the instant case should be dismissed and finally terminated insofar
as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero.
We cannot likewise accommodate respondents contention that the
failure of all the petitioners to sign the petition as well as the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in
contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court will cause
the dismissal of the present appeal. While the Loquias case
requires the strict
observance of the Rules, it however provides an escape hatch for
the transgressor to avoid the harsh consequences of non-observance.
Thus -
x x x x We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in
a matter involving strict
observance of the rules. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.
Petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. Utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction (underscoring
supplied).
In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigants,
petitioners made a request for a fifteen (15)-day extension, i.e.,
from 24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within which to file their
petition for review in view of the absence of a counsel to
represent them.
[16] The records also reveal that it was only on 10 July 2002
that Atty. Arnold
Cacho, through the UST Legal Aid Clinic, made his formal entry
of appearance as counsel for herein petitioners. Clearly, at the
time the instant petition was filed on 7 May 2002 petitioners were
not yet represented by counsel. Surely, petitioners who are
non-lawyers could not be faulted for the procedural lapse since
they could not be expected to be conversant with the nuances of the
law, much less knowledgeable with the esoteric technicalities of
procedure. For this reason alone, the procedural
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infirmity in the filing of the present petition may be
overlooked and should not be taken against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the NLRC dated 30
March 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated 29 May 1998 ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.,
Inc., to reinstate Prudencio Bantolino, Nilo Espina, Eddie Ladica,
Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia,
Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas to their former positions as
regular employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with the
exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be
computed upon proof of his dismissal, is REINSTATED, with the
MODIFICATION that herein petition is DENIED insofar as it concerns
Nestor Romero who entered into a valid and binding Compromise
Agreement and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim with respondent
company.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC.,
respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for
private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for
preliminary injunction is the novel question of where and in
what manner appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments
(BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting
provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226,
also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme
Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for.
Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision
dated December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually,
oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not
move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in
its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review
with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.
Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and
petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why
no injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993, respondent court
temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This
temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms on March 9,
1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court
issuing any preliminary injunction.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss
Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that
respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No.
92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition
is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
Private respondent is hereby given an inextendible period of ten
(10) days from receipt hereof within which to file its comment to
the petition.
1
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993,
petitioner decided not to file any motion for reconsideration as
the question involved is essentially legal in nature and
immediately filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition before
this Court.
Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
resolution of May 25, 1993, for the following reasons:
I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's
appeal from the BOI's decision in BOI Case No. 92-005, which has
become final.
II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this
Honorable Court cannot be amended or superseded by Circular No.
1-91.
2
Petitioner then concludes that:
III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal . . . in this case.
3
Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the
Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order
or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent
court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs
contrary to Article 82 of E.O.
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226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the
BOI shall be filed directly with this Court, to wit:
Judicial relief. All orders or decisions of the Board (of
Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall
immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of
the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such an order
or decision; Provided, that all appeals shall be filed directly
with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
order or decision.
On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious
inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been
between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of
venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the
Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four
(4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein quoted
below:
1. Scope. These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders
or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to
appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency
from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these agencies are the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of Agrarian Reform and
Special Agrarian Courts under RA 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission and Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission.
2. Cases not covered. These rules shall not apply to decisions
and interlocutory orders of the National Labor Relations Commission
or the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code of
the Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and other
quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is
prescribed or allowed by statute.
3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. The appeal of a party
affected by a final order, decision, or judgment of the Court of
Tax Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency shall be taken to the
Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact or of law
or mixed questions of fact and law. From final judgments or
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of
Appeals, to wit:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and
all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the
laudable objective of providing a uniform procedure of appeal from
decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the
bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P.
129 of unclogging the docket of this Court to enable it to attend
to more important tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente G.
Sinco, as quoted in our decision in Conde v. Intermediate Appellate
Court
4is "less concerned with the decisions of
cases that begin and end with the transient rights and
obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with
the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social
problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact
upon fundamental rights.
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
5
this Court noted that
B.P. 129 did not deal only with "changes in the rules on
procedures" and that not only was the Court of Appeals reorganized,
but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by Section 9
thereof. Explaining the changes, this Court said:
. . . Its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus, which theretofore could
be exercised only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was
expanded by (1) extending it so as to include the writ of quo
warranto, and also (2) empowering it to issue all said
extraordinary writs "whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." Its appellate jurisdiction was also extended to
cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts, but also
"all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of .
. . quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
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Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph
(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being
noteworthy in this connection that the text of the law is broad and
comprehensive, and the explicitly stated exceptions have no
reference whatever to the Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed, the
intention to expand the original and appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards, or commissions, is further stressed by the last paragraph
of Section 9 which excludes from its provisions, only the
"decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of
the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals."
6
However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the
country is far from perfect. During the transitional period after
the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking power was
lodged on the Executive Department. The obvious lack of
deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the
deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure
which B.P. 129 sought to promote.
In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 provides that all appeals shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision.
Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court
entertains ordinary appeals only from decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher. Judgments of regional trial courts
may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on
certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the
clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that
"(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly
not in consonance with the present procedure before this Court.
Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission
(Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on
Audit), may be brought to the Supreme Court on original petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within thirty
(30) days form receipt of a copy thereof.
7
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its
Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129,
issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the
Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary
contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not
strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of
law according to settled jurisprudence.
8 In Inciong v. de Guia,
9 a circular of this Court was treated as law. In
adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose
a sanction on a
judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated September
23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and
Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases,
this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge,
brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning
cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that
respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it
is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
10
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly
repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive
right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished
or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly
argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it
also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought.
These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which
this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its
constitutional rule-making powers.
The case of Bustos v. Lucero 11
distinguished between rights created by a substantive
law and those arising from procedural law:
Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive
rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under
the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60
C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains a redress for their invasion.
12
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from
decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure
or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted
by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or
final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals
from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and
provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from
notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to
appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of
quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of
Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to
appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second
sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall
also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any
quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by
statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is
one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words
"(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there
are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular
but which have not been expressly listed therein. More importantly,
BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in
Section 2
-
of the circular. Only the following final decisions and
interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular,
namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2)
the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from which
no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since
in DBP v. CA
13 we
upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not
among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P.
129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should
be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said
law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded
Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of
enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court,
should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
on July 19, 1993 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ. concur.
G.R. No. 69871 August 24, 1990
ANITA VILLA, petitioner,
vs. MANUEL LAZARO, as Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs,
Office of the President, and the HUMAN SETTLEMENTS REGULATORY
COMMISSION, respondents.
Eliseo P. Vencer II for petitioner.
NARVASA, J.:
On January 18, 1980, Anita Villa was granted a building permit
to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Boulevard in Gen. Santos
City.
1 The permit was issued by the City
Engineer after the application was "processed by Engineer
Dominador Solana of the City Engineer's Office, and on the strength
of the Certification of Manuel Sales, City Planning and Development
Coordinator that the "project was in consonance with the Land Use
Plan of the City and within the full provision of the Zoning
Ordinance".
2 With financing obtained from the Development Bank of the
Philippines,
Villa commenced construction of the building.
In October of that same year, as the funeral parlor was nearing
completion, a suit for injunction was brought against Villa by Dr.
Jesus Veneracion, the owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital, standing
about 132.36 meters from the funeral parlor.
3 The
complaint sought the perpetual enjoinment of the construction
because allegedly violative of the Zoning Ordinance of General
Santos City.
4 A status quo order was
issued.
After appropriate proceedings and trial, judgment on the merits
was rendered on November 17, 1981, dismissing Veneracion's
complaint as well as the counterclaim pleaded by Villa. The Trial
Court found that there was afalsified Zoning Ordinance, containing
a provision governing funeral parlors, which had been submitted to
and ratified by the Ministry of Human Settlements, but that
ordinance had never been passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
that the genuine Zoning Ordinance of
General Santos City contained no prohibition whatever relative
to such parlors' "distance from hospitals, whether public or
private".
5 Villa then resumed construction
of her building and completed it. 6
Veneracion did not appeal from this adverse judgment which
therefore became final. Instead, he brought the matter up with the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with
that commission praying "that the funeral parlor be relocated
because it was near the St. Elizabeth Hospital and Villa failed to
secure the necessary locational clearance".
7 The complaint, as will at once be noted,
is substantially the same as that filed by him with the Court of
First Instance and dismissed after trial. Furthermore, neither he
nor the Commission, as will hereafter be narrated, ever made known
this second complaint to Villa until much, much later, after the
respondent Commission had rendered several adverse rulings to
her.
8
Two months after the rendition of the judgment against
Veneracion, or more precisely on January 22, 1982, Villa received a
telegram dated January 21 from Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon of
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission reading as follows:
9
THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT REGULATORY COMMISSION REQUEST TRANSMITTAL
OF PROOF OF LOCATIONAL CLEARANCE GRANTED BY THIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY
UPON RECEIPT OF THIS . . NOT LATER THAN 21ST JANUARY 1982 REGARDING
YOUR ON GOING CONSTRUCTION OF A FUNERAL PARLOR AT SANTIAGO STREET
CORNER NATIONAL HIGHWAY GENERAL SANTOS CITY AN OFFICIAL
COMMUNICATION TO THE EFFECT FOLLOWS.
On the same day, January 22, 1982, Villa sent Dizon a reply
telegram reading: "LOCATIONAL CLEARANCE BASED ON CERTIFICATION OF
CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR AND HUMAN SETTLEMENT
OFFICER, COPIES MAIL . . ."
10 This she did on January 27,1982; under Registry Receipt
No.
1227 (Gen. Santos City Post Office), 11
Villa sent to Dizon
1) the certification dated October 24, 1980 of Josefina E. Alaba
(Human Settlements Officer, Gen. Santos City) to the following
effect:
12
-
. . that per scrutiny of the documents presented by Mrs. Anita
Villa on her application for a Funeral Parlor and inspection of lot
No. 4997 along Santiago Boulevard where the building is to be
constructed, the undersigned guarantees that the application passed
the criteria of this office for this purpose.
2) and the certification of Manuel O. Sales, City Planning and
Development Coordinator, dated December 27, 1979,
13 that:
. . the proposed project (funeral Chapel) of Anita G. Villa,
located at Lot No. 4997 along Santiago Boulevard is in consonance
with the land Use Plan of the City and within the full provision of
the Zoning Ordinance.
On February 8, 1982 Villa received what was evidently the
official communication" referred to in Commissioner Dizon's
telegram of January 21, 1982, supra, an "Order to Present Proof of
Locational Clearance" dated January 20, 1982. Knowing this and
"considering also that she . . (had) already sent the (required)
locational clearance on January 27, 1982," Villa made no
response.
14
No doubt with no little discomfiture Villa received on June 2,
1982 a "Show Cause" Order dated April 28,1982, signed by one
Ernesto L. Mendiola in behalf of the Commission, requiring her to
show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a
cease-and-desist order issued against her for her failure to show
proof of locational clearance.
15 The order made no reference whatever to the documents she
had
already sent by registered mail as early as January 27, 1982.
The following day Villa sent a telegram to Commissioner Dizon
reading as follows:
16
LOCATIONAL CLEARANCE WAS MAILED THRU REGISTERED MAIL REGISTRY
RECEIPT NUMBER 1227 DATED JANUARY 27, 1982, SENDING AGAIN THRU
REGISTERED MAIL REGISTRY RECEIPT NO. 6899 JUNE 3, 1982.
On the same day, she also sent to Commissioner Dizon by
registered mail (Reg Receipt No. 6899), as indicated in her
telegram, the same certifications earlier sent by her also by
registered mail (Reg Receipt No. 1227), supra.
If she thought the affair had thus been satisfactorily ended,
she was sadly in error, of which she was very shortly made aware.
On July 27, 1982, she received an Order of Commissioner Dizon dated
June 29, 1982 imposing on her a fine of P10,000.00 and requiring
her to cease operations until further orders from his office.
17 The order
made no mention of the documents she had transmitted by
registered mail on January 27, 1982 and June 3, 1982, or to her
telegrams on the matter. Villa forthwith went to see the Deputized
Zoning Administrator of General Santos City, Isidro M. Olmedo. The
latter issued to her a "CERTIFICATE OF ZONING COMPLIANCE" No. 0087,
dated July 28,1982, inter aliaattesting that the land on which
Villa's "proposed commercial building" was located in a vicinity in
which the "dominant land uses" were
"commercial/institutional/residential," and the project conformed
"WITH THE LAND USE PLAN OF THE CITY."
18 This certificate Villa sent on the same day to
Commissioner Dizon by registered mail (Reg. Receipt No. 1365
[Gen. Santos City P.O.]).
19 It is noteworthy that this Certificate No. 0087 is entirely
consistent with the
earlier certification dated November 27, 1979 of City Planning
& Development Coordinator Sales that Villa's funeral chapel was
"in consonance with the Land Use Plan of the City and within the
full provision of the Zoning Ordinance," supra,
20 and
that of Human Settlements Officer Alaba dated October 24, 1980,
supra 21
that Villa's
"application for a Funeral Parlor . . passed the criteria of
this office for this purpose." Villa could perhaps be
understandably considered justified in believing, at this time,
that the matter had finally been laid to rest.
One can then only imagine her consternation and shock when she
was served on November 16, 1982 with a writ of execution signed by
Commissioner Dizon under the date of October 19, 1982 in
implementation of his Order of June 29, 1982, above mentioned,
imposing a fine of P10,000.00 on her. Again, this Order, like the
others issuing from respondent Commission, made no advertence
whatever to the documents Villa had already sent to respondent
Commission by registered mail on January 27, June 29, and July 28,
1982, or her telegrams Be this as it may, she lost no time in
moving for reconsideration, by letter dated November 22, 1982 to
which she attached copies of the documents she had earlier sent to
Commissioner Dizon, viz.: her telegram of January 22, 1982,
22(2) the certification of the City
Planning & Development Coordinator 23
(3) the certification of the Human Settlements Officer
24 (4) the telegram dated June 3, 1982,
25 and (5) the Certificate of Zoning
Compliance dated July 28, 1982. 26
In addition, Villa executed a special power of
attorney on December 10, 1982 authorizing Anastacio Basas to
"deliver to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission . . all my
papers or documents required by the said Commission as requisites
for the issuance to me and/or the Funeraria Villa . . (of) the
locational clearance for the construction of my funeral parlor
along Santiago boulevard, General Santos City. . .
27 pursuant to which on December 15, 1982, said
Basas delivered to the Commission (Enforcement Office), thru one
Betty Jimenez
28 copies of Villa's (1) building plan, (2) building permit,
29 (3) occupancy
permit, 30
and (4) "the decision of the Court case involving the funeral
parlor". 31
By Order dated January 21, 1983, Commissioner Dizon denied the
reconsideration prayed for by Villa in her letter of November 22,
1982, opining that the plea for reconsideration had been presented
out of time,
32 and the order of June 29, 1982
had become final and executory. 33
Villa then filed an appeal with "the Commission Proper, which
denied it in an order dated September 7, 1983, also on account of
the finality of the order of the Commissioner for Enforcement. Her
subsequent motion for reconsideration . . (was also) denied in the
order of June 7, 1984 . .
34
Villa then sought to take an appeal to the Office of the
President. The matter was acted on by the Presidential Assistant
for Legal Affairs, respondent Manuel M. Lazaro. In a Resolution
dated September 21, 1984, respondent Lazaro denied the "appeal and
(Villa's) motion for extension of time to submit an appeal
memorandum".
35 It is noteworthy that Lazaro's resolution, like the orders
of
Commissioner Dizon and respondent Commission, contains no
reference whatsoever to the telegrams and documents sent by Villa
to the latter on various occasions evidencing her prompt responses
to the orders of Dizon and the Commission, and her
-
substantial compliance with the general requirement for her to
present the requisite clearances or documents of authority for the
erection of her funeral parlor. The very skimpy narration of facts
set out in the resolution limits itself merely to a citation of the
orders of Commissioner Dizon and the Commission; and on that basis,
the resolution simplistically concludes that "no appeal was
seasonably taken by Mrs. Anita Villa from the order of June 29,
1982, of the HSRC . . (and) (a)ccordingly, said order became final
for which reason a writ of execution was issued . . (which)
finality was confirmed in the subsequent orders of HSRC, dated
January 21, 1983, and September 7, 1983."
Villa filed a motion for reconsideration dated October 19, 1984,
this time through counsel, contending that the resolution of
September 21, 1984 was "not in conformity with the law and the
evidence" and deprived her of due process of law.
36 But this,
too, was denied (with finality) by respondent Lazaro, in a
Resolution dated December 14, 1984 which again omitted to refer to
the several attempts of Villa to comply with the order of
Commissioner Dizon to present the requisite documents of authority
anent her funeral parlor and adverted merely to the orders
emanating from Dizon and the respondent Commission.
37
These facts present a picture of official incompetence of gross
negligence and abdication of duty, if not of active bias and
partiality, that is most reprehensible. The result has been to
subvert and put to naught the Judgment rendered in a suit regularly
tried and decided by a court of justice, to deprive one party of
rights confirmed and secured thereby and to accord her adversary,
in a different forum, the relief he had sought and been denied in
said case.
There is no question that Dr. Jesus Veneracion had resorted to
the proscribed practice of forum-shopping when, following adverse
judgment of the Court of First Instance in his suit to enjoin the
construction of Villa's funeral parlor, he had, instead of
appealing that judgment, lodged a complaint with the respondent
Commission on substantially the same ground litigated in the
action. Also undisputed is that while the respondent Commission
took cognizance of the complaint and by telegram required Villa to
submit a locational clearance, said respondent did not then or at
any time before issuance of the order and writ of execution
complained of bother to put her on notice, formally or otherwise,
of Veneracion's complaint. It was therefore wholly natural for
Villa to assume, as it is apparent she did, that no formal
adversarial inquiry was underway and that the telegram was what it
purported to be on its face: a routinary request, issued motu
proprio, to submit proof of compliance with locational
requirements. And such assumption was doubtless fortified by
petitioner's knowledge that she already had in her favor a judgment
on the subject against which her opponent had taken no recourse by
appeal or otherwise.
Neither is there any serious dispute about what transpired
thereafter, as already recounted and, in particular, about the fact
that in response to that first and the subsequent demands sent by
Commissioner Dizon, Villa not once but thrice furnished the
Commission by registered mail with copies, variously, of official
documents certifying to her compliance with the pertinent
locational, zoning and land use requirements and plans. None of
these documents appears to have made any impression on Commissioner
Dizon, whose show-cause order of April 28, 1982 and order of June
29, 1982 imposing a P10,000.00 fine on petitioner made no mention
of them whatsoever. Not even Villa's submission of said documents a
fourth time to
support her motion for reconsideration of a writ of execution
could move Commissioner Dizon to stop acting as if said documents
did not exist at all. True, only copies had been submitted, but
ordinary prudence and fairness dictated at least some inquiry into
their authenticity, and this would not have posed any great
difficulty considering their purportedly official origins.
The mischief done by Commissioner Dizon's baffling failure (or
obdurate refusal) even to acknowledge the existence of the
documents furnished by petitioner was perpetuated by the
"Commissioner proper" and respondent Lazaro (Presidential Assistant
on Legal Affairs), who threw out petitioner's appeals with no
reference whatsoever thereto and thereby kept in limbo evidence
that would have been decisive. The Solicitor General's brief
Comment of September 3, 1985
38 neither admits nor denies Villa's claim of having submitted
the required
documents; it avoids any reference thereto and deals mainly with
the question of the timeliness of her appeal to the respondent
Commission and the propriety of the present petition. From such
silence and upon what the record otherwise clearly shows, the Court
remains in no doubt of the verity of said petitioner's claim that
she had more than once submitted those requisite documents.
There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out
as an administrative proceeding against Villa without informing her
of the complaint which initiated the case; for conducting that
inquiry in the most informal manner by means only of communications
requiring submission of certain documents, which left the
impression that compliance was all that was expected of her and
with which directives she promptly and religiously complied;
assuming that one of the documents thus successively submitted had
been received, but given the fact that on at least two occasions,
their transmission had been preceded by telegrams announcing that
they would follow by mail, for failing to call Villa's attention to
their non-receipt or to make any other attempt to trace their
whereabouts; for ruling against Villa on the spurious premise that
she had failed to submit the documents required; and for
maintaining to the very end that pretense of lack of compliance
even after being presented with a fourth set of documents and the
decision in the court case upholding her right to operate her
funeral parlor in its questioned location.
Whether born of ineptitude negligence, bias or malice, such
lapses are indefensible. No excuse can be advanced for avoiding all
mention or consideration of certifications issued by respondent
Commission's own officials in General Santos City, which included
the very relevant one executed by Human Settlements Officer
Josefina E. Alaba that petitioner's application for a funeral
parlor at the questioned location had . . passed the criteria of
this office for this purpose.
39 It was thus not even necessary for
petitioner to bring that document to the notice of the
Commission which, together with Commissioner Dizon, was chargeable
with knowledge of its own workings and of all acts done in the
performance of duty by its officials and employees. Petitioner is
plainly the victim of either gross ignorance or negligence or abuse
of power, or a combination of both. All of the foregoing translate
to a denial of due process against which the defense of failure to
take timely appeal will not avail. Well-esconced in our
jurisprudence is the rule:
. . that administrative proceedings are not exempt from the
operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural
principles,
-
such as the due process requirements in investigations and
trials. And this administrative due process is recognized to
include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of
the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal
right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights,
introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a
tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of
honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and
(d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
records or disclosed to the parties affected.
40
and, it being clear that some, at least, of those essential
elements did not obtain or were not present in the proceedings
complained of, any judgment rendered, or order issued, therein was
null and void, could never become final, and could be attacked in
any appropriate proceeding.
The Court finds no merit in the proposition that relief is
foreclosed to Villa because her motion for reconsideration of
November 22, 1982 was filed out of time. The very informal
character of the so-called administrative proceedings, an
informality for which Commissioner Dizon himself was responsible
and which he never sought to rectify, militates against imposing
strict observance of the limiting periods applicable to proceedings
otherwise properly initiated and regularly conducted. Indeed,
considering the rather "off-the-cuff" manner in which the inquiry
was carried out, it is not even certain that said petitioner is
chargeable with tardiness in connection with any incident thereof.
What the record shows is that she invariably responded promptly, at
times within a day or two of receiving them, to orders of
communications sent to her. At any rate, the Court will not permit
the result of an administrative proceeding riddled with the serious
defects already pointed out to negate an earlier judgment on the
merits on the same matter regularly rendered by competent
court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The proceedings complained
of are ANNULLED and all orders, writs and resolutions issued in the
course thereof, beginning with the show cause order of June 2, 1982
up to and including the challenged Resolutions of September 21,
1984 and December 14, 1984 of respondent Presidential Assistant
Manuel Lazaro are VACATED and SET ASIDE, for having been taken
and/or issued in violation of petitioner's right to due process,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur
G.R. Nos. 90660-61 January 21, 1991
UTE PATEROK, petitioner-appellant,
vs. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and HON. SALVADOR N. MISON,
respondents-appellees.
Untalan, Trinidad, Razon, Santos & Associate Law Offices for
petitioner-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:p
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari filed by Ute
Paterok the petitioner herein, seeking the annulment of the
decision
1 rendered by the public respondent,
the Bureau of Customs, through its Commissioner, the Hon.
Salvador N. Mison, approving the order
2 of forfeiture issued by the District Collector of Customs
against
the shipment of one (1) unit of Mercedes Benz of the petitioner
in favor of the government.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In March 1986, the petitioner shipped from Germany to the
Philippines two (2) containers, one with used household goods and
the other with two (2) used automobiles (one Bourgetti and one
Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The first container was released by the
Bureau of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The
Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the said
Bureau.
In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of
the said Mercedes Benz, the petitioner received a notice
3 of hearing from the legal officer of the Manila
International Container Port, Bureau of Customs informing the
former that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the
said Mercedes Benz for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 73 in
relation to Section 2530(F) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines (TCCP), as amended, and Central Bank Circular (CBC)
1069.
While the said case was pending, the petitioner received only on
April, 1988, a letter
4 informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her
Mercedes Benz had
been rendered on December 16, 1986 by the District Collector of
Customs. The petitioner had not been informed that a separate
seizure case was filed on the same Mercedes Benz in question before
the said District Collector, an office likewise under the Bureau of
Customs.
The petitioner later found out that on November 13, 1986, a
Notice of Hearing set on December 2, 1986, concerning the said
Mercedes Benz, was posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of
Customs at Port Area, Manila.
The petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial 5
before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila, but the latter,
in an order
6 dated May 30, 1988, denied the
same, invoking the failure of the former to appear in the said
hearing despite the posting of the notice on the bulletin
board.
Moreover, the Collector of Customs contended that a reopening of
the case was an exercise in futility considering that the forfeited
property, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, had an engine displacement of
more than 2800 cubic centimeters and therefore was under the
category of prohibited importation pursuant to B.P. Blg. 73.
-
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for review 7 with
the Department of
Finance, which petition the latter referred to the public
respondent. The petitioner likewise addressed a letter
8 to the Hon. Cancio Garcia, the Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, Malacaang,
requesting the latter's assistance for a speedy resolution of the
said petition.
Finally, the public respondent rendered a decision on September
22, 1989 affirming the previous order of the Collector of Customs
for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in question in favor of the
government.
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
III-1. THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE (Bureau of Customs) ERRED IN THE
RULING THAT A NOTICE OF HEARING POSTED IN [sic] THE BULLETIN BOARD
IS SUFFICIENT NOTICE AND FAILURE OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT TO APPEAR
CAUSED HER DECLARATION IN DEFAULT;
III-2. ERRED IN RULING THAT THEIR OFFICE WAS LEFT WITH NO
ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FORFEIT THE SHIPMENT AS MANDATED BY BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 73;
III-3. ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT OF OFFICE FINDS THE
RE-OPENING OF THE CASE AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY AND THAT THERE IS NO
POINT IN DISTURBING THE DECISION DECREEING THE FORFEITURE OF THE
SHIPMENT.
9
As regards the first assignment of error, we agree with the
petitioner that a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of
the public respondent in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of
the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute
sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural
due process.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative
necessity for administrative agencies to observe the elementary
rules of due process.
10 And no
rule is better established under the due process clause of the
Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be
heard before any person can be lawfully deprived of his rights.
11
In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing
posted on the bulletin board, the said procedure is premised on the
ground that the party or owner of the property in question is
unknown. This is clear from the provisions of the TCCP relied upon
by the public respondent, namely, Sections 2304 and 2306, captioned
"Notification of Unknown Owner and "Proceedings in Case of Property
Belonging to Unknown Parties," respectively, wherein the posting of
the notice of hearing on the bulletin board is specifically
allowed.
But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that the
petitioner could not have been unknown. The petitioner had previous
transactions with the Bureau of Customs and in fact, the latter had
earlier released the first container consisting of household goods
and the Bourgetti car to the former at her address (as stated in
the Bill of Lading). Moreover, there was a similar seizure case
12 that had been instituted by the Manila
International Container Port, docketed as S.I. No. 86-224,
covering the same Mercedes Benz in question and involving the same
owner, the petitioner herein.
If only the public respondents had exercised some reasonable
diligence to ascertain from their own records the identity and
address of the petitioner as the owner and the consignee of the
property in question, the necessary information could have been
easily obtained which would have assured the sending of the notice
of hearing properly and legally. Then, the petitioner would have
been afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present her
defense which is the essence of procedural due process. But the
public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic
duty.
Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity aforementioned, for
which the Court expresses its rebuke, the petition nonetheless can
not be granted.
This brings us to the second and third assignments of error
raised by the petitioner.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 73, a law intended to promote energy
conservation, provides that:
Sec. 3. Towards the same end and to develop a more dynamic and
effective program for the rational use of energy, the following
acts are hereby prohibited:
(a) The importation, manufacture or assembling of
gasoline-powered passenger motor cars with engine displacement of
over 2,800 cubic centimeters or Kerbweight exceeding 1,500
kilograms, including accessories.
13
The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the motor car in
question, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, has an engine displacement of
over 2,800 cubic centimeters which clearly falls within the
prohibited importation specified in the law aforequoted and as
such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public
respondents.
On the other hand, the petitioner claims that the said
prohibition involves only "direct" and not 'indirect" importation
as when both the shipper and the consignee are one and the same
person which is the case at bar. Be that as it may, the law is
clear and when it does not make any distinction on the term
"importation", we likewise must not distinguish. "Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguiere debemus."
Finally, the petitioner invokes Sec. 2307 of the TCCP, as
amended by Executive Order No. 38, dated August 6, 1986, which
provides an alternative in lieu of the forfeiture of the property
in question, that is, the payment of fine or redemption of the
forfeited property. But the last paragraph of the said section, as
amended, categorically states that:
-
Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any
case where the importation is absolutely prohibited or where the
surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the same
would be contrary to law. (Emphasis ours)
14
Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P. Blg. 73, to
allow the petitioner to redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there
is therefore no alternative, as correctly claimed by the public
respondents, but to forfeit the same.
We can not agree with the proposition that the Collector of
Customs is authorized to release the motor vehicle in question to
the petitioner which, in effect, would absolve the latter from any
liability.
In the matter of disposing of contrabands, Section 2609(c) of
the Tariff and Customs Code specifically provides that the
prerogative of the Collector of Customs is not the release of the
contraband like the Mercedes Benz in question but its sale, which
presupposes a prior custody pursuant to forfeiture and seizure
proceedings as in the case at bar.
As thus worded:
Sec. 2609. Disposition of Contraband. Article of prohibited
importation or exportation, known as contraband, shall, in the
absence of special provision, be dealt with as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Other contraband of commercial value and capable of
legitimate use may be sold under such restrictions as will insure
its use for legitimate purposes only . . .
There is nothing in the Code that authorizes the Collector to
release the contraband in favor of an importer. The Code, on the
other hand, is clear that the thing may be disposed of by sale
alone "under such restrictions as will insure its use for
legitimate purposes." To be sure, the restrictions to be prescribed
by the Collector must coincide with the purpose underlying Batas
Blg. 73, that is, to conserve energy. Hence, he can not allow its
use (after sale), in this case a Mercedes Benz with an engine
displacement of more than 2,800 cubic centimeters, that would set
at naught that purpose. He must make sure that the engine is
changed before it is allowed to ply Philippine soil.
In all cases, forfeiture is a must.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997]
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR,
Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued,
Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners, vs.
Honorable APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T.
CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ
Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal
Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISIMBING, Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE
OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted
by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until
President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of
Lumiqueds death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition
for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by
DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette
Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,
[1] charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification
of
official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued
allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding
gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt
worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another
receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of
falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of
P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made
field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it
impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he
claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22,
1989,[2]
private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission
on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the
months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he
made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00.
Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government by deliberately
concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification
of accounting entries in order not to reflect
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on `Cash advances of other officials under code 8-70-600 of
accounting rules.
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989,[3]
charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to
private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued
to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier
without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20,
1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued
Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the
complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State
Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City
Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix
Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation
within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their
report and recommendation within fifteen days from its
conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena
directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before
June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to
defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of
two of private respondents complaints. The committee granted the
motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992,[4]
Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against
him to extort money from innocent
public servants like him, and were initiated by private
respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac
and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent
weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondents
execution of an affidavit of desistance.
[5]
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption
was 108.45 liters. He submitted, however, that such consumption was
warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the five service
vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the
Office of the Regional Director of the DAR. He added that the
receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the
course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in
Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar.
Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers
for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors
and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He
affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that the same
were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that
official transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt,
Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along Santa
Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle
ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help
of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with
the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own
receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline.
Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated
this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990.
[6] With
respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the
amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that
the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting
the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal
error or accountability.
To refute private respondents allegation that he violated COA
rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in
the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification
[7] of DAR-CAR
Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no
outstanding cash advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against
him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not terminated
from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due to her
prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed
the required applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed
that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her
application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second
application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the
same immediately with the head office or upon her return to work.
He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her
application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that
private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA
examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to
November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private
respondent immediately returned the amount on January 18, 1990, the
day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued
claimed that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to
jobs that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3
and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the
second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992,
to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared
on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for
additional hearing,
[8] alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The
motion
was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently
because the investigation had already been terminated. In an order
dated September 7, 1992,
[9] State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion,
viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was
discharged from the Sacred Heart
Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date
was upon the request of
respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that
respondent advised the Investigating
committee of his confinement and inability to attend despite his
discharge, either by himself or
thru counsel. The records likewise do not show that efforts were
exerted to notify the
Committee of respondents condition on any reasonable date after
July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992,
respondent was already being assisted by counsel.
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Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted
reveal(s) the sufficiency,
completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together
with the documentary
evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of
the case based on the
pleadings submitted is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as
far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much
longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating
committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992,
[10] finding Lumiqued liable for all the
charges against him. It made the following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by
the parties, this committee
finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to
establish the guilt of the
respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in
claiming for the reimbursement of
his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established by
the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of
the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the
certifications issued by the different
gasoline stations where the respondent purchased gasoline.
Annexes `G-1 to `G-15 show that
the actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46
liters only at a purchase
price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the
respondent which reflects an average of
108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of
the respondent is made
manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10
times the value of what he
actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were
ascertained to have been falsified,
the motive, the pattern and the scheme employed by the
respondent in defrauding the government has, nevertheless, been
established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted
by the respondent. In fact, he
had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment
of an average consumption of
108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the
4 vehicles issued to his office.
Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondents act in defrauding the government of a considerable
sum of money by falsifying
receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but
also a criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of
Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic)
unliquidated cash advances in the
year 1989 which is in violation of established office and
auditing rules. His cash advances
totalling to aboutP116,000.00 were properly documented. The
requests for obligation of
allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed
by him. The mere
certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the
DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that
the respondents act in relieving
the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on
December 1, 1989 was an act of
harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks
after the complainant filed charges
against her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the
Commission on Audit came
only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondents
order relieving the
complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate
employee in retaliation to a
complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part
of the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no
help to the respondent. In fact,
this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to
have the cases against him
dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III
the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqueds
dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing
of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to
President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that the
filing of the affidavit of desistance
[11] would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the
matter
considering that what was at stake was not only the violation of
complainants (herein private respondents) personal rights but also
the competence and fitness of the respondent (Lumiqued) to remain
in public office. He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record
could call for a punitive action against the respondent on the
initiative of the DAR.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for
reconsideration of the findings of the Committee with the DOJ.
[12] Undersecretary Ramon S.
Esguerra indorsed the motion to the investigating
committee.[13]
In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating
committee informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee had
no more authority to act on the same (motion for reconsideration)
considering that the matter has already been forwarded to the
Office of the President and that their authority under Department
Order No. 145 ceased when they transmitted their report to the
DOJ.
[14] Concurring with this view, Undersecretary
Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee
could no longer act on his motion for reconsideration. He added
that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of
the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilons
recommendation.
[15]
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued
Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52),
[16] finding Lumiqued
administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of
fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service,
with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers
and that the auditor and
accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable
is untenable. The receipts in
question were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting
that those receipts were
validly issued by the commercial establishments and were
properly disbursed and used in the official business for which it
was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the
drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want us to
do.
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The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and
harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash
advances, were not satisfactorily established.
In a petition for appeal[17]
addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52
be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position
with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and
regulations. This petition was basically premised on the affidavit
dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former
driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the
falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner
Lumiqueds being an honest man who had no premonition that the
receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were altered.
[18]
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for the
reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on
August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration,
alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional
right to counsel during the hearing.
[19] On May 19, 1994,
[20] however, before his
motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28,
1994,
[21] Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying
for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then
Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos,
and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for
the payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to
deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the
backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the
time of his death on May 19, 1994.
[22]
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to
inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They
maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the
waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert
that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted
Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his
own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to
counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and
in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation.
[23] It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked
or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the
right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was
for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively
liable under the law for the complaints filed against
him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro
states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws, a
Committee to conduct the formal investigation of the
administrative complaint for oppression,
dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously
undesirable and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service against Mr.
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional
Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous
Region, is hereby created x x x.[24]
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee
was not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more
pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it
hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.
Petitioners misconception on the nature of the investigation
[25] conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been
engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is
true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system,
[26] conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to perform
such other functions as may be provided by law,
[27] prosecutors may be called upon to
conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the
investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was
duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in
accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not
be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges
and of the respondents capacity to represent himself and no duty
rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel.
[28] In an administrative proceeding
such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as
Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII
of Republic Act No. 2260
[29] (otherwise
known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2,
Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order