Admin Digest Atty. dela Cruz

7/29/2019 Admin Digest Atty. dela Cruz

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Administrative law:GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

Executive Secretary vs. SouthwingPresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

through Executive Secretary Alberto G.Romulo, issued EO156, entitledPROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVEINDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FORTHE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENTPROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTINGGUIDELINES. Article 2, Section 3.1prohibits the importation into the country,inclusive of the Special Economic andFreeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport(SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles,subject to a few exceptions. Respondents,Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.(SOUTHWING), United Auctioneers, Inc.(UNITED AUCTIONEERS), Microvan, Inc.(MICROVAN), Subic Integrated MacroVentures Corporation (MACRO VENTURES),and Motor Vehicle Importers Association ofSubic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION),filed actions for declaratory relief, prayingthat Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 be declared

unconstitutional because it was anunlawful usurpation of legislative powervested by the Constitution with Congressit was decided in their favor. Hence, thecurrent petition questioning the decision.

Issue: Whether Article 2, Section 3.1of EO156 is a valid exercise of thePresidents quasi-legislative power.

Ruling: Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 is voidinsofar as it is made applicable to thesecured fenced-in former Subic Naval Basearea but valid insofar as it applies to thePhilippine territory outside the secured

fenced-in former Subic Naval Base. Policepower is inherent in a government to enactlaws, within constitutional limits, topromote the order, safety, health, morals,and general welfare of society. It is lodgedprimarily with the legislature. By virtue ofvalid delegation, it may also be exercisedby the President and administrativeboards, as well as the law making bodieson all municipal levels, including thebarangay. Quasi-legislative power authority delegated by the law-makingbody to the administrative body to adoptrules and regulations intended to carry outthe provisions of the law and implementlegislative policy. Requisites for validadministrative issuance: Its promulgationmust be authorized by the legislature; Thisrequisite was satisfied by EO156, which asboth constitutional and statutory bases.Sec. 28(2) of Art. VI of the Constitution

provides that the Congress may, by law,authorize the President to fix withinspecified limits, and subject to suchlimitation and restrictions as it mayimpose, tariff rates, import and exportquot as, tonnage and wharfage dues, andother duties or imposts within theframework of the national developmentprogram of the Government. Tariff andCustoms Code, EO226 (OmnibusInvestment Code), RA880 (Safeguard

Measures Act; SMA) authorize thePresident, when general welfare andnational security require, prohibitingimports of commodities. It must bepromulgated in accordance with the

prescribed procedure; Difference betweenlegislative rules and interpretative rules:Legislative rules subordinate legislation,crafted to implement a primary legislation.Interpretative rules which give no realconsequence more than what the law itselfhas already prescribed. Notice and hearingis required when an administrative rulegoes beyond merely providing for themeans that can facilitate or render lesscumbersome the implementation of thelaw and substantially increases the burdenof those governed (legislative rules).

EO156 is a legislative rule because it seeksto implement or execute primarylegislative enactments intended to protectthe domestic industry by imposing a banon the importation of a specified productnot previously subject to such prohibition.However, there being no objection from

the respondents as to the procedure in thepromulgation of EO156, presumption isthat it duly complied with the procedure sand limitations imposed by law. It must bewithin the scope of the authority given bythe legislature; and The third requisite isnot complied with as EO156 exceeded thescope of its application by extending theprohibition on the importation of used carsto the Free port (SBF), which RA7227considers to some extent, a foreign

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territory.> RA7227 provided for theconversion of the Clark and Subic militaryreservations to a Subic Bay Freeport,wherein SBF enterprises may import andexport freely. The subject matter of the

laws authorizing the President to regulateor forbid importation of used motorvehicles, is the domestic industry or thecustoms territory that is the portion of thePhilippines outside the SBF. It must bereasonable. Issuance of the ban to protectthe domestic industry is a reasonableexercise of police power. > The problemit seeks to solve is the deterioration of thelocal motor-manufacturing firms due to theinflux of imported used motor vehicles.However, it becomes unreasonable whensuch ban applied to the SBF. > As longas the used motor vehicles do not enterthe customs territory, the injury or harmsought to be prevented will not arise.

Lupangco vs. CAIn October 1986 PRC issued Reso. No. 105

as part of the "Additional Instruction toExaminees" to all those applying foradmission to take the licensureexaminations in accountancy. Theresolution embodied the followingprovisions; "NO EXAMINEE SHALL ATTENDANY REVIEW CLASSES, BRIEFING,CONFERENCE AND THE LIKE CONDUCTEDBY OR SHALL RECEIVE HANDOUT FROMANY COLLEGE REVIEW CENTERS...DURINGTHE LAST 3

DAYS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDDING EVERYEXAMINATION DAY".Petitioner (all reviewees preparing for thenext licensure examinations inaccountancy) filed on their own behalf and

in behalf of all those similarly situated withRTC a complaint for injunction with prayerfor the writ of preliminary injunctionagainst PRC to restrain the latter forenforcing the Resolution that is found to beunconstitutional.PRC filed a motion to dismiss with CA onthe ground that the lower court had nojurisdiction to review and enjoin theenforcement of its resolution because PRCand RTC is a co-equal body hence does nothave any power to control each other orinterfere with each others acts.PRC further invoke Sec 9 paragraph 3 ofBP 129 saying that it is CA who hasjurisdiction over the case not the RTC.Issues:1. W/N RTC AND PRC is of the samecategory, where RTC cannot passupon the validity of the Admin Acts ofthe latter and it is CA who has proper

jurisdiction not RTC.2. W/N the Resolution isconstitutional?Ruling:1.No, in order to invoke Sec 9 of BP 129,there has to be a final order or ruling thatresulted from proceedings wherein theadministrative body involved quasi-judicialfunction. QUASI-JUDICIAL function refers toaction, discretion, etc. of publicadministrative officers or bodies required

to investigate facts or ascertain theexistence of facts, hold hearings and drawconclusions from them as the basis fortheir action. This DOES NOT cover rulesand regulations of general applIIcability

issued by the Admin Body to implementpurely administrative policies like Reso.No. 105.

SC further held that orders and resolutionsof PRC fall within the general jurisdiction ofRTC because of the absence of a provisionin the law creating the Commission that itsorders and resolutions are only appealablein CA or SC. And since PRC is attached tothe office of the President for generaldirection and coordination hence as settledin our jurisprudence, even the acts of theOffice of the President may be reviewed byRTC.

2. No, Reso No. 105 is held to beunconstitutional. It is an axiom in ADMINLAW that administrative authorities shouldnot act rbitrarily and capriciously in theissuance of rules and regulations. To be

valid, such rules and regulations MUST BEREASONABLE and FAIRLY adapted tosecure the end view. Res No. 105 is notonly unreasonable and arbitrary, it alsoinfringes on the examinee s right to libertyguaranteed in the constitution. It furtherviolated the academic freedom of schoolsconcerned

Biak na Bato vs. TancoDuring the mining boom in 1933, a group

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of hopeful and enthusiastic individualsfrom the North, appeared to have locatedfrom November, 1933 to February, 1934one hundred seventy (170) mining claimsin hinterlands of the Cordillera Mountains

in Sitios of Pasil and Balatoc, Municipalityof Lubuagan, Mountain Province (nowknown as the Municipality of Balatoc,Province of Kalinga-Apayao). The landcovered by said 170 mining claims isadjacent and surrounds the miningproperties of Batong Buhay Gold Mines,Inc.On February 8, 1969, the petitioner Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. was created as apartnership in accordance with law. And onNovember 19, 1969, the locators, namely:Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, MarioVillarica, Anastacio Cano and SalvadorEllone, each executed a Deed of Transferof Mining Rights assigning, transferring and conveying to the petitioner themining claims covered by the aforesaid declarations of location On December4,1969, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed withthe Bureau of Mines the application for

lease and a petition for an order of leasesurvey of the aforementioned miningclaims (Rollo,Ibid., p. 42). However, itreceived a notice of the letter of theDirector of Mines refusing to issue theorder of lease survey because the areascovered by the mining claims wereallegedly in conflict with the four (4)groups of mining claims purportedly ownedby the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines,Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. (Rollo,Ibid.,

pp. 45-46).On January 12, 1970, Biak-Na-Bato MiningCompany filed its separate protest with theBureau of Mines against Balatoc-LubuaganMines, Inc. In said protest, Biak-

Na-Bato Mining Company contests anddisputes the right of Balatoc-LubuaganMines, Inc. to eleven (11) mining claimsand the right of Mountain Mines, Inc. toanother nine (9) mining claims (Rollo, Vol.I, Petition, p. 12). After the ocularinspection conducted by the Bureau ofMines inspection team, a report wassubmitted with topographic map andpictures of the improvements. According tothe report, the ground worksimprovements and other form ofassessment works in the mining propertiesof said respondents were significant andextensive, all evaluated and assessed atP582,996.60 (Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 621-690).The Director of Mines promulgated itsdecision in both cases, holding that asagainst Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company, theBalatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. andMountain

Mines, Inc., have a better right to the 170mining claims of about 1,520 hectareslocated at the Cordillera Mountains, inPasil, Municipality of Balatoc, Province ofKalinga-Apayao (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 134-145).From the said decision of the Director ofMines, petitioner appealed to the Secretaryof Agriculture and Natural Resources,docketed as DANR Case No. 3613 entitled"Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs.

Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc." and DANRCase No. 3613-A entitled "Biak-Na-BatoMining Company vs. Mountain Mines, Inc."(Rollo, Petition, p. 9).In its appeal, the Biak-Na-Bato Mining

Company questioned the first ocularinspection report. The Secretary in theexercise of his appellate power and injustice to the petitioner ordered a secondocular inspection, after which the secondinspection team submitted a reportconfirming the findings of the first ocularinspection team, and also reported thatBiak-Na-Bato Mining Company despiteopportunity afforded was not able to showits location in the area (Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 693-701).On September 17, 1971, the Secretaryrendered his decision on the appeal,affirming the findings of facts of theDirector of Mines and declaring Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Baguio Mines,Inc. s mining area not open for relocationin 1967-1968 and therefore Biak-Na-BatoMining Company s locations null and void.

The Secretary also declared that itsmining claims are table located, andtherefore null and void, and that it hadno legal personality to file the protest inthe Bureau of Mines. The dispositiveportion of the decision reads:

ISSUE: W/N the contention of thepetitioner is correct.

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HELD: As a general rule, under theprinciples of administrative law in force inthis jurisdiction, decisions of administrativeofficers shall not be disturbed by thecourts, except when the former have

acted without or in excess of theirjurisdiction, or with grave abuse ofdiscretion. Findings of administrativeofficials and agencies who have acquiredexpertise because their jurisdiction isconfined to specific matters are generallyaccorded not only respect but at timeseven finality if such findings aresupported by substantial evidence (SanLuis v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 261[1989], Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v.Lopez Enage, 152 SCRA 80 [1987]) and arecontrolling on the reviewing authorities(Doruelo v. Ministry of National Defense,169 SCRA 448 [1989]) because of theiracknowledged expertise in the fields ofspecialization to which they are assigned.Even the courts of justice, including thisCourt, are bound by such findings in theabsence of a clear showing of a graveabuse of discretion, which is not presentin this case at bar (Gordon v. VeridianoII, 167 SCRA 53 [1988]).There is no question that the decision ofthe Director of Mines as affirmed by theSecretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources is substantially supported byevidence. Substantial evidence has beendefined or construed to mean notnecessarily preponderant proof as requiredin ordinary civil cases but such kind of

relevant evidence as a reasonable mindmight accept as adequate to support aconclusion (Castro v. CA, 169 SCRA 383[1989]; Bagsican v. CA, 141 SCRA 226[1980]; Lustre v. CAR, 10 SCRA 659

[1964]).PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition ishereby DISMISSED, and the assaileddecision of the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources is herebyAFFIRMED.

Euromed vs. Batangas

Province of Batangas: defendant;respondent Euro-Med Laboratories:plaintiff; petitioner

The Province of Batangas, through thevarious authorized representatives of thegovernment hospitals by Euro-MedLaboratories, were identified to havepurchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF)which were products of the petitioner.The respondent was found to have anunpaid balance of P487,662.80 whichwere evidenced by invoices received andsigned by defendant s authorizedrepresentatives.

Over the course of the trial where thepetitioner s side concluded theirpresentation of evidence, the respondentfiled a motion to dismiss on the groundthat the primary jurisdiction over themoney claim is with the Commission onAudit (CO A).

Issue: Who has primary jurisdictionover the case: COA/RTC?

Held: Merits of the case is well within the

jurisdiction of COA.- Under the doctrine of primaryjurisdiction, if a case is such that itsdetermination requires the expertise,specialized training and knowledge of anadministrative body, relief must first beobtained in an administrative proceedingbefore resort to the courts is had, even ifthe matter is within their properjurisdiction.- Under the Government Auditing Codeof the Philippines, it is well within the scope of COA s authority to take casesfor liquidated claims, or those determinedor readily determinable from vouchers,invoices and such other papers within reach of COA s jurisdiction.- Both parties agreed that the transactionswere governed by the Local GovernmentCode provisions on supply and propertymanagement in which its implementingrules and regulations are promulgated inCOA s Code. "the authority and power ofthe commission [on audit] shall extendto and comprehend all matters relating toxxxx the examination, audit, andsettlement of all debts and claims of anysort due from or owing to theGovernment or any of its subdivisions,agencies, and in strumentalities. xxxx"- Such matters are found to be not withinthe usual area of knowledge, experienc e

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and expertise of most judges but withinthe special competence of COA auditorsand accountants.

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO versus

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSIONOF 2010 (G.R. No. 192935; December7, 2010)

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B.ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,SR., versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARYPAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENTOF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENTSECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R.No. 193036; December 7,2010)

Like almost all powers conferred bythe Constitution, the power of judicialreview is subject to limitations, to wit:(1) there must be an actual case orcontroversy calling for the exercise ofjudicial power; (2) the person challengingthe act must have the standing toquestion the validity of the subject act orissuance; otherwise stated, he must havea personal and substantial interest in thecase such that he has sustained, or willsustain, direct injury as a result of itsenforcement; (3) the question ofconstitutionality must be raised at theearliest opportunity; and (4) the issue ofconstitutionality must be the very lismota of the case.

Among all these limitations, only the legalstanding of the petitioners has been put atissue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personalityof the petitioners-legislators to file theirpetition for failure to demonstrate theirpersonal stake in the outcome of the case.It argues that the petitioners have notshown that they have sustained or are indanger of sustaining any personal injuryattributable to the creation of the PTC. Notclaiming to be the subject of thecommissions investigations, petitionerswill not sustain injury in its creation or asa result of its proceedings.

The Court disagrees with the OSG inquestioning the legal standing of thepetitioners-legislators to assail ExecutiveOrder No. 1. Evidently, their petitionprimarily invokes usurpation of thepower of the Congress as a body to whichthey belong as members. This certainlyjustifies their resolve to take the cudgelsfor Congress as an institution and presentthe complaints on the usurpation of theirpower and rights as members of thelegislature before the Court. As held inPhilippine Constitution Association v.Enriquez,

To the extent the powers of Congress areimpaired, so is the power of eachmember thereof, since his office confers

a right to participate in the exercise of thepowers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injuresthe institution of Congress causes a

derivative but nonetheless substantialinjury, which can be questioned by amember of Congress. In such a case, anymember of Congress can have a resort tothe courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standingto see to it that the prerogative, powersand privileges vested by the Constitutionin their office remain inviolate. Thus, theyare allowed to question the validity of anyofficial action which, to their mind,infringes on their prerogatives aslegislators.

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG arguesthat, as a taxpayer, he has no standing toquestion the creation of the PTC and thebudget for its operations. It emphasizesthat the funds to be used for thecreation and operation of the commissionare to be taken from those funds alreadyappropriated by Congress. Thus, theallocation and disbursement of funds forthe commission will not entailcongressional action but will simply be anexercise of the Presidents power overcontingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG,Biraogo has not shown that hesustained, or is in danger of sustaining,

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any personal and direct injuryattributable to the implementation ofExecutive Order No. 1. Nowhere in hispetition is an assertion of a clear right thatmay justify his clamor for the Court to

exercise judicial power and to wield theaxe over presidential issuances in defenseof the Constitution. The case of David v.Arroyo explained the deep-seated rules onlocus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as "a right ofappearance in a court of justice on a givenquestion." In private suits, standing isgoverned by the "real-parties-in interest"rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 ofthe 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Itprovides that "every action must beprosecuted or defended inthe name of the real party in interest."Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is"the party who stands to be benefited orinjured by the judgment in the suit orthe party entitled to the avails of thesuit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffsstanding is based on his own right to therelief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standiarises in public suits. Here, the plaintiffwho asserts a "public right" in assailingan allegedly illegal official action, does soas a representative of the general public.He may be a person who is affected nodifferently from any other person. Hecould be suing as a "stranger," or in the

category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." Ineither case, he has to adequately showthat he is entitled to seek judicialprotection. In other words, he has to makeout a sufficient interest in the vindication

of the public order and the securing ofrelief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions nowallows both "citizen" and "taxpayer"standing in public actions. The distinctionwas first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,where it was held that the plaintiff in ataxpayers suit is in a different categoryfrom the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In theformer, the plaintiff is affected by theexpenditure of public funds, while in thelatter, he is but the mere instrument ofthe public concern. As held by the NewYork Supreme Court in People ex rel Casev. Collins: "In matter of mere public right,howeverthe people are the realpartiesIt is at least the right, if not theduty, of every citizen to interfere and seethat a public offence be properly pursuedand punished, and that a publicgrievance be remedied." With respect totaxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that"the right of a citizen and a taxpayer tomaintain an action in courts to restrainthe unlawful use of public funds to hisinjury cannot be denied."However, to prevent just about anyperson from seeking judicial interferencein any official policy or act with which hedisagreed with, and thus hinders the

activities of governmental agenciesengaged in public service, the UnitedState Supreme Court laid down themore stringent "direct injury" test in ExParte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v.

Ullman. The same Court ruled that for aprivate individual to invoke the judicialpower to determine the validity of anexecutive or legislative action, he mustshow that he has sustained a direct injuryas a result of that action, and it is notsufficient that he has a general interestcommon to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" testin our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, itheld that the person who impugns thevalidity of a statute must have "apersonal and substantial interest in thecase such that he has sustained, or willsustain direct injury as a result." The Veradoctrine was upheld in a litany of cases,such as, Custodio v. President of theSenate, Manila Race Horse TrainersAssociation v. De la Fuente, Pascual v.Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.[Emphases included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on thedoctrine that "the rule on standing is amatter of procedure, hence, can berelaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs likeordinary citizens, taxpayers, andlegislators when the public interest sorequires, such as when the matter is oftranscendental importance, of

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overreaching significance to society, or ofparamount public interest."

Thus, in Coconut Oil RefinersAssociation, Inc. v. Torres, the Court

held that in cases of paramountimportance where serious constitutionalquestions are involved, the standingrequirements may be relaxed and a suitmay be allowed to prosper even wherethere is no direct injury to the partyclaiming the right of judicial review. Inthe first Emergency Powers Cases,ordinary citizens and taxpayers wereallowed to question the constitutionality ofseveral executive orders although theyhad only an indirect and general interestshared in common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants oftranscendental importance laid down inCREBA v. ERC and Meralco are non-existent in this case. The Court,however, finds reason in Biraogosassertion that the petition covers mattersof transcendental importance to justifythe exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.There are constitutional issues in thepetition which deserve the attention ofthis Court in view of their seriousness,novelty and weight as precedents. Wherethe issues are of transcendental andparamount importance not only to thepublic but also to the Bench and theBar, they should be resolved for theguidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipinopeople are more than interested to

know the status of the Presidents firsteffort to bring about a promised changeto the country. The Court takescognizance of the petition not due tooverwhelming political undertones that

clothe the issue in the eyes of the public,but because the Court stands firm in itsoath to perform its constitutional duty tosettle legal controversies withoverreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create theTruth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935,Biraogo asserts that the TruthCommission is a public office and notmerely an adjunct body of the Office ofthe President. Thus, in order that thePresident may create a public office hemust be empowered by the Constitution, astatute or an authorization vested in himby law. According to petitioner, suchpower cannot be presumed since thereis no provision in the Constitution or anyspecific law that authorizes the Presidentto create a truth commission. He addsthat Section 31 of the AdministrativeCode of 1987, granting the Presidentthe continuing authority to reorganize hisoffice, cannot serve as basis for thecreation of a truth commissionconsidering the aforesaid provisionmerely uses verbs such as"reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate,""merge," and "abolish." Insofar as itvests in the President the plenary power to

reorganize the Office of the President tothe extent of creating a public office,Section 31 is inconsistent with theprinciple of separation of powers enshrinedin the Constitution and must be deemed

repealed upon the effectivity thereof.

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of apublic office lies within the province ofCongress and not with the executivebranch of government. They maintainthat the delegated authority of thePresident to reorganize under Section 31of the Revised Administrative Code:1) does not permit the President to createa public office, much less a truthcommission; 2) is limited to thereorganization of the administrativestructure of the Office of thePresident; 3) is limited to therestructuring of the internal organs of theOffice of the President Proper, transfer offunctions and transfer of agencies; and 4)only to achieve simplicity, economy andefficiency. Such continuing authority ofthe President to reorganize his office islimited, and by issuing Executive OrderNo. 1, the President overstepped thelimits of this delegated authority.

x x xThe question, therefore, before the Courtis this: Does the creation of the PTC fallwithin the ambit of the power toreorganize as expressed in Section 31

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of the Revised Administrative Code?Section 31 contemplates "reorganization"as limited by the following functional andstructural lines: (1) restructuring theinternal organization of the Office of the

President Proper by abolishing,consolidating or merging units thereof ortransferring functions from one unit toanother; (2) transferring any functionunder the Office of the President to anyother Department/Agency or vice versa;or (3) transferring any agency under theOffice of the President to any otherDepartment/Agency or vice versa. Clearly,the provision refers to reduction ofpersonnel, consolidation of offices, orabolition thereof by reason of economy orredundancy of functions. These point tosituations where a body or an office isalready existent but a modification oralteration thereof has to be effected.The creation of an office is nowherementioned, much less envisioned in saidprovision. Accordingly, the answer to thequestion is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of arestructuring of the Office of thePresident under Section 31 is a misplacedsupposition, even in the plainest meaningattributable to the term "restructure" an"alteration of an existing structure."Evidently, the PTC was not part of thestructure of the Office of the Presidentprior to the enactment of Executive OrderNo. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIBv. Hon. Executive Secretary,

But of course, the list of legal basisauthorizing the President to reorganizeany department or agency in theexecutive branch does not have to end

here. We must not lose sight of thevery source of the power that whichconstitutes an express grant of power.Under Section 31, Book III of ExecutiveOrder No. 292 (otherwise known as theAdministrative Code of 1987), "thePresident, subject to the policy in theExecutive Office and in order toachieve simplicity, economy andefficiency, shall have the continuingauthority to reorganize the administrativestructure of the Office of the President."For this purpose, he may transfer thefunctions of other Departments orAgencies to the Office of the President. InCanonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312(2000)], we ruled that reorganization"involves the reduction of personnel,consolidation of offices, or abolitionthereof by reason of economy orredundancy of functions." It takes placewhen there is an alteration of theexisting structure of government officesor units therein, including the lines ofcontrol, authority and responsibilitybetween them. The EIIB is a bureauattached to the Department of Finance.It falls under the Office of the President.Hence, it is subject to the Presidentscontinuing authority to reorganize.[Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of thePTC is not justified by the Presidentspower of control. Control is essentially thepower to alter or modify or nullify or setaside what a subordinate officer had

done in the performance of his duties andto substitute the judgment of the formerwith that of the latter.47 Clearly, thepower of control is entirely different fromthe power to create public offices. Theformer is inherent in the Executive, whilethe latter finds basis from either a validdelegation from Congress, or his inherentduty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a validdelegation of power from Congress,empowering the President to create apublic office?

According to the OSG, the power tocreate a truth commission pursuant to theabove provision finds statutory basisunder P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.1772. The said law granted the Presidentthe continuing authority to reorganize thenational government, including the powerto group, consolidate bureaus andagencies, to abolish offices, to transferfunctions, to create and classifyfunctions, services and activities, transferappropriations, and to standardize salariesand materials. This decree, in relation toSection 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 hasbeen invoked in several cases such asLarin v. Executive Secretary.

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The Court, however, declines to recognizeP.D. No. 1416 as a justification for thePresident to create a public office. Saiddecree is already stale, anachronistic andinoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation

to then President Marcos of theauthority to reorganize theadministrative structure of the nationalgovernment including the power tocreate offices and transferappropriations pursuant to one of thepurposes of the decree, embodied in itslast "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards theparliamentary form of government willnecessitate flexibility in the organization ofthe national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose ofproviding manageability and resiliencyduring the interim, P.D. No. 1416, asamended by P.D. No. 1772, becamefunctus oficio upon the convening of theFirst Congress, as expressly provided inSection 6, Article XVIII of the 1987Constitution. In fact, even the SolicitorGeneral agrees with this view. x x xWhile the power to create a truthcommission cannot pass muster on thebasis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended byP.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC findsjustification under Section 17, Article VII ofthe Constitution, imposing upon thePresident the duty to ensure that the

laws are faithfully executed. Section 17reads:

Section 17. The President shall havecontrol of all the executive departments,

bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure thatthe laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasissupplied).

As correctly pointed out by therespondents, the allocation of power inthe three principal branches ofgovernment is a grant of all powersinherent in them. The Presidents power toconduct investigations to aid him inensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws onpublic accountability and transparency isinherent in the Presidents powers as theChief Executive. That the authority of thePresident to conduct investigations andto create bodies to execute this poweris not explicitly mentioned in theConstitution or in statutes does not meanthat he is bereft of such authority. Asexplained in the landmark case of Marcosv. Manglapus:

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however,brought back the presidential system ofgovernment and restored the separationof legislative, executive and judicialpowers by their actual distribution amongthree distinct branches of governmentwith provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to statethat "executive power" is the power toenforce the laws, for the President is headof state as well as head of governmentand whatever powers inhere in such

positions pertain to the office unless theConstitution itself withholds it.Furthermore, the Constitution itselfprovides that the execution of the lawsis only one of the powers of thePresident. It also grants the Presidentother powers that do not involve theexecution of any provision of law, e.g., hispower over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the viewthat although the 1987 Constitutionimposes limitations on the exercise ofspecific powers of the President, itmaintains intact what is traditionallyconsidered as within the scope of"executive power." Corollarily, the powersof the President cannot be said to belimited only to the specific powersenumerated in the Constitution. In otherwords, executive power is more than thesum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whateverpower inherent in the government that isneither legislative nor judicial has to beexecutive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given muchleeway in ensuring that our laws arefaithfully executed. As stated above, thepowers of the President are not limited to

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those specific powers under theConstitution. One of the recognizedpowers of the President granted pursuantto this constitutionally-mandated duty isthe power to create ad hoc committees.

This flows from the obvious need toascertain facts and determine if lawshave been faithfully executed. Thus, inDepartment of Health v. Camposano, theauthority of the President to issueAdministrative Order No. 298, creating aninvestigative committee to look into theadministrative charges filed against theemployees of the Department of Healthfor the anomalous purchase of medicineswas upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executives power to create theAd hoc Investigating Committee cannot bedoubted. Having been constitutionallygranted full control of the ExecutiveDepartment, to which respondentsbelong, the President has the obligationto ensure that all executive officials andemployees faithfully comply with the law.With AO 298 as mandate, the legality ofthe investigation is sustained. Suchvalidity is not affected by the fact thatthe investigating team and the PCAGChad the same composition, or that theformer used the offices and facilities ofthe latter in conducting the inquiry.[Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose ofallowing ad hoc investigating bodies toexist is to allow an inquiry into matters

which the President is entitled to knowso that he can be properly advised andguided in the performance of his dutiesrelative to the execution and enforcementof the laws of the land. And if history is to

be revisited, this was also the objective ofthe investigative bodies created in thepast like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, theFeliciano Commission, the MeloCommission and the ZenarosaCommission. There being no changes inthe government structure, the Court isnot inclined to declare such executivepower as non-existent just because thedirection of the political winds havechanged.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1transgresses the power of Congress toappropriate funds for the operation of apublic office, suffice it to say that therewill be no appropriation but only anallotment or allocations of existing fundsalready appropriated. Accordingly, there isno usurpation on the part of the Executiveof the power of Congress to appropriatefunds. Further, there is no need to specifythe amount to be earmarked for theoperation of the commission because, inthe words of the Solicitor General,"whatever funds the Congress hasprovided for the Office of the President willbe the very source of the funds for thecommission." Moreover, since the amountthat would be allocated to the PTC shallbe subject to existing auditing rules and

regulations, there is no impropriety in thefunding.

Power of the Truth Commission toInvestigate

The Presidents power to conductinvestigations to ensure that laws arefaithfully executed is well recognized. Itflows from the faithful-execution clauseof the Constitution under Article VII,Section 17 thereof. As the ChiefExecutive, the president represents thegovernment as a whole and sees to itthat all laws are enforced by theofficials and employees of his

department. He has the authority todirectly assume the functions of theexecutive department.

Invoking this authority, the Presidentconstituted the PTC to primarilyinvestigate reports of graft and corruptionand to recommend the appropriate action.As previously stated, no quasi-judicialpowers have been vested in the said bodyas it cannot adjudicate rights of personswho come before it. It has been said that"Quasi-judicial powers involve the powerto hear and determine questions of factto which the legislative policy is to applyand to decide in accordance with thestandards laid down by law itself inenforcing and administering the samelaw." In simpler terms, judicialdiscretion is involved in the exercise ofthese quasi-judicial power, such that it is

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exclusively vested in the judiciary andmust be clearly authorized by thelegislature in the case of administrativeagencies.

The distinction between the power toinvestigate and the power to adjudicatewas delineated by theCourt in Cario v. Commission on HumanRights. Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood,means to examine, explore, inquire ordelve or probe into, research on, study.The dictionary definition of "investigate"is "to observe or study closely: inquire

into systematically: "to search or inquireinto: x x to subject to an official probe xx: to conduct an official inquiry." Thepurpose of investigation, of course, is todiscover, to find out, to learn, obtaininformation. Nowhere included orintimated is the notion of settling, decidingor resolving a controversy involved in thefacts inquired into by application of the lawto the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" isessentially the same: "(t)o follow up stepby step by patient inquiry or observation.To trace or track; to search into; toexamine and inquire into with care andaccuracy; to find out by carefulinquisition; examination; the taking ofevidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; tomake an investigation," "investigation"being in turn described as "(a)n

administrative function, the exercise ofwhich ordinarily does not require ahearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x aninquiry, judicial or otherwise, for thediscovery and collection of facts

concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularlyunderstood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,judge, decide, determine, resolve, ruleon, settle. The dictionary defines the termas "to settle finally (the rights andduties of the parties to a court case) onthe merits of issues raised: x x to passjudgment on: settle judicially: x x act asjudge." And "adjudge" means "to decide

or rule upon as a judge or with judicial orquasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grantjudicially in a case of controversy x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means:"To settle in the exercise of judicialauthority. To determine finally.Synonymous with adjudge in its strictestsense;" and "adjudge" means: "To passon judicially, to decide, settle or decree, orto sentence or condemn. x x. Implies ajudicial determination of a fact, and theentry of a judgment." [Italics included.Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and itcannot be likened to the judicial functionof a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function ofreceiving evidence and ascertainingtherefrom the facts of a controversy is not

a judicial function. To be considered assuch, the act of receiving evidence andarriving at factual conclusions in acontroversy must be accompanied by theauthority of applying the law to the

factual conclusions to the end thatthe controversy may be decided orresolved authoritatively, finally anddefinitively, subject to appeals or modesof review as may be provided by law.Even respondents themselves admit thatthe commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, thePTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or

the DOJ or erode their respective powers.If at all, the investigative function of thecommission will complement those of thetwo offices. As pointed out by theSolicitor General, the recommendation toprosecute is but a consequence of theoverall task of the commission toconduct a fact-finding investigation." Theactual prosecution of suspected offenders,much less adjudication on the merits ofthe charges against them, is certainly nota function given to the commission. Thephrase, "when in the course of itsinvestigation," under Section 2(g),highlights this fact and gives credence toa contrary interpretation from that of thepetitioners. The function of determiningprobable cause for the filing of theappropriate complaints before the courtsremains to be with the DOJ and theOmbudsman.

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At any rate, the Ombudsmans power toinvestigate under R.A. No. 6770 is notexclusive but is shared with othersimilarly authorized government agencies.

Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v.Galicia, it was written:

This power of investigation granted to theOmbudsman by the 1987 Constitution andThe Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but isshared with other similarly authorizedgovernment agencies such as the PCGGand judges of municipal trial courts andmunicipal circuit trial courts. The powerto conduct preliminary investigation on

charges against public employees andofficials is likewise concurrently sharedwith the Department of Justice. Despitethe passage of the Local GovernmentCode in 1991, the Ombudsman retainsconcurrent jurisdiction with the Office ofthe President and the local Sangguniansto investigate complaints against localelective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannotcontravene the power of the Ombudsmanto investigate criminal cases underSection 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, whichstates:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its ownor on complaint by any person, any act oromission of any public officer oremployee, office or agency, when suchact or omission appears to be illegal,

unjust, improper or inefficient. It hasprimary jurisdiction over casescognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, inthe exercise of its primary jurisdiction, itmay take over, at any stage, from any

investigatory agency of government, theinvestigation of such cases. [Emphasessupplied]

The act of investigation by theOmbudsman as enunciated abovecontemplates the conduct of apreliminary investigation or thedetermination of the existence of probablecause. This is categorically out of the PTCssphere of functions. Its power to

investigate is limited to obtaining facts sothat it can advise and guide the Presidentin the performance of his duties relative tothe execution and enforcement of thelaws of the land. In this regard, the PTCcommits no act of usurpation of theOmbudsmans primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to theDOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the RevisedAdministrative Code is by no meansexclusive and, thus, can be shared witha body likewise tasked to investigate thecommission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1can it be inferred that the findings of thePTC are to be accorded conclusiveness.Much like its predecessors, the DavideCommission, the Feliciano Commission

and the Zenarosa Commission, its findingswould, at best, be recommendatory innature. And being so, the Ombudsman andthe DOJ have a wider degree of latitude todecide whether or not to reject the

recommendation. These offices, therefore,are not deprived of their mandated dutiesbut will instead be aided by the reports ofthe PTC for possible indictments forviolations of graft laws

SC: Philippine Truth Commission of2010 Void(Biraogo vs. The Philippine TruthCommission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935& G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010)

At the dawn of his administration,President Noynoy signed Executive OrderNo. 1 establishing the Philippine TruthCommission of 2010 (Truth Commission).The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) iscreated to investigate reports of graft andcorruption committed by third-level publicofficers and employees, their co-principals,accomplices and accessories during theadministration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,and thereafter to submit its finding andrecommendations to the President,Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely amonth after the issuance of EO No. 1, twocases were filed before the SC assailingthe validity and constitutionality of thesaid EO.

The first case is a special civil action forprohibition instituted by petitioner LouisBiraogo in his capacity as a citizen and

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taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive OrderNo. 1 for being violative of the legislativepower of Congress under Section 1, ArticleVI of the Constitution as it usurps theconstitutional authority of the legislature

to create a public office and to appropriatefunds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No.1 is unconstitutional because there is noprovision in the Constitution or any specificlaw that authorizes the President to createa truth commission.

The second case is a special civil action forcertiorari and prohibition filed bypetitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B.Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and

Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators)as incumbent members of the House ofRepresentatives. Petitioners-Legislatorsargue that the said Order isunconstitutional because the creation of apublic office lies within the province ofCongress and not with the executivebranch of government.

The OSG counters that there is nothingexclusively legislative about the creationby the President of a fact-finding bodysuch as a truth commission. Pointing tonumerous offices created by pastpresidents, it argues that the authority ofthe President to create public offices withinthe Office of the President Proper has longbeen recognized. According to the OSG,the Executive, just like the other twobranches of government, possesses theinherent authority to create fact-finding

committees to assist it in the performanceof its constitutionally mandated functionsand in the exercise of its administrativefunctions.

The OSG also cites the recent case ofBanda v. Ermita, where it was held that thePresident has the power to reorganize theoffices and agencies in the executivedepartment in line with his constitutionallygranted power of control and by virtue of avalid delegation of the legislative power toreorganize executive offices under existingstatutes. The OSG concludes that thepower of control necessarily includes thepower to create offices.

1. Does the creation of the PTC fallwithin the ambit of the power toreorganize as expressed in Section 31of the Revised Administrative Code?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The power to reorganize as expressedin Section 31 of the Revised AdministrativeCode? Section 31 contemplatesreorganization as limited by thefollowing functional and structural lines:(1) restructuring the internal organizationof the Office of the President Proper byabolishing, consolidating or merging unitsthereof or transferring functions from oneunit to another; (2) transferring anyfunction under the Office of the Presidentto any other Department/Agency or viceversa; or (3) transferring any agency under

the Office of the President to any otherDepartment/Agency or vice versa. Clearly,the provision refers to reduction ofpersonnel, consolidation of offices, orabolition thereof by reason of economy or

redundancy of functions. These point tosituations where a body or an office isalready existent but a modification oralteration thereof has to be effected. Thecreation of an office is nowherementioned, much less envisioned in saidprovision. Accordingly, the answer to thequestion is in the negative.

2. May the President legally createthe Philippine Truth Commission

(PTC)? Is there a valid delegation ofpower from Congress empowering thePresident to create a public office?

Yes.The creation of the PTC findsjustification under Section 17, Article VII ofthe Constitution, imposing upon thePresident the duty to ensure that the lawsare faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall havecontrol of all the executive departments,bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure thatthe laws be faithfully executed.

Indeed, the Executive is given muchleeway in ensuring that our laws arefaithfully executed. As stated above, thepowers of the President are not limited tothose specific powers under theConstitution. One of the recognized powers

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of the President granted pursuant to thisconstitutionally-mandated duty is thepower to create ad hoc committees. Thisflows from the obvious need to ascertainfacts and determine if laws have been

faithfully executed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1transgresses the power of Congress toappropriate funds for the operation of apublic office, suffice it to say that there willbe no appropriation but only an allotmentor allocations of existing funds alreadyappropriated. Accordingly, there is nousurpation on the part of the Executive ofthe power of Congress to appropriate

funds. Further, there is no need to specifythe amount to be earmarked for theoperation of the commission because, inthe words of the Solicitor General,whatever funds the Congress hasprovided for the Office of the President willbe the very source of the funds for thecommission. Moreover, since the amountthat would be allocated to the PTC shall besubject to existing auditing rules andregulations, there is no impropriety in thefunding.

3. According to petitioners, E.O. No. 1illegally amended the Constitutionand pertinent statutes when it vestedthe Truth Commission with quasi-

judicial powers duplicating, if notsuperseding, those of the Office ofthe Ombudsman created under the1987 Constitution and the

Department of Justice created underthe Administrative Code of 1987. Isthis correct?

No. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it

cannot be likened to the judicial function ofa court of justice, or even a quasi-judicialagency or office. Contrary to petitionersapprehension, the PTC will not supplantthe Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode theirrespective powers. If at all, theinvestigative function of the commissionwill complement those of the two offices.As pointed out by the Solicitor General, therecommendation to prosecute is but aconsequence of the overall task of the

commission to conduct a fact-findinginvestigation.

The actual prosecution of suspectedoffenders, much less adjudication on themerits of the charges against them, iscertainly not a function given to thecommission. The phrase, when in thecourse of its investigation, under Section2(g), highlights this fact and givescredence to a contrary interpretation fromthat of the petitioners. The function ofdetermining probable cause for the filing ofthe appropriate complaints before thecourts remains to be with the DOJ and theOmbudsman.

4. Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1violates the equal protection clauseas it selectively targets forinvestigation and prosecution officials

and personnel of the previousadministration as if corruption is theirpeculiar species even as it excludesthose of the other administrations,past and present, who may be

indictable. Are the petitionerscorrect?

Yes! Although the purpose of the TruthCommission falls within the investigativepower of the President, the Court findsdifficulty in upholding the constitutionalityof Executive Order No. 1 in view of itsapparent transgression of the equalprotection clause enshrined in Section 1,Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987

Constitution.

Such classification, however, to be validmust pass the test of reasonableness. Thetest has four requisites: (1) Theclassification rests on substantialdistinctions; (2) It is germane to thepurpose of the law; (3) It is not limited toexisting conditions only; and (4) It appliesequally to all members of the same class.Superficial differences do not make for avalid classification.

Applying these precepts to this case,Executive Order No. 1 should be struckdown as violative of the equal protectionclause. The clear mandate of theenvisioned truth commission is toinvestigate and find out the truthconcerning the reported cases of graftand corruption during the previous

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administration only. The intent to singleout the previous administration is plain,patent and manifest.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind

that the Arroyo administration is but just amember of a class, that is, a class of pastadministrations. It is not a class of its own.Not to include past administrationssimilarly situated constitutes arbitrarinesswhich the equal protection clause cannotsanction. Such discriminatingdifferentiation clearly reverberates to labelthe commission as a vehicle forvindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates severaldifferences between the Arroyoadministration and other pastadministrations, these distinctions are notsubstantial enough to merit the restrictionof the investigation to the previousadministration only.

MIAA(Petitioner) vs. C A &P a r a n a q u eauthorities (Resp.)

MIAAo p e r a t e sthe NAIA Complex inParaaque EO No. 903 (MIAACharter). As operator , itadministers the land,improvements and equipmentwithin NAIA.In March 1997, the Office of theGovernment Corporate Counsel

(OGCC) issued Opin ion No. 061 to

the effect that the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (LGC)withdrew

The exemption from real estatetax granted to MIAA under

Section 21 of its Chart er.Thus, MIAA paid some of the realestate tax already due.In June 2001, it received FinalNotices of Real Estate TaxDelinquency from Paraa que forthe taxable years 1992 to 2001estimated at P624 million.The City Treasurer of Paraaqueissued notices of levy andwarrants of levy on the

Airport Lands and Buildings. Italso threatened to sell atpublic auction the Airport Landsand Buildings should MIAA fail topay the real estate taxdelinquenc y.Later on, the OGCC issuedOpinion No. 147 clarifying itsearlier opinion. OGCCc o r r e c t e ditsaying that Sec . 21 of the MIAAC h a r t e ris the proof that MIAAi sex empt f r om r e a l estate tax.Thus M I A A f i l e da petiti on with theCAs e e k i n gto res train theParaaque from i mp os i n g realestate tax on, levying against,and au ct io n ing for public salethe airport lands and bu i l d i ng s ,but this was dismis sed forhaving been filed out of time.Hence, this present petition.

Paranaques Contention: Section193 of the Local Government Codeexpressly withdre w t h e taxexemption privileges ofgovernment ow ne d and c on t r ol l e d

corp. upon. Resp ondents alsoargue that a basic rule ofstatutory construction is thatthe expre ss mention of oneperson, thing, or act excludesall others. An internationalai rport is not among theexceptions mentioned in Section193 of the Local Governme ntCode. Thus, respondents assertthat MIAA cannot claim that the

Airport Lands and Buildings areexempt from real estatetax .MIAAscontention: AirportLands and Buildings are owned bythe Republic. The gove rnmentcannot tax itself. The reason fortax exemption of public propertyis tha t its taxation would n o tinure to any pu bl ic advantage,since in such a case the taxdebtor is also the taxcreditor.

Issue: W/N Airport Lands andBuildings of MIAA are exemptfrom real estate tax.

Held: Yes. Real estate taxassessments issued by the Cityof Paraaque are void.1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned

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or Controlled CorporationMIAA is not a government-owned orcontrolled corporation but aninstrumentality of theNational Government and thus

exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporationbecause it has no capital stockdivided into sha res. MIAA has nostockholders or voting shares.MIAA is also not a non-stockcorporation because it has nomembers. A non-stock corporationmust have members.MIAA is a governmentinstrumentality vested with

corporate powers to performefficiently its governmentalfunctions. MIAAi s like any oth ergovernment instrumen tality;the only difference is that MIAAi s vested with corporatepowers.When the law vests in agovernment instrumentality

corporate power, the

instrume ntality does not

become a corporation. Unlessthe government instrumentalityisorganized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains agovernment instrumen talityexercising not onlygovernmental but also corporatepowers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of

eminent domain, policeauthority and the levy ing offees and charges. At the samet ime , MIAAe x e r c i s e sall the powersof a corporation under the

Corporation Law, ins of ar as thesepowers are not inconsistentwith the provisions of thisExecutive Order .2. Airport Lands and Bu i l d i n g s ofMIAAa r e owned by the Republica. Airport Lands and Buildingsare of Public Dominion No one candispute that properties ofpublic dominion mentioned inArticle 420 of the Civil Code,

like roads, canals, rivers,torrents, ports and bridgesconstru cted by the State, areowned by the State. The termports includes seaports andair ports. The MIAA Airport Landsand Buildings constitute aport constructed by the State. The Airport Lands and Buildingsare devoted to public use. Thefact that the MIA A collectsterminal fees and othercharges from the public doesnot remove the character ofthe Airport Lands andBuildings as properties forpublic use. The ch arging offees to the public does not

determine the character ofthe property wh ether it is

of public dominion or not.The terminal fees MIAAcharges constitute the bulkof the income that maintainsthe operations of MIAA.

b. Airport Lands and Buildingsare Outside the Commerce of ManThe Court has also ruled thatproperty of public dominion,being outside the commerce ofman, cannot be the subject of anauction, levy, encumbrance ordisposit ion through public orprivate sale. Any encumbrance,levy on execution or auctio n saleof any pr op er ty of public

dominion is void for beingcontrary to public policy.c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of theRepublic - Only the President ofthe Republic can sign such deedof conveyance.d. Transfer to MIAAw a s meantto implement ReorganizationThe transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from theBureau of Air Transport ationto MIAA was not meant totransfer beneficialownership of these assetsfro m the Republic to MIAA. Thepurpose was merely toreorganize a division in theBureau of Air Transportationinto a separate and autonomousbody. The Republic remains thebeneficial owner of the Airport

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Lands and Buildings. MIAA itselfis owned solely by the Republic.e. Real Property Owned by theRepublic is Not Taxable Sec 234of the LGC provides that real

property owned by the Republicof the Phil ippines or any of itspolitical subdivisions exceptwhen the beneficial use ther eofhas been granted, forconsideration or otherwise, to ataxable person follow ing areexempted from payment of thereal property tax.However, portions of the AirportLands and Buildings that MIAA

leases to privateentities are not exempt fromreal estate tax. For example,the land area occupi ed byhangars that MIAA leases toprivate corporations is subjectto real estate tax.

GSIS (Petitioner) vs. CityTresurer of Manila(Respondents)

A suit to nullify to theassessment of real propertytaxes on cer tain propertiesbelonging to petitioner GSIS

GSIS owns or used to own 2parcels of land (Katigbakproperty and Concepcion-

Arroceros property). Title tothe Concepcion-Arrocerosproperty was transferred to thisCourt in 2005 pursuant toProclamation No. 835. Both the

GSIS and the M T C ofManila occupythe Concepcion-Arrocerosproperty while the Katigbakproperty was under lease.The City Treasurer of Manilaaddressed a letter to GSISPresident and General Managerinforming them of the unpaidreal property taxes (from 1992to 2002), brok en down asfollows:

(a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for theKatigbak property; and(b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for theConcepcion-Arroceros property.They warned of the inclusion ofthe properties in a publicauction in Manila should theunpaid taxes remain unsettled.GSIS wrote back emphasizing theGSIS exemption from all kinds oftaxes, including realty taxes,under RA 8291. 2 days after,GSIS filed a petition forcertiorari and prohibition for arestrai ning relief. Hoping forthe nullification of theassessments and th a trespondent is permanentlyenjoined from p r o c e e d i n g sagainst GSIS p r o p e r t y. GSIS wouldlater

amend its petition to includethe fact that: (a) the Katigbakproperty has been leased to andoccupied by the Manila HotelCorporation (MHC), which has

contra ctually bound itself topay any realty taxes that maybe imposed on the subjectproperty; and (b) theConcepcion-Arroceros property ispartly occupied by GSIS andpartly occupied by the M T C ofManila.RTC dismissed GSIS petition.

Issues: W/N GSIS is exempt

from real property taxation;assuming that it is soexempt, whether GSIS isliable for real propertytaxes for its propertiesleased to a taxable entity;and whether the propertiesof GSIS are exempt from levy.Held: Petition is MERITOUS.Yes,GSIS is exempt.GSIS is a governmentinstrumentality . GSIS is not astock corporation because ithas no capital stock dividedinto shares and no stockholdersor voting shares.GSIS is also not a non-stockcorporation because it has nomembers.The Republic owns propertiesunder GSISs name. GSIS is but a

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mere trustee of theproperties. This particularproperty arrangement is shownby the fact that dispo sal orconveyance of such are done

through the authority of thePresident of the Philippines.GSIS manages the funds for thelife insurance, retirement,survivorship, and dis abilitybenefits of all governmentemployees and theirbeneficiaries. This const itutesan essential and vital function that the government, throughone of its agencies or

i nstrumentalities, ought toperform. Thus t h e Republicguarantees the fulfillment ofthe obligations of the GSIS to itsmembers ( government employeesand the ir beneficiaries) whentheyre due.GSIS enjoys under its charterfull tax exemption. As anins t rumenta l i ty of the nationalgovernment, it is itself notliable to pay re a l estate taxesassessed by the City of Manilaagainst its Katigbak andC o n c e p c i o n -Arrocerosproperties.Following the "beneficial use"rule, however, accrued realproperty taxes are du e from theKatigbak property, leased as itis to a taxable entity. But the

corre sponding liability for thepayment thereof devolves on thetaxable beneficial user. TheKatigbak property cannot in anyevent be subject of a public

auction sale, notwithstandingits realty tax delinquency. Thismeans that the City of Manilahas to satisfy its tax claim byserving the accrued realty taxassessment on M H Cas thetaxable beneficial user of theKatigbak property and, in caseof nonpaymen t, through meansother than the sale at publicauction of the leased property.

Petition is GRANTED.The RTCManila decisions are REVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Tax assessments issuedby the City of Manila are VOID,except that the real propertytax assessment pertaining tothe leased Katigbak propertyshall be valid if serve d on theManila Hotel Corporation, aslessee that has actual andbeneficial use of it.

GSIS vs The City Treasurer ofManilaFactsPetitioner GSIS owns or used to owntwo (2) parcels of land, one located atKatigbak 25th St., Bonifacio Drive,

Manila(Katigbak property), and theother, at Concepcion cor. ArrocerosSts., also in Manila (Concepcion-Arroceros property). Title totheConcepcion-Arroceros property wastransferred to this Court in 2005pursuant to Proclamation No. 835[3]dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSISand the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)of Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the Katigbakproperty was under lease to ManilaHotel Corporation. the City Treasurer ofManila addressed a letter ated

September 13, 2002 to GSIS informingof the unpaid real property taxes dueon the aforementioned properties foryears 1992 to 2002, broken down asfollows: (a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for theKatigbak property; and (b) PhP48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros property. The letter warnedof the inclusion of the subjectproperties in the scheduled October 30,

2002 public auction of all delinquentproperties in Manila should the unpaidtaxes remain unsettled before thatdate. On September 16, 2002, the City

Treasurer of Manila issued separateNotices of Realty Tax Delinquency forthe subject properties, with the usualwarning of seizure and/or sale. OnOctober 8, 2002, GSIS, through its legal

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counsel, wrote back emphasizing theGSIS exemption from all kinds oftaxes, including realty taxes, underRepublic Act No. (RA)8291.Two daysafter, GSIS filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition[7]with prayer for a restraining andinjunctive relief before the ManilaRTC.RTC ruled that the assessment ofManila was valid.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not GSIS is exemptfrom the payment of real propertytaxes from 1992 to 2002;2.Whether GSIS is exempt from thepayment of real property taxes onthe property it leased to a taxableentity; and3. Whether GSISs realproperties are exempt fromwarrants of levy and from tax salefor non-payment of real property

taxes.Ruling1.GSIS Exempt from Real Property TaxFull tax exemption granted through PD1146 Revised Insurance GovernmentActRA 7160 lifted GSIS Tax Exemptions

Local Governement Code or RA 7160was enacted in 1991. Sec 193 vis-avisSec234.GSIS tax-exempt status withdrawn in1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997by RA 8291Full tax exemption reenacted throughRA 8291 Under it, the full taxexemption privilege of GSIS wasrestored, the operative provision beingSec. 39 thereof, a virtual replication ofthe earlier quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146.Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads :SEC. 39.Exemption from Tax, Legal Process

and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policyof the State that the actuarial solvencyof the funds of the GSIS shall bepreserved and maintained at all timesxxx Accordingly, notwithstanding, anylaws to the contrary, the GSIS, itsassets, revenues including all accrualsthereto, and benefits paid, shall beexempt from all taxes, assessments,

fees, charges or duties of all kinds.These exemptions shall continueunless expressly and specificallyrevoked and any assessment againstthe GSIS as of the approval of this Actare hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances,regulations, issuances, opinions or

jurisprudence contrary to or inderogation of this provision are herebydeemed repealed, superseded andrendered ineffective and without legalforce and effect.Real property taxes assessed and duefrom GSIS considered paidSec. 39 which, for all intents andpurposes, considered as paid any assessment against the GSIS as ofthe approval of this Act. If only to stress the point, we herebyreproduce the pertinent portion of saidSec. 39:SEC. 39.

Exemption from Tax, Legal Processand Lien. x x x xxx Accordingly,notwithstanding, any laws to thecontrary, theGSIS, its assets,revenues including all accruals thereto,and benefits paid,shall be exempt from all taxes,assessments, fees, charges or duties of

all kinds.These exemptions shall continueunless expressly and specificallyrevokedand any assessment against the GSISas of the approval of this Act arehereby considered paid.

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GSIS an instrumentality of the NationalGovernment

The Manila International AirportAuthority Doctrine, which providesthat, since MIAA does not qualify as aGOCC, not having been organizedeither as a stock corporation, its capitalnot being divided into shares, or as anon-stock corporation because it hasno members. MIAA is rather aninstrumentality of the NationalGovernment and, hence, outside thepurview of local taxation by force ofSec. 133 of the LGC providing in

context that unless otherwiseprovided, local governments cannottax national governmentinstrumentalities.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS:

Chiongbian vs. OrbosPursuant to Article X Sec 18 of the1987 Constitution, Congress passedRA No. 6734 "The ORGANIC ACT for theAUTONOMOUS REGION in MUSLIMMINDANAO" calling for a plebescite tobe held in 23 provinces.4 provinces voted in favor of creatingthe Autonomous region and these areLANAODEL SUR, MAGUINDANAO,SULU and

TAWI-TAWI. Hence, in accordance to RA

No. 6734 these 4 provinces becamethe ARMM.On the other hand, with respect to theremaining provinces who did not votein favor of creating ARMM. Article XIXSec RA 6724 provides;"THAT ONLY

THE PROVINCES AND CITIES VOTINGFAVORABLY IN SUCH PLEBISCITESHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM AND

THE PROVINCES WHO DID NOT VOTEFOR THE INCLUSION IN ARMM SHALLREMAIN IN THE EXISTINGADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS;PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT

MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVEDETERMINATION, MERGE THEEXISTING REGIONS".Pursuant to the authority granted bythe above provision, then PresidentCory Aquino issued EO No. 429"PROVIDING FOR THEREORGANIZATION OF THE ARMM"where in t hose who are not in favorin creating the ARMM where

transferred (provinces of a certainregion to another) some of which are;a. Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X will become part ofRegion IX. b. General Santos, atpresent part of Region XI, will becomepart of Region IX. c. Transfered theregional center of Region IX fromZamboanga City to Pagadian.

Petitioners, protested and challengesthe validity of EO 429 contendingthat there is not law which authorizesthe President to make alterations onthe existing structure of thegovernmental units in other wordsREORGANIZATION. And that theauthority merge granted in RA 6724does not include the authority toreorganize even if it does not affectthe opportionment of the congressionalrepresentatives. In addition, theycontend that Article XIX Sec 13 of RA6724 is unconstitutional for 1) it is

invalid delegation of power by theLegislative to the President2) the power granted is not expressedin the title of the law.

Issues:1. W/N Article XIX Sec 13 of RA6724 is invalid because itcontains no express standard to guide the President s

discretion and whether the powergiven fairly expressed in the titleof the statute.2. W/N the power grantedauthorizes not just to merge buteven the reorganization of thosewho did not vote or not infavor toit.

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3. W/N the power granted to thePresident includes the power totransfer the regional center ofRegion IX from Zamboanga toPagadian since it should be theactsof Congress.

Ruling:While the power to mergeadministrative regions is not expresslyprovided for in the constitution, it is apower which has traditionally beenlodged with the President to facilitate

the exercise of the power of generalsupervision over local governments(Article X sec 4 of the Constitution).

The regions themselves are notterritorial and political divisions likeprovinces, cities, municipalities andbarangays but are "mere groupings ofcontagouos provinces foradministrative purposes. The powerconferred on the President is similar to

the power toadjust municipal boundaries".1. No, A legislative standardneed not to be expressed. It maysimply be gathered or implied. Norneed it be found in the lawchallenged because it may beembodied in other statutes on thesame subject as that of the challenged

legislation. And with respect to thepower to merge existingadministrative regions, the standard is to be found in the samepolicy underlying the grant to thePresident in RA No. 5435 of the power toreorganize the Exec Department to "Promote simplicity, economy, andefficiency in the government to enableit to pursue programs consistent withnational goals for accelerated socialand economic development and toimprove the services in the transaction

of public business.2. No, while Article XIX Sec 13provides that "THE PROVINCES ANDCITIES WHICH DO NOT VOTE FORINCLUSION IN THE AUTONOMOUSREGION SHALL REMAIN IN THE THEEXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS"

This provision is subject to thequalification that the PRESIDENT MAYBY ADMINISTRATIVE

DETERMINATION MERGE THE EXISTINGREGIONS.This means that while non-assentingprovinces are to remain in the regionsaas designated upon the creation ofthe Autonomous region, they maynevertheless be regrouped withcontiguous provinces forming other

regions as the exigency ofadministration may require.3. Yes, for administrative regions aremere "groupings of contiguousprovinces for administrative purposeshence are not territorial and politicalsubdivisions like provinces, cities,municipalities and brgys. Thereforethere is no basis that only Congresscan determine the region center.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compelrespondent public officials to publish, and/orcause the publication in the Official Gazette ofvarious presidential decrees, letters ofinstructions, general orders, proclamations,executive orders, letters of implementation andadministrative orders.

Respondents, through the Solicitor Generalwould have this case dismissed outright on theground that petitioners have no legal personality

or standing to bring the instant petition. The viewis submitted that in the absence of any showingthat the petitioner are personally and directlyaffected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances inquestion.

Respondent further contend that publication inthe Official Gazette is not a sine qua nonrequirement for the effectivity of the law where

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the law themselves provides for their owneffectivity dates.

ISSUES:Whether the presidential decrees in question

which contain special provisions as to thedate they are to take effect, publication in theOfficial Gazette is not indispensable for theireffectivity?

RULING:Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary inthose cases where the legislation itself does notprovide for its effectivity date, for then the date ofpublication is material for determining its date ofeffectivity, which is the 15th day following its

publication, but not when the law itself providesfor the date when it goes into effect.

Article 2 does not preclude the requirement ofpublication in the Official Gazette, even if the lawitself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances of apublic nature or of general applicability ismandated by law. Obviously, presidentialdecrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or

penalties for their violation or otherwise imposeburdens on the people, such as tax revenuemeasures, fall within this category. Otherpresidential issuances which apply only toparticular persons or class of persons such asadministrative and executive orders need not bepublished on the assumption that they have beencircularized to all concern.

The Court therefore declares that presidential

issuances of general application, which have notbeen published, shall have no force and effect.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27

(1985)FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to beinformed on matters of public concern, a rightrecognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamusto compel respondent public officials to publish,and/or cause the publication in the OfficialGazette, of various presidential decrees, lettersof instructions, general orders, proclamations,executive orders, letter of implementation andadministrative orders. The respondents would

have this case dismissed on the ground thatpetitioners have no legal personality to bring thispetition. Petitioners maintain that since thesubject of the petition concerns a public right andits object is to compel public duty, they need notshow any specific interest. Respondents furthercontend that publication in the OG is not a sinequa non requirement for the effectivity of lawswhere the laws themselves provide for their owneffectivity dates.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication in theOfficial Gazatte is an indispensablerequirement for the effectivity of the PDs,LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where thelaws themselves provide fortheir own effectivity dates.

RULING: Yes. It is the peoples right to beinformed on matters of public concern andcorollarily access to official records, and to

documents and papers pertaining to official acts,transactions,or decisions, shall be afforded the citizenssubject to such limitation as may be provided bylaw (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to

be valid and enforceable, must be published inthe OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. Thefact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivitydoes not preclude their publication in the OG asthey constitute important legislative acts. Thepublication of presidential issuances of publicnature or of general applicability is arequirement of due process. Before a personmay be bound by law, he must first be officiallyinformed of its contents.

Important Point: It illustrates how decrees andissuances issued by one manMarcosare infact laws of general application and provide forpenalties. The constitution afforded Marcos bothexecutive and legislative powers. The generalityof law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never workwithout constructive notice. The ruling of thiscase provides the publication constitutes thenecessary constructive notice and is thus thecure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance willnot even mitigate the crime.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL.V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONSCOMMISSION (NTC) G.R. 151908,August 12, 2003

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIALPOWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OFADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE OF

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PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

Facts:

The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000

which promulgated rules and regulationson the billing of telecommunicationsservices. Petitioners filed with the RTC apetition to declare the circular asunconstitutional. A motion to dismiss wasfiled by the NTC on the ground ofpetitioners to exhaust administrativeremedies. The RTC denied the motion todismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversedRTC.

Issue:Whether or not the Billing circular 13-6-2000 issued by NTCunconstitutional.

Held:Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b)quasi-judicial or administrativeadjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or

rule-making power is the power to makerules and regulations which results indelegated legislation that is within theconfines of the granting statute and thedoctrine of non-delegability andseparability of powers. To be valid, suchrules and regulations must conform to, andbe consistent with, the provisions ofenabling statute. Quasi-judicial oradministrative adjudicatory power is the

power to hear and determine questions offact to which the legislative policy is toapply and to decide in accordance with thestandards laid down by law itself inenforcing and administering the same law.

In carrying out their quasi-judicialfunctions, the administrative officers orbodies are required to investigate facts orascertain the existence of facts, holdhearings, weigh evidence, and drawconclusions from them for their officialaction and exercise of discretion in ajudicial. The determination of whether aspecific rule or set of rules issued by anadministrative body contravenes the lawor the constitution is within the judicial

power as defined by the Constitution whichis the duty of the Courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rightswhich are legally demandable andenforceable, and to determine whether ornot there have been a grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government. TheNTC circular was issued pursuant to itsquasi-legislative or rule-making power.

Hence, the action must be filed directlywith the regular courts without requiringexhaustion of administrative remedies.Where the act of administrative agencywas performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion ofadministrative remedy is required, beforegoing to court. The doctrine of primaryjurisdiction applies only where theadministrative agency exercises its quasi-

judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, incases involving specialized disputes, thesame must be referred to anadministrative agency of specialcompetence pursuant to the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction. This doctrine ofprimary jurisdiction applies where theclaim requires the resolution of issueswhich, under a regulatory scheme, hasbeen placed within the special competenceof an administrative body. In such case,the judicial process is suspended pendingreferral of such issues to theadministrative body for its view.

East Shipping Lines (ESL) vs CA

95 SCAD 349291 SCRA 4851998Constitutionality of E.O. No. 1088 providingfor uniform & adjusted rates for foreignand coasteise vessels in all Philippine Portsis assailed.FACTS:Davao Pilots Association (DPA) filed acompliant against ESL for non-payment of

pilotage services. ESL assailed theconstitutionality of EO 1088, upon whichDPA bases its claim,because (1) itsinterpretation & application are left privaterespondent, and (2) it constitutes anundue delegation of powers. It insists thatit should pay pilotage fees in accordancewith and on the basis of the PPAsmemorandum circulars. The PPA is the

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administrative body vested with the powerto regulate & prescribe pilotage fees.ISSUES:1. Whether EO 1088 isunconstitutional.

2. Whether the PPA circulars arevalid.HELD:1.EO 1088 was upheld as valid &constitutional in Philippine Inter-islandShipping Association vs CA (78 SCAD 197,266 SCRA 489 [1997]). It was held thatwhat determines whether an act is alaw or an administrative issuance isnot its form but its natureThe power

to fix the rates of charges forserviceshas always been regarded aslegislative in character.EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix newpilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is therationalization of pilotage service chargesthrough the imposition if uniform andadjusted rates for foreign & coastwisevessels in all Philippine ports.The PPA is duty-bound to comply with EO1088. PPA may increase the rates but it

may not decrease them below thosemandated by EO 1088.2.Since the PPA circulars are inconsistentwith EO 1088, they are void andineffective. Administrative/Executiveacts, orders and regulations are onlyvalid when they are not contrary tothe laws or the Constitution.As stated in LBP vs CA (64 SCAD 905, 249

SCRA 149 [1995]), the conclusive effect ofadministrative construction is not absolute.Action of an administrative agencymay be disturbed/set aside by thejudicial department if there is an Error

of Law, a Grave Abuse of Power orLack or Jurisdiction, or Grave Abuse ofDiscretion clearly conflicting with eitherthe letter or spirit of the law.An administrative agency has nodiscretion whether to implement alaw or not. If there is any conflictbetween the PPA circular and a law, thelatter prevails.

Philippine Association of Service ExportersInc., vs. Torres G.R. 101279, August 6, 1992

Facts:

Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc.

(PASIE) is the largest national organization ofprivate employment and recruitment agencies

duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, toengage in the business of obtaining overseas

employment for Filipino land-based workers,including domestic helpers. On June 1991, as aresult of published stories regarding the abuses

suffered by Filipino housemaids employed inHong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres

issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991,temporarily suspending the recruitment by

private employment agencies of "Filipino

domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The

DOLE itself, through the POEA took over thebusiness of deploying such Hong Kong-bound

workers. Pursuant to the above DOLE circular,

the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30,Series of 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the

Government processing and deployment ofFilipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the

accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agenciesintending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.

Pursuant to the previous issuances, the POEA

Administrator also issued Memorandum CircularNo. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of

employment contracts of domestic workers forHong Kong.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondents acted with

grave abuse of discretion and/or in

excess of their rule-making authority in

issuing said circulars

2. Whether or not the assailed DOLE and

POEA circulars are unconstitutional,

unreasonable, unfair and oppressive

Held:

They are in accordance but legally invalid,

defective and unenforceable for lack of powerpublication and filing in the Office of the

National Administrative Register as required inArt 2 of CC, Art 5 of the Labor Code and Sec

3(1) and 4, Chap 2, Book VII of the

Administrative Code of 1987.

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Admin Digest Atty. dela Cruz

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