08/07/2011 08:30:00 ← Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila ← SECOND DIVISION ← A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976 ← DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent. ← R E S O L U T I O N ← ANTONIO,J.: ← In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, ofthe same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records ofthe Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishi ng of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal. ← In his answer, the respondent significantly observed: ← Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right. For fear that the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be at play, Some of the cases filed and decided by the Court after the declaration of Martial Law and years after the election s till bore the stigma ofpartisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.
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← A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976← DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent. ← R E S O L U T I O N
← ANTONIO, J.:← In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal
Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of
the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allowemployees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of
the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated
report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an
intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court
records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the
parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate
interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable
regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He
further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an
improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies
therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by
a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere
curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.
← In his answer, the respondent significantly observed:
← Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the
exercise of the right. For fear that the dirty hands of partisan politics mightagain be at play, Some of the cases filed and decided by the Court after the
declaration of Martial Law and years after the election still bore the stigma of
partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.
← The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, 'to his
(register of deeds') discretion as to how much of the conveniences of the
office are required to be preserved for the accomodation of these persons. It
is not his duty to permit the office to be thronged needlessly with persons
examining its books of papers, but it is his duty to regulate, govern, andcontrol his office in such a manner as to permit the statutory advantages to
be enjoyed by other persons not employed by him as largely and extensibly
as that consistently can be done * * *. What the law expects and requires
from him is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, by which all
persons resorting to the office, under legal authority, and conducting
themselves in an orderly manner, shall be secured their lawful rights and
privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner in which the relator
has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by searches,
abstracts, or copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.
← Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination
is unlawful, or sheer, Idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under
the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives,
reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not
their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not
flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong
to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the
officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. Asto the moral or material injury which the publication might inflict on other
parties, that is the publisher's responsibility and lookout. The publication is
made subject to the consequences of the law.
← The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on
statutory grounds merely but on the constitutional right of the press to have
access to information as the essence of press freedom. 3
← In determining whether or not a particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like
"public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such mattersnaturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid .
at p. 541]
← In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the
constitutional right to information was the need for adequate notice to the
public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of
citezens. In Legaspi , it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]
← The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of
reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately
before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer
← Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the
privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition.
His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the
law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government,policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power.
← Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy
which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the
documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed
outside the ambit of the right to information.
← There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally
protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22
SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
← ... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept
of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. UItimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspectsof his life, is the hallmark of the absolute. state, In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important
as modem society has developed. All the forces of technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
← Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my concurrence, I
write this separate opinion simply to say I have nothing to add to Justice
Irene R. Cortes' exceptionally eloquent celebration of the right to information
on matters of public concern.
← Footnotes← * Art. II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
← ** Art XI, Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with partriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
← The following provisions of the 1987 Constitution are further indicative
of the policy of transparency:
← Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public
shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the cabinet in
charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall not be denied access to the President
during such illness.
← Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath or his assets liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress,
the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
← Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance
with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on
foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made
← The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC for short) is a wholly
government-owned corporation, located in Bataan. It produces 60% of the
national output of naphtha.
← Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as anew domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as
the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for the registration of the
project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel
for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical project was to be a joint
venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a Certificate of Registration on February
24, 1988 by BOI.
← BPC was accorded pioneer status and was given fiscal and other
incentives by BOI, like, (1) exemptions from tax on raw materials, (2)
repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation of investments in currency
originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of
repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on investments. As additional
incentive, the House of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the
petitioner, Congressman Garcia, eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on
naphtha if and when it would be used as raw material in the petrochemical
plant. The chairman of BPC, Tomas T.N. Hsi, profusely welcomed the bill,
stating:
← This project is aiming at a boon not only to the province of Bataan, butto the country of the Philippines in general. It will support the development
of the Philippine petrochemical industry by providing an ability to compete in
the world market for manufactured petrochemical derivatives such as
polyethylene and polypropylene products . . . (p. 7, Rollo.)
← However, in February 1989, A. T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East
Corporation, the major investor in BPC personally delivered to Trade
Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989, advising him of
BPC's desire to amend the original registration certificate of its project by
changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas (Annex F, p. 51,
Rollo). News of the shift was published by one of the major Philippine dailies
which disclosed that the cause of the relocation of the project is the
insurgency and unstable labor situation in Bataan. The presence in Batangas
of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Pilipinas Shell
← The Code also requires the "publication of applications for
registration," hence, the payment of publication and other necessary fees ...
prior to the processing and approval of such applications (Art. 7, subpar. 3,
Omnibus Investments Code).
← As provided by the law, the BPC's application for registration as a "newexport producer of ethylene, polyethylene and polypropylene was published
in the "Philippine Daily Inquirer" issue of December 21, 1987. The notice
invited "any person with valid objections to or pertinent comments on the
above-mentioned application ... (to file) his/her comments/objections in
writing with the BOI within one (1) week from the date of this publication"
(Annex 1, public respondent's Comment).
← Since the BPC's amended application (particularly the change of
location from Bataan to Batangas) was in effect a new application, it should
have been published so that whoever may have any objection to the transfer
may be heard. The BOI's failure to publish such notice and to hold a hearing
on the amended application deprived the oppositors, like the petitioner, of
due process and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
BOI.
← There is no merit in the public respondents' contention that the
petitioner has "no legal interest" in the matter of the transfer of the BPC
petrochemical plant from the province of Bataan to the province of
Batangas. The provision in the Investments Code requiring publication of theinvestor's application for registration in the BOI is implicit recognition that
the proposed investment or new industry is a matter of public concern on
which the public has a right to be heard. And, when the BOI approved BPC's
application to establish its petrochemical plant in Limay, Bataan, the
inhabitants of that province, particularly the affected community in Limay,
and the petitioner herein as the duly elected representative of the Second
District of Bataan acquired an interest in the project which they have a right
to protect. Their interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in
their midst is actual, real, and vital because it win affect not only their
← Art. 54. Publication and Posting of Notices. — Immediately after the
application has been given due course by the Board, the Secretary of the
Board or any official designated by the Board shall require the applicant to
publish the notice of the action of the Board thereon at his expense once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province or city where the applicanthas its principal office, and post copies of said notice in conspicuous places,
in the once of the Board or in the building where said office is located;
setting forth in such copies the name of the applicant, the business in which
it is engaged or proposes to engage or invest, and such other data and
information as may be required by the Board. No approval or certificate shall
be valid without the publication and posting of notices as herein provided.
(Italics supplied)
← Clearly, it is not the application itself that is required to be published
but notice of the action of the Board plus the specified data. Thus, the Notice
of Publication, which appeared in the Inquirer, simply read:
← Notice is hereby given that the application of BATAAN
PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION ... for registration with the Board of
Investments under Book I of the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987,
otherwise known as Executive Order No. 226 as new export producer of
ethylene, polyethylene and polypropylene has been officially accepted on
December 17, 1987 and is currently being processed.
← Any person with valid objections to or pertinent comments on theabove-mentioned application may file his/her comments/objections in
writing with the BOI within one (1) week from the date of this publication.
← Let this notice be published at the expense of the applicant
← ... (Annex "1," Opposition).
← Absent the requirement of publication of the application itself, there
should be no need either to publish the amendments to the application. The
statement in the majority opinion that the amended application is considered
a new application does not find support in the Omnibus Investments Code.
After all the amendment did not change the essence or nature of the
petrochemical project but only the site, and the feedstock.
← Specially significant, too, is the fact that the confidentiality of
applications is specifically provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code.
← (4) The reply-letter of the BOI to petitioner, dated 11 May 1989, took
exception to petitioner's claim that the BOI and the DTI, by not vigorously
opposing the transfer, had violated the Constitution, the Omnibus
Investments Code and P.D. 949 as amended by PD 1803, and urged
petitioner not to proceed with his planned court action as it would only serveto "discourage foreign investors and derail efforts at economic recovery"
(Annex "M," ibid .);
← (5) Petitioner's letter to the BOI of 16 May 1989 rebutted point by
point the arguments in the BOI letter of 11 May 1989 and argued that "PD
No. 949, as amended by P. D. No. 1803, as well as related issuances, have
chosen Bataan as the site of the petrochemical project" (Annex "N," ibid .);
← (6) Petitioner's letter to the BOI of 29 May 1989 formalized his "motion
for reconsideration of the BOI "decision' approving the transfer of the project
from Bataan to Batangas, and contended that President Aquino had set it
aside (Annex "P," ibid .);
← (7) Petitioner's follow-up letter to the BOI, dated 19 June 1989,
claimed that the BOI decision to approve the transfer of the project had, in
effect, been reversed by the President herself and that the BOI should
"refrain from taking any step to execute said defunct decision" (Annex "Q,"
ibid .);
← (8) In the BOI letter of 21 June 1989 to petitioner, the former denied
that there had been a reversal by the President of the BOI decision; andthat, as far as petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the BOI decision is
concerned, "since you are not submitting any new cause of action for BOI to
reconsider its decision, we believe that we have sufficiently answered the
questions you have raised in your letter dated 2 May 1989, which has been
replied to by the Managing Head of the BOI on 11 May 1989" (Annex "R,"
ibid .).
← All told, there can be no question that petitioner has been fully heard
on his original petition to the BOI to disapprove the transfer of the project
site and on his motion for reconsideration. No further purpose will be served
by setting petitioner's opposition for hearing.
← Neither do I think that "affected communities' have a right to be
consulted, as opined by the majority. The provision pertinent thereto reads:
← Art. 54. Publication and Posting of Notices. — Immediately after the
application has been given due course by the Board, the Secretary of the
Board or any official designated by the Board shall require the applicant to
publish the notice of the action of the Board thereon at his expense once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province or city where the applicanthas its principal office, and post copies of said notice in conspicuous places,
in the once of the Board or in the building where said office is located;
setting forth in such copies the name of the applicant, the business in which
it is engaged or proposes to engage or invest, and such other data and
information as may be required by the Board. No approval or certificate shall
be valid without the publication and posting of notices as herein provided.
(Italics supplied)
← Clearly, it is not the application itself that is required to be published
but notice of the action of the Board plus the specified data. Thus, the Notice
of Publication, which appeared in the Inquirer, simply read:
← Notice is hereby given that the application of BATAAN
PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION ... for registration with the Board of
Investments under Book I of the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987,
otherwise known as Executive Order No. 226 as new export producer of
ethylene, polyethylene and polypropylene has been officially accepted on
December 17, 1987 and is currently being processed.
← Any person with valid objections to or pertinent comments on theabove-mentioned application may file his/her comments/objections in
writing with the BOI within one (1) week from the date of this publication.
← Let this notice be published at the expense of the applicant
← ... (Annex "1," Opposition).
← Absent the requirement of publication of the application itself, there
should be no need either to publish the amendments to the application. The
statement in the majority opinion that the amended application is considered
a new application does not find support in the Omnibus Investments Code.
After all the amendment did not change the essence or nature of the
petrochemical project but only the site, and the feedstock.
← Specially significant, too, is the fact that the confidentiality of
applications is specifically provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code.
← (4) The reply-letter of the BOI to petitioner, dated 11 May 1989, took
exception to petitioner's claim that the BOI and the DTI, by not vigorously
opposing the transfer, had violated the Constitution, the Omnibus
Investments Code and P.D. 949 as amended by PD 1803, and urged
petitioner not to proceed with his planned court action as it would only serveto "discourage foreign investors and derail efforts at economic recovery"
(Annex "M," ibid .);
← (5) Petitioner's letter to the BOI of 16 May 1989 rebutted point by
point the arguments in the BOI letter of 11 May 1989 and argued that "PD
No. 949, as amended by P. D. No. 1803, as well as related issuances, have
chosen Bataan as the site of the petrochemical project" (Annex "N," ibid .);
← (6) Petitioner's letter to the BOI of 29 May 1989 formalized his "motion
for reconsideration of the BOI "decision' approving the transfer of the project
from Bataan to Batangas, and contended that President Aquino had set it
aside (Annex "P," ibid .);
← (7) Petitioner's follow-up letter to the BOI, dated 19 June 1989,
claimed that the BOI decision to approve the transfer of the project had, in
effect, been reversed by the President herself and that the BOI should
"refrain from taking any step to execute said defunct decision" (Annex "Q,"
ibid .);
← (8) In the BOI letter of 21 June 1989 to petitioner, the former denied
that there had been a reversal by the President of the BOI decision; andthat, as far as petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the BOI decision is
concerned, "since you are not submitting any new cause of action for BOI to
reconsider its decision, we believe that we have sufficiently answered the
questions you have raised in your letter dated 2 May 1989, which has been
replied to by the Managing Head of the BOI on 11 May 1989" (Annex "R,"
ibid .).
← All told, there can be no question that petitioner has been fully heard
on his original petition to the BOI to disapprove the transfer of the project
site and on his motion for reconsideration. No further purpose will be served
by setting petitioner's opposition for hearing.
← Neither do I think that "affected communities' have a right to be
consulted, as opined by the majority. The provision pertinent thereto reads:
← Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to
examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable
conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents
Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen
seeking examination of the board's records.← On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting
of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In
said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their
individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same
inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i .e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent
Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private
and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of
the members.
← Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive
Secretary, which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato for
appropriate comment.
← Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board
meeting held on June 22, 1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the
board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang
Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved forscreening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained
that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee
is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June
22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film
(already) reviewed especially those which are controversial."
← Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato
possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the review
committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and
← We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies
simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he
is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the
law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The rationale
behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations,comity and convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all
the available administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to
and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to act
and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is
rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.
← Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions,
such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the
only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256
[1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v.
Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del
Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v.
Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the
doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans' Backpay Commission
[1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal,
arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969];
National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429[1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would
greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742
[1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust
administrative review is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino,
43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies
(Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).
← The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the
doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by
respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any rate,
records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered
to the administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutionsof public respondents prior to filing the instant petition by, among others,
writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of
the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail.
← Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We
now proceed to resolve the issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We
find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of
respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as
well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's
constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art.
III of the Constitution provides that:
← The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
(emphasis supplied)← As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530
[1987]), this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right
and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence,
the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people
upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of
the Legislature (Id . at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 28)." (See also Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v.
← For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a
sub-committee composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake
the work of review. Any disapproval or deletion must be approved by a
majority of the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt of the
written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration inwriting may be made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall designate
a sub-committee of five BOARD members to undertake a second review
session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be rendered through a
majority of the sub-committee members so designated and present at the
second review session. This second review session shall be presided over by
the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision of the BOARD in the
second review session shall be rendered within five (5) days from the date of
receipt of the motion for reconsideration.
← Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television
program or publicity material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in
writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film
or motion picture intended for exhibition at the moviehouses or theaters or
on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject
matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its
entirety.
← The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of
a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or television programin its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines,
who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by an ad hoe
committee he may create or by the Appeals Committee herein created.
← An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines
is hereby created composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be
appointed by the President of the Philippines, which shall submit its
recommendation to the President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals Committee.
← The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter
← The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General
Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself
and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive
Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for the
implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisionsor orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having
been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice
but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i .e., as a collegial body, and
not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the intervening
mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari — a delegated power
cannot be delegated. And since the act of classification involves an exercise
of the Board's discretionary power with more reason the Board cannot, by
way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an established
rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of
delegation.
← WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89
and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and
← 1. The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by, or held
by other parties for the benefit of, the PRIVATE PARTY for purposes of
determining the totality of the assets covered by the settlement. The subject
assets shall be classified by the nature thereof, namely: (a) real estate; (b)
jewelry; (c) paintings and other works of art; (d) securities; (e) funds ondeposit; (f) precious metals, if any, and (g) miscellaneous assets or assets
which could not appropriately fall under any of the preceding classification.
The list shall be based on the full disclosure of the PRIVATE PARTY to insure
its accuracy.
← 2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which
shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained
by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of and
exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines.
However, considering the unavailability of all pertinent and relevant
documents and information as to balances and ownership, the actual
specification of assets to be retained by the PRIVATE PARTY shall be covered
by supplemental agreements which shall form part of this Agreement.
← 3. Foreign assets which the PRIVATE PARTY shall fully disclose but
which are held by trustees, nominees, agents or foundations are hereby
waived over by the PRIVATE PARTY in favor of the FIRST PARTY. For this
purpose, the parties shall cooperate in taking the appropriate action, judicial
and/or extrajudicial, to recover the same for the FIRST PARTY.← 4. All disclosures of assets made by the PRIVATE PARTY shall not be
used as evidence by the FIRST PARTY in any criminal, civil, tax or
administrative case, but shall be valid and binding against said PARTY for
use by the FIRST PARTY in withdrawing any account and/or recovering any
asset. The PRIVATE PARTY withdraws any objection to the withdrawal by
and/or release to the FIRST PARTY by the Swiss banks and/or Swiss
authorities of the $356 million, its accrued interests, and/or any other
account; over which the PRIVATE PARTY waives any right, interest or
participation in favor of the FIRST PARTY. However, any withdrawal or
release of any account aforementioned by the FIRST PARTY shall be made in
the presence of any authorized representative of the PRIVATE PARTY.
← (1) Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing
to file the instant petition; and
← (2) Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this
action may be filed.
← (b) Substantive:← (1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the
public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses;
and
← (2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a
compromise agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the
Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. 11
← After their oral presentations, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
← On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed
Jopson, filed before the Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto
their Petition in Intervention. They aver that they are "among the 10,000
claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos
Estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
Human Rights Litigation, Maximo Hilao, et al ., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796, June 16, 1994
and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997." As
such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties
may adversely affect their legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution issued
on August 24, 1998, the Court granted their motion to intervene and
required the respondents to comment thereon. The September 25, 1998
Comment 12 of the solicitor general on said motion merely reiterated his
aforecited arguments against the main petition. 13
← Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he
has the legal personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-
gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth hand in fact,
part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would
constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by ataxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such
assets.
← Besides, petitioner emphasize, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses is an issue "of transcendental importance the public."
He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute
actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are "of paramount public interest;" and
if they "immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of
the people."
← Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, 14 such as in this case. He invokes several decisions 15 of this Court
which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi , when the subject
of the case involved public interest.
← On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents,
contends that petitioner has no standing to institute the present action,
because no expenditure of public funds is involved and said petitioner has noactual interest in the alleged agreement. Respondents further insist that the
instant petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has
requested PCGG to disclose any such negotiations and agreements; or that,
if he has, the Commission has refused to do so.
← Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling
decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition.
Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties
← In Tañada v. Tuvera, 17 the Court asserted that when the issue
concerns a public a right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in
interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is
interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has anylegal or special interest in the result of the action. 18 In the aforesaid case,
the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 19 in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared
that the right they sought to be enforced "is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land."
← Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 20 while reiterating Tañada,
further declared that "when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general
'public' which possesses the right." 21
← Further, in Albano v. Reyes, 22 we said that while expenditure of public
funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the
development, the management and the operation of the Manila International
Container Terminal, "public interest [was] definitely involved considering theimportant role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved." We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the
petitioner's standing.
← Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to
information and access to official records, documents and papers — a right
guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a
former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of
the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, i .e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a
Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
← In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is
rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the
legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The standing of the Jopsons is not
seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said petitioners-
intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case,since a distribution or disposition of the Marcoses' ill-gotten properties may
adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims.
← Second Procedural Issue:
← The Court's Jurisdiction
← Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for
mandamus and one that is not intended to delay any proceeding in the
Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this Court was proper. He
invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and
mandamus.
← The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has
been erroneously brought before this Court, since there is neither a
justiciable controversy nor a violation of petitioner's rights by the PCGG. He
alleges that the assailed agreements are already the very lis mota in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0141, which has yet to dispose of the issue;
thus, this petition is premature. Furthermore, respondents themselves have
opposed the Marcos heirs' motion, filed in the graft court, for the approval of the subject Agreements. Such opposition belies petitioner's claim that the
government, through respondents, has concluded a settlement with the
Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten assets.
← In Tañada and Legaspi , we upheld therein petitioners' resort to a
mandamus proceeding, seeking to enforce a public right as well as to compel
performance of a public duty mandated by no less than the fundamental law.23 Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers upon
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
← Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions
refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being
considered. As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the PCGG
with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued, because
said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the Marcosheirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein. Thus, the
Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that they are not
aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise with the Marcoses
regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.
← The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject
provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent.
There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the
right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national
security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking
transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
← Limitations to the Right :
← (1) National Security Matters
← At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding
that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect
to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, theprivilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information,25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given
"scrupulous protection."
← Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. 26
← (2) Trade Secrets and
← Banking Transactions
← The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside
from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or
industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other
related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act 28) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure. 29
← Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by
the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Construction. The power to
tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain
extent, in the local legislative bodies. 58 Section 28 (4), Article VI of theConstitution, specifically provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall
be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the
Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions,
even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
← Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses
form paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the
test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant
of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class
legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be
uniform and equitable." 59
← Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the
commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may
be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the
claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position
demonstrates a clear inability to pay. 60 Definitely, neither requisite is
present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are
effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, partof which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax
exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax
liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be
unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection
costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax due. 61 In this instance,
the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the determination of the
amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which
legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be
← Third , the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases
against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other
court. 63 This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in
regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case
has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of itsdismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge.
In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled, including
the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound
discretion of the government prosecution; 64 but the court decides, based on
the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case.
Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution,
even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the
complaint. 65 The prosecution's motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the
least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the
trial court to make its own evaluation of the merit of the case, because
granting such motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case
itself. 66
← Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth
cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the
Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power
and discretion.
← Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims,"whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate," against the
Marcoses. 67 Again, this ill-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law.
Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. 68 The
stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future
claims against the Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes. Such
vague and broad statement may well be interpreted to include all future
illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to
perpetrate fraud against the government without any liability at all. This is a
palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the
law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. It is a
virtual warrant for public officials to amass public funds illegally, since there
is an open option to compromise their liability in exchange for only a portion
← The first alternative of the petition was denied by the Register of
Deeds and later, on appeal, by the Secretary of Justice. No request to
inspect the records seems to have ever been made, but the Solicitor
General, answering for the respondents, gives to understand that not even
this would the petitioner or his representatives be allowed to do if they tried.As the petitioner appears not to insist on his request for a list of sales of real
estate to aliens, we shall confine our discussion to the second part of the
prayer; namely, that the petitioner be allowed to examine all the records in
the respondents' custody to gather the material he wants. In this
connection, the Solicitor General contends that "the examination or
inspection of the records in the office of the register of deeds may be made
only by those having special interest therein and subject to such reasonable
regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office, and that the Secretary of Justice has reasonably ruled, to safeguard
the public interest and the interest of those directly concerned in the
records, that records may not be disclosed for publication."
← The petition in part is grounded on the liberty of the press. We do not
believe that this constitutional right is in any way involved. The refusal by
the respondents does not constitute a restriction upon or censorship or
publication. It only affects facilities of publication, and the respondents are
correct in saying that freedom of information or freedom to obtain
information for publication is not guaranteed by the constitution.← The case is governed by statute and to a certain degree be general
principles of democratic institutions. It has been expressly stated that the
right to examine or inspect public records is purely a question of statutory
← The respondents have been guided in their action by the rule laid down
in the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Buck vs. Collins ([1874],
51 Ga., 391; 21 Am. Rep., 236), copy of which was furnished the Register of
Deeds by the Secretary of Justice in 1933, evidently in answer to a query
covering a situation similar to the case at bar. As the respondents placemuch or entire reliance on this decision, we shall dwell at length on its
relevancy in the present case.
← Since, as we have pointed out, the right of inspection is dependent on
the construction to be given the statute in force in the particular jurisdiction,
the decision relied upon can not have any controlling or persuasive effect
here unless it is predicated on a statute like or similar to the Philippine law.
It is not. That decision was inspired largely by common law principles. It is
not in harmony with modern tendencies, and the common law rule has been
found to be inapplicable to the conditions obtaining in the United States and,
for that matter, in the Philippines. The present tendency is to extend the
right of inspection of recorded titles to abstracters, a right denied in Buck vs.
Collins. This tendency, according to American Law Reports (80, p. 760), has
even led the courts in some instances to overrule prior well-recognized
decisions, among which are Buck vs. Collins and Land Title Warranty & S. D.
Co. vs. Tanner (1896, 99 Ga., 470; 27 S. E., 727); while in at least one
other instance, a holding by the supreme court that abstracters were not
entitled to have access to public records le to the enactment of a statute bythe legislature expressly conferring such right. (80 A. L. R., 762.) In Atlanta
Title & T. Co. vs. Tidewell Co. ([1931], 173 Ga., 499; 160 S. E., 620), the
same court which announced the doctrine in Buck vs. Collins, while not
definitely reversing that decision says its opinion does not entirely accord
with the views expressed therein. The development of the more modern
tendencies is ably explained with a discussion of the common law rule in
Shelby County Co. vs. Memphis Abstract Co. (1918, 140 Tenn., 74; 203 S.
← "According to the rules of the common law as administered in England
there was no general or public right of inspection of public records, that right
being confined to those who had a personal interest in the property affected
by the records. The greater portion of the real property in England was held
by the nobility and the aristocracy in large estates, and the system thatprevailed looked to the descent of reality to the oldest son and other heirs,
often by entail, and this resulted in few transfers. In America different ideals
have prevailed, and these brought, as a necessary consequence, a decided
change. Small holdings in fee have resulted from the American concept and
principle of equality as heirs, and activity of sales and freedom of transfer
have been encouraged by the policy of our laws. The earlier common law
decisions are, therefore, not applicable to the changed conditions, and
should have little influence in the molding of precedents respecting the right
to inspect and make use of registries of titles. If subsequent purchasers and
encumbrances are to be charged with notice of all that appears of record
affecting the particular real estate, it is but sheer justice that the law should
be liberalized so as not only to extend the right of inspection to members of
the public who may be interested in the title, but so as to expand the
opportunity for notice to all who may be injured should they act or deal
without notice. Sound policy would give to the contents of the registries of
deeds, mortgages and liens the widest possible publicity, and in the form
that is most reliable and reassuring. Whatever adds to the vendibility of realproperty at its full value augments the wealth of the state. While the title
examiner or abstractor has followed his profession ever since a system of
registration was adopted, there has come in modern times the creation and
development of the abstract company, which in turn has paved the way for
and made possible the title guaranty company. The constantly increasing
complication of land titles, especially in populous estates, has made each of
these not only a utility, but a necessity, as aids in the ascertainement and
assurance of rights based upon titles of reality."
← In addition to his rights as a citizen and an elector, the newspaper
proprietor can demand access to public records on the basis of his special
pecuniary interest. The interest of the newspaper man in public records is
the interest of the manufacturer in his raw materials. By being denied access
to the records the newspaper is cut off from a source of income and profit.That the newspaper's prospective business from the sale of copies containing
information gathered from the records was a sufficient pecuniary interest to
entitle the proprietor or employee to access to the documents was finally
established in two cases.
← Upon the foregoing considerations, mandamus is the appropriate
remedy, and the petition will be granted commanding the respondents to
allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to examine, extract,
abstract or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to
aliens subject to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed necessary
not incompatible with his decision, without costs.
← A.M. No. 1037-CJ October 28, 1981← MARTIN LANTACO, SR., ESTEBAN DEL BARRIO, ROSALITO
ALAMAG and BORROMEO VITALIANO, complainants,
vs.
CITY JUDGE FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent. ←
← MAKASIAR, J.:← This is a verified letter-complaint dated August 7, 1975 addressed to
the President of the Philippines (by lst Indorsement, dated August 25, 1975,this case was referred by the Office of the President to this Court, pursuant
to Section 7, Article X of the Constitution), by jeepney drivers Martin
Lantaco, Sr., Esteban del Barrio, Rosalito Alamag and Borromeo Vitaliano, all
residents of Pasay City, against City Judge Francisco R. Llamas of the Pasay
City Court for "Backsliding and Grave Abuse of Discretion."
← On January 8, 1975, an investigating special counsel of the City
Fiscal's Office of Pasay City, filed Criminal Cases Nos. 95647, 95648, 95649
and 95650, all for estafa against Ricardo Paredes, an officer of the
PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for "non-remittance of
SSS contribution premiums." These cases were assigned to respondent.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss all
the criminal cases on the ground that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution opposed the motion. According to the complainants, the
respondent set the promulgation of his decision on July 22, 1975, postponed
to July 30, 1975 and again to July 31, 1975, when at about 9:45 in the
morning, upon respondent's instruction, his clerk of court read thedispositive portion thereof acquitting the accused of all four estafa cases on
← (b) The contributions payable under this Act in cases where an
employer refuses or neglects to pay the same shall be collected by the
System in the same manner as taxes are made collectible under the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended Failure or refusal of the
employer to pay or remit the contributions herein prescribed shall not prejudice the right of the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage.
← xxx xxx xxx
← (e) For purposes of this section, any employer who is delinquent or
has not remitted all the monthly contributions due and payable may within
six (6) months from approval of this amendatory act remit said contributions
to the SSS and submit the corresponding collection lists therefor without
incurring the prescribed three per cent penalty. In case the employer fails to
remit to the SSS the said contributions within the six months grace period,
the penalty of three per cent shall be imposed from the time the
contributions first became due as provided in paragraph (a) of this section.
Provided, however, That the Administrator, may in meritorious cases, allow
employers who have submitted a payment plan, on or before April 19 1973,
to pay their contributions due and payable up to December 31, 1973 without
incurring the prescribed three per cent penalty. As amended by Rep. Act No.
2658, and by Pres. Decrees Nos. 24 and 177).
← To prove remittance, the employer can submit his records thereon or a
certification from the SSS as to the fact of remittance of the contributions.← II. Respondent likewise erred in concluding that, in connection with the
daily deductions of P 0.50 as SSS premium contributions, "this Court is not
convinced and could not reasonably believe that there was a forced daily
deductions or exaction of P0. 50."
← Section 18 of the Social Security Act governing employees'
contribution, provides that ... the employer shall deduct and withhold from
such employee's monthly salary, wage, compensation or earnings the
employee's contribution in an amount corresponding to his salary, wage,
compensation or earnings during the month in accordance with the following
schedule effective on January 1, 1973 ... ." With this legal obligation placed
on the employer's shoulder, respondent's reasonable belief that "there was
or could be no forced daily deductions or exaction of P 0.50" would have no