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Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation Junjian Qi 1 , Ahmad Taha 2 , Jianhui Wang 3 1 University of Central Florida 2 The University of Texas at San Antonio 3 Southern Methodist University 1
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Page 1: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements

for Dynamic State Estimation

Junjian Qi1, Ahmad Taha2, Jianhui Wang3

1University of Central Florida2The University of Texas at San Antonio

3Southern Methodist University

1

Page 2: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Importance of State Estimation2

q Robust, real-time feedback control requires real-time dynamic state estimation

q Greg Zweigle from SEL yesterday at the Challenges of Cascading Failure panel

Page 3: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Dynamic State Estimation3

q General nonlinear dynamical model:

q Information needed– Power system dynamic model, subject to model

uncertainty– PMU measurements, subject to bad data/cyber

attacks

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Model Uncertainties

q Dynamics under unknown inputs

– A combination of unmeasurable or unmeasured disturbances, unknown control action, or un-modeled system dynamics

q Unavailable inputs– Unmeasurable or unmeasured known inputs

q Parameter inaccuracy in

4

Page 5: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Cyber Attacks Against Measurements

q Data integrity attacks– Corrupting the content of measurement, such as man-in-

the-middle attacks that intercept, modify signals q Denial of Service attack– Introducing a denial in communication of measurement

such as by flooding the networkq Replay attack – Special case of data integrity attacks where the attacker

replays a previous snapshot of a valid packet sequence

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Page 6: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Observer for Linearized System6

Linearize

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Observer for Linearized System, cont’d7

Unknown inputs

Attack vector

Page 8: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Sliding Mode Observer Design8

where

q Design variables: matrices Fq , Lqq Good design yields asymptotic convergence of est. error

Page 9: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Observer Design: Finding Fq & Lqq Solve for

q Then recover the observer gain: q The linear matrix inequality is scalable

9

Page 10: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Estimate Unknown Inputs10

q Discrete version of the power system dynamics:

q Substituting by

q Estimated unknown inputs

Page 11: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Results on 16-Machine System11

q 10-th order model for generator

q Six unknown inputsq Randomly chosen

q 12 PMUs are installed at the terminal bus of generator 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, and 16

Page 12: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Nonlinear Observer/Estimator

q Assumptions– One-sided Lipschitz condition

– Quadratically inner-bounded

Select parameters to satisfy the conditions

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Page 13: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Nonlinear Observer, cont’dq Observer dynamics

(*)– Measurement function is linearized– Key is to design the gain matrix

Theorem [Zhang2012]: The observer is asymptotically stable if there exist scalars such that the following Riccati inequality has a symmetric positive definite solution P

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Page 14: Addressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against ...abur/ieee/PES2018/JunjianQi.pdfAddressing Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks Against Measurements for Dynamic State Estimation

Nonlinear Observer Design14

(*).

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Results on 16-Machine Systemq Cyber attacks– Data integrity:Four measurements are scaled by 0.6 and the other four are scaled by 1/0.6– Denial of service:Loss of measurements– Replay attacks:Previous measurements

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q Unknown inputs

q Unavailable inputs: steady-state values

q We compare with literature’s status quo

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Results on 16-Machine System:Comparison with EKF, UKF, SR-UKF

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Estimation of one compromised measurement

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Observer Results: Detection of Attacks

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Data integrity attack: four measurements are scaled by 0.6 and the other four are scaled by 1/0.6

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Results on 16-Machine System, cont’d18

Denial of Service attack: first eight measurements are kept unchanged for

Replay attack: for first eight measurements

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[email protected] || [email protected] || [email protected]

• J. Qi, A. F. Taha, and J. Wang, “Comparing Kalman Filters and Observers for Power System Dynamic State Estimation with Model Uncertainty and Malicious Cyber Attacks.” [Online]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.01030.pdf

• A. F. Taha, J. Qi, J. Wang, and J. H. Panchal, “Risk mitigation for dynamic state estimation against cyber attacks and unknown inputs,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 886–899, Mar. 2018.

• J. Qi, K. Sun, J. Wang, and H. Liu, “Dynamic state estimation for multi-machine power system by unscented Kalman filter with enhanced numerical stability,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 2. pp. 1184–1196, Mar. 2018.

• W. Zhang, H. Su, H. Wang, and Z. Han, “Full-order and reduced-dorderobservers for one-sided lipschitz nonlinear systems using Riccatiequations,” Commun. Nonlinear Sci. Numer. Simul., vol. 17, no. 12, pp. 4968–4977, Dec. 2012.

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