AD- A258 297 DTIC- NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT: LTD C AN ARMY ROLE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER ELECTE C A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE by * ZACHARY P. HUBBARD, MAJ, USA B.G.S., University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 1977 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1992 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 92-32595 \\jj3\flUUlll ]U\ 9 2 12 22 159
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AD- A258 297 DTIC-AD- A258 297 DTIC- NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT: LTD CAN ARMY ROLE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER ELECTEC A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff
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AD- A258 297DTIC-
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT: LTD C
AN ARMY ROLE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER ELECTE
C
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for thedegree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
by*
ZACHARY P. HUBBARD, MAJ, USA
B.G.S., University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 1977
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1992
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
92-32595\\jj3\flUUlll ]U\ 9 2 12 22 159
REPO T D CUM NTATON AGEfoim Appi'oved
REPOR DOCMENTAION AGE No. 0704-0188
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank), 2. RE PORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND OATES COVERED
15 June 1992 Imaster's Thesis 1 Aug 90-5 Jun 92
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 'S. FUNDING NUMBERSft~d!
Naval Gunfire support: An Ary10P~ er in aNew World Order
6. AUTHOR(S)
MAJ Zachary P. Hubbard. USA7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S AND AOORESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATiON
REPORT NUMBER
U. S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeAttn: ATZL-SWD-GDFt. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
9. SPONSORING; MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/ MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent the viewsof the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College or anyother governmental agency. (References to this study shouldinclude the foregoing statement.)
ii
ABSTRACT
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT: AN ARMY ROLE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER byMAJ Zachary P. Hubbard, USA, 166 pages.
This study investigates the Army's role in naval gunfiresupport, in light of the current force reductions andchanging military missions. The discussion focuses uponnaval gunfire training and pre-deployment planning andcoordination for naval gunfire support of contingencyoperations.
During the initial stages of a contingency operation, theArmy relies upon other services for fire support untilsufficient Army field artillery and aviation attack assetsare available. Fixed-wing air support and naval gubrlreprovide this initial support. Naval gunfire for the Army wasnot coordinated during pre-deployment planning for operationsUrgen7t Fury, Just Cause, or Desert Shield.
This study explains the Army's dependance upon the MarineCorps for the planning and coordination of naval gunfiresupport. It promotes methods to decrease this dependance byimproving the field artillery community's naval gunfiretraining and awareness. The analysis addresses institutionaltraining in the Army and Navy; naval gunfire training at ArmyCTCs and in the BCTP; Army-Marine Corps joint naval gunfiretraining; and joint cooperation in developing Army operationsplans requiring naval gunfire support.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE PAGE ............................................. i
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .................................. ii
ABSTRACT ............................................. iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................... viii
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS .................................. ix
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................ 10
Introduction ................................. 10FM 31-5 (June 41) ............................ 11FM 31-5 (November 44) ........................ 12"Salvo-Splash " .. ............................. 13"Naval Gunfire Support in the Pacific"....... 15"An Artilleryman in a JASCO"................... 17Naval Gunfire Support for Amphibious
Operations--Past. Present, and Future ...... 17"Executing Operation Anvil-Dragoon"............ 19Victory at High Tide ......................... 20The Royal Navy and the Falklands War ......... 21"Airborne Early Warning: A
Primary Requirement".......................... 22"After Grenada: Joint Operations in the
82d Airborne Division"....................... 22Command of the Seas .......................... 24"Tactical Vertical Launch Systems: Key to
Naval Forces Surface Revolution at Sea"....26Recommended sources for researchers .......... 27N o te s ............................. ........... 28
iv
3. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................. 29
Research focus ............................... 29Naval gunfire training at Army CTCs .......... 29Army institutional training ................... 30Naval gunfire TTP ............................ 31The Army's dependance upon the ANGLICO ....... 31Emerging technology and naval gunfire ........ 33Marine Corps over-the-horizon tactics ........ 34Army-Marine Corps fire support exchange ...... 34Author's thesis intent ....................... 35
4. TRAINING ..................................... 37
Introduction ................................. 37Field Artillery responsibilities ............. 37Field Artillery Officer Basic Course ......... 38Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course ...... 39MOS 13F Advanced Individual Training ......... 40MOS 13F Basic NCO Course ..................... 40MOS 13F Advanced NCO Course ................... 40Navy Amphibious Schools ...................... 41Naval Gunfire Spotter Course ................. 42Naval Gunfire Spotter Special Course ......... 43Naval Gunfire Air Spotter Course ............. 44Fire Supportman Course ....................... 44Army Combat Training Centers ................. 46National Training Center ..................... 47Joint Readiness Training Center .............. 48Battle Command Training Program .............. 49Marine Corps ANGLICO Training ................ 51Naval Gunfire In Joint Exercises ............. 54Scheduling ANGLICO Training Support .......... 57Conclusions .................................. 59Notes ........................................ 6 1
Introduction ... .............................. 64Comparison of Corps Artillery FSE and
MEF FSCC personnel ......................... 65ANGLICO support to the Army ................... 67Comparison of Army FSEs and their ANGLICO
counterparts at division and below ......... 68Army-Marine Corps fire support exchange ...... 75Conclusions .................................. 79Notes ........................................ 79
6. THE NAVY'S DIRECTION IN NAVAL GUNFIRE ........ 80
Effects of the Falklands War ................. 82Airborne Early Warning ....................... 83Decision to reactivate the battleships ....... 85Effects of the battleship retirement ......... 85The sixteen-inch gunfire gap ................. 86Naval gunfire's future in the U. S. Navy ..... 88Modern ships and naval gunfire ............... 89Future U. S. Navy battle group ............... 90Future frigate ............................... 92Conclusions .................................. 93Notes ........................................ 94
7. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES .......... 97
Introduction ................................. 97Contingency operations discussion ............ 98Historical themes in naval gunfire .......... 100Development of the JASCO ..................... 101Naval gunfire support for Airborne forces... 102ANGLICO tactical configuration .............. 103Paucity of ANGLICO support to the Army ...... 105ANGLICO deployment to Desert Shield ......... 105Naval gunfire without an ANGLICO ............ 108Pre-deployment planning for
Joint operations .......................... 110Naval gunfire in other than
amphibious operations ..................... 112Determining naval gunfire requirements ...... 113Integrating ANGLICO teams in
Army operations ........................... 115Naval gunfire and aerial spotters ........... 116Naval gunfire and RPVs/UAVs .................. 116Counterfire for contingency operations ...... 118Naval gunfire support: Urgent Fury .......... 120Naval gunfire support: Just Cause ........... 123Naval gunfire support: Desert Shield/Store. .127Heavy-Light considerations for ANGLICO ...... 131Conelusions ................................. 133Notes ....................................... 134
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............. 152
Introduction ................................ 152
Author's conclusion on research question .... 152TRADOC support for naval gunfire training... 154Army institutional naval gunfire training...154Army use of Naval Amphibious Schools ........ 155CTCs and the BCTP ........................... 157Naval gunfire in Joint exercises ............ 157Army support for the ANGLICO ................ 158Army-Marine Corps fire support exchange ..... 160Pre-deployment naval gunfire planning ....... 161Joint publication revisions ................. 162Army field manual revisions .................. 162Joint cooperation in fire support
systems development ....................... 163Recommendations for further research ........ 165
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................ 178
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE TITLE PAGE
5-1 CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT KEY PERSONNEL 66
5-2 ANGLICO KEY PERSONNEL (DIVISION AND BRIGADE) 69
5-3 ARMY TYPE DIVISION FSE KEY PERSONNEL 70
5-4 ARMY HEAVY/LIGHT BRIGADE FSE KEY PERSONNEL 71
5-5 ANGLICO KEY PERSONNEL (BATTALION AND COMPANY) 72
5-6 ARMY HEAVY/LIGHT BATTALION FSE KEY PERSONNEL 73
5-7 ARMY HEAVY/LIGHT COMPANY FSE KEY PERSONNEL 74
7-1 USMC ANGLICO TACTICAL CONFIGURATION 104
viii
GLOSSARY
AAW - Anti-air WarfareAEW - Airborne Early WarningAFSO - Aerial Fire Support ObserverAIT - Advanced Individual TrainingANCOC - Advanced Noncommissioned Officer CourseANGLICO - Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison CompanyAOR - Area of ResponsibilityASW - Anti-submarine WarfareASuW - Anti-surface WarfareBCTP - Battle Command Training ProgramBFCG - Battle Force Combatant GroupBG - Brigadier GeneralBNCOC - Basic Noncommissioned Officer CourseCATIES - Combined Arms Training Integrated Evaluation SystemCENTCOM - U. S. Central CommandCEOI - Communications and Electronics Operating InstructionsCINC - Commander-in-ChiefCINCFOR - Commander-in-Chief Forces CommandCINCLANT - U. S. Commander-in-Chief AtlanticCINCLANTFLT - Commander-in-Chief Atlantic FleetCINCPAC - U. S. Commander-in-Chief PacificCINCSOUTH - U. S. Commander-in-Chief SouthCIS - Commonwealth of Independent StatesCIWS - Close-in Weapon SystemCOL - ColonelCOMSEC - Communications SecurityCONUS- Continental United StatesCP - Command PostCPL - CorporalCPT - Captain (Army)CTC - Combat Training CenterFA - Field ArtilleryFAIO - Field Artillery Intelligence OfficerFAOAC - Field Artillery Officer Advanced CourseFAOBC - Field Artillery Officer Basic CourseFCT - Firepower Control TeamFM - Field Manual (referring to a publication); Frequency
Modulation (referring to radio wave propagation).FMF - Fleet Marine ForceFMFLANT - Fleet Marine Force AtlanticFMFPAC - Fleet Marine Force PacificFORSCOM - U. S. Forces CommandFSCC - Fire Suppo:t Coordination CenterFSCOORD - Fire Support CoordinatorFSNCO - Fire Support Noncommissioned OfficerFSE - Fire Support ElementFSO - Fire Support OfficerHF - High Frequency
ix
HIMARS - High Mobility Artillery Rocket SystemHMMWV - High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled VehicleI MEF - 1st Marine Expeditionary ForceII MEF - 2d Marine Expeditionary ForceISSA - Inter-service Support AgreementJASCO - Joint Assault Signal CompanyJCS - Joint Chiefs of StaffJRTC - Joint Readiness Training CenterJTF - Joint Task ForceLCPL - Lance CorporalLIC - Low Intensity ConflictLSMR - Landing Ship Medium RocketLTC - Lieutenant ColonelMAGTF - Marine Air Ground Task ForceMAJ - MajorMCLWG - Major Caliber Lightweight GunMEB - Marine Expeditionary Brigade (formerly Marine
Amphibious Brigade)MEF - Marine Expeditionary Force (formerly Marine Amphibious
Force)MEU - Marine Expeditionary Unit (formerly Marine Amphibious
Unit)MLRS - Multiple Launch Rocket SystemMOS - Military Occupational SpecialtyNCO - Noncommissioned OfficerNTC - National Training CenterOPLAN - Operations PlanOPSEC - Operational SecurityOTH - Over-the-HorizonPFC - Private First ClassPGM - Precision Guided MunitionRAP - Rocket Assisted ProjectileRPV - Remotely Piloted VehicleSALT -Supporting Arms Liaison TeamSFC - Sergeant First ClassSGM - Sergeant MajorSPOTEX - Spotting ExerciseSRI - Surveillance, Reconnaissance and IntelligenceSSG - Staff SergeantSS-83 - Solid Shield 1983TPFDD - Time Phased Force Deployment DataTRADOC - (Army) Training and Doctrine CommandTSFO - Training Set Fire ObservationTTP - Tactics, Techniques and ProceduresTVLS - Tactical Vertical Launch SystemUAV - Unmanned Aerial VehicleUNAAF - Unified Action Armed ForcesUSCINCLANT - United Stated Commander in Chief AtlanticUSMC - United States Marine CorpsUSS - United States' ShipVHF - Very High Frequency
training opportunities are sometimes lost in these exercises.
To take advantage of the opportunity for naval gunfire
and other joint fire support training during joint exercises,
Army planners must request that joint fire support be
designated as one of the exercise objectives. This desire
must be made known at the Initial planning conference that
always precedes the exercise. The Army representatives to
the conference should be able to discuss their joint fire
support training objectives in detail. For this reason, they
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may need to consult with ANGLICO planners prior to the
conference. Designating joint (Army-Navy) fire support as an
exercise objective gives the Army justification to request
ANGLICO support fc. the participating Army units. The Army
submits this request through the CINC sponsoring the
exercise.
As the leaders of the fire support community, field
artillery officers and NCOs bears the responsibility for fire
support training in the Army. Inherent in this is the
requirement to coordinate ANGLICO training support. This
requires a thorough knowledge of the mission, capabilities,
and limitations of the ANGLICOs. Without this knowledge, an
FSO cannot properly determine the size and composition of the
ANGLICO teams required to support a given training event.
Unfortunately, this information receives only cursory
attention during the institutional training of a field
artillery officer or NCO, as previously discussed. The
following paragraphs briefly describe the mission and
capabilities of an ANGLICO and the peculiarities of obtaining
ANGLICO training support.
Stated simply, the ANGLICO mission is to plan,
coordinate, and control naval fire support (naval gunfire and
close air support) for the U. S. Army and allied units
p:ýrticipating in joint or combined operations with the Navy
and Marine Corps. 3 0 Inherent in this mission is the
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requirement to perform the same functions during training.
To meet its support obligation to allied forces, an ANGLICO
may have several teams deployed around the world at any given
time, supporting Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) at sea and
other Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) training with
American allies. With only two active duty and two reserve
component ANGLICOs in the Marine Corps, teams to support Army
training are a scarce commodity requiring close management.
A significant obstacle to obtaining ANGLICO support
for Army training is that there is no central agency within
the Marine Corps through which ANGLICO support requests are
directed. Requests for training support from active
component ANGLICOs are submitted through the appropriate
Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Headquarters. Requests for 1st
ANGLICO go through the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) at
Camp Smith, Hawaii; support from 2d ANGLICO is obtained
through the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLANT) at Norfolk,
Virginia. Support from the 3d and 4th ANGLICOs, both in the
reserve component, is requested through the 4th Marine
Division headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana. It is not
uncommon for an active duty ANGLICO to require augmentation
from a reserve component company in order to support an Army
training exercise. Due to the complexity of requesting
ANGLICO training support, requests that are submitted late in
the planning process may receive a negative response.
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To ease some of the coordination problems, the
ANGLICOs hold an annual working conference during which they
consolidate Army training requests and attempt to divide
support requirements between the four companies. Most Army
training support is coordinated at this conference. 3 1
Requests from the 75th Ranger Regiment, the XVIII Airborne
Corps, and other agencies desiring ANGLICO training support
are reviewed and deconflicted. The Rangers and the 82d
Airborne Division tend to receive the majority of support.
A large percentage of the requests receive a negative
response due to the paucity of ANGLICO teams. Consequently,
the Army's dependance on ANGLICO support for naval gunfire
training frequently results in lost opportunities, as
mentioned earlier in the discussion on ANGLICO support to
units training at the JRTC.
In summary, the Army is heavily dependant upon the
Navy and Marine Corps to provide institutional naval gunfire
training and to plan and coordinate naval gunfire support for
training exercises. It has little capability to conduct
autonomous naval gunfire training, either at Its training
Institutions or at unit level. Although the Navy Amphibious
Schools open their doors to Army students, seats for the
courses are on a space-available basis. The Field Artillery
School does not officially acknowledge a need for Army quotas
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to the Amphibious School naval gunfire courses; Army units
desiring quotas coordinate directly with the schools.
With the exception of the JRTC, the Army does not
Integrate naval gunfire training into its CTCs or the BCTP.
Likewise, the Integration of naval gunfire support Into the
training of Army units participating in joint exercises under
the warfighting CINCs is lacking.
With ample lead time, Marine Corps ANGLICOs can
provide naval gunfire MTTs to Army units. Given proper
planning and coordination, ANGLICO teams can support any
variety of Army training exercises. There is no single
source In the Marine Corps to which ANGLICO training
support requests are directed. Consequently, Army units
should forecast annual ANGLICO support requirements and
forward them to both active duty ANGLIC09 through their
respective chains of command. The requests are reviewed and
support scheduled, if available, during the annual ANGLICO
conference. Army field artillery officers require a working
knowledge of the ANGLICOs in order to properly formulate
these support requests.
CHAPTER 4 NOTES
1IU.S. Army, FM 25-100: Training the Force.(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1988), i1.
2 Fred F. Marty, "State-of-the-Branch Address," FieldArtillery (December 1991): 1.
3 Kris Aspen, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Fort Sill, OK, 2 Dec 1991. [Major Aspen is an instructor inthe Advanced Fire Support Branch of the U.S. Army FieldArtillery School.]
4Kris Aspen interview.
5Clifton Carper, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Fort Sill, OK, 23 Dec 1991. [Sergeant First Class Carper isan instructor in the Basic Fire Support Branch of the U.S.Army Field Artillery School.]
$Gary McAtee, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Fort Sill, Ok, 23 Dec 1991. [Sergeant First Class McAteeworks in the Advanced Fire Support Branch of the U.S. ArmyField Artillery School and helped develop the 13F ANCOC.]
7 Fred F. Marty, "State-of-the-Branch Address," 3.
sGary McAtee interview.
9 Mark Adams, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Fort Sill, OK, 2 Dec 1991. [Lieutenant Colonel Adams isChief of the Fire Support Instructor Branch, U.S. Army FieldArtillery School.]
' 0 Hank Gobar, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Little Creek, VA, 3 Dec 1991. [Lieutenant Colonel Gobar isDirector of the Supporting Arms Department, Naval AmphibiousSchool, Little Creek, VA. All information pertaining tocourses at the Navy Amphibious School was provided byLieutenant Colonel Gobar.]
1 1 Donald M. Weller, "Salvo-Splashl The Development ofNaval Gunfire in World War II, Part I," Naval InstituteProceedings 80 (August 1954): 844.
1 2 Roy Jones, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Coronado, CA, 5 Dec 1991. [Major Jones is Director of the
1 3 Fred F. Marty, "State-of-the-Branch Address," 1.
14James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert. (New York:Bantam Books, 1991), 83.
18Fred F. Marty, "State-of-the-Branch Address," 1.
iSRoger C. Fiske, interviewed by the author,telephonic, Fort Irwin, CA, 23 Dec 1991. [Colonel Fiske isthe Deputy Commander of the Operations Group, NTC.]
'7Craig Rosten, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 Dec 1991. (Captain Rosten is acontroller in the Exercise Maneuver Control Center at theJRTC.]
'SThomas Liptak, interviewed by the author, telephonic.Camp Lejeune, NC, 23 Dec 91. [Major Liptak Is the OperationsOfficer of the 2d ANGLICO.]
1 9 Craid Rosten interview.
2 0 Jack Silvers, interviewed by the author, telephonic.Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 Nov 1991. [Captain Silvers is aField Artillery Operations Officer, OPFOR Branch, BCTP.]
?•amphlet, "Naval Gunfire--First Battle", March 1986,N-20604.8, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,KS.
2 2Zachary P. Hubbard, "How Soon We Forget," FieldArtillery (October 1990): 4.
2 3 Zachary P. Hubbard, "The ANGLICO Edge," FieldArtillery (April 1990): 25.
2 *Thomas E. Crabtree, interviewed by the author,telephonic, Swansboro, NC, 11 Jan 1991. (LieutenantCommander Crabtree's last assignment before retirement InJuly 1991 was as the senior Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer forthe 2d ANGLICO.]
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27Jay F. Grandin, "After Grenada: Joint Operations in
the 82d Airborne Division," Field Artillery (February 1988):46.
2SJeff Schaefer. interviewed by the author, telephonic,
Fort Benning, GA, 18 Dec 1991. [Major Schaefer is theRegimental Fire Support Officer for the 75th RangerRegiment.]
2SU.S. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic, Joint Control Group
Exercise Control Plan--Solid Shield '83. (Norfolk, VA:USCINCLANT, 1983), C-11-1.
3 0 Talking Paper, 2d ANGLICO Operations Officer,13 March 1989. Subject: The Marine Air and Naval GunfireLiaison Company (ANGLICO).
3 1 Thomas Liptak interview.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PERSONNEL
"Wars are fought and won by men, not machines. The
human dimension of war will be decisive in the battles and
campaigns of the future, just as it has been in the past."'
This passage, from the Army's capstone field manual, clearly
expresses the value placed on the human element of the Army.
The reports of the three Service Secretaries contained in
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's 1991 Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, all praise the quality of the
individuals and the leadership in today's armed forces. 2
This chapter discusses the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps personnel that perform coordination and liaison
functions in providing naval gunfire support to the Army.
The analysis presented helps answer the secondary thesis
questions: 1) "In what direction Is the Marine Corps going in
the areas of tactics and force structure in the field of
naval gunfire support?"; 2) "Based upon its current force
structure and training, is the Army capable of planning and
controlling naval gunfire support?" Chapter four already
addressed the issue of training, contained in the second
question.
Army FMs on fire support tactics and techniques
typically look to the Marine Corps ANGLICO when discussing
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naval gunfire support for the Army. The possibility of Army
personnel coordinating and controlling naval gunfire is
rarely mentioned. The FN 6-20-30 (Fire Support for Corps and
Division Operations) is no exception.3 The following
discussion, by a comparison of ANOLICO teams with typical
Army fire support teams, examines the Army's capabilities to
control and coordinate naval gunfire based upon its current
fire support personnel structure.
A comparison of Marine Corps and Army fire support
structures reveals, surprisingly, that in some respects the
Army is better organized to coordinate and control naval
gunfire than the Marine Corps. The following discussion is a
comparison of the fire support structure from the corps/MEF
down to company level.
The Army corps artillery headquarters is responsible
for planning and coordinating fire support for the corps.
The Corps Artillery Commander, a brigadier general, is
designated as the Corps Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD).
His headquarters is organized with cells to support the corps
tactical and main command posts (figure 5-1). These cells
are staffed to manage fire support in current operations and
plan for future operations respectively. The corps artillery
headquarters has no NGLO in its structure.
The Marine Corps NEF headquarters is roughly the
equivalent of an Army corps headquarters. There is no
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CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT KEY PERSONNEL
BREAKDOWN OF ASSETS
TITLE RANK TACTICAL CP MAIN CP
Corps Artillery Commander BG 1
Deputy Commander COL
Deputy FSCOORD LTC 1
Assistant FSCOORD MAJ 2 2
Fire Support Officer MAJ 1 1
FA Intelligence Officer MAJ 1
FA Intelligence Officer CPT 2
FA Operations Officer CPT 2 2
Target Analyst CPT 2
Operations Sergeant SGM I
Intelligence Sergeant MSG 1
Fire Support Sergeant SFC 1
Sire Support Sergeant SSG 1
(Note: All officer positions are filled by field artillery
officers.)
FIGURE 5-1
(FN 6-20-30. p. A-12)
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doctrinal fire support structure in the MEF headquarters.
Consequently, the NEF must assemble an ad hoc fire support
coordination center (FSCC) when employed tactically. 4 This
creates a multitude of problems. One serious consequence is
that the personnel to man this FSCC must be taken from other
2Dick Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to thePresident and Congress, (Washington: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1991), 99, 102-103, 105.
3U.S. Army, FM 6-20-30: Fire Support for Corps andDivision Operations, (Washington: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1989), 1-10.
4William H. Schoffel, interviewed by author,telephonic, Camp Lejuene, NC, 23 Dec 1991. [Colonel Schoffelwas the Fire Support Coordinator for the I MEF, USMC duringOperation Desert Storm. He organized and led the I MEFFSCC.]
5U. S. Army, FM 6-20-30, 1-11.
OU.S. Marine Corps, Table of Oreanization 4854C,
(Washington; Headquarters United States Marine Corps,1988), 1.
7Memo, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne CorpsArtillery to Commandant, U.S. Army Field Artillery School,31 May 1990, Subject: Army/Marine Corps Officer ExchangeProgram.
s [The author served as the operations officer for the2d ANGLICO from August 1988 until June 1991.]
$Zachary P. Hubbard, "The ANGLICO Edge," FieldArtillery (April 1990): 22.
"1oZachary P. Hubbard, "How Soon We Forget," FieldArtillery (October 1990): 3.
''Thomas E. Crabtree, interviewed by the author,telephonic, Swansboro, NC, 11 Jan 1992. [Lieutenant CommanderCrabtree was the division NGLO for the 82d Airborne Divisionduring the first two months of Operation Desert Shield.]
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CHAPTER SIX
THE NAVY'S DIRECTION IN NAVAL GUNFIRE
Argentina and the United Kingdom went to war in 1982
over a relatively unknown group of islands called the
Falklands. Though fairly unremarkable in terms of its global
impact, the short Falklands War had a significant influence
upon trends in naval gunfire development. Beginning with a
look at naval gunfire employment during the Falklands War,
this chapter examines the current state of naval gunfire.
The analysis discusses the significance of the
retirement of the Iowa class battleships and some recent
developments that indicate the direction the U. S. Navy is
taking in the field. This chapter addresses the secondary
thesis questions: 1) "Is conventional naval gunfire still a
viable means of fire support?"; 2) "In what direction is the
Navy going in the areas of weapons and doctrine in the field
of naval gunfire support?"
Missile technology came of age during the Cold War.
Along with this technology came a new lethality in
sCharles W. Koburger, Jr., Sea Power in the Falklands,(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 71.
' 0 Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Use of Sea Power,(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 49-51.
''Neville Cately, "Airborne Early Warning: A PrimaryRequirement," Navy International 88 (January 1983): 35.
12C.W. Koburger, Jr., "Lessons in Modern NavalWarfare," Navy International 88 (January 1983): 10.
13John F. Lehman, Jr., Command, 282.
1 4 Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide, (New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1968), 83. [The author is a notedUSMC historian and was director of the Marine CorpsHistorical Program from 1958-1963.]
1 5 Eric J. Grove, "U. S. Navy Battleship Reactivation--A Commentary," Naval Forces III (1987): 85. [The author is asenior lecturer at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth,England.]
'sNorman Polmar, "Battleships and Naval GunfireSupport," Marine Corps Gazette 74 (October 1990): 24.
19Denise L. Almond, ed., Score, 229.
2 0 Donald M. Weller, Naval Gunfire Support ofAmphibious Operations: Past Present, and Future, (Dahlgren,VA: Naval Surface Weapons Center, 1977), 7. [The author isa retired Marine Corps Major General and noted naval gunfireauthority.]
2 1 MIchael C. Braunbeck, "Front Line Lessons," NavalInstitute Proceedings 117 (May 1991): 90.
2 2 Thomas E. Crabtree, interviewed by the author,telephonic, Swansboro, NC, 11 Jan 1991. [LieutenantCommander Crabtree, assigned to the 2d ANGLICO, served as theDivision NGLO for the 82d Airborne Division during the earlydays of Operation Desert Shield.]
2 3 Stanley R. Arthur and Marvin Putnam, "Desert Stormat Sea," Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (May 1991): 86.
2 4 Memo, U. S. Navy Amphibious School, Little Creek,VA, 3 December 1991, Subject: Naval Gunfire FutureDevelopments, 1.
2 5 Cary Hithon, interviewed by the author, telephonic,Washington, D.C., 21 Nov 1991. (Lieutenant Commander Hithonis assigned to U.S. Navy Operations, Surface Strike andAntisurface Warfare Division, the Pentagon.]
2 6 Cary Hithon interview.
2 7 Michael P. Ley, "Naval Gunfire Support: What WeNeed to Understand," Field Artillery (February 1988): 40.
2 *Richard Sharpe, ed., Jane's, 722.
2 *Lawrence H. Garrett, III, Frank B. Kelso, and A. M.Gray, "The Way Ahead," Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (April1991): 42. (At the time of publication, the authors were theSecretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations andCommandant of the Marine Corps respectively.]
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30Scott C. Truver and James C. Hazlett, "Surfacing a
New Battle Group," Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (April1991): 88.
31Scott C. Truver and James C. Hazlett, "Battle
Group," 86.
32Scott C. Truver and James C. Hazlett, "Battle
Group," 84.
33Scott C. Truver and James C. Hazlett, "BattleGroup," 84.
3 4 Scott C. Truver and James C. Hazlett, "BattleGroup," 86-87.
3 5 Bruce R. Linder, "Nobody's Square Peg," NavalInstitute Proceedings 118 (January 1992): 41.
3 6 Richard Sharpe, ed., Jane's Fithting Ships,(Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 1989): 732.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
The experiences of World War II account for the
largest portion of our base of knowledge in naval gunfire
support. The U. S. Marine Corps, historically an amphibious
force, was too small to conduct all of the amphibious
operations required to wage a global war. Consequently, the
Army was compelled to develop TTP for landing operations. It
published editions of FM 31-5 (Landing Operations on Hostile
Shores), in June 1941 and November 1944.
The literature from the late and post-war years
reveals an Army highly experienced in landing operations,
including the coordination and control of naval gunfire
support. Unfortunately time has erased many of the difficult
lessons learned. This chapter discusses the current TTP for
naval gunfire support to the Army, with an eye toward
historical lessons that are still applicable today. It
includes a look at joint planning for naval gunfire support
and fire support for the initial stages of contingency
operations. The chapter will also discuss how the Army
became dependant upon the ANGLICO and the implications of
that dependance for the future. The analysis addresses the
following secondary thesis questions: 1) "What insight do
naval gunfire historical lessons learned since the beginning
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of World War II provide into how the Army should approach
naval gunfire today?"; 2) "In what direction is the Marine
Corps going in the area of tactics and force structure in the
field of naval gunfire support?"; and 3) "Based upon its
current force structure and training, is the Army capable of
planning and controlling naval gunfire support?"
Most of the naval gunfire lessons learned were derived
from amphibious operations. Fortunately, many of these are
applicable to Army forces in a contingency operation. The
following discussion compares the fire support of an
amphibious landing with that of an Army force inserted by
parachute assault or air-landing into an area of conflict
during the initial stages of a contingency operation. This
discussion serves as a basis for other analysis in the
chapter.
Contingency operations may be divided into two
distinct types. The first type, peacetime contingency
operations, involve activities such as disaster relief,
noncombatant evacuations strikes and raids, peacemaking, and
unconventional warfare.' These operations, as discussed in
FM 100-20 (Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict),
are actions short of war and do not apply to this discussion.
The following discussion deals with the second type of
contingency operation, as described in FM 100-15 (Corps
Operations), where the corps is the largest ground force
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employed, and military conflict is imminent or has already
without an ANGLICO team would have to coordinate, through its
communications officer, to arrange for loan of both the
radios and the COMSEC hardware. This is not only time
consuming, but draws precious communications assets from
elsewhere. Additionally, the training requirements for HF
radio communications, as discussed in chapter four, must be
taken Into account. If the ANGLICO is reduced to a strictly
liaison function, the Army will require additional radio
assets in the tables of equipment for fire support
organizations expected to conduct naval gunfire operations.
Besides radios, ANGLICO teams provide AN/PPN-19 radar
beacons which are used as navigational aids for both naval
gunfire ships and numerous aircraft. The ships use the
signal from the radar beacon as a fixed reference point,
allowing accurate adjustment of naval gunfire rounds while
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the ship Is in motion. This is yet another expensive piece
of equipment the Army would require to conduct autonomous
naval gunfire operations. As always, with new equipment
comes additional training requirements to make an Army naval
gunfire system functional.
In any discussion of the ANGLICO, one must remember
that in addition to naval gunfire, ANGLICO teams provide
their supported Army units control of Navy and Marine Corps
close air support. With this in mind, changing the ANGLICO
to a strictly liaison organization takes on greater
significance.
The key to attaining proper fire support for a
contingency operation is the joint plannitig that occurs prior
to the operation. The 1944 edition of FM 31-5 (Landing
Operations on Hostile Shores) stresses the need for detailed
joint planning between the landing force commander (the
equivalent of our Army contingency force commander)
and the naval force commander.10 It goes on to explain that
the Army fire support plan should be included as an annex to
the naval task force operations order."1 One author of the
same era indicates that, during World War II, liaison
officers from the ground force were placed on the flagship of
the naval gunfire support force.12 There is nothing to
suggest that the same liaison requirement does not exist
today.
Joint Publication 3-09 (Doctrine for Joint Fire
Support) is currently in the final draft form. Though not
yet officially doctrine, it represents the current thoughts
on Joint fire support. The publication indicates that the
Navy will provide fire support advisors to the Army corps "as
the mission requires and as resources permit." 1 3 With no
ANGLICO support available at the corps level, the onus is
upon the Army to ensure that the proper liaison is
established with the Navy for both naval gunfire support and
other joint operations.
When attempting to integrate ANGLICO teams into Army
war plans, several problems occur. First, there is no
central agency within the Marine Corps with which to deal.
The Army planner must first determine the CINC AOR in which
the plan will be executed and then determine which MEF is
responsible for that AOR. Ideally, 1st ANGLICO would support
plans for an AOR covered by I MEF and 2d ANGLICO would
support plans for an AOR covered by II MEF. However, the
example of the 2d ANGLICO's deployment to Operation Desert
Shield indicates two things: the physical location of 1st
ANGLICO In California may make it impossible for the company
to respond quickly enough to meet the initial support
requirements of an Army contingency force; and it is unlikely
that one ANGLICO will be sufficient to meet all of the
support requirements of an Army corps. The physical
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proximity of 2d ANGLICO to Fort Bragg makes it the logical
unit to deploy in any situation requiring the 82d Airborne
Division, as 2d ANGLICO0s vehicles can self-deploy to Fort
Bragg in Just a few hours.
The next question an Army planner must ask is whether
a Marine Corps MAGTF will participate in the planned
operation. If a MEF is involved, unique fire support
planning problems exist due to the lack of a doctrinal FSE in
the headquarters, as chapter five discussed. Proper
coordination with the MAGTF Is required for both fire support
and for service-unique administrative and logistics support
to ANGLICO teams accompanying the Army forces.
When no MAGTF is involved in the contingency
operation, a failure of a service-unique piece of ANGLICO
equipment, beyond the ability of the supported Army unit to
repair, could have serious effects upon accomplishing the
ANGLICO mission. A situation like this requires that the
ANGLICO tailor a heavier than normal support structure for
the deploying teams. This must be taken into account when
Army planners develop the Time Phased Force Deployment Data
(TPFDD) for the ANGLICO teams supporting their operations.
Planning for naval gunfire support when no MAGTF is
participating in the operation presents unique problems for
the Army planner. Neither FM 6-20, the Army capstone manual
for fire support, nor Joint Publication 3-09 (Final Draft)
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acknowledges that the Army could receive naval gunfire
support in a situation other than an amphibious operation.
However, such a situation clearly existed in the early days
of Operation Desert Shield, when the 82d Airborne Division,
supported by 2d ANGLICO, was air-landed in Saudi Arabia as
the initial American ground force in theater. There is
clearly a need for the current literature to address this
situation.
There is no TTP manual available to the Army planner
that addresses, in the detail required, the employment of
ANGLICO teams. The best way to determine the requirements is
direct coordination with an ANGLICO. Fire support
coordinators at each level in a contingency corps should be
an expert on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of
his ANGLICO counterpart. Some unique planning considerations
for ANGLICO employment are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
As always, communications is the first consideration
for naval gunfire planning. A thorough understanding of the
communications architecture of the supporting naval gunfire
force is essential to receiving timely fire support. When an
ANGLICO team is coordinating that support, additional
communications requirements must be considered. The primary
means of command and control communications for an ANGLICO is
HF radio. The communications officer of the supported force
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must plan to allocate HF frequencies to his supporting
ANGLICO.
High Frequency communications are highly susceptible
to solar and atmospheric conditions. Ideally three
frequencies are allocated: one each in the upper, medium, and
lower range of the HF spectrum. This allows for twenty-four
hour HF radio operations under any sort of atmospheric or
solar conditions. A minimum of two frequencies are required.
The allocation of HF frequencies, which are generally closely
managed in a theater, may cause considerable problems for the
Army communications officer, who has only a limited number of
frequencies with which to work.
The ANGLICO is also equipped with man-packed satellite
communications systems. Like HF frequencies, satellite
channels are usually very limited in number. The Army
communications officer may have to arrange for channel
sharing for his supporting ANGLICO.
An ANGLICO team deploying in support of the Army will
bring its basic load of CONSEC material, normally enough for
a thirty day period. After that time, the Army
communications officer must have arranged to provide CONSEC
material to his supporting ANGLICO teams. If the ANGLICO
parent unit has also deployed, arrangements can be made to
obtain the necessary materials through that unit. If not,
the supported Army unit must add its ANGLICO teams to its
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CONSEC account. As this sort of transaction cannot be
accomplished quickly, it is essential that CONSEC planning
for ANGLICO teams be accomplished in conjunction with the
development of an Army operations plan.
Integrating ANGLICO support Into an operations plan
requires a complete understanding of ANGLICO employment. The
Army planner must be able to identify ANGLICO requirements in
terms of mission (close air support, naval gunfire support,
or both), type and number of teams required, airlift space
availability, method of entry into the theater of operations,
estimated duration of the mission, command and control, and
any special coordinating instructions.
Proper planning will enable the ANGLICO commander to
tailor his teams, his support, and his command and control to
fit the situation. Ideally, this type of information is
discussed at a planning meeting. Under less than ideal
circumstances, this information may be conveyed by a secure
telephone call directly to the ANGLICO unit. Advance
planning will enable the ANGLICO to develop detailed
supporting plans, thus facilitating their easy integration
Into the supported Army operations plan. Of all planning
considerations, the proper integration of ANGLICO teams into
the Army TPFDD is critical. Chapter five of the initial
draft of Joint Publication 3-00.1 (Joint Doctrine for
Contingency Operations), though far from complete, addresses
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some of the broader joint considerations that must be
considered by joint fire support planners.
Despite Its reputation for inaccuracy, naval gunfire
has been used quite effectively in close proximity to
friendly troops. Noted authority Donald M. Weller explains
that proper training and cooperation between shore parties
and naval gunfire ships allowed effective five inch fires
placed within fifty yards of friendly troops during the
Marine Corps landing at Tarawa during World War 11.14 One
way to achieve accuracy was through the use of aerial
spotters to adjust the fall of shot for the naval gunfire
projectiles. Many of the battleships in World War II had
float planes which were catapulted aloft to conduct
reconnaissance and spot for naval gunfire missions.1 5 When
the mission was over, the planes landed in the vicinity of
the battleship and were recovered with a crane.
During the Korean War, Army units provided aerial fire
support observers (AFSO) to spot for naval gunfire
missions.' 6 The advent of the helicopter in military
operations made aerial spotting even more effective, as the
helicopter offered a relatively stable platform for the
spotter. The value of naval gunfire spotters in helicopters
was most recently validated in the Falklands war. During the
Vietnam War, QH-50 drone helicopter, affectionately referred
to as Snoopy, provided naval gunfire spotting via an onboard
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television camera that relayed images to the supporting
ship.17 Shoopy was the forerunner of the remotely piloted
vehicles (RPV), commonly referred to today as unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV).
The decade of the 1970's saw the beginning of a
determined movement to integrate RPVs into U. S. military
operations. An RPV offers the advantages of being cheaper
than a manned aircraft, less susceptible to enemy air
defenses, and does not place human life at risk. While the
Army struggled with its Aqufla RPV system, the Marine Corps
fielded and validated its own RPV system, called Pioueer.
Currently, the Marine Corps has an RPV company in the
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence (SRI) Group of
each MEF. (The SRI Group is also the parent unit of the
ANGLICO).
In 1984, a Marine Corps detachment tested RPVs in
Lebanon. seeking a method to spot sixteen-inch naval gunfire
from the USS Nfew Jersey for the Joint Task Force (JTF)
Lebanon. The RPVs, flying from a land base, were able to
spot for naval gunfire missions from a distance in excess of
100 nautical miles. 1 s The Navy subsequently fielded a
battleship based version of the Pioneer RPV, launched from a
catapult and retrieved with a net mounted next to the number
three (rear) turret. This version of the Pioneer RPV was
employed successfully in Operation Desert Storx not only to
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provide valid targets for naval gunfire missions, but also to
provide critical battle damage assessments at the end of
missions.'' With the retirement of the Iowa class
battleships, the Navy will lose this capability, at least
temporarily.
Army interest in UAVs is steadily increasing. Future
systems, with sophisticated sensor packages, will provide
detailed target Information on the enemy. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff are currently developing Joint Publication 355.1
(Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles). Chapter nine proposes some naval gunfire related
recommendations for the Army's UAV program.
The Army is currently developing a High Nobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) to support forced entry
counterfire and deep fires requirements In a regional
contingency operation.20 Chapter eight discusses the HIMARS
system. The purpose of counterfire is to attack enemy
indirect fire (artillery and mortar) systems before they are
able to affect friendly forces. Deep fires are used to delay
or disrupt the enemy by attacking critical tactical targets
lying well beyond the area of the close battle. As was the
case with cannon artillery support, the counterfire and deep
fires capability of HIMARS fires will not be available to the
contingency force during the initial stages of deployment.
Naval gunfire can help the Army with both of these missions.
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A recurring theme in naval gunfire literature is the
ability of ships to deliver deep fires that are well beyond
the range of field artillery. This is more a result of
maneuverability than of the weapon systems' capability.
In some circumstances, a ship will be able to maneuver
parallel to enemy forces, well into the enemy rear area.
This was the case in Desert StorA. While the Marine Corps
front lines ran along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border,
battleships were able to steam well up the Kuwaiti coastline
to deliver their sixteen-inch fires. This capability can
prove even more effective in a small island scenario, where
it is may be possible to deliver fires against the enemy from
many directions.
The role of naval gunfire In counterfire has long
been recognized. Donald M. Weller lauds its success during
World War II, where it was used to destroy both field
artillery and massive coastal artillery fortifications. 2 '
The key to effective counterfire is the ability to locate
hostile firing positions. The role of the UAV in this was
previously discussed. A noteworthy lesson stems from the
American intervention in Lebanon during the 1980's. Firing
under the direction of a U. S. Army target acquisition
battery (TAB), the battleship USS New Jersey destroyed eight
Syrian artillery batteries with its sixteen-inch guns. 2 2
This sort of cooperation, though limited by the battleship
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retirement, is still possible. Chapter nine contains some
recommendations in this area.
With the preceding lessons in mind, the topic will now
turn to a brief analysis of naval gunfire support in the
contingency operations Urgenit Fury, Just Cause and Desert
Shield/Stors. A look at these operations raises some serious
fire support questions today that should have been answered
before Operation Urgent Fury in October 1983.
On 25 October 1983, Joint Task Force 120, operating
under the U. S. Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT),
invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada with the mission of
halting the spread of communism and rescuing American medical
students from a deteriorating situation. Operation Urgent
Fury was conducted using rapid planning, multiple services,
and a shroud of secrecy--a typical contingency operation.
Perhaps the most detailed unclassified description of the
fire support planning for Urgent Fury is an article written
by Major Scott R. McMichael, who served as a research fellow
in the Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and
General Staff College. 2 3
Though certainly not as thorough as a classified after
action report, McMlichael's articlc presents a strong
indictment of American joint fire support planning. It
addresses several deficiencies in communications and fire
support planning for naval gunfire and the integration of
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ANGLICO teams into the Army operations plan. His conclusions
are echoed by former Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr.
in his book Comand of the Seas. 2 4 A brief summary of the
problems follows.
Ranger elements made the initial forced entry
operation and seized Port Salines airfield for follow-on
forces. The Navy was not represented at any of the ranger
planning sessions so no coordination for destroyer or naval
air support was possible. 2 5 The ranger plan relied upon
their own organic mortars and Air Force AC-130 Specter
gunships for fire support. The AC-130 requires a permissive
enemy air defense situation in order to provide effective
support.
For the 82d Airborne Division, the initial plan called
for only the 2d brigade to participate. Consequently, the
division FSE personnel and the Division Artillery Commander
(the division's FSCOORD) were not included in the planning,
due to operational security (OPSEC) considerations, until the
division was alerted on 24 October--one day before the
Invasion began. 2 0 The division eventually deployed the 2d
and 3d brigades. Artillery support for the operation
consisted of two batteries of 105mm howitzers per brigade.
The batteries were split into two three-gun increments and
spread throughout the airflow. 2 7
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During the period 22-24 October, while 2d brigade
planners met with planners at CINCLANT headquarters, no fire
support representatives were included in the planning.
Consequently, information pertaining to the availability of
naval fire support was not obtained; specifically, procedures
for obtaining naval gunfire, communications channels for
coordinating fire support with the Navy Supporting Arms
Coordination Center (SACC), and other key fire support issues
were neglected. Consequently, these had to be worked out on
the ground once the operation was under way.20
Once the division was alerted, the 2d ANGLICO was
alerted for deployment, but could not arrive at Fort Bragg In
time to deploy with the initial wave of forces. Once
deployed, it was discovered that the ANGLICO did not have the
proper CONSEC materials to communicate with the supporting
naval ships. This had to be worked out face-to-face with the
Navy in Grenada. 2' Once able to conduct naval gunfire
missions, collateral damage restrictions severely limited the
use of naval gunfire; the Commander of JTF 120 directed that
all naval gunfire missions be personally approved by himself,
virtually eliminating the use of naval gunfire against
targets of opportunity.3 0
Mc~ichael points to three problems in pre-deployment
planning: operations security restrictions imposed by the
JCS kept key fire support personnel from participating in the
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planning; planners suffered from a severe shortage of time
owing to the rapid manner in which the operation was mounted;
the lack of Army and joint staff planners possessing joint
fire support expertise when the 82d Airborne 2d brigade met
with planners from CINCLANT headquarters. 3 1
Communications and fire support planning failures in
the pre-deployment/crisis action phase of Operation Urgent
Fury caused a breakdown in naval gunfire support. As is
typical of most contingency operations, artillery support was
extremely limited during the initial stages of the
deployment, due to the airflow restrictions that created the
requirement to split artillery batteries into three gun
sections. Fortunately, the AC-130 gunships and other air
support was effective. Had the weather turned foul, this may
not have been the case. Severe weather could have made naval
gunfire the only reliable fire support system in the battle.
The 75th Ranger Regiment has since added a Marine
officer to its FSE, as discussed in chapter five. The
rangers should never again suffer the same sort of planning
problems described above. With the preceding lessons in
mind, the analysis will now turn to Operation Just Cause, the
U. S. invasion of Panama.
In December 1989, U. S. forces invaded Panama with the
mission to oust the drug trafficking dictator Manuel Norlega
and install the duly elected government to power. The
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isthmus of Panama, forming the strategic link between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans, offered the ideal arena for the
application of naval gunfire support--there was no credible
naval threat to U. S. naval gunfire operations, hydrography
was favorable, and many of the operational targets were
within naval gunfire range. Naval gunfire was never usedl
Why naval gunfire was not used remains a mystery.
Some claim that it was due to collateral damage
considerations. Others contend It was refused due to Army
parochialism at a time when the Army and Marine Corps/Navy
amphibious team were competing fiercely for the role as the
nations supreme expeditionary force. The only certainty is
that, as in Grenada, the Army ground forces relied almost
totally upon air support, particularly fires from Air Force
AC-130 Specter gunships and O/A-37 attack aircraft. As was
the case in Grenada, over-reliance upon air support could
have proven disastrous had the weather not cooperated.
The following account was provided by the FSCOORD for
JTF South, the land component commander for the operation. 3 2
JTF South was comprised primarily of the XVIII Airborne Corps
Headquarters and elements of the 82d Airborne Division, the
7th Infantry Division and a small Marine Corps task force.
The Marine Corps exchange officer assigned to the XVIII
Airborne Corps FSE ultimately became the JTF South FSCOORD by
default--the Army colonel who would have normally had the job
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had transferred to Korea the month before and his replacement
had not yet arrived when Operation Just Cause occurred.
From the beginning of the operation, naval gunfire was
not considered, due to the concern over possible collateral
damage. Consequently, no ANGLICO teams deployed with either
the 75th Ranger Regiment or the 82d Airborne Division, as
would have normally been the case. Well into the operation.
JTF South was required to conduct an attack on the island of
Boca Del Torro. This was a remote island that was believed
to be manned by a Panamanian Jungle warfare training unit and
some Cuban advisors. The island was reportedly used, amongst
other things, for training Nicaraguan Sandanista forces.
With the exception of military forces, the island area of
operations was virtually uninhabited.
The decision was made for a daylight attack against
Boca del Torro. Due to its offshore range, only U. S. Army
UH-60 helicopters were able to reach the island with
sufficient fuel remaining for a return trip. Consequently,
attack helicopter support was not available to the infantry
task force assigned the mission of securing the island. AC-
130 gunship support was not available due to the reluctance
of the Air Force to employ the aircraft during daylight.
By chance, a U. S. Navy AKnox class frigate, the USS
Vreeland, was in the area and available to provide naval
gunfire support for the operation. The ship was an asset
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belonging to the U. S. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet
(CINCLANTFLT). Initial coordination indicated that the
CINCLANTFLT was agreeable to allowing JTF South to use the
Vreeland. The XVIII Airborne Corps FSE went so far as to
contact the 75th Ranger Regiment FSE in order to borrow an
ANGLICO team to spot for the Vreeland. When informed that
the Rangers had no ANGLICO teams to lend, the corps FSE built
an ad hoc team from radios borrowed from the 7th Infantry
Division and from several corps FSE members who had attended
the Naval Gunfire Spotters Course at Little Creek, Virginia.
Unfortunately, the CINC of the U. S. Southern Command
(CINCSOUTH) refused to allow JTF South to use naval gunfire.
The reported reason for the refusal was fear of collateral
damage by naval gunfire, even though the Boca DL' Torro area
of operations was remote and had only military targets.
Consequently, the infantry task force assaulting the island
did so without fire support. Fortunately, the enemy gave up
with minimal resistance.
Many problems arising during Operation Just Cause were
repeats of the problems encountered during Operation Urgent
Fury. Once again, the pre-deployment planning at the joint
level was lacking. In the particular instance of Boca del
Torro, had the situation been made clear to the CINCSOUTH
during the pre-deployment/crisis action phase, it is arguable
that the CINC would have authorized naval gunfire support for
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the operation. Under no circumstances should a conventional
ground operation proceed without adequate fire support.
In August 1990, barely seven months after the end of
hostilities in Panama, the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters
and the 82d Airborne Division were headed into harms way in
Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield. The beginning of
this chapter related how the 2d ANGLICO came to support the
82d Airborne division for Desert Shield and the circumstances
of its deployment to Saudi Arabia. The following paragraphs
will address some problems peculiar to naval gunfire support
for Desert Shield.
The 82d Airborne Division was the first U. S. ground
combat force in theater. Across the border in Kuwait,
approximately fifteen Iraqi divisions were positioned to
drive into Saudi Arabia at a moments notice. At least nine
of these divisions were armored, mechanized, or motorized
infantry. 3 3 President Bush's line in the sand was, as least
initially, composed mostly of infantry soldiers with very
little supporting equipment and little supporting fires
except from the air. The initial aircraft deployed had only
the ordnance they carried into theater with them.
The 82d Airborne pushed plane load after plane load of
soldiers into theater, each load raising the political ante
against Saddam Hussein. The senior NOLO for the 2d ANGLICO
was one of the first ANGLICO planners to deploy to Saudi
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Arabia with the 82d Airborne, arriving in country on
9 August. 3 4 At that time, the fire support for the 82d
Airborne division was inadequate, with only a battalion of
105mm howitzers in theater and a meager supply of ammunition
available.
One of the initial missions of the 82d Airborne
Division was to secure the port of Al Jubail to facilitate
the landing of Marine Corps maritime prepositioning ships.
Still suffering from a fire support drought, the 82d Airborne
attempted to acquire some naval gunfire support from the
Middle East Task Force. The task force was operating In the
Persian Gulf, fully involved in the maritime interdiction of
Iraqi shipping. There were in excess of a dozen ships in the
task force capable of providing naval gunfire support to the
82d Airborne.
A team from 2d ANGLICO, headed by the senior NGLO,
travelled to Bahrain during the second week of August to
coordinate naval gunfire support with the task force and to
determine what communications procedures to use, as there was
no communications plan available prior to deployment. A
visit to the task force flagship, the USS LaSalle, met with
only partial success. The task force was unwilling to
provide support using any of the ships involved in the
maritime interdiction mission, but promised support as soon
as the battleship USS Wisconasn arrived in the Gulf.
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The Nisconsin arrived on station during the last week
of August. Another coordination visit to Bahrain yielded the
desired results and arrangements for naval gunfire support
were made. Although no tactical mission (i.e. general
support) was assigned to the h'lsconsla, it was agreed that 2d
ANGLICO would maintain continuous HF radio communications
with her and fire support was promised in the event the Iraqi
forces crossed the border into Saudi Arabia.
Satisfied with this arrangement, 2d ANGLICO teams
conducted training with the battleship over the next month
until the 82d Airborne was relieved of its mission by the
Marine Corps 7th MEB in the end of September. The training
included practice naval gunfire missions with the battleship
and rotating firepower control teams out to the iisconsia for
naval gunfire orientation training. At the same time,
ANGLICO teams conducted naval gunfire classes for fire
support personnel of the 82d Airborne Division.
Fortunately, the 2d ANGLICO never had to use the
services of the Wisconsin during Desert Shield. The
hydrography in the area rendered the 5"/38 guns of the
battleship virtually useless, as the Wisconsin could come no
closer to shore than about 10 kilometers in the Al Juball
area, due to shallow water. The 5"/38 guns, from that
distance, could range only about five kilometers inland. The
16"/50 guns, on the other hand, were able to cover the full
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sector of the 82d Airborne's right brigade and approximately
half of the sector of the left brigade, which were both
oriented northward, parallel to the coastline. A ship with
5"/54 guns could have covered most of the right brigade's
sector, but would have been of little use to the left
brigade.
The preceding illustration, once again, shows a
breakdown in pre-deployment/crisis action planning. The
short-fuzed notification allowed the 2d ANGLICO virtually
no planning time in CONUS. Once again, planning at the Joint
level did not anticipate the fire support requirements for
the 82d Airborne Division. The situation clearly warranted
dedicated naval gunfire support for the division, but it was
somehow overlooked. Had Saddam Hussein pushed into Saudi
Arabia, the 82d Airborne division, with inadequate fire
support, might have become a sacrificial lamb.
Two platoons from the reserve component augmented the
2d ANGLICO for Operation Desert StorA. The platoons were
activated in late November, trained at Camp Lejeune during
December, and deployed into theater during the first week of
January. These platoons performed superbly, but they would
have been unavailable had hostilities occurred during the
early days of Desert Shield, prior to the reserve component
call-up by President Bush. For the purpose of contingency
operations, the Army can only depend upon the two ANGLICOs
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from the active component. The limitations of the active
companies were disscussed previously. The reserve ANGLICO
platoons deployed to Desert Stora suffering from severe
equipment shortages, particularly in radios and CONSEC
hardware. Had they been required to operate the full
doctrinal range of radio nets an ANGLICO normally uses, they
could not have complied.
An illustration from Operation Desert Storm lends some
insight into heavy-light force mixtures involving ANGLICO
teams. 3 5 The basic transportation for ANGLICO teams is by
foot or in High Nobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HNMWV). The HNNWV is a light truck, offering virtually no
crew protection. Accustomed to working with light forces,
the 2d ANGLICO learned early in Desert Shield, while attached
to the 7th (British) Armored Brigade (Desert Rats), that the
HMMWV was not suitable for working within tank or mechanized
infantry battle formations. The HNNWV could not keep up with
tanks, was a hazard operating within the armored vehicle
formations, and offered the crew no protection while the
armored vehicles were involved in direct fire engagements
with the enemy. The 2d ANGLICO was finally driven to try
putting forward air controllers inside tanks, but never fully
solved the problem.
On 19 January 1990, two days after the Desert StorA
air war began, the 2d ANGLICO was ordered to support the
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Army's Tiger Brigade, an armored brigade of the 2d Armored
Division. The Tiger Brigade was under the operational
control of the 2d Marine Division for the drive into Kuwait
City. Facing the same problems encountered while supporting
the Desert Rats, a stroke of good fortune saved the day for
the 2d ANGLICO. During the first week of February, the Tiger
Brigade exchanged its old Bradley infantry fighting vehicles
for new ones. Each ANGLICO SALT and FCT was issued one of
the old Bradleys, along with an intense training course on
how to operate it. The Tiger Brigade provided drivers, while
ANGLICO team members became the crews. The ANGLICO
communications platoon worked frantically to devise makeshift
mounts for the man-packed HF and UHF radios and their
associated COMSEC hardware. In a matter of 72 hours, the
radios were installed, the crews were trained, and the 2d
ANGLICO, now part of an armored force, rode off to make
history with the Tiger Brigade.
The success of the preceding illustration was largely
due to the serendipitous availability of Bradley infantry
fighting vehicles for the ANGLICO teams. Were the Bradleys
not available, the situation would have been very different.
With the 24th Mechanized Division as part of the XVIII
Airborne Corps, a similar situation could exist in a future
contingency operation. Finding a solution for this problem
poses a significant challenge for the fire support community.
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This chapter focused on some of the basic problems the
Army faces in the field of naval gunfire support. The Army
has become almost totally dependant upon the Marine Corps
ANGLICO to control and coordinate naval gunfire support. It
is foolish to assume that an ANGLICO will always be available
to perform this mission, yet the Army has not developed the
skills to perform the mission itself.
History has taught us a common set of problems
associated with naval gunfire. Amongst the most significant
are communications and joint planning. Naval gunfire
communications and joint planning problems plagued the U. S.
Army during Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert
Shield. Operation Desert StorA raised yet another issue, the
mixture of heavy and light forces in naval gunfire support
operations. The Army fire support community has a difficult
task ahead if it chooses to pursue naval gunfire as a means
of fire support for future contingency operations.
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CHAPTER 7 NOTES
'U. S. Army, FM 100-20: Military Operations in LowIntensity Conflict, (Washington: U. S. Government PrintingOffice, 1990), 5-1.
2U. S. Army, FM 100-15: Corps Operations,(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 8-3.
3W. D. Joslin, Sianal Communications for BeachOperations, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USCGSC School ofLogistics, 1947), 1.
4 William M. Doolittle, "An Artilleryman in a JASCO,"Field Artillery Journal 35 (August 1945): 463.
5U. S. Army Joint Airborne Troop Board, DiscussionNotes to Questions Posed by the Artillery School, (FortBragg, NC: Joint Airborne Troop Board, 1952). Encl 1. p.1.
GZachary P. Hubbard, "The ANGLICO Edge," FieldArtillery (April 1990): 23.
7J. Douglas Engstrom, interviewed by the author,telephonic, Dumphries, VA, 25 Jan 1992. (Lieutenant ColonelEngstrom, who was the Commanding Officer of the 2d ANGLICOduring the Operation Desert Shield Deployment, related thedetails of 2d ANGLICO's alert notification and deployment tothe author.]
8S. J. Labadie, interviewed by the author, telephonic,
Camp Lejeune, NC, 18 Oct 91. [Lieutenant Colonel Labadie wasthe Commanding Officer of the 2d ANGLICO during OperationDesert Storm.]
9U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Air Ground Task ForceMaster Plan: 1992-2002. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps CombatDevelopments Center, 1991), 5-4 to 5-5.
IOU. S. Army, FM 31-5: Landine Operations on Hostile
Shores, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,1944), 161.
11U. S. Army, FM 31-5, 55.
' 2 Francis J. Roberts, "Naval Gunfire Support," FieldArtillery Journal, 39 (March-April 1949): 55.
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1 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-09: Doctrinefor Joint Fire Suvport, (Washington: DLMO, 1991), C-4.
14Donald M. Weller, "Salvo-Splash! The Development ofNaval Gunfire in World War II (Part I)," Naval InstituteProceedings 80 (August 1954): 848.
'$Donald M Weller, "Salvo-Splash! The Development ofNaval Gunfire in World War II (Part II)," Naval InstituteProceedings 80 (September 1954): 1018.
' 1 Headquarters U. S. Military Assistance CommandVietnam, Vietnam Lessons Learned No. 77: Fire SupportCoordination for the Infantry Battalion Commander, (Vietnam:HQ U. S. MAC Vietnam, 1972), E-15.
"IsStephen Kruspe, interviewed by the author,telephonic, West Palm Beach, FL, 23 Dec 1991. [MasterSergeant Kruspe was the nomcommissioned officer in charge ofthe RPV detachment and briefed the results of the test to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.]
''Michael C. Braunbeck, "Front Line Lessons," NavalInstitute Proceedings 117 (May 1991): 90.
2 0 Fred F. Marty, "State-fo-the-Branch Address 1991,"Field Artillery (December 1991): 2. [Major General Marty isthe U. S. Army Chief of Field Artillery.]
2 1 Donald M. Weller, "Salvo Splash, (Part I)" 845.
2 2 John F. Lehman Jr., Command of the Seas, (New York:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 334.
2 3 Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury: Looking Back andLooking Forward," Field Artillery Journal 53 (March-April1985): 8 to 13.
2 4 John F. Lehman Jr., Command, 301.
2 5 Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury," 9.
2 6 Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury," 9.
2 7 Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury," 10.
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28Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury," 10.
2SScott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury," 10.
3 0 Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury," 12.
31Scott R. McMichael, "Urgent Fury," 12 to 13.
3 2 Edward Lesnowicz, interviewed by the author at FortLeavenworth, KS. 23 Jan 1991. [Lieutenant Colonel Lesnowicz,USMC, was an exchange officer in the XVIII Airborne Corps FSEand acted as the JTF South fire support coordinator duringOperation Just Cause.]
3 3 James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert. (New York:Bantam Books, 1991), 72.
3 4 Thomas E. Crabtree, interviewed by the author,telephonic, Swansboro, NC, 11 Jan 1992. [LieutenantCommander Crabtree served as the 82d Airborne Division NavalGunfire Liaison Officer during the first two months ofOperation Desert Shield.]
3 5 Second Brigade Platoon 2d ANGLICO, HistoricalNarrative--Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (CampLejeune, NC: 2d ANGLICO, 1991), 7; and Matt Kliaow,Interviewed by the author at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 Nov 91.[Lieutenant Colonel Klimow was the Operations Officer for the3d Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment (3-41 Infantry), part ofthe U. S. Army's Tiger Brigade, under the operational controlof the 2d Marine Division during Operation Desert Storm. The3-41 Infantry was supported by the 2d ANGLICO during DesertStorm.]
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
Today's Navy faces a dilemma--how to support the naval
gunfire requirements of the Marine Corps' over-the-horizon
(OTH) amphibious tactics while coping with a shrinking budget
and a reduced force. The problem is exacerbated by the
retirement of the Iowa class battlejhips, an action that
removes the longest shooting guns (16"/50) from the Navy's
inventory when the new Marine Corps tactics demand even
greater ranges than the 16"/50 could deliver.
This chapter will discuss some emerging technology
in weapons systems and projectiles that could hold the answer
to future naval gunfire requirements. The technology
discussed here presents a broad view of systems which may be
available to support the Army and the Marine Corps by the end
of this century. The fielding of any of the systems will
impact upon how the Army should approach naval gunfire in the
future.
The analysis will address the secondary thesis
questions: 1) "In what direction is the Navy going in areas
of weapons and doctrine in the field of naval gunfire
support?"; and 2) "In what direction is the Marine Corps
going in the areas of tactics and force structure in the
field of naval gunfire support?"
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The OTH operational concept document was signed by the
commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command on 15 March 1991.' This action set the stage for
such debate within the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. Over-
the-horizon calls for an extremely mobile amphibious force,
capable of placing a regimental-sized landing team up to 40
kilometers deep into the enemy's rear by helicopter and with
support provided by surface assault. Its success depends
upon operating from a distance in excess of 25 miles [ca. 40
kilometers] from the hostile shore, beyond visual and radar
range.2
The requirement to operate up to 40 kilometers deep
into the enemy rear, while beginning an assault from a 40
kilometer stand-off range, gives some indication of the range
requirements for naval gunfire support. Assuming that no
naval gunfire bombardment is fired prior to commencing the
OTH assault, a gunfire support ships may begin moving towards
the shore with the first wave of surface assault vessels. If
the gunfire support ships were able to come as close to the
shore as five kilometers, they would still require an
effective range in excess of 45 kilometers to support a deep
insertion of heliborne troops into the enemy rear. This
range virtually doubles the current capability of the current
5"/54 guns. Given today's budgetary constraints, the Marine
Corps may have to adjust its tactics rather than expect the
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Navy to field a new system to provide the necessary fire
support.
This chapter will discuss four possible approaches to
improve naval gunfire support and facilitate OTH tactics:
improving the range of the current 5"/54 gun systems using
new projectiles and propelling charges; fielding entirely new
gun systems that will mount on existing ships; developing
deck-mounted rockets for close support of ground troops; and
developing deck-mounted missiles for close support of ground
troops. Each of these approaches is discussed below.
Noted naval writer Charles W. Koburger stated after
the Falklands war that no readily acceptable substitute for
gunfire support has yet been found. 3 Little has changed in
the ensuing years to suggest otherwise today. There are a
number of arguments in favor of choosing gun systems over
rockets or missiles to provide close support for ground
troops.
The foremost argument for guns today deals with cost.
A projectile for a naval gun cost just a fraction of the
price of the simplest rocket or guided missile. Amongst the
other significant advantages is the relatively limited
magazine capacity most ships have for carrying missiles as
compared to gun projectiles.4 Likewise, guns are more
responsive to the immediate needs of a spotter, being better
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suited to the frequent ammunition changes needed to support
ground operations. 8
Improving the range of the current 5"/54 gun systems
is attractive for two obvious reasons--it promises the
fastest results and is probably the cheapest method. The
battleship retirement creates a gunfire gap that needs a fast
solution. However, this approach to improving gunfire
support is limited by the technology of the current 5"/54
gun. Gun breeches and barrels have a finite limit as to the
weight of projectile and internal pressures of propellant
combustion they can withstand before suffering a catastrophic
failure.
Increasing gun range through improved propellants and
projectiles is more easily attainable by producing an
entirely new gun system, built to the specifications needed
to meet the range requirements of OTH. The obvious problems
with this solution are the cost and the time required to
field a new system. If the entire project were fully funded
and development began immediately, the process of research
and development, operational testing, and fielding could
easily last five years or more. Under current budgetary
conditions, a solution nearer the end of the decade is a more
reasonable expectation.6 In the meantime, the OTH naval
gunfire requirements of the Marine Corps go unanswered.
Ship-mounted rocket systems offer a compromise somewhere
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between guns and guided missiles. Rockets, which follow a
ballistic path after launch, are much less expensive than
guided missiles. The U. S. Navy successfully supported
ground forces with rockets during World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam. The Navy's last ground support rocket used In
combat was carried on inshore fire support ships known as the
LFR.
The LFR boasted a 5"/38 gun and eight twin launchers
for five-inch rockets. It could fire up to 48 rockets per
minute to a maximum range of nine kilometers--a short range
even for the Vietnam war era. The LFR secondary armament
consisted of two twin 40 millimeter guns, two 50 caliber
machine guns, and four 30 caliber machine guns. 7 These ships
were virtual floating ammunition magazines, making them very
vulnerable and requiring destroyer or tactical aircraft
escort .8
Conventional rocket projectiles are generally less
accurate than comparable gun projectiles. They are also less
responsive to the spotter due to the greater handling
difficulty associated with rocket ammunition. Many modern
rockets are pre-packaged in discardable pods carrying several
rockets each. The pods require more ship magazine storage
space and offer less of a variety of ammunition than naval
gun ammunition. Rockets are, however, capable of achieving
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greater ranges than the current 5"/54 gun firing a
conventional projectile.
Guided missiles, though first in accuracy, arguably
offer the least desirable alternative to guns, the primary
drawback being cost. Operation Desert Storx demonstrated
that, "... [the] absolute dollar cost of a weapon or weapon
system is not a critical factor once hostilities
commence...," during a regional contingency operation.$ This
is true enough for operational and strategic weapons systems,
but not necessarily true for close support of ground troops.
Toaahawk land attack cruise missiles and Patriot air defense
missiles do not require actual firing to train their crews.
For a close support weapon, one must factor in the ability to
conduct training with the system. Unlike guns or rockets,
the prohibitively high cost of missiles limits their use in
training. For close battles, with moving targets and often
inaccurate target locations, missiles do not offer the
required responsiveness. Like rockets, missiles require an
inordinate amount of magazine storage space compared to gun
projectiles. Likewise, missiles do not offer the variety of
ammunition required for the close battle.
The inescapable conclusion Is that a gun system is the
best answer for the close support of ground troops. The
analysis now turns to technological developments that will
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allow greater ranges with naval guns than is currently
possible.
The technology for extended projectile ranges
currently exists in the field artillery. Amongst the
possibilities are rocket assisted, base bleed, and sabot
projectiles. Additionally, to remain viable in the future,
naval gunfire must improve its accuracy. The following
paragraphs will discuss each of these topics.
Rocket assisted projectiles (RAP) are a mature
technology in the field artillery. A rocket motor, fitted to
the base of a conventional projectile, ignites during flight,
altering the ballistic arc of the projectile and increasing
the range. Conventional naval gunRAPs could easily achieve
greater ranges than are possible firing conventional
projectiles. However, for RAPs or conventional rockets,
increased range is a function of decreased warhead weight.
Each pound of rocket propellant added to the weight of
a projectile requires an equal decrease in warhead weight.
At some point, increased range reaches a point of diminishing
returns when measured against warhead weight.
Base bleed projectiles offer an alternative to RAPs.
A normal projectile has a flat base. As the projectile is in
flight, a vacuum develops behind it, creating drag that slows
the velocity and decreases the range of impact. Base bleed
technology offers a 20 to 30 percent increase in range by
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using a burning chemical compound attached to the base of the
projectile to decrease the vacuum behind the round; with this
technology, "the base-bleed element ignites upon firing and
creates a positive pressure behind the projectile base, which
decreases the atmospheric drag."10
Sabot technology offers another possibility for
extending the range of naval guns. This Is a mature
technology that has been used for tank ammunition for over a
decade. The idea is simple--a sleeve is fitted over a
projectile, allowing it to fit into the barrel of a larger
caliber gun. The sleeve is discarded in flight, allowing a
relatively small projectile to take advantage of the higher
internal pressure of combustion that the larger caliber gun
breech can withstand.
Noted naval gunfire historian Donald M. Weller
describes naval gunfire ranges in the order of 65,000 yards
that were achieved in tests over fifteen years ago using
sabot technology. 1 " Similar to RAP projectiles, sabot
projectiles reach a point of diminishing returns. This is
particularly true with the relatively small caliber 5V/54 gun
system--the larger, the sabot, the smaller the overall
projectile. A sixteen-inch gun firing a thirteen-inch sabot
projectile still offers credible support to the ground force.
On the other hand, the value of a five-Inch gun firing a 3.5
Inch sabot round is debatable.
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One requirement for regional contingency operations is
a weapon system that can destroy enemy targets while
minimizing collateral damage to non-military targets.
Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), also called smart weapons,
promise to improve the lethality of gun projectiles. These
include systems requiring terminal guidance by a spotter
using a laser designator and smart munitions that use
sophisticated sensors to search for their targets. 1 2
The Copperhead Is a 155 millimeter artillery
projectile that proved itself in combat during Operation
Desert Stora. A semi-active laser seeker in the head of the
projectile homes in on a laser spot projected onto the target
by a laser designator used by an artillery forward observer.
The projectile follows a ballistic path until the laser
seeker locates the observer's laser spot, at which time the
seeker alters the projectile's path and flies it to the
target by manipulating small fins.
As early as 1977, Donald M. Weller suggested that
laser guidance was needed to improve the accuracy of naval
gunfire. 1 3 The relatively inexpensive technology exists
today. As with RAPs however, adding a laser guidance package
to a naval gun projectile fired from the current 5"/54 system
requires decreasing the warhead weight. Adding rocket
assistance to a five-inch laser guided projectile would
require an even greater decrease.
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One promising possibility for the future is the
electro-thermal gun. This technology uses an electrical arc
to super-heat a propellant material. This material
vaporizes, creating a high-pressure plasma to propel the
projectile.14 A similar, but less sophisticated method would
use the combustion of a liquid propellant, under extremely
high pressure, to propel a projectile.' 8 Either of these
methods, combined with RAP or base bleed technology, offers
substantially increased ranges. However, the electro-thermal
gun and the liquid propellant gun require development of
totally new weapon systems.
To achieve an increase in range in the order required
to support OTH tactics will probably require the development
of an entirely new system, be it gun, rocket, or missile.
High cost in developing a new gun system is virtually
unavoidable. The problems in developing a new major caliber
gun are compounded by the relatively light construction of
today's ships. However, it is conceivable to develop a
rocket or missile system for close support of ground troops
by adapting an already fielded ground system to the task.
The attractiveness of this method is the obvious savings in
research and development dollars associated with developing
an entirely new weapon system. The following discussion
addresses some of the proposed new systems before the Navy
today.16
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The Tactical Vertical Launch System (TVLS) represents
the current wave in naval weaponry. A part of the AEGIS,
combat system, the TVLS performs the naval warfare functions
of anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface
warfare, and strike against land targets. 1 7 The Arleigh
Burke class destroyers, the most modern ships in the U. S.
Navy inventory, are equipped with the TVLS system. Mounted
below decks, the TVLS is a missile launching system, capable
of loading a variety of pre-packaged guided missiles.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the TVLS is its
versatility.
Several close support weapon systems under review by
the Navy today will be capable of launching from the TVLS
system. While the development of such weapons is feasible,
they would still suffer the responsiveness problems and
ammunition storage problems associated with all missiles.
Not the least of concerns is the cost associated with any
missile system. Such problems exist with a system called the
Beachcoaer. It is a TVLS launched Patriot missile variant
adapted for support of ground troops.
The Navy is also considering an eight-inch gun system
that would mount on current ships. This system it totally
new and not to be confused with the eight-inch MCLWG lauded
by Donald M. Weller in his book, Naval Gunfire Support of
Amphibious Operations: Past, Present and Future.'s In
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addition to this gun, an electro-thermal gun is under
consideration.
Amongst the variety of naval gun projectiles, the Navy
is involved in research into RAPs, base bleed, and laser
guided technology. Laser guided projectiles, with current
costs up to $50,000 per round, may prove cost prohibitive. 1 '
One promising possibility Is a ship-launched variant
of the Army Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Proven In
combat during Operation Desert Store, the current MLRS fires
rockets out to a range of 30 kilometers. (The Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS), which is fired from the same
launcher as the MLRS, is capable of ranges in excess of 100
kilometers). A ship-launched MLRS variant, though not a
total solution for 0TH fire support requirements, is a
relatively low-cost system which has the potential for
further development as a close support weapon system. When
combined with the current 5"/54 gun system, MLRS represents
one possible step toward filling the sixteen-inch gunfire
gap.
This chapter discussed emerging technology in the
field of naval gunfire support. Greater ranges than are
currently possible with the 5"/54 gun system are needed to
meet the fire support requirements of the Marine Corps OTH
tactics. Possible solutions to the problem are improvements
in the current 5"/54 gun system, the development of a totally
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new gun system, or the development of rocket or missile
systems for the close support of ground troops. Whatever
direction the Navy chooses to pursue in attempting to provide
fire support to OTH tactics will impact upon the support
available for Army contingency operations. Chapter nine
discusses some recommendations for Army-Navy cooperation in
weapons development.
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CHAPTER 8 NOTES
'Jerome F. Bierley and Thomas E. Seals. "Over theHorizon Amphibious Operations," Marine Corps Gazette 75 (July1991): 41. [The authors work in the Concepts and PlansBranch, U. S. Marine Corps Concepts and Doctrine Center.]
2 Jerome F. Blerley and Thomas E. Seals, "Over-the-Horizon," 41.
3 Charles W. Koburger, Jr., Sea Power in the Falklands,(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 54.
SCarey Hithon, interviewed by the author, telephonic.Washington, D. C., 21 Nov 1991. [Lieutenant Commander Hithonis assigned to U. S. Navy Operations, Surface Strike andAnti-surface Warfare Division, the Pentagon.]
7 HQ, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam,Vietnam Lessons Learred No. 77: Fire support Coordinationfor the Infantry Battalion Commander, (Vietnam: U. S. MAC,1972), E-33.
8HQ, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam,Vietnam Lessons Learned, E-18.
9J. H. Patton Jr., "Desert Storm--More Gulf WarWeapons," Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (April 1991): 52.
Thompson, Ky L. "Mission 2000--Amphibolous or Amphibious?"Marine Corps Gazette 71 (December 1987): 35-35.
Trost, Carlisle A. H. "The Sea Launched Cruise Missile--ARevolutionary Contribution to Naval Warfare." NATO'sSixteen Nations 34 (September 1989): 96-101.
Truver, Scott. "Tactical Vertical Launch System, Part I."Naval Forces XI (Vol III 1990): 21-21.
. "Tactical Vertical Launch System, Part II."Naval Forces XI (Vol IV 1990): 66-73.
Truver, Scott and James C. Hazlett "Surfacing a New BattleGroup." Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (April 1991):81-88.
Weller, Donald M. "Salvo-Splash! The Development of NavalGunfire Support in World War II. Part I." The U. S.Naval Institute Proceedings 80 (August 1954): 839-849.
"_ "Salvo-Splash! The Development of Naval GunfireSupport in World War II. Part II." The U. S. NavalInstitute Proceedings 80 (September 1954): 1011-1021.
Witt, Wolfram and Markus Loeffler. "The Electro-MagneticGun--Closer to Weapon-System Status." MilitaryTechnology XII (May 1988): 80-86.
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Official Publications:
Air Land Forces Application Agency. FM 90-20 (J-FIRE).Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
Bivens, Harold A., An Annotated Bibliography of Naval GunfireSupvort. Washington: Historical Division, HeadquartersU. S. Marine Corps, 1971.
Cheney, Dick. Report of the Secretary of Defense to thePresident and Congress. Washington: U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1991.
Cosmas, Graham A., and Terrence P. Murray. U. S. Marines inVietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment. Washington:History and Museums Division, Headquarters U. S. MarineCorps, 1986.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub. 2 (Unified Action ArmedForces). Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,1986.
JCS Pub. 3-02 (Doctrine for Amphibious Operations)w/change 5. Washington: U. S. Government PrintingOffice, 1988.
_ JCS Pub. 3-02.1 TEST (Joint Doctrine for LandingForce Operations). Washington: U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1989.
_ Joint Pub. 3-09 FINAL DRAFT (Doctrine for JointFire Support). Washington: U. S. Government PrintingOffice, 1991.
_ Joint Pub. 3-09.2 INITIAL DRAFT (JTTP for RadarBeacon Operations). Washington: U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1991.
_ Joint Pub. 3-55.1 INITIAL DRAFT (JTTP for UnmannedAerial Vehicles (UAV)). Washington: U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1991.
-172-
President of the United States. National Security Strategyof the United States. Washington: U. S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1991.
Secretary of State for Defence. The Falklands Campaign:The Lessons. London: Her Majesty's StationeryOffice, 1983.
Shulimson, Jack and Charles M. Johnson. The Landing and theBuildup, 1965. Washington: History and MuseumsDivision, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1978.
U. S. Army. FM 6-20-10 (The Targeting Process). Washington:U. S. Government Printing Office, 1990.
_ FN 6-20 (Fire Support in the Airland Battle).Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
_ FM 6-20-30 (Fire Support for Corps and DivisionOperations). Washington: U. S. Government PrintingOffice, 1989.
__ _ FM 6-20-40 (Fire Support for Brigade Operations(Heavy)). Washington: U. S. Government PrintingOffice, 1990.
__ _ FM 6-20-50 (Fire Support for Brigade Operations(Light)). Washington: U. S. Government PrintingOffice, 1990.
FM 25-100 (Training the Force). Washington:U. S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
FM 25-101 (Battle Focused Training). Washington:U. S. Government Printing Office, 1990.
FM 31-5 (Landing Operations On Hostile Shores).Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941.
_ FM 31-5 (Landing Operations On Hostile Shores).Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944.
_ FM 100-5 (Operations). Washington: U. S.Government Printing Office, 1986.
_ FM 100-15 (Corps Operations). Washington: U. S.Government Printing Office, 1989.
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U. S. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic. Joint Control GroupExercise Control Plan - Solid Shield 83. Norfolk, VA:Headquarters USCINCLANT, 1983.
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. Marine Air Ground Task Force Master Plan:1992-2002. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps CombatDevelopments Center, 1991.
Weller, Donald M. Naval Gunfire Support of AmphibiousOperations: Past, Present, and Future. Dahigren, VA:Naval Surface Weapons Center, 1977.
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Bolin, Kent R. 2d ANGLICO Talking Paper: Comparison ofANGLICO Teams With Other Service Fire Support. CampLejeune NC: 13 March 1989.
_ 2d ANGLICO Talking Paper: The Marine Air andNaval Gunfire Liaison Company. Camp Lejeune NC:13 March 1989.
Chief of Naval Operations. CNO OEG Study No. 448: Analysisof Naval Gunfire in Korea. Washington, 1951.
Combined Arms Training Activity. Naval Gunfire Simulation inFirst Battle. Ft. Leavenworth KS, undated.
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery.Memorandum for Commandant, U.S. Army Field ArtillerySchool, dated 31 May 1990, SUBJ: Army/Marine Corps FireSupport Officer Exchange Program. Fort Bragg, NC:31 May 1990.
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EUSAK. Artillery Information Bulletin *8. Headquarters.U. S. Army Korea: 1950.
_ Artillery Information Bulletin *10. Headquarters.U. S. Army Korea: 1951.
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U. S. Army Command and General Staff College School ofLogistics. Signal Communications for Beach Operations.Ft. Leavenworth KS: 1947.
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_ Memorandum: Primary Courses Taught by U. S.Marines. Little Creek VA: 33 December 1991.
In terviews:
Adams, Mark. Chief, Fire Support Instructor Branch, U. S.Army Field Artillery School. Interviewed by the authorby telephone at Fort Sill, OK, 2 Dec 1991.
Aspen, Kris. Naval Gunfire Project Officer, Advanced FireSupport Branch, U. S. Army Field Artillery School.Interviewed by the author by telephone at Fort Sill, OK.2 Dec 1991.
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Blackburn, Mike. Chief, Plans Section, U. S. Army JointReadiness Training Center. Interviewed by the author bytelephone at Fort Chaffee, AK, 2 Dec 91.
Carper, Clifton. Basic Fire Support Branch, U. S. Army FieldArtillery School. Interviewed by the author bytelephone at Fort Sill, OK, 23 Dec 1991.
Crabtree, Thomas E. Senior Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, 2dAir and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, Camp Lejeune, NC.Interviewed by the author by telephone at Swansboro, NC,11 Jan 1992.
Engstrom, J. Douglas. Director, Infantry WeaponsProcurement, Headquarters, Marine Corps CombatDevelopments Center, Quantico, VA. Interviewed by theauthor by telephone at Dumphries, VA, 25 Jan 1992.
Fiske, Roger C. Deputy Commander, Operations Group, NationalTraining Center, U.S.Army. Interviewed by the author bytelephone at Fort Irwin, CA, on 23 Dec 1991.
Gobar, Hank. Director, Supporting Arms Department, NavalAmphibious School. Interviewed by the author bytelephone at Little Creek, VA, 3 Dec 91.
Hithon, Cary. OPS354G, U.S Navy Operations, Surface Strikeand Anti-surface Warfare Division. Interviewed by theauthor by telephone at Washington, D.C., 21 Nov 1991.
Jones, Roy. Director, Supporting Arms Dept., NavalAmphibious School, Coronado, CA. Interviewed by theauthor by telephone at Coronado, CA, 5 Dec 1991.
Kruspe, Steve. Assistant Instructor Inspector, 4th Air andNaval Gunfire Liaison Company, USMC. Interviewed by theauthor by telephone at West Palm Beach, FL, 23 Dec 1991.
Labadie, S. J. Commanding Officer, 2d Air and Naval GunfireLiaison Company, USMC. Interviewed by the author bytelephone at Camp Lejeune, NC, 18 Oct 1991.
Lesnowicz, Edward. Fire Support Coordinator, XVIII AirborneCorps Artillery, USMC. Interviewed by the author atFort Leavenworth, KS, 29 Jan 1992.
Liptak, Thomas. Operations Officer, 2d Air and Naval GunfireLiaison Company, USMC. Interviewed by the author bytelephone at Camp Lejeune, NC, 23 Dec 1991.
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McAtee, Gary. Instructor, Advanced Fire Support Branch, U.S.Army Field Artillery School. Interviewed by the authorby telephone at Fort Sill, OK, 23 Dec 1991.
Rosten, Craig. Plans and Operations Section, U. S. ArmyJoint Readiness Training Center. Interviewed by theauthor by telephone at Fort Chaffee, AK, 2 Dec 1991.
Sayko, Steven. Operations Officer, 2d Surveillance,Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group, USMC.Interviewed by the author by telephone at Camp Lejeune,
NC, 10 Oct 1991.
Schaefer, Jeff. Regimental Fire Support Officer, 75th RangerRegiment, U.S. Army. Interviewed by the author bytelephone at Fort Benning, GA, 18 Dec 1991.
Schoffel, William H. III. G-3, II Marine ExpeditionaryForce, USMC. Interviewed by the author by telephone atCamp Lejeune, NC, 24 Dec 1991.
Silvers, Jack. FA Operations Officer, OPFOR Branch, U. S.Army Battle Command Training Program. Interviewed bythe author by telephone at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 Nov1991.
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DISTRIBUTION
1. Combined Arms Research LibraryU. S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
2. CommandantU. S. Army Field Artillery SchoolFort Sill, Oklahoma 73503
3. CommandantU. S. Army Field Artillery SchoolAttn: ATSF-FSD (Lt. Col. Adams)Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503
4. Commanding Officer1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison CompanyCamp Pendleton, California 92055
21. Commander Eugene P. BernardNavy SectionU. S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
22. Defense Technical Information CenterCameron StationAlexandria, Virginia 22314
23. Dr. Jacob W. KippForeign Military Studies OfficeATZL-SASFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
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24. Lieutenant Colonel Randall S. LemonDepartment of Joint and Combined OperationsU. S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
25. Marine Corps Staff CollegeBreckenridge LibraryMarine Corps Combat Developments CenterQuantico, Virginia 22134
26. Naval Amphibious SchoolAttn: Dept. 43 (Maj. Olsen)Little Creek, Virginia 32521
27. Naval War College LibraryHewitt HallU. S. Navy War CollegeNewport, Rhode Island 02841-5010