Action, Desire and Subjectivity in Prabhakara Mimamsa

Action, Desire and Subjectivity inPrābhākara Mīmāṃsā

Elisa Freschi

Contents

1 Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic . . . . . . . . 32.1 Ritual as paradigm and the conundrum of desire . . . . . . . . . 62.2 Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā on the conundrum of desire . . . . . . . . 62.3 Summing up the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā view of the self . . . . . 82.4 Integration of the three aspects of subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . 93 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading . . . . . . . . 103.1 Body and subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3.1.1 Transient sense- and thought- faculties . . . . . . . . . . . 123.1.2 Embodiment as the ontological presupposition for a phe-

nomenological self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153.2 How do Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā arguments for the subject differ

from R.M. Chisholm’s ones? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153.2.1 Body and subject: Mīmāṃsā and Chisholm . . . . . . . . 19

3.3 Concluding remarks on the ontological interpretation: Peculiari-ties of the Prābhākara position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4 The phenomenological interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214.1 Which kind of proprioperception arises through a Vedic prescrip-

tion? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234.2 The two interpretations in Rāmānujācārya . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

4.2.1 Body and subject and the three aspects of subjectivity:Is Rāmānujācārya’s a phenomenological interpretation? . 24

5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Primary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Secondary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1 Foreword

As it is frequently the case, Mīmāṃsakas started their inquiry on the self outof concerns rooted in their primary focus, the Veda, and then extended itsprecinct of application to the sphere of ordinary experience, too. At a later stage,they adopted and adapted views about the subject elaborated by other schools,but I will not deal primarily with them, since they can probably be better

1

1 Foreword 2

examined by experts of, e.g., Nyāya, whereas proper-Mīmāṃsā (and even lessso, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka) theories have until now received little attention,and since –interestingly– even Mīmāṃsā authors did not focus primarily onthem, as can be seen by their peripheric position or absence in (as far as Iknow) all Mīmāṃsā works, from Śabara’s to Pārthasārathi’s, from Maṇḍana’sto Āpadeva’s ones.

Consequently, I will now present a short sketch of Mīmāṃsā views aboutthe self according to their historical origin (inquiries on the Veda) (“Hermeneu-tical part, §2-3.1), and then try to read them using the framework of Westernphilosophy, and especially of the difference between an ontological and a phe-nomenological approach. As my guide in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, I will focus onRāmānujācārya, a rather late but extremely accurate author1.

I will use the notion of “self” or “subject” (I am using the latter term in orderto avoid any confusion with the Advaita Vedānta notion of ātman/brahman)that emerges from Mīmāṃsā Vedic exegesis. Such a historical premiss is neededbecause Indian philosophers in general did not write “methodological forewords”to their works. Investigating into the origin of an idea is, hence, crucial tounderstand its import.

Since Rāmānujācārya’s exegesis of the Veda does not explicitly point to aphenomenology (or ontology) of the subject, at some points, I will have tosupply details in order to try to address further related points, and I will usethe principle of charity, that is, I will try to build a coherent view out of hisremarks. In order to do that, I will use whenever possible Rāmānujācārya’sown works, and alternatively those of Rāmānujācārya’s predecessor (and mainsource) Śālikanātha Miśra, or –in case of need– of a further Mīmāṃsā author,such as Someśvara Bhaṭṭa.

A last comment is needed in order to explain why I will use modern and con-temporary Western philosophers in order to compare their views with Mīmāṃsāones. First, this has to do with our natural way to know things. No one learnsthe Chinese script at once, because we learn things through assimilating the un-known, and in order to do that, we must be able to make it look less unknown.In order to be learnt, the unknown has to be known, but for a piece of novelty.Studying Indian Philosophy is, in my opinion, of fundamental importance inso-far as it offers external (and, hence, unexpected) stimuli to the contemporarydebate. But in order to understand an alien philosophy one has to be able toget in touch with it. In this sense, comparisons may be useful. On the otherhand, comparisons are also useful in order to make one aware of the fundamen-tal differences in the approaches one examines. Many (possibly: most) of themappear only by contrast. These (together with my personal ignorance) are alsothe main reasons why I avoided comparisons with authors using a more technicalapproach, since in such cases comparisons does not help immediate awarenessof the topic, and the quest for differences may end up in an investigation intotechnicalities of, e.g., each author’s formal language.

1 On Rāmānujācārya’s time and personality, see Freschi 2008 (Freschi East and West).

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic 3

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

Historically, Mīmāṃsakas started to look at the subject because of Vedic state-ments dealing with the agent of sacrifice (yajamāna). I will leave aside, here,any question about the accuracy of their interpretation of these statements. Infact, I am sure they misinterpreted them –at least from the point of view ofcontemporary Vedic scholars2.

From the Mīmāṃsā point of view, the subject enters the proscenio as a sac-rificer. Mīmāṃsakas spent time and energy to identify him/her (the alternanceof genders is not a matter of gender correctness only, as shown in MS 6.1.16-20,about the adhikāra of women to sacrifice).

And what did they have at their disposal, in order to identify the adhikārin,that is, the one who has the right and who ought to sacrifice? Vedic statementssuch as svargakāmo yajeta (“the one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice”),dealing with desire.

Hence, desire was the first candidate as the distinctive mark (lakṣaṇa) of thesubject. Within their ritual hermeneutics, Mīmāṃsakas further speculated onthe link between desire and initiation of action.

A significant step in this process is Śabara’s statement:

After [the prescription “the one who is desirous of heaven shouldsacrifice”] has made the one who is desirous of heaven responsible[for the sacrifice], it says “he should sacrifice”. In this way is thisdistinctive mark of the responsibility (adhikāra) established3.

To that, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu comments: “Śabara schließt sein Kommentar zuJS 6.1.3 mit einer für die Exegetik der Mīmāṃsā-Schule entscheidend wichtigenLehre, daß das Begehren des Himmels (svargakāma) eine fundamentale Bedin-gung für die Verleihung der Befugnis [adhikāra] zum Opfer ist” (Yoshimizu1994).

More interestingly, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas linked desire with the fact ofrecognising oneself. In the case of the Veda, this amounts to recognising oneselfas the one who has been enjoined (niyojya), and is linked with responsibility(adhikāra). Lastly, the fact of being responsible for an act is the cause forone to act. Hence the (indirect) link between desire and agent. According toRāmānujācārya, whenever a Vedic passage says, e.g., «the one who is desirous ofheaven should sacrifice with the Full and New Moon Sacrifices», whoever desiresheaven feels addressed by that injunction (stage 1: desirous subject) and cannotavoid identifying herself as the subject to whom the injunction refers (stage 2:enjoined subject). Hence, he or she understands that she is the one who isentitled to perform the sacrifice (stage 3: responsible subject). Finally, she

2 Garge writes about Śabara’s interpretation of the Ṛgveda: “Śabara is inclined to interpretṚgveda verses as well as words, in a sense suited to the ritualistic purposes. He looks uponthe Ṛgvedic Gods as mere recipients of oblations and not as representing some phenomena innature as Yāska holds” (Garge 1952, p. 158).

3 svargakāmam adhikṛtya yajeteti vacanam ity adhikāralakṣaṇam idaṃ siddhaṃ bha-vati, ŚBh ad 6.1.3). Yoshimizu mentions a parallel in Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra, seeYoshimizu1994


or he engages in the performance of the prescribed sacrifice (stage 4: agentsubject).

[Objection:] «But how is it that there is no other way [besides usingit as a specification for the prompted person] to connect (anvaya)the result [to the prescription]? [Answer:] It must be replied: forinstance, the one who is desirous of heaven (svargakāma) is firstlyconnected (anvi-) [to the prescription] as the prompted one (niyo-jya), insofar as he understands (budh-) that “I have to do (kārya)something I did not know about before [hearing this Vedic prescrip-tion] (apūrva)”. Thereafter, [he is connected] as the responsible one(adhikārin) since [he realises that] “as the ritual act (karman) is aninstrument to realise (sādhana) it (heaven), this act (karman) hasto be performed (anu-sthā-) by me for the sake of realising (siddhi)that”. The responsibility (adhikāra) is the cognition of one’s purposeas in relation to an act. It is called [also] competence (aiśvarya). [Fi-nally, one is connected] as a doer (kartṛ) when one performs (anu-sthā-) it (the ritual act). Thus, the three stages (prompted, respon-sible and doer) are the successive [conditions] of only one [type ofperson] (i.e., the one who is desirous of heaven). Among them, thecondition of being prompted is related to the injunction (niyoga).The other two stages are related to the act (karman). 4

So, desire is the motive of (ritual) action. Indeed, there cannot be (ritual)action without desire. Moreover, desire operates directly on the (ritual) agentto be. In the following lines (see next quotation), Rāmānujācārya explains howa ritual agent is unconceivable without desire and how desire must necessarilybe present for one to undertake an action. This is not just a restatement ofKumārila’s well-known motto «without a motive, even a fool does not act»,since desire is not just (as will be seen below) the motive of action, but ratherthe identification (viśeṣaṇa) of the agent. Without desire, the agent is not justinactive, but he or she does not even exist as a subject.

Rāmānujācārya also elaborates further on the three stages mentioned aboveby considering them in reverse order, from the view-point of what is prescribedby the Veda. The core meaning of the Veda, according to Prābhākaras, isnot something established (as in Vedānta), but rather something to be broughtabout. Since the Veda is an independent instrument of knowledge, it gives infor-mation which cannot be ascertained through any other instrument of knowledge.Hence it is non-precedented (apūrva) by any of them. But even from such anon-human point of view, desire is necessary, because nothing can be broughtabout by itself. The Veda needs a doer for its rituals to be realised; being a doer

4 nanu phalasya kathaṃ prakārāntareṇānvayāsambhavaḥ. ucyate. tathā hi prathamamapūrvam evamamedaṃ kāryam iti boddhṛtayā niyojyatvenānveti svargakāmaḥ puruṣaḥ. sapaścāt tatsiddhaye tatsādhane karmaṇi mayānuṣṭheyam idaṃ karmety adhikāritayā. karmaṇimādarthyajñānam adhikāraḥ.aiśvaryam iti yāvat. tadanutiṣṭhan kartṛtayā. ity ekasyaiva tisro�vasthāḥ kramabhāvinyaḥ. tatra niyojyatvaṃ niyoge. itarad avasthādvayam karmaṇi. (TRIV, §10.4, TR, p. 58).


means being responsible towards an act, and in order to take responsibility foran act one has to be prompted to undertake it. And one feels prompted becauseshe or he desires the result mentioned in the prompting prescription.

And the prompted person cannot be unspecified (viśiṣṭa), thus heaven(svarga) is connected as the specification of the prompted person.Since the prompted person is not unspecified, indeed, when in theviśvajit [sacrifice], etc., nothing relating to the prompted person’ssphere is directly mentioned (śruta), the prompted person is supplied(adhyāhāra) and the result is postulated (parikḷp-) as his specifica-tion (viśeṣaṇa) because of the [prescription’s] expectation (ākāṅkṣā)for a prompted person. To elaborate: in “he should sacrifice with theviśvajit[sacrifice]” the optative (lin˙) ending (of “he should sacrifice”,yajeta) informs that something unknown before [hearing this Vedicprescription] (apūrva) has to be done. And since this non-precededduty (kārya) cannot by itself be performed (anu-sthā-), it cannottake place (sambhū-) without the performance of [the injunction’s]content (viṣaya). Therefore, a doer (kartṛ) who performs (anu-sthā-)it, is indirectly implied (ākṣip-). And one cannot be a doer with-out being responsible (adhikāra). Whoever knows (jñā-) that “thisact (karman) relates to me”, he performs (anu-sthā-) it. And it isnot [possible] to be responsible without being prompted. He whoknows the injunction as “this has to be done (kārya) by me”, fullyunderstands (adhi-ava-so-) the act (karman), which is an instrumentto realise (sādhana) it (injunction), in this way: “It is for my ownsake, since it is the instrument to realise what I have to do”. Andhe cannot be unspecified (viśiṣṭa), therefore heaven (svarga) – whichhas happiness (sukha) as its general (sāmānya) characteristic (lakṣ-),which is present (anuvṛt-) in the various means to realise (sādhana)happiness such as cattle, a son, food (annādya), and which is longedfor (apekṣ-) by everyone– is postulated (parikḷp-) [if a specificationlacks].5

5 na cāviśiṣṭo niyojyo bhavatīti svargo niyojyaviśeṣaṇatayānveti. yato nāviśiṣṭo niyo-jyaḥataevāśrutaniyojyake viśvajidādau niyojyākāṅkṣāvaśāt niyojyādhyāhāre tadviśeṣaṇatayāphalaparikalpanam. tathāhi “viśvajitā yajeta” ity atra liṅāpūrvaṃ kāryatayā pratīyate.tasya ca kāryatvaṃ svato �nuṣṭhātum aśakyatayā viṣayānuṣṭhānam antareṇa na sambha-vatīti tadanuṣṭhātā kartākṣipyate. kartṛtvaṃ cādhikāram antareṇa na sambhavati. yohi madīyam idaṃ karmeti jānāti, sa eva tad anutiṣṭhati. sa cādhikāro na niyojyat-vam antareṇa. yo hi niyogaṃ mamedaṃ kāryam iti jānāti, sa etatsādhanaṃ karmamadīyakāryasādhanatayā madartham ity adhyavasyati. sa ca nāviśiṣṭobhavitum arhatītitadviśeṣaṇatayā paśuputrānnādyādinānāsukhasādhaneṣu anuvṛttas sukhasāmānyalakṣaṇaḥsarvāpekṣitas svargaḥ parikalpyate. yady api śrutaniyojyasthale �pi niyogasya niyojyākāṅkṣākartradhikārapraṇālikayaiva tathāpi tatra niyojyasya sākṣāc chrutatvāt prathamaṃ tenān-vayaḥ. tad api tatsiddhaye �dhikārikartṛbhyām iti ākāṅkṣākramam anādṛtyaivānvayaḥ. aśru-tasthale tu trayāṇāṃ apy aśrutatvāviśeṣād ākāṅkṣākrameṇaiva kartradhikāriniyojyānvaya itisthitiḥ. yato niyojyānvayaḥ kartrādipraṇālikayā, ato yatrānyato �nuṣṭhānalābhaḥ tatra naniyojyakalpanaṃ, yathādhyayanavidhau. sa hy adhyāpanavidhiprayuktasvaviṣayānuṣṭhāno naniyojyam apekṣate. adhyāpanavidhiś cādhyayanam antareṇādhyāpanāsambhavāt adhyayanamapi prayuṅkte. yathā vā uttarakratuvidhiprayojyam ādhānam. yathā vā prayājādividhayaḥ.


2.1 Ritual as paradigm and the conundrum of desireThis all could have nothing to do with the Classical and Upaniṣadic concept ofan ātman, if Mīmāṃsakas had not used their ritual categories to interpret alsoUpaniṣadic statements about the ātman. This is a typical Mīmāṃsā move, sinceMīmāṃsakas are always keen to interpret in a ritual way Upaniṣadic statements.Hence, they maintained that the ātman Upaniṣads refer to is nothing but thesacrificial agent.

Similarly, Rāmānujācārya uses also worldly examples of niyojya, such as“the one who is desirous of a well-nourished condition should drink milk” and“Devadatta, cook!” (TR IV §9.3.1; NR ad AN III, ad 23-25, NR, pp. 251-2).

Moreover, as it was often the case, Kumārila applied the concept of thenecessary link between desire6 and action (until now used in ritual and Vedichermeneutic) also to worldly matters. For instance, he claimed that the Buddhacould not speak, if –as Buddhists state– he had no desires.

This leads to the well-known conundrum of desire. In its classical formula-tion, the conundrum sounds like that: how is liberation from desire achievable,if not through one’s desire for it? In the Mīmāṃsā case, if there is no subjectunless there is desire, liberation from desire would be tantamount to liberationfrom the subject itself.

In a recent book (Framarin 2009, Christopher Framarin debated this conun-drum and proposed to follow Fred Schueler’s suggestion and distinguish betweentwo types of desire: the one we have to get rid of (let us call it “passion”) andthe one we need in order to initiate whatever an action, including that of gettingrid of passions (let us name it “will”) (see Schueler 1995).

2.2 Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā on the conundrum of desireDoes this distinction apply to the Mīmāṃsā theory?

The kind of desire the Mīmāṃsaka uses as a tool to identify the adhikārin,the responsible subject, is a worldly passion (rāga), such as the desire for rain,cattle, a son, etc. Nor does Kumārila accept the distinction between two sortsof desire when he refutes that the Buddha, who has overcome passions, maystill undertake his teaching activity.

More in general, is (worldly) desire accidental to the Mīmāṃsā notion of“subject”? I do not think so.

First of all, Mīmāṃsakas are too strong empiricist to accept something whichovertly contradicts worldly experience, unless there is a strong evidence for it.And we do not have any strong evidence against the universal link of desire-action-subject, neither through direct perception nor through the Veda.

However, Kumārila’s interpretation of desire (and of liberation) might becontroversial (on this subject, see the debate between Roque Mesquita (Mesquita1994) and John Taber (Taber 2007), and my analysis of the dissonance between

te hi pradhānavid adhikāriṇaṃ niyojyaṃ kalpayantīti. (TR IV, §§10.4-5 of my own unpub-lished edition, p. 58 of the 1956 edition).

6 And not just “will”, as with the Naiyāyika icchā, see below and §2.2.


Kumārila and his commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra in ŚV sambandhākṣepa110-111, Freschi 2007, pp. 56-59). The contradiction may be solved if it issuggested that Kumārila’s account is quite strict as regards worldly experience,whereas liberation (and, hence, one’s progress towards it) are not part of itsdomain. Whatever the case, in the following I will only refer to PrābhākaraMīmāṃsā texts. In these texts, the problem of desire is somehow differentlyput, since desire is used to identify the subject to which the injunction refers,but the main stress lies on the injunction’s content as something to be done(kārya).

The concept of “enjoined” (niyojya) is crucial in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsāhermeneutics. The Veda is an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa), according tothis school, because it imparts an injunction (it has, hence, a deontic authorityand no epistemic one, according to the distinction proposed by J. Bochenski(Bochenski 1974). This injunction is also called niyoga, and its content is calledapūrva or kārya.

All these terms refer to the fact that the Veda imparts a duty (kārya, “some-thing to be done”), which is altogether new (apūrva, “non-precedented [throughany other instrument of knowledge]”) and has a deontic form (niyoga, “injunc-tion”). Hence, it does not exist unless in this prescriptive form.

The centrality of niyoga as the Veda’s meaning (artha, “meaning” and “pur-pose”) entails that the Veda is basically an order directed towards its listeners,the niyojyas.

The latter are not listeners whatsoever, since in order for the process from(Vedic) order to action to take place, one has to recognize the duty as one’sown (mama idam kāryam or the like). This can only happen if the order deeplyregards the listener. This happens, Prābhākaras continue, if it regards his/herdesires. One feels that one ought to sacrifice, that the duty to sacrifice has beenstated directly for oneself, because one recognizes oneself as the one towardswhom the injunction (e.g. svargakāmo yajeta) has been formulated.

So, desire is a necessary element for a human being to get involved inVedic actions (and in worldly ones, since Vedic actions are for Mīmāṃsakasthe paradigm of all actions).

Does this also mean that desire is objectively necessary? In other words, isdesire needed only from the human perspective or is it also independently ofthe desiring subject’s perspective the cause for the undertaking of an action?

In fact, there are Prābhākara statements about the opposite, such as thefollowing: na ca phalam antareṇa pravṛttyasambhavaḥ (VM II, ad v. 30). Butthey mostly regard the absence of the fruit, not of the desire itself. The reward is,in fact, not the point. According to the Prābhākaras the action is not directed byit, unlike what is maintained by Maṇḍana (in his Mīmāṃsā garb) and somehowby Kumārila (prayojanam anuddiśya na maṇḍo ’pi pravartate). Instead, theaction has an intrinsic value. BUT, it is not subjectively initiated, unless onestrives for its result. Does this mean that the Veda tricks its listeners, promisinga fruit which will never occur? This is altogether denied by Kumārila, whoassumes that there is an apūrva (non-precedented) energy, risen by the sacrificeand lasting until its result. Prabhākara is less concerned with the ontological


justification of the arousal of the result. For him, the Veda is a valid instrumentof knowledge. Hence, a result will follow because the Veda says it will. But wedo not need to focus on it, since the purpose of the Veda (vedārtha) does notconsist in the sacrifice’s fruits, but rather in the very fact that a (sacrificial)action has to be done. The fruit is an element of this execution, and it is nomore important than any other element.

2.3 Summing up the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā view of the selfIn the preceding pages and in the following scheme, I highlight some elementsof the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā view about the self. I could not find any textexplicitly connecting them all, and the desire/agent connection might have littleor no significance outside the hermeneutic context. The next sections are meantto explore whether the opposite is the case and desire and action do play a rolefor one’s awareness of oneself as a subject and/or for the ontological definitionof what a subject is.

The elements hinted at in Mīmāṃsā discussions about the subject can bebroadly distinguished in two groups, namely statements about how the subjectis, and statements about how it is known. To the first group (viewing the subjectas a prameya) belong, for instance:

1. (against Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika…) The subject desires

2. The subject is active (knowledge is included in action7)

3. The subject is a continuously lasting entity, ensuring memory, self-recognitionetc.

4. The body is the instrument of the subject’s experience (bodily movementsare, hence, just a consequence of the subject’s “actions”)

To the second group (discussing the pramāṇas to know the subject) belong,for instance:

1. The subject becomes aware of itself through its desires

2. This process is initiated by a Vedic statement (that is, through śab-dapramāṇa), see infra, p. 23

3. According to Kumārila, the subject is identical with the content of “I” andis hence seized through ahampratyaya in every verbal cognition featuringan “I”8

4. According to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the subject is known in everycognitive act

7 See Freschi forthcoming.8 For an interesting discussion of the import of this identity, see Watson 2006, §3. This way

to know the subject also means that it is thought to be the substratum of the notion of “I”(whereas Prabhākara rather argues, even in regard to the knowing aspect of the subject, thatit appears in cognition as its subject, i.e., as the agent of cognition, see infra 25.


Such statements refer to different aspects of the subject: the subject asknower, as agent and as emotional being. I am including in the latter both desireand experience –which could be further distinguished– because of Prabhākara’sdistinction between kartṛtva and bhoktṛtva in regard to the ātman (tasmāt suṣṭū-cyate –kartṛbhoktṛtaivātmeti, Bṛhatī, 1.1.5, ātmavāda, Prabhākara Miśra 1929,p. 173), without the further addition of desire as a distinct element9.

Let me now try to connect the two groups:

known through (Bhāṭṭa) aspect known through (Prābhākara)ahampratyaya =⇒ knower ←− saṃvid’s svaprakāśa

⇓agent↑

desiring ←− Veda

The link of the desiring subject to the agent presupposes the intermediatestep of the responsible subject (adhikārin). More important, here, the agentaspect is seen by Prabhākara not as the core element, but as the result of aprocess initiated through the fact that one desires, and going through his/herbeing enjoined and being responsible for the act. A sheer agent (for instance,the sacrificer according to whose size the sacrificial audumbarī pillar is cut) isnot a responsible person and, hence, does not become aware of himself as asubject10.

2.4 Integration of the three aspects of subjectivityThe Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā subject did not emerge out of an epistemologicaldiscussion, but rather out of hermeneutic concerns. More in detail, it emergedas the self referred to in svargakāmo yajeta. It owns desires and is responsible ofactions. Both of them are immediately grasped through one’s inner awareness(more precisely: others’ movements are only inferable –so TR II–, whereas one’sown initiations of actions are available to inner awareness). Hence, I think thathis concept of a self does not describe a trascendental self, like Immanuel Kant’sone. It is not postulated as a pre-requisite for our theoretic or moral acts to

9 I am extremely grateful to Mag. Eunyee Choi for making me aware that the coincidenceof these three aspects of a self is not necessary. She mentioned as her source J.N. Mohanty,Mohanty 1970, but I could not locate any discussion about it in that book. Instead, aninteresting definition can be found in Perry: «In philosophy, the self is the person considered asagent, knower, subject of desires and conscious subject of experience. These are philosophicallythe most central parts of a person’s self-concept: I am the person doing this, wanting this, andhaving these sensations and thoughts. It is this concept of ourselves that is extended throughmemory and anticipation and forms the basis of personal identity, I am the person who didthis and will do that; I am the person who had this experience and wants to have it again»(Perry 2002, p. 190). The integration of the first three aspects will be discussed below, 10;that of the subject of experience in the Prābhākara conception of a subject will be discussedlater, 15.

10 See MS 3.1.6 and Bṛhatī thereon. I owe the insightful remark on the distinction of agentand responsible to to Yoshimizu, see Yoshimizu1994

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading 10

be logically possible. On the other hand, it gradually emerges out of one’sperception of actions or desires. One achieves the subject as the result of acomplex process of recognition. In Rāmānujācārya’s hermeneutic description,this process sounds as follows:

desire → my desire → my responsibility → I decide to act

“mine” or “my” are here not to be interpreted as possessive pronouns (sincethe substrate they stand for is still not established). They rather indicate a loosereference to a still indeterminate oneself: “this desire is connected to \me\”.

Unfortunately, Rāmānujācārya did not insert the epistemological self withinthis process. However, in order to study the Veda, one needs to undergo a spe-cific education and to acquire many notions. Since in any process of knowledge,the cognitive act (saṃvid) is according to the Prābhākaras self-revealing, andsince it reveals at the same time also the object known and the knower, one mayimagine that the Vedic student is already acquainted with this knower-aspectwhen he first listens to a Vedic injunction –although probably he is not awareof it as co-referential with the subject’s feeling and active aspects. Later, then,he becomes aware of himself as an enjoined person, and eventually as responsi-ble for the ritual action enjoined. In order to be responsible for an action, oneneeds the training mentioned above (children, strangers, śūdras, etc. will neverbe held responsible for ritual actions, even if they should accidentally listen toa prescription). Hence, the Vedic student is now in the position to integratethe knower-aspect he experienced already within his experience of himself as anagent and a moral subject.

In sum, the knower-aspect, experienced while studying the Veda is later inte-grated within one’s experience of oneself as a desiring agent since this experiencepresupposes the study of the Veda. Hence, one is reminded of one’s experienceof learning it and (if my hypothesis is correct) integrates the knower-aspect inthe desiring-agent picture.

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

Are the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā views devised in order to build also an ontologyor a phenomemology of the subject?

In Prābhākara texts there are surely many pages dedicated to the ontologyof the subject (see Śālikanātha Miśra’s Tattvāloka, a chapter of his PrP), butthey are hardly original and rather repeat (or adjust) arguments found in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā texts about the distinction between body, mind,senses and ātman; the way to know it; its status once liberated. In general, theuse of the term ātman seems to mark the beginning of an ontological discussion.

But what about the concept of an active, desiring subject we highlightedabove? Is it an ontological category or not?

In order to understand whether it is meant to build an ontology of thesubject, one could test it by checking whether it is able to address problemssuch as the following ones:


1. Self: some classical Indian objections

• The challenge of reductionism/physicalism (Lokāyatas)• The “Bundle of perception” theory (Buddhists)

2. Self: some contemporary problems

• The challenge of reductionism/physicalism• The “Bundle of perception” theory (Hume: the self is nowhere to

be grasped. One only grasps perceptions and, when there are noperceptions, there is also no self –as in deep sleep. Others: there arejust properties and no substratum for them).

Both kind of reductionism want to prove that the subject (the “soul”) isnothing exceeding the material body. A variant of this theory which is verymuch worth consideration is P.F. Strawson’s claim that persons are irreducibleto a mind/body dualism. A person, hence, cannot be further analysed into twocomponents (Strawson 1959).

As for the “Bundle of perception” theory, its most well-known Western for-mulation is David Hume’s one:

we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular per-ception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions whichsucceed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in per-petual flux and movement (Hume, Treatise on the Human Nature,I.I.VI)

Which is, allegedly, proven through a sort of abhāvapramāṇa:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heator cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I nevercan catch myself at any time without a perception, and never canobserve anything but the perception.” (A Treatise of Human Nature.Book I, Part IV, section VI (”Of Personal Identity”).

Against these objections, one might take recourse to several Classical Indianarguments in favour of the existence of a subject, most of which are endorsedalso by Prābhākara authors. As for the role of the agent/desire argument withinontology or phenomenology, it may be used against physicalism if this is un-derstood as aiming to identify psychological states and properties with physicalstates and properties. In fact, it is relatively easy to identify a sensation with itsphysical correlate, but less easy to identify desire with a physical state. More-over, the feeling of “ownness” in desire represents a further challenge to theessay to reduce the first-person experience to a third-person perspective.


3.1 Body and subject3.1.1 Transient sense- and thought- faculties

As for the body/soul problem, that is, the ontological relation between this(active, desiring, knowing) subject and the body, Mīmāṃsakas are quite clearfrom the time of the ŚBh in denying any identity11. The subject is neithertantamount to the body, nor is it a quality of the body or a part of it. Thesubject is, hence, not a material soul weighing so and so. In Roderick Chisholm’swords,

Thus we could say, as Bishop Butler [(1692-1752)] did, that “ourgross organized bodies with which we perceive the objects of sense,and with which we act, are no part of ourselves… We see with our eyesin the same way we see with our glasses”. (The Analogy of Religion,Part I, Chapter 1). The eyes are the organs of sight, not the subjectof sight. (Chisholm, Self-Profile in Roderick M. Chisholm, p.74).

This leads to a further problem: what is the link between the subject and itsfaculties? All Indian philosophical schools I am aware of think that both senseand thought faculties are transient (like the body), and that the subject is justthe one who is conscious of operations going on automatically. Does this applyto the Mīmāṃsā case in the same way?

The distinction body/subject surely allows the Mīmāṃsaka to distinguishbetween psychic and sensory functions, with the latter pertaining to the body.Moreover, manas is also said to belong to the body12. On the other hand, theMīmāṃsā identifies as characteristics of the subject even qualities which are notattributed to it by Nyāya and, even more so, Advaita Vedānta. According tothe latter, only consciousness is intrinsic to the subject. All the rest of whatcontemporary Western common opinion considers to be “psychical” qualities(such as will and effort) is, instead, attributed to the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa–made of buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas), which is as perishable as the gross body.Against that, Mīmāṃsā admits most (if not all) of these qualities as typical ofthe subject. This may imply either narrowing down the role of buddhi, etc. (seeinfra, 4.2), or no longer considering knowledge, effort, etc., as qualities. Suchis the position of Someśvara, who stated that action (including knowledge andwill) inheres in the subject (see Freschi forthcoming).

I will not deal here with the problem of what an “action” is (see on thistopic Freschi 2010 and Freschi forthcoming). Suffice it to say that according toMīmāṃsakas an action is different from a bodily movement and that it consistsin one’s initiation of an act (prayatna or pravṛtti)13. Hence, many Mīmāṃsakas

11 See, for instance, the pūrvapakṣin (not contradicted as far as this point is concerned)in ŚBh ad 1.1.5, Śabara and Dignāga 1968, p. 34: pātracayanaṃ vidhāya āya “sa eṣa ya-jñāyudhī yajamāno ’ñjasā svargaṃ lokaṃ yāti”. pratyakṣaṃ hi tad dahyate. na caiṣa “yāti”iti vidhiśabdaḥ.

12 “And the mind is within the body [and] it is atomic in size” (manaś ca antaḥśarīraṃparamāṇuparimāṇam, PrP, Tattvāloka, Śā p. 332).

13 By the way, a further similarity with R.M. Chisholm’s philosophy, is his idea that actionsare, with the Aquinas, those which occur ex voluntate deliberata. Just like Kumārila and


may include among actions also psychic acts such as knowing or wishing. Thismove is explicit in Someśvara Bhaṭṭa, who, however, seems thereby to explicatethe philosophical consequences of Mīmāṃsā exegetical theories (Freschi forth-coming).

Further details on the role of ahaṅkāra, buddhi and manas It could also bethe case that the agent- and desiring-self described above is in itself essentiallyactive, knower, desiring, etc. and only uses additional psychic organs such asbuddhi, ahaṅkāra and/or, according to some schools, citta as the depository ofpast sensations. In fact, these terms are never used in the TR and hardly atall in Śālikanātha Miśra’s PrP (where, moreover, ahaṅkāra seems rather a non-technical term meaning “the concept of an I” as in “I go”, “I know the pot”etc.)14. Buddhi is used at the beginning of Śālikanātha Miśra’s defence of theātman (PrP Tattvāloka), in order to state that the latter is distinct from buddhiand sense organs, but then not discussed again.

Manas is used by Rāmānujācārya, but seems to refer only to its functionas the inner sense organ. For instance, again in TR IV §11.6.2 it is said thateffort (prayatna) is knowable through the manas. This does not imply thatthe manas is aware of it. mānasapratyakṣavedya rather parallels the frequentstring cakṣurādigrāhya (or similar), indicating the instrument through which oneknows something.

The other main source of Rāmānujācārya, the Bhāṭṭa Pārthasārathi Miśra,discusses ahaṅkāra, etc. within his rebuttal of the Sāṅkhya view and denies theSāṅkhya view on ahaṅkāra, but not its existence. However, in Pārthasārathi’sunderstanding the ahaṅkāra seems to be nothing more than the fact that an ”I”exists (and not a subjectivity organ), since one of the evidences in favour of it isthe necessity of an “I” (i.e., a located subject) in order to make sense of sentencessuch as “I am the father” (Pārthasārathi Miśra 1977, p. 256, ātmavāda, 1977 p.256). Moreover, Pārthasārathi Miśra, follows Kumārila in maintaining that the

Someśvara Miśra, Chisholm connects actions to intentions, endeavours (what I called above“efforts”) and to the fact of bringing about (Chisholm, Reply to Douglas N. Walton in Rod-erick M. Chisholm, p.213). Post-Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas are probably even more extreme inadmitting as actions endeavours independently of their being successful.

14 All occurrences of this term are found in a short passage of PrP, Tattvāloka, Śā p.327,debating with Cārvākas on whether the body is the subject. The Siddhāntin proposes to usethe ahaṅkāra as an evidence against the identification of ātman and body and the opponentreplies with examples for the contrary: «[S]: And through the support of the ”concept ofan I” (ahaṅkāra), again there is a rebuttal of the theory that the self is the body. [PP]:It is not so. In ”I know the pot” the knower has the rank of the ”I” (ahaṅkāra). Since itis so, there is consent of the usage of ”I” in ”I go”, ”I am fat” etc., only in regard to thebody. Hence, the body alone is perceptible [and] it is seized as knower. And an inferencewhich goes against direct perception does not hold» (ahaṅkārāvalambanena punardehātmavā-dapratyavasthānam. naitadevam. ”ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmī”ti jñātur ahaṅkārāspadībhūtatvāt”ahaṃ gacchāmy ahaṃ sthūlaḥ” ityādāv ahaṅkārasya śarīra eva pravṛttyavivādāc charīrameva pratyakṣaṃ jñātṛ pratīyate, pratyakṣavirodhe cānumānam ātmānaṃ na labhata iti). NB:I would rather expect ahaṅkārāspadībhūtatvāt and pravṛttyavivādāt to be on the same level:since the knower is equated to the ”I” and since the ”I” is found to be the same as the body,the body is the knower!


ātman can be seized as the concept of I (ahampratyaya) and, hence, de factoeliminates the need of a separate ahaṅkāra:

[PP:] Isn’t it the case that, like in the case of the body (who hasbeen proven to be only metaphorically referred to with the pronoun“I” in “I’m fat”, etc.), also the conception of the “I” in regard of theself is a plain error?[S:] No, because there is no subsequent cognition invalidating [thisconception].[PP:] In the case of yogins (who transcend the notion of an I) thereis a subsequent invalidating cognition.[S:] No, since there is no evidence for that. [See indeed the followingverses:]In the same way, even the ones who have reached the supreme levelof yoga |these masters among the masters of yoga also think of the “I” inregard to the self ||[In fact, they say:] “The I is the origin of the whole world, as it is[its] end” |[…] And in fact the ahaṅkāra which evolves from the [Sāṅkhya]Prakṛti cannot be the origin of the whole world [hence they areinstead referring to the ātman]15.

Nonetheless, a doubt is raised by the term antaḥkaraṇa in TR IV §10.11.Traditionally this refers to the psychic faculties together (as being the instru-ment of the self). Literally, it might also designate only manas, but the passagerequires something able to feel satisfaction. Nor did I find a source text whichmight have influenced Rāmānujācārya’s terminological choice.

More in general, I could not detect any distinct examination of the psychicorgans within an ontology of the psyche either in Pārthasārathi’s nor in anyother Mīmāṃsaka’s texts.

Summing up, these psychic organs may well have a role also in Rāmānu-jācārya (and in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā in general), but their help is only sub-sidiary and does not affect the fundamental nature of the self. For instance,the self is surely the knower, although it needs sense-organs and maybe alsopsychical ones in order to know.

15 nanu śarīravad ātmany apy ahamabhimāno bhrāntir eva? na, bādhābhāvāt. yogināmasti bādha iti cet? na, pramāṇābhāvāt. tathā ca ye ’pi yogasya parāṃ kāṣṭhām upāgatāḥ |yogeśvareśvarās te ’pi kurvanty ātmany ahaṃmatim || 21 || ahaṃ kṛtsnasya jagataḥ prabhavaḥpralayas tathā | […] na hi mahadvikāro ’haṅkāraḥ kṛtsnasya prabhavaḥ (Śāstradīpikā, 1.1.5,Sastradipika [Śāstradīpikā] of Pārtha Sarathi Misra with the Commentary called YuktisnehaPrapūraṇi by Pandit Rama Krishna Misra, pp. 349-350).


3.1.2 Embodiment as the ontological presupposition for aphenomenological self

The body is anyway an essential instrument of the subject, which can haveexperiences only through it. The link between subject and body is based onthe former’s karman and is, hence, necessary. The body is not merely a massof material substances, but it is the abode of experience (bhogāyātana, TR II;PrP Tattvāloka Śā p.331). Hence, Śālikanātha and Rāmānujācārya state thatnothing like plant bodies exist, since plants are not able to experience anything(bhogānupalambhāt, TR II, p.17). Moreover, they also deny ayonija bodies (lit.“bodies not born from a womb”), since they are nowhere to be seen (TR II,ibidem, PrP Tattvāloka, Śā p.332). In a footnote to the PrP text, its learnededitor explains that ayonija bodies are described in the Vaiśeṣika system (VS4.2.5) and attributed to Gods and ṛṣis (i.e., superhuman creatures)16.

Whatever our contemporary view about that, it is noteworthy that the body,although sharply separated from the subject, does not exist independently ofit. In short, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas hold a view akin to what Brian Gar-rett labels the “Intermediary view” (between Cartesianism and Reductionism)and attributes to John Locke. So understood, this view “holds that personsare psychophysical substances, which are necessarily embodied” (Garrett 1998,p. 320)17. In this connection it is worth remembering that Rāmānujācāryacriticises the belief in a God exactly because in order to be omnipotent andomniscient He needs to have a body, but His having a body leads to furtherlogical problems (TR IV, §9.4.5, 1956 edition p. 55). Moreover, the Veda issaid to be apauruṣeya, that is, “not [the work] of a person”, thus denying botha human author and God as author. Hence, the nexus between personhood andembodiment is not denied even in the case of superhuman beings.

3.2 How do Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā arguments for the subjectdiffer from R.M. Chisholm’s ones?

It easy to see how several of the ontological arguments hinted at above have beenimplemented also by Western thinkers. A short excursus on them will hopefullyhelp (especially Indologists non familiar with philosophical discussions) to dis-tinguish what does not belong to this sphere in the Prābhākara argumentation.

16 yat punar apārthivam ayonijaṃ śarīraṃ kevaladharmādhipatyanibandhanaṃ kaiś-cid abhyupagamyate, tat sarvaśarīrāṇāṃ pārthitvāvyabhicārān nānumātuṃ śakyate (PrPTattvāloka, Śāstri’s edition p.332). “It is impossible to infer that body not made of earth, notborn out of a womb and having as condition [for its occurrence] only the Power of Dharma,which is admitted by some [i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas]. In fact, all bodies without exception are madeof earth”. I am grateful to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for the following answer to an on-linequery of mine on this subject: «’The power of dharma’: In other words, these divine bodiesare supposed by those who believe in them to be conditioned only by dharma, unlike bodiessuch as ours which are conditioned by both dharma and adharma». Isaacson also pointed outa corresponding passage in PrP, vimalañjana, PrP, p. 306, where bodies made of dharma andof adharma are explicitly mentioned.

17 For a longer discussion, see also Garrett 1991, pp. 62; 69-70.


The appeal to common sense is particularly evident in Roderick Chisholm’sclaim that there are some pre-analytic facts about the self which are “innocentuntil proven guilty”. In this way, he can discuss common-sense notions (suchas that of the self and of its ownership of feelings, thoughts and desires) inorder to state that either one accepts them, or one is bound to give a satisfyingexplanation of such a well-spread error.

(This would, however, not apply necessarily to a Buddhist thinker, whowould reply that common sense is, in fact, our gaoler and, therefore, we cannotrely on it if we want to escape worldly existences.)

The appeal to self-presenting evidences is also the key-point of Chisholm’sdefence of the self. Against Hume’s Bundle theory, he quotes Price:

As Professor Price once observed, it looks very much as though theself that Hume professed to be unable to find is the one that hefinds to be stumbling (H.H. Price, Hume’s Theory of the ExternalWorld, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940, 1940, pp. 5-6; quotedinp. 39)18

(In a somehow similar vein, Indian authors of various Theistic schools withinand outside Vedānta (until the Pratyabhijñā school) have said that the self isundeniable, since it is established whenever one tries to deny it19).

An argument driven out of common experience, the continuity-argument isalso crucial for Chisholm’s dealing with mereology. In several of his essays,Chisholm ponders the problem of what happens of a thing whose parts have,gradually, all been substituted. Does it still exist as such? Chishom does notyield a definitive answer, but he is sure that even if we were to say that it still“exists”, this would only be in a loose sense. This position is called “mereologicalessentialism”, as it states that parts are essential to things and that things cease

18 A more detailed version of Chisholm’s argument is the following: The difficulty is thatHume appeals to certain evidence to show that there are only impressions or perceptions, andthat when he tells us what this evidence is, he implies not only (i) that there is, as he puts itin his example, heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, but also (ii) that there is someonewho finds heat or cold […], and moreover (iii) that the one who finds heat or cold is the sameas the one who finds love or hatred and the same as the one who finds light or shade, andfinally (iv) that this one does not in fact stumble upon anything but perceptions. It is notunreasonable to ask, therefore, whether HUme’s report of his fourth finding is consistent withhis report of the second and third. If Hume finds what he says he finds, that is to say, if hefinds not only perceptions, but also that he finds the, and hence that there is someone whofinds them, how can his premises be used to establish the conclusion that he never observesanythign but perceptions? (p. 40).

19 See ĪPK 1.1.2: What intelligent being could ever deny or establish the cognizer and agent,the Self, Maheśvara, established from the beginning (ādisiddhe)? (kartari jñātari svātmanyādisiddhe maheśvare | ajaḍātmā niṣedhaṃ vā siddhiṃ vā vidadhīta kaḥ ||) and commentariesthereon (translation and text from Utpaladeva 1994. Isabelle Ratié translates as follows Ab-hinavagupta’s explanation of the relevant point: «[…] [Similarly, this person] must performthe refutation (niṣedha) in this way: if [this self] is not manifest, accordingly, [this person]is insentient (jaḍa); and it has [already] been stated that this [refutation] is not possible foran insentient [entity]; nor is it (possible) for a sentient [entity, for this sentient entity wouldprecisely have to prove that it is not sentient].» (Ratié 2007, 361, fn.98). I am grateful toIsabelle Ratié for pointing out this passage.


to exist if they loose their parts20. On the other hand, argues Chisholm, I donot cease to exist if I loose a hand. Hence, persons can be said to last in a sensein which things cannot. I am the same person as one year ago, although thematerial components of my body might be altogether different. On the otherhand, a chair whose parts have been replaced may be said to last only in a loosesense. Hence, from mereological essentialism one can conclude that we are notto be identified with our bodies21.

One might propose a different kind of link between body and subject. ButChisholm stresses the sharp distinction between body and what he calls “per-son”. In doing so he argues, in an Indian garb, for the necessity for qualities toinhere in quality-endowed substances:

Therefore it is not possible for modes to have modes; and it is nec-essary that every substrate be a substrate. A further consequence isthat the person is not a mode of his body. For it is obvious that theperson has modes. […] Could I be a ‘mode’ of my body? It is certainthat I have modes; there is one for each of my psychological proper-ties. But we have seen that modes themselves do not have modes.Therefore I cannot be a mode of my body. (Chilsholm, Self-Profilein Roderick M. Chisholm, pp. 71, 73).

By the way, as for what a mode is, in Chisholm’s terminology,

It will be convenient to read the converse of “x is a mode of y” as“y is the substrate of x”. Our definition of mode should allow us tosay […] that a house is a mode of a heap or aggregate of buildingmaterials – and that the heap or aggregate of building materials isnot a mode of the house. […] Our definition of mode should also allowfor the possibility that a mode, though ontologically dependent uponits substrate, may yet change its substrate. The house or ship mayhave one heap as its substrate today and another one tomorrow.(Chilsholm, Self-Profile in Roderick M. Chisholm, p. 66).

Further, Chisholm is quite close to the (nearly) Pan-Indian way of distin-guishing a subject from its instruments, even the ones allowing it to think andperceive, such as the sense-faculties and the inner sense (or “mind”, manas).Observe his reply to an imaginary objector:

“Persons, being thinking things, must have a complex structure.[…] After all, you can’t think unless you have a brain. And thoselittle things [what Chisholm calls “persons”, see below about thebody/subject problem] don’t have brains!”

20 In Chisholm’s words, mereological essentialism applied to substances amounts to: “x is asubstance, if and only if: for ally, if y is a part of x, then x is necessarily such that y is a partof it.” (Chilsholm, Self-Profile in Roderick M. Chisholm, p. 67).

21 It is interesting to note how mereology had a major role also in Buddhism, but led to oppo-site conclusions. See Kapstein, Matthew (1988): Mereological Considerations in Vasubandhu’s”Proof of Idealism” (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ). Idealistic studies 18/1, 32-54.


The hypothesis being criticized is the hypothesis that I am sucha microscopic entity. But note that I do have a brain. And therefore,according to the hypothesis in question, the microscopic entity hasone, too –the same one that I have, the one that is inside my head.It is only a confusion to suppose that the microscopic entity […] hasanother brain which is in fact inside of it.

The brain is the organ of consciousness, not the subject of con-sciousness –unless I am myself my brain. The nose, similarly, is theorgan of smell and not the subject of smell –unless I am myself mynose. But if I am one or the other –the brain or the nose– then, Ithe subject, will have some organs that are spatially outside me.

Moreover, Chisholm’s concept of “person” might be said to be especiallyclose to the Mīmāṃsā one, since it includes the abilities to think and desire,which are not necessarily included in the self (ātman) in classical Indian philos-ophy (Advaita Vedānta excludes desire and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika denies thought ascharacteristic of the self, see p. 12). In fact, Chisholm writes:

We could use the term “mind”, as Descartes had used the term“mens”, to refer to that which has psychological properties – to thatwhich thinks, senses, believes, desires. In this case, we would beusing “mind” to mean the same as “person” and hence to designatesuch entities as you and me. (Chilsholm, Self-Profile in Roderick M.Chisholm, ed. by Rogdan Bagu, p.71).

More in general:

The following may be taken as being paradigmatic cases of psy-chological attributes: judging; being sad about something; beingpleased about something; wondering about something; feeling de-pressed; seeming to oneself to have a headache; and being appearedto redly. […] Any property which is possibly such that it is exempli-fied by just one thing and which includes every property it impliesor involves is psychological.

This formula provides us with an interpretation of one traditionalthesis –namely, that whatever is ‘purely qualitative’ is psychologi-cal. We will define the psychological by reference to that which ispurely qualitative. But we will not define the psychological as thatwhich is purely qualitative, since certain psychological attributes–for example, thinking about one’s brother– are not purely qualita-tive. (Chisholm 1989, p. 99).

Lastly, Chisholm takes it for granted (possibly as part of his appeal tocommon-sense) that there are many persons. The same tenet is defended byMīmāṃsakas against Advaita Vedānta authors (see, e.g., Śālikanātha Miśra,Tattvāloka Śā p.345).


3.2.1 Body and subject: Mīmāṃsā and Chisholm

How far is, on the other hand, Chisholm’s approach from the Mīmāṃsā one?

1. Mīmāṃsakas are quite clear about the fact that the subject is not a mate-rial substance, whereas Chisholm does not rule out the possibility of the“person” being a material substance with no parts, possibly situated inthe brain

2. The body is according to Mīmāṃsakas not just a material substance what-soever. It is linked with the subject through the latter’s karman and be-cause it is the abode of its experiences.

3. Mīmāṃsakas (and possibly all other Indian philosophers apart from Lokāy-atas, Jainas and obviously Buddhists) argue that the subject is all-pervading,and explain in this way its connections with the body’s organs. On theother hand (see quote above, p.18), Chisholm maintains that it is possiblefor a subject to use organs which are spatially outside it.

1. Once one endorses a dualism between psychic and physical properties, one isbound to explain how do the two work together in one’s body (assuming that oneagrees that a body is a mass of matter and that its movements are psychicallydetermined). Chisholm’s answer denies the dualism. Prābhākara’s one, on theother hand, stresses the bridge-function of fruition (bhoga) and action (see infra,point 2).

More in detail, the point seems to be that, according to Chisholm the pos-tulation of an extra entity, purely psychical, such as what one commonly refersto as “mind” has no epistemological grounds. Psychical properties can be as-cribed also to a material substance (according to what he calls a “double aspecttheory” (Chisholm 1989, p. 123, On Metaphysics, p. 123). Hence, “we” canwell be a material substance having also psychical properties. But what mate-rial substance are we? As already seen, we cannot be our body, since this isan ens successivum22, whereas a person is not (Chisholm 1989, pp. 124-5 OnMetaphysics, pp.124-5):

[T]he theory does not imply that there is certain matter that isincorruptible. It implies rather that there are certain material things–in all probability, certain material particles or subparticles– that areincorrupted and remain incorrupted as long as the person survives.The theory would be, then, that I am literally identical with someproper part of this macroscopic body, some intact, nonsuccessivepart that has been in this larger body all along. This part is hardlylikely to be the Luz bone, of course; more likely, it would be some-thing of a microscopic nature, and presumably something that islocated within the brain. (On Metaphysics, Chisholm 1989, p. 126).

22 An ens successivum is an entity which is made up of different things at different times. Anens nonsuccessivum is an individual thing that is not made up of different things at differenttimes.


2. According to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, on the other hand, the materialsubstance constituting a body can become the vehicle of experience of its guest,the subject, which is intrinsically linked to it through its karman. In sum, thematerial body is the result of mental properties like the good or bad actions(intended by Mīmāṃsakas as initiations of actions and not as body movements)done in one’s past. One’s psychic properties are immediately and necessarilylinked to a body, since one intrinsically desires fruition and, consequently, strivesfor action. The two action and fruition, in fact, originate in the psyche, but needa body in order to be performed.

One’s link to a single body is secured by karman.3. Chisholm’s position entails that there are as many persons as there are

brains. The fact that the subject is considered as absolutely non-material inPrābhākara Mīmāṃsā leads it, in order to ensure the possibility of its contactwith the present body and the future ones, to admit its all-pervasiveness. But, ifit is all pervasive, than why should not one argue, as with the Advaita Vedānta(and other schools, such as the Śaiva Pratyabhijñā one), that there is only onesubject? This claim is refuted on the ground of the diversity of, for instance,one’s own pain from someone else’s one and, more in general, because it iscounter-intuitive. The existence of other subjects (ātman) is admitted throughinference out of the efforts (or initiations of actions, prayatna) one sees in otherbodies23.

3.3 Concluding remarks on the ontological interpretation:Peculiarities of the Prābhākara position

In sum, the subject is the substrate of desires and actions (including amongthem knowledge). It grounds the validity of our notion of an enduring self, of“ownership” in regard to our thoughts, feelings and desires, and of memory.

At this point, one might argue: how can the establishment of an agent-selfinfluence the establishment of a knower-self? The same might be argued inregard to the emotional-self. Apart from the hermeneutical answer discussedabove, §2.4, Prābhākaras try to bridge the first and the last one by claiming thatspontaneous desire (that is, passion, rāga, not “resolution”, cetanā or saṃkalpa)leads one to action. Naiyāyikas add knowledge as a necessary intermediate step(knowledge-will-action) in order to involve the knower-self, too, but risk in thisway to under-estimate the emotional-aspect. The agent-aspect also tends to beunder-estimated in many Indian philosophical schools (most of all in Sāṅkhyā,see Watson 2006, pp. 90-92, Torella 1994, Bronkhorst 1996, pp. 611-618).

Maybe, Prābhākaras stressed the agent- and the emotional-self because theseare the aspects we are more immediately aware of? One might perceive a patchof blue as such (not necessarily affected by the fact that I am perceiving it),whereas desire and action are necessarily felt as one’s own (see also infra, p.24).This question leads me to the next section.

23 For the whole inference, see Freschi forthcoming.

4 The phenomenological interpretation 21

4 The phenomenological interpretation

First of all, do at all Classical schools of Indian Philosophy distinguish betweenPhenomenology and Ontology? They surely lack a terminological distinction.

Prabhākara’s (and the general Indian) habit of writing comentaries insteadof “treatises” may also fail to convey additional information on this.

However, in many cases schools oppose one another exactly because theyerroneously interpret as metaphysical/ontological a statement which was notmeant to be one.

For a Mīmāṃsā example, let me recall the Prābhākara account of the pre-scriptive character of the Veda. Prābhākaras say that the content of the Vedais always something to be realised and never something which is already there.Hence, it would not be correct to interpret it along the lines of our descriptivereading of language.

Similarly, the link between subject and desire emerges not out of investiga-tions on the ontology of the subject, but as the pragmatic consequence of itsDasein in the world (in this world and not in all possible worlds).

In sum, a non-ontological stance is possible, although hard to ascertain,apart from indirect elements. In the present case, it might be suggested thatthe usage of ātman tends to mark an ontological argumentation, whereas puruṣais more generically employed in the sense of “person”, that is, as defining thekind of beings we all identify with, without taking into account the problem oftheir link to a material body, their duration, etc.

A further hint to a phenomenological orientation of the Prābhākara accountof the subject may lie in its appraisal of the pain-argument. Whereas it can beconceived that the contents of epistemic experiences are not necessarily relatedto an individuality, since they can be conceived as universally valid, indepen-dent of a particular subject, in the case of the contents of pain- or pleasure-experiences their subject-dependence is hardly deniable (since not everythingwhich is pleasant to one is pleasant to anyone else). Hence, pain-experiencesare used by Prābhākaras against the idea of a single Self which only due toillusion appears as divided into many concrete individuals. In his Tattvāloka,Śālikanātha writes:

Like in a single body the distinction among the sensation referringto a foot, etc., does not get confused, in the same way in severalbodies it will not get confused. In fact, a sensation referring tothe foot does not [occur] in the head, nor does a sensation referringto the head [occur] in the foot. Nor is it possible to say that asensation inheres only in a foot [or other parts of one’s body andnot in a distinct subject], since these [body parts] are not conscious(a-jña). In fact, a conscious subject (jñātṛ) is [necessarily] connectedwith the sensations, since these have the form of a specific pain [andpain can only be felt by a conscious subject]. Hence the ancientssay that this (belief that the pain is in the foot or the head) is adelusion [typical] of childish people. [One says] “In my foot there is


a (painful) sensation”, “In my head there is a (painful) sensation”:in all sensations a single afflicted one appears. And the connectionwith pitta and the other [qualities whose unbalance causes diseases]is not contradictory even in case of unconscious [body parts] such asthe foot. The distress (duḥkha born out of this [qualities’ unbalance],[on the other hand,] inheres only in the self 24.

Let us assume that this phenomenological alternative is correct and that Prāb-hākaras did not intend primarily to describe the ontology of the subject.

In fact, the characters of activeness and desire seem interesting marks torecognise someone as a subject and, hence, as someone who has potentially theright and also the responsibility (I am using both terms to translate adhikāra)to act. Moreover, they are even more so in case one speaks from the point ofview of what a subject thinks of herself. Indeed, for a subject its being desirousis evident (that is, empirically certain25), whereas, e.g., its ontological structure(as distinct from mind and sense-faculties, to name just one example) is not.

In sum, the Prābhākara account may point primarily to:

1. one’s feeling of oneself (as desiring, active, endowed with free will),

2. the emergence of one’s concept of oneself through the fact that one hasbeen enjoined to do something,

3. the emergence of a social concept of the subject through its social role insacrifice.

(Points 2 and 3 explicitly echo the titles of two books on Emmanuel Lév-inas26.)

24 yathaikasminn eva śarīre pādādivedanāvyavasthā na vyatikīryate, tathā nānāśarīreṣu navyatikariṣyata iti! na hi pādagatā vedanā śirasi, na vā śirogatā vedanā pāde. na ca vedanāpādādiṣv eva samavaitīti śakyate vaktum, teṣām ajñatvāt. jñātā hi vedanābhis saha sambad-hyate, duḥkhaviśeṣarūpatvāt tāsām iti. tad idaṃ bālajanamohanam iti vṛddhāḥ. “pāde mevedanā, śirasi me vedaneti” sarvavedanāsv eko duḥkhī prakāśate. Pādādiṣu tu santāpādikaṃsamavaiti. […] acetanānām api padādīnāṃ pittādisaṃyogo na virudhyate. tajjanyaṃ duḥkhamātmany eva samavaiti. (PrP, pp. 345-6). Even in this passage, especially because of the con-clusive remark on pitta, etc., ontology and phenomenology tend to be conflated.

25 Chisholm summarizes his view of what is “empirically certain” as follows: «I said thata proposition is empirically certain for a given subject S provided that the proposition isone that is (a) contingent, (b) such that accepting it is epistemically preferable for S towithholding it, and (c) there is no contingent proposition i such that accepting i is morereasonable for S then accepting the proposition in question. Then I said: “Propositions thatare empirically certain, in this sense, will be propositions about what are traditionally called’states of mind’ –propositions about thinking, feeling, and believing. No proposition that isempirically certain for a given subject S will imply the existence of any person other than S.If I am not in pain, then the proposition someone is in pain cannot be empirically certainfor me” (R.M. Chisholm, Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies, in Ernest Sosa (ed.),The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, vols.7/8 of Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1979,p. 324. Chisholm’s own quote comes from “The Self and the World” in Wittgenstein andhis Impact on Contemporary Thought, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna 1978, pp. 407-410, p.410.)

26 Ulrich Dickmann, Subjektivität als Verantwortung and Stephan Moebius, Die soziale Kon-stituierung des Anderen.


From this point of view, it would be beside the point to argue against thisperspective from the standpoint of the ontology of the subject and, e.g., of braincells, since a better understanding of how the brain works would not change theway we feel about ourselves (as, e.g., endowed with free will and activity).

The underlying assumption is that the Prābhākara account of the subjectas niyojya highlights, on a personal level, one’s recognising one’s own desiringnature. On the other hand, on an external level, one’s nature of subject inits ethical and social significance is constituted through one’s being enjoined tosacrifice. It did not pre-exist the injunction. As explained by Ian Kaplow, one’sfeeling of oneself (and, even more so, of oneself as a subject) is not innate:

Zudem heißt dies, daß Wesen mit mentalen Ereignissen (zumind-est diejenigen, die in der Welt ihr mentales Instrumentarium er-folgreich intentional einsetzen) auch ein propriozeptives “Gefühl”haben: Sie können unterscheiden zwischen dem, was zu ihnen selbstgehört, und dem, was nicht Ich ist. Es sollte in diesem Zusam-menhang erwähnt werden, daß diese Leistung keineswegs selbstver-ständlich zu sein scheint; falls Propriozeption tatsächlich angemessenals ”Gefühl” bezeichnet werden kann, darf sie nicht als ”unmittel-bar” oder ”gegeben” hingenommen werden. Die Tatsache, daß z.B.menschliche Babys dieses “Gefühl” erst erlernen müssen, weist da-rauf hin, daß Propriozeption eine Leistung ist, die einen komplexerenApparat an kognitiven Vorgängen voraussetzt (Ian Kaplow, S.72).

I am suggesting that, within the history of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, this “proprio-perception” of oneself as subject first occurred through Vedic injunctions enjoin-ing a desirous one to act.

4.1 Which kind of proprioperception arises through a Vedicprescription?

Several thinkers, especially the ones trained also in Phenomenology, have stressedthe primitive character of inter-subjectivity27. The world we experience, theyargue, is not made of monads who later connect to each other. Rather, ourDasein in the world consists of an inter-subjective experience, out of whichone can, at a later stage, insulate a single “I” or “thou”. In this sense, thefact that the Prābhākara agent does not become aware of itself on its own issignificant. It becomes aware of itself insofar as s/he is enjoined. The Vedic pre-scriptions do not single him/her out of many with a “Thou”, but insofar as theyidentify him/her with his/her salient characteristic, namely, his/her desire forsomething. The Prābhākara agent is, hence, from its very beginning, part of acomplex world of relations, with a text (an Authority), with desired goals, withits own desiring nature. Immediately thereafter, the whole world of pragmaticrelations intervenes with sacrificial roles and acts.

27 Mohanty 1970, p. 101, Olivetti2007.


P.T. Raju (Raju 1994, p. 165) is somehow sceptical about the fact that forPrabhākara the subject (ātman is not apprehended as an “I”, as it happensfor Kumārila (see infra, p.14) but rather only out of the Veda. This givennessof the subject only through a prescription (the Veda is essentially prescriptiveaccording to Prabhākara) is however significant for the non-isolation of thesubject since the moment it is apprehended.

4.2 The two interpretations in RāmānujācāryaRāmānujācārya, seems to presuppose a self (called ātman or puruṣa) which isactive (cf. TR IV §11.6.2) and includes knowledge among its possible activities(cf. TR IV §3.11.1). The above analysis seems to allow the conclusion that itis also intrinsically desiring.

4.2.1 Body and subject and the three aspects of subjectivity: IsRāmānujācārya’s a phenomenological interpretation?

The stress on action and desire may have some advantages in order to solve theconundrum of the link between an immaterial subject and “its” body.

But in what respect can desire and action be more suitable to connect one toone’s body and to one’s feeling of subjectivity than, for instance, consciousnessand knowledge? “Knowledge” can designate either the act of knowing something(and in this case it is included in action) or a general state of awareness (andin this case it is included in consciousness). Consciousness, cit, is consideredby many authors as the inner nature of the self. It is, however, unsuitable tolink it to a body, a social world, an individual subjectivity, exactly because itlacks intentionality (in Brentano’s sense of “being directed to something else”).Moreover, even if compared to knowledge in the first sense, the intentionalcontents of desire and effort directly involve the fact that one perceives themas related to oneself (Pramāṇavāda authors speak, in this regard, of a grāhyaand a grāhaka aspect within the act of desiring —that is, the desired objectand the desire itself— but this is strongly counterintuitive in denying the chainhinted at above, p.10). In short, it is probably not a case that Pramāṇavādaauthors started from knowledge in order to deconstruct the necessity of a knowerindependent of the act of knowledge and then expanded the argument to thefield of desire, action, etc., where also only an act is deemed to exist. And itis not a case that Rāmānujācārya, on the other hand, starts with desire, wherethe first-person perspective imposes itself as unavoidable on a phenomenologicallevel and then generalises the existence of a subject in action and knowledge (asa kind of action), arguing that there is something extra (atiśaya, see below) in“my” knowledge, which distinguishes it from “a knowledge”. In fact, although itmight be argued that “mineness” comes in degrees (so Metzinger 2003, chap.6)or that it is illusory, it is hard to deny that there is a fundamental differencebetween “a desire” and “my desire” and that it is, hence, hard to be persuadedthat nothing more than the action of desire exists (and that the mine-part is


just a component within it)28.More in detail: Prābhākaras argue (see PrP, TĀ, Śā around p.328 CHECK)

that a knower separate from knowledge is necessary in order to distinguishone’s own knowledge and the others’ ones. But, a Pramāṇavādin might argue,it is enough to specify –instead of the self-existence of the knower– the timeand space where this cognitive act takes place. This cannot happen in the samesatisfactorily way in the case of desire, where time and space still cannot explainthe intrinsic difference between “hunger” and “my hunger”.

Lastly, how are action and desire apprehended? And how is the subject whois endowed with them? The self (ātman) is only inferable according to manyNyāya authors. On the contrary, the Bhāṭṭas (and some Naiyāyikas), maintainthat it is apprehended as the “I” in every cognition (through mānasapratyakṣa).The Prābhākaras, as already hinted at, distinguish between the knower andthe agent/desiring/(experiencing) aspect. The first one appears within everycognition act:

In the same way, the self is not mind-perceptible, as there would acontradiction between the agent’s and the object’s condition. Thedenomination “I know myself” is on the other hand metaphorical.But, when the objects are illuminated, [the self] becomes evident be-cause it is the substratum of cognition. Whatever cognition (saṃvid)is three times illuminating. The experience (anubhava) of the knower(gen. ogg.) is necessarily present among the experiences of theknowable contents. Since otherwise there would be no superiority(atiśaya) of what has been known (saṃvid) by oneself or by someoneelse. And since it is so, it is congruous (upapad-) that [the self] isseized (upalabh-) together with the [knowledge’s] contents (viṣaya).Indeed, the self does not appear separated from the contents nor docontents appear (bhās-) if the knower does not appear. Therefore,in regard to the content (which is the self), just such a (“I knowX”) cognition (saṃvid) is a means of knowledge. And it causes theperson (puruṣa) to become a [knowledge’s] content [though not anobject]. Hence, the person is not an object (karman) although itis part of the result (phala) of that cognition. It is only an agent(kartṛ) [of cognition]29.

28 On a similar vein, although referring to experiences in general and not to desire in partic-ular, Dan Zahavi writes:

In contrast to physical objects which can exist regardless of whether or not theyde facto appear for a subject, experiences are essentially characterized by havinga subjective ‘feel’ to them, i.e., a certain (phenomenal) quality of ‘what it is like’or what it ‘feels’ to have them (Nagel 1986: 15-16; Jackson 1982; James 1890:I/478). Whereas the object of my perceptual experience is intersubjectivelyaccessible in the sense that it can in principle be given to others in the same waythat it is given to me, my perceptual experience itself is only given directly tome. It is this first-personal givenness of the experience which makes it subjective(Zahavi 2000, p. 60).

29 tathā ātmā ca na mānasapratyakṣaḥ. karmakartṛbhāvavirodhāt. ”māṃ jānāmi” iti vya-

5 Conclusion 26

Noteworthily, then, the knower is not known through focusing on oneselfand away from worldly experience. On the contrary, it (just like the agent- andthe emotional-subject) are apprehended within worldly experience, as a part ofit.

The agent/desiring aspect is, instead, known through a Vedic prescription.I suggested above that the immediate availability of the knower aspect may beuseful insofar as it enables one to insert the knower aspect within the newlyapprehended oneself (see supra, §2.4).

More in general, TR II (dedicated to ontology) does not explicitly endorsethe defence of the subject I attributed here to its author. However, the chapteris the shortest one in TR and seems to be nothing more than a summary ofearlier views on disparate themes (from jāti to obscurity, from Brahminhood toplants’ bodies). Possibly, its author was mostly interested in hermeneutical andepistemological matters and, if my opinion is correct, dealt even with “ontolog-ical” problems, such as the existence of a subject, from these points of view.In this sense, Rāmānujācārya’s approach diverges from Śālikanātha’s one, whodirectly deals with the ātman-defence in his PrP TĀ. Śālikanātha’s view seems,in fact, more “ontologically” grounded. For instance, manas is analysed; it isdistinguished from ātman and the qualities of the latter are said to arise due toa contact of the eternal ātman with manas (PrP Tā, Śā p.330CHECK).

5 Conclusion

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā subject did not emerge out of an epistemologicaldiscussion, but rather out of hermeneutic concerns. More in detail, it emergedas the enjoined person referred to in svargakāmo yajeta. It owns desires andis responsible of actions. Both of them are immediately grasped through one’sinner awareness. And both actions and desire make the subject immediatelyaware of the body which is the only chance for it to experience the world.Hence, although on the ontological level the Prābhākara metaphysics may notimprove much on the general Indian (but not Buddhist or Jaina) account of asubject different from its body but linked to it through karman, a phenomeno-logical interpretation of the Prābhākara view may shed some light on the Indianand Western troublesome link between two distinct and yet connected entities.Moreover, the Prābhākara approach does not ground an isolated self, but rathera subject which becomes aware of itself when a text (the Veda) enjoins it to dosomething, does connecting it from the outset to action, to a social scenario (thesacrifice) with other agents, and to an order pronounced by an Other.

padeśas tu bhāktaḥ. kin tu viṣayeṣu prakāśamāneṣu jñānāśrayatayā prakāśate. sarvāpisaṃvit tritayaprakāśikā. avaśyaṃ jñātur anubhavo meyānubhaveṣv anuvartate. anyathā sva-parasaṃvedyayor anatiśayaḥ syāt. viṣayais sahopalambhaniyamaś ca evaṃ saty upapannaḥ.na hy ātmā viṣayānanuviddho ’vabhāsate viṣayāś ca boddhary anavabhāsamāne bhāsante. tas-māt saiva saṃvid viṣaye pramāṇam. saiva puruṣaṃ viṣayīkarotīti tatsaṃvittiphalabhāgitve’pi puruṣasya na karmatā. kartṛtaiva (TR II, p. 17). Cf. also PrP TĀ Śā p.334.

6 Primary sources 27

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