CVO Poly BD Contractor CVO Poly BD Contractor Fatality Fatality Final Report Final Report
CVO Poly BD Contractor FatalityCVO Poly BD Contractor Fatality
Final ReportFinal Report
Event Chronology (8/12/2006 in PolyBD at CVO) A night contract crew consisting of a supervisor, a crane operator and two multi
craft persons worked to finish piping on an exchanger.
Prior to starting the job, the crew: Discussed the job and assignments were given Signed work permit and EID (Energy Isolation Device) lockout form The two multicraftpersons filled out JSA (Job Safety Analysis) but did not
review with supervisor or crane operator Crane operator completed a lift form and did not review with crew
Multicraftperson 1 was the only crewmember to go to the 3rd level to assess the needs of the job.
Crew supervisor rigged the spool piece on the ground for the two multicraft persons on the exchanger deck.
Event Chronology(8/12/2006 in PolyBD at CVO)
The supervisor and crane operator were blind to the final location. All communications were by radio.
As the spool piece was lowered, a structural member obstructed the rigging and the spool piece could not be set in place.
A decision was made by the multicraftpersons on the deck to adjust the rigging by setting the spool piece on the exchanger shell. This was not communicated to the crane operator or crew supervisor.
The pipe was to be secured by putting an aligning bar in the spool piece bolt hole and through the exchanger flange bolt hole.
Simulation of Piping Spool Location Simulation of Piping Spool Location
Aligning bar installed to secure the piping spool
Piping spool was lowered to the exchanger shell to allow the slings to be moved by the multicraft persons
Event Chronology(8/12/2006 in PolyBD at CVO)
The spool piece was lowered to the exchanger shell, the L shaped piece lifted its flange away from the exchanger flange. This left the spool piece being held by the tapered end of the bar.
As multicraftperson 1 walked back towards the exchanger flange, the crane end of the spool piece slid down his side of the exchanger. This dropped the end more and released the tapered bar from the exchanger flange.
The spool piece then traveled down the north side of the exchanger and struck multicraftperson 1 resulting in a fatal injury.
Structural member interference during the lift
Fatally injured contractorwas struck
Causal Factors
Contractor Expectations
Contractor did not enforce requirements for JSA
No training program for riggers and competent persons
The contractor did not have a rigging training program for employees.
Lift plan guideline
The Lyondell lifting guideline does not specifically address rigging and lift path issues.
Structure not fully removed during demolition
The overhead crane structure was only partially demolished and the remaining structure can provide an obstruction when installing the exchanger piping
1. Contract company is required to present a plan to CVO/Lyondell to cover corrective actions regarding training, JSA improvements and safe work practices accountability.
2. Establish contract requirements for rigger and competent person.
3. Develop an OE crane and rigging procedure that includes the appropriate elements of above and below the hook guidelines (EG 1016 and EG 1017).
4. Evaluate the removal of overhead structure.
5. Put a process in place to document key learnings from lifting activities into safe job plans for future.
Recommendation(s) / Corrective Actions
Incident Incident
Basic Design
Safety systems(Permits, JSA,
etc…)
Individual jobknowledge
Deficiencies (holes)Deficiencies (holes) in the layers of in the layers of
protection that prevent protection that prevent an incidentan incident
Decisionmaking
Key Learning
Safety Culture
Safety Culture
Hazards
Hazards
“Swiss-cheese” Model For Layers of Protection
Media & Community Response
Media interest high, actual coverage was sparse
Company response was quick and accurate
Media statements updated regularly
Message disseminated to key stakeholders
Plant telephone information hotline updated
Minimal interest from local residents
Leadership Key Decisions
Multiple HRGs responded to man the EOC
EAP contacted
Determined amount of counselors
Identified EAP location
Split resources to have HR support in EOC and field
Provided EAP support to StarCon workers
Provided EAP resources to the site
Visible Leadership