Top Banner
Muhammad Rizwan Asghar September 4, 2020 ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b COMPSCI 316 Cyber Security
21

ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Oct 15, 2020

Download

Documents

dariahiddleston
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Slide title

In CAPITALS

50 pt

Slide subtitle

32 pt

Muhammad Rizwan Asghar

September 4, 2020

ACCESS CONTROL

Lecture 18b

COMPSCI 316

Cyber Security

Page 2: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

2

FOCUS OF THIS LECTURE

Identify access control requirements

Know access control elements

Understand access control systems

Page 3: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

3

AUTHORISATION

A process of granting rights or permissions to a

system entity to provide access to a given

resource

Also known as Access Control

Page 4: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

4

ACCESS CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

Reliable inputs

– Authenticated entities

E.g., using UPI and password

– Genuine information

E.g., a student or staff member

Least privilege

– Principle of least privileges deals with granting the minimum

set of access rights to do a job

– For instance, accessing a single course vs all courses

Administrative duties– Only a special entity should be able to manage access

rights

– For instance, granting, revoking, or updating access rights

Page 5: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

5

ACCESS CONTROL ELEMENTS

Subject– An entity that can access objects

– It could be a user or process representing a

user/application

Object– An entity that needs to be protected

– E.g., files, directories, or other resources

Access right– An access right r ∈ R describes how a subject s ∈ S can

access an object o ∈ O

– E.g., read, write, execute, create, delete, and search

Page 6: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

6

ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM

Access control function f(s, o, r)– It looks up access right r for the combination (s, o)

– On a successful match, it grants access, otherwise not

Security administrator– An entity that manages access rights

Auditor– An entity that inspects the whole authorisation system

Page 7: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

7

A TYPICAL ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM

Auditor

User

Access

control

functionResources

Security

Administrator

Access Rights

Page 8: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

8

ACCESS CONTROL MODELS

Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

Usage Control (UCON)

Policy-Based Access Control (PBAC)

Page 9: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

9

DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

Users can protect what they own

The owner may grant access to subjects

Access is granted based on identity of the

requester

These mechanisms are adequate for honest

users

Vulnerable to Trojan horses

DAC is used in operating systems

– E.g., Linux file permissions: rwxr-x--x

Page 10: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

10

ACCESS CONTROL MATRIX

Own

Read

Write

Own

Read

Write

Read

Own

Read

Write

Write Read

Read

WriteRead

Own

Read

Write

Alice

Bob

Charlie

File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4

Page 11: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

11

ACCESS CONTROL LIST

Own

Read

Write

Own

Read

Write

Read

Own

Read

Write

Write Read

Read

WriteRead

Own

Read

Write

File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4

Alice

Bob

Charlie

Page 12: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

12

CAPABITILITY LIST

Own

Read

Write

Own

Read

Write

Read

Own

Read

Write

Write Read

Read

WriteRead

Own

Read

Write

File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4

Alice

Bob

Charlie

Page 13: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

13

ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

RBAC maps roles to access rights

Supports complex access control

Reduces errors in administration

Ease of administration– Move users in and out of roles

– Move permissions in and out of roles

– Very flexible

Least privilege– Restricts access according to needs

– Separation of duties through constraints

Page 14: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

14

RBAC MODEL

User– Typically a human being

Permissions– Approval of a mode of access to some object

Roles– Job title

Assignments– User-role and role-perm

Session– Mapping of users to roles

Constraints– Sessions, assignments, and roles

Page 15: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

15

CORE RBAC

Permissions represent what operations can be performed on

objects

Roles are assigned permissions: Permission Assignment (PA)

Users are assigned roles: User Assignment (UA)

Session is a mapping between a user and an activated subset of

assigned roles

Users Roles Operations Objects

Permissions

User Assignment

(UA)

Permission Assignment (PA)

Sessions

Revised image, originally from: Secure Systems Research Group at the Florida Atlantic University

Page 16: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

16

RBAC EXAMPLE

ClerkIssue

ManagerApprove

Purchase

Order (PO)

Bob

Alice

Bob, Clerk

Alice, Manager

Session

Page 17: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

17

SAMPLE QUESTION

Which one of the following statements is TRUE?

a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived

from an access control matrix

b) Capability list cannot be derived from an

access control matrix

c) Both ACLs and capability lists can be derived

from an access control matrix

d) None of the above

Page 18: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

18

SAMPLE QUESTION: ANSWER

Which one of the following statements is TRUE?

a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived

from an access control matrix

b) Capability list cannot be derived from an

access control matrix

c) Both ACLs and capability lists can be derived

from an access control matrix

d) None of the above

Answer) c

Page 19: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

19

SUMMARY

Access control models should follow the

principle of least privileges

DAC is vulnerable to Trojan horses

RBAC model is widely used

– E.g., Canvas

Page 20: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

20

RESOURCES

Read Chapter 4 of

Computer Security: Principles and Practice

Fourth Edition

William Stallings and Lawrie Brown

Pearson Higher Ed USA

ISBN 1292220635

Sandhu, Ravi S., Edward J. Coyne, Hal L. Feinstein,

and Charles E. Youman, Role-Based Access Control

Models, Computer 2 (1996): 38-47 [Download link]

Page 21: ACCESS CONTROL Lecture 18b - cs.auckland.ac.nz · a) Access Control Lists (ACLs) cannot be derived from an access control matrix b) Capability list cannot be derived from an access

Top right

corner for

field

customer or

partner logotypes.

See Best practice

for example.

Slide title

40 pt

Slide subtitle

24 pt

Text

24 pt

5

20 pt

21

Questions?

Thanks for your attention!