Acar Talking about God and Creation 2005.pdf

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHYTHEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

Texts and Studies

EDITED BY

H. DAIBER and D. PINGREE

VOLUME LVIII

TALKING ABOUT GODAND

TALKING ABOUT CREATION

Avicenna-'s and Thomas Aquinas-' positions

BY

RAHIMACAR

BRILLLEIDEN . BOSTON

2005

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Acar, Rahim.Talking about God and talking about creation: Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas'

positions / by Rahim Acar.p. cm. - (Islamic philosophy, theology, and science; v. 58)

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 90-04-14477-3 (alk. paper)1. Avicenna, 980-1037. 2. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274. 3. God

Comparative studies. 4. Creation-Comparative studies. 5. God-History ofdoctrines. 6. Creation-History of doctrines. 1. Title. H. Series.

B751.Z7A352005213'.092'2-dc22

2005050724

ISSN 0169-8729ISBN 900414477 3

© Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NI{ Leiden, The NetherlandsKoninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers,

Martinus Niyhoff Publishers and VS?

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .

Introduction .

PART ONE: TALKING ABOUT GOD

Chapter One Theological Language and PhilosophicalAssessment .Avicenna's Theory of Theological Language ..

We Cannot Know and Name God in Himself .God Is Known through Creation ..God Has Negative and Positive Relations to

Creation .God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from

Creation .Perfections Are Predicated of God and Creation

according to Tashkfk .Aquinas' Theory of Theological Language , .

We Cannot Know God's Essence ..God Is Known through Creation ..God Has Negative and Positive Properties .God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from

Creatures .Perfections Are Predicated of God Analogically .

The Use of the Negative Element in Aquinas' Position .Conclusion of Chapter One .

Chapter Two Conception of God and TheologicalLanguage .Avicenna's Conception of Divine Formal Features

and Divine Knowledge .God Is Simple ..God Is Necessary and Immutable ..

IX

25262628

30

34

3641424446

48505475

79

818186

VI CONTENTS CONTENTS vu

Bibliography .Primary Literature ..Secondary Literature ..

Causes Necessitate Their Effects .Causes and Their Effects co-Exist .The co-Existence of Causes and Their Effects Does

not Require that They Be Equal .The Efficient Cause Is the Cause only of the

Existence of Its Effect .Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe ..

The First Argument: Time and Temporal BeginningAre not Applicable to All Things ..

The Second Argument: Temporal PosteriorityRequires a Change in God .

The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leadsto Impossible Conclusions ..

Aquinas' Position .What Is Creation? ..Creation Is not a Change .Creation as the Relation between God and the

Universe .Real Relations of God ..How God Is Related to the World .

The Sempiternity of the Universe Is Possible but notNecessary .

Countering Avicenna's Arguments for the Sempiternityof the Universe ..Countering the First Argument .Countering the Second Argument ..Countering the Third Argument ..

Remarks on Arguments Concerning Sempiternity ..Conclusion of Chapter Four ..

..................................................................................

God Is Eternal .God Knows Creatures as well as Himself .

Aquinas' Conception of Divine Formal Featuresand Divine Knowledge .God Is Simple .God Is Necessary and Immutable ..God Is Eternal .God Knows Creatures as well as Himself ..

Theological Language Revisited: Talking AboutGod in the Light of Divine Formal Features .

Conclusion of Chapter Two .

PART Two: TALKING ABOUT CREATION

Chapter Three The Nature of Creative Action .Avicenna's Position: Creation is Voluntary and

Necessary .Interpretation of Avicenna's Position ..God Creates by Will not by Nature .God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe .Objections Revisited .

Aquinas' Position: Creation is Voluntary andHypothetically Necessary .God Creates by Will not by Nature ..God's Will Is Simple: God primarily and essentially

Wills Himself .God Freely Wills the Universe ..God Has Free Choice .Is the Universe Necessary? .

Talking About Creation: Necessity or HypotheticalNecessity .

Conclusion of Chapter Three .

Chapter Four The Beginning of the Universe .Avicenna's Position .

What Is Creation? .Creation Is not a Change .Creation as the Relation between God and the

Universe .

8993

101101105108113

119126

131

132133136140146

149150

155156159162

164167

169170170172

173

Conclusion

Index of AuthorsIndex of Topics

........................................................................

..........................................................................

176177

181

182185

186

189

193197198200

201201204

210

213213216222225228

231

235235236

243245

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study has grown out of my doctoral dissertation comparingAvicenna's and Aquinas' positions on creation. Throughout the processI have received support and encouragement from many people.During the dissertation stage, David Burrell's guidance led me toidentifY the roots of the apparent differences between Avicenna's andThomas Aquinas' understandings of creative action. I appreciatedhis insights as well as his thoughtful and quick comments on mydrafts. Steven Brown's assistance in the subtle details of medievalChristian philosophy helped clarify my arguments. He gave generously of his time and provided me with constant encouragement.Sarah Coakley's attention to the finer points of my discussion as wellas to its scope and shape was very valuable and her deep interestin the philosophy of religion inspired me, as did her encouragementto contribute to this field. Wolfhart Heinrichs assisted me with themore difficult Arabic translations. Robert Wisnovsky was a constantconversation partner throughout, paying close attention to my arguments and helping me to present a more balanced and hopefullymore persuasive discussion.

I am grateful to Hans Daiber for encouraging me to revise andpublish my dissertation. He read the manuscript and made helpfulcomments and suggestions to improve it. I would like to also thankto Caner Dagli for copy-editing the manuscript. Without his helpthe text would be drier and more ambiguous.

Among many other professors whose support I greatly appreciateare William A. Graham, Bekir Karliga and Necip Taylan. My friendshave provided me with thoughtful conversation and warm companionship. I am grateful to them for their support in different waysand at different stages of this work.

Although I would not have finished this work without the contributions of those mentioned here, I bear sole responsibility for itsshortcomings.

A part of chapter 3, concerning Avicenna's position regarding thenature of creative action appeared in The Muslim World, 94/1 (2004),

x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

pp. 65-79. Thanks are due to the editors of The Muslim World forpermitting me to include it here with some revision. Finally, mythanks go to Trudy Kamperveen for all the work she has donetoward the publication of this study in the IPTS series at Brill.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is to study the positions of Avicenna andThomas Aquinas regarding theological language and creation. Whenbeginning to research this project, my sole intention was to comparetheir positions concerning (1) the nature of the divine creative actionand (2) the eternity vs. temporal beginning of the universe. Duringthe process of research, it became clear that a statement of theirpositions regarding theological language must precede the discussionof their position regarding creation. Thus the study at hand is dividedinto two parts. In the first part, which comprises the discussion concerning their position regarding theological language, I tried first toanswer the question whether their positions can be philosophicallyassessed and second to provide a statement of their conceptions ofdivine attributes insofar as they are related to the discussion of creation. The first issue requires discussion, especially since scholarsinterested in Thomas Aquinas' thought have expressed their worriesif Aquinas' theological views should be subject to philosophical assessment. By having such a discussion, I intended to establish thatAvicenna's and Aquinas' positions are equally open to philosophicalscrutiny.

A concise statement of their conceptions of divine attributes is crucial not only for understanding their positions regarding theologicallanguage, but also for comparing their positions regarding the natureof creative action and the beginning of the universe. It is crucial forunderstanding their positions regarding theological language, sincetheir conceptions of divine formal features modify their conceptionof theological language respectively. At the beginning, it seemed tome that I needed to state their conceptions of divine perfection properties, or attributes, in order trace whether their positions regardingthe two question concerning creation can be assessed on the basisof their conceptions of God. That is, if they had a common conception of God, then either Avicenna's position or Aquinas' positionon these two questions would be more in conformity. Or if they hadimportant differences regarding their conceptions of God, then thedifference between their answers to these questions could be tracedto the difference between their conceptions of God. However, during

2 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 3

my work I found that discussion of their conceptions of divine attributes was crucial not simply as a criterion to check the compatibility of their answers to their positions regarding the nature of thecreative action and the beginning of the universe. But it also provided an important guideline to understand their statements on theseIssues.

Introducing OJlestions concemzng Creation

Historical Background

The questions concerning the nature of creative action and the beginning of the universe had occupied the sharpest minds long beforeAvicenna and Aquinas. In arguing for their positions regarding thosequestions, Avicenna and Aquinas continue traditions that were shapedlong before them. They share some of the sources, which contributedto the development of their own and opposing positions, althougheach also has sources which were not available to the other. Amongthese common sources are Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Proclus. I

Besides these common sources influencing their discussions of creation-though not necessarily determining their positions-they alsohad predecessors whose interpretation of the classical sources influencedthem. For Avicenna, besides these figures from the ancient andHellenistic philosophy, al-Farabf seems to be a source of influence. 2

I 77ze Book qf Causes, which was translated from the Arabic, Xitab fi al-Khayr alMabd, into Latin was attributed to Aristotle. However, it was mostly derived fromProclus' Elements qf 77zeology. Vincent A. Guagliardo, "Introduction," in St. 77zomasAquinas: Commentary on the Book qf Causes, trans. Vincent A. Guagliardo et alii(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1996), pp. 9~32. Proclus,77ze Elements qf 77zeology, trans. & comm. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963).See also Richard C. Taylor, "Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the Metaphysicsof Being and Actuality," Journal qf the History qfIdeas 59 (1998), pp. 217~239. However,the Book qf Causes may indicate indirect connection between Avicenna and Aquinaswith regard to their common Neoplatonic sources. The Plotiniana Arabica, which wasavailable to Avicenna, was not translated into Latin. However, the Book qf Causes,which was available to and commented on by Aquinas, indicates the debt of itsauthor to the Plotiniana Arabica. The author of the Book qf Causes diverges fromProclus, modifies the ideas taken from Proclus' Elements qf 77zeology in the light ofthe material contained in the Plotiniana Arabica. Richard Taylor, op. cit., pp. 222~225.

2 See for al-Farabf's refutation of John Philoponus' criticism of Aristotle concerning the eternity of the universe, Muhsin Mahdi, "Alfarabi against Philoponus,"Journal qf Near Eastern Studies 26 (1967), pp. 233~260.

John Philoponus and early Muslim theologians can also be considered among Avicenna's sources, not in the sense that he followedthem but in the sense that he was responding to them in constructinghis position.3 For Aquinas, on the other hand, a host of Christianauthors, such Augustine, John of Damascus, Pseudo-Dionysius andthe Jewish theologian Maimonides must be mentioned among manyothers. John Philoponus' arguments were also available to Aquinas,even though his arguments may not have always been traced to hisname.4

Avicenna may also be cited among Thomas Aquinas' sources viaAvicenna's own works and through the presentation of his ideas byothers. An important part of Avicenna's works were available in theWest within one hundred years of his death. 5 Goichon dividesAvicenna's influence in the medieval West into three periods on thebasis of the reaction it received. From the beginning of translationsof Avicenna's works into Latin until 1230, approximately one hundred years, Avicenna's theories were received with unreserved admiration. The second period begins at 1231 by the pontifical decreeauthorizing the study of Aristotle's work and those of his commentators. It lasted almost thirty years, and was characterized as an emotional reaction to the first period. The third period began around1260 through studies of Avicenna by Albert the Great, and continued in the Thomistic synthesis. Unlike the previous two periods, atthis stage Avicenna's theories were carefully studied and evaluated.6

Beyond Avicenna's own works, al-Ghazalf's works, which were translated by the translator of Avicenna's works, Gundussalinus, also served

3 For a discussion of the Kalam theories in Avicenna's thought, whether Avicennamight have been responding to Muslim theologians, see Michael E. Marmura,"Avicenna and the Kalam," in Zeitschriftfiir Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wzssenschajien,vol. 7, ed. Fuat Sezgin et alii (Frankfurt am Main: Institut fur Geschichte derArabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1992), pp. 172~206. See also Robert Wisnonsky,"Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness (shay'iyya)," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy10/2 (2000), pp. 181~221.

4 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, New York: Cornel!University, 1983), p. 202; Herbert A. Davidson, Proqfs fir Eternity, Creation and theExistence qf God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (henceforth Proqfs) (Oxford &New York: Oxford University, 1987), p. 120.

5 AmeIie-Marie Goichon, "L'influence d'Avicenne en occident," Revue de L'Institutedes Belles Lettres Arabes (Tunis) 14 (1951), pp. 374-375. Jacques Forget, "De I'influencede la philosophie arabe sur la philosophie scholastique," Revue Neo-Scholastique (Louvain)1 (1894), pp. 403-404.

6 Amelie-Marie Goichon, "L'influence d'Avicenne en occident," p. 376.


as a source to understand Avicenna's theories.? Al-Ghazalf was thoughtto be a proponent of Avicenna's philosophy, and his clear and moreaccessible rendering of Avicenna's arguments made his work moreappealing to people interested in Avicenna's thought.

Avicenna may be considered to be one of the sources of Aquinasin developing his theories regarding various aspects of creation. Onemay immediately think that Avicenna may be a source for Aquinason this issue only in negative terms, by helping Aquinas to sharpenhis views, since Aquinas mostly criticized Avicenna's theories, suchas those concerning emanation and the necessity of the universe.However, Avicenna also seems to be a positive source for Aquinasregarding his understanding of creation. For example, one may assigna part to Avicenna in Aquinas' affirmation that the relation betweenthe Creator and the universe is ultimately a relation of being, nota temporal relation. These issues will be discussed in greater detaillater.

Conception if the Beginning if the Universe

The main question regarding the relation between God and the universe concerns what the universe owes to God. What does the universe owe to God? If one stretches the meaning of creation to denotethe relation between God and the universe, we may say creation isconceived to be I) giving order, 2) giving movement, 3) giving existence after non-existence, which includes a prior non-existence, and4) simply giving existence to the universe irrespective of temporalconsiderations. Giving order and giving movement are the two alternatives that go back to ancient Greek thought, to Plato,8 and toAristotle9 respectively. The idea that the universe began to exist afternon-existence was not the way ancient philosophers preferred toexplain the existence of the universe. That the universe did not havea beginning was supported by the majority of philosophers of theancient period, including Plato and Aristotle. lO God and the uni-

7 Etienne Gilson, Les Sources Greco-Arabes de l'Agustinisme Avicennisant (Paris: J. Vrin,1930), pp. 74-76.

8 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper(Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1997), 28-29a.

9 Aristotle, Physics VIII. 1, in The Complete Works if Aristotle: The Revised O:gordTranslation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University, 1984).

10 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, ch. 15, pp. 232-252.

verse, for them, seem to exist alongside each other. The doctrine ofthe 'creation out of nothing,' as it is understood today may be seenas having arisen later "as part of the controversy of early Christianitywith philosophy."ll

Plato offers what he self-consciously refers to as a likely story ofthe creation of the physical universe. Plato asks whether the universehas always existed, or whether it began to exist. He teaches that thecosmos and all perceptible things must have begun, and they musthave been caused by the Demiurge. The Demiurge reproduces the formand the character of what is changeless, when it creates the world.Plato's discussion suggests that time and material things with chaoticmovements existed before the creation of the cosmos. The creativerole he assigns to God is to impose order on things already in existence. This is the first alternative in the quadruple division above,and it turned out to be fruitful. Later efforts at assigning a beginning to the universe either with regard to being and time, or simply with regard to being, may have been inspired by Plato's account.His account was subject to various interpretations. For example, itcould mean that time began with the ordered universe, and therewas nothing before. It could also mean that orderly time began withthe ordered cosmos, which would still leave disorderly matter, motionand time before God made it a cosmos. A third interpretation isthat Plato's talk of a beginning was simply a metaphor, and he talkedabout it only for pedagogical purposes.l 2

That everything is created by God in the sense that everythinghas a beginning seems to have been an idea that evolved over time.That is, not all Jewish and Christian philosophers, who faced theancient Greek and Neoplatonic philosophical heritage, understoodcreation in the third sense mentioned above. Except for a few people in ancient times, philosophers denied that the universe had abeginning. That the cosmos had a temporal beginning was approvedby many, who denied that matter itself had a temporal beginning.Although the idea that the material universe had a beginning wasdefended by many Jews and Christians, they were not unanimousabout it. Some of the verses in the Bible, such as Genesis I & 2,

11 Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: the Doctrine if 'Creation out if Nothing' in EarlYChristian Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. xii.

12 For a discussion of the various interpretations of Plato's account, see RichardSorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 268-276.


Job 28 and 38 were interpreted in a Platonic spirit to mean thatGod created the cosmos out of already existing matter. Philo, forexample, who lived in the first century C.E., has contradictory statements about the issue, denying a beginning once and approving itat other times. Whether prime matter had also a beginning for Philois a disputed issue among scholars. 13 Some Christians seem to haveendorsed the idea that the universe is beginningless or endless, suchas Clement (d. 215 C.E.) and Synesius of Cyrene (370/5-413/414C.E.), a view which can be traced to Platonic influence. 14

Instead of interpreting Plato's story in such a way that the cosmos has a temporal beginning and that God made it begin-as didSpeusippus and Crantor (d.e. 290 B.C)-Plotinus (e. 205-269/70C.E.) argued that matter itself had a beginning but not a temporalbeginning. 15 This interpretation meant that God was the cause of itsexistence. Thus, Plato's presentation of the relation between Godand the universe is considered in terms of being, not in terms oftime. Even Aristotle's God, at times, was considered to be the creator and sustainer of the world due in part to works, such as theTheology ifAristotle incorrectly attributed to him. Proclus' (c. 411-485C.E.) student Ammonius (c. 435/45-c. 517-26 C.E.) is consideredto have initiated the interpretation of Aristotle's position in this way,and this interpretation was endorsed by later Greek commentatorssuch as Philoponus and Simplicius, thus paving the way for effortsto harmonize Aristotelian philosophy with Christian faith. 16

In any case, Plotinus' conception of emanation seems to be thefirst comprehensive account of the dependence of the universe onits cause which does not claim that it began after non-existence.Plotinus' position exemplifies the fourth division mentioned above.Instead of employing Plato's Demiurge in the Timaeus, Plotinus offershis theory of emanation to explain the existence of the universe. He

13 See for Philo's position, Philo, De prouidentia I and 2, ed. Mireille Hadas-Lebel(Paris: 1973); Philo, De opijicio mundi, trans. & annot. R. Arnaldez (Paris: 1961) 2.7& 5.21. For a discussion of Philo's position, see Richard Sorabji, Time Creation andthe Continuum, pp. 203-209.

14 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 193-196. See also GerhardMay, Creatio Ex Nihilo: the Doctrine if 'Creation out if Nothing' in Earry Christian Thought,ch. 1, pp. 1-38.

15 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 268-272.16 Richard Sorabji, "Infinite Power Impressed: the Transformation of Aristotle's

Physics and Theology," in Aristotle Transfirmed: the Ancient Commentators and their bifluence,ed. Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1990), pp. 181-195.

replaces Plato's artisan model for the making of the cosmos-whichmay not mean the whole universe in the sense of everything otherthan God-with the nature model. In Plotinus' universe the Intellectexists as an effect of the contemplation of the One, the Soul as aneffect of the contemplation of the Intellect, and so on down to theproduction of the material world. 17

The arguments for the universe not having a beginning in thetemporal sense are linked to the explanation of the relationshipbetween the universe and its cause. Most of the arguments contending that the universe cannot have begun after non-existence aretraced back to Aristotle, who must have had Plato in mind in hisarguments for the beginninglessness of the universe. In fact, Plato'sconception of creation does not conform to the idea of creation inthe sense of giving being to all other things, nor does the beginninghe talks about cover the whole universe. And since Plato and Aristotleare considered by many Greek commentators and following generations up to modern times to have accepted God as the efficientcause of the universe, as well as a final cause, the dispute over thebeginning of the universe turns around Plotinus' conception of therelationship between God and the universe, and the question ofwhether the universe must be related to God simply in terms ofbeing or must also be related to God in temporal terms.

Philoponus interprets Plato's story to imply that time began togetherwith the ordered cosmos, and argues clearly that there was nothingbefore creation. He draws upon the authority of Aristotle for thisinterpretation. Aristotle maintained that Plato meant that the heavens and the cosmos began to exist, and that time began from there.Philoponus has an important place among those who argue that theuniverse had begun to exist. Unlike many others who were simplyresponding to arguments that the universe cannot have begun,Philoponus devised counter-arguments telling why the universe musthave begun after not having existed. He presents two sets of arguments:one based on the impossibility of an infinite number, and the other"on the principle that a finite body can contain only finite power."18

17 Plotinus, Enneads trans. S. MacKenna; third edition revised by B. S. Page(London: 1962), 111.8. Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction to Enneads (Oxford:Clarendon, 1993), pp. 70-78. See also John M. Rist, "The One of Plotinus andthe God of Aristotle," in Platonism and its Christian Heritage (London: VariorumReprints, 1985), ch. IX.

18 Herbert A. Davidson, Proqft, p. 86 ff. See also Richard Sorabji, Time Creation


His arguments have played an important role for the philosophersand theologians of Christian, Jewish as well as Muslim traditions.

Does the Universe Have a Temporal Beginning?

The arguments that the universe cannot have begun temporally afternon-existence may be divided into two groups: I) arguments basedon the nature of the world not the world as a whole but things making up the world; and 2) the perfection properties of the Creator ofthe world. Each group comprises sub-groups. One may include thearguments from the nature of time within the family of the arguments from the nature of the world. 19 However, this may not beadequate, because time is not only associated with matter, but mayalso be considered in regard to the action of the agent. Furthermore,the arguments based upon the nature of time and motion, on theone hand, and the arguments based on the nature of things whichmake up the world and the perfections of God, on the other, maynot be of the same importance. The latter, as far as Avicenna presents them, are positive arguments designed to show that the universe is sempiternal. Sempiternity, as we shall see, may imply infinitetemporal duration, but it itself is not a temporal duration. The arguments based on motion and time, on the contrary, are argumentsthat aim to reduce the opposite claim to impossibility.

Most of Avicenna's arguments for the sempiternity of the universe,based on the nature of things, are traceable to Aristotle. However,Avicenna does not use all of the arguments that Aristotle offers inthis respect, such as the vacuum argument. The arguments from thenature of the physical world include arguments based on the concept of coming to exist, or the concept of generation. Firstly, Aristotleargues that everything that comes to exist needs a substratum. Theprime matter of the universe cannot come to exist, since it is thesubstratum for everything that comes to exist. If matter itself comesto exist, it must come to exist from already existing matter. Hencethe assumption that the world began to exist is self-contradictory.2o

and the Continuum, p. 198. For Philoponus' arguments for the beginning of the universe and their repercussion in the Kalam, see Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, ch. IVand V.

19 Herbert A. Davidson, for example, presents the arguments for the eternity ofthe world in this way. Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 24-27.

20 Aristotle, Physics I.9; Physics IV.7; Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 13-14.

Secondly he argues in the same vein that celestial spheres are notsubject to generation and corruption, because the motions of thecelestial spheres do not have a contrary. Since they do not begin toexist by generation, they always exist. Aristotle also provides a thirdargument for the sempiternity of the universe from the concept ofpossibility. For Aristotle, in order for something to come to exist, itmust potentially or possibly exist before it actually exists. This impliesthat nothing can come to exist out of absolute nothingness. 21 Avicennaclosely follows Aristotle, when he argues that the possibility of something must be prior to its actuality and the possibility of the material beings resides in matter. A fourth argument is based on theconception of motion arguing that the universe has always been inmotion. His argument is that motion is beginningless, since any supposed first motion requires that there be a motion before it.22 Aristotle'sfifth argument is based on the concept of time. He argues that timecannot have a beginning, because there can be no before and afterwithout time. Assuming a beginning for time does not eliminatespeaking of time before the beginning of time. Since a "before" canonly be in time, then assuming a beginning for time is impossible.His sixth argument concerns the relationship between time and aninstant. An instant separates past from future. It is the end of pastand the beginning of the future. Assuming a first moment, then,requires assuming a period of time before the assumed first instant. 23

The arguments regarding the nature of God can also be tracedback to ancient philosophy. One of the arguments questions whyGod did not create sooner. If the universe began to exist, then Godcould have created it before. But there is no reason why God shouldhave delayed it. This argument can be traced back to Aristotle. 24Augustine responds to the "why not sooner" argument by sayingthat there was no time before the universe.25 Hence "why not sooner"~r~ment does not apply to t~e beginning of the universe. AugustIne s answer goes back to PhIlo. Many others, as well, discuss thisargument.

26The arguments based on God's immutability, on his

:~ Ar!stotle, De ~eneratione I.3; Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, p. 16.23 A~stotle, PhySICS VIII.l; H. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 18-20.

Ar!stotle, Physics VIII.l; H. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 24-25.:: Aristo~e, Physics VIII. 1; Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Contznuum, p. 233.. A~gustllle, Confimons, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford & New York: Oxford

Ulllvensty, 1991), XI.13.26 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 232-237.


changeless will, on God's being a changeless and sufficient cause alsohave antecedents in the teachings of Greek philosophers and commentators, such as Proclus and Themistius. They are widely discussed by Augustine, Philoponus, as well as Muslim theologians andphilosophers. 27

The discussion of whether creation resembles a natural or a voluntary action must have arisen after the relation of the universe toGod was clarified-that is, after the view that God is the cause ofthe existence of the universe became a standard account. Plotinusseems to be the main figure who developed an account of the relation between the universe and God in these terms. He replacedPlato's conception of the artisan model for the production of theuniverse with the productive contemplation model. The latter turnscreative action into a kind of natural action. 28 It is countered byarguments attempting to show that the divine creative action is avoluntary action: God creates the world according to a plan by hisvoluntary action. Arguments in this spirit go back to Augustine.29

Comparative Studies between Avicenna and Aquinas withRegard to the OJ/.estions conceming Creation

In the West, Avicenna is among the best known medieval Muslimphilosophers. Literature devoted to Avicenna's life and thought isconsiderable, especially when compared to other intellectual figuresof the medieval Muslim world. Western interest in Avicenna can bedivided into the medieval and modern periods. In the Middle Agesthe works translated from the Muslim-Arab world contributed to theflourishing of intellectual life in the West, particularly at the Universityof Paris in 13th and 14th centuries. Avicenna's works were avidlyread and discussed and greatly influenced medieval Western philosophers and theologians. In modern times, Western interest in thethought of Avicenna is historical rather than philosophical, and focuses

27 For arguments based on the conception of God, see Richard Sorabji, TimeCreation and the Continuum, pp. 239-250. For a well articulated construction of arguments based on the conception of God and responses to them, see Herbert A.Davidson, Proqft, pp. 49-85.

28 Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction to Enneads, pp. 70-78.29 Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University, 1941), pp.

49-62.

primarily on the impact of his philosophy on medieval Westernthinkers such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In thisrespect it is worth mentioning Etienne Gilson's call to Westernmedievalists and historians of philosophy to unearth Avicenna's thoughtthrough attention to "Avicenna Latinus."3o Gilson's call receivedresponses from many scholars, so that we now have new editions ofthe Latin translations of many of Avicenna's works, as well as a considerable scholarship devoted either to comparative studies or explorations of some of his theories. 31

Despite all this scholarship, relatively little effort has been madein analyzing Avicenna's theory of creation and comparing it toAquinas' theory of creation. In many works, one may come acrossstatements of Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions on aspects of creation. At times the difference between their positions with regard tocreation is traced back to their conception of God. Nevertheless,with the exception of one article by Beatrice Zedler,32 whose article

• 30 Etienne Gilson states that without studying the Muslim-Arab philosophical herItage, one cannot obtain a correct understanding of medieval Western philosophers.Thus he urges scholars to reedit the Latin translations of the works of Muslim-Arabph~osophers in general and those of Avicenna in particular. E. Gilson, "L'etude dephilosophes arabes et son role dans I'interpretation de la scolastique," Proceedings ofthe Szxth Internatwnal Congress of Philosophy (1927), p. 596, mentioned in G. C. Anawati,"St. Thom~s et la Metaphysique d'Avicenne," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974:Commemorative Studzes, eds. A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of MedievalStudies, 1974), pp. 450-451.

31 E.g., E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns Scot " Archives d'Histoiredoctrinale et ~itteraire du Moyen Age II (1927), pp. 89-149; Stephen Brown, "Avicennaand the Umty.o~the Concept. of Being," Franciscan Studies 25/3 (1965), pp. 117-150;G. ~. Anawau, A Comparauve-Study of the Psychologies of Avicenna and ThomasAqumas;;' 1cta Antiqua Academi~ Scientiarum Hungaricae 29/1-4 (1981), pp. 13-32;P. Lee, Samt. Thomas and AVlcenna on the Agent Intellect," Thomist 45/1 (1981),pp. 41-61; Mlchael Marmura, "Avicenna's Bying-Man in Context," Monist, 69/3(1986).' pp. 3,~3-395; E. M. Macierowski, "Does God Have a Quiddity accordingt? AVlcenna~ Tho~i~t 52/1 (.1988), pp. 79-87; A. M. Goichon, "Un Chapitre de~ Influence d Ibn Sma en, O~Cldent: Le de Ente et Essentia de Saint Thomas d'Aquin,"III Le Lwre du Mzllenazre d:;tmcenna v. 4 (conference proceedings) (Teheran: 1956), pp.118-131; ~olland-Gossehn, Le 'De ente et essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: 1948).

32 Beatnce Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei '" Traditio6 (19.48), pp'. 105-159. Dav.id Burrell's wor~ has an important place am'ong comparau~e studle~ between AVlcenna and Aqumas. Burrell explores how philosophers?e~onglllg to different Abrahamic religions contributed to the development of a theISUc .conception of God and creation, that grew increasingly articulate and moreco~slsten~ with the ~heis,tic id~~ of a free ~reator. .He does not primarily focus onAVicenna sand Aqumas s posluons on the Issues I mtend to discuss. What is moreBurrell's work does not analyze their arguments for their respective positions, bu~takes them at face value. Beside his other works see especially David Burrell, Freedom


is primarily concerned with the nature of the divine creative action,there is almost no in-depth modern discussion comparing Avicenna's

position to that of Aquinas on creation.

and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, .199~);Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sfnii, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: Umversl~of Notre Dame, 1986). Georges Anawati is one of the most respected scholars. mAvicenna studies. He has devoted a considerable amount of effort to co~panngAvicenna and Aquinas, and to tracing historical conditi.ons of tr~nslation .of AVlcen~a'sworks into Latin. He wrote an almost book-length mtro~uctlOn to hIS tr~~slatI~nof the Iliihiyyiit (Metaphysics) of al-Shi/ii' (The Healzn~), La Met~Pl!J!sl?~e du Shi/a (Pa~~,1978-1985). In the introduction, he discusses va~ous ArabIc edItIons o~ the Shi/a ,the Medieval Latin translations, and compares hIS own French translatI~n t~ MaxHorten's tum-of-the-century German translation (Max Horten's translatIOn. IS: DieMetapl!J!sik Avicennas: das Buch der Genesung der Seel~, Leipzig: 1907). He also d:,~ussesthe reaction to Avicenna's thought among Mushm thmkers such as al-Ghazah andthe 17th century Iranian philosopher Mulla Sadra (1571-1640), and among Westemphilosophers such as William of Auvergne (c. 1180-1249 C.E.) and Roger Bacon(c. 1214-after 1292). He speaks at some length a~o':t the rel~tionship of Avicenna'sthought to that of Aquinas. This part of Anawatl s mtroductIo~ presents .almost"t~esame view as his article, "St. Thomas d'Aquin et la metaphyslque d'AVlce~ne, mSt. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies,. pp. 449-465. ~nawatI examines the reception of Avicenna's work in the West m general, and m the thoughtof Aquinas in particular. He discusses the translations of Avicen~a's works, as wellas earlier treatments of the issue of Avicenna's influence on Aqumas. He also talksabout how Thomas frequently cited Avicenna as an authority, c.onsidered .him tobe a philosophical master, and maintained that Avi<;enna's doctn~es. were m ~eneral agreement with the Christian faith (p. 454). Fmally An~watI gIVes two ~IStS.The first is of Avicenna's theories that were endorsed by Aqumas; the second IS ofAvicenna's theories that were refuted by Aquinas. Only in this section Anawatimentions that Aquinas rejected Avicenna's positions on v~riou~ a~pects of .the issueof creation (pp. 461-462). But Anawati does not treat thIs tO~IC m a ~etaI1ed way,let alone offer a philosophical analysis of Avicenna's and Aqumas' posItIons. A.-M.Goichon's The Philosophy if Avicenna and Its lrifluence on Medl~val Europ~ (trans,. M. S.Khan, Delhi, [1969]), gives a general picture of the transl~t~on of .AVlce~n~ s worksinto Latin of the historical periods into which one could dIVIde AVlcenna s mfluenceon medie~al \V"estem philosophers, and of the major issues in which one can detectAvicenna's influence. She talks about Avicennan theories that were accepted thoughwith certain modifications such as the fact that his distinction between essence andexistence was viewed not 'only as a conceptual but as a real distinction (pp. 80-81,83, 96). However she does not talk about Avicenna's theory of creatIOn on theground that his position reg~rdi~g this is~ue was generally rejected, except for theattempt of Dominicus Gundlssalmus, whIch was not followed by others, to relatehis cosmogony to Christian doctrine .(\?p. 79~80). Ge:ard Verb?ke wrote t.he do~trinal introduction to the critical edItIOn of the Latm translatIOns of AVlcenna sMetapl!J!sics (liber de philosophia prima, sive, scientia di?in.a, ed. S. :-ran Riet, 3 vol~. Louvain:Peeters & Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977-1983). In thIS mtro<!uctIon, Ver?eke gIv~s a general outline of the Metaphysics of Avicenna. He traces dIfferent Medieval Latm translations, or editions of the Metapl!J!sics of the Shijii', and summarizes A,?cenna's majortheories such as the essence-existence distinction, substance and aCCIdents, and therelation~hip between cause and effect. However, he does not t:Jk about specific~~~H"""" .... n .... l-.. 'CH' r- ....""''''t-~A.n 1p1- -.::ll"np. rn.rnn~rp thprn to tho~p of Anulnas.

In her long and well-constructed article comparing Avicenna's position to that of Thomas Aquinas, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna inthe 'De potentia Dei,"'33 Beatrice Zedler compares Avicenna's conception of the act of creation to that of Aquinas. Beside discussing someother aspects of creation, especially cosmogony, she insists upon thedifference between Avicenna's position and that of Aquinas withregard to the nature of the creative action of God. Whereas forAvicenna the universe is necessary, for Aquinas God has the freewill to create and the freedom to choose what to create. As will bediscussed in chapter 3, at times she over-interprets Avicenna's passages to support her argument. But more importantly, in her comparison, Zedler takes the texts of both authors at face value. Shedoes not attempt to identify the background of Avicenna's andAquinas' positions.

Louis Gardet devotes a chapter to this issue in his book La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne. 34 He first tries to situate Avicenna in relationto the Muslim theologians (mutakallimun) in order to trace Avicenna'sdebt to them. Then he describes Avicenna's conception of creationas a kind of eternal act in which God creates the world by the necessity of His nature or His essence, and not by His will. Thus therelationship between God and the universe is not, according toAvicenna, one of temporal priority and posteriority but a relationship of essential or logical priority and posteriority. Next, Gardetexplains how Avicenna's emanationist cosmology serves as the framework for such a theory of creation. Finally, he tries to identify termsthat are crucial to Avicenna's theory of creation, i.e., iMiith (origination), ibdii( (innovation), khalq (creation), takw'in (generation), andexamines their relationship to Qur'anic usage. Gardet does makereference to Aquinas' reaction to certain positions of Avicenna's, butsuch references are brief and superficial, and by his own admissionGardet does not deal with the details of arguments but offers anoverall survey.3'> Hence Gardet neither analyzes Avicenna's theory ofcreation, nor does he compare it to that of Aquinas. What he doesis giving a general idea of Avicenna's position, situating it within itshistorical context. 36

33 Beatrice Zedler, op. cit.34 Louis Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sfnii) (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), Ch.

11: "L'explication du monde: l'etre necessaire et I'etre possible," pp. 33-68.35 Louis Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sfnii), p. 44.36 In another article, "Saint Thomas et ses predecesseurs arabes," Gardet's main

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Methodological Concerns

The study at hand is partly historical and partly philosophical. I donot attempt to situate Avicenna's views, or those of Aquinas, in theirhistorical context, nor trace how much they owe to their predecessors. I will also not address whether Aquinas was influenced byAvicenna on some issue through the translations of Avicenna's worksinto Latin. Although at times I refer to the correspondence betweenAvicenna's and Aquinas' terms, this is not meant to trace the historical connections between them but rather the philosophical ones.

This study is a historical one in the sense that I attempt to stateand compare the position of two historical figures on creation. Sucha comparison is worthy in itself because of the lack of serious attention to it so far, despite the wealth of references. As mentionedabove, there are not many detailed studies comparing Avicenna'sposition to that of Aquinas with regard to their conception of creation. Moreover, their positions on various other related issues needto be carefully investigated, rather than being passed over superficially.In this sense this study aims at contributing to the scholarship ofmedieval intellectual history.

On the philosophical side, I attempt to give an analytically clearand reasonable statement of Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions, thoughI do not attempt to give a full philosophical assessment of the validity of their arguments on every topic that I explore. My main objective is to compare their positions with regard to the questionsmentioned above, and to identifY to what extent they agree or diverge.I attempt to assess the philosophical value of their positions onlywhen they have divergent views. For example, I do not attempt toprovide a justification of divine simplicity, or divine eternity, sincethey do not have substantially different positions on these questions,but I do discuss, for example, whether the model of voluntary agent

intellectual heritage and in particular whether he clearly knew different theologicalschools and philosophical trends. He does not relate Aquinas to Avicenna exclusively, nor does he pay special attention to the problem of creation. Gardet agreeswith Gilson that Aquinas used Avicenna's thoughts in metaphysics and Averroes'sthoughts in physics (pp. 421-422). But Gardet's is a general account intended togive an overall idea of Aquinas' acquaintance with the Muslim philosophers andtheologians, and it does not deal with the issue of creation at all. Louis Gardet,"Saint Thomas et ses predecesseurs arabes," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974:Commemorative Studies, pp. 419-448.

can be applied to God without problems, because this is an issueon which Avicenna and Aquinas disagree. Furthermore, the fact thatAvicenna appears to deny intention to God while Aquinas asserts itof God is not of primary importance. But what is of primary importance in this context is whether there is a substantial differencebetween Avicenna and Aquinas resulting from the fact that onedenies intention to God whereas the other attributes it to God.

By no means am I suggesting that discussion of differences betweenAvicenna and Aquinas, with regard to specific features of their theories-such as terminology, context, or organization, all of whichreveals the way they individually look at theological problems-isunimportant. These differences should be traced as well. For example, one will find Aquinas' articulation of his positions, his organization of the topics discussed to be more detailed, better organized,and less obscure than those of Avicenna. However, I am only interested in their articulation of their theories inasmuch as it concernsa substantial similarity or dissimilarity between their positions.

This study remains general with regard to the issues it exploresbecause it covers a wider area of discussion, and is intended to coverthe positions of Avicenna and Aquinas regarding theological language on the one hand, and their positions regarding the nature ofdivine creative action and the beginning of the universe on the other.In the same vein, while discussing these matters, I did not attemptto construct possible diverging interpretations of the texts I use. Nordo I look, through the texts of these two philosophers, for passagesthat might not be as supportive of my interpretation of them as thepassages that I use. In any case, entering into more detailed analysis and interpretation would require having a firm ground on the?asis of which detailed analyses make sense. If I aimed at providrng detailed analysis and interpretation of peripheral topics, then itwould be more difficult to make my rather general remarks, whichare at times contrary to widely accepted views relating Avicenna'stheories to that of Aquinas. Besides being general, the discussion ofs~condary literature is limited to essential works, either those I clearlydisa~ee with or those from which I get fundamental support.

GIven these aspects of this study, I do not claim to provide a conclu~ive assessment of theories of Avicenna and Aquinas, though Ibeheve that I have covered the representative texts of these authors.It is hoped that this general discussion will provide a springboardfor further studies. I believe I have presented a clear statement of


their positions and enough discussion to prove my claims, and haveshown that they have similar positions on a numbers of issues. Iwould be more than happy if my study encourages others to generate challenging interpretations.

Another point that needs to be explained concerns the conceptualtools I use to state the positions of these two philosophers, or criteria on which I compare their positions. When comparing Avicenna'sposition and Aquinas' position on a certain issue, I could takeAvicenna's position as the paradigm and evaluate Aquinas' views onthis paradigm. However, instead of attempting to suppress whatAquinas offers-since he knew Avicenna and the problems his viewsgenerated, he is definitely more attentive to issues that to whichAvicenna might have been inattentive-I usually tend to take intoaccount Aquinas' position, and examine whether or not Avicenna'sposition fits to what Aquinas maintains. Nevertheless, I am carefulnot to attribute to Avicenna something more than his texts allow.For example, even though I argue that Avicenna's conception oftashkik is similar to Aquinas' conception of analogical predication, Iclearly state that, in Avicenna's thought, tashkik does not play thepart that analogical predication plays in Aquinas' thought.

I do not attempt to reference all of their works in order to identify the development of their position on a certain issue. Since I aminterested in stating and comparing their mature views, rather thanin the evolution of their views over time, I consult the works thatare representative of their later positions. In formulating Avicenna'sposition my primary source is the Metaphysics section of The Healing(al-Shijin. However, at times Avicenna's other works provide somevaluable details guiding how to interpret the texts in the Metaphysicsof The Healing. Despite my preference for this particular work, I usehis other works either to support my interpretation of a passage inthe Metaphysics, or to supply a direct and clear statement of his argument on a certain issue. For similar reasons, I do not consult all ofAquinas' works. I mostly use his later works, i.e., Summa contra Gentiles,Summa Theologiae, and the de potentia Dei. Although I may indicate acertain variation in his positions here and there, this is not an essential part of this study.

In regard to the way I read and translate Avicenna's texts, I muststate that I do not attempt to render Avicenna's Arabic terms inEnglish in a one-to-one correspondence with English philosophicalterms. Besides the difficulties of trying to be this consistent, I do not

think that Avicenna was always so consistent in his choice of terms.Furthermore, I do not think that all technical philosophical termshave one definite meaning valid in all contexts. I have tried to provide the Arabic transliteration as much as possible.

Briif Outline

In the first chapter, I discuss Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions concerning theological language. I first state their conception of humanknowledge about God. I argue that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positions as far as the divine perfections and human knowledgeof the divine perfections are concerned. However, Avicenna's position is not as clearly articulated as Aquinas' position, whose theoryof analogical predication sets him apart from many of his medievalcontemporaries. I also examine 'the negative element' in Aquinas'conception of theological language and attempt to show that thenegative element in Aquinas' conception of theological language isnot meant to free his teachings from philosophical assessment.

After arguing in chapter one that Avicenna's and Aquinas' statements concerning God are equally liable to philosophical examination, in chapter two I investigate their conceptions of the divineperfections insofar as they relate to comparing their conceptions ofthe nature of the divine creative action and the beginning of theuniverse. Since Avicenna and Aquinas are usually considered to havedifferent positions concerning the nature of the divine creative action,and since they do in fact have different positions concerning thebeginning of the world, stating the similarities or differences betweentheir conceptions of divine perfections serves as a benchmark. Thatis, it helps us to examine whether or not the difference between theirpositions on these two questions is something traceable to their conceptions of God. I argue that they agree on fundamental points concerning the divine formal features, such as simplicity and necessity.They also agree on the character of the divine knowledge and itsrelation to the existence of things in re.

After showing the similarity in their conception of God throughexamining divine formal features and divine knowledge, I revisit theissue of theological language in the light of the divine formal features, and examine how these features affect their understanding oftheological language. Considering their conceptions of divine formal


features, or formal properties, in relation to theological languageshows us that Avicenna adopts what I call a reductive strategy andAquinas an appreciative one in regard to theological languageY Thisis another point that underlines the importance of analogical predication in Aquinas' thought.

In chapter three, I compare Avicenna's conception of the divinecreative action to that of Aquinas. Contrary to the usual interpretation of Avicenna's position, I argue that Avicenna and Aquinashave similar positions on this issue. I argue that for Avicenna Godhas no natural action at all. He conceives creation as a voluntaryaction, just as Aquinas does. For Aquinas God has both natural andvoluntary action. Still, I argue that the difference between Avicenna'sand Aquinas' positions is not fundamental. Aquinas' conception oftheological language amplifies the difference between their positions.While Aquinas comes up with answers to both philosophical expectations and religious concerns, Avicenna's theory may satisfy us onlyphilosophically.

In chapter four, I discuss the issue of whether the universe has atemporal beginning. While Avicenna argues that the universe canbe related to its cause only in terms of being, not in terms of time,Aquinas takes an agnostic philosophical position in regard to creation in time. I examine whether Aquinas' responses to the arguments that the universe does not or cannot have a temporal beginningare satisfactory, and conclude that Aquinas' answers do not satisfactorily refute Avicenna's arguments. Even though they argue fordifferent positions concerning the beginning of the universe, theirpositions are consistent with their common conception of God, i.e.,as simple, eternal, necessary and immutable. I find Avicenna's position more consistent not with their common conception of God butwith their common Aristotelian and Neoplatonic heritage.

37 By 'reductive strategy,' I want to express the fact that for Avicenna divine perfection properties are taken into account only insofar as they are modified by divineformal features, such as eternity and necessity. In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinasholds that they can be considered without being modified by divine formal featuresand as modified by them.

Contribution rif this Stu4J

This study generally supports David B. Burrell's contention that therehas been a collaboration among the followers of three Abrahamicreligions to found a philosophical basis for theistic beliefs,38 despitethe fact that I have criticized him in a few instances by arguing thatthe distance between Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions on certainissues is smaller than what he maintains. This study also confirmsAlbert Judy's thesis that Aquinas did not substantially change hisinterpretation of and position towards Avicenna.39 Some scholars holdthat while Aquinas had closer ties to Avicenna's thought in his earlier works, he later distanced himself from Avicenna's thought to asignificant extent. While Avicenna's name appears more frequentlyin Aquinas' earlier works, in his later works Avicenna's name appearsless, and usually in a context where Aquinas is about to criticize acertain theory of Avicenna.40 Through examining their positions concerning the divine attributes and the nature of the divine creativeact, I hope to show that Aquinas agrees with Avicenna with regardto important issues, even when he wrote the de potentia.

I attempt to show that for Avicenna God has attributes, eventhough he wavers as far as the theological language concerning theseattributes is concerned. I argue, contrary to the interpretation ofsome scholars, that for Avicenna God's knowledge is related to theuniverse in the manner of the knowledge of an artisan to his artwork. This shows that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positionsin this regard. In chapter three, I have attempted to show that creation, for Avicenna, is like a voluntary action. This again runs contrary to the widespread interpretation of his position.

38 David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable Cod: Ibn-Sinii, Maimonides, Aquinas,(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1986), pp. 1-4.

39 Albert Judy, "Avicenna's Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles," Angelicum 52(1975), f.lp. 340-384, 541-586; 53 (1976), pp. 184-226. Judy compares passages~rom AVlcenna's Metaphysics VIII.4 to Aquinas' ScC I 22, 26 and 25. He argues thatl~ these chapters of the ScC I Aquinas produces a Thomistic version of Avicenna's~cu~s~on concerning the divine simplicity and negative corollaries of the divineS~pliClty. Thus Albert Judy's work and the study at hand support a common theS18 through examining different topics.

4<l For a discussion of Aquinas' attitude toward Avicenna's theories, see AlbertjUdy, "Avicenna's Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles," Angeluum 52 (1975) pp.376-380. '


Another important point, in a sense deriving from the precedingconsiderations, is that evaluating Avicenna's positions based on theLatin material, more specifically based on how Aquinas seems tothink, may not always lead to sound conclusions. For example, if wetake Aquinas' contention that creation is not a natural action but avoluntary one as a criticism directed at Avicenna, we may not getan adequate interpretation of Avicenna's position. Even if Aquinasintended to criticize Avicenna, his criticism applies only to the imageof Avicenna as represented in the Latin. The image of Avicenna inthe Latin may not always give an adequate presentation of Avicenna'sviews, howeverY

The importance of Aquinas' theory of analogical predication isgiven new valence through comparing Aquinas' conception of thedivine attributes to that of Avicenna. Aquinas distinguishes betweenthe divine perfections and the mode of signifying them. While perfection properties are found in God and creatures, human languagecannot signify divine perfections in the manner they are found inGod. Based on this distinction Aquinas was able to underline thecontingency of creation as well as to hold that it is necessary in adifferent sense, which is discussed in chapter three. Thus pressingexclusively on the negative aspect of analogical predication is notwarranted.

One indirect result of this study concerns how to interpret thetheistic conception of God, or more properly the conception of Godmore or less common to Abrahamic religions. To distinguish thetheistic conception of God from the Neoplatonic or pagan conception of God, some pairs of opposites are employed, such as necessary emanation versus creation, eternal versus created universe, orGod as natural agent versus God as free creator.42 Arguing that

41 Avicenna was known in the medieval Western world not only through thetranslations of his own works but also through the translations of Averroes' worksand as well as the translation of al-Ghazall's (Algazel) Maqii!id al-Faliisifa (Intentionesphilosophorum). For a modern edition of the medieval translation of al-Ghazall'sMaqii~d, see C. S. B. Muckle (ed.), Algazel's Metaphysics, a Medieval Translation (Toronto:The Institute of Medieval Studies, 1933). Al-Ghazall was out to criticize Avicenna,and Averroes may not have had an adequate knowledge of Avicenna's theories.For a discussion of Averroes' criticism of Avicenna and its problems, see HerbertA. Davidson, Proqft, pp. 311-335.

42 For these assumptions see, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation:Writings on the "Sentences" rif Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, O!!estion 1, trans. StevenE. Baldner & William E. Carroll (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,1997), "Introduction" by translators; Herbert A. Davidson, Proqft, p. In.

Avicenna's position and Aquinas' position have more similarities thanone might initially think calls into question such broad distinctionsbetween theistic and Neoplatonic conceptions of God and creation.43

A Note on Riferences

I refer to the Metapfrysics part of Avicenna's The Healing simply as'Avicenna Metaphysics.' For example, 'Avicenna Metaphysics IV.2,p. 165.2-4' stands for 'Avicenna, The Healing, Metapfrysics book 4,chapter 2, page 165, lines 2-4.' I refer to Aquinas' Summa Theologiaesimply as ST Unless further specified, the reference is to the bodyof the article in question. For example, 'STIa. 13, 3' refers to 'SummaTheologiae, prima pars, question 13 and body of article 3.' Similarly,I refer to the De potentia without writing Aquinas' name. For example, 'De potentia Ill, 15, ad 7' indicates De potentia, book 3, article 15,reply to objection 7.' Unless further specified, my references to SummaTheologiae and De potentia go to the body of the respective article. Irefer to Aquinas' Summa contra Gentiles as ScG, and indicate the paragraph numbers in accord with the translation published by theUniversity of Notre Dame Press. For example, 'ScG I, 14 [4], refersto 'Summa contra Gentiles, book I, chapter 14, paragraph 4.'

43 Andrew Louth develops a similar position in his study on the development ofthe Christian mystical theology. He underlines the affinity of Greek Fathers toNeoplatonic thought. Andrew Louth, TIe Origins rif the Christian A{ystical Tradition .fromPlato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981).

PART ONE

TALKING ABOUT GOD

CHAPTER ONE

THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE ANDPHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT

The negative element in Aquinas' theology poses a disturbing challenge to scholars: should one demand that Aquinas conform to philosophical expectations or should leave his definitions and the implicationsof his theories unscrutinized, given that as a theologian he maintainsthat God is ultimately unknowable, and given that his theory of analogical predication leaves the divine perfections seemingly indeterminate? If one grants exemption to Aquinas' theories, should onealso grant such an exemption to Avicenna's theories on the basis ofhis position regarding human knowledge and discourse about God?In order to come up with an answer to these questions, I am goingto discus Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions regarding the basis, extentand nature of human knowledge and discourse about God. Whethertheir theological views are suitable to philosophical examination willbe judged on the basis of their conception of theological language.

Avicenna's and Aquinas' theories about God are philosophicallyvaluable, and both can be philosophically assessed. Their positionsregarding human knowledge of God and theological language are toa considerable extent similar, in that both argue, (1) we cannot knowGod in himself, (2) God is known through creation, (3) God has positive and negative properties, (4) God has all perfections in a differentmanner from creation, and (5) perfections are predicated of God andcreation on the basis of a causal order.

Secondly, I argue that the negative element in Aquinas' theory isnot designed to exempt his theories from philosophical assessment.With the negative element in his theory of theological languageAquinas intends that two things be granted in our discussion of God:(1) Things that imply a creaturely mode of existence cannot be predicated of God univocally, but can be predicated only analogically;and (2) one should not expect human discourse about God to expressGod in himself or his eminent perfections. Aquinas does not arguethat one should not talk about God. He does "not maintain that his,or anyone's theories about God, should not be required to have

26 CHAPTER ONE THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 27

philosophical rigor. For him theological statements contain or ~imto contain knowledge. What Aquinas intends is not that theologIcalstatements should be left out of philosophical scrutiny, but that theymust be considered in the light of these two guiding rules. This doesnot contradict Aquinas' purposes in emphasizing the unknowability

of God's essence.

Avicenna's Theory if Theological Language

There is no doubt that Avicenna does not have as elaborate a theory of theological language as Aquinas does, and there are severalquestions to which one might find answers in Aquinas' texts but n.0t

in those of Avicenna. However, Avicenna provides enough matenalthat helps us find answers to essential questions with regard to theological language. Avicenna acknowledges that w: cannot kn~wGod in himself, though he is known through creatIOn. The attnbutes that are predicated of God are based on God's negative andpositive relations to creatures. God has perfections in a mannerdifferent from creatures. These perfections are predicated of Godand creatures according to tashkrk, i.e., according to priority and posteriority. Avicenna's position on human knowledge and speech aboutGod conforms to Aquinas' position in general. The major differencebetween Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions arises between Avicenna'stheory of predication according to tashkrk and Aquinas' theory of

analogical predication.

We Cannot Know and Name God in Himself

Avicenna's position regarding the subject-matter of metaphysics impliesthat God in himself falls beyond the scope of human knowledge. Inthe first chapter of his Metaphysics of the Healing (al-Shijii)!, Avicen~a

discusses whether God is the subject-matter of metaphYSICS. He distinguishes between the subject-matter and the objective of sciences(ulilm). Each science takes the existence of its s~b~ect-m~tter to beproven from another science. It investi~at~s wha~ It IS b~t I~ does n~ttry to establish that it is. On these prmClples, If estabhs~l~g Go~ sexistence is the goal of metaphysical investigation, then It IS not ItSsubject-matter, and therefore God is not the subject-matter of meta-

physics. l However, because metaphysics occupies the highest and ultimate place among sciences which are available to human mind,Avicenna is indicating that God, in himself, falls beyond humanknowledge.

In his commentary on the Qur'anic chapter al-Ikhlii!,2 Avicennaclearly states that we cannot know and name God as he is in himself. He constantly reminds us of God's majesty and the inexpressibility of what God is. He argues that "God's essence (dhiit) is thathe exists."3 Besides sheer existence, there is nothing to be added toGod. God's mode of existence-specific to himself and excluding allthe modes of existence assumed by other beings-is such that it hasno name. It cannot be expressed or explained (sharb) except throughconcomitants that necessarily follow from his being (lawiizim).4 AlthoughAvicenna does not elaborate here, it seems that he assumes that atrue name could give us the essence, or definition of the thing thatis named. For example, when we call a certain existing thing 'aman', through this name we understand certain things about him,such as his being intelligent, having a soul, eating and drinkingno matter whether we observe this person displaying any of theseactions. However, with respect to God, we cannot come up with aname expressing what he is, such that it would enable us to lookdirectly at God and expect him to be in such and such a way.

But why cannot 'what God is' be put into words (yu(bar (anhu)? Isit because of a defect in our language, or simply because of the lowdegree of our comprehension? This is because God's majesty andsublimity cannot be captured by us. Consequently, we cannot talkabout God as he is. The imperfection in human thought and language cannot bridge the insurmountable distance between human~nd divine being. What we can say properly about God ultimatelyIS that 'he is he' (huwa huwa).5 This Arabic phrase, 'huwa huwa,' can

s :- Avicenna, al-Shifii', al-Iliihiyyiit (henceforth Metaphysics), eds. aI-Ab Qanawati andSa Id Zayid (Cairo, 1960-[1963]), I.l, p. 5.5-6 and 16-19; p. 6.1-2 and 14-16.e~ alS?, op. cit., 1.2, p. 14.14-17.

Tt ~Vlcenna, Al-TqftZT al-OJtr'iinz wa Lughat al-Sufiyya fi Falsafat Ibn Sznii (henceforth!!(SZT), .ed. I:Iasan 'A~f (Beirut: 1983).

AVlcenna, Tafs'iT, p. 106.12-13.4 A'5 ~cenna, Tafs'iT, p. 107.16-18.

I A,YIce~na, .Tafs'iT, p. 107:3-7. This rt;minds the bibl!cal expression 'I am whoher' .whI~h IS also underlmed by Aqumas. 1 shall bnng in Aquinas' discussionow III thIS chapter.

28 CHAPTER ONETHEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 29

also be translated in this context, as 'he is whatever he is,' or 'he is

identical to himself.'If we cannot know God in himself, then does God really have

those properties that we predicate of him or not? Taking Avic:nna'semphasis to the extreme, some authors ev~n arwued that for ~Vlcenn,aGod's attributes may be reduced to negatIOns. However, AVlcenna semphasis on God's transcendence and majesty should not lead us tothink that for Avicenna God is devoid of perfections, or that theproperties we attribute to God are mere words saying nothing. aboutGod. Such an interpretation cannot be justified, given that AVlcennatalks at length about God, and frequently affirms that God has perfections. He unequivocally states that God has complete being, becausehe does not lack any perfection, but he does not have the perfections (kamalat) by way of participating. Moreover, God is pure good.Good is either the being towards which everything strives, or is theperfection of being. God as pure being is pure good and pure perfection (kamal).7 For him, the perfections found in creation belongfirst and foremost to the First, and secondarily to creation, becausewhatever found in creation is acquired from God.

s

God Is Known through Creation

Although Avicenna argues that God, as he is in himself, can neither be named nor talked about other than to acknowledge that heis whatever he is, he still attributes many properties to God. The

6 I agree with John Rosheger in his critical stance against ~an R. Netton andJ. G. Flynn ascribing to Avicenna a position si~ar t? that of.Plotmus. Ian R. Nettonargues that for Avicenna God should be descn?ed I~ negatIve terms, and the positive tenns attributed to God simply reflect an Idea m the thought of the one whoattributes it, but not something in the divine essence. Ian R. Netton, Allah Transcendent:Studies in the Structure and Semiotics qf Islamic Philosophy, 7heology and Cosmology (NewYork, NY.: Routledge, 1989), p. 155. J. G. Flynn argues that ?n ~vicenn~'s rendering God might be the cause of perfections, but may not be IdentIfi~d WIth perfections. J. G. Flynn, "St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of God, Abr-Nahrazn14 (1973-74), pp. 60-62. As Rosheger points ~l\~t this i~ only ~alf of the story. JohnP. Rosheger, "A Note on Avicenna and the Dlvme Attnbutes, the Modem Schoolman

87 (2000), pp. 169-177. . - -7 Avicenna, Metaphysics VII1.6, p. 355.6-14. See also, A,?cenna, al-Isharat wa al-

Tanblhat (henceforth Ishiirat), ed. J. Forget (Leyde: E. J. Bnll, 1892) VI, p. 158.S Avicenna, Al-Risala al-'Arshryya (henceforth Risala 'Ars~ryya) (Haydarabad: 1.353

A.H.), p. 13.15-16. "Thus all perfection, beauty and bemg that belong to th~ngsother than the Truth (Ijaqq) belong at first to the First Turth. They are acqUIredfrom him (mustafiid), they do not [indeed] belong to anything other than him ('adahu)."

basis on which we are allowed to predicate properties of God is creation, because (1) creation is a concomitant (lazim) of God, and (2)God has both negative and positive relations (irjaft) to creatures.

The fact that creatures are concomitants of God serves to explainhow we come to know God. Although because of the simplicity ofGod in every respect only one thing emanates from God immediately, all creatures to the very bottom of things are necessary concomitants of (lawazim) God. Avicenna states that these concomitantsof God make God known (taCrif) , showing something of their cause.However, there is a gradation among these concomitants in showing God. The closer to the origin a concomitant is in the hierarchyof being the better it makes the origin known or reflected.9 Thereis a correlation between divine perfections and creaturely ones.Perfections that are found in the world are the effects of God's properties. Since God is the origin, which gives being to all things thatcome to exist, things that come to exist do so in accordance withthe goodness and the perfection of their source. Avicenna clearlystates that not only do things that come to exist follow the divinebeing and perfections, but that the manner of their existence alsofollows the divine goodness and perfection. Thus the perfectionsthat creatures display are the reflection of the divine goodness andperfection. 10

Based on the idea that creatures reflect God's perfections, andhence bear a certain similarity to God, Avicenna establishes someof. God's perfections by examining the order and perfections of crea~on. Creation shows that the creator has perfections, because creanon has a perfect, strong and enduring order. When Avicenna talksabout the ~ll of God, for ~xample, he emphasizes the order, harmony and nchness of creatIOn. What he concludes is that such aperfect, regular and lasting order can only be brought about by acause that has perfect being and the perfections necessary for thisperfect order to happen in the world. Thus creation indicates thatthe cause of such and such things must have will. 11

9A·IQ ~cenna, Taftfr, p. 107.17-21.

(hAVlcenna, Kitab al-Nqjahfi al-Ijikmah al-Man(iqryyah wa-al-Tabf'ryyah wa-al-Ilahryyah

~~cefo.rth Nqjat), ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut: 1985), p. 286. .AVlcenna, Risala 'Arshryya, p. 10.12-22.


God Has Negative and Positive Relations to Creation

For Avicenna, the fact that God is unlike creatures does not meanthat God is utterly different from creatures, for indeed there aresigns of God in creatures. God has positive as well as negative relations (ir/iijiit) to creation. He reminds us of God's being unique(waMiiniyy) , i.e., unlike anything existing, his being unmixed (Jiif) andpure (maM) real (~aqq). Such properties may be thought, on the onehand, to make God inclusive of, or identical to, all other beings, ina sense making him like a substratum to specific existents. On theother hand, they may also be thought as separating God from allother things, making him absolutely different from them. Avicennadenies the inclusion of all kinds of being (wujudiit) in God. He deniesthat God can be the substratum on which all other beings (wujudiit)subsist, or that he can be the being common to and inclusive of all

creatures. 12

However, Avicenna also rejects the idea that God does not haveany relation (ir/iija)13 to other kinds of being (wujudiit). In this regard,Avicenna's rule of thumb is this: while some aspects (anhii') of existence are negated of every being, every being has a certain relation(ir/iija) and connection (nisba) to other beings. This holds for Godmore appropriately, as God is the origin of everything. Since Godis the origin-the creator of things-creaturely aspects of being mustbe negated of God, as God is not included among the things in theworld. But again, since God is the creator of things, God has some

relation (ir/iija) to his creatures.

Know that when we say that or explain how 'the necessary being doesnot become multiple in any way, and he (dhiituhu) is unique (wa~diiniyy)

12 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 344.1-5.13 The term 'ir/afa' is one of the crucial terms in Avicenna's theory concerning

God's properties and human talk about God. Harry Austryn Wolfson constantlytranslates 'ir/afa' as 'relation.' See H. A. Wolfson, "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroeson Divine Attributes," in Studies in the History qf Philosophy and Religion, I, eds. IsadoreTwersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University,1973), pp. 143-169 (originally published in HomenaJe a Millas-Vallicrosa 22 (Barcelona,Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1956), pp. 545-571). In his translation of Risala 'Arshryya, Arthur Arberry translates 'irf.iifa' as 'positive.' See Risala'Arshryya, p. 7.16-17. Arthur J. Arberry, Avicenna on Theology (Westport, Conn.:Hyperion Press, 1979), p. 32. Wolfson translates a similar occurrence in NaJat(p. 287.10-12) as 'relation.' Wolfson, "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on DivineAttributes," p. 151.

in~act (!iif) pure real one (maMun ~aqqun), we do not mean by doingthIS that no aspect (an~ii') of existence (wujudiit) is negated of him, nordo w: mean tha~ ~e doe~ ~o~ have any relation (ir/iiJa) to other aspectsof eXIstence (wUJudat). ThIS IS Impossible. This is because many differentaspects (~n~ii') of :xistence are negated of every (kullu) being. Moreover,every bemg .(maU(Jud).h~s a relation (ir/iiJa) and certain connection (nisba)to other bemgs. ThIS IS especially true in the case of the one fromw~om ~ll b~ing (wujud) emanates. However, when we say that he is~mque m ~Imself (dhat), and he does not multiply, we mean that heIS as such [I.e., uniqueJ in himself (fi dhiitihi). In addition, if this [i.e.,statement ~bout th~ umty of.God] is followed by many positive (fjiibiyya)and. negatIve (salbwa) relatIOns (ir/iiJiit) these are the necessary concomItants of (la~iiZlm) of the being (dhiit) [i.e., God's being] and thee~ects of ;he ~emg (dhiit). They.follow the existence of the being (dhiit)[I.~., God_s b~mg]. T~ey a~e neIther constituents (muqawwimatun) of thebemg (dhat) [I.e., Gods bemg], nor parts ofit. 14

Thus the statement that 'God is unique,' and 'does not become multiple'. et~.... r~fers to God in himself (dhiit) , but does not preventpredicatmg vanous attributes of God. Besides the reference to Godi~ hi~self (dhiit), many positive (ijiibiyya) and negative (salbiyya) relatIons (u/iijiit) are predicated of God. However, things that we attributeto or negate of God are not to be thought of as either constituents(muqawwima) , or parts (qjza') of God. They are necessary concomita~ts (lar:iizim) an.d effec~s (maCluliit) of the being (dhiit), they follow(tuJad ba d) the bemg (wtgud) of God. 15

God's pos~ti:e .an~ negative relations to creatures imply similaritya~ well as ~IssImIlanty.between God and creation. They also proVIde the baSIS upon whIch some properties are affirmed of God andsome others are denied of him. Although Avicenna argues that God

:~ both negative and positive relations (ir/iija) to creatures, whicho ow the essence (dhiit) of God and are its effects he does not go~~nd t.his. If God has positive and negative relations to creatures,

s. ImplIes at least that some properties are negated of God in com~anson to creation, while some other properties are affirmed of Godm comparison to creation. For example, 'being omnipotent' is affirmedof Godl6 'th d .W1 regar to creatures. That IS, one assumes that crea-tures are made by God. Furthermore, one may consider the fact

14 A .15 ~cenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 343.16 - p. 344.1-5.16 A~cenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 344.1-5.

AVlcenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 368.2-3.


that any effect is the result of the power of an agent. If the agentdoes not have power, in a broad sense, to cause the effect, the effectwould not exist. Since the existence of creatures is traced to God,then one affirms that God must have the power to create. Thus onemay say that God is omnipotent in the sense that God has the powerto make all things. However, even though attributing power to Godsays something about God, it still does not indicate much about whatGod's power is. These properties (Jifat) are attributed to God on thebasis of creation. Whereas negative properties are attributed to Godwith reference to (ir/aJa) his other-ness from creatures, positive properties are attributed to God with reference to (ir/aJa) the reflectionof God in creation, as creatures are God's effects. As such they indicate something of what God is-as well as what God is not-butthey do not give comprehensive knowledge of God. The prop~rti~s

attributed to God in positive or negative relation to creatures mdIcate God only partially and indirectly.

Based on God's exclusion of other modes of being and God's relation (ir/aJa) to creatures, Avicenna accepts that God has both negative and positive properties. Avicenna has a triple division in thisregard. Besides purely negative and purely positive properties, thereare also properties combining both negative and positive aspects.That is we have three different sorts of names expressing the pos-,itive and negative relations between God and creation: (1) those thatonly express God's otherness, (2) those that only express creature'ssimilarity to its cause, and (3) those that include different senses toexpress both God's otherness from creation and creation's similarity

to God.

Know that since it has been established that he is the necessary being,and that he is one in all respects, and that he is free from havingcauses and that he does not have any cause at all, and that his properties ~re not additional to his essence (dhiit), and that he has glorificationand perfection properties (sifiit al-mad~ wa al-kamiil) , it is apt to talkabout his being a knower, being alive, having will, power, speech,sight, hearing and other beautiful properties..It must be kr.t0wn. ~hathis properties are reduced to (twjaC

) eith.er negatIO~ (salb), relatIOn (it/iift),or combination of both of these. If hIS propertIes have such a character [either negation, or relation, or their co~bination], then even ifthey are multiple they do not destroy the umty [of God], and t.heydo not contradict the necessity of [God's] being. As for the negatIOn,take for example, eternality (qidam). First, (1) it is reduced (turjaC

) to

the negation of non-being of him, secondly (2) to the negation of beingcaused and having something prior (awwal).I7

Avicenna emphasizes the negative properties of God. For him a negative property does not have to be expressed negatively. The negativity depends on God's otherness from creatures, no matter whetherits expression has a negative or a positive wording. Some of thedivine properties have both negative and positive connotations,although they have simply positive meaning in other contexts. Forexample, God as the 'necessary being' (wajib al-wujUd) indicates, forAvicenna, (1) that God does not have a cause, and (2) that God isthe cause of other things. But such statements may be interpretedto show that God is not similar to creatures in terms of the modeof being. Whereas creatures have their being from God, God doesnot owe his being to anything else, that is, his being is not something received. In this sense it shows how God is not like creatures.Hence the attribution of 'necessity of being' to God partly indicatesthe negative relation (i(jaJa) between God and creation. But in itself,the property 'necessary being' does not have to be a negative property. Thus, God's otherness from creatures does not have to beexpressed negatively; it simply concerns the negative 'ir/afa' of Godto the world, i.e., his difference from creatures. IS

The terms 'God' and '$amad' are among the properties that combine positive and negative aspects. Avicenna expands upon theseexamples in his commentary on the chapter al-IkhlaJ. The 'divinity'comprises in it two properties, which are the strongest properties inmaking God known to us. These are (1) that he has the necessityof being first and foremost (aqdam) in himself, and (2) that he is theorigin of all other beings. 19 Beside this double connotation of the

17 Avicenna, Risiila 'Arshfyya, p. 7.13-19.IS Avicenna, Risiila 'Arshfyya, p. 7.20-21. H. Wolfson, in his article "St Thomas

on Divine Attributes," states that some philosophers, including Avicenna, interpreted~ve.n positive terms negatively, and he argues that St. Thomas follows St. Augustine1ll mterpreting positive tenns positively. In a sense what Wolfson says is true, butpositive tenns are interpreted, by Avicenna at least, negatively on the basis of God's~therness-his difference from creation. For example, 'good' expresses both negatlve and positive properties, when it is applied to God. See Nqjiit, p. 287.25-26.The negation expresses only God's otherness from creation, but not God's beingdevoid of goodness. Avicenna's negative interpretation does not amount to anabsolute negation but to emphasizing God's difference from creatures.

19 Avicenna, Tqfifr, p. 108.4-11.


properties ())f God, elsewhere Avicenna states that 'divinity' consistsof God's lalCk of need for anything whatsoever and the needfulnessof everything else for God.20 This conception of divinity, or the property 'God,' has a negative meaning, since it denotes God's needlessness in lfegard to anything else. It has also a positive meaning,

since all thimgs are needful of him.In denoting God, Avicenna seems to accept a gradation among

God's properties. For example, the property, or the name, 'God,'for Avicenma, is the most powerful of the divine properties, becauseit describes God better than all other properties. That is why Godchose this term when he let himself become known to us in thechapter al-lkhlii~. If we remember the dual meaning of the property'God,' i.e., ((1) that he has necessity of being first and foremost (aqdam)in himself, and (2) that he is the origin of all other beings,21 it willremind us of two things. This property 'God' (1) denotes both thenegative amd the positive relationship between God and creation atthe same time, and (2) it refers to God's creative act, giving existence to creatures, the foremost perfection with regard to creation.Thus the property 'God' is the strongest property making God known

in relation to creation.

God Has Pe1ftctions in a Different Mode .from Creation

God has perfections in a different mode from creation. God's modeof having perfections, as opposed to the creaturely mode of havingperfections, is characterized by simplicity, necessity, fullness and purity.These are called formal properties, in contradistinction to divine perfection properties, such as knowledge and will. In chapter 2, I willhave more to say regarding the distinction between divine formalfeatures and non-formal features. God has his attributes simply andnecessarily; whereas creatures have them in a composite, accidental,and limited manner. In presenting Avicenna's position on this issue,I am going to consider simplicity, necessity and eminence to underline the difference between the way creatures have properties andthe way God has them. As we shall see, Avicenna and Aquinas havesimilar positions regarding the difference between God's manner ofhaving perfections and creation's manner of having their perfections.

20 Avicenna, Tqfsfr, p. 113.5-6.21 Avicenna, Tqfsfr, p. 108.4-11.

God has his properties in a simple manner. For Avicenna God'sunity is not merely numerical, but concerns separation of God fromeverything else. In this context, he considers unity and simplicity tomean the same thing. He explains God's unity in terms of simplicity. God is one in three respects: (1) He cannot have constitutiveelements from which he is composed (tajtamn, (2) he cannot havecountable parts, (3) he cannot have parts like that of definition (ajzii)al-&add) nor a statement (qawl), neither as the parts in a matter-formcombination or in any other way, such as the parts of an utterance(qawl) which explain the meaning of his name. Each of these denotessomething which exists separately from other parts. Simply put, theexpressions we use for God cannot be understood as referring toparts or aspects of God which exist in a distinct manner from eachother, such as the parts of the human body being distinct from otherparts and occupying a different part of space. Although all attributes we predicate of God have different meanings, it does not meanthat the attributes we express with different names exist in God ina distinct manner, separate from each other. 22 The properties arenot constituents or parts of the essence of God. God simply has allthe properties he has by being what he is. They are not additionalto the divine being. 23

God has his perfections necessarily since he is necessary in allrespects. If he were not necessary in all respects, he would dependon other causes and would not be absolutely necessary in himself.There is nothing which can happen in or to the necessary being;he necessarily has everything possible for him to have. Thus he hasno new will which can come to be, no new nature to gain, no knowled~e to be attained, and no new property to have. 24 Although forAVlcenna what actually exists is necessary, the necessity God has and~e necessity creatures have are different. Since God is necessary byhImself, he does not owe his being and perfections to anything else.All. creatures, however, owe their being and perfection to their cause,~hmately to God. Furthermore, things that are subject to generahon and corruption are in a process of gaining and loosing their

22 A . .Vlcenna, Nq:jat, p. 264.8-12; see also, Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1.4-11; Tqftfr,

p. 108.20 - p. 109.1-5.23 A . .

R' _ ~cenna, MetaphYSICS VIII.4, p. 344.2-5; see also ibid., p. 345.6-11; Avicenna,zsala Arshryya, p. 5.22-24.

24 Avicenna, Najat, p. 265.3-11.


perfections. Contrary to creaturely manner of having properties, Godhas all his properties necessarily.

God has his properties eminently. Although Avicenna does notargue that God has properties eminently, his argument for God'sbeing pure being and pure perfection supports such an interpretation. Avicenna argues that God, as the necessary being, is pure goodand pure perfection (kamiil). God, as the pure being, lacks no perfection, is always in act (bi'l-ji'l) , and is pure good. 25 Contingentbeings, however, are not pure good, are vulnerable to non-existence,hence also to evil. Since contingent beings do not have being ontheir own, they are lacking in their being and hence in the perfection of their properties. 26 At first sight it may be difficult to see theconnection Avicenna makes between having being on its own andbeing abundantly perfect or pure act. Although he does not developthis topic very much, the quiddity (miihiyya) and existence (wu:fud) distinction may be helpful to make the contrast. Avicenna constantlyrejects that God has a quiddity (miihiyya) , and argues that God isnecessary being. Quiddity (miihiyya) , in Avicenna's philosophy, appliesto many members of a genus or species. It also functions as a limitation of the individual members under certain forms, excludingother kinds or ways of existing. However, God has no quiddity limiting his existenceY Hence God has his perfection properties eminently in the sense that his perfections are unlimited.

Peifections Are Predicated qf God and Creation according to Tashkik

Although Avicenna argues that God has a positive relation to theworld as he is the cause of its being, hence laying the ground todescribe God with perfections that are found in creation, he doesnot systematically treat the issue of predicating perfections of Godand creation. However, in a scattered manner, he talks about someperfection properties, and states that these are not found in Godand creation in the same degree. Hence they are not said of Godand creation univocally.

25 Avicenna, Najat, p. 265.13-17; Avicenna, Risala 'Arshryya, p. 5.16-17.26 Avicenna, Najat, p. 265.17-21.27 See for example, Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, pp. 344-345.

Avicenna's discussion of priority and posteriority explains thedifference between the way things have their properties and Godhas them as well as how this difference is observed in language. Inthe Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna talks about 'priority' (taqaddum) and 'posteriority' (ta'akhkhur). He states that things are said tobe prior or posterior to other things in many ways. However, allthe different respects that priority and posteriority have in their applications amount to one modality of predication: predicating bi'l-tashkik. 28

Something is prior in having a certain property over those whichare posterior, inasmuch as it has the property at such a degree, thatthe posterior thing does not have it in that way. Moreover, there isnothing of this property that is had by the posterior thing that isnot had by the prior thing. 29

Predications according to tashkik may be different depending onthe peculiarities of each case in which something is prior to another.But what is required is that there be a certain measure, or a definite

28 The term 'tashkik,' or 'bi'l-tashkik,' is rendered sometimes as 'analogy' and 'analogical,' and sometimes as 'ambiguous.' Wolfson translates it as 'ambiguous.' Harry~ustrynWolfson,"Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine Attributes," in StudiesIn the !!,zstory if Philosophy and 1!-eligion v.l, ed. edited by Isadore Twersky and George.H. Williams (~arvard, Cambndge, Massachusetts, 1973), pp. 154-156 passim. Wolfson,m another an:lcle, renders mushakkak as 'ambiguous' and 'amphibolous.' He arguesthat the ArabIC and Hebrew terms for ambiguous were rendered in Latin as analogical. And Aquinas' use of analogy "has absorbed what in Arabic philosophy isc~ed 'ambiguous'." H. A. Wolfson, "The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, ArabicPhilosophy and ~aimonides" in Studies in the History if Philosophy and Religion vo!. I,p. ,477. A. M; GOlchon re~ders it as 'analogy.' A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la LanguePhllosophlque d'Ibn Szna (Pans, 1938), p. 162. John Rosheger explains Avicenna's useof the tel;'ID 'tas,hkik' and its relatives referring both to Avicenna's own texts and thescholarship on It. John P. Rosheger, "A Note on Avicenna and the Divine Attributes"!he Jo;1odem Schoolman 87 (2000), p. 174. I prefer to render Avicenna's term tashJdk,m thIS context, as analogy rather than as ambiguous or ambiguity despite the factt?at the. predication according to tashkik is not on a par with an'alogical predicatIon as It shall be clear. As will be explained, for Avicenna predication accordingto tashk-k' b d . .

I IS ase on an order. ThIS order, as AVlcenna presents it is such that~e ?ne that ?ri~a~ly has .the prol?erty, has all that the one that s~condarily has

, WIthout .bemg hmlted to It. In thIS way, we may consider the perfections as they:~ found m creatur~s and God. God, as having existence primarily, does not lack

mg, or any perfectIOn as they are found in creatures, but he has more than whatc:eatures h~ve ~f them. Analogi~al predication may not be limited to 'having abOperty pnma~ly and secon~ar:ly because of the cause and effect relationshipfi etween two thmgs. However, It IS one sort of analogical predication. Thus I pre.er to render the expression, 'bi'l-tashkik' as analogical predication, in this contextmS2~ead ?f rendering it as, for example, 'priority-based ambiguous predication.' '

AVlcenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 163.7-9.


principle to start with. One can then predicate the same propertyof different things according to priority and posteriority dependingon the distance between the thing in question and the measure orprinciple. For example, in the case of a certain perfection, something which has the perfection more than other things and whichlacks nothing of this perfection is prior to other things with respectto this perfection. The prior thing has this perfection primarily and

others have it secondarily.30The term "being" is a good example to illustrate how perfections

are found and predicated according to tashk'ik. Being is predicatedboth of a cause and its effect. However, the cause and the effect arenot of equal degrees with respect to having existence. The being ofthe cause is independent of its effect. However, the being of theeffect depends on the cause. For Avicenna, this relationship of priority and posteriority between cause and effect with regard to having being is so important that it can never be eliminated. The causeand its effect may exist together in time or in sempiternity or insome other respect, but they can never be of the same degree withrespect to having being. Thus being is said of the cause and of itseffect analogically (bi'!-tashk'ik) , and the cause is prior to its effect with

respect to being.3!

Although Avicenna does not elaborate on this issue and does notstate clearly that being is applied to God and creation bi'!-tashklk,his conception of the relationship between God and the world justifiesour saying that being is said between God and the world bi'!-tashk'ik.In the passages where he discusses predication based on priority andposteriority Avicenna does not mention God, but the entire discussion regarding priority with respect to being hinges on the causethat is the giver of being, not any random cause. Sharpening hisposition, he mentions that there may not be a temporal prioritybetween the cause and its effect, but there is an existential priorityof the cause to its effect. Since God is prior to everything as thecause which gives them being, Avicenna's discussion regarding howthings are predicated on the basis of priority and posteriority appliesprimarily to the relationship between God and the world. Thus,

30 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 164.1-11 passim.31 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.1-5. Also see pp. 164-166 passim.

based upon Avicenna's larger discussion, 'being' is predicated of Godand creatures bi'!-tashklk, according to priority and posteriority.32

Avicenna's discussion of the predication of the term "one" maybe pointed to as another example relevant to the predication of properties of God and creatures. In his commentary on the chapter a!Ikh!ii~, Avicenna states that the term "one" is predicated of thingsanalogically (bi'!-tashklk). Things have different degrees of unity, depending on whether they are divisible only in the mind or according togenus, or are divisible actually or potentially.33 God however cannotbe divided in any way. That is why, in the chapter Ik!ii~ of theQur'an, 'a~ad' is predicated of God. 'A~ad', as Avicenna explains,denotes the utmost degree of unity or being one, that is, of simplicity.34 Although as a generic term 'unity' (waMa) is predicated ofeverything analogically, as the specific form of unity 'a~ad' is predicated of God exclusively.

Avicenna's conception of predication according to tashk'ik is to someextent similar to Aquinas' theory of analogical predication, which Iam going to discuss in the next section of this chapter. The discussion of how one predicate is said of several things-not simplyhomonymously-goes back to Aristode,35 whose works are amongthe common sources between Avicenna and Aquinas. Aristode usesthe example how the term 'healthy' is predicated of many things,some of which denote causing health, like food, while others denotebeing signs of it, like a good complexion. He also explains thatsubstance is the primary reference as far as the predication of 'being' is concerned, whereas accidents have being as accidents of substance. In his example of health, substance is one reference point inall its various predications. (This health example is also picked up

32 ~~zlur Rahman stat?,s that. Ib~ Sina "firmly held to the univocality of existence. Fazlur Rahman, Ibn Sma s Theory of the God-World Relationship" inGod and Creation, eds. David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame Indiana:No.tre Dame, 1990), p. 3~. Throughout th.e article, Fazlur Rahman explains howAVlcenna held that God IS a necessary bemg and creation is a contingent being.H~weve:, he does not make any further explanation how the statement about 'theUll1VOCallty of existence' is consistent with the distinction between necessary beingand contingent being, the former belonging solely to God and the latter belongingsolely to creatures. '

33 Avicenna, Tajsfr, p. 109.13-17. See also, Avicenna, Metaphysics III.2 p 97 1-5p. 103.1-9. ' . . ,

34 Avicenna, Tqfsfr, p. 110.1-6.35 Aristode, Metaphysics, trans. Christopher Kirwan (Oxford, 1971) IV.2 1003a33-

1003bll. ' ,


by Aquinas). Avicenna's use of 'tashkfk' con~orms to A~isto~le's .expl~nation. That is, there is one referent of whIch somethmg IS saId pnmarily; others have it secondarily. Rendering the term tashkfk as'analogy' may be justified in relation to Aqu~nas' use of. the ter~.As we shall see in the next section, for Aqumas, analogical predIcation is justified because of the causal order that holds b~tw~enGod and the universe. In Avicenna's writings, we find predlcatlOnaccording to priority and posteriority. We also find that there is acausal order between God and the universe. God, as the cause andsource of all being, is the giver of the being and the perfections ofother things. The example of 'being' as a predication of God ~ndof creatures according to priority and posteriority shows that p~ed:cation bi'l-tashkfk and analogical predication are to some extent Slml1ar.

Despite these parallels, Avicenna's conception of tashkfk ~hould n~tbe taken as equivalent to Aquinas' conception of analogical pred~cation. One must not underestimate the differences between predication according to tashkfk and analogical predication. AlthoughAvicenna has this conception of analogy, he does not have an explicitaccount of how analogical predication holds between God and creation with regard to perfections. Predication by way of tashkfk andanalogy are similar in the sense that they are based on a causalorder and gradation among the different subjects of which th.ey areapplicable, and which can be applied to God a~d cre~tures ms~faras they are considered analogues. However, AVlcenna s conceptlOnof tashkfk seems to be employed to distinguish between God and creation so as to remind us that they are not equivalent, although weare obliged to use some common terms. He does not identify .theextent and conditions of similarity and difference between predlcations of perfection properties when they are predicated of God andof creatures. Thus Avicenna's conception of predication bi'l-tashkfkand Aquinas' theory of analogical predication are not equivale~t.Consequently, Avicenna's theory of predication bi'l-tash~fk-as Wl~lbe shown-does not have an important part in shaping hIS own pOSItion regarding theological language, while Aquinas' theory of analogical predication plays a crucial role in this regard.

To sum up, according to Avicenna we cannot ~ow God'~ essenceand cannot name him in himself, because God IS too subhme andtoo majestic to be comprehended by us. We know G?d t~roug~ creation because he is the origin of everything; creatlOn Itself IS theconcomitant of God's being. As an effect it reflects its cause. Hence,

the perfections therein, starting with 'being,' are given by God, andare indicative of God's perfections. However, God is different fromcreation as well, inasmuch as God is the cause and origin of it. Thusfor Avicenna, there is not only a relationship of similarity betweenGod and creation, but one of dissimilarity as well. Creation is similar to God inasmuch as it is God's effect and reveals God's perfections. God is known to us through positive and negative attributeson the basis of the dual relationship between God and creation. Butperfections are not found in God and in creation in the same manner and to the same degree. Since God is the origin and true ownerof perfections, he has them primarily while creatures have them secondarily. In other words perfections are predicated of God and creatures bi'l-tashkfk, according to the order of priority and posteriority.

Aquinas' Theory rf Theological Language

Aquinas presents his position regarding human knowledge of Godand his doctrine of predicating properties of God in a more elaborate fashion than Avicenna. My presentation of Aquinas' conceptionof God's properties will follow a similar pattern to my presentationof Avicenna's conception, and will enable us to see the similaritiesbetween Avicenna and Aquinas. Since Aquinas' theory of analogical predication plays a crucial role in determining how to considertheological statements with respect to philosophical assessment, I putmore emphasis on his theory of analogical predication. Mter a briefs~atement of his position, I will discuss reactions to and interpretahons of Aquinas' position in present-day scholarship. One line oft?0u~ht emphasizes the negative aspect with approval; another emphaSIzes It but considers his position less satisfactory in explaining humanspeech about God. I will argue that Aquinas' position secures humansp.eech about God more reliably than some scholars think. The neg~hve element in Aquinas' theology in general and his position regardlUg theological language in particular function as a guideline inspeaking about God. Instead of diminishing the force of humanSpeech about God, the negative element indicates the limits and rulesfor, Our speaking about God. Consequently, Aquinas' theory of analo~c~ predication does not devalue theological statements, but definestheIr limits. As long as one takes these specific conditions into accountone is justified in assessing theological statements-statements tha~


are made by fellow human beings-philosophically. If one does nottake the specific conditions of theological statements into account,then one will be unjust in one's criticism of theological language byexpecting more than the nature of theological statements allows.

We Cannot Know God's Essence

Aquinas contends throughout his works that we cannot know God'sessence in purely positive terms: we cannot know what he is in himself, but we can know what he is not. Aquinas' frequent remindersof God's unknowability in himself taken together with his teachingthat some of our terms apply to God not metaphorically but literally have received different interpretations from scholars. Even thoughthe assessment of the scope of the negative aspect of Aquinas' theology varies from one scholar to another, it is certain that Aquinasdoes not categorically deny the human mind all knowledge of God.

36

In ST question 12, Aquinas exclusively discusses the problem ofour knowledge of God's essence. There he makes a distinction betweenseeing God and comprehending God. Whereas he denies the comprehension of God to any creature forever,37 he argues that thehuman mind can know something about God's essence. In article1, he argues that the created mind can see God's essence, not onlyon the grounds of faith but also on philosophical grounds. Nevertheless,he clarifies that this kind of knowledge of God, namely seeing God'sessence, is not possible for human beings in this life, because humanknowledge depends on the manner in which human beings haveexistence. In this life the human soul has its being in union withcorporeal matter. It knows material forms and other things insofaras they can be known through them. Since God's essence is not amaterial form and the knowledge of God attained through the created likeness is not of the divine essence in itself, the human mindcannot know God's essence in itself in this life. 38 This is a subtle butcrucial aspect of Thomistic philosophy which I will take up in more

detail below.Having a quidditative knowledge of God, or knowing God's essence

in itself, is different from knowing God through a created likeness.

36 Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), p. 41.37 ST la. 12, 7.38 ST la. 12, 11. See also ST la. 12, 2 and 4.

When Aquinas argues that in this life we cannot see God's essence,what he is denying to the human intellect is a quidditative knowledge of God equivalent to human knowledge of other things according to their definitions or their causes. Yet he does not deny thatthe human mind can have some positive knowledge of God. In hiscommentary on Boethius' De trinitate, Aquinas states that somethingis known either through the form that is proper to a thing, or throughthe form of something similar. In the case of God we do not knowGod through the form that is proper to himself, but we know himthrough the likeness that created things have to him. 39 In the Deveritate, we find a more decisive statement of Aquinas' position. Heargues that we know what something is when we can define it. AsJohn F. Wippel puts it, the intellect is said to know something "whenit conceives a form which corresponds in every way to that thingitself. Whatever our intellect may conceive about God, this cannotperfectly represent him. "40 It does, however, as we will see, somewhat represent him.

39 De trinitate, q.l, a.2. English translation of Aquinas' commentary on Boethius'De trinitate: Thomas Aquinas, Faith, Reason, and 7heology: Qyestions I-IV ofhis Commentaryon the De trinitate of Boethius, trans. & ed. Armand Maurer (Toronto & Ontario:Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), pp. 21-22. It is interesting that in~he De trinitate, Aquinas argues that through creation we can only know that GodIS an~ when it comes to what God is we know by transcendence, negation andcausahty. In ST la 12, 12, he states that through creation we know that God existsand alS? "that he has whate~er must belong to the first cause of all things." Thiss~ows, m a sense, that Aqumas clarifies or develops his position in his ST, and~ves m?re value to the knowledge of God that we attain through creatures. ThisIS also m agreement with Wippel's argument that Aquinas adds precision in hislater works in his theory of analogical predication against agnostic positions suchas tha.t of Maimonides. John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in 7homas Aquinas(Washmgton, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1984), p. 286. LawrenceMoonan has similar interpretation of Aquinas' position. He argues that with regardto our knowledge of God Aquinas' position evolves from a more reserved to a lessreserved one. Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power (Oxford: Clarendon 1994) pp.231-235. ' ,

40 J. F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on What Philosophers Can Know about God"A~encan Catholic Philosophical Qyarter[y 66/3 (1992), p. 283. On p. 286, Wippel mai~tains~ "In my view, in here defending our ability to apply some names to God substantIally, Thomas has now developed his position somewhat. He continues to insisthowever, that this does not mean that we can comprehend or define the divin~esse?ce, or know what it is. It also means that, against the position of the medievalJeWIsh philosopher, Moses Maimonides, he clearly defends some kind of positive oraflinnative knowledge of G~d." What Wippel says here for the de potentia is applica~le to ST as well. Hence, It would not be wrong to say that Aquinas' position inthis regard gradually evolves to one in which he acknowledges a broader scope ora more rationally grounded admission in regard to human knowledge of God.'


In SeC I, 14, where Aquinas argues that we cannot know whatGod is positively but can through negation, he states the parallelbetween giving definitions of created things and negating things ofGod.4! The activity of negating more and more things of God issimilar to defining things by first giving the genus of a certain thingand adding its differentiae from other things. Of course, giving thedefinition of created things aims at a positive knowledge of them,while negating things of God does not presume to provide a posi

tive knowledge of God.For Aquinas, since we cannot know God in himself, the most

appropriate name for God is the least determinate name. In an interesting passage in the Summa theologiae la. 13, 11, Aquinas treats thequestion of whether "HE WHO IS is the Most Appropriate Namefor God."42 He argues that 'he who is' is the most appropriate namefor God for three reasons. The first reason is the meaning of thename in itself. This name expresses only existence. Since God'sessence is being, and only God's essence is being, this name is themost appropriate name. The second reason is the universality orbroadness of the scope of this name. In this life we cannot graspwhat God's essence is, and however we think of him we fail to havefull understanding of him. Thus, since this name is unrestricted,indeed since it is less determinate and simpler, it is the most appropriate name for God. The third reason is that the wording of 'Hewho is' is in the present tense. For God, to whom past and futureare not applicable at all, this name is the most appropriate name,even though the present is also not applicable to God inasmuch asit implies being in time.43

Cod Is Known through Creation

We do not have a quidditative knowledge of God in this world,because the manner in which we have being in this world limits the

41 SeC l, 14 [2] and [3].42 ST la. 13, 11, and ad I. A similar discussion also occurs in Thomas Aquinas,

Qyestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei in Qy~estiones disf!.utatae, volumen 11. editio X. Taurini.Ed. P. Bazzi, [et al.] (Rome: 1965). EnglIsh translatIOn, On the Power qfGod (Qyaestzonesde potentia Dei), trans. English Dominican Fathers (London: Bums. Gates ~ Wash~oume,1932-1934) (Henceforth De potentia) VII, 5. The answer to thIS questIon remmds usof Avicenna's contention that the most appropriate thing we can say about God isthat 'he is' or 'he is whatever he is,' since God cannot be expressed, cannot betalked about, as he is in himself.

.t~ 1''7""' T _ 1 () 1 ~.-l '2

reach of our knowledge. But we can attain a certain kind of knowledge of God through the creatures that are in fact within the limits of our reach. The human knowledge of God in this life is throughcreatures, because creatures, as the effects of God, reflect God, andare similar to him.

Although human knowledge concerning God is limited, humanbeings can know that God has perfection properties in addition toknowing God's existence. As part of his discussions regarding theunknowability of God's essence by human beings in this life, Aquinasunderscores the limited character of human knowledge. In this life,the knowledge that corresponds to the capabilities of the human souloriginates from the senses. Starting with sense-perceptual knowledge,the human soul reaches the forms of realities. This knowledge is nottrivial, even if it does not include the quidditative knowledge of God.It leads us to know not only that God exists but also that he musthave certain perfections:

The knowledge that is natural to us has its source in the senses andextends just so far as it can be led by sensible things; from these, however, our understanding cannot reach to the divine essence. Sensiblecreatures are effects of God which are less than typical of the powerof their cause, so knowing them does not lead us to understand thewhole power of God and thus we do not see his essence. They arenevertheless effects depending from a cause, and so we can at leastbe led from them to know of God that he exists and that he has whatever must belong to the first cause of all things which is beyond allthat is caused.44

In ST la. 13, 1, Aquinas refers back to ST la. 12, 12 confirmingthat in this world our knowledge of God is through our knowledgeof creatures. Based on our knowledge of creatures, we know thatGod is the cause of them; he surpasses them, and he lacks anythingcreaturely. We are, despite the last two points, also able to makepredications of God because of our knowledge of creatures as hiseffects.45

The similarity of creatures to their cause can be traced throughthe principle that every agent does something similar to itself. 46 InSeC I, 29, Aquinas sets the stage to discuss how we ascend to the

44 ST la. 12, 12.45 ST la. 13, 1.46 SeC l, 29 [2]; De potentia VII, 5. John F. Wippel, the Metaphysical 7hought

of 7homas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America, 2000),PP·517-."J1R.


knowledge of God through the knowledge that we attain from creatures. Since what we know directly comes from creatures, there mustbe a ground to justify our talking about God based on our knowledge gained from creatures. The justification of how we can knowsomething of God in positive terms on the basis of our knowledgeof creatures is the similarity between God as cause and creatures ashis effects. Aquinas argues that since God has given all the perfections that creatures possess, these perfections must somehow be foundin God.

Cod Has Negative and Positive Properties

The similarity and the dissimilarity between God and creatures determine whether properties are negated or affirmed of God. It is thesimilarity of God's effects to their cause that guarantees for us atleast some knowledge of God. This similarity of creatures to God isagain the basis upon which some properties are either negated oraffirmed of God. Affirming similarity of two things implies their dissimilarity, because it amounts to not only denying absolute dissimilarity, but also denying identity of the two things in question. Tothe extent that creatures are not similar to God, the properties wefind in creatures should be negated of God. In turn, to the extentthat creatures are similar to God, the properties we find in creatures should be affirmed of God, although not absolutely, that is,not in precisely the same way.

Since God is different from his creatures, God has negative attributes. Pursuing God's otherness from creatures increases our knowledge of God, even if it is expressed in negative terms. In ST,immediately after arguing for the existence of God, Aquinas undertakes the task of clarifying "the ways in which God does not exist."47From question 3 through question 11, Aquinas explains how Godis not, such as being composite, changeable, material. In SeC I, 14,Aquinas explains why we need to use negation in order to knowGod. He states that we cannot know God in himself, because hesurpasses our understanding. We cannot know God in a purely positive way, but we can come closer in our knowledge of God by nega-

47 ST la. prologue (prooemium) to question 3. Here Aquinas, at the end of question 2 gives his plan for the rest of his investigation into questions concerning Godin himself.

• 48 Th' ktlOnS. mgs are nown not only directly but also through theirdistinction from other things. Since we do not know what God isin himself, we must frame the distinction between God and creationin negative terms. Although these negative distinctions do not showwhat God is, they show at least what God is not. Mter setting thestage for using negations in order to know something of God, Aquinasdevotes 14 chapters to explaining what are the things that need tobe negated of God. The basic idea behind all these negations is thepolarity between God and creation. All these negations emphasizeGod's otherness from creatures. 49

Since creatures are similar to God, God has positive attributes.Perhaps it is Aquinas' bold assertion regarding the positive properties of God that puts him in a distinctive place among medievalphilosophers. For Aquinas, pure perfections, such as being, goodnessand wisdom, are properly predicated of God: they say somethingabout what God is, even if they do so inadequately.50 Aquinas arguesthat the perfections that we see in creatures are found in God without reducing them solely to God's actions. That is, saying that Godhas pure perfections does not mean that God causes them but doesnot himself possess them in any manner. Aquinas consistently arguesthat not all the perfections we find in creatures are limited to creatures. They are found in God, though not in the way they are foundin creatures. If God did not have these perfections in some way,then all that we could say about God would be limited to pure negations or declarations that he caused something but is in no way likewhat he caused. In fact, the divine perfections are interpreted inboth ways by Aquinas' predecessors. Mter a brief survey of otherphilosophers such as Maimonides, and Muslim thinkers, most likely

48 Aquinas, ScG I, 14 [2].49 Norman Kretzmann gives a detailed list of properties that Aquinas, in ScG I,

15-28, negates from God: "(A) anything that begins or ceases to exist, (B) tempo~, (C) depe~dent for i.ts .e;astence on anything other than itself, (D) anything thatm3S a?y passIve p.otentlahtles, (E) matter, .or .anything material, (F) the universalunatenal ca~se (pnme mat~er), (G) composIte III any way, (H) subject to anything( natural, vlOl~nt, or coerClv~, (I) corporeal, whet~er a body or. a power in a body,J) other than ItS own essenhal nature, (K) anythlllg whose belllg is other than its

nature, (L) anything that has any accidental characteristics, (M) specified by differentiae(N) ~lassified within any genus or category, (0) defined, (P) the subject of an ~P~on de~onstration, (Q) a universal formal cause, (R) the form of any particularthing, (8) Imperfect." Norman Kertzmann, the Metaphysics qf 7heism: Aquinas's Naturaln::logy in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 118.

ST la. 13, 2.


including Avicenna,JI Aquinas argues for a stronger pOSItIOn. Forhim, some of these names say something of what God is. Eventhough we first know the perfections in creatures, these perfectionsare also predicated of God in a substantial or formal way. The basisof such predications is the fact that the perfections found in creatures represent God's perfections.52

God Has Perftctions in a Different Mode ]ram Creatures

Aquinas has concerns similar to those of Avicenna regarding themanner in which God has perfection properties. Like Avicenna,Aquinas maintains that God has perfections in a manner differentfrom creation. The manner in which God has perfections is characterized by the manner in which God is. Since God is simple,immutable, infinite, necessary, eternal etc., perfections are found inGod simply, necessarily, immutably. In contrast to those who reduceGod's properties either to pure negations of properties in creaturesor to declaring that God caused them but in no way is like them,Aquinas argues that some properties are predicated of God in a substantial or formal way. They say something about what God is. If,then, they are found in such a way in God, then one must explainhow the attribution of these perfections to God does not violate thebeliever's conception of God as a transcendent being. Arguing thatthe manner in which God has perfection properties is determinedby divine formal features, such as simplicity and infinity, Aquinas

51 In ST la. 13, 2, after stating that Maimonides interprets affirmative statementsabout God as negations, Aquinas-referring to the interpretation of the perfectionsattributed to God as merely caused by him-says that "Others said that such sentences were used to signify the relation of God to creatures, so that when we say'God is good' we mean that God is the cause of goodness in things, and likewisein other such propositions." The reference of the expression "others" may be Muslimphilosophers, including Avicenna. See H. A. Wolfson, "St. Thomas on DivineAttributes," in Studies in Maimonides and St. 7homas Aquinas, ed. Jacob I. Dienstag,(Ktav Publishing, 1975), pp. 8-9/680-68l.

52 ST la. 13, 2, De potentia VII, 5. Through his emphasis that perfections arefound in God, and predicated of God in the category of substance, Aquinas arguesfor a stronger position. He diverges not only from Maimonides and Avicenna, butalso from Pseudo-Dionysius, whom he considers as an authority. Rudi A. Te Velde,Participation and Substantiality in 7homas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995),pp. 261-265. For a detailed discussion of Aquinas' inheritance and modification ofthe Pseudo-Dionysian theology, see Fran O'rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysicsof Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1992).

clearly sets the manner in which God has perfections apart from theway creation has them.

Unlike creatures, God has perfections in accord with his simplicity. In creatures perfection properties denote (1) something differentfrom other perfection properties, (2) something different from thecreature's essence. Aquinas gives the example of wisdom. If it ispredicated, for example, of a man, then it signifies something differentfrom his power, his will, as well as something distinct from his essence.In this sense each perfection property indicates something distinctfrom other perfection properties, and it is limited to a certain aspectof the person who is wise. However, in the case of God, perfectionsare not something extraneous to his essence. They do not have adistinct existence from each other, indicating a certain limited aspectof God. What a perfection property signifies when it is predicatedof God "is not confined by the meaning of our word but goes beyondit."53 In brief, God is not wise accidentally. He is wise essentially.His being is to be wise.

Although all the divine names, or perfection properties, signify oneand the same thing because of God's simplicity, they are not synonymous. Despite the belief that God is simple, we attribute to himmany perfection properties. Consequently, in our way of speakinghe is considered in the way composite things are. Aquinas arguesthat since we know these perfections as they are found in creatures,we understand God's perfections through the concepts that are appropriate to the perfections as they are found in creatures. But, in fact,perfections are found in God in a simple and unified manner. Henceit is because of the perfection of God's unity or simplicity that theperfections found in creatures in a divided way are found in him ina simple and unified way.54 Although the perfections we attribute toGod are not distinct from each other in God, the names we use todenote these perfections have different meanings, that is, they arenot synonyms.

God's being infinite and unlimited may be given as another example to indicate that God has perfections in a different manner fromcreation. God has perfections eminently, whereas creatures have their

53 ST la. 13, 5. See also SeC I, 32 [2], [4], [7], De potentia VII, 7. In SeC I, 32[4] Aq~inas states that perfections are not predicated of God as properties, sincehe conSIders them to be in the category of accident.

54 ST la. 13, 4, and ad 3 and 5; SeC I, 31, [4].


perfections in a limited manner. The perfections creatures have primarily belong to God. Creatures have these perfections because, asGod's effects, they reflect God's perfections. However, since they donot reflect God fully, they fall short of representing God's full power.These perfections are not found in created things in a manner similar to the manner that they are found in GOd.55 Given that weknow those perfections as they are found in creatures, and that theyfall short of representing the way they are found in God, from ahuman point of view they are said to be found in God eminently.56

In ScC I, 30, Aquinas presents a further clarification of what theeminence, or supereminence, of perfections means. He suggests ahierarchy in speaking of perfections. Perfections as they are knownfrom creatures are given the names they have as they are in creatures. But since such perfections are not restricted to creatures-tothe contrary, God has them primarily and since God surpasses creaturely limits-they are considered to be found in God eminently.More precisely, then, God is eminently good, or the highest good.Aquinas then talks about the mode of eminence, or 'supereminence'of these perfections. How then do we express it? He states that theirmode of supereminence can be signified either through negations,such as eternal, i.e., not temporal, infinite, or through positive proportions such as the highest good, the first cause.57

I do not intend to discuss all divine formal features in this context. However, one can safely assume that a similar paradigm isapplicable with regard to other divine formal features such as necessity, eternity, and immutability. That is, in the same manner as thedivine simplicity, they modify the divine perfections. That is, God'sknowledge and will, for example, are necessary and immutable asmuch as they are simple.

Perfections Are Predicated rif Cod Analogically

For Aquinas perfections are predicated of God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally. They cannot be predicated of Godunivocally, because God is utterly different from creatures, being simple, eternal and infinite. Perfection properties cannot be predicated

55 SeC I, 29; ST la. 13, 2 and 3, De potentia VII, 5.56 ScC I, 30 [2]; ST la. 13, 2 ad 2; ST la. 13, 3; ST la. 13, 7.57 SeC I, 30 [2] and [4].

of God and creatures equivocally. Otherwise we would not knowanything about what they mean when they are predicated of God.Aquinas proposes a way in between: analogical predication of pureperfection terms. Analogical predication would allow affirmations ofwhat God is, and would eliminate the fallacy of equivocation in ourlanguage about God.58

Aquinas argues that perfections are predicated of God and creatures according to the analogy of one to another in almost all hisworks, though he is hesitant in the De veritate. 59 In ST, Aquinas states,"words are used of God and creatures in an analogical way, that is,in accordance with a certain order between them." He mentions twomodes of analogical predication, and gives the health example. Inone mode, a term is predicated analogically of two things, becausethese two things have a certain relationship to a third thing. Healthis said of 'a diet' and a 'complexion,' because of the relation of thelatter two to the health in man-diet being the cause and complexion being the sign of health. In the second mode, a term is predicated of two things because of a relation between these two things.Health is predicated of 'diet' and 'man' because the diet is the causeof health in man.60

58 Aquinas argues that if these perfections are predicated of God and creaturesequivocally, then all speech about God would be meaningless, and philosopherswho try to prove that God exists, or who speak about God's being such and suchwould be committing the fallacy of equivocation. ST la. 13, 5. See also SeC I, 33[6] and De potentia VII, 7. There is a parallel between the structure of being andthe use of language in Aquinas. That is, since (I) there is a similarity between Godand creatures, perfection terms are not predicated of God and creatures equivocally, (2). God and creatures have different modes of being, perfection terms arenot pred.icated of them univocally, (3) perfections are found in God and creaturesbut III different modes, they are predicated of God and creatures analogically. Tosee such .a parallel between the structure of being and the use of language impliesthat Aqumas' theory of analogical predication is not simply a theory about the useof lanf?Uage. For discussions concerning whether Aquinas simply offers a theory~g~di~g the use .of terms, or w?ether his theory of analogical predications hasunplicatlO~s reg~rding the conceptIOn of God see: Neil A. Stubbens, "Naming God:Moses Malmomdes and Thomas Aquinas," Thomist 54 (April 1990) p. 267.

59JFW' I"Th . ,. . Ippe , omas Aqumas on What Philosophers Can Know about God"pp. 293-.295: Wippel provides a survey of Aquinas' position regarding the analo~ical predicatlOn throughout Aquinas' works.• 60 S! la. 13, 5. In ~he De potentia he c.ites tw? kinds of analogy, (I) a property~ pr~dicated or two thmgs because of their relation to a third thing, such as being: sald of q~allty ~nd quantity on ~he basis of their relation to substance, and (2)

property IS predicated of two thmgs because of the relation of the one to theother, as being is said of substance and quantity. In the first kind of analogy, theremUst be something prior to the things of which something is predicated analogically.


Aquinas distinguishes between the signified perfections (res significata)and the manner of signifying (modus significandi) , and argues that theres significata are predicated of God and creatures because of the"order that creatures have to God as to their source and cause inwhich all the perfections of things pre-exist transcendendy."51 Whereasin univocal predication perfections are predicated of different subjects with one meaning or conception (una ratio), in analogical predication perfections indicate different connotations of the subjects tothis one thing. Aquinas gives the health example again: the predications of health in regard to diet ("this is health food") and to complexion ("you look healthy") indicates different relations to health,one as a cause of health and the other as a sign of it.52

Even though in analogical predication res significatae have differentfoundations (rationes) in their different instances of predication, thesituation between God and his creatures is not exacdy the same asthat provided by the health example. In order to see the difference,we must keep in mind that (1) perfection properties are predicatedof God and creatures because of the order of things to God as theircause, and 2) perfection properties that we know from creatures andwhich are predicated of God do not simply show God's causal activity but something found in God eminendy.53 In the health example,the form 'health' is found only in the healthy man. But the diet isnot the form of health, or does not have health formally. It is thecause of health in a healthy man. Likewise, complexion is not formally health; it is simply a sign showing that a man is formallyhealthy. However, as opposed to predication of health both of dietand complexion, some forms of perfections are found both in Godand in creatures.

Since perfections are predicated of God and creatures analogically, i.e., with different rationes of the same res significata, the question that arises is this: what is the thing that makes their rationesdifferent in their predication of God and creatures? The answer tothis question is found in the mode of existence of perfections. The

Since, Aquinas argues, there can be nothing prior to God, the analogy of many to

one is not the analogy that applies between God and creatures in predicating perfections. Only the second kind of analogy applies between God and creatures. Depotentia VII, 7.

61 ST la. 13, 5.62 ST la. 13, 5.63 ST la. 13, 2.

rationes of perfections are different when they are predicated of Godand creatures on account of the modes of existence that belong toGod and to creatures respectively.54 As I have mentioned in the previous section, whereas God has these perfections simply, eternally,infinitely, eminendy, creatures have them in their composite modeof being-in a compounded manner, temporally and finitely. A further question: What is the thing that the mode of existence corresponds to in human knowledge and in the expression of theseperfections?

In order to answer this question I should mention Aquinas' distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi of perfection terms. In 5T la 13, 3, Aquinas argues that these names areaffirmed of God on the basis of their res significata, but they are deniedof God on the basis of their modus significandi. The modus significandiis the way we signify things in a precise way when we affirm theseperfections. Aquinas states that as far as the res significata of theseperfections is concerned, they are literally predicated of God, andtheir attribution to God is more appropriate than to creatures. Butas far as their mode of signifying is concerned, their predication ofGod is inappropriate, because their mode of signification is creaturely.55 Hence it is the modus significandi in human language that corresponds to, but which cannot properly express, the mode of existenceof perfections.

Aquinas explains how our mode of signifying is appropriate forcreatures but not appropriate for God through highlighting the failure of human language to express simplicity and concreteness together.He states that we use concrete nouns to indicate completeness andsubsistence, but concrete nouns always indicate composite things.Our human expressions, if they are meant to signifY simple forms,however, are abstract and do not signify subsistence and complete~ess along with simplicity. For example God is not simply wise, butIS also wisdom itself. The abstract noun wisdom however does not. , ,SIgnifY something subsistent. Because God is both subsistent and simple, the perfection terms signify God inadequately.55

• 64 Since God is the equivocal cause-this is why univocal predication is not pos~ble between him and creatures-God's being the cause or source of the perfections does not seem to constitute a difficulty. For God's being the equivocal cause,see SeC I, 29 [2].

65 ST la. 13, 3.66 In ST la. 13, I, ad 2 and ad 3.


Still, Aquinas does not see this imperfection as something thatshould prevent us from predicating pure perfections of God. Eventhough they are not suitable for God in their creaturely signification,this does not mean that we cannot form true or valid propositionsabout God. In his discussion concerning the validity of our statements about God Aquinas emphasizes the difference between thestructure of our statements about things and things as they exist inreality. Aquinas argues that the structure of our statements does notmatch things as they exist, whether they be material objects or simple beings such as God. Thus, the fact that God is simple and wehuman beings use propositions that are not simple-since they contain at least a subject and predicate-do not make our propositionsabout God less valuable than our propositions about material things.57Our propositions about created things and about God are validbecause "the intellect does not attribute its mode of understandingto the things that it understands; for example it does not attributeimmateriality to a stone even though it knows the stone immaterially."58 Hence, if for Aquinas the inadequacy of the signification ofstatements we make about God does not make them invalid or devoidof knowledge, why cannot we assume the same thing for the modeof signification of our perfection terms when we speak of God?

'The Use qf the Negative Element in Aquinas' Position

There is an apparent difficulty in understanding Aquinas' positionregarding our knowledge of God and the expression of this knowledge. Aquinas maintains that we do not know how God is in himself in purely positive terms. We can know God more adequatelyonly through negations of perfections as they are found in creatures.

59

Throughout his writings Aquinas also reminds us that human mindcannot comprehend God (S7 la. 12, 7). However, he also maintainsthat perfection terms are predicated of God analogically, i.e., literally not metaphorically, and that those perfections belong primarilyto God and secondarily to creatures. There is a tendency amongAquinas scholars to interpret Aquinas' position in such a way that

67 57 la. 13, 12, and ad 3.68 ScC I, 36 [2].69 ScC I, 14.

strips the force from Aquinas' theory of analogical predication.Through the theory of analogical predication Aquinas allows thatwe know God in some sense and our positive predications of Godare not metaphorical inasmuch as they concern perfection terms. Asa result of the emphasis on Aquinas' frequent reminders about theunknowability of God, one can become confused about how to understand analogical predication and how to assess Aquinas' statementsabout God's perfections. If we do not know how God is in any way,then can we talk about God, or how can we understand the statements about God? Can one argue that since Aquinas is a theologian, one should not expect him to meet philosophical standards,such as coherence and implication?

In fact the ambiguity in Aquinas' position has received differentinterpretations from scholars of different backgrounds. For some ofthem, the fact that Aquinas has a negative element in his theologyis something praiseworthy. It is something that justifies why oneshould not attempt to push Aquinas' accounts of God and God'sperfections to their logical conclusions, or why one should not drawunpleasant implications. For others, Aquinas' qualifications regarding our knowledge of God's perfections amount to an ambiguity thatmakes his theology less informative and not as explanatory as onemight initially expect. 70

I would like to consider the interpretations of Josef Pieper andHarm Goris, who hold the negative dimension in Aquinas' philosophy in high esteem, and William P. Alston, who presents the position held by philosophers critical towards Aquinas' negative element.Both sides agree that in Aquinas' view we do not have determinateknowledge of God in himself. Pieper emphasizes that we do not have

7.0 Amon~ many different interpretations of Aquinas' theory of analogical predicanon, DaVld Burrell developed an interesting approach. He argued in his earlierwO:ks, such. as Aquinas: Cod and Action, that through his theory of analogical predicano.n, Aqumas offers not a t~e.ory explaining how perfections denoting God arepre~cated, but rather emphasIzmg the transcendence of God. For Aquinas analogy IS not a method to describe God but an "intellectual therapy," which relievesus from our nee~. for theo~es ~bout God. S?e Da~d Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action,~. 118: For a C~tIcal exammatlOn of Burrell s earher position, see Philip A. Rolnick,

nalogzcal Posslbllztzes (Atlanta: Scholars, 1993). In his later work, Burrell acknowledges more credibility to analogical predication in attributing perfections to Godan? c;,e~tures. David B. Burrell,. "From Analogy of "Being" to the Analogy ofBemg, m Recoverzng Nature: Essays In Natural Phzlosophy, EthiCS, and Metaphysics in HonorrifRalph McInerny, ed. Thomas Hibbs and John O'Callaghan (Indiana, Notre Dame:Notre Dame University, 1999), pp. 253-266.

56 CHAPTER ONE

r\'~'.

THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 57

quidditative knowledge of God, but only have the hope of knowGod. Goris argues that we should not assess Aquinas' teaching inpurely philosophical terms. Alston contends that Aquinas' theory ofanalogy leaves the meaning of perfection terms indeterminate, andthat perfection terms according to Aquinas' theory of analogical predication are not adequate for philosophical discussion. Against Aquinas'theory regarding theological language, he argues that perfections canbe predicated of God and of creatures univocally. Since his presentation of the problem is more direct and articulate, I mainly rely onAlston's discussion to state my position. I will argue that contraryto Alston's interpretation, Aquinas' theory of analogy does not leaveus with indeterminate conceptions of the divine perfections. Theunfavorable interpretations of Aquinas' position result from the errorof expecting that analogical predication should teach us the ratio propria of the divine perfections. The fact that we do not know the ratiopropria of the divine perfections shows only that our knowledge ofGod is limited, not that our knowledge of God is indeterminate suchthat we cannot make philosophical assertions about divine perfections or criticize those assertions. There is no compelling reason,based on Aquinas' theory of analogy, to consider statements concerning God as indeterminate, and hence not suitable for philosophical assessment.

Josif Pieper

In 'The Silence if St. 'Thomas,71 ]osef Pieper emphasizes the unknowability of things and of God in Aquinas' thought and the apophathiccharacter of his theology. He does not conclude that what we sayabout God has no philosophical rigor, but his emphasis on the ultimate unknowability of God weakens the hope of evaluating Aquinas'teachings in philosophical terms. Pieper argues that since we do notknow the relationship between God-who gives things their truthand things, we cannot know things. Since we cannot know the 'truth'of things, we cannot know God-except imperfectly-because he isonly imperfectly reflected through creatures, i.e., in as much as theyimitate their source. Hence Pieper maintains that, for Aquinas, God's

71 Josef Pieper, The Silence if St. Thomas, trans. s. J. Murray and Daniel O'Connor(New York: 1957).

knowledge is beyond our reach. We may only hope to attain thisknowledge.

Pieper discusses the concepts of the truth of things and truth ofkno,:ledge in order to clarifY what the truth of human knowledgeconSIsts o~ He states that, according to Aquinas, 'being true is beingthought eIther by God, hence being created, or by other subjects. '72

G~d's .thought, or knowledge, is the creative knowledge giving everythmg ItS truth, measuring everything but itself is not measured. It isGod's creative knowledge that makes things understandable to humanbeings. Created things in turn are measured by God's knowledge onthe one hand, and measure human knowledge on the other. Thehuman mind, however, is measured but does not measure as far asnatural beings are concerned. The truth of human knowledge dependson its conformity to the truth of creation. 73 Thus things are related(1) to God, and (2) to the human mind. Although we know thingsas they are related to the human mind, we cannot know things asthey are related to God. As Pieper states, we cannot know "the relation between natural reality and the archetypal creative thought ofGod."74

Pieper points to a vicious circle in Aquinas' thought regardinghuman knowledge of God. Because we cannot properly grasp "thecorrespondence between the original pattern in God and the created copy, in which formally and primarily the truth of things consists,"75 we cannot know the 'truth of things' perfectly. This is becauseultimately it is the divine knowledge of things that constitutes thetruth of things, and we cannot properly know what God is. We don~t ~o,: what God is, because our knowledge of God through creat~on I~ Imperfect or defective. Our knowledge of God through cre~tIOn IS defective because (1) creation can represent God onlyImperfectly, and (2) even this imperfect representation or reflectionof God is too much for the human mind to fully understand. 76

If we cannot know God without knowing creatures, and if we cannot. kn~w the truth of creatures without knowing God, then whatOptIOn IS left for us as far as the knowledge of God is concerned?

72 Pieper, op. cit., p. 50.73 Pieper, op. cit., pp. 51-57.74 Pieper, op. cit., pp. 58-59.75 Pieper, op. cit., p. 62.76 p. .. leper, op. Clt., pp. 66-67. See also Pieper's reference to Aquinas Q,uaestiones

Disputatae de Veritate V, 2 ad 11. '

77 Pieper, op. cit., p. 69.78 Pieper, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

In Pieper's own words, "St. Thomas's doctrine means that hope isthe condition of man's existence as a knowing subject, a conditionthat by its very nature cannot be fixed: it is neither comprehensionand possession nor simply non-possession, but 'not-yet-possession'."77Pieper's discussion does not directly concern the problem of analogical predication, which is the topic of my discussion here. Nevertheless it is related to this discussion. Since we name God throughcreation, and we do not know things perfectly, but only hope thatwe will know them perfectly, then we cannot properly name Godthrough creation, but only hope that we can later properly nameGod through creation.

What can we make out of this riddle? Do Thomas' teachings aspresented by Pieper mean that what Thomas or anyone says aboutGod should not be taken seriously? What would 'hoping to haveknowledge' mean, if it means to exclude the claim of knowledge? Ido not think Aquinas' writings are meant to contain no knowledgeof God, being mere instrumental statements put forward with thehope of reaching knowledge of God eventually-a hope that won'tbe fulfilled in the present life. As Pieper himself notes, despite hisreminders of the unknowability of God and things, Aquinas does notadhere to agnosticism. 78 One may take Pieper's conclusion in abroader sense to mean that Aquinas' constant reminder of theunknowability of God shows that he considers human knowledgequalified and limited. Human knowledge is conditioned by our humanity whether it concerns God or things. This would be acceptable,but the fact that human knowledge is not absolute-that is, not theknowledge the Creator has of his creation-does not mean thathuman knowledge is not reliable or offers only hope but not anykind of knowledge whatsoever. This would be a self-contradiction.There is no reason to take Aquinas' reminders regarding the unknowability of things and God to mean that he is arguing that we cannotand do not know things and God at all. To do so would renderAquinas' life-long occupation as a grand effort to create an illusion.Pieper must mean something more-but he does not express it.

Fi 79 Harm J. M. J. Goris, Free Creatures if an Eternal God: Thomas A ui G d'~~knowl~dge and .Irresistible Will (Leuven: Peeters, [1996?]). q nas on 0 s

Gons, op. Clt., p. 14.81 Goris, op. cit., p. 15.82 Goris, op. cit., p. 16.

59THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT

Harm Cons

!Iar~ Goris discusses Aquinas' approach to theological statementsIII hIS. Free Creatures if an Eternal Cod. 79 Goris argues that although thenegatIve element in Aquinas' theology does not exclude all affirmativetheo.logy, it "qualifies ~ll at,Jirm~~ve God-talk in a very radical way."80Gons first ~t~tes Aqumas pOSItIOn regarding predicating names ofGod, explammg how perfection terms are predicated of God notmet.aphorically but pr~perly or literally. Analogically predicated perfectIOn terms are predicated of God primarily and of creatures second~rily: Goris states that although Aquinas' theory of analogicalpredicatIOn expresses "confidence in the appropriateness and truthfulnes~ of human language to talk about God" there is a "negativestroke' "interwoven with all positive affirmations. "81 Based on thimperfection .of .human l~nguage about God, Goris distinguishes tw:aspects. of"thIs ImperfectIOn: (1) imperfection on "the grammaticalsyntactIcal level, and (2) imperfection on "the logical-semantic" level.

The i~perfection in human speech about God resulting from thegrammatIcal structure of human language consists of the fact thatwhen a~ attribute is predicated of something it does not show thatthe subject and the predicate are identical, i.e., are one and thesame thing. For example, when we say 'A is wise' it signifies thatthe ~roperty 'wise' inheres in the subject A, or is possessed by A,but It d~es not mean that the subject and the predicate are identical. G~ns states that Aquinas considers this deficiency of human lan~age ~n expressing d~vine pe.rf~ctions to be due to God's simplicity.Sm~e m God there IS no dIstmction between his essence and his;ttnbutes, the statem~nt, "God is wise," though true and proper,alls .short of expressmg how God is wise. To complement thisde~C1ency one should also say that 'God is wisdom itself.' However,.~emg an abstract name, 'wisdom' does not signify a subsistent being~k~ ?od. Thus, the way we signify God is again deficient. Thi~~ ~Iency re~ulting from the structure of human language applies to

. ~man discourse about God using concrete or abstract nounsadJectIves, pronouns and tensed verbs.82 '

CHAPTER ONE58


The second type of imperfection, resulting the mode of signifyingGod, is the imperfection at the logical-semantic level. Simply put,the imperfection results from the difference between the way theseperfections are found in God and the way they are found in creatures. Whereas in creatures these perfections are found in a limitedand accidental manner and are also distinct from each other, theyare found in God to a 'maximum degree.' They are identical toGod's essence, and finally they are identical to each other as well,e.g., God's wisdom is not something different from God's justice.Since "the mode of signifying that belongs to perfection-terms fitsand depends on the way in which the signified perfections exist increatures,"83 they cannot express the divine perfections. Hence wecannot predicate perfection terms of God and of creatures in the

same sense (ratio).84Does this mean (1) that we simply do not know what perfection

terms mean when they are predicated of God? Or (2) that we onlypartially know what they could mean when predicated of God? Wecannot take (1) as Goris' position, because Aquinas has clear statements to the effect that we know God, even if this knowledge isimperfect. If we take (2) to be Goris' position, then we must askwhat this partial knowledge may consist of, and how we can treatthis partial knowledge with regard to other kinds of supposedly com

prehensive human knowledge.Goris does not state exactly how this negative aspect of Aquinas'

theory would affect our assessment of Aquinas' statements concerning God. However, his statement of the methodology which he wantsto follow in his work might be taken as the reflection of his conclusion regarding the negative aspect of Aquinas' position concerning theological language. He suggests that Aquinas' texts should beread as theological texts. This means that when reading Aquinas oneshould keep in mind that Aquinas is talking about God as relatedin the Scriptures-a God who foreknows, predestines, etc. .. , Inaccordance with this idea, Goris' goal

83 Goris, op. cit., pp. 16-17.84 Goris, op. cit., p. 17. "As a consequence of this, we cannot ~ay that the per

fection-terms when predicated of God have exactly the same ratIO as when theyare predicated of creatures. They are not .said univocally ?f ?ot~ cr~atu,~es andGod, but analogically, leaving the One signified beyond their significatIOn.

is not ~o .talk abo~t the abstract concept itself of e.g. foreknowledge?r ommSCIence ~s Isolated from talking about God, and then to analyseIt and to show Its conceptual coherence with other concepts like theones of im~utability.or c~ntingency. Although conceptual analysis willplay a cr~CIal rol~ III thIS stu~y, we do not aim at constructing aclosed, fimshed lOgIcal structure III which well-defined concepts of foreknowledge, immutability, contingency etc. are the building blocks andtheir logical relations of implication the cement which links them. Weshall be talking about God who transcends all that is, all that we know,and all that we say and who, therefore, does not fit into any conceptual framework.85

Similar to this first strategy of suspending the demands of conceptual coherence and logical structure between concepts and theories. . 'Gons mtroduces a second strategy: to avoid defining God's attrib-utes, owing to our lack of knowledge or our incapability of comprehending those attributes as they are found in God.86 His thirdmethodological guideline is "to take a close look at the languageused for God: we have to start with a logical-semantic (...) andgrammatical-syntactic (...) analysis of statements like 'God foreknew','God provides' etc."87 Considering Goris' methodological guidelinesto structure his study as arguments meant to suggest the correct wayof dealing with Aquinas, I would like to make some qualifYing remarks.

Suspending the demands of conceptual coherence and logical structure between concepts and theories may be granted to religious texts,as they are not philosophical, or theological, texts. They may notbe e~pected t~ give the reader full-fledged well-constructed philosophIcal theones about how God is. However, when it comes tophilosophical and theological texts produced by a scholar, then standa~d philosophical and theological criteria, such as consistency, implicatIon, etc.... can be justifiably expected. Based on the unknowabilityof.God, if one does not expect philosophical arguments to meetphIlosophical expectations, it would hardly be possible to criticizeany theological statement. Since no ordinary man is able to have

85 Goris, op. cit., pp. 18-19.86 Goris,. op. cit., p. 19. "Stated bluntly, we do not know what God's foreknowl

~dge, prOVIdence etc. really is. They are divine acts and as such in reality'd _ucal . h th di" " I enWIt e VIne essence ItSel£ Therefore, in contrast with common procedureWe .cannot start our reflections by giving a definition of e.g. foreknowledge Fo;talking about real foreknowledge is talking about God of whom we do not knowwhat He is or how He is."

87 Goris, op. cit., p. 19.


the knowledge of God in himself, what philosophers or theologi~nsdiscuss is not whether what a proposition that asserts somethmgabout God conveys exactly how God is in himself with respect tothe point in question. To the contrary, what philosoph~rs or theologians discuss is rather concerned with-granted the avaIlable data,such as natural reason, or a certain religious text-how the conception of God in this and that way would be philosophically tenable.

The second reason Goris puts forward is acceptable, but mu~t.bequalified in keeping with Aquinas' ge~eral strategy of not. gIVm~definitions of 'divine versions' of perfectIOns. To be clear, thIS POSItion does not mean that one may neglect whether one's conceptionof a divine perfection like foreknowledge is consiste~t with ~ne'sother convictions about God. When talking about God s perfectIOns,what a theologian or philosopher seeks after is not to have totalgrasp of the perfections as they are found in God, but to ma~e areasonable, coherent expression of what one knows of God, or. thm~sone knows about God. Defining 'divine versions' of perfectIOns ISone thing; expressing divine perfections in a philos~phically tenablemanner is another. The latter is the very thing that IS expected from

a philosopher or theologian. . ' , .Now let me turn to the third factor shapmg Gons work. It IS

proper and even necessary to take into acc.ount the logical-semanticand grammatical-syntactic differences reqmred by the man~er p:rfections are found in God and in creatures, and the manner m whIchwe talk about these perfections. Without doubt human discourseabout the Creator and about creatures differ, since these two arenot equivalent. However, this does not require that human knowledge and expression of this knowledge be reasonably exclude~ fromphilosophical assessment. Worst yet would ~e to grant such l~munity to theories of some people, l.e., theologians, to the exclUSIOn ofsome others, i.e., philosophers. Such a distinction would be totally

arbitrary.

William P. Alston

William P. Alston puts the complaints of philosophers. about Aquinas'conception of theological language into two categones:

They [theological statements] (1) lack the truth conditions. and (2) ~a~not figure in reasoning in the ways. they ar~ supposed to m Thomls~lc,and other, theology ... If (I) is valid, that IS gomg to play havoc WIth

any attempt to perform inferences to or from theological statements.If it is indeterminate just what it takes to make a given (putative) statement true, then what follows from the statement, or what it followsfrom, will certainly be indeterminate, because what the statement "says"is indeterminate. But, of course, (2) can make trouble even if theological statements are as determinate as you please. For the determinate theological meaning might not be such as to underwrite theinferences that Aquinas and other theologians purport to perform.ss

These two issues are related to the res signfficata and the modus signfficandiin Aquinas' theory of theological language, respectively. However,these complaints regarding Thomas' position on theological languagedepend on a particular interpretation of Aquinas' position, namelythat (I) knowledge of perfections as they are found in creatures isnot of much help in knowing the divine perfections, for differentreasons; and (2) the limitation in the grammatical structure of humanlanguage to express the identity of God and his attributes, and theidentity of different attributes with each other, makes theologicalstatements unsuitable for reasoning; hence they cannot be understood in rational terms. In the following I will examine only the firstproblem, which is the major problem with respect to the questionwhether divine perfections are determinate enough to be assessedphilosophically. As for the second problem, I agree with Alston inthat it does not constitute a serious impediment regarding the definitemeaning of perfections, even though it constantly reminds us of theimperfection of our thought and expression of God's perfections.89

Mter stating Alston's presentation of Aquinas' position, I will discusswhether in Aquinas' theory there is no common meaning in the twopredications of perfections of God and of creation. Then I will evaluate, if there is indeed some common element, whether it is a firmenough ground to supply some truth conditions for theological statements and make them suitable for philosophical assessment.

The question whether there is a similarity between the divine perfections and the creaturely ones may be the fundamental questionwhich determines whether our knowledge of God's perfections isdeterminate enough to fit into philosophical discussions. Even though

88 William P. Alston, "Aquinas on Theological Predication: A Look Backwardand a Look Forward," in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor ifNorman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca & London: Cornell Universily, 1993),pp. 167-168.

89 Alston, op. cit., pp. 168-171.


Alston accepts that according to Aquinas 'forms of perfections' areintrinsic in God and creation,90 he hesitates to see a similarity betweenthe divine and creaturely perfection properties according to Aquinas.Alston rejects Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas' theory of analogyas the analogy of proportionality, an analogy based on the similarity of the relationships of two things to a third thing. For exampletake the term 'wise.' 'Wise' is predicated of God and of creationanalogically, because they bear similar relationships to wisdom.

9l

Against this Alston argues that the kind of analogy Aquinas seesbetween God and creation is the analogy of attribution and it is notbased on a similarity between God and creation.

We must be careful not to read Thomas on analogy in terms of thedominant current meaning of the term in which it has to do withsome likeness or similarity between things. Analogically related uses ofterms, or the things to which they are applied in these uses, need notbe markedly similar to each other. Similarity is only one of the relations that can tie together analogically related senses.92

For Alston, the fact that Aquinas does not attempt to delimit thedivine version of these perfections indicates that for Aquinas ourknowledge of divine perfections is not sufficiently determinate to usein philosophical discussions. After stating that Aquinas applies various general principles concerning God's perfections, Alston concludes:"Thus someone who is looking for as full-blooded a conception ofGod's knowledge, volition, love, or power as we have of humanknowledge, and so on, will be disappointed with what he gets fromAquinas."93 Alston gives the example of 'will,' to illustrate what itcould mean to say that 'God wills P.' If we say 'God wills P,' itmeans that God "does something of the same sort as what we callwilling by creatures, except that it is in a higher mode." "Understanding the divine sense does not give us as much as we might like to

90 Alston, op. cit., pp. 157-158. . .9\ See Alston, op. cit., p. 153; Ralph McInerny, Aqumas and Analogy (Washmgton,

D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), pp. 16-17,22-23. Both authorsnotice how Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas theory of analogy as the analogy ofproportionality misrepresents Aquinas' true .intt;ntion, and makes his theor~ of analogical predication closer to umvocal predIcatIOn. McInerny also emphaSIzes thatCajetan's interpretation denies Thomas' caution in ST la, 16, 6 saying that the ratiopropria is found in only one of the analogates, which is the reason why two instancesof the predication of a perfection term are analogical, not univocal.

92 Alston, op. cit., p. 152.93 Alston, op. cit., p. 159.

have by way of a detailed conception of what it is for God to willthat P."94

Referring to ST la. 13, 3, where Aquinas states that perfectionsare predicated of God literally, and SeC I, 30, where Aquinas statesthat perfections can be affirmed because of their meaning, Alstonclaims that 'as far as the res signijieata is concerned, Aquinas givesthe impression that he endorses univocal predication without usingthe language of 'univocity-equivocity-analogicality'. '95 Based on thisclaim, Alston states that "if the lack of univocity" is attached "onlyto the modus signijieandi," then there would not be any "room for analogically related senses."96 Later, Alston considers more passages fromAquinas, such as, ST la. 13, 2, where Aquinas states that creaturesfail to have the forms of their cause as those forms are in God and,SeC I, 32, 2 and 3, where Aquinas states that perfection terms arenot predicated of God and of creatures univocally because they donot share the same form according to the same mode of being. Basedon these passages, Alston concludes that, in Aquinas' position, creaturely terms are not fully applicable to God with respect to either"lexial" or "grammatical" aspects of their meaning. "There can beno exact reproduction of form just because creatures have in a dividedway what is found in God in an absolutely simple way without anyreal distinction among the divine perfections."97 Again, since we canattribute to God only a more eminent analogue of creaturely perfections without satisfactorily knowing what they are,98 according toAquinas' position we would not sufficiently know what the divineperfections are so that we can consider them philosophically.

Not being satisfied with Aquinas' position, Alston offers his ownsuggestion, which would make theological statements more determi~ate, providing them with truth conditions. He argues that it is posSIble to form concepts that are univocally predicated of God andcreation. In elaborating his position, Alston first examines passages

94 Alston, op. cit., pp. 160-161.95 Alston, op. cit., p. 164.9.6 Alston, .op. cit:, p. 165. Although Alston acknowledges that a term cannot have

leXIcal me~mng W1th~)Ut also having a mode of signification, here he takes Aquinast? ~e aq~umg for umvocal predication. But Aquinas only says that as far as the resS7gTlifi.cata. IS concernt;d they are 'predi~ated of God literally not metaphorically. LiteralpredicatIOn, accordmg to Aqumas, mcludes not only univocal predication but alsoanalogical and equivocal predication, and is the opposite of metaphorical p:edication

97 Alston, op. cit., pp. 166-167. .98 Ibid.


from De veritate Il, 11, ScC 1,32,2 and STla. 13,5, and he concludes that in all these passages Aquinas concludes from, "God andcreature do not share exactly the same forms" that "No terms canbe predicated univocally of God and creatures." The reason whyAquinas makes this argument, as Alston states, is that for Aquinas"terms signifY immediately our concepts, and through them the thingsof which these are concepts, this claim is based on the assumptionthat our concepts reflect precisely the ontological character of theirobjects."99 Later, Alston also underscores that the close connectionbetween concepts and the ontological character of the objects, throughwhose knowledge these concepts are formed, may not be in conformity with Aquinas' theory of how we come to name God. Sincewe first know perfections through creatures and then realize thatthese perfections primarily belong to God, if our concepts were closelytied to their objects, then it would be impossible for us to attributethese perfections to God, as it would call for separating them fromtheir creaturely features. 100

Contrary to Alston's reluctance, I think that on Aquinas' part thereis some similarity between the divine and creaturely perfections, nomatter whether we call it analogy of attribution or not. This assertion can be supported by three arguments. First, if there were nosimilarity at all between divine and creaturely perfections, then (i)we would be l~ft only with saying that God is the cause of this orthat perfection, and (ii) we could no longer talk about God and hisperfections. We could not know what they mean. However, Aquinasrejects that predicating perfections of God simply means that Godis their cause and he talks about divine perfections and their implications throughout his works. For example, he argues from the factthat 'God has knowledge' to that 'God has will.' The second argument is based on the idea that perfection properties are intrinsic toboth God and creation. As Alston himself notices, "1he causaliry hereis if such a sort as to involve transmission if firm (perfection) from cause toifftct."lOI Although the mode of their realization in God and creatures is different, they are the same perfections. Leaving aside fornow the discussion concerning the nature of this difference, let mestate my third argument, which is based on Aquinas' contention that

99 Alston, op. cit., pp. 174-175.100 Alston, op. cit., pp. 177-178.IO! Alston, op. cit., p. 157.

we predicate perfections of God, these perfections being knownthrough creatures. Although, according to Aquinas, 'ontologically' or'causally' these perfections belong to God primarily, 'semantically,'they are said primarily of creatures. We know these perfections firstin creatures, and then apply them to God, but we acknowledge thatthey belong ontologically to God primarily and 'in a higher mode.'If there were not a similarity between the divine perfections and thecreaturely ones, then we could not attribute them to God except byblind faith. We would not be able to conceive of even a nominalsimilarity between them, because we do not know the divine perfections in themselves and we cannot judge exactly how the namesof creaturely perfections are suitable to name God's perfections. Eventhough these names are names of perfections, we would not knowif they denote simply creaturely perfections or not. Thus Aquinas'theory of analogy requires a similarity between the divine and creaturely perfections from the start.

Now I would like to turn to the question whether the similaritybetween divine perfections and creaturely perfections is firm enoughas to provide us with a determinate conception of divine perfectionsso that they are suitable for philosophical discussions, permittinginferences from and implications of them. The fact that Aquinasdoes not attempt to explain what the 'divine versions' of perfectionslook like is a direct result of his position on how, or why, divineperfections are different from creaturely perfections. Whether wereduce it to simplicity or explicitly refer to other "formal features,"such as necessity, infinity and eternity, it is the divine mode of beingthat prevents human beings from knowing what the 'divine versions'of perfections are like. Since this kind of knowledge of God is in noway open to the mind of a philosopher, any attempt from Aquinas'side would show an inconsistency. However, the fact that he doesnot present "full-blooded" conceptions of the divine perfections doesnot mean that the divine perfections as we know and talk aboutthem are indeterminate. It only shows that our knowledge of thedivine perfections is imperfect in the sense that it lacks the full graspof God-comprehending God in himself. But from this one cannotconclude that the knowledge we claim to have of God is or mustbe indeterminate in such a way that makes it unsuitable for philosophical assessment.

Alston's claim-based on ST la. 13, 3, where Aquinas states thatperfections are predicated of God literally-that "as far as the res

102 Alston, op. cit., p. 164.103 See Ralph McInerny, Being and Predication (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic

University of America, 1986), p. 282.104 Thomas Aquinas, ST la. 16, 6. See also Ralph McInerny, Being and Predit;ation,

p. 281.

significata is concerned, Aquinas gives the impression that he endorsesunivocal predication without using the language of 'univocity-equivocity-analogicality"102 is an important statement that needs to be discussed. It is true that Thomas uses perfection terms for God andcreation with the same res significata literally. But I would not agreewith Alston that Aquinas is not aware of the implications of his argument. Aquinas would not accept the position that perfection termsare predicated of God and creation univocally, even though they,on Aquinas' understanding, have literal and similar meanings in theirpredication of God and of creation such that divine perfections areas determinate as creaturely perfections are for us. From the wayAlston presents univocity, it follows that univocity is determined onlyon the basis of the res significata. Of course one can take such a position, but according to Aquinas both the res significata and the modussignificandi are required in determining whether a perfection term ispredicated analogically or univocally.103

From Alston's presentation of Aquinas' position, we receive theimpression that there is an incoherence between Aquinas' statementsin ST la. 13, 3, SCC I, 30, and his statements in ST la. 13, 2, ScCI, 32, 2 and 3. As Alston presents them, while in the first group ofpassages Aquinas seems to be accepting the univocal predication ofperfection terms of God and creatures as far as res significata is concerned (as explained in the previous paragraph), in the second groupof passages Aquinas seems to argue that there can be univocal predication of terms between God and creation neither with respect tothe modus significandi nor with respect to the res significata.

In order to confirm that there is in fact no discrepancy in whatAquinas argues in different parts of his work, we need to highlightAquinas' conception of analogical predication and its difference fromunivocal predication. Aquinas distinguishes between analogical andunivocal predications on the basis of the ratio propria. If the ratio propria of a term is found in both subjects when a term is predicatedof two different things, then it is a univocal predication. If, however,the ratio propria is found only in one of the analogates and not all,then it is a case of analogical predication. 104 As opposed to a uni-

105 Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, p. 128.106 •~:Inerny: op. cit., p. 128. McInerny's explanation is obscure when he says

that It,,, enters mto the other.acco~mts," and ':rt]he ratio propria is 'the subject ofh?alth. !Iowever, the quotatIOn gIVen above m the text is clearer and coherentWIth Aqumas' theory in that in. all predications what is analogically predicated isthe. res slgnificata, and the res ;Ignificata h~s the mtio propria only in one of the precli~atlOns. So the. res slgnificata IS. found WIth ratIO propna only in one of the predicahom that combmes the res slgnificata and "one of" modi significandi. See also McInernBezng and PredicatIOn, p. 283. y,

69THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT

vocally predicated term, which has one and the same meaning (ratio)t~roughout all its predications, an analogically predicated term hasdIfferent me~nings (ratio) in its different predications, one being theproper meanmg and others having somehow divergent meanings. 105BesIdes the concept of a ratio propria Aquinas also introduces the concept of the ratio communis. A ratio communis includes all the differentbut related rationes (conceptions or meanings) of the term in its various predications. Ralph McInerny illustrates this by using Aquinas'recurre~~ example of health. The ratio propria is found only in onecompOSItIOn of the res significata and the modus significandi. The ratiopropria of health is found only in the 'subject of health.' "'Subjecto~' is a modus .significandi which if joined with the res significata con~t~t~tes t~e ratto propria. The other notions are fashioned by conJOllllng dIfferent modes to the same res significata. What then wouldthe ratio communis of the analogous name 'healthy' be? Perhaps something like: '__health'."106 Other modes of signifYing 'health' thatcould fill in the blank include 'cause of' and 'sign of'

Now let us examine what it means to predicate perfection termsof God and creatures analogically, so that we can decide whetherAquinas' theory of analogy leaves us with indeterminate conceptionsof the divine perfections. Based on the above discussions, if a perfection term is analogically predicated of God and of creatures, thenthe res significata is common to God and creation. When, for example, we say 'Socrates is wise' and 'God is wise,' the term 'wise' inthe two predications is not simply identically written and pronouncedbut has a meaning found in both of analogates. Otherwise the twoins:ances of predication would be equivocal predication, and not analOgical. However, the ratio propria of the perfection 'wise' is foundonly in one of the analogates, i.e., in God but not in Socrates. Ifthe ratio propria were found in both of the analogates, then the twopredications would be univocal not analogical. The common element

CHAPTER ONE68


in both predications is 'wise.' 'Wise', taken as the res significata, is oneand the same in both of them. However, this same res significata, wise,does not have the same ratio (conception/meaning) in the two applications. Following the analysis above regarding the constitution ofthe ratio propria, we may infer that 'wise' as the res significata with thecombination of the divine mode of being makes the ratio propria ofthe perfection 'wise.' Aquinas' theory that 'perfections primarily belongto God' confirms this result.

In order to see the extent to which creaturely perfections help usto understand divine perfections, and to decide whether creaturelyperfections help us to reach a determinate knowledge of the divineperfections, the relationship between the proper conception (ratio propria) and improper conceptions (rationes) of perfections must be clearlyidentified, as does the conception (ratio) of perfections occurring intheological statements.

It should be recalled that although perfections with their properconception are found only in God, perfections are found in God aswell as in creatures. In this regard, there is an important differencebetween Aquinas' favorite example of analogical predication, i.e.,health, and the analogical predication of perfections between Godand creatures. In the health example 'health' with the ratio propria isfound only in the predication 'x is the subject of health,' and theform health is intrinsic only to 'the subject of health.' We may predicate 'health' with the ratio propria of a man and of a horse univocally, because the form health is intrinsic to both of them. Thus, inthe health example what causes the analogical predication is the factthat in the subject of health the form is intrinsic, but in the causeof health, health is not intrinsic. Thus, the conception of health foundas a form in the subject does not help us much in understandingthe conception of health as an effect in the cause, or vice versa.However, in the case of analogical predication where God and creatures are two analogates, the cause that makes predications of perfection terms analogical is not that the form is found in one and isnot found in the other. Although God is the cause of perfections increation, Aquinas denies that when we predicate perfections of Godwe simply mean that God is the cause of this or that perfection increatures. God also has perfections. I want to emphasize that perfections are found in both God and creation, as opposed to thehealth case where the form of health is found only in the subject ofhealth.

In theological statements, perfections are predicated of God withtheir improper conception (ratio), not with their proper conception(ratio propria) as they are found in God. Let us remember that wefirst know perfections as they are found in creatures. Then, we nameGod with the perfection terms the ratio of which is not the ratiopropria, because perfections are found with the ratio propria only inGod. Since we do not know God directly, we cannot know and thusname God with the perfections according to the ratio propria. Sincewe predicate perfections of God, as Aquinas does in practice-suchperfections being known with divergent or improper conception-itmust be granted that the conception of perfections as found in creatures is applied to God in theological statements. Otherwise, we couldnot predicate perfection terms of God, since such terms are basedon creaturely perfections. In fact, this is what analogical predicationis all about: perfection terms with their improper conceptions arepredicated of God, but not based on proper conceptions of divineperfections.

Theological statements must have the same truth conditions andphilosophical value as other philosophical statements, because theconception of perfection terms we predicate of God is the same aswhen we predicate them of creatures. Aquinas' conception of divinesimplicity, as we have seen, is the major reason why Alston objectsto this claim. Since perfections are found in God in accordance withdivine simplicity, being identical to the divine essence and to eachother, perfection terms as known through creatures would not beapplicable to God. Can it really be the case that divine simplicitymakes predication of perfections of God indeterminate and thus illsuited to philosophical assessment? How does the fact that perfection properties are found in God in a simple, undivided, manneraffect our predication of perfections terms of God, and how does itaffect the philosophical value of theological statements? In otherwords, what does divine simplicity impose on us when we predicateperfections of God? Answering this question will establish the extentof conformity and difference between the proper and improper conceptions of perfections when they are analogically predicated of Godand creatures. The question needs to be divided into two parts. (1)Does considering perfections in the light of divine simplicity addsomething positive to the account of the divine perfection? If it addssomething positive, then would this new ratio of the res significata turnout to be indeterminate? (2) Does considering perfections in the light


of divine simplicity subtract anything from the creaturely account ofthe res significata, or does it limit or specify the extent to which therationes of the res significata are applicable to God? If it subtracts orlimits the extent to which the rationes of the res significata are true ofGod then does this make the new accounts of the res signigicata inde-,terminate, and thus not suitable for philosophical discussion?

For Aquinas, divine simplicity does not add anything positive tothe meanings or rationes of the perfections as far as human knowledge of and discourse about God are concerned. Accordingly, Aquinasdoes not give any positive explanation of what the rationes of thedivine perfections would be. Alston also attests this, even though heseems somehow surprised. If taking divine simplicity into account indetermining the rationes of the divine perfections can yield some further positive knowledge, then it must be possible for us humans tobe able to know what is simple. This is an attainment, according toAquinas, of which human minds are not normally capable. Sincetaking divine simplicity into consideration does not add somethingpositive to our knowledge of the divine perfections, we do not havenew rationes, with increased positive information of the divine perfections. We do not have new rationes of perfections that would beindeterminate, and hence ill-suited to philosophical considerations.

My answer to the second question is positive, and not at all acontroversial answer. Taking divine simplicity into account limits andmodifies the extent to which the rationes of perfection terms areapplied to God. In this sense divine simplicity subtracts some elements that constitute the rationes of the perfections that are first knownthrough creation. This is the case as far as our knowledge of Godis concerned, not as far as God in himself is concerned. However,subtraction may not be a good term to express the manner in whichdivine simplicity affects the conception of perfections as predicatedof God. For example, unlike human knowledge, God's knowledge isnot subject to change. While 'being subject to change' is subtractedfrom the conception of God's knowledge 'being not subject to change'is added. Hence instead of 'subtraction,' 'modification' seems to bea more suitable term to express the effect of divine simplicity.Consequently, since divine simplicity modifies the conception of theperfections, one should discuss whether this modification would makethe divine perfections indeterminate.

I do not think that the modification of the conception of the divineperfections makes the divine perfections less determinate or deprives

theological statements of the truth conditions that they otherwisewould have. This modification only removes what the divergentrationes of perfection terms imply when they are predicated of God.For example, it removes the changeability, temporality and finitude.One could argue that the void after removal of the creaturely features is filled with new features, such as immutability, eternity andfullness. However, this does not make the conceptions of divine perfections indeterminate, because these new features are either of thesame kind as those that are removed-hence they have similar truthconditions-or they do not add something positive the truth conditions of which we do not know.

From the discussion above, it follows that the simplicity of Goddoes not make divine perfections indeterminate or less determinatethan creaturely perfections. Rather it provides guidelines to distinguish the predication of perfection terms of God and of creatures.There seems to be an unfulfilled expectation driving the argumentsfor indeterminacy of our knowledge of the divine perfections, Thisunfulfilled expectation is that Aquinas does not give a positive accountof ratio propria of the divine perfections as they are different fromcreaturely perfections, but simply qualifies them as 'in a higher mode,'or 'eminently.' As I tried to show above, this attitude of Aquinas isin total conformity with his teaching that we do not know what Godis in himself. Otherwise he would have made the mistake of assuming a privilege for himself of knowing what he deems to be unknowable for ordinary human minds.

Both groups of scholars, i.e., scholars who view the negative element in St. Thomas' theology with favor and those who assume amore critical position towards it, mistake Aquinas' silence about theratio propria of the divine perfections to mean that since divine simplicity does not provide us with a determinate knowledge of whatthe ratio propria of the divine perfections is, our knowledge of thedivine perfections, hence our expression of this knowledge is indeterminate and hence ill-suited for philosophical examination. However,it is spurious to conclude from 'divine simplicity does not teach usthe ratio propria of the divine perfections' that 'if we do not know theratio propria of the divine perfections, then theological statements featuring these perfections are indeterminate and elusive of philosophicalassessment.' Based on the different modes of being, divine simplicity simply limits human knowledge of divine perfections by indicating to us where the conception of the res significata is not applicable


to God any more. Consequently, it provides us with a general framework to observe the difference between the creaturely perfectionsand the divine perfections. Let me emphasize that divine simplicitylimits our knowledge of the perfections of God but does not makeour knowledge indeterminate. Limited human knowledge concerning divine perfections may be expressed with as much philosophicalrigor as human knowledge concerning creaturely perfections. Thephilosophical rigor of theological statements, as well as its conformity to religious teachings, is insured by observation of the requirements of divine simplicity.

Contrary to negative and indeterminate interpretations of Aquinas'position on theological language, Aquinas in fact attempts to provide a firm basis for theological language so that it may be of philosophical value while doing justice to God's transcendence. Aquinaswants two things to be granted in our speech about God: (1) A distinction between the two kinds of terms with respect to predicationof God and creatures. The first category concerns the terms denoting perfections that cannot be separated from the mode of existenceof the creatures in which they are found. The second category includesterms denoting perfections that are independent of or separable fromthe mode of their existence. (2) Since what we know primarily arecreatures, those terms that signify properties that cannot be separatefrom their creaturely mode of existence can be predicated of Godonly metaphorically. Terms that signify perfections that are independent of or separable from their mode of existence can be saidof God and creatures literally, i.e., their meaning is common to allmodes of being in which they are to some extent realized. Thus,they are predicated of God and creatures not univocally but analogically. They are predicated of God and creatures, because theirratio is common to God and creatures, even though their ratio doesnot fully express God and is not identical to the ratio of perfectionsas they are found in God. Since semantically we know and expressperfections in the creaturely mode, when we predicate them of creatures we do not need to do anything extra. But since they are foundin God other than the way they are found in creation, when wepredicate them of God we must keep in mind that they are not limited, and are distinct neither from each other nor from God's essence.

The difference between the divine mode of being and the creaturely one must guide us so that we do not draw the same implications we draw from the creaturely mode of existence. We cannot

say, for example, 'God will know this and that tomorrow,' or 'Godforgot this and that,' because these implications do not apply todivine knowledge. But the fact that we cannot draw the same implications from God's perfections and from creaturely perfections doesnot mean that the res significata does not have a common meaningthat is true for God and creation. Based on the fact that we canonly predicate perfections known through creatures, one cannot arguefrom that 'we cannot grasp the whole picture,' to 'we cannot orshould not expect from our knowledge of God, attained through creation, to meet philosophical expectations.' One can and should thinkcritically about any claim of knowledge about God attained throughcreation in order to get a better 'human' understanding of God, notin order to comprehend God's essence. In our discussions of God'sperfections what we discuss is not the perfections as they are foundin God, as infinite, ultimate and unknowable, but our understanding of God as revealed through creation and modified through thedivine simplicity, immutability etc.

Contrary to Pieper's thesis, I argued that Aquinas' reminders ofthe unknowability of God indicate that our knowledge is limited, notthat we do not know God at all or our knowledge of God is notreliable. I tried to show that Goris' strategy to study Aquinas' philosophy, taken as philosophical arguments, exaggerates Aquinas'emphasis on the unknowability of God. I postponed discussing Goris'argument for not assessing Aquinas' teaching on purely philosophical grounds on the basis of Aquinas' theory of analogy to my discussions of Alston's arguments. I have discussed Alston's positiondefending that Aquinas' theory of analogy makes the divine perfections indeterminate, thus not suitable for philosophical discussion.Against Alston's position, I tried to show that although Aquinas' theory of analogy does not help us to know the 'divine versions of perfections,' predication of perfections of God is as determinate aspredication of creaturely perfections of creatures. Therefore, theological statements fit into philosophical assessment as much as otherphilosophical statements.

Conclusion if Chapter One

Regarding our knowledge and discourse about God, there are pointson which Avicenna and Aquinas agree. They agree that (1) we do


not know God in himself, (2) we know God through creation, and(3) we do not predicate perfections of God and of creatures eitherunivocally or equivocally. There is a similarity between Avicenna'sconcept of tashk'ik and Thomas Aquinas' concept of analogical predication. Avicenna's use of the term 'tashk'ik' -expressing predicationof perfections of God and of creatures-conforms to Aquinas' useof analogy, in the sense that it excludes univocal predication andacknowledges an order between God and creatures with regard tohaving perfections, God being the source of perfections of creatures.

In other respects, Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions regarding theological language diverge from each other. This divergence is thefact that Avicenna's theory of predication by tashk'ik is not a welldefined explanation of theological language and does not play a central role in Avicenna's conception of theological language, whereasAquinas' conception of analogy plays a central role providing clearguidelines regarding how to talk about God. From the ambiguityand scarceness of his discussion of this topic, one can conclude thatAvicenna does not seem to intend to develop a theory of theological language, but simply wants to state that properties are not saidof God and of creatures in the same sense.

This ambiguity may be discerned in his going back and forthbetween arguing that God's attributes are either negations or relations and affirming that God has all perfections. He tends to reducethe positive properties to relations, even though his position in theMetaplrysies of The Healing and other works may show some variations. Although he does not want to say that God is devoid of perfections, he underlines the relational character of divine attributes aswe know them. Out of caution, he wavers between affirming themand reducing them to mere relations. This is why some authorsargued that for Avicenna God does not have properties.

Even though Avicenna argues, in many places but not all, thatthe positive attributes of God should be reduced to relations, andthat they should not be taken as showing something of what Godis, in practice this cannot be the case, because such a position wouldsuffer from the fallacy of equivocation. We may think that Avicennawas fully aware that the perfections attributed to God do not showanything more than that God is the source of those creaturely perfections. If we follow this line, then Avicenna's position regardingGod and his attributes would amount to the fallacy of equivocationand would be meaningless. Such an interpretation does not seem to

explain Avicenna's theological discussions, since Avicenna only heldthat one cannot predicate perfections of God and creatures univoeally. However, he was not able to provide a theory to explain howthey are predicated of God and creatures. His conception of tashk'ikserves only to indicate that they are not predicated univoeally but nothow they are predicated. As will be explored in chapter 2, he modifiesperfection properties in the light of the divine formal features so thatthey are predicated of God.

Unlike Avicenna, Aquinas argues that the perfections that areaffirmed of God show what God is, but are found in God supereminently. In SeC, he argues that their mode of supereminenceamounts to either a negation or a relation, which seems like a position closer to that of Avicenna. However, Aquinas takes a bolderposition in his ST and De potentia, which are written later than SeC.There Aquinas seems to emphasize that perfections are found inGod and creatures, and they cannot be reduced to relations. Consequently one can argue, at least, that Aquinas has a more stronglyheld position in affirming that God has perfection properties.

Aquinas' distinction between res signifieata and modus signifieandi ofperfection terms plays a crucial role in his taking the discussion upa step further than his predecessors with regard to the predicationof the divine perfections. Avicenna did not argue that God is devoidof perfections, but the fact that we know these perfections in creatures made him hesitate between affirming on the one hand thatthese perfections are also found in God and reducing them to relations on the other. This is because the perfections as they are foundin creatures cannot be attributed to God, who is the simple, eternal, immutable being. Since he did not want to deny these perfections to God-as he conceived God to be the source of all beingand perfection, just as Aquinas did-Avicenna tended to interpretthe perfections as relations, i.e., the perfection terms predicated ofGod in relation to creation. However, Aquinas' clarification that theway we express these perfections are creaturely, and 'it is not andcannot be divine' made it easy for him to argue that these perfectionsprimarily belong to God. This impacts how they handle the relationship between God and creatures. For example, even though bothargue that God is simple, Avicenna argues that because of his simplicity God creates only one simple intellect immediately. For Aquinas,it is quite the contrary. Hence, it is an important achievement ofAquinas that he was careful about the limits of human knowledge

and its conformity to reality. That is, he considered how limitedhuman knowledge is applicable to conceiving the divine reality andexpressing it. Likewise, his position allowed him to not expect thathuman knowledge must conform to the divine reality in order totalk about God with the claim of knowledge. Nevertheless even afterarguing for analogical predication, Aquinas prefers the negative wayand this shows that his affiliation with Pseudo-Dionysius continued.

Both Avicenna's and Aquinas' theological statements are well-suitable for philosophical assessment, although they argue that God isultimately unknowable. Furthermore the fact that Aquinas is a theologian does not justify that his theological views be exempt fromphilosophical examination. If at all, such an exemption would go toAvicenna, because although Avicenna affirms that properties arepredicated of God and of creatures according to tashkik, he does nothave a full-fledged theory regarding theological language. Aquinas,however, does have a well-articulated theory of theological language,indicating not only that properties are predicated of God and ofcreatures non-univocally, but also including the rules determininghow and to what extent perfections of two analogates conform. Sinceboth assume God's unknowability and since Aquinas has well-articulated position regarding theological language and the value of predicating properties of God, whatever is applicable to Avicenna'stheological ideas is also applicable to those of Aquinas. That is, ifAvicenna's theories can rightfully be subject to philosophical assessment and are philosophically valuable, then Aquinas' theories, in thisregard, are also suitable-even more eligible-to philosophical assessment. I do not see any reason to exempt Avicenna's and Aquinas'positions from being subject to philosophical assessment.

78 CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTION OF GOD ANDTHEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

Attempting to state Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas' conception ofGod, I will discuss their conception of divine formal features anddivine knowledge. Accordingly, this chapter comprises three sections,two of them are devoted to discussion of Avicenna's and Aquinas'positions concerning divine formal features and knowledge, and onesection devoted to the way divine formal features modify their positions regarding theological language.

I include a discussion of divine knowledge in this chapter becausedivine knowledge is closely connected to the discussions of the natureof the creative action as well as the beginning of the universe. Sincethe divine will as the cause of the universe will be discussed in chapter 3, I will not discuss it here, even though it is in a sense on thesame level with the divine knowledge of the universe.

A discussion of Avicenna's and Aquinas' conceptions of God's simplicity, immutability, eternality and necessity, i.e., divine formal features, seems crucial not only for issues related to theological languagebut also for issues related to creation. A statement of their conception of divine formal features is important for a better understanding of Avicenna's and Aquinas' conception of theological language,because their conceptions of divine formal features modify the waythey talk about God.

Discussion of divine formal features will also help us better understand their arguments regarding the nature of the divine creativeaction and the beginning of the universe. At first glance, for someone who argues for the sempiternity of the world, i.e., that the universe has always existed, those who defend the temporal beginningof the universe should hold that God is not simple, that he is changeable, and that his knowledge is changeable. One might expect, atleast, that Avicenna and Aquinas conceive of God's formal or nonformal attributes differently, if their position on the question of thebeginning of the universe is consistent with their conceptions of God.That is, since Avicenna defends the position that the universe has

80 CHAPTER '!WO CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 81

always existed, and Aquinas argues that the arguments for the sempiternity of the universe do not yield necessary conclusions, theneither each of them conceives of God in a different manner fromthe other-so that their conception of God is consistent with theirrespective positions concerning the beginning of the universe-orthey have similar conceptions of God, and regarding the beginningof the universe one of them takes a position that is more coherent.

The distinction between formal and non-formal divine propertiesis based on whether a property says something of what God is, orof how God is. David B. Burrell calls 'formal features' the properties that modify the mode in which God has the perfection properties he has. While non-formal properties tell something about whattheir subject is, formal properties do not directly tell us what theirsubject is. For example, simplicity, as a formal property, does nottell us about the subject that has this formal feature the way a perfection property, such as will, does. Formal features concern the ontological constitution, or the mode of existence, of the subject. Burrellstates " 'Formal properties' are not so much said of a subject, asthey are reflected in a subject's very mode of existing, and governthe way anything might be said of that subject."l Besides simplicity,limitlessness, unchangeableness, necessity, unity and eternity areincluded among the formal features. As opposed to perfection-terms,like good and wise, formal features are treated as negations byAquinas and Avicenna. 2

Avicenna and Aquinas agree that (1) God is simple, (2) God isnecessary and immutable, (3) God is eternal, and (4) God has knowledge of himself and creation. Simplicity seems to imply self-necessity, immutability and eternity. That is, if you take one in, then youmust take in the others, too. As for (1), God does not have a quiddity in addition to his being; God is an intellect, or intelligent being;the perfections that God has are identical to God's essence. Regarding(2), Avicenna emphasizes the necessity of God, while Aquinas emphasizes the immutability of God. However, the ontological aspect ofAvicenna's conception of necessity collapses to immutability. Thus,both argue that God is altogether immutable. Regarding (3), although

1 David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Slnii, Maimonides, Aquinas (NotreDame, Indiana: Notre Dame, 1986), p. 47.

2 For Burrell's discussion of divine formal features, see ibid., pp. 46-50.

Avicenna does not have discussions devoted to it, both seem to havea similar conception of the eternity of God. That is, God has beingin and of himself, God has all his being at once, and is not in needof further perfection. Regarding (4), God's knowledge of other things,both argue that God has one knowledge, God knows primarily himself, and God's self-knowledge is inclusive of his knowledge of otherthings. His knowledge of other things is in accordance with his being,which is simple, immutable, intellectual and eternal.

However, Avicenna and Aquinas have dramatically different positions with regard to taking divine formal features into account withrespect to theological language. Whereas Avicenna tries to modifythe application of perfection properties to God in the light of thedivine formal features, Aquinas does not concern himself with it,because he acknowledges that we do not need to and we cannotspeak about God as he is in himself. That is, while Aquinas is content with simply removing the creaturely implications of perfectionsin predicating them of God, Avicenna wants additionally to modifythem in accordance with the divine formal features. While Avicennaadopts what I call a reductive strategy, Aquinas follows what I callan appreciative strategy traceable to his well thought-out theory ofanalogical predication. His ease in talking about God makes Aquinasmore comfortable when explaining God's knowledge of creatures,God's being a voluntary agent, etc.

Avicenna's Conception if Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge

God Is Simple

God's simplicity is arguably the most troublesome attribute forAvicenna. 3 Avicenna's first step in arguing for God's simplicity is todeny that God has a quiddity other than being. He argues that there

3 One may want to append to the discussions regarding God's simplicity the discussions regarding God's unity. Regarding God's unity, Avicenna and Aquinas mayhave different positions. Whereas for Avicenna God's unity means God's uniqueness, Aquinas argues not only for God's unity but also for a Trinity of Persons inGod. Robert Burns rightly relates Aquinas' conception of the divine simplicity tohis rejection of a Trinitarian natural theology. Aquinas maintains that "it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason' since 'we canknow what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction

is no composItIOn of existence and quiddity in God.4 However,whether he absolutely denies that God has a quiddity at all, or heargues that God's quiddity is identical to his being is unclear. 5 Sincefor Avicenna God is 'necessary of being' (wiijib al-wu:iud), he tries toshow that 'necessity of being' (wu:iub al-wu:fud) cannot be a quiddityfor God such that it is distinct from God's being. If 'necessity ofbeing' were taken as a quiddity, then the 'necessary being' wouldnot have existence, since quiddities do not, in themselves, have existence. But the necessary being is supposed to be existent and be theorigin of the existence of other things. 6 If the necessary being hadan existence different from its quiddity, i.e., 'necessity of being,' and

of the persons'" (ST, la. 32.1). See Robert Burns, "The Divine Simplicity in StThomas," Religious Studies 25 (1989), pp. 271-293, p. 271. Hence Aquinas' discussion of the creation insofar as it is within the limits of natural reason pertains onlyto God as one. His position regarding the Trinity does not affect his discussionsconcerning his arguments on creation, as, for example, simplicity affects them. Thisis because whether the universe has temporal beginning or not is affirmed or deniedof one God as a simple being inasmuch as God is known through natural reason.Hence, I will not enter into their conception of God's unity. For Avicenna's discussion that God must be one, unique, without a similar, an associate, or an opposite, see Metaphysics VIII. 5, pp. 349-351.

4 I want to use the term quiddity instead of 'essence' to denote 'that which is'(miihiyya). The main reason for this choice is that the Arabic term 'dhiif is usuallytranslated as essence. Whereas 'dhiit' denotes an individual being and includes a reference to its existence, 'miihiyya' is indifferent to existence and applicable to manyindividual members. This is why 'the dhiit of x' can be rendered as 'being of x' aswell as 'the essence of x,' singled out as an object of thought.

5 Avicenna, Metaphysics VllI.4, p. 344.10 "The first does not have a quidditiy(miihiyya) other than being (inniyya). You know the meaning of quiddity (miihiyya),and how it differs (tufiiriq) from inniyya (being) in [respects] that it differs, from thebeginning of our explanation. Now we say: It is not appropriate for the necessarybeing to have a quiddity (miihiyya), which must have (yalzamuhii) the necessity ofbeing. Quite contrary, we say at the outset: [to be] necessary of being (wiijib alwujild) can be thought of as (yu'qal) to be identical to the necessary being (wiijibal-wujild), just as the [number] one can be thought of to be identical to one [thing)."In this paragraph Avicenna makes 'necessity of being' similar to 'one.' Just as 'beingone' is not the quiddity of anything, being a 'necessary being' is not the quiddityof God. Hence God is 'necessary being' but does not have a quiddity. For discussions of whether for Avicenna God has a quiddity, see Albert Judy, "Avicenna'sMetaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles," Angelicum 52 (1975), pp. 340-384, 541-586;53 (1976), pp. 184-226; Edward Michael Macierowski, the 7homistic Critique ifAvicennian Emanationism from the Viewpoint if the Divine Simplicity with Special Riference tothe Summa Contra Gentiles (University of Toronto, 1979, Ph. D. dissertation). In STla. 11, 1, ad 1, Aquinas argues that for Avicenna 'one' adds something to 'being.'I do not know where exactly Aquinas' reference goes, but in the paragraph that istranslated above, Avicenna assumes that 'one' does not add anything to 'being.'

6 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 345.6-11.

7 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 345.12-16.8 Ibid., p. 346.5-8.9 Ibid., p. 346.11-12. Avicenna reserves the term 'inniyya' for God's being which

is identical to his miihiyya. But it is not like the miihiyya in the sense that miihiyya isapplied to other things. Inniyya is used in the sense of existence, reality, that-ness.For a discussion of the meaning and the origin of the term 'inniyya,' see RichardFrank, "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term inniyya," Cahiers de Byrsa (Paris:1956), pp. 181-201.

IQ One may want to distinguish between 'being' and 'being a necessary being,'and argue that necessity may be considered as a quiddity for God as distinct fromhis being. But one needs to keep in mind that for Avicenna actual existence is identical to being 'necessary.' In other words, whatever exists is necessary, whatever is

83CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

if 'the necessary being' were the necessarily existing being becauseof this quiddity, then 'the in and of itself necessary being' would benecessary by something else, i.e., by its quiddity. This contradictsthe conception of a necessary being.7 Hence the necessary being doesnot have a quiddity which is additional to its being.

For Avicenna, God cannot have a quiddity because self-necessityand having a quiddity cannot go together. Being in a general sense,which is applied to everything that exists, can be an effect, i.e., somebeings are caused. But the being that is in and of itself necessarycannot be something caused. Otherwise this being would not be necessary in and of itself Since, there cannot be a quiddity due towhich the necessary being exists,S the necessary being does not havea quiddity.

That God does not have a quiddity extraneous to his being pavesthe way to the conception of God as pure being. At the end of hisdiscussion of whether God has a quiddity other than his being,Avicenna concludes, "there is no quiddity belonging to the necessary being other than that he is necessary of being. And this is being(al-inniyya)."9 Avicenna confirms that necessity of being is not something other than being (al-inniyya) , and his confirmation should betaken into account. First, he states that the necessity of being is nota quiddity of the necessary being and then he explains the expression 'the necessary being,' saying that 'this is being.' One may wantto see a difference between the implication of the terms 'necessarybeing' and simply 'being,' such that necessary being has somethingadditional to being. But here Avicenna clearly indicates that necessity of being is not something additional to being, since for him, asa general rule, actual existence is identical to being a necessarybeing. 10

CHAPTER TWO82

not necessary does not exist. For such a distinction concerning Avicenna's conception of God as necessary being, see Edward Michael Macierowski, The ThomisticCritique of Avicennian Emanationism fiom the Viewpoint of the Divine, Simpliciry with SpecialRiference to the Summa Contra Gentiles, pp. 92-118. Macierowskii compares Avicennaconception of God to that of Aquinas. He argues that where;as for Avicenna necessary existence is more fundamental in conceiving God, for Aquinas it is simply'being' without qualification. However, Macierowski misses Awicenna's point, sinceAvicenna makes painstaking efforts to argue that God does mot have a quiddity,and necessity of being cannot be God's quiddity after the mlanner of quiddity inother things. Indeed for Avicenna, God is not the only necessary being, but everyexistent thing is a necessary being. The only difference ben.ween God and otherthings with regard to necessity is that whereas God is self-necessary-which amountsto uncaused necessity-other things are necessary on account olf something else. ForAvicenna's additional arguments, see Metaphysics VIIl.4, p. 346.13 - p. 347.2.Avicenna argues that if the necessary being had a quiddity and existed by thatquiddity, then that quiddity would have being before being; lbut this is not possible. Being then would be in need of a quiddity in its own being, which is contradictory. In Book VIII, p. 346.8-12, he argues that the necressary being may beindicated (mushiirun ilayhi) by the intellect. If he had a quidditty, then this quidditywould be something different from the thing that is indicated b~ the intellect. Hencethis quiddity would be the quiddity of something else. The laLst argument assumesthat the species of immaterial things are confined to one m,ember, and that theself-necessary being is not caused.

11 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 347.9-16. Aquinas exprresses the same contention quite clearly in the ST la. 3, 4, obj. I & ad I.

After arguing that the necessary being is not composed of 'being'and a quiddity that is distinct from his being, Avicenna maintainsthat God is pure being, 'is an immaterial (mujarratd) being with thecondition that non-existence and distinguishing rmarks (aw~iif) arenegated of him.' By this, Avicenna does not wa.nt to make Goddevoid of divine perfections, but he wants to distinguish God (l)from limited beings, and (2) from the being comrrlOn to and predicated of all existent things, ens commune. II To illustrate the idea thatGod is not one of those limited beings, let's consid!er human beings.In a man, there is being, and in addition to it the:re is the quiddityof humanity. Consequendy, a human being is a limited being, sinceit is being 'with the condition of affirmation ('[jabl) of humanity ofthis being.' To illustrate the second, Avicenna uses the example ofuniversals. He contrasts this 'immaterial being' to uniiversals. Universalsare predicated of many things with some additi(on. In this sense'being,' as a common ground of all things which is predicated ofthem all, is 'being without the condition of affirrmation of properties' but not 'with the condition of negation.' Hence 'being with thecondition of negation of non-existence and properties,' denotes andbelongs to God in contrast to (1) 'being with the condition of

12 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIlI.4, p. 347.17-19.13 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIlI.4, p. 348.1-4.14 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 348.5-6. Cf. Aquinas, ST la. 3, 5. Avicenna's

argument from the fact that God is simple to the fact that God does not have agenus is circular. But the point seems to be not to establish that God does nothave a genus, or differentia-and as a result, a definition-on 'independent' groundsbut to explain the implications of God's being simple.

15 See, e.g., Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.5 p. 354.6-8; VIII.6 pp. 356-358; God isintellect because he is free from matter.

16 Avicenna's explanation of what God's being an intellection, intelligent andintelligible (knowing, knower, and known) means is a good example. Avicenna statesthat God's being an intellection, intelligent and intelligible simply means "that fromthis immaterial being (mujarrad) the allowability (jawiiz) of mixing with matter andits attachments ('alii'iq) is negated, and this being is taken with a consideration ofa certain relation." See, e.g., Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 368.1-2.

17 Avicenna, Risiila 'Arshryya, p. 5.15-19.


affirmation,' as well as (2) 'being without the condition of affirmation'of properties.

As a corollary to God's being simple or without composition, butpure being, God does not have a genus, or a differentia. Avicennaargues from that God does not have a quiddity to that God doesnot have a genus. For him, whatever does not have a quiddity alsodoes not have a genus. Genus, he argues, is in a sense a part ofthings that have it. But since God does not have composition, Goddoes not have a genus. 12 If God were to have a quiddity, it wouldeither be 'the necessity of being,' or a 'constituent of the necessarybeing.' However, in both cases the necessary being would be subsisting by something 'not necessary of being.' This, for Avicenna, isa contradiction. 13

The same reasoning, i.e., the necessary being cannot be subsistent by something else, is repeated to show that God does not havea differentia. Being without a quiddity, a genus and a differentia,Avicenna concludes that God does not have a definition, nor canthere be a demonstrative proof for God. God's action also cannotbe assigned a reason (limmiyya).14

Accordingly Avicenna asserts that God is not matter and is devoidof the attachments (lawii~iq) of matter. 15 He usually uses this formulain order to support other philosophical arguments. 16 God is separatefrom matter and he does not have a material cause, since (1) material things are possible of existence, (2) matter itself is somethingpotential and (3) does not exist without a form, i.e., only as a composite. To the contrary God is (la) the necessary being, (2a) pureact, and (3a) devoid of any composition whatsoever. 17

CHAPTER TWO84

18 The Aristotelian background of Avicenna's conception of necessity also supports such an argument. For Aristode's idea of necessity, see, Richard Sorabji,Necessiry, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. (London: D~c.kworth, 1980).

19 For Avicenna's position concerning the modahty of proposItIOns see AlienBack's "Avicenna's Conception of Modalities," Vivarium 30/2 (1992), pp. 217-255;Gerard Verbeke, 'La dialectique du possible et du necessaire', in Avicenna Latinus,

God Is Necessary and Immutable

Whereas Avicenna argues for God's self-necessity and does not offera detailed discussion of God's immutability, Aquinas does not emphasize God's necessity as much as Avicenna does, but he discussesGod's immutability in detail. However, I am going to highlight thesimilarity of functions related to their points of emphasis, rather thandirectly compare their conceptions of the necessity or immutabilityof God. That is, I am going to argue that the necessity of God inAvicenna's thinking has a similar function to the immutability of Godin Aquinas' thought. I will take Aquinas' conception as the basis andargue that Avicenna's theories conform to Aquinas' expectations.

Avicenna's conception of divine necessity functions in a mannersimilar to Aquinas' conception of divine immutability in setting Godapart from creation. For Avicenna, God is the necessary being, theonly self-necessary being. Avicenna's conception of God's necessitymay be reduced to God's self-subsisting existence and immutabilityin Aquinas' approach. That for Avicenna God's immutability followsfrom God's necessity-even his conception of God as necessary beingequals Aquinas' conception of God as immutable 18-can be shownthrough an analysis of his frequent references to God as 'necessaryin all respects.' For Avicenna God's being necessary in all respectsmeans that God is fully in act and is free from potency. Similarly,for Aquinas, God's immutability amounts to God's freedom frompotency. All other things are in some sense potential and liable tochange, but God changes not in any respect whatsoever. Hence,God's being necessary in all respects in Avicenna's conception ofGod has the same function as God's immutability in Aquinas' system.

To appreciate the full-force of Avicenna's conception of necessityrequires a precise statement of Avicenna's conception of necessity.However, since by doing this I intend to introduce his conceptionof divine necessity, my discussion of necessity is limited to the modality of being and I will not enter into discussion of the modality ofpropositions.19 First, I will introduce Avicenna's conception of neces-

Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, vol. I, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain, 1977),pp. 42*-62*. . ..

20 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5, p. 29.5-6 and 1.5, p. 35.3-4. AVIcenna uses, m thIScontext, 'r!arun' and 'wiijib' interchangeably, although 'wiijib' is the standard termto express necessity. See Metaphysics 1.4, p. 25.4-6 and 1.5, p. 35 paSSIm. See alsoHerbert Davidson, Proqft, pp. 289-290.

21 Aristode's Prior Analytics 1.13, 32a 19-20, Metaphysics V.5, 1015a34, discussedin Herbert Davidson Proqft, p. 290.

22 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5, p. 35.17-18 - p. 36.1-2.23 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5, p. 29.14-16. .,.24 Avicenna Metaphysics 1.5, p. 36.4-5. (I quoted Herbert DaVIdson s translatIOn

(Proqft, p. 290))..Avic;nna:s enigmatic ~tate~ent a~:JOut G?d's simpliei~ :?akes moresense with the IdentIficatIon of necessIty With bemg. AVIcenna states. Thus thereis no quiddity belonging to the necessary being other than that he is necessary of


sity in general terms, and then state his conception of God's necessity, which distinguishes God from everything else.

Necessity for Avicenna is one of the primary concepts that areconceived before everything else. At the beginning of the MetapkJsics,Avicenna talks about the primary concepts. These primary conceptscannot be defined in the strict sense, since they cannot be subsumedunder anything more known. Avicenna's examples of these primaryconcepts are 'existent' (mal£!iud), 'thing' (shql) , 'necessary' (rjarufi andwiijib), possible (mumkin) and impossible (musta~Zl).20 He considers strictdefinitions of these terms, which can be traced back to Aristotle,21to fall into a vicious circle. 22 Although these concepts are inscribedin the mind a priori, and the conception (t~awwur) of every thingrests on their being conceived before all else, if one wants to indicate (yadull) what they are, this will not be a definition of something unknown, but rather a waking call (ikhtiir) for or directing theattention (tanblh) of the mind by means of a name, or a sign (Caliima).Although they are conceived before everything else, still one mayneed his attention to be directed to them. However, the name orthe sign-which serves to direct one's attention to them, for somereason or condition-may clarity and be helpful in grasping them,even though they are more obscure in the mind than the primaryconceptsY Hence, for Avicenna, to consider something to be necessary is one of the primary notions which cannot be defined.

For Avicenna Necessity and actual existence, imply each other.From among this triplex of necessary, possible, and impossible, according to Avicenna, 'necessary' is conceived before (awlii) the other n:o,because "it signifies certainty of existence." To say that 'somethmgis necessary,' means 'confirmation of its existence.'24 Moreover, 'being

CHAPTER 1WO86

being. And this is being (al-inniyya)." Metaphysics VII1.4, p. 346.11-12. If necessitysignifies certainty of being, then describing God as 'necessary being,' amounts tothe self-subsisting existence of God.

25 Avicenna identifies investigation into necessity-possibility with the investigationinto actuality-potentiality. This also conforms his reduction of necessity to existence.Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.4, p. 25.4-6.

26 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.6-10.27 Herbert A. Davidson traces the distinction between self-necessary being and

the things that are possible to exist in themselves but are necessary insofar as theyexist back to Aristotle's conception of necessary beings. For Aristotle whereas somenecessary things do not owe their necessity to anything else, some necessary beingshave a cause of their necessity, Aristotle, Metaphysics V.5, discussed in H. A. Davidson,Proqfs, p. 291.

28 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.1-10.29 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.11-16, p. 39 passim.30 Herbert Davidson, Proqfs, p. 291.

is known by itself' while 'non-being is known with reference to being.'This close connection of necessity to being is very helpful in making sense of Avicenna's contention that every thing that exists in reis necessary. That is, necessity is assigned to 'what exists.'25 If necessity indicates existence, then everything that exists is necessary. Ornothing that is not necessary exists.

Avicenna takes 'that which is necessary, i.e., what actually exists,as the starting point from which further implications of the modality of being branch. Avicenna takes 'that which exists' into consideration and argues that it can be divided into two kinds in the mind:(1) necessarily existent in itself, and (2) not necessarily existent initself. The latter cannot be impossible to exist, if considered in itself,otherwise it would not exist at all.26 If everything existing is necessary, and if "possibly existent" things exist in re, then "possibly existent" things are necessary insofar as they exist in re. 27 While theself-necessary being does not have a cause28 -otherwise it wouldnot be necessary in and of itself-things that are necessary by something else need a cause necessitating them, i.e., making them exist.Even the non-existence of things that we think to be possible toexist, but do not exist actually, is due to a cause, i.e., the absenceof their cause. 29 Avicenna's division of being on the basis of necessity and possibility amounts to three categories, (1) necessary in andof itself, (2) necessary by something else, and (3) possible in itselfand not necessitated by something else. However, only things in thefirst two categories actually exist. 30

For Avicenna, it is self-necessity that opposes to possibility. Avicenna's conception of necessity and possibility diverges from the con-

God Is Etemal


31 See Davidson, Proqfs, p. 292.32 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.7, p. 47.10-15; Davidson, Proqfs, p. 292.33 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.11-18.34 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.11-18.35 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.7, p. 47 especially lines: 16-19.

ception of Aristotle and al-FarabL 31 According to Avicenna necessity, simply taken, does not oppose possibility. Only self-necessityexcludes possibility. Consequently, for Avicenna, there is no differencebetween material things and heavenly bodies or even intellects withregard to modality of being. Although things subject to generationand corruption in the sublunar world are temporal and subject tochange, and heavenly beings are not temporal and are not subjectto change this does not make any difference between them withregard to their status of being. They are forever possible, if considered in themselves, and necessary on account of their cause as longas they exist. That the duration of something's existence is longer,or shorter, or that it is sempiternal does not make any difference. 32

Self-necessity sets God apart form creation. God is the only selfnecessary being, and all other things are necessary through something else, ultimately through God. Since necessity implies existence,for Avicenna, then self-necessity implies self-subsistence, i.e., havingno cause. This self-subsistence, i.e., having no cause, is the necessary condition of simplicity, unity and immutability.33 In addition toGod's self-necessity, Avicenna frequently states that the self-necessarybeing is necessary in all respects. 34 Given this, then for Avicenna thenecessary being is also pure act, without any potency. In oppositionto the self-necessary being, things that are necessary by somethingelse depend on their cause, and they are composite and potential. 35Independence of and dependence on a cause is what ultimately distinguishes God from all other things. This is in fact what Aquinas'analysis of immutability amounts to, as we shall see when discussinghis account.

As with the discussions of the necessity and immutability of God,Avicenna does not discuss God's eternity as much as Aquinas does.Despite the difference between Avicenna's and Aquinas' discussionsof God's eternity, what Avicenna attributes to God can be matched

CHAPTER TWO88

90 CHAPTER TWO CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 91

to Aquinas' conception of God's eternity. Avicenna:s c~nception. ofqidam functions in a similar manner to that of Aqumas conceptIOnof aetemitas. For both asserting God's priority or eternality amountsto saying that (l) God is a self-subsisting existent, (2) fully actual,without succession, (3) is not subject to change and so not bound totime, but not exclusive of time and temporal beings, because theydepend on the eternal God. In the latter sense, God's eternality isnot being atemporal, or timeless, like numbers, but being free from

and above time.Although the Arabic term qidam36 does not have the same range

of meaning as the Latin term aetemitas, it should be employed as thetechnical term for eternity, because this term may have the sense ofthe measure of being just as eternity does. Qjdam is not the standardterm corresponding to the term eternity in the Latin translations ofthe Metaphysics of the Healing. Although 'abad' and similar terms arerendered in Latin by eternity, they are not the proper terms expressing eternity in the strict sense.37

For Avicenna the term qidam is not exclusively predicated of God,but is a term which is used to rank things with respect to a certaincriterion. For Avicenna it is God's qidam that singles out God fromeverything else, although there are infinitely many respects in whichqidam may be attributed to things. Aquinas' expressions attributing

36 The standard terms to express priority and posteriority among things on thebasis of a certain criterion are 'taqaddum' and 'ta'akhkhur.' 'Taqaddum' derives of thesame radix as 'qidam,' which has more or less the same me~ning. 'Qgdf",:' derivingof the same radix is a verbal adjective of the first form, WIth the functIOn of the'active participle' meaning 'that which is prior.' Besides the term 'qidam,' term~ suchas 'dii'im,' (rendered usually as semper) 'sarmad,' 'azal' and 'abad' are rendered m theLatin translation as 'aetemus' or 'semper.' Dii'im is usually rendered as semper exceptfor it occasional rendering of eternal: 1.8, p. 55, line: 69 an~ IX.I p. 435 line: .25;dii'iman rendered semper. IV2, p. 211, line: 22; IV.3, p. 217 Ime: 43; 1.5, p. 36 I~ne:81; ibid., line: 92; 1.7, p. 55 line: 50; dahr rendere.d aetemztate: IV~I, p. 189 vanantreading; mu'abbada rendered aetemae, IV.2 p. 211, Ime: 14; ab~d!yyat rendered aetemaIV.2, p. 211 line: 22; azal rendered aetemus: IV2, p. 210, Ime: 4; az~tz renderedaetema, VII.2 p. 366 line: 55; sarmad rendered aetemztate: VIII.3 p. 396 Ime: 38; .tam

yazal rendered semper. IV.2, p. 210 line: 7; dii'zm rendered semper. VLI, p. 300 Ime:90; qadfm rendered aetemus: I-?C.I, p. 443, line: 81; abadf rendere? aetemus: IX.7,p. 511, line: 89. Avicenna, Lzber de phzlosophza pn",:a, szve, sczentza dzvzna, ed. S. vanRiet 3 vols. (Louvain: Peeters & Leiden: E. J. Bnll, 1977-1983).

3,' 'Dii'iman' can be rendered in English as 'always.' It was interpreted in differentways. Whereas Plato's texts allow a temporal se~se, PI~tinus gives ~. non-temporalmeaning to always. For Plotinus it denotes true be~ng . .Richard SorabJI, Time Creatzonand the Continuum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UmversIty, 1983), p. 112.

eternity to immaterial substances38 may be similar to the usage ofqidam. Aquinas sometimes employs the term eternity to express themode of being of creatures. Nevertheless Aquinas' texts are unequivocal that it is God's eternity that singles out God from everythingelse. Both 'God's qidam' and 'God's aetemitas' amount to saying thatGod is the self-subsistent and fully actual being, and everything elseowes its existence to God. In this sense, only God is eternal. Allother things have a beginning either with respect to their being orwith respect to time.

The term 'qidam' may concern ranking things according to a criterion as well as the criterion itsel[ The fifth form of the root q-d-m,i.e., taqaddama, of which the term qidam is derived, is used to rankthings on the basis of a criterion. "The thing that is prior (mutaqaddim) inasmuch as it is prior has something which the posterior thinglacks, and the posterior thing does not have anything unless the priorthing also has it. What is generally noticed among ordinary people(alj·umhur) is that which is prior (mutaqaddim) with respect to placeand time. [However,] priority (taqaddum) and being before (al-qabl)are applicable to [vertically] ordered (tart'ib) things."39 In addition toranking things on the basis of a criterion, 'that which is prior' (mutaqaddim) may also mean the criterion itself. For example, if something isprior to everything else in some respect, then this thing is the criterion on the basis of which other things are ranked.40

Priority and posteriority apply to things with respect to being aswell. Avicenna considers two ways in which this is applied withregard to being. In one of them, something is the condition of thebeing of the second thing, although it is not the cause of the second thing, such as one and many. In order to have many theremust be one, but the existence of one does not require the existenceof many.4! The second way priority and posteriority apply to thingswith regard to being concerns the causal relationship between twothings. The cause is prior to the effect with regard to having existence, since the effect depends on the cause in order to exist, whilethe cause does not depend on the effect.42 Avicenna denies that

38 ST la. 10, 2, ad 2.39 Avicenna, Metaphysics lVI, p. 163.8-11.40 Avicenna, Metaphysics lVI, p. 164.7-8.41 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.l, p. 164.12-17.42 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.l, p. 164.18-19 - p. 165.1-4.

43 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV. I , p. 165.10-14. For the denial of temporal priorityof essential and immediate causes to their effects, see also Avicenna, MetaphysicsVI.2, p. 266.

44 See for example Avicenna, Isharat, p. 153.45 Avicenna Metaphysics VIII.5, p. 354.10; VIII.6, p. 362.1-2; IX.I, p. 373.5. In

VIII.6, p. 362.1-2, he writes: "However, the First who is not subject to time andwhat is true of it (&ukmuhu) ..."

46 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 257.12-17.47 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266.48 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.3, p. 342.15-19.49 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.1-5 "Thus the existence of every effect is

necessary through the existence of the cause.... They are together (ma'an) in timeor sempiternity (dahr) or something else. But they are not together (ma'an) withrespect to having existence (&~iil al-wujiid). That is because the existence of that[cause] is not derived (lam ya&~ul) from the existence of this [effect]. That [cause]has existence, but it [i.e., that it has existence] is not derived from the fact thatthis one has existence. This [effect] has existence; it [i.e., that it has existence] isderived from the fact that that [cause] has existence. Hence that [cause] is prior[to this effect] with respect to having existence."

among the vertically ordered causes and effects there can be a ranking with regard to time, i.e., temporal priority. The ranking in sucha chain of existents is in regard to having being. The thing thatbestows being is prior to the thing that has existence because of it,and the effect is posterior to its cause since it owes its existence to

its cause.43

The priority of God to everything else is not a temporal prioritybut an existential priority. Since for Avicenna (1) not everything istemporal,44 (2) God is not a temporal being,45 and (3) the cause ofbeing is unlike the cause of movement,46 God's priority to everything else cannot be a temporal priority. Avicenna argues that if acause is essentially the cause of the being of something else, then itis always (da)iman) the cause of its effect as long as the cause itselfexists. Such a cause is prior to its effects because it does not oweits existence to its effects, whereas its effects are nothing in themselves, but exist on account of their causeY Since God gives beingto everything else no matter whether it has a temporal beginning ornot,48 the relationship of priority and posteriority that holds betweenGod and the universe concerns being. The cause and the effect aresimultaneous either during a period of time, or sempiternally, butthe cause is prior to its effect with regard to being.49

When qidam is predicated of God, it means 'to be without beginning,' or 'to be without origin,' or 'to be prior to everything else.'If God is prior to everything else, there cannot be anything prior

God Knows Creatures as well as Himself

Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of God's knowledge.The similarity between their conceptions of God's knowledge may


to God' with respect to being. In this sense qidam is a restatementthat God is the cause of being of others, and that he is the self-subsistent being. Avicenna takes qidam to be negation. If God is said tobe qadim (eternal), it is a negation. "It is first reduced to (tury'a') thenegation of non-existence of him [God], and secondly it is reducedto the negation of causality (sababi;yya) [negation of that God has acause] and negation of a beginning (al-awwal)."50

In his Ta'liqat, Avicenna gives some explanation of how being isdivided on the basis of immutability. The first concerns those thingsthat are in time. These are changeable things, which have a beginning and an end in infinitely flowing time. The second realm ofbeing is together with (ma'a) time, but not in time. This is calledsempiternity (dahr). Sempiternity encompasses time, because timesprings forth (yansha») from the movement of the sphere (alfalak) ,which is a sempiternal being. The relationship of sempiternity totime is the relationship of what is permanent to what is changeable.Although there is no past, present or future in the temporal sense,the human mind cannot conceive it. It conceives of every thing intime. The third category "is the being (kawn) of what is permanent(thabit) together with what is permanent. It is called eternal (sarmadt).It encompasses sempiternity." This triple division gives the structureof the hierarchy of beings.51

In sum, for Avicenna only God is eternal in the true sense. Heinterprets this eternity negatively. The eternal being (1) does not lackbeing, (2) does not have a cause, and (3) does not have a beginningin any way. Hence God, being the only eternal existent, does notlack any aspect of his being, i.e., there is no succession in God, hedoes not have a cause, and he does not have a beginning.

50 Avicenna, Risala 'Arshiyya, p. 7. Avicenna also uses the term 'azal'i' (having noend in the past) to express God's eternity in much the same sense as qidam: "Thereis also mention of 'being eternal' (azalZ), which in reality (&aq'iqat) means that itsbeing (hasti) has no beginning." Parviz Morewedge (trans. & commentary), 7heMetaphysica qf Avicenna (New York: Columbia University, 1973), chapter 26, p. 58.

51 Avicenna, Ta'lZqat, ed. A. Badawi (Cairo: 1973), pp. 141-142.

CHAPTER TWO92


be reduced to two overarching ideas. (1) God has one act of knowledge, in which God's self-knowledge and knowledge of other thingsare included; and (2) since God knows other things in himself, God'sknowledge of other things is in accordance with his being: (a) intelligible (b) simple, (c) immutable, (d) eternal, but not temporal.

Avicenna argues that God knows himself and that he is the principle of other things. That God knows 'that he is the principle ofother things'52 is prone to misunderstanding. For example, if Johnknows that he is the father of Adam, his knowledge 'that he is thefather of Adam' does not require that John knows who Adam is,what he looks like, what his thoughts and his actions are, etc. OftenGod's knowledge 'that he is the principle of other things' is equatedwith this limited kind of knowledge John might have of his son.However, the relationship between God and other things is not thesame as the relationship between a father and his son, or any kindof relationship between two creatures. The closest relationship maybe in this respect the relationship between the cause and its effects,even though not every cause and effect relationship conforms to therelationship between God and the universe. Since God has one actof knowledge, God primarily and essentially knows himself. His knowledge of himself is not to be understood in a narrower sense, reducing it, for example, to self-awareness. God's self-knowledge must alsoinclude the knowledge concerning things that are concomitants ofGod's being (dhiit). Since God is the only self-necessary being, andeverything that exists other than him owes its existence to God'sbeing, the knowledge pertaining to them must be included in God'sself-knowledge. On Avicenna's account, otherwise they would notexist.

Contrary to conventional interpretations, Avicenna clearly statesthat God's knowledge 'that he is the principle of other things' includeshis knowledge of other things, not simply the relationship of beingtheir principle. In book VIII, chapter 6 of the Metaphysics of TheHealing, Avicenna states that God's knowledge of other things doesnot derive from those things, but is the result of his knowledge ofhimself: "Since he is the principle (mabda') of all being, he knowsfrom himself (min dhiitihi) [i.e., through the knowledge of his self]everything (mii) that he is the principle of, and he is the principle

52 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 363.3-4.

of the existent things (mawjudiit) that are complete (tiimm) in theirindividual existence (hi ayiinihii) [immediately], and of the existentthings that are subject to generation and corruption first in theirspecies (anwii'ihii) and through them in their individuals (hi ashkJzii~ii)."53

Thus God knows things that are not subject to generation directly,as one by one, since their species are identical to their single members. And similarly, he knows first the species of things subject togeneration, and via their special form particulars that are subject togeneration and corruption. In any case, God's knowledge that he isthe principle of other things does not simply mean that God is aprinciple, but includes God's knowledge of other things, because ofthe special relationship between God and other things.

In order to maintain this idea that God has one act of knowledge, Avicenna argues that God knows things in a universal way.54

53 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VIII.6, p. 359.1-4. See also Ishiiriit, VII, p. 181. For afurther confirmation that for Avicenna God does not only know 'universals,' in thesense of genera and species of things, but also particular things see Metaphysics VIII. 7,p. 364.7-15. For a detailed discussion of God's knowledge of individuals accordingto Avicenna and Aquinas, and the conformity between Avicenna's position and thatof Aquinas see Nicolas Louis Rofougaran, Avicenna and Aquinas on Individuation (HarvardUniversity, 2000, Ph.D. dissertation), pp. 241-261. Rofougaran argues that Avicenna'sconception of 'dhiif (individual essence) includes matter and the accidents of things.Since God knows individual essences, God's knowledge of individuals includes boththeir matter and accidents, as Aquinas also maintains. Rofougaran holds that Aquinas'and Avicenna's conception of God's knowledge of particulars is similar, partly dueto their affiliation with Aristotle's philosophy.

54 Here Avicenna contrasts 'universal' not to 'particular' but rather to 'material.'One can distinguish here two things. In the literature, Avicenna's expression 'Godknows things in a universal manner' is usually equated with 'God knows universals' with the implication that God does not know particulars. In fact, as the context indicates, Avicenna contrasts universality to materiality not to particularity. SeeMetaphysics VIII.6, p. 359.7-14. Avicenna does not mean that God does not knowparticulars. Avicenna simply means that God's knowledge of particular materialthings is not a temporal changeable knowledge, or sensible knowledge. In this sense,Aquinas would not also deny that God's knowledge is not temporal, nor is it subject to change, although he criticizes Avicenna's account for failing to explain God'sknowledge of particulars. For Aquinas' criticism of Avicenna, see ST la. 14, 11.Michael Marmura has written a superb article on Avicenna's theory of God's knowledge of particulars. His semantic clarifications concerning the usage of the terms"universal" and "particular" are invaluable. However, Marmura's interpretation ofAvicenna's position comes closer to the traditional interpretation of Muslim theologians that for Avicenna God does not know particulars in the realm of generation and corruption. (Michael E. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theoryof God's Knowledge of Particulars," Journal qftheAmerican Oriental Sociery 82/3 (1962),pp. 299-312). Contrary to the traditional interpretation of Avicenna's position supported by Marmura, from Avicenna's texts the most one can argue is that Avicennadoes not provide a successful explanation of how God knows particulars that are


The universal way of knowing things is contrasted to the way ofknowing things which are subject to generation and corruption, inasmuch as they are subject to generation and corruption. The knowledge of material, changeable things in accordance with the conditionsin which they exist must include the material and temporal properties of things. In this sense, Avicenna denies that God would havesuch knowledge of individuals because, he argues, this kind of knowledge is either sensory, or imaginal (mutakhayyal) knowledge. As beingsensory or imaginal knowledge, it is conditioned by the particularorgans which provide this kind of knowledge. Furthermore, sincethings occur in time, and the knowledge pertaining to them in theirmaterial temporal conditions must be renewed, it also requires multiplicity of the acts of knowing. Avicenna concludes, as the affirmationof many actions (rifii'fl) of God implies an imperfection in God, sodoes the affirmation of many acts of knowing in God.55 Hence, having a sensory knowledge of things would imply a multiplicity in God,which would not conform to his simplicity.

God knows himself and other things in a simple manner withouthaving any multiplicity. Avicenna contrasts 'to be intellect' and 'toknow in a simple sense' to the knowledge that souls have. Whereasin the soul the forms of different objects of knowledge are distinguished, and arranged in a way distinct from each other, in theknowledge of an intellect there is no distinction among the forms ofvarious objects of knowledge.56 What does this knowing 'in a simple

subject to generation and corruption. But the claim that for Avicenna God doesnot know particulars is very difficult to justify, given Avicenna's contention thatGod's knowledge is the cause of things. For a detailed examination of al-GhazalI'sand Michael Marmura's interpretations of Avicenna's position see, Rahim Acar,"Reconsidering Avicenna's Position on God's Knowledge of Particulars," in JonMcGinnis and David C. Reisman eds., Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosoplry inMedieval Islam, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 142-156.

55 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.6, p. 359.11-12.56 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.7, p. 362.17 - p. 363.4 "Then (thumma), it must be

known that the First [i.e., God] is said to be intellect, or intellection, (Caql), it issaid in a simple (al-basff) sense, which you have known in the book of the soul;and that in him there is no distinction (ildztiliif) among forms (~uwar) arranged(mutarattiba) differently, as is the case in the soul in the sense [po 363] that wasstated in the book of the soul (Kitiib al-Nafi). This is why he knows (yaCqil) thingsall at once without being multiplied by them in his substance, or without that theyare formed (ta~awwar) in the reality of his essence (dhiitihi) with their [own] forms.To the contrary, their forms emanate from him as things known (maCqulatan). He ismore worthy to be an intellect more than the forms emanating (al-jii'irja) from hisintellect-ness (Caqliyyatihi). Since he knows himself (dhiit), and he is the principle of

sense' mean? Does it mean that God has the knowledge of one single thing concerning other things? And can it be God's knowledgethat 'he is the principle of other things' without the implication ofGod having the knowledge of other things? One may be temptedto think so. This would make it easy to explain God's one act ofknowledge, since for Avicenna God has only one knowledge, andsince God's knowledge of being 'the principle of other things' canbe identified with God's knowledge of himself without the implication of God's knowledge of other things.

Avicenna attempts to explain how God knows many intelligiblethings without his simplicity being damaged, and without those intelligible forms being independently existing things, as Platonic ideas,or without them being placed in an intellect containing them like asubstratum. He argues that God's knowledge of many other thingsdoes not constitute a multiplicity in God, because these forms aresubsequent to God's essence. 57 Avicenna explains the relationshipbetween God's self-knowledge and his knowledge of other things onthe basis of the relationship between a causal principle and its effect.58

Avicenna's premises are: (1) God's knowledge of himself is identicalto himself, (2) God knows things after (ba'da) himself through hisknowledge of himself. The conclusion he draws from these is: God'sknowledge of himself is the cause of his knowledge of things thatare posterior to himself. Even if the relationship between God's selfknowledge and his knowledge of things which are posterior to himis construed in causal terms, Avicenna does remind us again thatthe relationship between God and his knowledge of other things is

everything, he knows everything from his own essence." For Avicenna's discussionof the simple knowledge in opposition to complex or discursive knowledge, seeAvicenna, De Anima, ed. F. Rahman (London, New York & Toronto: OxfordUniversity, 1959) V, 6, p. 242.6 - p. 244 n. 9. On the issue of whether God'sknowledge is discursive, c£ Aquinas, ST la. 14, 7.

57 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.7, p. 364.1-6. See also Ishiiriit VII, p. 182. Theexpression that 'these forms are posterior to God's essence' may need some elaboration. What does Avicenna mean by this being posterior to God's essence? Clearlythis is not a temporal posteriority. Can one interpret Avicenna along Aquinas' lines:'other things being ordered to God as their cause'? In any case Avicenna himselfstates that there is a causal relationship between God and his knowledge of formsof other things. Can this be a strictly causal relationship, or is it just a manner ofspeaking?

58 This explanation of the link between a principle and its effect is used byAquinas frequently. Things are included in their principles. Even though Avicennamay not be as articulate as Aquinas is, as we shall see later they have similarapproaches.


the relationship between an intellect and the intelligible forms belonging to it or known by it, as opposed to the relationship between thesoul and its objects of knowledge. Avicenna wants to confirm thateven if between God's self-knowledge and knowledge of other thingsthere is the relationship of a causal principle and its effect, there isno distinction among the intelligible forms in God's knowledge. Heknows them all at once. Avicenna also asserts that the intelligibleforms are simply relations.59 By saying this, Avicenna seems to denythe existence of these intelligible forms independently of the divineessence and divine self-knowledge, even if he has to talk about themas if the divine self-knowledge and divine knowledge of other thingsare two distinct things. Hence, the causal relationship between God'sself-knowledge and knowledge of other things conveys here more ofthe sense of dependency and inclusiveness than the sense of a causalrelationship, in which a cause brings about a distinct effect.

Showing the compatibility between God's simplicity, God's selfknowledge, and God's knowledge of other things is a frequent concern of Avicenna's. To this effect, he also proposes that intelligibleforms of other things are 'from him' but 'not in him.' This formulafavors an efficient-causal relationship between God's self-knowledgeand the knowledge of other things over a material-causal relationship. God's knowledge of other things is thus not a constitutive element of God's self-knowledge but comes out of it. This formulaapparently relieves Avicenna in his quest to save God's simplicity.But it also gives rise to new problems: what does 'from him but notin him' mean? Would it force him to postulate those intelligibleforms as Platonic forms subsistently existing, or an intelligence containing them and functioning as their substratum? He rejects theposition that they can exist subsistently as Platonic ideas or that theyreside in an intellect or a soul which functions as their substratum.50

In order to explain how multiple intelligible forms do not cause mul-

S9 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.1-6.60 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 365.8-17. In Ta'tiqat (pp. 119-120), Avi~enna

also uses 'in him.' Usually Avicenna emphasizes that God's necessary concomitantsare 'from him' but not 'in him.' Here he says 'in him.' He is aware that this isunusual on his part, so he explains what he means by saying 'in him': "These existent things are from among the necessary concomitants of his essence. And his necessary concomitants are in him, in the sense that they emanate from him, not thatthey emanate from something else into him such that he is receptive and has anaffection (irifi'iil) ..." See also Ta'liqat, pp. 152, 180.

tiplicity in God, Avicenna distinguishes between the emanation of'intelligible forms insofar as they are understood by God without anyextra condition (bi-la ziyada) and insofar as intelligible forms existin re. He states that one should not be concerned with the existence,or more accurately the realization, of intelligible forms in re, becauseGod's existence does not depend on the existence of other things.Even though God's essence may be considered in relation to thingsin re-since God is their principle-God is necessary by himself, buthe is not necessary 'because he is the cause of their existence.'Avicenna seems to argue that if one considers intelligible forms without being concerned with their realization in re these do not harmdivine simplicity. For Avicenna, 'intelligible forms insofar as they areunderstood' are not entities distinct from God's self-knowledge, despitethe fact that his efficient causal model suggests two distinct entities.51

God's knowledge of other things is in accord with God's being.To spell out what I mean by this phrase, three points come to mind:(1) Since God is independent of other things and they depend onGod for their existence, God's knowledge of other things is independent of other things. Other things depend on God's knowledgefor their existence. (2) God's knowledge is eternal and immutable.(3) God's knowledge is simple and intelligible. I have already spoken about the simplicity of God's knowledge, and that God's knowledge of other things is included in God's self-knowledge, which isalso intelligible. All three points are interconnected. It seems thatone either has to take the whole package, or leave it all.

Avicenna construes the relationship between God's knowledge andthe existence of other things to be such that God's knowledge ofother things is not attained from things themselves, but things existbecause God knows them. In explaining his conception of the relation between God's knowledge of creatures and the existence of creatures, Avicenna distinguishes two different relationships between theobject of knowledge and the one who knows: either the knowledgeis attained from the object of knowledge which already exists, or the

61 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 366.1-7. One may question whether Avicenna'sexplanation is convincing or not. But it is certain that he knows other things inasmuch as they are intelligible, and this knowledge is, in a sense, the result of God'sself-knowledge. As I will try to show, in Aquinas' works we come across the sameformula: God's knowledge of himself and other things are not different acts ofknowledge. Still God primarily and essentially knows himself.

knowing subject has the knowledge first and then realizes his knowledge in concrete in the external world. He gives the example of thearchitect and the building. First the architect has the plan of a building in his mind. Then he builds the building in accordance with theplan in his mind. For Avicenna, "This is the relation (nisba) of everything to the First Intellect, the necessary of being. This is because(fa innahu) he knows (ya'qil) himself (dhiitahu) and what his self necessitates. And [because] he knows from his self (dhiitihi) how there is(kawn) good in everything. Consequently (fa) the forms of existentthings (al-mawjudiit) follow his intelligibly known form (~uratahu alma'qula) [i.e., God's knowledge of himself] in accordance with theorder (al-niZiim) known (ma'qul) by him ('indahu)."62

By arguing that God knows things from himself and not from thethings themselves, Avicenna is able to assert God's independence ofother things, as well to maintain the eternity and immutability ofhis knowledge. Avicenna argues that if God were to know thingsfrom things themselves, this would imply that God is not self-subsistent but is subsistent because of creatures. Since God has knowl-

62 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 363.9-11. See also Ishiiriit VII, p. 181. Thekind of knowledge God has of creatures insofar as they exist in re needs clarification.If one thinks that God knows only universals, interpreting Avicenna's expression'God knows things in a universal manner,' then God does not know particularthings, but simply universals, i.e., concepts that are predicated of many particularthings. But since universals qua universal, such as humanity, do not exist outsidethe mind, God's knowledge of other things, conceived to consist of universals, doesnot imply anything regarding the existence or the organization of things existing inre. In this context, Avicenna's position regarding God's knowledge of creatureswith his emanation theory at the background-as consisting of universals, hencebeing theoretical knowledge, is contrasted with Aquinas' position on the artisanartifact model in the manner of practical knowledge. For this contrast see DavidB. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sinii, Maimonides, Aquinas, pp. 72-75 andpp. 86-90. Burrell argues that for Avicenna God's causation is not quite intentional(p. 73). God's relation to the world is conceived of on the basis of speculative knowledge (p. 74). N. Rofougaran adopts this same position with reference to DavidBurrell's article "Creation, Will and Knowledge in Aquinas and Duns Scotus," inPragmatik, Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens, Herausgegeben von Herbert Stachowiak,Band I (Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986), p. 248. See Nicolas Louis Rofougaran,Avicenna and Aquinas on Individuation, pp. 119-220. See also Rudi A. Te Velde,Participation and Substantiality in 7homas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995),pp. 102-108. It is true, Avicenna maintains that God does not know things thatare material and temporal with their material and temporal properties. In this senseGod's knowledge of them is 'universal.' It is also true that Avicenna explains theexistence of the universe with his version of the emanation model. Nevertheless, itdoes not seem to be true that for Avicenna God's knowledge of other things fallswithin theoretical knowledge rather than practical knowledge.

God Is Simple


Aquinas' position regarding God's simplicity conforms to Avicenna'sto a large extent. For Aquinas, like Avicenna, God is free of matter and mixing with matter, does not have a quiddity distinct fromhis being, and does not have a genus, differentia or definition.

Aquinas starts his discussion of God's simplicity with the examination of whether God is a body or something material. 65 Aquinas

Aquinas' Conception if Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge

edge of himself and other things, if he did not know other thingsfrom his self (dhiit) then God would depend on other things for hisknowledge of them. This would amount to God's dependence onother things. 63

However, such dependence may not be suitable for God, becauseit makes God's knowledge of other things similar to creaturely knowledge. It strips divine knowledge of simplicity, necessity, etc. If God'sknowledge of other things were derived from those things themselves,Avicenna argues, this would make God's knowledge subject to change,as well as making it temporal, in the sense that its truth or falsityis bound up with the flow of time. For example, at time T Godwould not know that John was born, since he was not born. Thenat time T] God would know that John was born because he wasborn. God's dependence on other things for his knowledge of themwould also imply uprooting God's simplicity; as creatures are subject to change, generation and corruption, God's knowledge of themwould also follow the same course. Consequently, God's knowledgeof other things would be like accidents occurring to him and vanishing away from him. This, Avicenna argues, contradicts God'sbeing "necessary in all respects." Hence God's knowledge of otherthings cannot be drawn from those things, because it contradictsGod's simplicity, necessity and immutability.64

63 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14-17.64 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14-17.

• 65 ST la. 3, 1 & 2. As m~nitioned in t~e section on Avicenna's position, AvicennaSImply assumes that God IS not to be Identified with matter and does not haveanything material. '

CHAPTER TWO100


brings in various arguments to reject the position that God is a body,such as God's being the unchanging first cause of all things, God'sbeing pure actuality without any potentiality, and his being the mostexcellent being, unlike any body.66 In addition to God's not beinga body, God also is not something composed of form and matter.One of Aquinas' arguments to this effect is that God does not havepotentiality at all. Since matter is potential, and God is pure actuality, God cannot have matter, so he cannot be composed of matter and form. His second argument to this effect is based onparticipation. In composite things, form is the component giving thatthing its goodness and perfection, while matter participates in goodness and perfection. However, God is good in and of himself, andcannot therefore participate in goodness and perfection. Consequently,he is not composed of matter and form. Aquinas' third argument isbased on the idea that every agent acts by virtue of its form. AsGod is primarily and by himself an agent (per se agens) , he must be,primarily and in himself, a form. Hence God is essentially a form,not a composite of form and matter.67 God is a form that is notreceivable by matter; he is a self-subsisting form. 68

After confirming the position that God is not something material,or mixed with matter, Aquinas argues the identity of God with hisessence and existence. His treatment of the question takes on adifferent form than that of Avicenna. Aquinas not only talks aboutthe identity of existence and quiddity in God, but he also talks aboutfirst the identity between God and his quiddity (ST la. 3, 3), andthen about the identity between God and his existence (ST la. 3,4). When dealing with the question of whether in God there is acomposition of quiddity, essence, or nature, and the subject, i.e.,God, Aquinas states that God, (i.e., the subject to which the formdeity refers) and his quiddity, or his nature, are identical. He contrasts their identity in God to their non-identity in material beings.Material beings are not identical to their quiddities because an individual human being, for example, has more than what its essenceis, which defines the human species. An individual human being, inaddition to its form, has its individuating matter (materia individualis) ,

66 ST la. 3, 1.67 ST la. 3, 2.68 ST la. 3, 2 ad 3.

by which it becomes individuated. However, the individuality ofthings that are not composed of matter and form, but pure form,cannot derive from an individuating matter. These forms are intrinsically individual and by themselves subsistent. Hence, God as a nonmaterial form is identical with his quiddity, i.e. deity. 69

In ST la. 3, 4, Aquinas discusses whether there is a compositionof essence (essentia) and existence (esse) in God. He brings in arguments similar to those of Avicenna. One of Aquinas' arguments toshow that God is identical to his existence is that if God were notidentical to his existence, then he must have obtained his existencefrom his essential principles (principiis essentiae), or from some external cause. But it is impossible that existence be caused by essentialprinciples as such, because nothing can bring itself into being. SinceGod is the first cause, there cannot be anything that brings him intoexistence. Hence, in God existence cannot be other than his essence. 70

The second argument is based on the similarity of opposition between self-existence (ipsum esse) and essence and between actualityand potentiality. If God, the self-existing being, had an essence otherthan his being, then God would have potentiality. Since God doesnot have any potentiality, then God's essence and being must beidentical. 71 Aquinas' third argument is based on participation. Everything that exists exists either by itself or by participation. But Godcannot exist by participation. Hence, his essence and his being mustbe identical. 72

Aquinas also shares Avicenna's contention that God is the beingwith the condition of negation. He registers an interesting objectionconcerning God's being unspecified existence. If God's essence wereidentical to existence, then there would be nothing to specify God'sbeing, and everything existing would be identified with God. Answeringthis objection Aquinas makes a distinction between two senses of'unspecified (nonfit additio) existence.' It may mean either that 'furtherspecification is excluded by definition,' or 'further specification is notincluded in the definition.' For example, reason is excluded fromirrational animals by definition, and it is not included in the definitionof animal in general. In the first sense, being with the condition of

69 ST la. 3, 3.70 ST la. 3, 4.71 Ibid.72 Ibid.

104 CHAPTER 'TWO CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 105

exclusion of any addition (esse sine additione) is the divine being; inthe second sense it is existence in general (esse commune).73

As part of his discussion of divine simplicity, Aquinas also addressesthe question whether God is composed of a genus and a differentia.Similar to Avicenna's position he rejects that God can be composedof genus and differentia. Aquinas distinguishes two ways of belonging to a genus: (l) immediately and strictly as species and membersof a species belong to a genus, and (2) mediately, just as a unityand a point both belong to the genus of quantity because they generate number and extension, that is, just as measure is consideredto belong to the genus of what is measured. He offers three arguments to refute the position that God can be in a genus. The firstargument is based on God's lack of potency. Species, within a genus,differ from each other by some differentia, and the differentia issomehow an actualization of the genus. Since God does not havepotentiality or since God is not the actualization of a potentiality,God does not belong to a genus as a species. 74 The second argument is based on the identity of God's essence and existence. If Godhad a genus, it would be the genus of 'existent' (ens). However,Aquinas states with reference to Aristotle, 'existent' cannot be agenus, because every genus has a differentia that does not participate in the essence of the genus. But there cannot be any differentiathat is not an 'existent' (ens). Hence God does not have a genus.The third argument again is based on the identity of God's existence and essence. Things that belong to a genus share a quiddity,or a generic essence (quidditate vel essentia generis). But as existent things,they differ from each other. For example both horse and man belongto the genus 'animal' but neither of them is identical to 'being animal.' Hence things that belong to a genus must differ from theirgenus. Since God's being and essence are identical, God does not

belong to a genus. 75

73 ST la. 3. 4 obj. I & ad I. Avicenna has the same contention that God's beingis the being with the condition of exclusion of any addition.

74 ST la. 3, 5. . . .75 ST la. 3 5. "Tertio quia omnia quae sunt In genere uno commumcant In

quidditate vel' essentia generis quod. p~aedic~tur de eis in, e~ quod qu!d." ~oticehere, how Aquinas uses terms 'qulddltas an~ essentza genens. SInce the discusslOn ofbelonging to a genus requires a genu~ whic~ ca~ ~ave.more than on~ m?m~er,Aquinas uses these terms instead of simply. es.sent,,!, ThIS may be an ~m'ph.catlO~that 'essentia' is the individual essence when It IS Said of God, and that It IS Idenhcal to God; and if we talk about God's essence, we talk about an individual essence,

Aquinas states two objections, arguing that God must belong tothe genus of substance: (l) Since the definition of substance, a selfsubsisting thing (ens per se subsistens) is most suitable to God, Godmust be a substance;76 and (2) since measures belong to the samegenus as what they measure, and God is the measure of all substance, God must belong to the genus of substance. 77 Aquinas' replyto the first objection is similar to that of Avicenna, who also statesthis objection and answers it. The substance signifies 'an essence thatexists by itself, not in a subject, if it exists.' But it does not meanthis essence is identical to its existence. In other words, substancedoes not imply its existence. Hence, God does not belong to thegenus of substance. 78 God's being the measure of substances doesnot require that God be in the genus of substance, since nothing iscommensurate with God. As the self-subsisting being God is calledthe measure of things to indicate that the nearer they come to God,the more fully they exist. But it does not require that God be a substance as things coming closer to him are substances. 79

Cod Is Necessary and Immutable

For Aquinas God is necessary and immutable. Unlike Avicenna, whoemphasizes God's necessity, Aquinas puts greater emphasis on God'simmutability but their positions are similar inasmuch as necessity isconnected to immutability and eternity. That God is a necessarybeing is either clearly mentioned or assumed frequently throughoutAquinas' writings. Perhaps his discussion of God's eternity in ScC I,15 and in his tertia via (ST la. 2, 3)80 displays Aquinas' subscription

which is identical to God's being. In this context Avicenna's statement that 'Goddoes not have a quiddity (mahiyya) other than being,' may be more understandable.The essence God has cannot be a quiddity applicable to anything other than God.

76 ST la. 3, 5, obj. I.n ST la. 3, 5, obj. 2.78 Ibid., ad I. For Avicenna's position see Metaphysics VlII.4, p. 348.5-16.79 Ibid., ad 2.80 Aquinas' third way is one of the much-discussed pieces of Aquinas' writings.

Two issues of debate regarding the third way are: whether Aquinas' move from 'ifeverything is possible to exist and not to exist' to 'then nothing would exist at sometime' is justified, and whether Aquinas means logical necessity when he argues thatthere must be a necessary being.' Patterson Brown criticized scholars who interpreted Aquinas's tertia via in this manner, such as]. J. C. Smart, "The Existenceof God," Church Qyarterfy Review (1955); P. Edwards "The Existence of God," in AModem Introduction to Philosophy, ed. A. Pap and P. Edwards (Glencoe, 1957), p. 455;


to God's necessity best. God is not the only necessary being, nor isGod's necessity a logical necessity.8l But God is the only self-necessarybeing and it is this self-necessity that sets God apart from everythingelse.82 Aquinas also argues that self-necessity implies eternity.83 Thisself-necessary being must be immutable and the origin of all change.84

In Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers three reasons why God isimmutable. God is immutable, because otherwise God would be (1)potential, (2) composite, and (3) imperfect. Aquinas has already arguedthat these predicates must be negated of God.85 Aquinas' argument

and C. B. Martin, Religious Belief(Ithaca, N.Y., 1959), pp. 151-152. Patterson Brown,"St. Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary Being," The Philosophical Review 73/1 (1964),pp. 77-78. See also Anthony Kenny, Five Wqys (Notre Dame, Indiana: Universityof Notre Dame, 1980). Brown argues that "A large number of commentators have,like Smart, interpreted the first part of Aquinas' Third Way according to the following schema:

(1) If anything exists, then there must exist a logically necessary being.(2) Something exists.(3) Therefore: there must exist a logically necessary being.

St. Thomas would have to have been rather artless to defend such an argument.For the most obvious point about it is that the two premises are entirely superfluous.That is to say, if God's existence is supposed to be logically necessary, then surelythe conclusion will stand on its own. Step (3), in short, itself constitutes the rationalistic version of the ontological argument. So, if this interpretation of Aquinas'demonstration were correct, the Third Way would really be an a priori proof merelymasquerading as a posteriori." (p. 78). Moreover, Brown argues, even in the thirdway Aquinas argues that there is more than one necessary being. This argumentclearly indicates that 'necessary being' does not mean, for Aquinas 'logically necessary being' (p. 79). This is why Immanuel Kant's criticism of the cosmologicalargument, i.e., it is a form of ontological argument, does not apply to Aquinas'third way (p. 80). Immanuel Kant Critique qf Pure Reason, trans. & eds. Paul Guyerand Alien W. Wood (Cambridge, New York, 1998), A606-607, B634-635.

81 Patterson Brown, "St. Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary Being," pp. 78-80.Aquinas' conception of necessity and necessary being(s), and his use of modal operators is a topic of debate among scholars. Aquinas employs necessity in variousways, and he grants that there are necessary beings other than God. If one doesnot take into consideration which kind of necessity Aquinas is concerned about ona given topic, one is likely to misunderstand him. For a brief survey of Aquinas'understanding of necessity see J. J. MacIntosh, "Aquinas on Necessity," AmericanCatholic Philosophical Qyarterly 72/3 (1998), pp. 371-403.

82 ST la. 2, 3 (Third way).83 SeC I, 15, [5].84 ST la. 2, 3 (First way). Aquinas is more faithful to Aristotle's conception of

necessity than Avicenna. Aquinas places necessity in the nature of things. Necessityand immutability go hand in hand. Unlike Aristotle and Aquinas, as stated in thepreceding section, Avicenna places necessity in the cause, not in the nature of things.Thus, something is immutable inasmuch as it is necessary. Patterson Brown, "St.Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary Being," pp. 81-85.

85 Aquinas argues for a denial of potentiality and composition in God in ST la. 3,SeC I, 16 & 18; he argues that God is perfect in ST la. 4. God's immutability is

______ L~...l __ L_~__ ~ ...~ ...:~ l-u ~ ................ ......... 1-.. ......1......... ll'.......... ..,. r1~C' ....nC'<."~,......, ."f' hn.t-h ,....h;lncn.......h; .... -::r.l

based on the negation of potentiality in God may be considered amodification of his first way. Since God is the first and the sourceof the being of other things, and actuality precedes potency, andsince anything changing is potential, God must be unchangeable.On his argument based on the simplicity of God, in a changingthing there is a part that changes and there is a part that persiststhrough the process of change. So there must be at least two partsin a changing thing. This undoubtedly requires that anything changeable must be composite. This is contrary to God's being simple.Hence God's simplicity requires that God be immutable. Anotherimplication of change which is unacceptable to Aquinas is that thechanging subject acquires something new that it did not have beforethe change. This obviously runs against God's being the most perfect being, having all perfection and needing nothing else.86

Moreover, for Aquinas, onlY is God unchangeable. Not only material things, which are subject to generation and corruption, but allthings including angels and pure forms are subject to change in somesense.87 Aquinas distinguishes two respects that something may bechangeable: (1) Something is changeable either because of somethingelse's power over it, or (2) because of its own potency. All thingsdepend on God's power and will for both their coming to exist andtheir remaining in existence. In this respect all such things are changeable. But God does not depend on anything else. In terms of theirown potentiality, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds passive and active.Material things are changeable with respect to their having passivepotentiality, i.e., their matter is not fully actualized. Heavenly bodies, however, do not undergo substantial change, since their matteris fully actualized. But they change with respect to their place.Immaterial heavenly substances, which are angels, or intellects, arealso subject to change with respect to their goal and their place.They may change their goal and choose to do evil. They are alsosubject to change with respect to place; since they are limited beings,they cannot be in all places at once. Thus, they may change frombeing in this place to being in that place.88

and biblical objections and attempts to supply answers to them see Brian Davies,The Thought qf Thomas Aquinas (Oxford & New York: Oxford University, 1992), pp.109-117.

86 ST la. 9, l.87 ST la. 9, 2.88 <;:7 T~ Q ?


In all creatures then there exists potentiality of change, either substantially as with perishable bodies, or in place as with the heavenlybodies, or in orderedness to a goal and application of power to differentthings as with the angels. And in addition there is a changeablenesscommon to the whole universe of creatures, since whether they existor not is subject to the creator's power. So, because God cannot changein any of these ways, he alone is altogether unchangeable.89

God Is Eternal

Aquinas' conception of God's eternity conforms to that of Avicennain its basic tenets. For Aquinas, God is eternal, and only God iseternal in the true sense, eternity should not be mixed with timeand identified as omnitemporality. This is, because whereas eternityis the measure of being, time is the measure of movement. Consequendy that which is eternal is immutable and that which is temporal is changeable. However, eternity does not mean being atemporal,or timeless, like numbers, but being free from and above time. Hence,asserting that God is eternal amounts to saying that God is immutable.This ultimately amounts to saying that God is self-subsistent being.On this point Aquinas and Avicenna agree.

Following Aquinas' procedure, let me first state how he contrastseternity with time before discussing how he understands God's eternity. In treating God's eternity, Aquinas adopts Boethius' definitionof eternity.90 Having adopted Boethius' definition of eternity, Aquinastackles the objections raised against it. Boethius defines eternity:"Etemiry is the instantaneously whole and peifect possession if unending life·"91

89 ST la. 9, 2.90 Scholars agree that Aquinas' position regarding God's eternity should be I?cated

within a definite tradition in Western Christian theology. In some respects It maybe traced to ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers. Within the Christian tradition, Aquinas followed Augustine (350-430 C.E.), Boethius (480-525 C.E.) andAnselm (1033-1109 C.E.). See, for example, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann,"Eternity," the Joumal if Philosophy 78/8 (1981), pp. 429-434; Brian Davies, 7he7hought if 7homas Aquinas, pp. 103-104.

91 "Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio." Boethius,De Consolatione V, prosa 6. PL 63, 858, ed. E. K. Rand, in H. F. Stewart, E. K.Rand, and S. J. Tester, Boethius: the 7heological Tractates and the Consolation ifPhilosophy(London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1973), p. 422.9-11, quoted inEleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 431. Understanding God'seternity and even whether eternity is coherent with the conception of God presented in the Scriptures is one of the areas of serious debate among theologiansand philosophers of religion. Stump and Kretzmann's article, which includes dis-

Aquinas interprets the parts of this definition of eternity negatively.92Following Boethius, Aquinas argues that we come to know eternitythrough time, as we move from the knowledge of composite thingsto the knowledge of simple things. According to him, time and eternity are opposed to each other in two respects: change and limit.Whereas time is associated with change "as the numbering if bifOre andqfter in change,"93 eternity is associated with immutability. Changeincludes succession, because in changeable things one part, or state,follows another. Numbering the antecedent and consequent parts ofchange gives rise to the notion of time. Based on our knowledge oftime, Aquinas argues that we come to know eternity. Eternity, inopposition to time, is what an immutable thing has. Since an immutablething does not change at all, its mode of existence does not vary atall. There is no succession and no 'before and after' in such a thing.

As for the second point of opposition between time and eternity,time is associated with things that have a beginning and an end,whereas eternity belongs to something that does not have a beginningor end.94 Aquinas points out that time is attributed to changingthings, because changing things can be assigned a beginning and anend. In contrast to time, eternity belongs to unchangeable things because one cannot assign a beginning and end to them. Hence something eternal does not have a limit (interminabile) either with respect

cussion of implications of Boethius' paradigmatic definition, and its historical rootsgoing back to Parmenides (see: pp. 429-434), pioneers the debate in the last quarter of the 20th century. In order to explain the tenability of the conception of eternity of God, they argue for the Eternal-Temporal simultaneity (ET-Simultaneity)with support from the theory of relativity. Their article has received a wide ranging reaction from philosophers of religion and theologians. David Burrell in his article "Eternity" argues that Stump and Kretzmann's efforts to give a new explanationof eternity hardly goes beyond the traditional conception of eternity. Moreover,where it goes beyond the traditional conception, it has been subject to severe criticism. Burrrell argues, despite all the merits of the article, that it does not makeany substanti~1 contribution to the conception or deeper understanding of eternity,because etermty cannot be understood except by one who is eternal. David B.Burrell"God's Eternity," Faith and Philosophy 1/4 (1984), pp. 394-402. '

92 That Aquinas negatively interprets the components of Boethius' definition ism~ntained by Mark~s tI: W6rner~ "Der Sinn von .'Ewigkeit' und seine Deutungbe? Thomas von Aqulll, III On~ologze und 7heologze: Bettrage ;:.um Problem der Metaphysikbet Amtoteles und 7homas von Aqum, ed. M. Lutz-Bachmann Europaische Hochschulschriften (Frankfurt: 1988), esp. pp. 93-94 and John C. Yates, the timelessness if God(London: 1990), pp. 39-40, mentioned in Goris, Free Creatures if an Eternal God,p.42.

93 Implicit reference to Aristode, Physics IV, 11.220a25.94 Reference to Aristode, Physics IV, 12.22Ib28.

110 CHAPTER 1WO CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE III

to a beginning or with respect to an end, and it does not have succession. Not having a limit, as Aquinas suggests, can be reduced toimmutability.95

Mter clarifying the meaning of eternity, Aquinas argues that Godis eternal. For him God is eternal because God is unchangeable.God's immutability in turn may be reduced to God's self-subsistentexistence. Despite the implications of eternity being possessed bymany things-because eternity runs parallel to immutability-Aquinasargues that only God is eternal in the proper sense. Moreover, eternity is not some addition to God, because eternity is identical to hisbeing, or rather to his immutable being.96 The contrast between timeand eternity amounts to the contrast between motion and being,which may be traced to ancient Greek thought through Neoplatonicsources,97 a contrast Aquinas makes explicit in ST.9B Whereas timemeasures movement, eternity measures being. Consequently, insofaras something is not permanent in its being, it is subject to time. Itsendurance is measured by time in accordance with its change. Henceit is not eternal. This may also be interpreted in the following way:since God's being is immutable, God's being cannot be measuredby time. God's immutability, in turn, ultimately resides in God'sbeing self-subsistent being. We should recall Aquinas' argument regarding God's immutability. He argues that God is totally immutablebecause, unlike all other things, he is not subject to the power ofanything else. Consequently, God's immutability amounts to his selfsubsistent being. Therefore, eternity exclusively belongs to God,because only God is self-subsistent being.99

It should be emphasized that for Aquinas God's being eternalamounts to God's self-subsitent being, although one can find diverging elements in Aquinas' treatment of eternity. On the one hand the

95 Aquinas ST la. 10, 1. Aquinas also states that eternity does not simply implyexistence but life. So something that is eternal is living. Living includes activity andsimple existence does not. ST la. 10, 1, ad 2. Stump and Kretzmann argue thatfor Boethius something eternal is alive (p. 434). William Lane Craig thinks thatthey are wrong in their understanding of Boethius' position. William Lane Craig,"The Eternal Present and Stump-Kretzmann Eternity," American Catholif; PhilosophicalQyarterry 73/4 (1999), p. 525. But it seems that Aquinas understands Boethius inthe way Stump and Kretzmann do.

96 ST la. 10, 2.97 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 431.98 ST la. 10, 4 ad 3.99 This is ultimately traceable to God's simplicity, identity of existence and essence.

See David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God, pp. 49-50.

definition of eternity (ST la. 10, 1), his explicit statements that eternity properly belongs to God alone (ST la. 10, 3), and that God isidentical with eternity (ST la. 10, 2 ad 3) amounts to saying thatonly God is eternal and nothing else is eternal. His statement thateternity measures being while time measures movement (ST la. 10,4 ad 3), and his statements that God shares his eternity as he shareshis immutability (ST la. 10, 2 c, and ad 1) imply that eternity acceptsgradation. That is, the more something is immutable, i.e., has thingsthat are proper to it, the more it is eternal. In this respect the onlything that sets God apart from all else, and makes eternity properlybelong to God, is that he does not depend on something else in hisbeing. As mentioned in the previous section on Aquinas' conceptionof God's immutability, God's self-subsistent being is what ultimatelydistinguishes God from all else and makes him utterly immutable. 100

Thus what makes God properly eternal in exclusion to other thingsis that his being is not subject to change because of something else'spower. That is, he does not derive his being from something else,but is self-subsisting being.

Saying that 'God is eternal' does not in fact express 'what Godreally is' in positive terms. The contrast between time and eternitywith regard to our knowledge of them is applicable between temporal beings and God. By negating what time is, i.e., measure ofchange, we get what eternity is. By negating the properties of temporal things, change and limit, we get how an eternal being shouldbe. But what do the results achieved by negation amount to? Dothey amount to a claim about how eternity is, or how an eternalbeing can act in time? Aquinas' discussion of eternity is part of thenegative dimension of his theology. 101 Saying that God is eternal doesnot express anything positive about how God is, but rather expresseshow God is not.

God is neither sempiternal, nor timeless. Aquinas clearly sets eternity apart from time. If the difference between time and eternity

100 ST la. 9, 2. See also Aquinas' conception of God's infinity, ST la. 7, 1.101 Harm Goris considers Aquinas' discussion of God's eternity as part of "Aquinas'

project of mapping out 'how God is not'." Goris, Free Creatures, p. 42. David Burrellargues that eternity is one of the formal features of God besides others, such assimplicity and immutability. As such, it serves to assert the distinction between Godand all the rest. It does not say how God is directly, like other attributes such asknowledge, but it indicates God's ontological constitution. David Burrell, Knowingthe Unknowable God: Ibn-Sfnii, Maimonides, Aquinas, pp. 46-50; "God's Eternity," Faithand Philosoplry, pp. 390-392.


were only that time has a beginning and an end while eternity lacksthese limits, then time could be part of eternity. Then eternity wouldbe transformed into sempiternity (aevum, or aeon), or omnitemporality.102 Eternity is also different from time insofar as "eternity is aninstantaneous whole whilst time is not."I03 Consequently, arguesAquinas, even if time existed forever it would never be instantaneously whole-one could indicate beginnings and endings. 104 God'seternity should also not be confused with the timelessness of necessary truths. Necessary truths may be immutable, and indifferent totime and change, but they are not eternal. 105 If we call the modeof their existence timeless, then eternity does not consist of timelessness in this sense. 106 Thus, for Aquinas claiming that God is eternal does not mean that God is timeless, since eternity includes alltimes. 107 Relating the eternal Creator to his temporal and/or sempiternal creatures fuels debates over topics, such as God's knowledgeof creatures, the beginning of the universe, God's intervention in history, and so forth.

Aquinas' discussion of the difference between time, aevum, and eternity, which is of Neoplatonic origin, runs parallel to the hierarchical triple division of being. It is probably the only text of Aquinasin which we find a similarity to Avicennan texts concerning the issueof eternity. According to this triple division, God is eternal, thingswhich are not subject to generation and corruption (i.e., heavenly

102 Richard Dales argues that early medieval commentators minimized the notionof simultaneity in Boethius' definition with the consequence that eternity came tomean omnitemporality. Only in the 13th century did the implications of eternitybecome the object of philosophical and theological reflection. Richard C. Dales,"Time and Eternity in the Thirteenth Century," Journal qf the History qf Ideas 49/1(1988), pp. 27-28.

103 ST la. 10, 4.104 ST la. 10, 4.105 ST la. 10, 3 ad 3.106 Burrell distinguishes between atemporality and eternity: while the former may

be irrelevant to time, it does not include having life, but eternity does: "Otherthings, which for one reason or another, may be unaffected by time, or to whichtime is irrelevant, may be said to be atemporal (or timeless), but not, properly speaking, eternal. For what eternity adds to timelessness is the 'perfect possession all atonce of limidess life.' Aquinas makes Boethius' celebrated formula his own, and indoing so explicates it: the 'perfect possession' in question is the identity of the divinesubject with its to-be, the absence of any composition whatsoever, and hence a perfect at-one-ness with itself. And such an unrestricted act of existing amounts to 'Iimidess life.'." David Burrell, "God's Eternity," p. 393.

107 ST la. 10, 2, ad 4; also see, ST la. 14, 13.

bodies and angels) are in aevum, and things which are subject to generation and corruption are in time. Hence, aevum lies between eternity and time, absolute immutability and absolute changeability.Eternity is the measure of a being that is absolutely immutable andis not accompanied by something changeable. It does not have abefore or an after, and it is not accompanied by before or after atall. Aevum measures beings like angels which combine unchangeableness of substance with changeability of thought, will and place.It does not have before and after in itself, but it is accompanied bybefore and after. Unlike aevum, time measures things that are altogether changeable. 108

God's eternity is almost a restatement of God's otherness fromcreatures, based on his simplicity and immutability. Only the eternal being in the proper sense is self-subsistent and absolutely immutable.It exists all at once, and includes all times. Aquinas' position conforms to that of Avicenna in the sense that for both of them Godis the self-subsistent and fully actual being.

God Knows Creatures as well as Himself

Aquinas shares a similar conception of God's knowledge with Avicenna.Even though there are divergences, they agree that (1) God knowshimself as well as other things by one act of knowledge; (2) God'sknowledge of himself and other things is in accordance with hisbeing, i.e., it is identical to God's being. It is simple, creative andeternal.

For Aquinas, like Avicenna's contention, God knows himself andhis knowledge is identical to himself. To establish his claim, Aquinasemploys God's immateriality and actuality. First, he uses the immateriality of God to argue that God is a knower. In a similar manner to Avicenna, he founds knowing on 'being free from matter.'Freedom from matter, according to Aquinas, is proportionate to having knowledge. Since God is absolutely free from matter,109 Godknows to the highest degree. IIO Secondly, he introduces God's actuality in order to explain that in God the knower and the object ofknowledge are identical, i.e., God knows himself through himself. In

108 ST la. 10, S.109 See for Aquinas' argument for God's being free from matter, ST la. 7, I.110 ST la. 14, l.


explaining how God knows himself through himself, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of operations: one in which the object of the operation is outside the agent, and one in which the object of the operationis inside the agent. Recalling Aristotle, III Aquinas states that an actualintelligible is identical with an actual intellect (intelligibile in actu estintellectus in actu). The object of knowledge and the knowing subjectare not identical if there is potency in either of them, i.e., the knowing agent or the object of knowledge. Since there is no potency inGod, in God the knowing intellect and the object of knowledge areidentical. Like Avicenna, for Aquinas God is intellect and intelligible. 112 In God not only are the knower and the object of knowledgeidentical, but also the act of knowing is identical to them. Since Goddoes not have a form separate from his being-his being is identical with his essence-and since God's essence (i.e., knower) is identical with his knowledge, God's being is identical to his act of knowing.Hence in God, the knower (subject), the thing known (object) andthe act of knowing are identical. l13

Divine knowledge for Aquinas is not limited to God's self-knowledge so as to exclude knowledge of other things. Like Avicenna,Aquinas locates God's knowledge of other things within God's selfknowledge. Since other things are the effects of God that fall withinGod's creative power, in order for God's self-knowledge to be perfect, the knowledge of the effects of his power must be includedwithin God's self-knowledge. Since God knows other things in himself but not in themselves as they exist in re, the manner they arefound in God's knowledge is in accordance with the manner in whichGod exists, i.e., immaterially and simply, etc. 114 Since God is simple, he must have one act of knowing, which includes both his selfknowledge and knowledge of other things.

III Aristotle, De Anima Ill, 2.426aI6; De Anima Ill, 4. 430a3.112 ST la. 14, 2.113 ST la. 14, 4. One can see the similarity between Aquinas' position and that

of Avicenna, if Avicenna's triplet is recalled. God is intellect/intellection ('aql), intelligent ('iiqil), and the object of intellection (ma'qill), or act of knowing, knower, andthe object of knowledge. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIlI.6, p. 357.3-9.

114 ST la. 14, 5. In ScC I, Aquinas' presentation of his position seems closer tothe way Avicenna expresses his position. Aquinas states that God primarily andessentially knows himself, and through his self-knowledge also knows other things.One does not see an important change in both Summas regarding this question,except that his wording in ScC reveals more affinity to Avicenna's expression. SCCI, 49. See also ST la. 14, 14; ScC I, 48 [7] and [8].

Another argument for the oneness of God's knowledge can befound in Aquinas' discussion of whether God can have speculativeknowledge. God's knowledge of things, as a master plan of thingsexisting in re, is practical knowledge, but it is not only practical butalso speculative. This is a subtle point that one does not see explicitly in Avicenna. Aquinas argues that one and the same knowledgecan be both speculative and practical in different respects. Knowledge,he contends, is speculative if its aim is consideration of truth, andbut not producing something based on this knowledge. However,knowledge can be in one respect speculative and in another respectpractical. God's knowledge of himself is speculative knowledge, sinceanother God cannot be produced. God has, however, both speculative and practical knowledge of created things, given that in addition to the things that he created there are things that God couldcreate but he has not created and will not create. 115 Ultimately God'sspeculative and practical knowledge of things is subsumed within hisknowledge of himself. It is true that, because of his perfect knowledge, God knows things as they are producible (operabilia). However,given that God knows things other than himself in himself, and thatGod's knowledge of himself is speculative knowledge, ultimately God'sknowledge of other things is also speculative. 116 Hence God has oneact of knowledge, i.e., his self-knowledge, which includes his knowledge of other things.

Just as Avicenna felt the need to explain how God could knowmany things at once without having many acts of knowledge, Aquinasdiscusses whether God's knowledge is discursive. He argues that Godknows other things not from themselves, but in himself. Consequently,his knowledge of other things is not discursive in the sense of having pieces of knowledge succeeding one another. God knows everything at once. ll7 One may compare God's being the cause of thingsand having knowledge of things to human knowledge of things basedon a cause-effect relationship. Aquinas considers the objection that,insofar as human experience goes, knowing effects through theircauses is discursive. Therefore if God knows other things throughhimself because he is their cause, then God's knowledge of other

115 ST la. 14, 16.116 ST la. 14, 16, ad sed contra.117 ST la. 14, 7.

116 CHAPTER TWOCONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 117

things must be discursive. IIB He explains that God's act of knowingdoes not depend on temporal succession, nor does it depend oncausal succession. Since God knows other things in himself, by knowing himself he does not consider one effect after another. In thisrespect, human experience with respect to knowing something throughsome other thing cannot be applied to God. We know effects fromcauses but not in their causes but God knows them in their causes,since he is the first cause of everything, and he knows his effects inhimself. llg

Aquinas' argument that God's knowledge is not discursive is largelyharmonious with Avicenna's argument that God's knowledge is simple, despite apparent differences. On the one hand, Aquinas emphasizes that God knows other things 'in himself' and implies that hedoes not know them 'from himself.' Otherwise it would suggest asimilarity to the human knowledge of effects from their causes, andwould imply that God's knowledge of other things is discursive.Avicenna, on the other hand, argues that God's knowledge of otherthings is not 'in himself' as constitutive parts of God's knowledgebut 'from himself' as a necessary concomitant of God's self-knowledge. Both aim at securing the simplicity of God's knowledge, eventhough they address different concerns because of the difference intheir approach to expressing God's simplicity, an issue which will bediscussed in more detail below.

The discussion I have pursued so far, i.e., that for Aquinas Godhas one knowledge of himself and other things, is also a discussionof God's knowledge being simple and intelligible. 120 What still needs

liB ST la. 14, 7, obj. 2 & 3.119 ST la. 14, 7.120 Even though God knows other things .im~a~e:ially an~ simply, ~his. ~oes ?ot

mean that God's knowledge fails to contam mdlVlduals Wlt~ theIr m?IVlduallty,because, by knowing his essence, God knows essences of all. t~mgs (essentzGS, omnzum).ST la. 14, 14. Aquinas devotes article 6 in q 14 to emphaslz~ng t~at G?d.s ~?wl

edge of other things is not universal, but that God knows thmgs m theIr mdlVlduality. He argues that to know something with its fe~tures that a~e .common to manythings but not with its exclusive (speciali) featur.es I~ to know. It Imperfecdy. S.o, ~f

God knew things only in their universal propertIes (z~ unz~ersalz tantum), but. not mdlvidually, then God's knowledge-consequendy God s be~ng-would b~ Imp.erfec~.

Since God cannot be imperfect, God must know other thmgs not only m theIr ~nI

versal features but in their proper, individual existence. Another argument Aqumasdevises to show that God knows things with their specific properties is based onhis theory of participation. First, he affirms that all perfections that are found increatures are found in God eminendy (secundum modum excellentem). He argues that

discussing is the eternity and immutability of God's knowledge ofother things. Even though these can be deduced from God's knowledge being identical to his being as well, some aspects may needhighlighting.

the nature proper to each thing consists in its participation in the divine perfectionto some degree. But God would not know himself perfecdy, if he did not knowhow other things participate in his perfection.. ~~e intel!igibility of God's. knowledge vis-i-vis the extension of his knowledge tomdlVlduals IS one of the topICS where Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions are considered to radically diverge. When treating God's knowledge of individuals in STla. 14, I I, Aquinas' first objection can be compared to what Avicenna states whenhe argues that God's knowledge of material individuals cannot be of material individuals qua material individuals. In fact, Aquinas has also argued that God knowsthings 'as they are in himself' in the sense that they are known in accord with his~anner of knowing, (ST la. 14, 6 ad I), and hence his manner of being, i.e., GodIS free from matter (ST la. 14, I) and in accord with the way that the intelligiblena.tures (species) of t~ings are included in the divine essence (ST la. 14, 5 ad 3).WIth reference to Aristotle, he reminds us that the mind grasps universals and thesenses grasp individuals (ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium). (Aristode, De Anima11, 5.41 7b22). For Avicenna's position, see chapter 2, section I. Another objectionAquin~s .stat~s is that matter is the principle of individuation. But matter is purepotentIality, m total contrast to God's being, which is pure actuality. If matter isthe only indispensable condition for material individuals, then God cannot knowtheir individuality. Whereas Avicenna proposes knowing individuals in a universalmanner, Aquinas argues that unlike humans who need one faculty to know universals and immaterial things, and another faculty to know individual material things,God knows both kinds of things by his simple intellect (per suum simplicem intellectum) (ST la. 14, I I). Without mentioning Avicenna's name, Aquinas mentionsAvic.enna's :xa~ple of ho~ particular eclipses can be known through their causes.Aqumas mamtams that AVlcenna's effort to show how God knows individuals fails.;\q~i?as refutes .Avicenna's a.rgument on the ground that the forms and powers thatmdiVlduals receIve from theIr causes are not individuated except through individual matter (materiam individualem). Aquinas argues, in his turn, (a) since God's knowledge of things is their cause and whatever exists is caused by God, only things thatGo.d knows to exis~ can exist. (b) And since God is not only the cause of form,whIch bears the unIversal conception (ratio universalis), but also the cause of matterby which things are individuated, God's knowledge must include individuals:Con?nuin? ~is explan~tion, A<:juinas reiterates that (c) God's essence, as the prod~ctIve pnnClpl: (pnn~zpzuTTl; actzvum) of things, must be a sufficient principle to knowthings not only m theIr unIversal natures but also in their individuality. I think onecan find all three arguments (a, b, c) in Avicenna too, with regard to God's beingno.t only the. c~use of forms but also the cause of matter, God's self-knowledgebemg the pnnClple of both the knowledge and the existence of individual things.Furt~ermore, Avicenna's example of an astronomer knowing particular eclipses ina unIversal manner seems to have been misunderstood. Avicenna's example seemst? be intended t? be an example to illustrate what intellectual knowledge of par~culars ca~ be lIke. In. the Ishariit, VII, pp. 182-.183, Avicenna clarifies his positIon by notIn/? that parucula.r events ma~ be d.etermmed by supplying their particularcauses. In this case, a partIcular matenal thmg may be known with the inclusionof its particula~ matte:. So ?ven. if we do not take it to. be a simple example, itwould be fine, smce AVlcenna s pomt seems to be that God IS not something temporal


In accord with God's eternity, God's knowledge of other things isalso eternal, i.e., all that is known about creatures is known as onesimultaneous whole, embracing the whole of time. 121 Having arguedthat time is something included within eternity, Aquinas continues,God surveys all things as they are in their presence to him. 122 Inaccordance with God's eternity, God's knowledge is necessary.123Aquinas does not specifically discuss the necessity of God's knowledge in this context, but the necessity of God's knowledge is assumed, probably because it can be deduced from God's eternity andimmutability.

The fact that God's knowledge is identical to his substance, notsomething additional, is also the basis for Aquinas' argument thatGod's knowledge is not changeable. 124 If one argues for the immutability of God's knowledge, the immediate objection to this position concerns how to explain the changeable creatures of God in relation tothe unchangeable knowledge of God. This is again a concern common to Avicenna and Aquinas. They propose similar solutions aswell. One of Aquinas' objections is as follows: Knowledge implies a

and his knowledge of temporal material things cannot be like the knowledge thattemporal things have of temporal things. In any case, in Ishiiriit, p. 185, Avicennastates that even if God's knowledge of particulars must be above time and sempiternity, God knows particulars in a sacred (muqaddas) manner. The existence of particular temporal things is identical to the divine execution (qadar) of God's primal(al-awwal) decree (qarfii'uhu). If they were not necessary, they would not be. Thismay be compared to Aquinas' statement in ST la. 14, II ad I. Aquinas states thatthe intelligible species, or likeness, of the divine intellect-which is identical to thedivine essence-is not immaterial by abstraction that takes place later on, but immaterial by itself Thus, it is the principle of essential elements entering into composition in composite things, whether it be principle of species, or be principle ofindividuation. Hence, God knows particulars as well as universals through this intelligible species, or likeness, which is his essence.

121 ST la 14 13122 ST la: 14: 13.' Aquinas contends that the eternal presence of temporal things

to God does not simply mean that God has their intelligible natures present inhimself. The editor-translator of this volume, Thomas Gornall, notes that Aquinas'contention refers to Avicenna's position. Aquinas' manner of explaining the atemporal nature of God's knowledge may be different from that of Avicenna. Avicennaargues that time is a corollary of movement and things subject to movement. God'sknowledge cannot be subject to time, absolutely free from matter and its attachments as he is. However, it does not mean that time and eternity are mutuallyexclusive, such that an eternal being does not know anything regarding temporalthings or what happens in time.

123 ST la. 14, 13, ad I & 3.124 ST la. 14, 15.

relation to the object of knowledge. Since creatures, which are theobjects of God's knowledge, are in time, and creatures are subjectto change, then God's knowledge of them must change as well. l25

Aquinas' answer to this objection is that the reference of God'sknowledge of creatures is not to creatures as they exist in re but asthey are known by God in himself. Hence, God's relation to thingsas his objects of knowledge does not imply a change in God. In asense, Aquinas' argument amounts to saying that God's knowledgeof things is independent of their actual existence in re. 126

Aquinas considers God's knowledge of other things to be the causeof their existence. God's knowledge of other things, he maintains, isto created things what the knowledge of an artisan is to his artifacts.Just as the artisan makes the artifacts through the form he has inmind, God's knowledge of other things functions as the principle ofhis creative action (principium actionis). However, taken by itself, anintellectual form does not indicate that it will be made to exist outside God's knowledge. Furthermore, an intellectual form-as something theoretical and speculative-is indifferent to determinate objects,because it includes opposites at once. Aquinas concludes that Godis the cause of things by his intellect together with his will. 127

Theological Language Revisited: Talking About Godin the Light if Divine Formal Features

Talking about the simple God in non-simple human terms is one ofthe places where Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas have quite divergent

125 ST la. 14, 15, obj. I.126 I~ this context,. one must note a difference between Avicenna and Aquinas.

For AVlcenna all attnbutes of God are eternal, as God's being is. Avicenna defendshis position by simply stating that God's existence is independent of the existenceof thi~gs in re. Aquinas, however, defends his position by arguing that some namesare Said of God eternally, and some names are said in time. Whereas, for Aquinas,God's knowledge and love exemplifY the former kind of divine names, God's beingCreator and Lord exemplifies the latter kind of the divine names. Whereas the former indicates God's relations resulting from God's act that is known to be in Godthe latter arises from the existence of things in re, because of God's action whichtakes its objects as existing in themselves, but not in God. Hence whereas the former do not accept change, the latter allow change of relation in accordance withthe change in things existing in re. See: ST la. 14, 15, ad I; ST la. 13, 7.

127 ST la. 14, 8.

positions. Simplicity, as I have discussed, is one of the divine formalfeatures acknowledged by both Avicenna and Aquinas. They sharea similar conception of the simplicity of God. However, they go inthe opposite directions regarding how to talk about God in conformity with divine simplicity, necessity and other divine formal features. Given divine simplicity, on which ground are we justified inattributing to God properties, which we know as existing in composite beings and through our human conditions? How can Godhave many perfection properties? In the face of these questions,divine formal features play a different role in the positions of Avicennaand Aquinas regarding theological language.

In order to hold together divine simplicity despite the pluralityand creaturely aspects of properties predicated of God, Avicennaattempts to show that (1) they are ultimately reducible to divine purebeing, and (2) they are properties attributed to God in relation tocreation, i.e., they do not have to be conceived in the manner theyare found in creatures. Aquinas, however, emphasizes the conceptual difference among divine perfection properties, despite the existential unity and identity. He argues that human ways of signifYingdo not, and need not, match divine properties. This is supported byhis theory of analogical predication.

In addition to divine simplicity, other divine formal features, suchas necessity and eternity, also affect theological language and argumentation. Here the central issue seems to be limited to modifyingthe meaning of perfection terms. Thus the meaning divine perfection properties and rational assessment of theological statements whichfeature them seem to be major issues in this regard. For example,we may have to think extraordinary ways to conceive of divine will,vis a vis divine necessity. God does not simply have will, but Godhas necessary will. As a result, we may not draw all the implicationsof the property of will but make the adjustments required by divinenecessity.

Still, divine simplicity modifies the whole approach to theologicallanguage, including the manner in which other formal features, suchas necessity and immutability, are taken into account. The role oneassigns to divine simplicity with regard to theological language determines how and to what extent divine perfection properties are modifiedby divine formal features other than simplicity. Avicenna thinks that

128 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 367.12-15.129 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 347.9-10.130 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.6~ 1O. Aquinas shares Avicenna's position.

Aquinas, ST la. 4, 2.131 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.11 ~ p. 356.15.

divine perfection properties must be considered only insofar as theyare modified in the light of other divine formal features. For example, divine will can be considered only insofar as it is necessary.Aquinas however takes divine perfection properties, both in the lightof divine formal features and on their own.

Concerned with keeping divine simplicity intact, Avicenna takes areductive and relativizing strategy regarding divine perfection properties, attempting to show how they are reducible to divine being.He argues that divine perfections are said of God in relation to creatures despite his explicit discussions attributing various perfections toGod. In explaining how various properties are attributed to Godwithout falling into anthropomorphism Avicenna attempts to showthat all attributes reside in one single or simple thing. For him theonly property predicated of God in himself is 'being.'128 All otherproperties predicated of God either indicate a relation to creation,or consist of a negation denying something creaturely of God. As aresult, Avicenna tries to show that all that is attributed to God canbe reduced ultimately to a 'self-subsistent pure being.' His guidingprinciple seems to be this: since God's perfections are all one andsimple in being, our conception of God's perfections should be inaccordance with God's simplicity. Thus differently conceived perfections may be reduced to a simple origin: 'being with the condition of negation.'129

Avicenna's attempt to show how all that is said of God is reducibleto being can easily be seen in his elaborations of various attributesof God. For example, when he talks about God's being perfect, hefirst states that God is the perfect, or complete being, even abovebeing perfect. And he explains 'being perfect,' in terms of havingbeing. God is perfect, or above perfection, because he has all thebeing that belongs to him as well as to other beings. 13o The samereasoning is applied in explaining that God is good, and that he istrue or real (baqq), which are reduced to being. 131 God is good not

121CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGECHAPTER TWO120


only because he is necessary of existence by himself, but also becausehe bestows the perfection and goodness of all other things. God istrue or real (baqq) since he is necessary of being, hence the belief inhis existence is true and is always true. He also mentions in passing the correlation between 'being' and 'being in act.' That is, inactivity is the result of non-being. 132 Thus 'being in act' may also bereduced to being.

Avicenna includes among divine attributes that God is a pureintellect and pure intelligible. His explanation of God's being anintellect has two implications, one a negation and the other an affirmation. He reduces it to immateriality. God is a pure intellect/intellection (Caql) because he is a being separate from matter in all respects.Since it is matter and its attachments (Calii/iq) that prevents something to know and be known,133 God is a pure intellect and a pureintelligible. He argues that God's being an intellectlintellection (Caql),an intelligizer (knower) (Ciiqil) and an object of intellection (maCqul) atonce l34-or knowledge/knowing, knower and object of knowledgedoes not imply any composition. For Avicenna, these three namesindicate one and the same thing. They are coined only because ofdifferent points of view. One and the same thing considered "insofar as it is a separate entity (huwiy)'atan), it is an intellect;" "considered insofar as this separate entity (huwiyya) belongs to its essence (lidhiitihi) , it is an object of intellection belonging to its essence (dhiit);"and "considered insofar as its essence belongs to itself (lahu) as a separate entity, it is an intelligizer (Ciiqil) of its essence (dhiit)."135 Avicennaunderlines that they, i.e., caql, Ciiqil and maCqul, mutually imply eachother. That is, an caql by definition is something that has knowledge,or an act which involves knowledge, and is an object of knowledge,etc. 136 As they are 'correlative' concepts one cannot exist without theexistence of the other.

As a divine attribute, God's being an intellect, deserves specialattention. This is because, on the one hand, God's being an intellect is one of the properties that Avicenna reduces to being. On the

132 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.15 - p. 356.5.133 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 356.16 - p. 357.2.134 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 357.3-5.135 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 357.5-7.136 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 6, p. 357.13-20.

other hand, God is said to be an intellect in relation to creation,since divine knowledge is the ultimate source of the existence ofother things. As I have discussed above, for Avicenna things existbecause God knows them to exist. Thus divine knowledge seems tobe at the junction of divine attributes which Avicenna reduces tobeing and those which he considers to be said of God in relationto creation. Conforming to his reductive strategy, Avicenna reducesdivine perfection properties that are attributed to God in relation tocreation to divine knowledge. Divine knowledge is in turn reducedto divine being. In this way all divine attributes are reduced to divinepure being.

In conformity with his strategy of reducing divine attributes topure being, Avicenna also argues that divine perfection propertieswhich are said of God in relation to creation are not conceptuallydifferent from each other. From the 'existential identity of divineattributes to the divine essence and to each other' Avicenna arrivesat the 'conceptual identity' of divine attributes. 137 He argues thatdivine will is identical to divine knowledge not only in terms of existence but also in terms of conception. He attempts to show howvarious divine perfection properties are reducible to divine knowledge. For example, to say that God has power means that Godknows everything as an intellect and that he is the origin (mabda') ofeverything by himself (bi dhiitihi). Avicenna also examines the differencebetween 'life' as found in creatures and as found in God. Life asfound in God, he argues, depends on apprehension and action. Inthe case of human beings, each of these two actions stems from adifferent source. But insofar as God is concerned, they do not comefrom different sources, since in God the perfections are identical tohis essence. If apprehension and action, which perfect life in us, areidentical, then God's knowledge, God's willing and God's act of creation are identical. I38

Avicenna's interpretation of divine attributes, when he explains theexistence of creatures, indicates his commitment to the conceptualas well as existential identity of the divine attributes to each other.

137 For the assertion of a conceptual as well as existential identity of the divineattributes, See Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 367.7-12; Nqjat, ed. Majid Fakhry(Beirut: 1985), p. 287.3-12.

138 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.11-17.


Avicenna examines the relationship between knowing something andhaving the power to make it. In case of human beings, knowingsomething and making it are different. Man knows, but the fact thathe knows does not mean that what this man conceives of becomesimmediately realized. But as far as God is concerned, since his knowing is identical with his having power to make what he knows tobe realized, God's knowledge of something is identical to his makingit. Whereas human beings need to will in order to make the thingthat they know, God does not need an additional will to make it. 139

Thus we have the reduction of 'power' and 'will' of God to knowledge of God.

Avicenna's commitment to the conceptual identity of the divineattributes accords with his commitment to consider the divine perfections insofar as they are modified not only by divine simplicity butalso other divine formal features such as necessity. As a result of hisstrategy to reduce all attributes of God to God's being, he maintainsthe conceptual identity of divine perfection properties. Given hisargument for the conceptual identity of divine perfection properties,Avicenna does not, and indeed could not, emphasize the differencebetween divine perfection properties. For example, he could notunderline the difference between God's knowledge and will in themanner Aquinas does. For Avicenna, God does not have will butnecessary will. Consequently, Avicenna does not distinguish betweenwhat there is and what there could be, even though he believes thatGod is omniscient, omnipotent, and has free will. This can be contrasted to Aquinas' use of the distinction between God's power considered absolutely and God's power as determined to something. 140

Aquinas' theory of analogical predication plays an important partin securing divine simplicity despite the inadequacy of human lan-

139 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.18 - p. 367.2.140 Aquinas distinguishes between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity in

examining the claims for the necessity of the world. His arguments are groundedon his appreciative strategy which does not require that the divine perfections beconsidered only insofar as they are modified according to the divine formal features, such as necessity and eternity. Lawrence Moonan discusses Aquinas' distinction between the divine power 'considered absolutely,' and 'considered as determinedto something.' Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994),pp. 265-295. His discussion recalls Aquinas' distinction between the divine will considered absolutely, and considered together with the divine formal features.

guage to express it. While discussing divine simplicity, in ST la. 3, 6,Aquinas discusses whether God is a composite of subject and accidents. Aquinas rejects the position that in God there can be accidents by arguing (1) that accidents realize a potentiality of theirsubject, but God does not have a potency at all; (2) that God isidentical with existence and nothing can be added to existence; and(3) that accidents are caused by the principles of the subject (accidentia causantur ex principiis subjecti), and since God is the first cause,there cannot be accidents in God. 141 One objection to this is thatsomething accidental cannot be a substance, such as heat is accidental to hot things. Since the perfections, such as wisdom andpower, are accidental in man, they must be accidental in God toO. 142

In his reply to this objection, Aquinas states that perfections, suchas power and wisdom, are not predicated of God and of us 'univocally.' Since they are not predicated univocally, the fact that theyare accidents in us does not require that they be accidents whenthey are predicated of God. 143

The theory analogical predication makes Aquinas able to maintain an appreciative strategy concerning the predication of pure perfections of God. With the theory of analogical predication Aquinaswas comfortable to maintain that God is simple, and that pure perfections are found in God and they are predicated of God properly.Certainly, the mode of signification in human language does notcompete with the mode in which perfections are found in God,because the mode of signification in human language is proper onlyto the mode in which perfections are found in creatures. Predicationof perfections of God and of creatures are analogical exactly becausethe mode of signification in human language does not conform tothe manner perfections are found in God. Consequently, althoughGod's perfections are identical to God's essence and each other existentially, we can talk about them without damaging divine simplicityand without modifying them to the point of being reducible to divinepure being. Indeed, Aquinas argues that these perfection propertiesdiffer from each other conceptually, since each indicates God from

141 ST la. 3, 6; De Potentia VII, 4.142 ST la. 3, 6, obj. 1.143 ST la. 3, 6, ad 1; De Potentia VII, 4, ad 3.

Conclusion if Chapter Two

a specific respect. His theory of analogical predication allows Aquinasto maintain that we talk about God without reducing divine perfections to the divine being and without damaging God's simplicity.

Aquinas acknowledges at the outset that neither our knowledge ofGod nor the way we express this knowledge can conform to God'smode of being. Hence, he does not feel the need to modify divineperfections in accordance with the divine formal features so that theycan be predicated of God. Avicenna, however, has difficulties inexplaining how he can maintain that 'God is simple,' and also that'God has perfections.' In order to keep divine simplicity intact,Avicenna argues not only for the existential identity of God's attributes to God himself and each other, but also argues for the conceptual identity of each to the others. As a result, he attempts tomodify the divine perfections in the light of the divine formal features by reducing them to pure being.

I have attempted to show that Avicenna and Aquinas share similarinsights concerning God's simplicity, necessity, immutability and eternity. Furthermore, for both of them God's knows himself and creatures, God's knowledge of things is the cause of their existence.Moreover, God's knowledge of things is in accord with how God is,i.e., simple, eternal and so on. Having argued that Avicenna andAquinas have similar conceptions of divine formal features and divineknowledge will help us better understand and examine their arguments regarding the nature of the creative act and the beginning ofthe world.

Although Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of divineformal features, they follow very different paths with regard to theological language in light of these features. As part of his reductivestrategy, in order to keep divine perfection properties separate fromcreaturely perfection properties, i.e., to keep them unaffected by theimperfection of human knowledge and talk of God, Avicenna considers divine perfection properties only insofar as they are modifiedin the light of the divine formal features. Contrary to such a reductive strategy based on divine formal features, Aquinas takes divineperfection properties into account both insofar as they are modified


by divine formal features and on their own. Their positions withregard to any particular theological-metaphysical question must beunderstood in the light of this underlying difference. The issue ofthe nature of divine creative action which is the topic of the following chapter is going to provide a good example in this regard.

CHAPTER TWO126

PART TWO

TALKING ABOUT CREATION

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION

In the first and second chapters I attempted to establish that thereis a shared ground between Avicenna and Aquinas on the basis ofwhich one can compare their theories regarding creation. I have alsounderlined the difference between their positions concerning theological language. In this chapter, I will discuss Avicenna's and Aquinas'conception of the act of creation. To be more precise, I will try toidentify whether the act of creation is likened to acts stemming fromnature or acts stemming from will. According to the prevalent interpretation, for Avicenna God's creative action is similar to the actionsof things acting through their natures. Aquinas, however, is creditedwith the second alternative. I will argue that this sharp distinctionbetween Avicenna's position and that of Aquinas regarding the characterization of the act of creation is unwarranted, since they agreeon the basic issues. For both of them, (1) God creates by will, (2)God primarily and essentially wills himself, and his volition concerning the universe is subsumed in his self-volition, (3) the universeis not the end of God's will, and (4) God does not need to createin order to be what he is, i.e., God's being and goodness do notdepend on the existence of other things.

However, Avicenna and Aquinas reached different conclusionsregarding the necessity of the actual universe, or regarding God'sfreedom to create and to choose. For Avicenna there is a strongrelationship between God's being and the actual universe. He arguesthat all existing things are necessary concomitants of the essence ofGod. This argument has two plausible implications. The first is thenecessity of the universe. If God's essence necessitates other things,then they are necessary. Thus God has to create. Second, God willsonly the actual universe. Or more precisely, God could not havewilled a different universe because this universe is necessitated byGod's essence. Aquinas argues, contrary to Avicenna, that since Godcreates by will and the universe is not the end of God's will, theuniverse is not necessary, i.e., God does not have to create. Moreover,God knows himself to be imitable by creatures in infinitely many

132 CHAPTER THREE THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 133

ways. Although this universe is the actual one, God has free choiceregarding which things or universe to create. For Aquinas, the universe is hypothetically necessary, i.e., if it is considered together withthe eternity and immutability of God's will. I will argue that theunspecified necessity of the universe in Avicenna's thought corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas' system. This can be shown on the basis of their positions regardingtheological language, discussed in previous the chapters.

Avicenna's Position: Creation is Voluntary and Necessary

In Avicenna's account of creation, one does not find the detailedand complex explanations found in Aquinas' account. This is partlyattributable to Avicenna's reductive strategy regarding our knowledge of God. Since our knowledge of the perfections we attributeto God is derived from our knowledge of creation, he limits himselfto what is given, i.e., there is the existing world, which is not selfexisting. He also considers divine will together with how it is, i.e.,necessary and immutable. For him, creation is a voluntary act, butthe divine will is different from the human will, because it is simple, immutable and eternal. Moreover, the world is not the end ofGod's will. God's being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the universe; the universe necessarily follows from the essenceof God, who is a knowing and willing being. Even though God'swill is independent of any factor motivating him to will creatures,and even though God's being and perfection are independent of theexistence of other things, the universe is necessary. Since the universe, considered in itself, is contingent and since God's being andgoodness do not depend on the existence of other things, the necessity of the universe in Avicenna's argument is the result of his position regarding theological language. That is, since he considers divineperfection properties only insofar as they are modified by the divineformal features, God's will to create and to create this universe isnecessary and eternal. Consequently this universe is necessary.

Avicenna usually is considered to have held that God's creativeaction is similar to the actions of natural things acting through theirnatures. This interpretation of Avicenna's position is supported byhis denial of intention to God in creation and by his claim that theuniverse is necessary. Despite this, for Avicenna creation is a vol-

untary action. When he argues that God cannot have an intentionin creation, he simply wants to state that other things do not constitute a final cause for God. Furthermore, the necessity of the universe does not make the act of creation like the actions of naturalbeings. Nor does it take God's freedom away, since for Avicennathe necessity of the universe is neither imposed on God from outside, nor is it required by something internal to God. The existenceof the universe, as well as the form the universe takes, is necessarybecause God is necessary in all respects.

In the following, I will first state an interpretation of Avicenna'sposition concerning creation shared by many scholars. Then I willintroduce Avicenna's conception of the divine will, and his accountof why and how things other than God exist. I will also explore thesense in which God is a free creator for Avicenna, and how he reconciles the necessity of the universe with divine freedom. Withoutattempting to question the validity of Avicenna's arguments for divinefreedom vis a vis his act of creation, I will rather show how creationis a voluntary action for Avicenna, even though he argues that Godhas no intention in creation and that the universe is necessary.

Interpretation if Avicenna's Position

To distinguish the theistic conception of God from the Neoplatonic,pagan, conceptions of God, some contemporary scholars employstrategic pairs of opposites: necessary emanation versus creation, eternal versus created universe, God as natural agent versus God as freecreator.! In this context, one may easily contrast Avicenna's theoryof emanation to voluntary creation in reference to how the universecomes to exist. Following this contrast, emanation denies intentionto the efficient cause and implies the necessity of the effect, whereascreation as a voluntary action bespeaks the intention of the efficientcause as well as the contingency of the effect.

I For these assumptions see for example, Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation:Writings on the "Sentences" ifPeter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Qyestion 1, "Introduction"by translators, pp. 1-20; Herbert A. Davidson, Proqft, p. I footnote: I; Rudi A. TeVelde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J.Brill, 1995), pp. llO-1l1. Cf. Andrew Louth, The Origins if the Christian MysticalTradition )Tom Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981). He underlines the affinity ofGreek Fathers to Neoplatonic thought.


Avicenna is regularly presented as insisting that God creates bythe necessity of nature. The term "nature" in the expression "necessity of nature" may be understood as nature in inanimate things likefire or stone. It may also be taken in the sense of the essence orquiddity of anything that exists. In inanimate things nature is theprinciple of action. They act on account of their natures becausethey do not have the volition or desire with which animate beingsare endowed. Let us take fire as an example. The characteristicaction of fire is to burn. Obviously fire cannot refrain from burning. Within the natural order, ceteris paribus, fire acts by way of natural necessity in burning. Avicenna's position is usually associatedwith nature in this sense.

In a detailed study discussing Avicenna's theory of creation, BeatriceH. Zedler2 employs the term "nature" in this sense of acting throughnature as opposed to acting through will. In this article, Zedler supports the thesis that Aquinas wrote the De potentia as a Christianreply to Avicenna's theory of emanation.3 Zedler interprets Aquinas'

2 Beatrice H. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei',"Traditio VI (1948), pp. 105-159. The idea that for Avicenna creation is like a natural action is the popular interpretation of Avicenna's position among scholars. Ina passing reference, Etienne Gilson, when discussing Duns Scotus' conception ofthe function of the divine will and intellect with regard to creatures, writes:"Exterminating Avicenna's necessitarianism at its very root Duns Scotus proves,therefore, that far from flowing from the first being in virtue of any natural law,creatures could not even have any distinct ideas in the first being without a freeintervention of His will." Etienne Gilson, TIe Spirit if Mediaeval Philosophy, trans.A. H. C. Downes (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1991), p. 255. Ina similar fashion Oliver Leaman presents Avicenna's conception of creation, asthough, for Avicenna things were planned by something other than God and Godsaid yes and had to do so. Consequently, God plays hardly any part in the existence of things. "For the latter [i.e., Avicenna], God is the ultimate cause of everything which exists, but it is not clear whether, once a thing has passed the test ofpossibility, God can prevent it from coming into existence. God is rather in theposition of a constitutional monarch, who is required to sign the legislation passedby parliament, which makes the legislation 'royal', so legal. But all that the crowndoes in this sort of situation is rubber-stamp, as it were, a decision which has alreadybeen taken elsewhere." Oliver Leaman, A Brig Introduction to Islamic Philosophy(Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 44. Although Arthur Hyman does not clearly articulate why the necessity opposes the divine will, he assumes a sharp opposition. Heargues that by holding that God created through the divine will, Maimonides disagrees with Aristotle, "as well as with the emanationists, who affirmed that theworld emanated from God by necessity." Arthur Hyman "Maimonides on Creationand Emanation," in Studies in Medieval Philosphy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington,D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), pp. 50-51.

3 Zedler, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

many arguments as being directed against Avicenna's teachings, specifically that the world as eternal and necessary presumes that Godacts ex necessitate naturae.+ As Zedler argues, Aquinas traces Avicenna'sinsistence on the principle: "from one only one can proceed," toAvicenna's conception of God's creative action: God acts by necessity of nature.s The fact that Avicenna assimilates God's creativeaction to natural actions may also be observed from Aquinas' identification of natural action. Aquinas states throughout the De potentiathat "Nature is determined to one effect," and "explains this as meaning that nature is determined to one thing, both as regards what isproduced by the power of nature and as regards producing or notproducing."6 Since for Avicenna emanation is necessary, God has tocreate, and to create this actual universe. This confirms the contention that God acts by the necessity of nature.

Zedler explains away the passages in which Avicenna states thatGod's action is not like natural actions. On Zedler's interpretation,Avicenna's denial is not directed to the nature of natural things, butrather intends to deny that God's nature (intelligence) has any partin his act of creation, since for Avicenna, things are concomitantsof God. This means, however, that "the production of the world isaccomplished almost in spite of Him." Hence Aquinas' understandingof Avicenna's account of God's creative action, i.e., that God actsby the necessity of nature, was correct. 7 Combined with necessity ofthe universe, Avicenna's denial of intention to God in creation would,according to this interpretation, confirm the thesis that for Avicennacreation is not a voluntary action but a natural one. Avicenna'sadherence to the principle that "from one only one can proceed"reflects this point. Since for Avicenna God does not intend whatemanates from him, the things that emanate from him can only bein accordance with the divine simplicity, which suggests comparingemanation to a natural agent producing an effect similar to it. Thus,for example fire, being devoid of intention, cannot design its effect,but simply produces something similar to itself.8 Since intention is

4 Zedler, Ibid., p. 113.5 Zedler, Ibid., pp. 114-115.6 Zedler, Ibid., p. 115.7 Zedler, Ibid., pp. 121-122.8 Zedler, Ibid., pp. 114-115.


found only in voluntary agents, if an agent lacks intention, its actioncannot stem from volition. This, in turn, implies that the divineknowledge does not have a part in creation. Since willing and intention are based on knowledge, if one denies that God is an intentional or a voluntary creator, then divine knowledge can have nopart in creation. Hence Avicenna's contention that the universe isnecessary and that God does not intend anything in creating apparendy support interpreting his position that creation is a natural action,and not a voluntary one based on knowledge.9

God Creates by Will not by Nature

Before beginning to discuss how Avicenna explains creation of theuniverse and the role divine will plays in the act of creation, it isproper to state that for Avicenna God's will is in accordance withhis being, following the identity of God's attributes with his being.That is (1) God's will is simple; God has one act of self-will whichincludes God's willing of other things; (2) nothing else is the end ofGod's will, so it does not depend on anything external; (3) God'swill is necessary, eternal and immutable. Avicenna takes the divinewill into account only insofar as it is understood together with thesedivine formal features.

Since the divine will is simple, God has one act of will. God primarily wills and loves himself, and God's willing of other things mustbe subsumed under his self-willing. lO Besides being simple, God's willis eternal and immutable, following from his eternity and his beingpure act without any potency. Avicenna touches on the eternity and

9 David B. Burrell, siding with L. Gardet, contrasts Avicenna's theory of necessary emanation to intentional creation, and argues that Avicenna's and Al-Farabi'sinsistence on the 'from one only one can proceed' is because of "an insufficiendyintentional view of the divine nature." Louis Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (IbnSinal (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), pp. 157-158, as cited by David B. Burrell, "God'sEternity," Faith and Philosophy 1/4 (1984), p. 395. Necessary emanation for Burrellmay not even be counted as divine action. See op. cit., p. 404. I agree with Burrelland Gardet that Avicenna did not pursue the logical consequences of his conceptof God as pure intelligible being. But I would not say that for Avicenna God actsby necessity of nature, devoid of willing and intention, because all Avicenna aimsat is to distinguish between creaturely volition and divine volition. As will be discussed below, neither for Avicenna nor for Aquinas are other things the end of thedivine will.

IQ Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 363.14-16; VIII. 7, p. 366.12-13; Avicenna,Ta'liqiit, p. 157 "God is self-lover"; Avicenna, Nqjiit, p. 286.8-19.

immutability of the divine will in various contexts, albeit indirecdy,but notably to support the contention that God creates eternally.Since creation can be traced back to the divine will, if God's willwere not eternal and immutable, then God would be subject tochange, or, in other words, receptive and in need of something external in order to be an efficient cause. Since God is eternal and sincethere is no change in God, God's action must also be eternal. ll IfGod did not will eternally to create, nothing would be created becausethis implies a change both in God's will and in God's knowledge,due to the identity of will and knowledge in God. 12

In fact, Avicenna explicidy argues that creation is a voluntaryaction, following upon God's knowledge of things, which follows fromGod's self-knowledge. 13 God's will is the cause of the existence andthe order of things. However, Avicenna is much concerned lest thedivine will should be put on a par with human will.

The First knows (ya<qilu) his essence, and the order (nil-iim) of goodexisting (al-mau!Jud) in everything (fi al-kull), i.e., how it [i.e.,everything] is according to this order, since he knows (ya<qiluhu) it [i.e.,everything] as something emanating (mustqfir/), becoming (kii'in) andexisting (mau!Jud). And everything that is known to be (ma<lum al-kawn) ,and the direction of [its] coming to be (jiha al-kawn) on account ofCan) its place of origin is known by «inda) its principle. And it [i.e.,everything that is known to be] is good, and is not contradictory (ghG;)!rmuniij) [to good], since it [i.e., everything that is known to be] follows(tiibn the goodness of the essence of the principle and its perfection,which are loved in themselves (li dhiitG;)!hima). And this thing [i.e., whatemanates from the principle] is that which is willed (muriid). However,the object of volition (muriid) of the First is not in the manner of ourobject of volition (muriidinii) , such that he would have an aim (gharar/)in what comes to be (yakun) because of him «anhu). It appears thatyou know its impossibility, and you will know [more]. On the contrary, he is the wilIer (murfd) of his essence (li dhiitihi). This kind ofpure intellectual «aqliyya) volition (iriida) and this life of his, similarly,are identical to him (bi <G;)!nihi).14

This passage can be divided into two parts. In the first part Avicenna asserts God's knowledge of things, and in the second part how

II Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, pp. 373, 376-377; see also Avicenna, MetaphysicsVLl, p. 263; VI.2, p. 266.

12 See, Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14 - p. 359.2; Avicenna, Ta'liqiit,p. 158.

13 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.16.14 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 366.8-13.


God's will IS related to things. In the first part Avicenna states that(1) God knows himself, (2) God knows the order by which all thingsexist, and (3) God knows everything that exists as well as how theyexist. In the second part Avicenna attempts to explain how the divinewill is related to things. God's will is not directed at the emanationof things primarily, but as God's self-knowledge includes his beingthe principle, the creator of things, it also includes the knowledgeof things to be created. God's essence and perfection are loved inthemselves so God's essence is what is willed. Other things come toexist through God's self-volition. They are known and willed, butthey are not a final cause for God's will. By willing himself, Godalso wills the existence of other things. Avicenna does not explainfurther how God's will with respect to himself and his will withrespect to other things differ from each other. For example, we donot find the distinction Aquinas makes, whereby God wills himselfnecessarily, but he does not will other things necessarily.

For Avicenna, nothing else constitutes an end for God, and Goddoes not pursue an end distinct from himself in creating the universe. He gives two basic reasons for arguing this: (1) that only Godexists by himself and everything else depends on him, and (2) thatGod is simple. Avicenna explains the first by arguing that there isnothing to be intended. Only God exists without a cause, and therecan be no reason (sabab) unless it be because of God, in God or byGod, or belongs to God. If we assume that God has an end distinct from himself, we propose a voluntary action similar to humanvoluntary actions, with possibilities independent of the agent. A voluntary agent may seek to realize one of these possibilities. However,with regard to God, since there can be nothing outside and independent of God to be intended, God does not act for the sake ofsomething else. Hence, God creates other things even though otherthings do not constitute an end for God. 15

Avicenna's second reason concerns God's simplicity and perfection. If God is supposed to have an intention for the existence ofother things, three things follow from this supposition: (1) In Godthere is something distinct from God's self-knowledge which is theground for whatever God intends. This thing is God's knowledge ofthe necessity or lovability or goodness necessitating this act of inten-

15 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.6-10.

tion; (2) God intends, and (3) there is a benefit to which the intention is directed. This is impossible for Avicenna, given that God issimple. 16 God's simplicity for Avicenna requires that God have oneknowledge and one will, which are in turn identical to each other.Since God primarily knows, wills and loves himself, God's will cannot be directed to an end other than God.

Avicenna argues not only that creation is a voluntary act, but alsounderscores that creation cannot be similar to actions stemming fromnature, where 'nature' is taken to mean the principle of action ininanimate thingsY For Avicenna, a natural action excludes (1) knowledge and (2) approbation (rir/a) of the result of action by the agent. 18

After stating that the act of creation is different from human voluntary acts, he continues:

The existence (kawn) of everything from him is not in the way of nature[either], such that the existence (kawn) of everything from him is without a cognition (ma'rifa) and without his permission (rir/an). How could

16 Avicenna, Metapfrysics IX.4, p. 402.10-13. However, the kind of intentionAvicenna denies to God regarding the creation is an intention of 'something extraneous to the act of creation of things, and something extraneous to God's knowledge and will of himself,' as Avicenna indicates just before his statement that God'saction is the action of a knowing agent. This extraneous intention consists of 'intending creation for the sake of creation, or creatures.'

17 See for Avicenna's conception of nature, A.-M. Goichon (ed. trans. & annot.),Introduction cl Avicenne: Son Epitre de Dijinitions (Paris: Desclee, 1933), pp. 92-97.

18 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.13 - p. 403.1. See also, Metapfrysics VIII.7p. 363.10-13. G. Anawati translates lines 13-15 in the passage quoted above: "wakayJa . . .ya'qilu dhiitahu . . .": "De plus, que le tout provienne de lui par mode denature ne signifie pas que l'existence du tout proviendrait de lui sans connaissanceni agrement de sa part. Comment cela serait-il possible, alors qu'il est intelligencepure, s'intelligeant lui-meme?" G. Anawati (trans. & ed.), La Metaphysique du Shifd'(Paris: J. Vrin, 1978-1985), vol. 2, p. 137. I think Anawati's translation misses thevery point Avicenna is trying to make. While Avicenna is trying to separate actionsstemming from nature from actions stemming from knowledge and approval, Anawaticonflates them. Hence the translation gives the impression that for Avicenna theidea 'that God's action is like a natural action' is not opposed to the idea that Godis pure intellect. On the basis of such a translation, one may argue that althoughfor Avicenna God is a pure intellect, his act of creation is like the action of natural things, i.e., devoid of knowledge and volition. After stating that God's actionshould not be identified with the action of natural agents, Avicenna quite understandably asks how the action of an intelligent agent could be identified with theaction of natural agents, which are devoid of knowledge. The reason Anawati provides for his translation is this: "Parce que le necessairement existant n'a d'aucunemaniere un principe; sa creation du tout ne peut pas avoir lieu par mode d'intention par essence, car Cela impliquerait une recherche de perfection; il serait, de cepoint de vue, cause." G. Anawati, op. cit., p. 227. Anawati's reason is not justified,since Avicenna does not identify will and intention, as will be discussed below.


it be so, while he is a pure intellect who knows his essence? Thus hemust know that the existence of everything necessarily follows (yalzamuhu) from him, because he does not know his essence, except as heis the pure (maM) intellect and the first principle. And he only knowseverything from himself in accordance with being their principle, andwith there being nothing in his essence preventing (miini'), or repugnant to (kanh) the emanation of everything from him. And he (dhiituhu) knows that his perfection (kamalahu) and his transcendence ('uluwwahu)is such that good emanates from him, and that this [i.e., emanationof things] is of the necessary concomitants (min lawiizim) of his majesty(jaliilatihi) , which is loved in itself (al-ma'shuqa lahu li dhiitiha).19

In this passage Avicenna contrasts voluntary action and natural actionon the basis of the agent's knowledge. He identifies the former withhaving knowledge and approbation and the latter with the lackthereof. Approbation for the existence of other things may be anexpression suitable for the divine will concerning other things because,for Avicenna, the universe is not the end of God's will. 20 WhatAvicenna's text suggests is that whatever God has not known to existand whatever God has not allowed to exist does not come to exist.21

God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe

Based on Avicenna's statements that God is a voluntary creator, canwe say that for him God is a free creator? If God primarily willsonly himself, and if creation is not an end for God, does the fact

19 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.13 - p. 403.1. Beatrice Zedler misses the verypoint Avicenna is trying to make in this passage. Despite the textual counter-evidence, she equates Avicenna's conception of concomitance with acting by way ofnature. Beatrice H. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De potentia Dei',"121-122. One can mistakenly equate Avicenna's position with the position of Plotinus.Whereas for Plotinus the One is beyond being and knowledge, and beyond activity, Avicenna clearly argues that things follow from the divine knowledge and will.To the best of my knowledge Avicenna never attributes 'nature' to God. It wouldbe unusual of him if he were to do this, unless he used it in a broader sense, givenhis subscription to the Neo-Platonic hierarchy of being. In this hierarchy 'nature'is placed below soul. In this respect, even human actions, in the proper sense, donot fall under the category of natural actions. For Plotinus' conception of the hierarchy see Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction (Oxford: 1993), pp. 60-78.

20 Aquinas expresses more or less the same thing as what Avicenna calls 'rii/ii'in ST la. 14, 8. Although God's will is the cause of things in the proper sense,God's knowledge may be considered the cause of them because of the identity ofknowledge and will in God. In this respect, Aquinas states: "God's knowledge asthe cause of things has come to be called the 'knowledge of approbation' (scientiaapprobationis)."

21 See Avicenna, Ishiiriit, p. 185.

that other things come to exist imply that God is compelled orrequired to create? God's freedom to create may be taken awayeither by something external, or by something internal that is requiredby God's nature. Avicenna rejects both of these constraints on thedivine will.

Avicenna argues that no cause external to the agent can be assignedto God's volition concerning the universe. He emphasizes that God'swill is different from human will because the divine will does notdepend on anything external to the agent. While for human volition there is an end distinct from the willing agent, for God's willthere cannot be anything causing God to will something. To expressthis idea Avicenna sometimes uses the term 'da'in,' i.e., a motive, ora reason, pushing God to do something.22 Most of the time, he usesthe terms "intention" (qaFj) and "purpose" (ghararj).23 As I havealready stated, for Avicenna there is nothing outside God that mightcompel God to will something. Hence God is not to be conceivedas seeking after something that exists independently of God. Nordoes God create for the sake of compensation ('iwarj).24

For Avicenna there is nothing internal requiring that God shouldcreate, though this seems difficult for Avicenna to defend since heargues that God knows himself in such a way that the existence ofthings is the necessary concomitant of God's majesty, which is lovedin itself. Avicenna's statements lead one to think that God's volitionconcerning other things must be included in God's essence, so thatGod would be the natural agent of the universe in the sense that Godcreates because of his nature. Hence one is led to think that creating other things must be a constitutive element of God's essence:God would not be what he is if he did not create. To elucidate howAvicenna defends his case, I will first present his more negative wayof explaining why other things exist, followed by his more positiveexplanation. Avicenna explains the existence of the universe throughgenerosity and concomitance. While generosity concerns the negative aspect of this account, concomitance offers a positive dimension.

For Avicenna, God creates out of his generosity, since he neitherexpects nor attains anything in return. Generosity requires that the

L2 Avicenna, Ta'liqiit, pp. 103, 117.23 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7 p. 366.11-17; IX.3; Ishiiriit VI, p. 159; VII, p. 185;

Ta'liqiit, p. 149.24 Avicenna, Ishiiriit VI, p. 159.


generous agent be free from internal as well as external constraints.Avicenna argues that anything-in this case, the existence of theuniverse--may be considered with respect to the agent or with respectto the patient. Thus something may be deemed generous with respectto the agent, while it may be called good with respect to the thingthat receives and becomes perfect by it. In this case, the act of creation will be generous with regard to God and good with regard tothe universe. He defines generosity (jud) to be the case where theagent is not in any way affected (murifG'il) by what it does, or bysomething following upon what it does. Generosity is giving out whatis proper to be given not because of a debt, or compensation ('iwar;l),without pursuing a desire or expecting revenue.25 By excluding payment of a debt and compensation from generous actions, Avicennaindicates that in order for an action to be an act of generosity, itmust be free from external factors compelling the agent, as well asfree from anything internal to the agent, like expecting to attainsomething through the object of volition (muriid) or intention (maqsud).If God were to pursue after something willed or intended, God wouldbe imperfect. An agent might be pursuing a purpose (gharar;l) "withregard to himself in his being (bi ~asabi nafiihi fi dhiitihi), or withregard to the exigency (m~iili~) of his being (dhiit) , or with regard tosomething else in his being, or with regard to his benefit (m~iiliM."

All these imply that the agent obtains something in return. Yet anyagent obtaining something in return for its action is imperfect eitherwith respect to its being or with respect to one of its perfections(kamiiliit).26 God is truly generous, since God's giving being to thingscan neither be compelled by something external nor required bysomething internal to God.

Clearly, Avicenna employs 'denial of intention to God' in orderto support his argument that there is nothing external compellingGod to create, as well as his argument that there is nothing in God'sessence requiring God to create. He seems to consider the intentionboth with regard to 'what is intended' and with regard to the 'intend-

25 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.5 p. 296 lines: 6-11. Ishiiriit VI, p. 159. See alsoTa'liqiit, p. 106, Metaphysics VIII.7 p. 367 lines: 7-12.

26 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.5 p. 297 lines: 7-11. Aquinas has a similar contentionin ST la. 19, 3, ad. 2. "2. That God necessarily wills his own goodness does notdemand that he will other things as well on that account for his goodness can wellbe without them." '

ing agent.' Yet intention cannot be attributed to God insofar as itis considered with respect to the 'intended object,' as in compensation and debt, since there can be nothing external compelling Godto create. Similarly, intention cannot be attributed to God, since itimplies imperfection of the agent. Thus for Avicenna God is a freecreator since God creates out of his generosity, without any external motive and without internal requirements.

Before beginning to discuss whether the necessity of the universeposes a threat to the divine free will, it must be noted that forAvicenna God's having free will does not mean that God has freechoice. For Avicenna, the idea that God does not have free choicefollows from the assertion that other things are not God's end. Ifother things could be ends for God, then God would have free choicebecause one end could be distinguished from alternatives (naq'ir;l) ina free choice (ikhtiyiir). Since the one with free choice (ikhtiyiir) choosesone end as better than its alternative, then in order for God to havefree choice there must be alternatives placed in front of God. ThenGod would be required to choose the better alternativeY However,there can be no set of independent "possible universes" facing Godso that he may choose one. Since there is nothing for God to intend,there is nothing for God to choose over others.

The necessity of the universe, which Avicenna unwaveringly upholdsmay not necessarily contradict maintaining that God is a free creator. Avicenna argues for the necessity of the universe through histheory of concomitance, which I have called the more positive aspectof his account of why the universe exists: it is a necessary concomitant of God's essence (dhiit). Even though God does not will theuniverse for something external, so that he would depend on it, theexistence of the universe is a necessary concomitant (liizim) of God'sessence (dhiit).28 Here one may question whether there is a tensionbetween Avicenna's conception of generosity and concomitance. Ifother things necessarily follow from God's essence, does that showGod to be in need of creating? Or does it make God dependentupon his creatures, such that God would not be what he is if creatures did not come to exist?

27 Avicenna, Ishiiriit VI, pp. 159-160.28 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 403.1; Ta'liqiit, p. 103.


We may find an answer to these questions by identifying the relation between a concomitant and the thing of which it is a concomitant. "A concomitant," states Avicenna, "is the thing thatnecessarily follows (yal::.am) something because of what it is that [thething] is (li annahu huwa), [however] it does not make subsist (layuqawwim) the thing [it follows]."29 Although the concomitant necessarily follows the thing of which it is a concomitant, the thing thathas this concomitant does not subsist through its concomitant. Thatis, the thing that has a concomitant does not depend on its concomitant in order to be the thing it is. Friendship in a narrowersense may serve as an example. The constitutive element of friendship between two people consists in the fact that they love eachother. But they do not make one another friends simply by expecting to get help from each other. A relationship based on mutualinterests would be a business transaction rather than a relationshipof loving and caring. But helping each other, when the need arises,necessarily follows from a relationship based on love. It is almostinconceivable that two friends who love each other would not helpeach other. In this sense, benefit is a necessary concomitant of friendship but is not constitutive of what friendship is.

Avicenna distinguishes two kinds of concomitants in the TaCZ'iqat: 30

Concomitance is of two kinds (wajhayn): [1] One of them is that something is a concomitant (liiziman) [stemming] from ('an) some other thingbecause of (li) its nature and substance, such as light [stemming] fromthe source of light (al-mur/i') and burning [following] something hot.[2] The other is that it [i.e., something] is the concomitant (liiziman)[stemming] from it [i.e., the thing, of which it is a concomitant]' Andit [the concomitant] follows (tiibi'an) its [the thing that has the concomitant] self-knowledge, and it knows that this concomitant emanatesfrom itself. This is the concomitance (al-luzum) that necessarily follows(yalzamu) from the Creator (ai-ban). This is because he is in himself(fi dhatihi) perfect (kiimil), complete (tiimm), loved (ma'shuq), and he knows('atzm) himself. Indeed magnificence (majd) and nobility ('uluww) belongto him. And these things, which are existent on account of him ('anhu),are concomitants (liizima) of his self-knowledge, magnificence, nobilityand of his goodness (khayriyyatihi). Goodness is not something differentfrom his essence (dhiitihi).

29 Avicenna, Ta'liqiit, p. 180.30 Avicenna, Ta'liqiit, p. 103. e£ G. Verbeke's statement of Avicenna's position.

Verbeke argues, "... der Schiipfer wiirde nicht sein, was er ist, wenn er die Welthervorzubringen aufhielte." G. Verbeke, "Avicenna im Westen: Eine historischeBegegnung," in Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29 (1981), p. 9.

Here Avicenna attempts to distinguish between the concomitants ofGod and the concomitants of natural beings. While concomitants ofother things stem from their nature, God's concomitants stem fromhis knowledge. It is, of course, open to discussion whether such anexplanation can work without difficulty, but he makes a clear distinction between God and other things with regard to their concomitants. While for other things their nature necessitates theirconcomitants, in the case of God, it is his self-knowledge that determines the emanation of concomitants. The concomitants of naturalthings, such as fire or water, follow the course of nature becausethey are concomitants of natural things without knowledge and will.Similarly, God's concomitants follow what God is, i.e., the divinenature. In contrast to natural things, however, God's concomitantsfollow from the divine knowledge and will, which are identical toGod's essence (dhat).

Through his theory of generosity and concomitance, Avicennawants to assert both God's independence from the universe and thenecessary existence of the universe owing to the divine will. WhileGod's being and goodness do not depend on the existence of theuniverse, the universe necessarily follows from God's being.31 Yet ifGod's being and goodness do not depend on the existence of theuniverse, God does not need to create in order to be what he is.

We may further ask: if creation is not constitutive of God, whymust the universe be a necessary concomitant? The answer to thisquestion concerns not what God is, but rather how God is. That is,it does not concern the divine perfections, specifically the divine will,per se, but divine formal features like simplicity and necessity. Avicennadoes not consider this question separately, hence he does not statein detail that the necessary concomitance of the universe is due toGod's being necessary, immutable, or fully actual. Nevertheless, asdiscussed in chapter 2, Avicenna takes divine perfection propertiesonly insofar as they are modified by divine formal features. For him,when talking about God divine perfection properties must be considered in the manner they are found in God. For example, at thebeginning of the first chapter of Book IX of the Metaphysics of 77zeHealing, when he is about to begin his explanation why the universe

31 For the independence of God's being and perfection from the existence ofother things see also: Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.1-7, p. 367.7-12.


must be sempiternal, Avicenna reminds the reader that God is anecessary being. He is necessary in all respects; nothing new or additional can happen to him. 32 On the basis of the necessity of God,the universe necessarily follows the divine knowledge and will. Yetdivine knowledge and the divine will concerning the universe arealso necessary. Why? Because God is necessary in all respects. SoGod's will concerning the universe is included in the divine self-volition, not because God's being what he is includes or depends onthe existence of creatures, but because of the formal features of simplicity and necessity.

Objections Revisited

Arguments designed to show that for Avicenna creation is a naturalaction rather than a voluntary one have in part been based onAvicenna's contention that the universe is necessary. Indeed, the universe is necessary, but does the necessity of the universe imply thatGod has to create in the manner a natural agent must act? Thequestion 'Does God have to create?' is an intriguing question. It canbe understood as a question asking (1) whether God is compelled orforced to create, in the sense that there be something external toGod compelling God to create. The question may also be understood to be asking (2) whether there is something in God requiringthat he create: whether God needs to create in order to be what heis. In this way, one can take it to be inquiring whether God's beingand goodness depend on the existence of creatures.

With regard to the first interpretation of the question, whetherthere is something external compelling God to create, Avicenna'sanswer is an unqualified no. As should be clear from the discussionthus far, for Avicenna nothing can compel God to create. God's will,unlike a human will, does not have a motive or a cause. Indeed,there cannot be anything independent of God. God does not seekafter anything, nor does he create for the sake of compensation.Hence, there is nothing external compelling or moving God to create.

With regard to the second interpretation of the question; whetherthere is something in God requiring that he create, Avicenna's answeris again no. There is nothing in God requiring that God create the

32 Avicenna, Metaphysics lXI, p. 373.15-17.

universe, because God's being and goodness do not depend on thefact that God creates. If God is independent of the existence of otherthings, then God's being good does not require that God createother things; God is good without creating the universe. Thus creation is not a constitutive element of 'what God is,' but rather follows from it.

If God's being and goodness do not depend on the existence ofthe universe, is the universe 'not-necessary'? Avicenna's answer tothis question would be no again, because the universe is God's necessary concomitant. God cannot have a freedom such that he couldchoose to create or not to create. For Avicenna, one may not evenconsider that God could have not created, because God is necessaryin all respects. And saying that God could not have created assumesa possibility which is laid out ahead before God. The idea that theuniverse is a necessary concomitant of God does not simply takeinto account God's perfections, willing and goodness in this case, butalso God's formal features, namely simplicity and necessity. Avicenna'sinsistence on the necessity of the universe and this universe is closelyconnected to his position regarding theological language, not becausehe likens divine creative action to natural actions of inanimate beings.Thus, the universe is necessary, because God is necessary in allrespects.

As we have seen, the fact that for Avicenna God is not an intentional cause of the universe has been employed to support the argument that for Avicenna creation is a natural action. If creation isnot something intentional, then creation must be the brute emanation of things. However, by denying intention to God, Avicenna simply wants to establish that other things do not constitute a final causefor the divine will. As I have tried to show, intending somethingmeant two things for Avicenna. With respect to the object of intention, it implied the existence of something external to and independent of the agent. With respect to the intending agent, it impliedthat the agent is imperfect. Hence attributing intention to God withregard to creation meant, for Avicenna, both internal and externalconstraints on divine freedom. He thus argued that God is free fromsuch constraints, which would constitute a final cause compelling orrequiring God to create.

On the contrary, God is himself the final cause of creatures. Goddoes not will the universe in itself but primarily wills himself, so God

33 Na~ir aI-DIn TusI interpreted Avicenna in such a way that for him God isonly the efficient cause of the universe. For a discussion of Tusl's interpretationsee, Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's Metaplrysics in Context (Ithaca, NY: Comel! University,2003), pp. 186-187.

34 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.6 - p. 356.5. For a thorough analysis ofAvicenna's conception of the relation between efficient cause and final cause withregard to explanation of effect, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context,ch. 10, pp. 181-195. The question of giving a successful account of cases whereone thing is both the efficient and the final cause of the effect had a long historybefore Avicenna. In order to explain how the final cause is prior to the efficientcause without falling into circularity and without making any of the causes superficial,Avicenna employs his distinction between essence and existence. The final cause isthe cause of the causality of the efficient cause by its essence, and the efficient causeis the cause of the realization of the final cause. The pair essence-existence is anevolution of the pair thingness and existence. For an explanation of this evolutionand Avicenna's sources in developing the distinction, see Robert Wisnovsky, op. cit.,chs. 7-9. See also his "Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness (shay'iyya)," ArabicSciences and Philosophy 10/2 (2000), pp. i81-221.

himself is the final cause of the existence of other things. 33 As anheir to the Neoplatonic heritage, Avicenna identifies existence withgoodness. Good is what is desired, and since God is the perfectbeing-even above perfection as we know it-he is the ultimategood toward which all other things strive. They exist overflowingfrom his being. 34 God, and nothing else, is the final cause of creation.

For Avicenna denial of intention on God's part does not meanthat God is a non-voluntary agent. His denial of intention has beeninterpreted by some scholars to mean that God does not know andis indifferent to the existence of the universe. One may consider willand intention to be inseparable, or even equate intending and willing and say, for example, 'if an agent wills something, then thisagent intends that it be, or that it be such and such.' Yet howeverone may conceive the relationship between intending and willing,clearly Avicenna does not consider them to be identical in regardto God. For him, 'intending something' cannot be devoid of actingfor recompense, of seeking after something distinct from the agent.However, willing does not have to be connected with the expectation of a gain, nor should its final cause be something distinct fromthe agent. Even though he rejects the idea that God has an intention in creation, this does not make him conceive God to be indifferentto the existence of things. Since he argues that God wills things bywilling himself, and it is his willing that allows them to exist, Godcannot be indifferent to the existence of things.

Aquinas' Position: Creation is Voluntary and Hypothetical?J Necessary

149THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION

In sum, for Avicenna creation should be likened to voluntaryactions rather than to natural actions, because God is an intellectwith will. However, God's will should not be confused with humanvolition. God wills only himself, and nothing else can be God's end.His being and perfection are independent of the existence of theuniverse. There is nothing external pushing God to create, nor doesGod's essence require that God create. However, the universe is anecessary concomitant of God's essence. The fact that Avicennaargues God's independence of the existence of other things as wellas their being necessary concomitants of God-without seeing anycontradiction-may be explained by his position regarding theological language. Since Avicenna does not take into account God's willalone, a perfection property, but considers it together with God'sformal features when he talks about God, he can consistently maintain that God is independent of the universe and that the universeIS necessary.

Avicenna's argument that the universe is necessary and that Goddoes not intend anything in creation caused his interpreters to thinkthat for Avicenna creation is more like a natural action than a voluntary action. Avicenna would respond to such interpretations of hisposition by insisting that creation and this universe are necessary,not because creation is the action of an agent acting through nature,but because it is the action of a necessary, immutable and perfectbeing. God is a free voluntary creator because nothing, either internal or external, requires God to create. However, given that thisuniverse exists and given that God is necessary in all respects, creation and this universe are necessary.

Despite the fact that Aquinas criticized Avicenna-or is interpretedas having done so-for likening the act of creation to the actionsstemming from nature, his position conforms to Avicenna's to someextent. For Aquinas, as for Avicenna, God is a voluntary agent, andGod's will is identical to his essence. Just like God's knowledge, God'swill is simple, i.e., God's willing of other things is included in hisself-volition, and is immutable and eternal. Aquinas' discussion concerning God's freedom to create is founded upon the independenceof God from the universe. God does not have to will the existence

CHAPTER THREE148

150 CHAPTER THREE

11THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 151

of the universe, nor does he have to will the actual, or definite setof, creatures, because God's being and perfection do not depend onthe existence of the universe. Up until this point, Aquinas' positionconforms to Avicenna's contention.

Beyond this, however, we can note differences. Whereas Avicennaargues that the universe is necessary, without further explanation,Aquinas gives a more detailed explanation of 'how the universe isnecessary,' and in what sense God has free will and free choice. Heargues that the universe is 'hypothetically' necessary, not 'absolutely,'and that God has free choice in the sense that neither the actual,nor any definite set of creatures, matches the infinite perfection ofGod. Comparing their positions, I am going to argue that the necessity of the universe defended by Avicenna corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas' terms. I will furtherargue that the reason why Avicenna does not, or could not, makesuch a distinction, while Aquinas does, can be traced to their strategy concerning human speech about God. On the basis of his distinction between 'res signijicata' and 'modus signijicandi' in human talkabout God, Aquinas was able to consider the divine will concerning creation in isolation from God's formal features, i.e., eternity,simplicity, etc.

God Creates by Will not by Nature

Aquinas provides four arguments to show that, as far as creation isconcerned, God is a voluntary agent, not a natural agent. One ofhis arguments considers the order in the universe, which must betraced back to an intelligent agent. Both nature and will act for anend. But while a voluntary agent knows and sets the goal for itself,nature does not know and cannot set up a goal for itself. The endand the means ordered to attain the end of a natural agent mustbe set by an intelligent and voluntary agent. Since God is the firstefficient cause, he is an agent acting by will, not by nature. 35

The second argument that Aquinas provides to explain why Godcreates by will and not by nature states that nature is determinedto one effect. The way Aquinas presents the argument in the STand the De potentia differ to some extent. The ST version of the argu-

35 ST la. 19, 4; De potentia Ill, IS; SeC 11, 23 [6], [8].

ment emphasizes that different things with different natures are created by God-not simply one kind of thing. Since the nature of anagent acting by nature is determinate, the action of a natural agentfollows in accordance with its determinate nature. However, God'sbeing and perfection are not limited to a definite nature, but contain the whole perfection of being. "Therefore God does not actfrom necessity of nature, but defined (determinati) effects proceed fromhis infinite perfection by the resolution of his intelligence and will(determinationem voluntatis)."36 In the De potentia, Aquinas distinguishesbetween God's natural action and voluntary action. He reminds usagain that nature is determined to one effect. Moreover, since everyagent produces something similar to itself, "nature always producesits equal" (natura semper Jacit sibi aequale) unless it is hindered in someway. Hence, whatever proceeds from God naturally (naturaliter) isequal to him. This is the Son. In contrast to the Son, creatures arenot equal to God. Moreover, among creatures there are many degreesof inequality. Hence, God does not create the universe by naturalaction, but by voluntary action. 37

Aquinas' third argument considers the relation between the divineknowledge and the divine will. Since God's being is identical to hisintellection (intelligere), creatures exist in God's knowledge before theyexist in re. And that which exists in knowledge proceeds from knowledge by means of will. Hence God creates through his will. 38

The fourth argument that Aquinas uses in the De potentia is basedon the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic actions. Intrinsicactions such as knowing and willing, remain in the agent, whereasextrinsic actions go out from the agent to an extrinsic patient, suchas heating or moving something. Since God's action is identical tohis essence (essentia) , God's action cannot be an extrinsic action goingout of him to some extrinsic patient. Thus, God's action stems fromhis knowledge and will. At this point Aquinas also reminds us that

36 ST la. 19, 4; SeC 11, 23 [2], [3].37 De potentia Ill, IS. The second argument, especially as stated in the De poten

tia Ill, IS, and ad 7, has some bearing on Avicenna's conception of creation.Avicenna argues that only one intellect emanates from God. Because God is absolutelyone and simple, only one simple being can immediately emanate from God. Sincethe discussion of this aspect of the issue of creation is not my objective, I wish simply to indicate the importance of the context in comparing their positions. In anycase, Avicenna does not consider the first intellect to be something of the samenature as God or a divine person.

38 De potentia Ill, IS; ST la. 19, 4; SeC 11, 23 [4].


the fact that God's action is intrinsic does not contradict the begetting of the Son through God's natural action, since the Son is notsomething outside the divine essence. 39 Even though the Son naturally proceeds from the Father, this does not require that God'saction be an extrinsic action in the way that the action of heatingis extrinsic to the source of heat.

In order to understand what Aquinas intends when he rejects theidea that creation is a natural action, one needs to have a firmergrasp of the sense in which Aquinas attributes natural action to Godand of the sense in which he denies it. One must know, for Aquinas,in what respect God's natural action is similar to God's voluntaryaction, and in what respect it differs from it. In the first argumentAquinas compares agents acting through will and through nature.Both kinds of agents act for an end, but only a voluntary agent canmake something an end for itself because only such an agent hasknowledge. If all beings are taken into account, that which createsthe rest cannot be devoid of knowledge and will. Otherwise, therewould not be an order within the universe, since the agent actingthrough nature cannot set its own goal. This indicates that in thefirst argument the contrast is between 'nature' in inanimate beingson the one hand and will in intelligent beings on the other. In thissense, God's action is not a natural action because God has knowledge and will. That is, God's nature is not like the nature of inanimate things. Avicenna clearly denies that God's action is like anatural action in this sense, as discussed in the preceding section.

In the second argument, Aquinas highlights another sense of natural action. Nature as employed in the second argument is differentfrom nature in the first argument. In the second argument naturerefers not to the nature of inanimate beings, but rather to the natureof an intellect. However, these two kinds of nature are similar insofar as natural action is (1) determined to one effect, (2) produces itseffect necessarily-since it produces its effect, unless it is hinderedand (3) produces something equal to the agent. Aquinas approves anatural action of God in this sense, but creation is not God's natural action in this sense either. The natural action in this senseexplains the procession of the Son, and the spiration of the Spirit.While the Son proceeds from the Father on account of nature, the

39 De potentia Ill, 15; SeC Il, 23 [5].

unIverse comes to exist not on account of the divine nature but onaccount of the divine knowledge and will. Nevertheless natural actionin this sense, for Aquinas, does not exclude knowledge and will. InST, when distinguishing between creatures and the divine persons,Aquinas traces the procession of the Son to the divine knowledge,and that of the Holy Spirit to the divine will. 40 If the Son and theHoly Spirit are assigned to the divine knowledge and the divine willrespectively, and the world proceeds from God through his knowledge and will, then what is the difference between the divine Personsand the universe? While the divine Persons are of the same nature,the world is not of the same nature as God. As will be discussedbelow, in contrast to the procession of the divine Persons, God doesnot necessarily will the universe. Moreover, while the Son is one single procession, many effects are created through will.

Avicenna, unlike Aquinas, does not attribute a natural action toGod in this sense either. Aquinas attributes natural action to Godin order to explain the procession of the Son and the Holy Spiritin contradistinction to the creation of the universe. That nature isdetermined to one single effect, and that natural action necessarilyfollows unless it is hindered are ideas that may be related to Avicenna'sconcepts of the emanation of things and the necessity of creationrespectively. For Avicenna, only one simple and single being-thefirst heavenly intellect-emanates from God immediately, and is created by God necessarily. Aquinas himself indicates that the maindifference between the natural action and the voluntary action concerns being restricted to one effect. While a natural action producesone effect, a voluntary action may produce many effects at once.4 !

Whether Avicenna's position is a target for Aquinas' arguments isan open question, a detailed discussion of which falls outside of thisdiscussion. However, stating that for Avicenna the single thing thatemanates from God is not a divine Person, or something of the samenature as God, is sufficient to justify my argument.42

The third reason Aquinas provides to explain why creation is avoluntary action and not a natural one is shared by Avicenna as

40 ST la. 28, 4; ST la. 27, 4. For a statement of how the procession of the Son~nd the Holy. Spirit a.re explained through the model of knowledge and will respecuvely, see Bnan DaVles, The Thought if Thomas Aquinas, pp. 193-198.

41 De potentia Ill, 15, ad 7.42 Cf. Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, (Leiden

& New York, E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 104-105.


well. Avicenna has similar statements explaining the existence ofother things. I have not come across anything similar to the fourthargument of Aquinas in Avicenna's texts where he explains creation.Nevertheless, generally speaking, it does not seem to contradictAvicenna's concept of the divine creative action.

Let us continue to explore Aquinas' concept of divine voluntaryaction. The contrast between divine voluntary action and naturalaction concerns necessity. Although for Aquinas divine natural actionis different from divine voluntary action, the divine will is not something distinct from, or additional to, or contrary to, the divine essence.Aquinas rejects the idea that creation is like a natural action in thesense that it is like the action of inanimate beings. Creation is nota natural action in the sense that only one creature is made immediately by God, and it is not a natural action in the sense that whatis created is not of the same nature as God. Moreover, creation isnot a natural action in the sense that God does not necessarily create. But the divine voluntary action-just like the divine naturalaction-stems from the divine nature, or divine essence. It followsfrom this that the divine will is identical to the divine essence. Theidentity of the divine will to the divine essence can be shown on thebasis of the divine knowledge and divine simplicity. God has willinsofar as he is an intelligence. Since God's knowledge is identicalto his essence, God's will is identical to his essence as well.43 SinceGod is simple and most perfect, if God has will, it must be identicalto his essence.44 Moreover, every agent acts insofar as it is in act.Since God is pure act, God must act through his essence. If Godcreates through his act of willing, then God's will is identical to hisessence. 45 If God acts through his essence, then God's voluntaryaction must be an essential, i.e., a natural, action. However, Aquinasreserves the term "natural action" to indicate what God wills necessarily. Despite the identity of the divine will to the divine nature,the divine voluntary action indicates God's willing only insofar as itconcerns the things that God wills but which are not necessary.46Hence, the difference between divine natural action and divine voluntary action concerns the necessity with regard to what God wills.

43 SeC I, 73, [2]; ST la. 19, 1.41 SeC I, 73, [3], [5].45 ScC I, 73, [4]; ST la. 19, 4, ad 2; De potentia Ill, 15, ad 20.46 ST la. 19, 3, obj. 3 & ad 3; De potentia Ill, 15, ad 6.

Cod)s Will Is Simple: Cod primarily and essentially Wills Himself

Before starting to discuss God's object of volition with regard tonecessity it should be recalled that for Aquinas God has one act ofwilling. By this one act, God wills himself as well as other things.While he wills himself as the end, he wills other things so that theyparticipate in his goodness. 47 In ST, Aquinas does not explain indetail the unity of God's will, which includes both his self-volitionand volition concerning other things.48 In SeC, he includes a separate chapter on the idea that God has one act of will.49 Aquinascomes up with various accounts of how God wills himself and otherthings. by one act of will, based mostly upon God's simplicity.50 AsGod IS the end for the sake of which other things are willed thething desired for the sake of the end is willed if the end is willed.Since God wills himself, by his self-volition other things are alsowilled in the same act of volition.5l If God were to will himself andother things in different acts of the will, not by one act of will, thenthere would be discursiveness in God-discursiveness which requiresmovement from one to the other. Since God is free from motion,God wills himself and other things by the same act of will.52

The eternity and immutability of the divine will follow from thesimplicity of the divine will. All these in turn are reducible to thesimplicity of divine knowledge, as divine will is based upon divineknowledge. When arguing for the eternity and immutability of thedivine will, Aquinas highlights the contrast between the divine actof will and the object of God's volition. There is no correlationbetween the way in which God's will is and the way in which theobjects of God's will are. Even though his will is eternal, it does notrequire that the objects of his willing should be necessary. 53 Nor doesit require that they should be eternal.54 Similarly, that which is willedby God does not have to be immutable because of the immutability of God's will. Clarifying this argument, Aquinas points out the

47 STla.19, 2; SeC I, 75.48 ST la. 19, 2, ad 4; ST la. 19, 5.49 SeC I 7650 SeC I: 76: [4], [5], [7].51 SeC I, 76, [2].52 SeC I, 76 [4].53 ST la. 19, 3 obj. 1, ad 1.54 ST la. 46, 1, ad 6.


difference between changing one's will and willing a change. Onecan will contrary things to follow one after the other without changing one's will. In order to will change, God does not have to changehis will or cease to will what he willed before. Since God himself(substantia) and his knowledge are immutable, nothing causes God tochange his will. Thus God's will is immutable as well.55

God Freely Wills the Universe

So far, we have seen Aquinas argue that (1) God has one act ofvolition, and (2) God wills himself necessarily. From these two premisesone may expect to deduce the conclusion that God necessarily willscreatures as well. However, Aquinas rejects this conclusion and arguesthat God freely wills to create. Here the question that needs answering concerns the nature of God's freedom. Aquinas' conception ofdivine freedom will clarify whether the two premises above requirethat God wills to create necessarily. It will also show whether hisconcept of the divine freedom to create, as well as to choose, is substantially different from Avicenna's conception.

If God is free to create or not to create, then it must be grantedthat there is nothing obliging God to create. God's freedom to create may be eliminated either because of something external to Godor because of God's being itself. Aquinas does not put much emphasis on the question whether something external could eliminate God'sfreedom to create. He simply assumes it, probably because it seemedtoo obvious to require a detailed discussion.56 Aquinas mostly addressesthe question whether there is something internal to God that eliminates God's freedom in creation. In this respect, Aquinas considerswhether God's goodness, immutability and necessity would eliminateGod's freedom to create. It seems that the most difficult issue is toexplain how divine goodness does not rule out divine freedom.

Aquinas maintains that nothing stemming from God's nature eliminates God's freedom in creating. Even though God has one act ofwilling, by willing himself he also wills other things, the primaryobject of the divine will is divine goodness. God's will concerninghis own goodness is absolutely necessary, but it is not absolutely nec-

55 ST la. 19, 7; ST la. 19, 7, obj. 3 & ad 3.56 De potentia Ill, 15 obj. 11; De potentia VII, 10; SeC I, 87 [3].

essary for everything that God willsY Since the divine goodness isthe proper object of the divine will, he wills his own goodness withabsolute necessity. This is similar to the human condition in thateverybody wills his own happiness necessarily. A similar relation holdsbetween every ability and its proper and principal object, such asthe relation of sight to color. As the proper object of the divine will,divine self-volition is necessary. 58

Aquinas conceives the relationship between God's self-volition andvolition concerning other things in terms of final causality. By creating other things God wills to communicate his goodness.59 AlthoughGod has one act of will in which he wills himself and other thingsat once, God's will pertaining to himself and his will pertaining toother things have different modalities. The primary object of God'swill is his own goodness, which he wills necessarily. However, Godwills other things as they are ordered to (ordinatur) his goodness astheir end, not for their own sake. They do not constitute an endfor the divine will. Here Aquinas makes a distinction between endsand means, which can be related in one of two ways: means arenecessary in order to reach the end, or means are not necessary inorder to reach the end. The relationship between God and the world,as the end and the means ordered to this end, is of the secondkind.5O

Even though God creates because he is good and wills to communicate his goodness, God's goodness for Aquinas is not opposedto the divine freedom in creating. The relation between God's goodness and his creatures is the relation between the end and the meansordered to this end. God's goodness subsists and is complete by itself;it is independent of the existence of other things. Thus, God's goodness does not require that God create,61 because if God did not create at all, this would not make God devoid of goodness. 62 Aquinas

57 The issue of whether the divine freedom is compatible with the divine perfections caught the interest of modern philosophers of religion. See for example,William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom," in ReasonedFaith: Essays in Philosophical Yheology in Honor ifNorman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump,(Ithaca & London: Comell University, 1993), pp. 223-233; Laura L. Garcia, "DivineFreedom and Creation," Yhe Philosophical Qgarter(y 42, (Apr., 1992), pp. 191-213.

58 ST la. 19, 3.59 ST la. 19, 2.60 ST la. 19, 3; SeC, I, 75.61 ST la. 19, 3; De potentia Ill, 15, ad 10.62 Norman Kretzmann examines the consistency of Aquinas' argument with his


clearly states that the communication of goodness does not necessitate that God create. Even though God creates because he wills tocommunicate his goodness, the end of the divine will is not the communication of the divine goodness, but, rather, the divine goodnessitself.53

The simplicity of the divine will does not require that God's selfvolition should cause God to will other things. In explaining thispoint, Aquinas makes use of the relationship between God's selfknowledge and his knowledge of other things. Just as God knowshimself and other things by one act of knowledge, though his selfknowledge does not cause God to know other things, he wills himself and other things by one act of will, and his self-volition doesnot cause God to will other things.54 Consequently, there is no discursiveness in God's will, as if he were first to will himself and then,because of his self-volition, he were to will other things.55

Let me repeat Aquinas' main points concerning the divine freedom to create. God has freedom to create, because there is nothing either external or internal necessitating that God should create.God primarily and naturally wills himself, and other things are notthe final cause of the divine will. God wills them to communicate

conception of goodness. He argues that Aquinas' "emphatic, unqualified" positiveanswer to the question whether God is free to choose whether or not to create isinconsistent with his conception of God's being "goodness itself, not merely good."(SeG I, 38). Aquinas adopts the neo-Platonist principle-which he traces to PseudoDionysius-that goodness is by nature self-diffusive. While Aquinas takes a libertarian explanation of creation by arguing for God's absolute freedom to create andnot to create, as well as what to create, this principle seems to require a necessitarian line of the explanation of creation. In this way, creation would be a naturalconsequence of the divine nature, since God is goodness itself, and goodness is selfdiffusive. Kretzmann considers Aquinas' attempts to remove the tension betweenhis conception of divine goodness and freedom of choice to create or not to create to be counterintuitive. Kretzmann argues that "God's bringing into existencesomething other than himself is among "those things which the essential nature ofhis goodness includes." If so, then God is not free to choose whether or not to create because it is included in the divine self-volition. In this case God "freely, althoughnee;ssarily wills" the existence of other things. Norman Kretzman, "A General Problemof Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?," in Being and Goodness, ed.Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, London, New York: Cornell University, 1991), pp. 208-228.See especially 215-221. I agree with Kretzmann that Aquinas' conception of divinegoodness and his concept of divine will concerning t.he unive:s~ are not quite compatible. However, Aquinas seems to prefer to modIfy the dlvme goodness by thedivine will.

63 De potentia Ill, 15, ad 12, ad 14.64 ST la. 19, 5 C.

65 SeG I, 87 [4].

his goodness, but God's goodness subsists and is complete by itself.Creatures are not constitutive of the divine goodness. Even thoughby willing other things God wants to communicate his goodness,communicating his goodness is not, again, the final cause of thedivine will. These insights are largely shared by Avicenna. As I discussed in the preceding section, he explains creation through his concept of generosity and concomitance. For him, God's generositymeans that God gives being to all other things without acquiringanything additional and without being required to do so by anymeans. I have also underlined that Avicenna denies intention to God.Avicenna does this in order to defend that other things do not constitute a final cause for divine will. Aquinas shares Avicenna's VIewthat other things are not final causes of divine will.

God Has Free Choice

God wills freely not only to create but also what to create. The attribution of free choice to God can be considered as a special case,which ultimately may be reduced to God's free will. The generalstatement that God has free will means that God's being and goodness do not depend on the existence of other things. As the morespecific statement, the idea that God has free choice means thatGod's goodness does not depend on any definite set of creatures.Furthermore, it means that creatures that are willed to exist are notnecessary, since no creature or set of creatures matches the divineperfection. Consequently, God does not have to create the actualuniverse. God's free will includes choice with regard to creaturesbecause they are not the end of God's will, but only the means tothe end of the divine will.55

However, Aquinas' position in this regard may not be stretchedso far as to make divine free choice similar to human free choice.One may consider Aquinas' arguments for the idea that God hasfree choice (liberum arbitrium) to be indicating that the free choice ofGod is something similar to the human experience of free choice,choosing from among many alternative things or courses of events.Such an interpretation of the idea of free choice was Avicenna's reason for rejecting the idea that God has free choice in creation.

66 ST la. 19, 10 and ad 2; SeG I, 88 [4].


Understanding free choice in this way meant for him the existenceof possibilities independent of God. Despite his argument that Godhas free choice with regard to what to create, Aquinas does notcounter Avicenna's contention. Although God is said to choose freelywhat to create, creating what he creates and excluding what he doesnot, this does not mean that there are alternatives before God andGod chooses one of them.57

What Aquinas seems to argue is that God could have createdthings other than those he actually did, because things that exist because of God are not all of what God could create.58 That is, creation does not exhaust God. In order to clarify this point, let uslook at the objections Aquinas considers. The freedom of the divinewill may be thought to be opposed to its immutability. If God does

67 Norman Kretzmann interprets Aquinas' contention that God has free choiceregarding what to create as if there were possible worlds which could be configuredin different ways. However, Aquinas' point in this argument is not that there arepossibilities before God but rather that no creature, or rather, no universe, matchesGod's goodness and power. Norman Kretzmann, "A Particular Problem of Creation:Why Would God Create This World?", in Being and Goodness, pp. 229-249, especially pp. 229-239. David Burrell criticizes the concept of creation as one in whichGod actualizes one among possible worlds. Such a conception is contrasted withthe necessary emanation scheme, of which Avicenna is a follower par excellence.He argues that in fact Avicenna's conception of creation is closer to the conceptof creation as the actualizing of a possible world. Since for Avicenna existence issomething coming to essence, Avicenna's concept of creation supposes the existenceof essences capable of existing before they come to exist. For Aquinas, however,there is no possibility before creation except by reference to the power of God.Burrell argues that "Avicenna's scheme" and "possible worlds treatments" take possibles to be "identifiable prior to their existing." In contrast to this, Aquinas assertsthat God creates all things, he does not simply actualize possible things existingindependently of God. David B. Burrell C.S.C., "Creation and 'Actualism': TheDialectical Dimension of Philosophical Theology," Medieval Philosophy & Theology 4(1994), pp. 25-41. I agree with Burrell in his interpretation of Aquinas' positionthat in creating this world God does not choose one set of possibilities hanging outthere existing independently of God. However, the association between Avicenna'semanationist scheme and the consideration of creation as actualizing one possibleworld is very difficult to justify. What Avicenna meant when talking about 'existence coming to essence' is an issue of debate among scholars. Discussing it is farbeyond my scope here. For recent discussion of the issue see, Nader el-Bizri, "Avicenna and Essentialism" The Review qf Metaphysics 54 (2001), pp. 753-778. As I triedto articulate in the preceding section, Avicenna's reason for rejecting God's freedom to choose is that there cannot be any thing possible independent of God'screation such that God would choose to create. Undoubtedly there is a tensionbetween Avicenna's rejection of possibles before God and his contention that thepossibility of things is independent of the power of the efficient cause, which I shallexplore in chapter 4.

68 ScG I, 82, [6].

not will necessarily things that he wills, then his will is open to alternatives. Being open to alternatives is being open to change. If Goddoes not necessarily will, then his will is changeable. Aquinas answersthis objection by reminding us of the difference between absolutenecessity and hypothetical (ex suppositione) necessity. God's willing ofother things is not absolutely necessary. However, it is hypotheticallynecessary based on the supposition that the divine will is immutable.59

In SeC I, 82, Aquinas raises similar objections. The answers heprovides for these objections are more detailed. One of the objections proceeds in the following way: if God's will is not determinedby certain objects, then it would be disposed to opposites, and henceit would be in potency. But since there is no potency in the will ofGod, it must be determined to a definite alternative. Another argument for the changeability of God is framed along similar lines. Itis based on God's being in potency because of his being open towilling opposite alternatives. If God is in potency, God's will mustbe changeable, since potency implies movement and change.7o Theexpression 'being open to alternatives,' which is the main point ofthe objection largely tallies with the idea of possible worlds, one ofwhich God actualizes by creating. Aquinas' answers to both objections amounts to asserting that God is independent of the existenceof the actual universe. Being open to opposites may be either fromthe side of the agent or from the side of the objects. If it is fromthe side of the agent, it shows the imperfection of the agent, andthat the agent is in potency. From the side of the objects of the will,if the action of the agent depends on neither of the alternatives, thisopenness to alternatives does not show an imperfection in the agent,but rather its eminence in dominating alternatives. Aquinas gives theexample of art in which the same thing can be achieved by alternative tools. "This is how the divine will is disposed in relation tothings other than itself. For its end depends on none of the otherthings, though it itself is most perfectly united to its end. Hence, itis not required that any potentiality be posited in the divine will."7l

'That God's will is not determined to a certain effect but open toalternatives' does not require that his will should be changeable.

69 ST la. 19, 7, obj. 4 & ad 4.70 ScG I, 82, [2], [3].71 ScG I, 82, [6].


For, if there is no potentiality in the divine will, God does not thusprefer one of the opposites among His effects as if He should bethought as being in potency to both, so that He first wills both inpotency and afterward He wills in act; rather, He wills in act whatever He wills, not only in relation to Himself but also in relation toHis effects. The reason rather is because the object willed does nothave a necessary order to the divine goodness, which is the properobject of the divine will (...). The exclusion of the aforesaid necessity,therefore, does not take away the immutability of the divine will. 72

Here, as his responses to the objections, Aquinas seems to argue thatthe actually willed things, or their existence, is not necessary in itself.Since God wills only himself necessarily, and God's being does notdepend on anything, God does not necessarily will them. But it alsoclarifies his position, stating that the openness of God's will to alternatives does not mean that there are alternatives before God andthat God chooses one of them. It simply amounts to saying thatGod's goodness does not depend on any definite thing-actual ornot-outside himself.

Is the Universe Necessary?

In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas argues that the universe is not necessary. This is so because God does not have to create. He arguesnot only that (1) God does not have to create, but also that (2) Goddoes not have to create the actual universe. The straightforward conclusion resulting from these arguments are that God has free willand free choice with regard to creation. The foundation of Aquinas'argument for God's free will and free choice is that God's being andperfection do not depend on creating something, nor do they dependon creating the actual universe. This principle, as I stated in theprevious section, is shared by Avicenna.

For Aquinas the universe is both necessary and not-necessary. Heargues that God has free will and free choice. It is also clear thatAquinas' arguments for the contingency of creation are founded onthe idea that God's being and perfection do not depend on the existence of other things, nor do they depend on the existence of theactual universe. If God is free (1) to create and not to create, and(2) to decide what to create, then neither creation, nor the actual

72 SeC I, 82, [7].

universe is necessary. But this is only one aspect of the problem.The other aspect concerns the fact that there is a universe and thatGod's will is immutable and eternal. If we consider the existence ofthe universe along with the eternity and immutability of God's will,then the universe-as it is-is necessary. It cannot not be. Now thereseem to be involved here two contradictory judgments about theuniverse. The universe is not necessary, because God does not haveto create; and the universe is necessary, because it exists and God,who created it, is eternal and immutable. In explaining in what sensethe universe is necessary and in what sense the universe is not necessary Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of necessity: absolute (absolute)and hypothetical (ex suppositione) necessity. 73

Aquinas identifies the condition of absolute necessity in the following way: either (1) the predicate is part of the definition of thesubject (for example, man is an animal with an absolute necessity)or (2) the subject is part of the meaning of the predicate (for example, 'X is a number.' X is either even or odd with absolute necessity, because being even or odd is part of what "number" means).In these two senses, the universe is not necessary. That is to say,the world (standing for the predicate) is not part of what God is,and God's goodness (standing for the subject) does not depend onthe existence of the universe. 74 The relationship between God andthe world as an object of volition is like the end and things orderedto (ordinatur) that end. However, willing the end does not alwaysrequire willing the things ordered to this end. Since God's goodnesssubsists (esse) and is perfect without other things, God's will concerning other things is not a constitutive part of God's self-volition.Hence the universe is not necessary in the absolute sense.

However, other things are necessary on the supposition (ex suppositione) that God cannot refrain from that which he wills, becauseGod's will is immutable. 75 God's eternity is also involved among theconditions that require that things be necessary. Since God's willing

73 The distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity should be tracedback to Aristotle. In Metaphysics V.5 I015a20-b15 he discusses the kinds of necessity. Absolute and hypothetical necessities are included in his quintuple division.Hypothetical necessity in general means that in order for something to exist, certainconditions must be met. Absolute necessity refers to things that cannot be otherwise.

74 ST la. 19, 3.75 ST la. 19, 3; SeC I, 83 [2].


that some effect to be caused is eternal, his will concerning the existence of other things is necessary. "But it is not necessary considered absolutely, because the will of God does not have a necessaryrelation to this willed object. Therefore, it is necessary by supposition."76 Thus, if God's will is considered in isolation from his immutability and eternity, things are not necessary. But if it is consideredtogether with God's immutability and eternity-one may extend thelist under the title "God's formal features"-and the fact that hewills the existence of other things, then the universe is necessary.This kind of necessity is hypothetical necessity. Hence, the universeis hypothetically necessary.

Talking About Creation: Necessi!y or Hypothetical Necessi!y

Aquinas argues that God has freedom to create and free choice,because (1) there is nothing external compelling God to create, and(2) God's being and perfection do not depend on the existence ofother things. Since the universe is not the end of the divine will,God does not need to create in order to be what he is. Thus, theuniverse is not absolutely necessary. The universe may be taken asnecessary only if one takes into account the fact that God willed theexistence of the universe, and that God's will i~ eternal and immutable.Aquinas calls this hypothetical necessity as discussed above.

If Aquinas' two premises insure that the universe is not necessary,then Avicenna would be justified if he argued that the universe isnot necessary, since he himself subscribes to these two premises onwhich Aquinas founds his argument that the universe is not necessary. As for Aquinas, for Avicenna there is nothing external compelling God to create. God could not be creating to gain somethinghe acquires by creating it; otherwise God would not be truly generous. We also saw that other things for Avicenna are not the endof God's will. However, despite his subscription to these premises,unlike Aquinas Avicenna argues that the universe is in fact necessary. Avicenna's argument that the universe is a necessary concomitant of God's being does not contradict his belief in theindependence of God's being and goodness from the universe. As I

76 ScC I, 83, [3].

stated when discussing Avicenna's position, a concomitant is not constitutive of the thing of which it is a concomitant. Consequently, ifthese two premises provide a solid ground for arguing that the universe is not necessary, then for both of them this is true. That is,for Avicenna as well as for Aquinas, the universe is not necessary.

On these same premises, Aquinas explicitly says that the universeis not necessary, and clarifies the sense in which the universe is notnecessary. If the existence of the universe were constitutive of God'sbeing and perfection, or if it were the end of the divine will, thenthe universe would be absolutely necessary. Hence, the universe isnot absolutely necessary if it is considered solely in relation to thedivine will as the cause of the existence of other things, since creating the universe is not constitutive of what God is and the universe is not the final cause of the divine will. But if the universe isconsidered together with the idea that God wills the universe andthat the divine will is eternal and immutable, then the universe ishypothetically necessary.

The necessity of the universe as argued by Avicenna77 correspondsto the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas' theory.Avicenna agrees with Aquinas on the point of the first premise, i.e.,that the universe is not constitutive of God's being. God does notneed to create in order to be what he is. He agrees with him thatnothing else could be the final cause of the divine will. Furthermore,he agrees with him on the eternity and immutability of the divinewill. Despite this agreement, Avicenna simply argues that the universe is necessary. Given his agreement with Aquinas on the premisesof his argument for the hypothetical, or conditional, necessity of theuniverse, Avicenna's argument for the necessity of the universe indicates that he considers the divine perfections as modified by thedivine formal features. I am not suggesting that Avicenna makes adistinction similar to that of Aquinas. I simply want to say that theunqualified necessity Avicenna attributes to the universe correspondsto the hypothetical necessity of Aquinas. To see this correspondence,let us follow Aquinas' argument. Let us assume that the universe isnecessary if it is considered not simply with regard to the divine will,but with regard to the eternal and immutable divine will and remind

77 For a discussion of the Aristotelian roots of Avicenna's concept of necessity,see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context, ch. 11, pp. 197-219.


the fact that God wills the universe. Such an assumption totally isfound at the bottom of Avicenna's position when he argues that theuniverse is necessary. Following Aquinas, if we call such a necessitya hypothetical necessity, then obviously the necessity Avicenna attributes to the universe is not absolute necessity. Then within Aquinas'conceptual framework the necessity Avicenna attributes to the universe is hypothetical necessity.

At this point, the question is why, then, does Avicenna argue thatthe universe is necessary without hesitation? The reason why Aquinasmakes a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, whileAvicenna does not can be traced to their different concepts of theological language. One should not forget that the distinction betweenabsolute and hypothetical necessity belongs to Aquinas. Avicennadoes not and perhaps could not make such a distinction. The distinction between absolute necessity and the hypothetical one is theresult of considering the divine will in isolation from the divine formal features. While the universe is not necessary if it is consideredsolely in relation to the divine will, it is necessary when consideredtogether with the formal features such as eternity and necessity.Considering the divine perfections separate from their mode of beingis an application of Aquinas' understanding of predicating divinenames-of talking about God.

Let us have a closer look at Aquinas' discussion of God's will withrespect to the application of his distinction between the res significataand the modus significandi of the divine perfections. The pure perfection terms are predicated of God and creatures analogically, i.e.,according to similar yet different conceptions. As I argued in chapter 1, for Aquinas perfections that are attributed to God are notsimple negations. They say something about what God is. As far asthe res significata of perfections are concerned, they are predicated ofGod and of creatures literally. However, as far as their mode ofsignification is concerned their literal predication of God is inappropriate, because the mode of signification in human speech cannot match the way they truly are. We cannot express God's perfectionsin the way in which they belong to God in himself. Since Aquinasclearly distinguishes the divine will-which corresponds to the ressignificata-from the manner it is in God-identity with God's essence,eternity and immutability, which corresponds to what cannot beexpressed by the modus significandi, he was able to assert God's freedom and free choice, and the conditional necessity of the universe.

In other words, Aquinas' separation of the divine will and the manner in which it exists, i.e., its eternity and immutability, follows hisdistinction between the res significata and the modus significandi in theological language.

Since Avicenna takes divine perfection properties insofar as theyare modified by divine formal properties he had to argue for thenecessity of the universe. In contrast with Aquinas' appreciative strategy concerning the divine perfections, Avicenna pursues a reductivestrategy by taking divine perfection properties together with themanner in which they exist. That is, even though he attributes perfections, such as will, power, life, etc., to God, he takes them intoaccount only as they are modified in the light of the divine formalfeatures, such as simplicity, necessity and eternity. Consequently, indiscussing creation, Avicenna does not consider the divine will, asthe cause of the existence of the universe, separately from the mannerin which it exists. As a result, while he affirms that God's being andperfections do not depend on creatures, and that they do not constitute an end for God, he argues only that the universe is necessary.

For Avicenna, one may not even consider the possibility that Godcould not have created, because God is necessary in all respects.Such a possibility is applicable only to agents that are not fully inact. While Aquinas considers the divine perfections separately fromthe manner in which they exist with respect to human vantage point,Avicenna modifies his concept of the divine perfections in the lightof the divine formal features. Consequently, he limits human speechto what actually is. By limiting himself with what actually is, heargues that the universe is necessary and that God does not choosefrom alternatives.

Conclusion if Chapter Three

For both Avicenna and Aquinas, creation is a voluntary act, not anatural one. God's will is simple, eternal and immutable. The endof God's will is himself, not other things. By willing himself, Godalso wills other things. However, based on these premises, Avicennaargues that the universe is necessary. He further argues that Goddoes not have free choice. Aquinas argues that the universe is notabsolutely necessary and that God has free choice with regard tocreatures. Aquinas' arguments for divine free will and free choice

168 CHAPTER THREE

are founded on the idea that God's being or goodness is independent of the existence of other things, a principle also shared byAvicenna. However, on the basis of this principle, Avicenna doesnot come up with similar arguments concerning the contingency ofthe universe and divine free choice.

The difference between Avicenna and Aquinas concerning thenecessity of the universe and God's free choice can be traced backto their consideration of divine perfection properties. Since Aquinaswas able to consider God's will with regard to the existence of theuniverse in isolation from God's formal features, i.e., immutabilityand eternity, he could make a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. If God's will concerning the universe is takentogether with God's formal features, Aquinas argues, the universe isnecessary and God creates only this universe. This is what he meansby the hypothetical necessity of the universe. Avicenna does not makea distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, since hedoes not consider God's will with regard to the existence of the universe in isolation from God's formal features. He takes, God's perfections together with how God is, i.e., necessary, immutable, eternal.As a result, he simply argues that the universe is necessary. Giventhe fact that the premises on which Aquinas establishes his positionare maintained by Avicenna as well, the necessity of the universe asargued by Avicenna corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of theuniverse in the theological language of Aquinas.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE

Throughout the preceding chapters, it has been confirmed that Avicenna and Aquinas agree on important issues concerning God andcreation. To recall the main points, they agree on the point thatGod is eternal and immutable. God's perfections are identical tohim. His knowledge is creative. With respect to things, the divineknowledge is like the knowledge of the artisan, who makes what hehas in mind to be realized in the external world. Moreover, God isa voluntary agent, not an agent acting because of his nature in themanner of natural agents, e.g., in the manner in which fire burns.The divine will, like the divine essence, is simple, eternal and immutable. God is the sufficient cause of the universe. He does notneed anything else to cause the universe.

Despite the background they share, Avicenna argues that the universe has always existed, while Aquinas argues that the universe couldhave always existed, but that the arguments brought forth to demonstrate that the universe must have always existed are not conclusive.According to Aquinas the idea that the universe began to exist afternon-existence is not an issue of philosophical demonstration, but anissue of faith. Avicenna argues that the relation between God andthe universe can only be conceived in terms of being. As God iseternally in act, he must be eternally creating. Eternity, sempiternityand time are kinds of duration specific to different orders of being.Since time is applicable only to some of the things in the universe,it cannot be applied to the universe as a whole. Thus a priori, theuniverse as a whole cannot have began to exist temporally after nothaving existed. Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that the fundamentalrelation between God and the universe must be conceived in termsof being, but holds that the relation between God and the universecan also be conceived in terms of time. Consideration of this relation in terms of time does not yield a necessary conclusion, however-either in favor of the thesis that the universe does not havea temporal beginning, or in favor of the thesis that the universebegan to exist temporally after not having existed.

170 CHAPTER FOUR THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 171

Avicenna's Position

For Avicenna, creation is the act by which God gives being to everything. The relation between God and the universe is the relationbetween a metaphysical efficient cause, i.e., the cause of being, andits effect. Even though God is not related to things as they exist outside the divine knowledge in the same way a created cause is relatedto its effect, this does not mean that God is not related to the universe at all. Like the relation between any efficient cause and itseffect, (1) God necessitates the existence of the universe; (2) God andthe universe must co-exist; (3) God and the universe are not equal,because God is the cause and has being by himself, but creaturesowe their being to God; (4) God is the cause of the existence of theuniverse, not its non-existence. For Avicenna since God is eternallynecessary in all respects, and since he created the universe, he musthave always (dii'iman) created it. Since coming to exist after not having existed concerns the quiddities of things, and there are thingsthat cannot come to exist temporally after not having existed, theuniverse as a whole cannot have come to exist after not havingexisted. Temporal posteriority requires that the thing that comes tobe comes to be from an already existing matter. In this regard, ifthe universe started to be temporally after not having existed, thenthe universe does not come to exist through creation in the strictsense, but through movement undergone by some preceding thing.Stricdy speaking, his argument is that the relation between the Creatorand the creature cannot be construed in temporal terms. Avicennaargues that time and movement are infinite, thereby he tries to makean argument of reductio ad absurdum against the thesis that the universe has a temporal beginning.

What Is Creation?

Avicenna prefers the Arabic term ibdii' to express the idea of creation, corresponding to Aquinas' use of creare or creatio. I There areother terms that can express the idea of creation in Arabic, such askhalq and i~diith, which Avicenna also uses in various contexts. Even

I As we shall see in the next section, unlike his contemporaries, such as Bonaventure,Aquinas understands that creation simply means giving being or the existentialdependence of the creature on the Creator.

though these can be rendered as creation in general, in Avicenna'sterminology they are used in a rather technical sense.2 It is the termibdii' that Avicenna uses in a broader sense to cover all kinds ofcreatures with respect to their existence in the absolute sense.

Creation as expressed by the term ibdii' means, for Avicenna, togive being in the most comprehensive sense of the word. It is morecomprehensive than similar terms, because it takes into account theexistence of all things. It accounts not only for the existence of thingsthat have relative non-existence but also the existence of things without relative non-existence. All things are absolutely non-existent bythemselves, and they exist on account of their cause, God. This giving of being in the absolute sense is creation (ibdii'). Things existafter not having existed, but this posteriority is an essential posteriority; it is not a temporal posteriority. What belongs to things onaccount of their essence is non-existence and they have existence onaccount of something else, i.e., God. Since what belongs to something on account of something else is posterior to what belongs toit on account of its essence, things exist after not-having existed. Ifthe posteriority of things were limited to temporal posteriority, itwould require that something exists before the thing in question.This would nullify creation in the absolute sense (ibdii').3

Consequendy creation must be set apart from generation, andmust not be conditioned by that which applies to the realm of generation and corruption. If the temporal posteriority of the universeis assumed, it requires at least that a material cause exist before theuniverse. Then the whole universe would be conditioned by relativenon-existence, but not by absolute non-existence. However, in creation the question is absolute dependence of things on God. If creation were something like preventing a relative non-existence, it wouldbe more like a weak action than creation in the true sense.4 Avicennaexplicitly states that the non-existence of things is not simply nonexistence of their form, nor is it the non-existence of their matter,

2 For a discussion of Avicenna's terminology concerning creation, see Jules Janssens,"Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina," Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione FilosoficaMedievale 8 (1997), pp. 455-477. Janssens examines Avicenna's terminology, such as~udur, fayrj and tajallz, reflecting the emanationist conception of creation. He alsoprovides an examination of Avicenna's use of Qur'anic terms, which are mostlyadopted by and identified with Muslim theologians.

3 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266.12-15. See also Metaphysics VIII.3, p. 342.15-19-p. 343.1-6.

4 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 267.4-9.


but the non-existence of the whole of their being.5 Thus, creation isabsolutely out of nothing. It is the prevention of non-existence inthe absolute sense.6

Creation Is not a Change

For Avicenna, creation is not a change, but unlike Aquinas he doesnot discuss this issue at any great length. 7 Avicenna's failure to devotea systematic discussion of this point may be due to his rejection ofa temporal beginning to the universe: God's being beyond time andmovement removes any doubt that creation might be a change. Forhim change and its corollaries start with the first celestial soul, ontologically well below God and even the heavenly intellects.8 Secondly,his distinction between efficient causes of being and efficient causesof movement, and his identification of God as the efficient cause ofbeing rather than of movement, removes the possibility that creationis an action producing change. Since he undoubtedly argues thatcreation is the giving of being, he most likely did not see any pointin further discussing the issue.9 Another reason may be that his conception of possible being does not leave room for such doubt. Avicenna frequently affirms that everything other than God is possibleof existence, and nothing possible of existence exists on account of

5 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 3, p. 342.6-1l.6 Avicenna argues that beginning to exist after not having existed (~udiith), or

making something to exist after not having existed (iMath) may also be used. Thisis the term that is usually preferred by Muslim theologians to express the relationof the world to the Creator and its beginning. The terms iMath or ~udiith as usedby the Muslim theologians have temporal connotations. That is, the universe beganto exist temporally after not having existed. Avicenna is quite aware of the usageof the term iMath. He argues that if the temporal implication of the term is omitted then it can be used interchangeably with the term ibda'. Avicenna, MetaplrysicsVI.2, p. 266.16-17 - p. 267.1-3. For the Muslim theologians' conception of creation, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, TIe Philosoplry if the Kalam (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University, 1976), pp. 355-373.

7 That Aquinas discusses the issue specifically is very reasonable. Since he arguesthat assigning a temporal beginning to the universe is possible, he is expected toexplain how this could be. Since he adopts the Aristotelian conception of time, i.e.,time is the measure of change, he needs to explain his position by showing thatcreation does not imply a change. We can identifY a tension between allowing thatthe universe can begin to exist temporally after not having existed, and the danger of conceiving creation as an action of change occurring in matter existing independently of God.

8 See Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.2, p. 383.10-17 - p. 384.1-15.9 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VU, p. 257.7-17.

itself If creation were a change then it would require that there besomething existing independently of God. By creation God wouldbe acting upon this independently existing thing.

Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe

Before turning to discuss Avicenna's understanding of the relationship between God and the universe, it is worthwhile to discuss howGod is not related to the universe. Two seemingly contradictorystrands can be found in Avicenna's writings: (1) God is stronglyrelated to the universe as the cause of the universe, and many positive and negative relations are predicated of God on the basis ofuniverse; and (2) God is not related to the universe as it exists in re.

The thing to which God is really related is his knowledge of things,not things as they exist in re. As stated in the second chapter, forAvicenna God's knowledge is creative. Being a pure intellect, Godknows himself, which is identical to his being (dhiit). Through hisessence, God knows everything that is after or below himself in theontological hierarchy. God's knowledge of himself is the cause ('illa)of his knowledge of other things. But even though God's knowledgeof other things comprises all things which are multiple, God's knowledge of them is a simple intellectual knowledge. This simple intellectual knowledge includes intelligibles which have an essential andeven a temporal order insofar as they exist in re. God bears the relation of being a principle to them, such that they are 'from God,' asAvicenna puts it, but not 'in God.'lO God is related to his knowledge of things as its origin, but God is not related to things whichexist on account of his knowledge as they exist in re, although Godis their origin as well. If God were really related to things as theyexist in re, then unacceptable conclusions would follow. For example, God would not know things except those which actually existat a given time. Moreover, God would not know himself (nrifsihi) astheir principle until a certain thing actually comes to exist. Consequently, he would not know his essence either, because his being(dhiit) is the origin necessitating the existence of things, no matter

10 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.7, p. 364.1-6. See also Fazlur Rahman, "Ibn Sina'sTheory of the God-World Relationship," in God and Creation, ed. David B. Burrelland Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990),pp. 47-49.


whether they exist at a given time. Hence, God is related to thingsinsofar as they are known by him, not insofar as they exist in re (fial-a'yiin).11

Paradoxically enough, Avicenna states that God has many relations to the universe. For Avicenna, the fact that God is not reallyrelated to things as they exist in re does not eliminate the situationthat God and the universe are related to each other. Many positiveand negative relations are predicated of God, such as God's beingthe origin of the universe, or God's being dissimilar to creatures.These relations are approved only as necessary concomitants of God,not as constitutive parts of the divine being. These relations are predicated of God, since they follow the divine being as its effects. However, God's being related to the universe does not imply that hedepends on the universe. The relations are simply the effect of thedivine action. 12

Even though God is related to the universe, this relation is notlike relations holding between two things in the universe. The mostfundamental relation between God and creatures is creation, whichseemingly can be placed in the category of action-passion relations.But creation as the divine action is not something that makes Godin someway dependent on creatures. For example, if one builds ahouse, building a house perfects and changes the builder. Creatingand creatures do not perfect or change God's being. We can resolveAvicenna's contrary statements if we say that the relations betweenGod and the universe, based on action and passion, are not like therelations between creatures. If relations between creatures are takento be definitive regarding what a relation is, then God is not relatedto the universe. God is related to the universe if the dependenceand affection are eliminated, this relation is not constitutive of hisessence. Avicenna employs his concept of necessary concomitant

11 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.7-15. See also, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.1-7.Here Avicenna also states that God is self-subsisting by himself, not because he isthe cause of the existence of things. This is reminiscent of one of Aquinas' arguments concerning why God is not really related to the world.

12 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 343.16-17 - p. 344.1-5. See also, MetaphysicsVIII.5, p. 354.12-14. "... If you ponder upon (~aqqaqtahu) him, after the [theaffirmation of] being (inniyya) God is described (yueqf) by negation (salb) of similarities (mushiibihiit) and by affirmation (fiiib) of all kinds of relations (Ujiifiit), becauseeverything is of him, he does not participate (mushiirik) in what is of him. He is theorigin of everything, but he is not one of the things that are after (ba'd) him."

I);

(liizim) to explain the unique character of the relations between Godand the universe.

The underlying relation of God to the universe, as Avicenna considers it, is that of metaphysical efficient cause. Avicenna makes adistinction between two senses of efficient cause, one being metaphysical and the other physical. Whereas in the context of metaphysics an efficient cause is the cause that gives existence to a beingdistinct from itself, an efficient cause in the context of physics is thecause that gives movement to a being that already exists. I3 Avicennaemphasizes the point that metaphysical efficient cause and its effectare absolutely distinct beings. Neither the efficient cause nor its effectreceive each other, nor are they conjoined (muqiirana) to each other. 14

The causal relation between God and the universe can be put inthe group of action-passion in the Aristotelian triple division of relations. I5 Even though Avicenna does not state it explicitly, this modelunderlies his discussion of the relation between the Creator and theuniverse. God is the efficient and the final cause of the universe andthe universe is the effect of the divine action.

Since the relation between God and creatures is the relationbetween an efficient cause and its effect, what holds true betweenan efficient cause and its effect must also be true between God andthe universe. When discussing creation, Avicenna, most of the time,uses rather inclusive language. He talks in terms of agents and patientscategorically. Then he adds his specific qualifications concerning therelation between God and the universe. Avicenna argues that betweenan efficient cause and its effect the following must hold: (1) causesnecessitate their effects. Whereas God is a self-necessary being, the

13 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.l, p. 257.7-17.14 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI. I , p. 259.11-19. Michael Marmura notes how Avicenna

insists on this point. Michael Marmura, "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality inAvicenna," in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed.Michael E. Marmura (New York: SUNY, 1984), pp. 172-173. Also seeJulesJanssens,"Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina," pp. 458-459.

15 Aristode, Metaphysics, V.15, 1029b25-I021bll. Avicenna is very much Aristotelianwith respect to his conception of relatives and the category of relation. We find theAristotelian triple division of relatives, i.e., quantity, action-passion, and resemblanceor non-mutual relations. However, in Avicenna's discussion, non-mutual relationsdo not have the specific importance that they have in Aquinas' discussion of therelation between God and the universe. Michael Marmura, "Avicenna's Chapter,"On the Relative," in the Metaphysics of the Shifii'," in Essays on Islamic Philosophyand Science, ed. George F. Hourani (Albany: SUNY, 1975), pp. 83-99, especiallyfirst part, pp. 83-87.

16 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.11-18.17 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.1-10.18 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.11-18 - p. 39.1-4.19 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 39.5-16.20 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.6-10. Avicenna's distinction between necessary

universe is necessary by something else, i.e., God. (2) Causes andtheir effects co-exist. If what we call a cause exists and the effectdoes not exist, then the cause is not actually the cause. Effects needtheir cause not simply to begin to exist; they also need their causein order to continue to exist and act. (3) Their co-existence does notrequire that they be on par with, or equal to, their cause. (4) Theefficient cause is the cause of only the existence of its effect, not itspreceding non-existence. Nor is the efficient cause the cause of thefact that the effect 'begins to exist after not-having existed.'

Causes Necessitate Their EffectsThings that are possible to exist are effects and need a cause tomake them exist. For Avicenna, necessity is almost interchangeablewith existence as far as it concerns things, not propositions. Sayingthat a cause makes its effect exist is equivalent to saying that a causenecessitates its effect. All existent things can be divided into twogroups: (1) necessary to exist by itself and (2) possible to exist, if considered by itself alone. The thing that is possible to exist, if considered by itself, cannot be impossible in itself Otherwise it could notexist at all. There cannot be more than one being that is necessaryto exist, if considered by itself 16 Unlike things that are possible toexist, the self-necessary being cannot have a cause making it exist. 17

Things that are possible to exist, if considered in themselves, aredependent on some extrinsic cause in both their existence and nonexistence. When explaining the existence of something possible toexist, what we consider in the mind is the quiddity of the thing.Since the quiddity of the thing is not sufficient to explain or causeits existence or non-existence, it must be determined or specified bysomething else. IS The existence of the effect is traceable to the causemaking it exist, and its non-existence to the non-existence of itscause. 19 Since the sheer possibility of something does not make thething exist, it must have been necessitated by a cause if it actuallyexists. As a result every possible thing that exists is necessary bysomething else. If we apply this analysis to creation, God, as theefficient cause, necessitates the existence of the universe. 2o

177THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE

Causes and Their Effects co-ExistThe efficient cause and its effect, Avicenna argues, must co-exist.The co-existence may be considered with regard to the beginningof the effect, such that given the cause, the effect exists, without atemporal gap between the existence of the cause and the effect. Itmay also be considered with regard to the continuity of the existence of the effect, such that as long as the effect exists, its causemust be existing. That is, the effect does not become independentof its cause after beginning to exist. One can think of cases wherethe efficient cause exists, but its effect does not exist. The effect maybegin to exist temporally after the existence of the efficient cause.Consequently, one must qualify the co-existence between the causeand its effect by saying that the efficient cause insqfar as it is theefficient cause must co-exist with its effect. 21

For Avicenna, co-existence of the efficient cause and its effect doesnot simply concern the 'beginning' of the effect, but also its continuing to be what it is. Avicenna develops an argument to this effecton the basis of his distinction between necessary and possible being.Everything existing is necessary, either by itself, or on account of itscause. Without reference to the causal activity of the efficient cause,the effect is simply possible. It does not exist unless it is made necessary by its cause. Since after beginning to exist the effect does notbecome necessary by itself either on account of its quiddity or on

and possible is one of the troublesome issues. Following this distinction, Avicennatalks about the properties of possible things and how they are related to being. Oneof the serious objections to such a talk about possible things is that non-existentpossibles cannot even be referred to before they exist. For an argument saying thatsuch things cannot be referred to before their existence see Barry Miller, A MostUnlikely God (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame, 1996), pp. 29-33.One may distinguish between talking about possible beings categorically and talking about non-existent individuals. In that case, Avicenna's talk about properties ofpossible beings may escape Miller's objection. Some scholars interpret Avicenna'sconception of possibility as if there is a realm of possible beings and God actualizes them by bringing existence to them. Avicenna's argument that the possibilityof things does not concern the power of the agent, which we shall talk about below,is one of the supporting elements in this regard. However, as we have seen in chapter 3, Avicenna denies the freedom of choice to God, simply because there cannotbe a realm of possible things before God so that God may choose which ones ofthem to actualize. For discussions on this issue, see Gerhard Smith, "Avicenna andthe Possibles," the New Scholnsticism, XVII (1943), pp. 340-357; Francis A. Cunningham,"Averroes vs. Avicenna on Being," TIe New Scholastieism XLVIII (1974), pp. 184-218;Beatrice Zedler, "Another Look at Avicenna," TIe New Scholasticism L (1976), pp.504-521.

21 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 259.11-19 - p. 260.1-4.

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178 CHAPTER FOUR

I'THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 179

account of its properties, it always needs its cause as long as it exists.22

The condition of co-existence between a cause and its effect isnot simply limited to the relation between God and the universe,but it is applicable to any case where a causal relation is concerned.Avicenna examines some counter-examples to show that efficientcauses and their effects must co-exist. For example, a builder is theefficient cause of the building. However, the building survives thebuilder. A father is the efficient cause of his son, but the son maylive after the death of his father. 23 In fact, Avicenna argues, the

22 Avicenna, Metaphysics VLl, p. 261.5-16 - p. 262.1-5. Avicenna's argument tothis effect runs as following: He refers to some people arguing that the need of theeffect to have its cause is for beginning to exist. But after beginning to exist theeffect does not need the cause anymore. If the effect needs the cause only in orderto begin to exist, then the cause is prior to (mutaqaddiman) the effect, but does notco-exist (ma'an) with the effect. Avicenna argues that this is incorrect. He offers thefollowing argument, which assumes the convertibility of necessity and existence. Inorder for something to continue in existence, it must be necessary: so the beingthat comes to exist after not having existed is either (I) a necessary being, or (2)not a necessary being. Since nothing possible exists simply by being possible, hedoes not discuss the second option further. If (I), i.e., it is a necessary being, then(1.1) either it is a necessary being by itself because of its quiddity, or (1.2) it is nota necessary being by itself. If it were a necessary being by itself, it could not havebegun to exist. Hence, (1.1) is false. If it is not a necessary being by itself, then itis a necessary being (1.2.1) on the condition that it begins to exist after not having existed, or (1.2.2.) on the condition of one of its properties, or (1.2.3) on thecondition of something distinct from it. The condition (1.2.1) is not acceptable,because 'coming to exist after not having existed' (~udi1th) is not something necessary by itself so that it could necessitate the thing coming to exist on its own. Whenthe thing comes to exist after non-existence, the non-existence of the thing ceasesto be the case. Hence 'coming to exist after not having existed' cannot be the condition insuring the existence of the thing. One may argue that the condition of'coming to exist after not having existed' is not the cause of the existence of thething, but rather the thing has undergone 'coming to exist after not having existed.'Then 'coming to exist after not having existed' is a property that is included in(1.2.2). On p. 261.17-19, Avicenna starts examining (1.2.2). If (1.2.2) holds, theneither (1.2.2.1) the properties insuring the existence of the thing are the propertiesof its essence not insofar as the thing exists-thus its essence necessitates the existence of the thing-or (1.2.2.2) these properties come to exist and belong to thisthing when the thing exists. This last division parallels the first division (I) and (2)(p. 262 lines 1-5). Hence (1.2.2.1) is not the case. If (1.2.2.2) is assumed, then either(1.2.2.2.1): there are infinite number of properties of this thing and they are notnecessary by themselves, or (1.2.2.2.2): there is a property of the thing which isnecessary by something else (1.2.2.2.1) cannot be the case. Since all of them arepossible to exist, they cannot make the thing necessary, hence existent. Hence(1.2.2.2.2) holds. The thing that comes to exist after not having existed remains inexistence by something else. Hence, (1.2.3) is true, that is, the thing that comes toexist is necessary by something else. Consequendy it remains in existence by something else.


builder is not the cause of the subsistence of the building. The builderis the cause of the movement of the material making up the building. But the organization of the building-materials in a certain way,and the conditions of the configuration of the building, are the causesof the subsistence of the building. Causes contributing to the subsistence of the building are simultaneous with the subsistence of thebuilding. 24 In the case of father-son relations, the father is only thecause of the movement of the semen towards a definite direction.From then on, Avicenna argues, for each specific situation there canbe assigned a cause, or causes, that exists simultaneously with theeffect in question. 25 Avicenna traces this co-existence between causesand effects up to the giver of forms, which governs what happensin the sublunar world. True (baq'iqiyya) causes, he maintains, co-existwith their effects. Causes that precede their effects are either accidental causes or specifying causes (mu'qyyinat).26

One possible objection to the condition of co-existence is that ifefficient causes must co-exist with their effects, then for any presenteffect now an infinite number of causes must actually exist. Tocounter this Avicenna makes a distinction between essential and accidental causes,27 and between immediate and remote causes. Essentialcauses, which co-exist with their effects, are finite. Auxiliary andpreparative causes, which precede their effects and which are accidental, may be infinite. As far as particular things are concerned,their causes may be infinite, some of them temporally prior to theireffects which have come to exist after not having existed. However,even for the things that come to exist after not having existed, thecauses that make them necessary and actually exist must co-existwith them. 28 Since things subject to generation and corruption arethings coming to exist after not existing, their causes also come toexist after not having existed. Even though an effect can be tracedback to infinitely many causes, which must co-exist with their effects,no effect requires that an infinite number of actual causes exist for

24 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.9-11.25 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.12-14.26 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 265.1-5.27 Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that God is the essential cause of the universe.

For what an essential cause is and how Aquinas has this conception, see WilliamL. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton & London, 1975), pp. 18-25.



it. Only the immediate and the essential cause of something mustco-exist with it. Each essential cause co-exists with its effect. Throughmovement both the cause and effect cease to exist but new causesand new effects emerge through continuous renewal. The formercause becomes the remote cause of the new effect. Movement is theparticipating or conserving cause of the order of the realm of generation and corruption. Hence, for any effect only its immediate andessential causes must co-exist with it. 29

Avicenna distinguishes between the things that are subject to generation and corruption and those that are not, the latter being freeof time, matter, and movement. Ungenerable things exist withoutthe mediation of matter and change; they co-exist with their cause.In contrast to them, things that are subject to generation and corruption are conditioned not simply by the existence of their essential efficient cause, but also their immediate causes. They must cometo exist after not having existed. This is why Avicenna traces thecontinuity of the building made by a builder to the giver of forms.While the properties of the material making up the configurationare the immediate causes of the continuity of the building, the giverof forms is the one that gives this particular form to this material.Let us consider the case of an individual man: (1) Brian who is theson of (2), the son of (3), the daughter of (4) the son of (5) John.The existence of Brian is conditioned not simply by the existence ofhis essential cause, ultimately God, but as well by his immediatecause (2). (2) in turn is conditioned by the existence of God and (3)so on and so forth.

The conception of the relations between an efficient cause and itseffect does not involve a temporal gap between the existence of theefficient cause and its effect as such. The efficient cause simply bybeing what it is can be an efficient cause. However, not all efficientcauses must be efficient cause simply by their existence. If one setsup the condition that there be a temporal gap between the existenceof the efficient cause and its effect this would be a limited viewpoint.This conception, which Avicenna states to have been adopted bythe majority-which refers to theologians-requires that the effectbe temporally after the existence of the efficient cause. On this condition, the cause is simply the cause of the beginning of the effect.

29 Avicenna, Metaphysics V1.2, p. 265.17-19 - p. 266.1-8.

Its remaining in existence does not depend on the cause. He arguesthat this condition requires that there be something that goes alongwith the cause which has no part in the existence of the effect, i.e.,the preceding non-existence of the effect. 30

For Avicenna, within such a limited conception of the efficientcause, moreover, every efficient cause must be potential and changeable. The implication of this argument is serious. If the conceptionof an efficient cause is limited to the causes whose effects follow lateron, then God cannot be the efficient cause of the universe. On thisconception, the cause would not be an efficient cause, at the outset. It would become an actual efficient cause, only when its effectbegins to exist. Furthermore, the cause would become an actualcause by something happening to the cause, such as volition, or compulsion. And the action of the efficient cause would take place becauseof this thing happening to the efficient cause. Hence, according tosuch a conception, the efficient cause is an efficient cause after having been a potential efficient cause. 3

! Since nothing new or additional can happen to God, on this condition God cannot be theefficient cause of the universe.

The co-Existence if Causes and Their E.ffects Does not Require thatThey Be EqualIf the cause and the effect are simultaneous, one can object by saying that there is no ground to identify one as the cause and theother as the effect. 32 Although the cause and its effect co-exist andthere is no temporal gap between their existence, this does not meanthat they are on the same level. The cause and its effect are notequal because while the effect exists simultaneously and on accountof the cause, the cause exists only simultaneously with the effect. Coexistence does not suffice to explain the causal relation between the

30 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 263.3-11. See also, Avicenna, Ishiiriit V, pp.147-148.

31 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 263.12-18.32 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV, p. 167.60-8. This objection may refer to the posi

tions of Muslim theologians. Michael Marmura traces two objections which Avicennadiscusses to Baqillanf, an Ash'arite. One of the arguments concerns the necessaryconnection between the cause and the effect, the other concerns the co-existenceof causes with their effects. Michael Marmura, "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causalityin Avicenna," in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor qf George F Hourani,ed. Michael E. Marmura (New York: SUNY, 1984), pp. 184-186.


twO. Based solely on co-existence, if one takes the cause away, thenthe effect is taken away. But then if one takes the effect away-according to the rule of co-existence-the cause is also taken away. As aresult, what is supposed to be the cause depends on the effect asmuch as the effect depends on the cause. Avicenna answers thisobjection by saying that one cannot take the effect away unless thecause is prevented from being the cause, or is already removed. 33

Neither does the fact that both cause and effect are necessarymean that they are equal. The co-existence of an effect and its causeconcerns their 'duration,' but not their subsistence or having existence. If the cause exists, the effect simultaneously exists. "They existtogether (maCan) in time, or in sempiternity (dahr) , or something else.But they are not together with respect to having (buJul) existence."34As far as existence is concerned, while the effect becomes necessaryon account of the cause, the cause is not necessary on account ofits effect. The cause is either necessary by itself, or it is necessaryon account of its own cause. But it is not necessary on account ofits effect. Everything existing-except for the self-necessary being-ispossible in itself, i.e., without reference to its cause. If it is takenwith the existence of its cause, then it becomes necessary by something else. In any pairing of an efficient cause and its effect, theeffect is necessary with reference to its cause, but not vice versa.Hence, the cause and the effect are not equal, although they coexist and they both are necessary. 35

TIe Efficient Cause Is the Cause on[y if the Existence if Its EffictThe cause has a part only in the existence of the effect, not in itsnon-existence. Avicenna considers the existence and the non-existence

33 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.9-16; p. 169.3-5 and 9-13.34 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.2-3. There is a hidden problem here. If

both the effect and the cause have the same kind of being, such as being temporal or sempitemal, then it is conceivable that both the cause and the effect 'existtogether.' However, if the cause and effect are not of the same genus, or of thesame order of being, how can they be temporally simultaneous or co-existing? Iwant to simply point out the problem, the discussion of which goes far beyond myobjectives. Although this is a problem for Avicenna in this context, because of theco-existence of the cause and its effect, this is also applicable to the thought ofmany philosophers and theologians. This is true especially with regard to the divineknowledge of things and God's intervention in history, such as his response toprayers.

3S Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.3, p. 274.7-17.

I i;

11

of the effect as separate units. Since not all efficient causes exist forever, and since not all efficient causes are unstoppable from exerting their causal activity, some effects may come to exist temporallyafter not having existed. In such cases, if the cause is not such thatit immediately causes its effect, the cause must become an actualefficient cause. No matter whether the effect exist simultaneouslywith the cause or it comes to exist later on, the relation of the effectto the cause concerns its existence. The cause has a part in the existence of the effect,36 but it does not have a part in the non-existence of the effect. Since the cause is the cause of the being of theeffect, it does not have a part in the preceding non-existence of theeffect insofar as it is the efficient cause of the effect. The precedingnon-existence can have a cause, which can be simply the non-existence of the cause. It may also be due to something preventing thecause from exercising its causal power. In this case, the cause doesnot exist as the cause, though it exists without being a cause. Hence,the existence of the effect is on account of a cause, i.e., the existence of the cause. The non-existence of the effect is, again, onaccount of a cause. Its cause is the non-existence of the causeY

The compound made up of 'preceding non-existence' and 'posterior existence' cannot be traced to one cause. Within the universe,there are things the quiddities of which require that they temporallybegin to be after not having existed. There are also things that cannot begin to exist after temporal non-existence. All of them can betraced to their cause. However, if the prior non-existence and theposterior existence of the effect is taken as a compound, it cannotbe traced to a single cause. Each part of the compound, then, canbe traced to its own cause. The effect taken by itself is simply whatis possible to exist. It does not reveal anything about whether it actually exists or not. Its existence or non-existence is due to the existence or non-existence of the cause. The cause is the cause of theexistence of the effect, even if the effect begins to exist after not having existed despite the prior existence of the cause. The non-existence of the cause is the cause of the non-existence of the effect.However, 'beginning to exist after not having existed' is not something possible to exist among other things. Rather it is somethingthat supervenes on some of the things that are possible to exist.

36 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.!, p. 260.1-4.37 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.I, p. 260.5-11.


Thus, there is not one single cause for the fact that 'something beginsto exist after not-having existed. 38

The claim that 'the preceding non-existence' and 'the posteriorexistence" of an effect cannot be traced to a cause needs some further explanation. The cause in this statement does not refer to oneentity with regard to its quiddity. It rather refers to all the conditions under which the cause exerts its causal activity. As will becomeclear through the discussions of divine immutability, for AvicennaGod is the cause of the universe by willing it to exist. He mighthave been the cause of its non-existence by not willing it, but if atfirst he willed not to create, in order to be the cause of the universeGod must have a new volition different from the former. Thus 'acause' in this context includes all that makes the cause a cause, notsimply an entity without reference to its causal activity.

The compound made up by the 'preceding non-existence' and'posterior existence' concerns the quiddity of things that exist. WhatAvicenna intends by saying this may be exemplified by comparing'a man' to 'a heavenly intellect.' Man, a rational animal, if he existsoutside the mind, exists as composed of form and matter, a material and temporal thing with a certain bodily construction broughtforth through generation. A heavenly intellect, however, is not amaterial and temporal thing. If it exists outside of the mind, it existswithout reference to time. If the effect is such that its quiddity requiresthat this effect may exist as something material and temporal, thenthe effect may begin to exist after temporal non-existence. In thepreceding non-existence of the effect, the cause does not have anyinvolvement. The cause has a part only in its existence. Since 'beginning to exist after not having existed' (buduth) concerns the quiddityof the thing in question, it does not concern the power of the agent.It is not something that can be done. Within the universe, the quiddities of some things are such that they cannot exist, except afterpreceding non-existence. 39 These consist of the things in the sub-

38 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.I, p. 260.12-17; p. 261.4.39 In this context Aquinas' analysis of the constraints on God's creative activity

may provide clarification. He maintains that "[n]ecessity arises from the end whenthe intention of the end cannot be fulfilled, either not at all or not conveniently,without this or that thing. It remains therefore that necessity in God's works cannot arise except from the form which is the end of operation ... thus we mightsay, for instance, supposing that God intends to make a man, that it is necessaryand due that he give him a rational soul and an organic body, without which thereis no such thing as a man." De potentia Ill, 16.

lunar realm, also known as the realm of generation and corruption.Some other things, however, cannot begin to exist temporally afternot having existed. Things in the supralunar realm, which are notsubject to generation and corruption, belong to this category. Hencesome of the things in the universe must necessarily (wiijib t/aruratan)exist 'after temporal non-existence' ('adam) , and some others mustnecessarily exist 'not after temporal non-existence. '40

Arguments fir the Sempitemi!J qf the Universe

For Avicenna, the world is not eternal in the technical sense of theword. As discussed in chapter 2, for him, eternity (qidam) belongsonly to God. Being eternal, for him, is to exist by itself and to havefull perfection of being. In this sense only God is eternal, i.e., priorto all other beings. The universe, in the sense of everything otherthan God, may be characterized as sempiternal. Sempiternity, forAvicenna, is not infinite temporal duration. Rather it is above time,and is a non-temporal duration. Sempiternity is applicable to thevertical order of the universe, beginning from prime matter andgoing up to the first intellect. Within sempiternity, temporal thingsand time exist. Time is applicable only to things that are subject togeneration and corruption. As the measure of movement, time isapplicable to things that are subject to change. Since not all thingsin the universe change and are thus temporal, the basic argumentof Avicenna is that considered as a whole, time is not applicable tothe universe; it is rather a part and applicable to only some part ofthe universe. From there on, based on this conception of movement,he argues for an infinite temporal duration. But this latter againapplies only to part of the universe. Further arguments, based ondivine immutability and the nature of time, are meant to show theabsurdity of a temporal beginning to the universe.

Minimal adjustment is sufficient to apply the foregoing explanation of the relations between an efficient cause and its effect to therelation between God and the universe. The preceding four relations between an efficient cause and its effect are assumed in allarguments. In addition to this, that God is not like any other efficientcause must be underlined. In this respect, Avicenna reminds us that

40 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.!, p. 262.6-14.


God is necessary in all respects, i.e., God is fully in act eternally.By implication, God is immutable, and nothing new may happen toGod. Thus, Avicenna argues, since God exists always and is theessential cause of the universe, God always (dii'iman) causes the universe to exist.41

The First Argument: Time and Temporal Beginning Are not Applicable toAll ThingsAvicenna draws a fundamental distinction among the things in theworld: (1) things the quiddities of which require that they cannotcome to exist after temporal non-existence, and (2) things that mustbegin to exist after temporal non-existence.42 In other words, thereare things that do not need a substratum in order to exist, and thereare things that need a substratum in order to exist. This correspondsto the distinction between ungenerable and generable things. Heavenlyintelligences, souls, and bodies, as well as movement and time, areincluded in the first category. As we saw in chapter 2, Avicennadivides things with regard to duration into three categories: eternal,sempiternal and temporal.43 God is at the highest level, he is theeternal being who is self-subsistent and all-necessary. At the otherend of the chain of being there are the things that are subject togeneration and corruption. These are temporal things the quidditiesof which require that they begin to exist after temporal non-existence. All things which are in between God and the things in thesublunar world are sempiternal. These are the things the quidditiesof which require that they be non-temporal, and that they must notcome to exist after temporal non-existence.

One must ask why the quiddity of something must require thatit be without temporal beginning, or that it be with a temporalbeginning. In order to answer this question, Avicenna discusses the

41 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 373.13-18.42 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.l, p. 262.6-14.43 Avicenna's triple division of the hierarchy of being possessing three types of

duration may not be coherent, since heavenly bodies and heavenly intellects maynot quite fit the same kind of duration. See Faz1ur Rahman, "Ibn Sina's Theoryof the God-World Relationship," pp. 43-46. Faz1ur Rahman compares Avicenna'sconception of dahr to Proclus' concept of 'perpetual becoming.' He argues that whileProclus considers 'perpetual becoming' within time, Avicenna places it beyond time.According to this interpretation, which seems justified to me, if we render Avicenna'sterm 'dahr' as 'sempiternity' in English, then sempiternity is not infinite temporalduration. It is rather a kind of non-temporal duration. Hence time and movementis applicable neither to sempiternal beings nor to the eternal being, i.e., God.

relationship between the possibility of something and its actual existence. Everything other than God, considered in itself, is possible ofexistence. Something that is possible to exist is also possible not toexist. If it is not possible to exist before it actually exists, then itcannot exist. The possibility of existent things must precede them,either temporally or essentially. Hence, in order for something toexist it must be something possible to exist before it actually exists.In this context, Avicenna divides things into three categories: (1)something possible to be a substratum, (2) something possible to existin a substratum, and (3) something possible to exist without a substratum.44 In order for things to exist through a substratum, e.g.,stone, wood and man, their substratum must exist. The possibilityof their existence is in their substratum. Unless their substratumexists, they have no possibility of existing.

The possibility of things that exist without a substratum cannotbe temporally prior to them, because they do not exist through asubstratum where their possibility is found. The possibility of thingsthat exist in a substratum is in their substratum.45 Things that existthrough a substratum, that is, things that are subject to generationand corruption begin to exist after temporal non-existence. But thosethat exist without a substratum cannot begin to exist after non-existence in the temporal sense.46

Avicenna places the possibility of material things in prime matter,but also considers placing the possibility of things in the power ofthe agent. The latter is what Aquinas argues when refusing one ofthe arguments for the sempiternity of the world. For Avicenna thepossibility of something cannot be reduced to the power of the agent.The agent can do only what is possible. If one defines the possiblein terms of the power of the agent, saying that 'power is applicableonly to something possible' this declaration would mean 'power isapplicable only to that to which power is applicable.' If possible iswhat can be done and the impossible what cannot be done, then ifwe doubted whether something can be or cannot be done, we couldnot reach the resolution of this doubt at all. Hence, the possibilityof things must be different from the power of the agent to make

44 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 177.5-12.45 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 177.13-20 - p. 178.1-5.46 Avicenna, Metaphysics IY.2, p. 177.6-8; p. 182.7-18.


them. That something can be done necessarily follows from its beingpossible. Something 'is possible' with regard to itself, and 'can bedone' with regard to the power of the agent. Therefore, the possibility of things is distinct from the power of an agent over it.47

Special emphasis may be appropriate regarding the beginning ofmovement and time. They do not exist through a substratum. Inthe Aristotelian spirit, Avicenna defines time as the measure of movement with regard to before and after. Time co-exists with movement. Movement is not one of the things that are subject to generationand corruption and it does not have a temporal beginning.48 Avicennareaches this conclusion through his arguments that every movementrequires a preceding movement.

On the basis of the discussion above, Avicenna's argument canbe constructed as follows:

(1) God is the efficient cause of the universe and the universe isthe effect of the divine creative action. (2) Beginning to exist temporally after not having existed concerns the quiddity of existingthings. (3) Only things that can exist in a substratum can begin toexist after not having existed. (4) There are things in the world thequiddities of which require that they exist without a substratum, (5)Hence the universe cannot have begun to exist temporally after nothaving existed.

In this argument, (2) states that the universe's beginning to existafter not having existed cannot be traced to the divine action. Onemay object that God is not simply the cause of the existence ofthings with quiddities which require that they are not after temporal non-existence, but God is also the cause that determines whichquiddities existent things should have. In a sense God is the designerof the quiddities of things. Nevertheless, even if this argument isgranted, the fact that there exist things that cannot come to existtemporally after not having existed (4) makes this objection ineffective.The things indicated in (4)-the things the quiddity of which requiresexistence without a substratum-cannot begin to exist temporallyafter not having existed.

47 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 181.6-16 - p. 182.1-6. See also, Avicenna,Mabda' wa Ma'iid, pp. 40-41.

48 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 381.8-11; p. 374.17-19. It is generated by thesoul of the first celestial sphere, both of which are sempiternal. See also, Avicenna,Metaphysics IX.2, p. 383.10-17 - p. 384.1-9; p. 386.14 - p. 387.3.

The Second Argument: Temporal Posteriori!)! Requires a Change in GodThat the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existedis not compatible with the immutability and eternity of God. Asstated above, for Avicenna causes and effects are simultaneous.'Existing after not having existed,' as a compound, cannot be tracedto a cause. Avicenna's support for this claim is that the cause is thecause of the existence of the effect, not its preceding non-existence.If, despite the existence of the cause, the universe did not exist atfirst-on the assumption of God's immutability-it could not cometo exist at all. Or, if the universe has begun to exist after not having existed, then the universe as a whole must be something generable that needs the existence of a substratum that exists before it.49

If the universe begins to exist after not having existed, then Godis not immutable. Consequently, either its cause must begin to existafter not having existed, or there must be a chain of remote andclose causes leading to the existence of the effect. Since none of theparties debating the beginning of the universe would accept that Godbegins to exist after non-existence, this may be dismissed. If, despitethe existence of God, the universe does not exist, in order for theuniverse to begin to exist, some other cause must come to exist. Thisnew cause is the immediate cause of the universe,5o in addition tothe existence of the essential cause, i.e., God. This immediate causein turn needs its own immediate cause ad irifinitum. Members of thischain come and cease to exist through movement, which itself doesnot begin to exist after not having existed.51 Thus, if the universebegins to exist temporally after not having existed, then God is notthe sole cause of the universe. Clearly this is not the conclusionacceptable by defenders of the thesis that the universe began to existafter temporal non-existence.

If God is the sole cause of the universe, and if, given the cause,i.e., God, the universe does not exist, then God must change so thatthe universe comes to exist. God is a necessary being, the necessitating agent of all other things. If God did not at first necessitateall things existing on account of him and then did this later, Godwould have two states: (1) one state in which he does not create,and (2) another state in which he creates. If God has two states he,

49 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 374.1-6; p. 376.7-9.50 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 374.8-10.SI Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 374.17-19; p. 375.1-4 and 9.

190 CHAPTER FOUR

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THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 191

would change from being not the creator to being the creator. Ifone conceives divine will to create to be identical with God, thenGod must change in order to create. Or if one conceives the divinewill to create as something separate from God's being, then there isno doubt that it would be additional to God. In any case, whetherone conceives the divine will to create the universe as somethingidentical to God's being or something distinct from God, it must benew. The divine will itself must come to exist after not havingexisted.52 However this contradicts divine immutability and necessityin all respects.

In order to explain both that the universe as a whole does notbegin to exist and that within the universe some things begin to existafter not having existed without affecting the divine immutability,Avicenna reminds us of the distinction between the vertical and horizontal orders of things. There are things which are immediatelygiven existence and there are things produced by the mediation ofsome of the things in the former group, i.e., matter, movement. Atthe vertical level which concerns the existence of things which aregiven existence immediately, things cannot come to exist after nothaving existed. If they came to exist after not having existed, thenthere must be a reason to prefer the non-existence of the things atfirst. Since their existence depend solely on the divine will but doesnot require time or matter, at first God must have willed not to create and then must have willed to create. Were God to will not to,create and then to create, he would be changeable, because thedivine will is not something apart from God's being, in the mannerwhere the object of volition is something outside of him.53 Hence,as far as the vertical order of things is concerned, the immutabilityof the divine will requires that the universe cannot begin to existafter not having existed. At the horizontal level, however, things thatare subject to generation and corruption need their essential causeas well as their immediate causes, such as movement and time. Theirbeginning to exist after non-existence does not oppose to the necessity and immutability of the divine will.

Another argument for the thesis that the universe does not havea temporal beginning is based on God's relation to the universe. Ifthe universe comes to exist after not having existed (~adatha), then a

52 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 376.10-17.53 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 377.4-7.

new relation (nisba) occurs to God, the relation of being the creatorof the universe. This must occur to his essence (dhiit) and be in hisessence (dhiit). If it is outside of the divine being, i.e., if this relationdoes not occur to God but to something else, then this is not therelation that is sought after. This is because the relation that is soughtafter is the relation that should explain the existence of everythingother than God. If this relation is not in God, then it must be insomething else which is distinct from God. Since creation includeseverything, nothing other than God can be the origin of this relation.54

Avicenna is so certain about the demonstrative power of his argument that he maintains that one cannot possibly deny it. He confirmsthat without something new happening to the cause, nothing cancome to exist after non-existence. One may deny this with the tongue,but cannot escape from acknowledging it in one's conscience (rjamfr).God is immutable, and nothing possible can exist by itself Avicennaimplies that if the universe as a whole were conditioned to come toexist after not having existed, then now it would not exist at all.55

But is Avicenna's argument sufficient to justify his conclusion?Does the claim that 'the cause is the cause of the existence of theeffect' contradict the claim that 'the cause can be the cause of theexistence of the effect as well as its preceding non-existence'? If causesthat act simply on account of their nature are considered, this seemsto be the case. The cause causes the existence of the effect unlessit is prevented. But does it apply, in the same way, to the divineaction, which stems from divine knowledge and will? In order to geta firmer grip on this question, let us break it into two smaller pieces,reflecting the two alternatives the question implies. (1) Why cannotGod be such that he wills not to act at first, and later on he willsto act? (2) Why cannot God be the cause of the preceding non-existence and then the existence of the effect by one act of will? Thatis, why cannot God, as a voluntary agent, cause the effect to besuch that it exists temporally after not having existed?

Avicenna argues that if an agent does not cause the effect at firstand then later causes the effect, this agent is a potential efficientcause at first and then becomes an actual efficient cause. He statesthat the majority of people have such a conception of an efficient

54 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 377.18-19 - p. 378.1-4.55 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 377.8-17.


cause. He argues that no matter whether the efficient cause is acause acting on account of its nature or on account of its will, ifthe cause does not cause the effect simply when it itself exists, thenthe cause is a potential efficient cause. As long as the cause doesnot actually cause the effect, it is a potential cause of the effect.Additionally, if the cause does not cause the existence of the effectwhen it itself exists, then the cause must become an actual efficientcause by something occurring to it, such as a new nature, or a newvolition, or something else. Hence, according to such a conception,the efficient cause, in the same manner as the effect, begins to actby becoming an actual efficient cause after being a potential efficientcause.56 Moreover, in this conception, the efficient cause acts onaccount the thing that occurs to it. 57

In light of the foregoing, let us come back to question (1), i.e.,why cannot a voluntary cause be such that it wills not to act at first,and later on it wills to act? This may be applicable to voluntarycauses in general, but it cannot be accepted with regard to God.For Avicenna, God cannot will not to act at first and will to actlater on. Otherwise God would be, at first, the potential efficientcause of the universe, then the actual efficient cause. This wouldrequire that God be changeable. Furthermore, it would require thatGod have his perfections in a manner similar to creatures. That is,God's perfections would not be identical to his being, but rather therelation between his being and his properties would be similar tothe relation between a created subject and its accidents. Moreover,God would then be acting for the sake of something else, that is,for the sake of the thing that occasions him to act.

As for question (2), i.e., why cannot God be the cause of the preceding non-existence and then the existence of the effect by one actof will? Avicenna does not seem to consider this form of the question specifically. This may be due to the fact that he was not awareof the question in this form, or that he did not consider it to besubstantially different from the previous form of the question. It is,in fact, the argument Aquinas comes up with, as will be discussedin the following section. However, Avicenna's argument that 'thequiddity of some things require that they must not be after temporal non-existence' turns out to be a kind of reply to this. Avicenna

56 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.!, p. 263.3-1l.57 Avirpnn~ Mdnhhvsics VI. I. D. 263.12-14.

maintains that there cannot be such a temporal, or any kind of, gapbetween God's willing something to be and its existence, becausethe divine knowledge of things is identical to the divine willing, thelatter being identical to making them exist. 58 If the divine will concerns the making of creatures, then he must have made them existby willing them. Otherwise, one can ask questions about the timingof creation.

Avicenna argues that if God's volition concerning the universe isidentical with making it, i.e., God does not have a purpose whichhe would reach by creating the universe or a benefit God expectsby creating,59 then the following questions can be asked: (1) why didGod not create the universe before he did? (2) did God think themoment when he created the universe was more suitable? (3) didthe time when the universe could exist begin when God created it?(4) and finally, was God unable to create the universe before? Thesequestions may sound absurd. However, Avicenna argues that theyare all valid questions and applicable to all times, if the universe isassumed to be after its preceding temporal non-existence. 60

The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads to Impossible ConclusionsAvicenna questions the applicability of time to the whole universeand attempts to deduce absurdities from the assumption that theuniverse began to exist after not having existed on the basis of thenature of time. One of his arguments is based on the non-existenceof time without the existence of movable things (3.1). He argues, byassuming that time is the measure of movement, and exists as supervening on movement and movable things, if no movable thing exists,there cannot be two distinct instants of time, by which the temporal posteriority of the existence of the universe may be traced.61

Another argument of Avicenna concerns the priority of God tohis effects (3.2.1). He asks the question 'by what is God prior to hisaction (aj'alahu) that comes to exist after not having existed (~aditha)?'

Avicenna's use of the word 'action' needs to be interpreted. For himGod is eternal and God's action is identical to himself in the strict

58 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.14-15; IX.l, p. 378.14-16.59 Since God does not benefit from the existence of the universe and cannot be

seeking after a purpose in creating, divine volition is identified with making creatures exist. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 378.15 and p. 379.2-3.

60 Avicenna, MetapfFysics IX. 1, p. 378.15-16 - p. 379.1-2.61 Avicenna, MetapfFysics IX.l, p. 378.8-9.

192 ClL<\PTER FOUR THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 193

cause. He argues that no matter whether the efficient cause is acause acting on account of its nature or on account of its will, ifthe cause does not cause the effect simply when it itself exists, thenthe cause is a potential efficient cause. As long as the cause doesnot actually cause the effect, it is a potential cause of the effect.Additionally, if the cause does not cause the existence of the effectwhen it itself exists, then the cause must become an actual efficientcause by something occurring to it, such as a new nature, or a newvolition, or something else. Hence, according to such a conception,the efficient cause, in the same manner as the effect, begins to actby becoming an actual efficient cause after being a potential efficientcause.56 Moreover, in this conception, the efficient cause acts onaccount the thing that occurs to it.57

In light of the foregoing, let us come back to question (1), i.e.,why cannot a voluntary cause be such that it wills not to act at first,and later on it wills to act? This may be applicable to voluntarycauses in general, but it cannot be accepted with regard to God.For Avicenna, God cannot will not to act at first and will to actlater on. Otherwise God would be, at first, the potential efficientcause of the universe, then the actual efficient cause. This wouldrequire that God be changeable. Furthermore, it would require thatGod have his perfections in a manner similar to creatures. That is,God's perfections would not be identical to his being, but rather therelation between his being and his properties would be similar tothe relation between a created subject and its accidents. Moreover,God would then be acting for the sake of something else, that is,for the sake of the thing that occasions him to act.

As for question (2), i.e., why cannot God be the cause of the preceding non-existence and then the existence of the effect by one actof will? Avicenna does not seem to consider this form of the question specifically. This may be due to the fact that he was not awareof the question in this form, or that he did not consider it to besubstantially different from the previous form of the question. It is,in fact, the argument Aquinas comes up with, as will be discussedin the following section. However, Avicenna's argument that 'thequiddity of some things require that they must not be after temporal non-existence' turns out to be a kind of reply to this. Avicenna

56 Avicenna, Metapl!Jsics VU, p. 263.3-11.57 Avicenna, Metapl!Jsics VI. I , p. 263.12-14.

maintains that there cannot be such a temporal, or any kind of, gapbetween God's willing something to be and its existence, becausethe divine knowledge of things is identical to the divine willing, thelatter being identical to making them exist.58 If the divine will concerns the making of creatures, then he must have made them existby willing them. Otherwise, one can ask questions about the timingof creation.

Avicenna argues that if God's volition concerning the universe isidentical with making it, i.e., God does not have a purpose whichhe would reach by creating the universe or a benefit God expectsby creating,59 then the following questions can be asked: (1) why didGod not create the universe before he did? (2) did God think themoment when he created the universe was more suitable? (3) didthe time when the universe could exist begin when God created it?(4) and finally, was God unable to create the universe before? Thesequestions may sound absurd. However, Avicenna argues that theyare all valid questions and applicable to all times, if the universe isassumed to be after its preceding temporal non-existence.6o

The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads to Impossible ConclusionsAvicenna questions the applicability of time to the whole universeand attempts to deduce absurdities from the assumption that theuniverse began to exist after not having existed on the basis of thenature of time. One of his arguments is based on the non-existenceof time without the existence of movable things (3.1). He argues, byassuming that time is the measure of movement, and exists as supervening on movement and movable things, if no movable thing exists,there cannot be two distinct instants of time, by which the temporal posteriority of the existence of the universe may be traced. 61

Another argument of Avicenna concerns the priority of God tohis effects (3.2.1). He asks the question 'by what is God prior to hisaction (rif'alahu) that comes to exist after not having existed (~aditha)?'

Avicenna's use of the word 'action' needs to be interpreted. For himGod is eternal and God's action is identical to himself in the strict

58 Avicenna, Metapl!Jsics VIII.7, p. 366.14-15; IX.I, p. 378.14-16.59 Since God does not benefit from the existence of the universe and cannot be

seeking after a purpose in creating, divine volition is identified with making creatures exist. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 378.15 and p. 379.2-3.

60 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 378.15-16 - p. 379.1-2.61 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 378.8-9.

62 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 379.4-8.63 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 379.7-12.64 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 379.14-19.

sense. He seems to be speaking here not of the divine action in thestrict sense, but the effects of the divine action. Is God prior to theuniverse by his being (dhiitihi) or by time? Since all the effects owetheir being to him (kii'ina 'anhu) and God is eternal, he is prior tothe universe with regard to being, not with regard to time.62

One may also consider why God should not be prior to the universe with regard to time in addition to his priority with regard tobeing (3.2.2). If God is assumed to be prior to the universe by bothessence and time, then the situation can be described as following:(1) There is a time when God exists, and the universe does not exist.(2) Now God exists and the universe exists. Statement (1) indicatesa past time when God existed but the universe did not. When (2)is true, (1) is no longer true. This implies that there was a time withfinite duration before the existence of the universe. In turn thisimplies that there was an existence (kawn) before creatures were created (khuliqa), since time does not exist on its own. This existencemust have finite duration, since at the beginning of the existence ofthe universe this time-period, during which 'God was' and 'the universe was not,' ended. Since such an assumption would require thatsome creature exists before creation, God cannot be prior to theuniverse by time.63

By the co-existence rule between cause and effect, if time begins,the cause of the time, i.e., God, must have begun to exist, or havebecome an efficient cause, at that instant (3.2.3). Of course, one mayreject the co-existence rule. However, Avicenna argues that if God'spriority to the universe with respect to time is such that 'he was,and there were no creatures,' this implies more than that time hada beginning. The statement that 'he was and creatures were not'does not mean that 'simply God existed,' or 'God existed alone.'Rather, Avicenna argues that when the universe begins to exist,God's essence is realized (M~il).64 Since before the universe beginsto exist God does not create the universe, God's act of creation isnot realized. Since God's action is identical to his being, his beingis realized after creating the universe. Here Avicenna does not distinguish between the divine action and the effect of the divine action,and he maintains that God's willing to create is identical with the

65 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 380.1-8.66 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX. I, p. 380.9-10.


existence of what he has willed to create. Aquinas rejects such arequirement. For him since God is not really related to the universe, even though the divine will is eternal and God's act of creation is identical to God, the fact that the effect of the divine actionbegins to exist after not having existed does not contradict divineimmutability.

Assuming that God is temporally prior to the universe requiresthat God cannot be prior to the universe with regard to being(3.2.4.1). That is, if temporal priority applies to God, then God cannot be eternal. If by God's temporal priority to the universe onemeans that there was a time when God existed but the universe didnot exist, then three things are implied: (1) God's existence, (2) thenon-existence of the universe and (3) a time period before the universe began to exist. This priority of God to the universe in termsof time does not simply imply the beginning of time, but rather atime period in which God could have created. This would mean thatGod's priority can be measured and quantified by something impermanent, something subject to renewal, which time is. Hence, if Godis assumed to be prior to the universe by time, this implies that Godis not absolutely prior to the universe but only temporally prior.Since time is attributed to God, and since there are two differentsituations so that we say 'God was, and the universe was not' andnow 'God is and the universe is,' God's duration is assumed to bea temporal duration, which is not the duration of something permanent (thabiit).65 Avicenna states, "If you have realized (ta~aqqaqta)

[this], you have known that, according to their position, the first isprior to creatures not by absolute priority (sabqan mut/aqan) , but bytemporal priority, which includes (ma'ahu) movement and bodies(ajsiim) , or one body."66

Avicenna provides another argument to deduce absurdities basedon the assumption that God is temporally prior to the universe. IfGod is assumed to be temporally prior to the universe, this impliesthat God is not absolutely prior to creatures, but this indicates thatGod is prior only to this universe (3.2.4.2). Since time is the measure of movement, there must be something the movements of whichmake time exist before this universe. Since time is the measure of

CHAPTER FOUR194


the movement, there must be something movable during the nonexistence of the universe which, when its movement is measured,allows God's duration is quantified as well.

Let me remind essential points in Avicenna's arguments for thesempiternity of the universe. For him, God is the metaphysical efficientcause of the universe. What applies between a cause and its effectis also applicable between God and the universe. Avicenna advancesfour rules that hold between causes and effects. These are (1) causesnecessitate their effects; (2) causes co-exist with their effects; (3) causesare prior to their effects with regard to being, not with regard totime; and (4) causes are causes of the existence of their effects, nottheir preceding non-existence. These four rules apply between Godand the universe, granted that God's relation to the world has itsown specific aspects that must be taken into account.

For Avicenna, the universe must be sempiternal, because there aresempiternal beings. In addition to the four rules mentioned above,Avicenna maintains that the temporal posteriority concerns not thecause but the quiddity of things. Some of the things in the universemust begin to exist after temporal non-existence, and yet some others must not begin after temporal non-existence. Things that mustbegin to exist after temporal non-existence are material, changeablethings, i.e., things that are subject to generation and corruption. Thecondition of some of the things in the universe cannot be appliedto the whole universe. Thus although some things in the universebegin to exist temporally after not having existed, the universe as awhole cannot have begun to exist temporally after not having existed.

If one admits that the universe began to exist after not havingexisted, for Avicenna, this implies various unacceptable results. Itrequires that God's will is changeable, and that God is first a potential cause of the universe, then its actual cause. Furthermore, theassumption that the universe began to exist after not having existedis also self-defeating, because one cannot make such an assumption,unless one also assumes that there is a time period-hence somemovable thing-existing before the universe. Thus, on this assumption God is not temporally prior to all other things, i.e., the universe, but only this universe.

Aquinas' Position

Before tackling the question whether the universe has always existed,Aquinas' position concerning the nature of creation should be statedin its essential points. This will help us grasp to what extent his position accords to that of Avicenna, and to identify what the majordifferences between Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions are. It willalso provide a guide to assess whether Aquinas' refutation of arguments for the sempiternity of the universe are successful.

Aquinas' discussion of the sempiternity of the world makes up onlya small part of his writings on creation. He wrote on all issues essential to religious teachings, such as creation out of nothing, God's creating without intermediaries, God's ability to create many things,etc.57 I want to highlight four main points that characterize Aquinas'conception of creation: (1) Creation is existential dependence, (2) creation is not a change, (3) creation is a relation, (4) whether the universe is sempiternal, or it has begun to exist temporally after nothaving existed, cannot be demonstrated through rational arguments.Aquinas emphasizes that creation is neither motion, nor change fromone type of existence to another. It is simply a relation between Godand the universe. While it is not a real relation ]ram God to creatures, itis a real relation ]ram the universe to God. For Aquinas, that the universehas not always existed, i.e., is not sempiternal, cannot be proventhrough philosophical demonstration. This is because God createsby his will and all properties of the universe, including its duration,are determined by the divine will. Since God creates freely, not necessarily, the duration of the universe cannot be known through investigating the divine will.58

67 For more inclusive studies of Aquinas' theory of creation see Steven E. Baldner& William E. Carroll, "Introduction," in their translation of Aquinas on Creation:Writings on the "Sentences" qf Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Qyestion 1, pp. 22-62;Etienne Gilson, The Christian philosoplry qf St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1994), pp. 120-160.

68 Moses Maimonides is considered to be one of Aquinas' sources of influencein regard to his agnostic position. See David Burrell, "Aquinas and the Islamic andJewish Thinkers," in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmannand Elenore Stump (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993),pp. 70-74. For Maimonides' theory concerning creation, see Andrew L. Gluck,"Maimonides' Arguments for Creation Ex Nzhilo in the Guide if the Perplexed," MedievalPhilosophy and Theology 7 (1998), pp. 221-254; William Dunphy, "Maimonides' NotSo-Secret Position on Creation," in Moses Maimonides and his Time, ed. Eric L. Ormsby


VVhat Is Creation?

Creation primarily concerns the being of things, not their duration.Only God is the self-subsisting being, which does not owe its beingto anything else. No other thing is identical with its own existence,but exists by participating in existence. And all things existing byparticipation must be caused by God who is being in the fullestsense.59 All things including prime matter exist on account of creation. 70 In considering creation, one looks not at specific features ofalready existing things, or any particular thing which comes to existin the already existing universe; the whole universe is taken into consideration. Thus creation designates the emanation (emanatione) of allbeing (entis) from a universal cause, the causal power of which reignsover all things. This universal cause is God, and the coming forthof all things into existence (emanatione) is creation. 71

Creation is out of nothing. Since creation designates the fact thateverything comes to be-ing, then everything must be coming to be

(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), pp. 151-172; ArthurHyman, "Maimonides on Creation and Emanation," in Studies in Medieval Philosophy,ed. John F. Wippel (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987),pp. 45-61. Gluck and Dunphy interpret Maimonides' position to be similar to thatof Aquinas. They argue that Maimonides maintains that there is no demonstrationeither for or against "creation," e.i., beginning of the universe temporally after nothaving existed. Arthur Hyman states four propositions summarizing Maimonides'view: "(I) God brought the world into existence after absolute non-existence; (2)He brought everything into existence through His will and volition (though, as hasalready been noted, His wisdom was operative as well); (3) He brought everythinginto existence out of nothing; and (4) time is created, so that, whatever one's theory, creation must be considered as atemporal." (p. 49). I cannot further enter intoMaimonides' position. But as Hyman interprets it, Avicenna would endorse all ofthese propositions wholeheartedly. The fourth proposition might be most welcomedby him, because Avicenna's main point in his theory is that time is not applicableto the whole universe, let alone divine action. Hyman reminds us that Maimonidesconsiders the second proposition to be the major difference between his positionand that of Aristotle and emanationists. As I have tried to show in chapter 3, forAvicenna, who can be included among the emanationists, divine will and necessitydo not exclude each other. Hyman argues that through the sharp distinction madeby Maimonides between the temporal and the atemporal realms, "it makes no senseto ask: 'what did God do before He created the world?' or 'why did God createthe world at one time rather than another'." (p. 53). Avicenna raises such questions concerning time, because he thinks that the conception of creation as the existence of the universe after temporal non-existence rests on unwanted assumptionsregarding divine action. It implies that divine action is like human actions conditioned by the pre-existence of time and matter.

69 ST la. 44, I.70 ST la. 44, 2, c.71 ST la. 45, I; SeC Il, 15; De potentia Ill, 14, ad s. c. (= sed contra) 8.

from non-being. Consequently, there is no being presupposed in creation, no being from which the universe is made. Just as a manbecomes a man out of what is not-man, everything comes to be outof what is non-being, which is identical to nothing. Hence everything comes to exist by creation from nothing, i.e., out of nothing.72

Creation out of nothing (ex nihilo) denies the existence of anythingpreceding the existence of the universe. The preposition "ex" maybe considered to imply the existence of a material cause, out ofwhich things are created. However, when something is said to bemade from nothing (ex nihilo fieri), the preposition "ex" signifies asequence, not a material cause, e.g., noon comes from dawn. Thisexpression can be considered either to modify, or be modified bythe expression "nihil." According to the first view, the actual situation is connected to what precedes: the universe exists, and it is preceded by nothing. Following the second view, such a sequence isdenied, because there is nothing preceding the universe. Thus itmeans the universe is not made from something pre-existing. 73 Thepriority and posteriority here is an essential priority and posteriority, since what belongs to something on account of itself is essentially prior to what belongs to it on account of something else. Beforethey are created, things in themselves are nothing; they do not exist.They exist because God created them. 74

72 ST la. 45, I; De potentia Ill, I, c.; SeC Il, 16. In SeC, Aquinas provides various arguments why creation must be out of nothing, i.e., not something alreadyexisting. In some of them, he argues that otherwise creation would be the same asmovement, in some of them he argues that in contrast to causes of movement Godmust be the cause of being, and still in some others he argues that movement doesnot explain the existence of things.

73 ST la. 45, I, ad 3; De potentia Ill, I, ad 7. See also Steven E. Baldner &William E. Carroll (trans. & ed.), Aquinas on Creation Writings on the "Sentences" of PeterLombard 2.1.1, p. 67: "Because of these two points, creation is said to be "out ofnothing" [ex nihilo] in two ways. On the one hand, the negation [in the word "nothing"] denies the relation implied by the preposition "out of" [ex] to anything preexisting. Thus, the creature is said to be "out of nothing" because it is "not fromsomething pre-existing." And this is the first point. On the other hand, the orderof creation to a pre-existent nothing remains affirmed by nature, such that creationis said to be "out of nothing" because the created thing naturally has non-beingprior to being. If these two points are sufficient for the meaning of creation, creation can be demonstrated and in this way philosophers have held [the doctrineof] creation."

74 Aquinas, On the Eternity of the World, trans. Steven E. Baldner & William E.Carroll, in Aquinas on Creation Writings on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard 2.1.1, p. 119;De potentia Ill, 14 ad 7. Essential priority of nothingness in things is reminiscent ofAvicenna.

75 ST la. 45, 2; SeC 11, 17, [2], [4].76 ST la. 45, 2, ad I.77 ST la. 45, 2, obj. & ad I; SeC 11, 18, [2], [3].78 SeC 11, 17, [5]; ST la. 45, 3, ad 3.

Creation Is not a Change

That creation is not a change is immediately implied by the factthat creation is not out of pre-existing matter. In this respect, Aquinas'affir~ation that creation is not a change must be considered as partof hIS a.rgument that creation is not out of some pre-existing thing.If .creat~on were a change, it would imply that something alreadyeXIsted mdependent of God, something from which God created theuniverse. 75 The principle 'nothing comes from nothing' may be raised,on the authority of ancient philosophers, as contradicting the position that creation is out of nothing. This principle, however, appliesonly to the forthcoming of particular effects from particular causes.It does not apply to the whole being of all things existing on accountof God. 76

Another objection Aquinas discusses is based on the analysis ofthe terms of creation. If creation is to make something from nothing, by creation the thing created 'becomes' something. But 'becoming' is change, and change supposes that the subject precedes theend .of the action. Thus God does not create out of nothing. ForAqumas the mistake in this objection is to consider creation as a~nd of change. Creation is not change, even though it is conceivedm such a manner. Unlike various kinds of change, e.g., accidentalan~ substantial, in creation it is not some part of things but theirenure substance that is produced. The preceding non-existence andfollowing existence of things can be understood as a change fromnothing to .something by the human intellect, but this is only in ourunderstanding, and by extension in our expression. 77

Creation is an instantaneous act that does not take place in time.It is not a process, which takes time, such that the beginning andthe end of which could differ. If it were a process taking up time,then creation as the act by which creatures come about would beprior to the created thing. This would require the existence of somesubject prior to the created thing. However this is contrary to whatcreation is. 7s Unlike an action causing a change, in creation the twoends with regard to the created things are not in the same category.

In change the beginning point of the change and the end point fallin the same ontological order, in that both exist. In creation, however, there is nothing existing to begin with, simply something comesto exist. 79


79 SeC 11, 17, [3].80 ST la. 45, 3.81 •Some s~holars argu? th~t Aq~inas did not raise all the relevant questions con

cermr;tg relatlOn.s, and ~lS diSCUSSIOns are ambiguous. For example, see Mark G.Henmnger, Relatwns: Medzeval TheorteS 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) (HenceforthRelations), p. 13; Earl Muller, "Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas'sU~?erstanding of G?d's Relation to the World," Theological Studies .5.6/4 (1995).

Mark G. Hennmger, Relatwns, pp. 17-18 and 33-39. For a cntIcal assessmentof Aquinas' transformation of the notion of relation in his metaphysics of creationsee Jan ~ertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Wtry qf Thought (Leiden, Ne~York: Bnll, 1988), pp. 168-170, 274-275.

83 Aristode, Metaphysics V.15, 1029b 25-1021b 11.

Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe

Since creation is not a change, if one eliminates the idea of changein conceiving creation, what is left is the creator, the created thing,and the relations between them. Creation is a relation between theagent and the patient.so But the relationship between God and theworld is not reciprocal. Whereas the relation of God to the universeis not a real relation, but a conceptual one; the relation of the universe to God is a real relation.

In order to have a better grasp of Aquinas' conception of the relations between God and the universe, we need to highlight his conception of relation in general and identify the place of relationsbetween God and the universe within this context. Aquinas was oneof the pioneering theologians, in the Medieval Christian world, touse Aristode's theories in this regard.sl

Real Relations if GodAquinas follows the Aristotelian triple division of relations in general, though he modifies Aristode's theory in important ways.S2 InMetaphysics V,S3 Aristode divides relations into three kinds on the basisof their foundations: numerical, causal and psychological. In the firstdivision, Aristode includes not only "stricdy numerical relations,"such as 'greater than,' 'equal to,' but some other relations such as"specific identity, qualitative similarity, and qualitative equality," on

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the grounds that "all refer to unity."84 The second division includesrelations whose foundations are "the accidents of action and passionand active and passive potencies," for example the thing that heatsand the thing that is heated, the thing that cuts and the thing thatis cut. The third class consists of the relations between a measureand the measured thing, and example of which is the relationshipbetween the thing known (measure) and the knower (whose knowledge is measured by the thing known).85

Not all relations are real relations. Whether a relation is a realrelation or a conceptual one depends on the related things and thefoundation of the relation. For medieval theologians and philosophers, including Aquinas, in a relation there are three elements: thesulject, which has the relation to the term, on the basis of a fiundation.For example a and b have a relationship of similarity, because bothare white. The subject a bears the relation of similarity, R, to theterm b, on the basis of the foundation of being white, inhering in aas an accident. B bears the relation of similarity, R', to a, on thebasis of the foundation of being white, inhering in b as an accident. 86

For Aquinas, "a relation R of a to b is real only if a and b are reallydistinct extra-mental things, and there is a real extra-mental foundation in a for R." Aquinas also held that a relation R of a to b ora relation R' of b to a is a relation of reason only if either (i) a

and/or b is not real, or (ii) a and b are not really distinct, or (iii)there is no real foundation in a for R or in b for R'. 87

84 Mark G. Henninger, Relations, p. 6.85 Ibid., p. 7.86 Henninger, Relations, p. 5.87 Henninger, Relations, p. 7; ST la. 13, 7. See also ST la. 28, 1; Earl Muller,

"Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas's Understanding of God's Relationto the World," pp. 675-676. The condition for real relations, as Henninger formulates it, i.e., extra-mentality, is a bit problematic. His formulation works whenhe tries to explain Aquinas' position concerning the relations between God and theworld, but if one requires the same condition, i.e., the relata must be distinct extramental things, and there must be a real extra-mental foundation in the subject,then the relations among the divine persons turn out to be non-real. This is becausethe divine Persons are not three distinct beings. In ST la. 28, 1, when explainingwhy relations among the divine Persons are real, Aquinas argues that those relations are real because the divine Persons have an identical nature. This simplyrequires that in order to have real relations to each other, relata must be of thesame order of being. However, in addition to the requirement that both relata mustbe of the same order, the thing that is really related to the other must also in someway depend on the other. One may consistently apply these two conditions to the

The relations among divine Persons are real relations, althoughGod is not the subject in which accidents inhere. For Aquinas, thereare two kinds of relations that concern God: (I) relations among thedivine Persons, and (2) God's relation to the universe through creation. Whereas the relations among divine Persons are real, God'srelation to the universe is not a real relation. It is a conceptual relation, or a relation of reason. In explaining why the divine Personsare really related without God's being subject to accidents inheringin him, Aquinas distinguishes between relatives-terms that belongto the category of relation-and relations supervening on other categories of accidents, such as quantity and quality. Only relative termscan indicate conceptual not real relations, even though they are byno means limited to this. Relative terms do not indicate or requirethat something inhere in the subject. In contrast to relative terms,terms expressing relations supervening on other accidental categories(e.g., similarity based on quantity, quality) do require and indicatesomething inhering in the subject.

As far as the divine Persons are concerned the relative terms signify a real relation. Relatives, terms expressing pure relations, indicate only a reference to something else by their meaning, such asfather implying having a son. What a relative term often signifiesmay be simply in the mind (ipsa apprehensione rationis), but it may signify something real as well. If the thing a relative term signifies issimply in the mind without referring to something real, such a relation signified by this relative term is a conceptual, or logical, relation (relatio rationis tantum). Man is related to animal as a species toits genus. Since 'animal' as such does not have a real existence whenwe speak of man as a rational animal, man taken as a relative termsignifying a relation to animal as such does not indicate a real relation. Whereas animal, when we speak of a rational animal, does notexist as simply being animal, man exists in re. Hence they are notof the same order. However, the divine persons are of the sameorder and have the same nature, one being the principle of whatproceeds from it. Thus, concludes Aquinas, the relations arising fromthe divine processions must be real.88 As God cannot have accidents,in God all real relations are identical with the divine nature. The

relations among the divine Persons and to the relations between God and the universe. See ST la. 13, 7; De potentia VII, 8-10.

88 ST la. 28, 1.


divine nature and the relations in God are identical III reality butdiffer only in our understanding.89

How God Is Related to the WorldThe idea that the universe is really related to God but God is notreally related to the universe was an idea common among manymedieval philosophers.90 Aquinas conceives the relations between Godand the world as the third category in Aristotle's division. However,the third category in turn may be considered as a specific case withinthe second category, i.e., relations based on action and passion.Aquinas definitely places the relations between God and the universein the category of action and passion in a broader sense. He evencriticizes Maimonides for failing to see this.9

! In the third group ofrelations, in Aristotle's division of relations in Metaphysics, the relations between relata are not mutual. While one of the two relatedthings bears a real relation to the second, the second is not reallyrelated to the first. The relations between God and the universe areof this kind.

Aquinas brings in two arguments to explain why God is not reallyrelated to creatures. An agent and patient are mutually related (1)

89 ST la. 28, 2. For the reality of relations among the divine Persons withoutimplying there be three distinct natures or three gods, see also Brian Davies, 7he7hought if 7homas Aquinas, pp. 198-202.

90 Henninger, Relations, p. 31. In modern times this proposition has been criticized, especially on the ground that it is a consequence of the commitment to thedivine immutability. Henninger, op. cit., p. 32. Henninger discards the view thatAquinas' rejection of real relations from God to creatures stem from his view thatGod is immutable. Since the universe cannot come to exist unless God creates it,no change in the status of the universe with regard to existence occurs by itself.Even if Aquinas does not explicitly use the immutability of God in denying thatGod is really related to the universe, it is in the background. Since according tofaith, the universe was created temporally after not being created, if God were reallyrelated to the world, then upon creation God would have acquired a new relation.This contradicts the belief in divine immutability. Henninger argues that for Aquinassomething can be really related to something else without any change in the subject. If God were not the creator of the universe, then this would hold. For example, John grows old, and Adam becomes equal to John in size. Even though Adamdid not change, he bears the real relation of being equal to Adam. However, ifGod did not create, the world would not exist. Hence the change implied by thebeginning of the world's existence would not be a mere Cambridge change. If Godwere to have real relation to the world, and if God created the world after nothaving created it, then it would imply a change in God. Henninger, Relations, pp.21-22; 32-33.

91 De potentia VII, 10. See also Earl Muller, "Real Relations and the Divine: Issuesin Thomas's Understanding of God's Relation to the World," pp. 676-678.

if there is mutual dependence between the relata, and/or (2) if theyare of the same order of being. One of Aquinas' arguments is thatthe agent and the patient must be ordered to each other so thatthey are mutually related to each other. In the relations based onaction and passion, while in some cases both the agent and thepatient mutually depend on each other, in some cases the patientdepends on the agent, but the agent does not depend on the patient.By the action of the agent, the patient may be perfected as well asthe agent itself. Or the patient might move the agent. This may befound especially, as Aquinas puts it, in univocal agents. That is,mutual dependence is characteristic of cases where the agent andpatient are of the same order of being. For example by producingsomething in its own species, the agent preserves the perpetuity ofits species. For the cases in which one of the relata is not reallyrelated to the other, Aquinas gives the example of knowledge. Whilethe knower, by the act of knowledge is related to the object of knowledge, the thing known is not related to the knower. This is becausethe act of knowing is an intellectual act and in no way touches thething known. The act of knowing is not something intervening andcommon between the two relata. While the knower is related to thingknown through the act of knowing, in the thing known there is nothing corresponding to the act of knowing. Hence the thing known isnot related to the knower, because there is no foundation in it toprovide a relation to the knower.92

Since none of the aforementioned conditions are true for God,God is not really related to the universe. God does not depend onthe universe in any way. God does not acquire anything by creating; his actions are supremely liberal. God acts without moving, without being changed. Furthermore God and the universe are not ofthe same order of being. The universe does not exist on account ofGod's nature, but on account of his will and knowledge. Consequently,the universe is not another God but a creature. These two premisesjustify the position that God is not really related to the universe,although the universe is really related to God. God does not actthrough an action "proceeding from God and terminating in thecreature, but his action is his substance and whatever is in him is

92 De potentia VII, 10.


wholly outside the genus of created existence by which the creatureis related to God. "93

Aquinas raises an objection highlighting the difficulty of using themodel of knower and the thing known to reflect the relations betweenGod and the universe. On this model the knower is related to thething known but the thing known is not really related to that bywhich it is known. God is the knower with respect to the creatures,and things are the objects which are known with respect to God.Consequently God must be related to the universe. In answering thisobjection, Aquinas notes the dissimilarity between divine knowledgeand human knowledge of things. While divine knowledge is the measure of things, human knowledge is measured by them. Hence asthe measured thing is related to the measure but not vice versa, ,things are really related to God, but God is not really related tothem. Since God knows other things by knowing himself, the relation of the divine knowledge is not directly to things but to thed· . 94 Alvme essence. t most one can say that there is a real relationbetween God himself and his knowledge of things. But one may notposit a real relation from God to things as they exist outside God'sknowledge.95 Yet even this cannot be said in the case of God, becausein God knowing and what is known are identical.96 Henninger correctly notes that for Aquinas non-mutual relations between the knower

• 93 De potentia V~I, l~, c., ad 6;. S! la. 13, 7; ST la. 28, I, ad 3. Henninger consld:rs these premIses, l.e., God IS mdependent of the universe, and God and theumve:se are not of.the same order of being, to be parts of separate arguments toestabhsh t~a.t God IS not really r:lated to the universe. He argues that the argument .that smce God and the umverse do not belong to the same order of being,God IS not really rel~ted to the universe' is more radical and fully developed thanthe other.. See ~em~mger, Relations, p. 33, footnote: 55. However, this argument, iftaken by Itself, Imphes that the universe can be 'not really related to God' as well.That 'while from the side of God there is nothing extra-mental, but creatures existsIn re' does not constitute a justifYing ground for the non-mutual relations eithersince being mental by itself does not justify that the relations between two thing~be non-mutual. Otherwise relations in the Trinity would not be real. See, ST la.28, I, ad 4. Moreover God's knowledge of things and human knowledge cannotbe comp~red in this respect. ~hile in the human case the knower is really relatedto the thmg he knows, God IS not really related to things existing on account ofthe divine knowledge and will. Hence these two premises must be taken together.

94 De f!otentia VII, 10, 5 and ad 5. W~at Aquinas argues amounts to saying thatthe relatlOns betw~en God and the umverse are not reciprocal. See Sara Grant,Towards an Alternatwe Theology (Bangalore, India: Asian Trading Corporation, 1991),pp. 35-52.

95 ST la. 28, I, ad 4.96 ST la. 28, 4, ad l.

and the object known in the usual sense do not hold between Godand the universe.97 If this were to be applied to God and the universe-God being the knower and the universe being the objectknown-then God would be, at first sight, really related to the universe, while the universe would not be really related to God.

Dependence of the universe on God for its existence and thedifference between God and the universe in the ontological hierarchy make up ground that justifies the real relation of the universeto God. While creatures are really related to God, the Creator isonly conceptually related to creatures. As stated above, Aquinas usestwo premises in arguing that God is not really related to the universe: (1) God does not depend on the universe, and (2) the universe and God are not of the same order of being. The universetotally depends on God in its existence. The universe is not of thesame order of being as God. These two insure that the universe isreally related to God. 98

97 Henninger, Relations, p. 33.9B ST la. 13, 7; De potentia VII, 9, c. In De potentia VII, 9, Aquinas uses an argu

ment based on the order among things. The universe is ordered to God as its principle. But God is not ordered to the universe. Hence the order among thingsparallels the dependence and independence between them. See also, De potentia VII,10. Of course, that God is not really related to the universe while the universe isreally related to God follows from his premises. However, the first premise reduces'relation' to 'dependence.' This may not be easily acceptable. P. T. Geach in LogicMatters (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980) criticizes itsharply: "We must take it as a way of saying that some relational propositions latchon to reality in a way that others do not. This difference would have to holdbetween true relational propositions, and even between pairs of logically equivalenttrue propositions; for clearly "God providentially governs the world" is logicallyequivalent to "The world is providentially governed by God", but by the Thomistictheory only the second of these propositions predicates a 'real' relation, though bothare true." Geach blames interpreters of Aquinas rather than Aquinas himself(p. 318). "If a relational proposition indeed made no predications about A or B,but only affirmed a relation 'between' them, then it would be quite unintelligiblehow, if true, the proposition could correspond to a reality in A rather than to areality in B; and of the two converse relations, alike holding 'between' A and B,one could not very well be more 'real' than the other" (p. 319). Harm Goris, inhis Free Creatures qf an Eternal God: 77wmas Aquinas on God's Foreknowledge and IrresistibleWill (pp. 24-28), responds to this objection of Geach. He argues that Aquinasintends "to consider the semantics of words that signify relations," not to make adistinction "between relations as real entities." (p. 24). Moreover, "The distinctionserves to indicate how a specific group of divine names, viz. terms that signify arelation, fall short in signifYing the divine essence." (p. 25). His explanation is notquite convincing, because as he immediately states, all our talk about God, all nameswe predicate of him, fail to express the divine essence perfectly.


That God is not really related to the universe does not preventthe predication of relative terms of God and creatures. As God isthe origin and the principle of all things, God bears to the universea relation of being the origin as well as the relation of being differentfrom the universe. In fact, an infinite number of relations existbetween God and the universe. 99 Consequently, relatives, such asLord-servant, Creator-creature and cause-effect, apply to God andthe universe without requiring that God and the universe be equal. IOO

By positing one of the relatives in things such as creature and servant, one posits the counterparts of those relatives, such as Creatorand Lord, in God. This does not require, however, that the subjectsof the relations be equal. The relationship between Creator and creature is not similar to the relationship between any cause and itseffect, e.g., father and son, since God is not a univocal cause withregard to the existence of the universe. That is, the effect, which iscreation, is not another god. 101 Consequently, even though creatorand creature are relative terms--if one affirms one, the other isaffirmed by it-still this does not require that both must be affirmedin the same way. 102

Anything that is said of God on the basis of the existence of creatures outside the divine knowledge is said ex tempore, not eternally.Some of the divine actions are internal actions, such as knowing andwilling, and do not require the existence of anything outside of God.These names are said of God eternally. Yet some other divine namesare such that there must be something corresponding to them outside God, for example creating and forgiving. 103 They refer to divineactions in relation to creatures. God's names that require the existence of creatures are not said of God eternally. They are said ofGod not because God is really related to things, but because thingsare really related to God. Following the creaturely conditions, wecan predicate of God terms implying temporal sequence, change,etc. Thus the terms predicated of God on the basis of the existenceof creatures are said of God from time, in accordance with crea-

99 De potentia VII, 8.1110 De potentia VII, 8, ad I and ad 2.1111 De potentia VU, 10, 3 and ad 3.1112 De potentia VII, 10, 12.1113 For Aquinas' distinction between God's aetions that require an object outside

the divine knowledge and those that do not, see SeG 1, 79 [9]; SeG I1, 13 & 14;Harm Goris, Free Creatures DJ an Etemal God, p. 23.

turely conditions, not from eternity.104 Aquinas' distinction betweenthe divine names that are said of God from time (ex tempore) andthose that are said from eternity conforms to his distinction betweenreal relations and relations of reason. The relations implied by thedivine names that are said of God from time are relations of reason. 10"

Aquinas interprets creation in accordance with the non-reciprocalcharacter of the relations between God and creatures. He arguesthat creation does not place anything real in God, while it denotessomething real in creatures. Creation may be taken in the activesense denoting the action of the agent, i.e., to create, and it maybe taken in the passive sense denoting the action of the patient, i.e.,to be created. Following the active sense of creation, if God werereally related to creatures, this would rule out creation as temporalin the passive sense. This is so because if God is really related tothe universe and if the universe has a temporal beginning, then something temporal would be in God, i.e., a new relation. One mayo~ject that if on this ground such a relation is not real in God, thenneither should it be real in creatures. 106 In his reply to this objection, Aquinas states that creation in the active sense is God's action,"which is his essence with a relationship to a creature." vVhile God'srelation to the world is merely conceptual, the relation of creaturesto God is real. 10] Their relation to God is real, because creatures

. h . h Id . IOSreally depend on theIr creator-Hot erwIse t ey wou not eXIst.Another o~jection to the reality of creation is that if creation is real,it can be considered as a reality mediating between God and creatures. But since creation is not eternal, it cannot be in God. It isnot in the creature either. Otherwise another creation would berequired for creation, ad infinitum. Hence creation is not somethingreal. I09 In reply to this objection, Aquinas reminds us that creationshould not be understood as a change. In the passive sense, creation

Ill' ST la. 13, 7.IlIj For a lueid articulation of the conformity of the real and non-real relations

of God to the distinction between the divine names said of God from time andfrom eternity, see D. J. \Vennemann "Saint Thomas' Doctrine of Extrinsic Denomination as Mecliate Correspondence in Naming God I,x Tempore," 'The il.fodern SchoolmanLXV (.January, 1988), pp. 119 129.

IlIb ST la. 45, 3, obj. 1.1117 S'F la. 45, 3, ad 1.tOH SC'G 11, 18, [41.1()lJ ST la. 45, 3, obj. 2.

110 ST la. 45, 3, ad 2; SeC II, 18, [4J; De potentia VII, 9, ad 2; De potentia rn, 3,ad 2. For a discussion of Aquinas' theory that creation in the passive sense andthe cr:atures are co-created, and how the relation of creation might be prior, orpostenor, to the creature, see F. D. Wilhelmsen, "Creation as a Relation in SaintThomas Aquinas", 77ze Modem Sehoolman 56 (1979), pp. 107-33.

III De potentia VII, 8, ad 5.'" ST la. 46, I.

The Sempitemiry qf the Universe Is Possible but not Necessary

Aquinas takes an agnostic position concerning the beginning of theuniverse. Such a position amounts to saying that neither the proposition that the world began temporally after not having existed, northe proposition that the world has always existed can be demonstrated through philosophical argumentation. Taking eternity in abroader sense, Aquinas states that nothing besides God is eternal(aetemum) , and that arguing this does not contradict reason (impossibile). That is, the arguments for the sempiternity of the universe donot yield a necessary conclusion. Hence arguing that the universehas not always existed is reasonable. 112 His argument that rejectingthe sempiternity of the universe is reasonable may also be applicable to his rejection of the position that the temporal beginning ofthe universe can be demonstrated by rational arguments. That is,arguments aiming to establish that the universe began to exist tem-

is in the creature and, in this sense, is co-created with creature.There is nothing additional to the created thing as a relation. Justas accidents and the forms of things do not exist by themselves, butwith a substance, creation in the passive sense is not something existing by itself. Since things have relations with reference to anotherthing, a relation is by itself referential. A relation does not needanother relation in order for two things to be related. Hence no further creation is needed for creation. 110

Aquinas' argument that God is not really related to the universeas it exists in re is important for his position concerning the beginning of the universe. As will be shown in the next section, Aquinasdistinguishes between the divine actions, such as knowledge and will,and the effect of the divine action. The universe, as it exists in re,is the effect of the divine act of knowing and willing. By arguingthat God is not really related to the world, Aquinas provides groundsfor keeping the divine immutability intact. III


113 ST la. 46, 2.114 De potentia Ill, 14. John Wippel traces the increasing sharpness of Aquinas'

position concerning the possibility of the universe to have always existed. Wippelargues that until Aquinas wrote the De potentia Ill, 14, he defended only the position that no one successfully demonstrated that the world began to be. But in Depotentia Ill, 14 he comes very close to asserting "an eternally created effect" is possible. And in the De aetemitate mundi, Aquinas is quite satisfied with asserting thepossibility of the sempiternity of the world. See John F. Wippel, A1etaphysieal 77zemesin 7homas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1984),pp. 191-214.

11\ SeC II, 31 [2].lib ST la. 46, I; SeC II, 31, esp. [3] and [5].

porally after not having existed do not yield a necessary conclusion. 113

Aquinas argues that something can be possible in three senses: (l)with regard to the power of the agent; or (2) with regard to its terms,i.e., the universe and being sempiternal; or (3) with regard to a substratum. It is possible for the universe to have always existed in thesense that God could have it so. It is also possible for the universeto have existed sempiternally in the sense that the terms 'world' and'being sempiternal' do not contradict each other, as does the ideaof a square triangle. However, the world is not possible to be sempiternal in the sense that there is a passive potency, a substratumby which the universe could have always existed. The possibility ofthe sempiternity of the universe contradicts the truth of the Catholicfaith only in this third sense. 114

For Aquinas, it is possible that the universe has always existed.But it is not necessary that the universe has always existed. Aquinasdeduces from the position that the world is not absolutely necessarythat the world does not have to be sempiternal. If the existence ofthe universe is necessary, then it is necessary either by itself, or bysomething else. If the universe were necessary by itself, then it wouldnot need an efficient cause giving it existence. 115 Since the universeis not necessary by itself, it needs an extrinsic cause so that it couldexist. Properly speaking, it is the divine will which is the cause ofthings and from which the necessity of things is derived. Since inthe absolute sense God wills necessarily only himself, he does nothave to will the existence of the universe, and he does not have towill an everlasting (semper) universe. The world exists so long as Godwills it to exist. Thus one does not have to accept that the worldhas always existed. 116

CHAPTER FOUR210

117 ST la. 46, 2.118 De potentia Ill, 17.

From the side of the agent, we cannot reach a necessary conclusion concerning the duration of the universe. The existence of theuniverse, considered as a whole, depends absolutely on the divinewill, and we cannot assign any necessity in any way. Since God doesnot necessarily will the universe, and we cannot inquire into matters which God freely wills, we cannot reach a demonstrative conclusion regarding the duration of the universe on the basis of thedivine will. ll7

Such an argument cannot be provided on the basis of the universe, either. Aquinas distinguishes between the case of particularthings within the universe and the universe as a whole. We canexplain why a particular thing is such and such, or that it came toexist through something else (relating it to its causes), or by takingthe order of the universe into account. However, if we want toexplain the properties of the universe, such as its beginning after nothaving existed, we cannot refer to any creature as being the reasonwhy the universe is such and such. Moreover, neither the divinepower nor the divine goodness can be the reason for a particulardisposition of the universe. The sole reason for the existence of theuniverse and the properties it has, e.g., the particular size of theheavens, is the divine will. The universe exists with its structure andproperties because God willed it to be so. Just as the distance betweenstars-even if this can be attributed to their nature-does not limitthe divine will, neither does the question of the time of the universe.This is even truer, because, for example in the heavens there is nopossibility for a different quantity, or a different accident. Since timeand place are not intrinsic to things, their nature as it is given doesnot require a definite time or place. Thus determining the durationof the universe depends absolutely on the divine will. Consequently,rational arguments based on the properties of the universe do notyield a necessary conclusion as to whether the universe is sempiternal, or has a temporal beginning. 118

Let me summarize my discussion of Aquinas' conception of creation and his position regarding the sempiternity of the universe.Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that creation in the philosophical senseis an existential dependence of the effect on its cause. Coming to

Countering Avicenna's Arguments fir the Sempiternity qf the Universe


Countering the First Argument

Aquinas raises objections from the conception of possibility and theexistence of ungenerable things. These are related to Avicenna's firstargument for the impossibility of a temporal beginning of the universe. As already stated, he argues that God is the cause of everything. Some of the possible things must begin to exist temporallyafter not having existed, yet some others must not have a temporal

exist anew, or beginning to exist temporally after not having existed,is not included in the conception of creation, which can be arguedon philosophical grounds. Creation is a non-reciprocal relation ofdependence the universe bears to God. While God is not reallyrelated to the universe, the universe is really related to God. Consequently, the names attributed to God on the basis of the existenceof creatures are said of God from time, not from eternity. SinceGod is not really related to the universe as it exists in re, the emergence of creatures does not imply any change in God.

On philosophical grounds, it is possible that the universe has alwaysexisted. However, there can be no philosophical argument to demonstrate that the universe has always existed. This is, because no demonstrative argument can be provided either on the basis of the agent,or on the basis of the universe. On the one hand, the divine freewill is the cause of the universe, and we cannot inquire into thedivine will with respect to things God freely wills. On the otherhand, we cannot explain the dispositions of the universe as a whole,including its duration, on the basis of a cause within the Ulllverse,as we do with regard to particular things in the universe.

Since I am comparing Aquinas' position to that of Avicenna withregard to the temporal beginning of the universe, I will not attemptto cover all that Aquinas discusses in this regard. Aquinas brings inalmost all of Avicenna's arguments for the sempiternity of the universe as objections in questioning whether the world has always (semper) existed. However, they may not conform to Avicenna's argumentsexactly, since Avicenna is not the only person whose argumentsAquinas wants to refute.

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119 De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 10; ST la. 46, obj. I. Sce also, De potentia Ill, 17,obj. 11.

120 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 10; Ill, I, ad 2; ST la. 46, ad I. For a similar argu-

beginning. Those that begin to exist after a preceding temporal nonexistence need a substratum in which their possibility resides beforethey begin to exist. And those that do not need an immediate, orpreparative, cause cannot begin to exist after temporal non-existence.

Highlighting the issue in question based on the possibility of theuniverse, Aquinas raises the following objection: if the world has notalways existed, and since it is not impossible to exist, then the worldmust have been possible before it began to exist. Its possibility meansit had the potency to exist. Its potency requires a substratum, whichis matter. Since matter cannot be found without form, the assumption requires that there existed a body before the universe. I 19 Aquinas'objection pardy captures Avicenna's point. Avicenna would add thatgiven such a conception, the whole universe would be treated likea generable thing. Given the existence of God, the efficient cause ofthe universe, if something does not exist by simply being possible,two alternatives result: (l) either the possibility of the universe mustbe in matter, or (2) God is the potential efficient cause of the universe at first. I will have the opportunity to discuss this second pointlater. The first alternative is the issue of concern here. The possibility of the universe must be in matter, because only things thatneed an immediate cause besides the essential cause may come toexist temporally after not having existed. If the world began to existtemporally after not having existed, such an assumption would positthe existence of a substratum before the universe. Thus, God wouldnot be the creator of all things. It would also require that the wholeuniverse is subject to generation and corruption.

Aquinas argues that the possibility of the world before it beganto exist does not require a substratum. The possibility of the universe does not have to be traced to a passive potency. But this possibility is traced to an active potency, residing in the power of theagent. Or one may even dispense with the reference to the powerof the agent, and consider the possibility of the world in the senseof 'not impossible.' In this respect, that the subject and the predicate of the statement, 'the world exists,' do not contradict each otheris sufficient to justifY the possibility of the universe before its existence. 120 However, from Avicenna's perspective both of Aquinas'

ment see, Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence if the Philosophers, ed., trans. & annot. MichaelMarmura (Utah: Brigham Young University, 1997), p. 42. The argument placingthe possibility of things in the agent may be traced to Philoponus. See Herbert A.Davidson, 'John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs ofCreation," Journal if the American Oriental Sociery 89/2 (1969), p. 360.

12l De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 4.122 ST la. 46, obj. 9.123 ST la. 46, obj. 3. See also, De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 2.


explanations for the possibility of the universe before it began toexist are not acceptable. Given the cause of the universe, if the universe depended only on God, not requiring a substratum and temporal order, it must have existed immediately. Given the cause, ifthe universe still remains non-existent, then it would mean that Godis not the cause of the universe. Thus, the universe is impossible,not in itself, but because of the non-existence of its cause. Aquinas'argument that a voluntary agent can determine the time when itbegins to exist is the way out from this dilemma.

Avicenna's argument for the thesis that some things must not beafter temporal non-existence can be found in a slighdy different manner dispersed throughout the objections that Aquinas discusses. InDe potentia, referring to Avicenna, Aquinas states that effects are necessary given the existence of their cause. If, given the cause, theeffect still remains possible, then some other cause would be needed.Since God is the sufficient cause of the universe, and God has always(semper) existed, concludes the objection, the universe has alwaysexisted. 121 Aquinas brings in a similar objection in ST. But in ST,the argument concludes that since God is eternal (ab aetemo), the universe is eternal (ab aetemo).122 Since both Aquinas and Avicenna agreethat the universe is not eternal in the strict sense, I take the eternity attributed to the universe in this argument in the sense of sempiternity. In ST, Aquinas raises the objection based on the natureof ungenerable things. Ungenerable things do not begin (incoepit) toexist. Matter and heavens are ungenerable. Hence, the universe didnot begin (incoepit) to exist. 123 This basically echoes Avicenna's contention that time is not applicable to all things in the universe. Henceif we take 'incoepit' in Aquinas' text in the sense of temporal beginning, it comes down to saying that ungenerable things cannot havea temporal beginning.

In replying to this objection, Aquinas acknowledges that everyeffect is necessary (necessariam habitudinem) on account of its natural

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Countering the Second Argument

As discussed in the preceding section, Avicenna's second argumentis based on the immutability of God. Based on his conception ofthe relation between causes and effects-that is, causes and effectsco-exist and the cause is the cause of the existence of the effect notits.previous non-existence-Avicenna argues that the universe al~ayseXIsted. The universe exists now, but if, at first, God existed and the

or voluntary cause. God does not cause the universe by necessity ofhis nature, but by his will. Consequently, it is not necessary thatungenerable things exist whenever the divine nature (natura) existed.However, the effects of God follow in accordance with the divinewill, in the manner God willed them to exist. 124 Aquinas maintainsthat in arguing that matter and the heavens do not begin to exist,Aristotle's point was that they are not generated. 125 But it does notcontradict the theory that everything is produced in existence throughcreation. 126

Aquinas' answer to the question does not seem to adequatelyaddress the crux of the debate. Two main points need to be highlighted: (1) God is the voluntary agent of the universe, and (2) everything began to be through creation. As for the first point, that theuniverse is the effect of God, a voluntary agent explains well enoughthat the universe depends on the divine will. The divine will determines how and when the universe exists. The implication of thisview will be discussed further below. As for the second point, evenif one grants that Aristotle may not be of help as an authority, onthis issue, the debate is not resolved. Avicenna acknowledges, just asAquinas does, that everything is created by God and depends onGod with regard to its existence. But Avicenna rejects that ungenerable things can be assigned a temporal beginning. If time is applicable only to generable things, then temporal beginning cannot beassigned to ungenerable things. Thus, the issue of debate is notwhether everything owes its being to God, but is rather whethereverything can have a temporal beginning.

universe did not exist, a change in God would be required. Godmust have willed first the previous non-existence and then the existence of the universe. Furthermore, with the beginning of the universe, a new relation would occur to God. More importantly, atemporal beginning of the universe implies a time before the existence of the universe, which raises further questions, such as whyGod did not create before.

Some of objections on the basis of the divine immutability, whichare discussed by Aquinas, concern various divine perfection properties. Since an immutable agent always produces the same effect unlessit is prevented, and since God cannot be impeded, God seems tohave always (semper) created the universe from eternity (ab aeterno).127This objection concerns divine power in combination with the divineimmutability. With reference to Augustine (Confissions VII, 4) Aquinasraises an objection based on the identity of the divine power, will,and action. God must have willed to create the universe from eternity, otherwise he would change. If he willed the universe from eternity, since there is no impotence in God, then the universe appearsto have existed from eternity (ab aeterno).128 If God did not create atfirst and then created, he would be moving from potency to actuality. Since God is immutable, he seems to have created from eternity.129 Furthermore if God willed to create from eternity, there isno reason why God should delay the creation of the universe. 13o

Some other objections based on the divine immutability concernthe emergence of the universe existing in re, taking into account therelative names expressing relation between God and creatures. IfGod is said to be Lord from eternity (ab aeterno), then creatures musthave existed from eternity. Since being Lord implies having subjects,and since God is eternally Lord, then creatures must have existedfrom eternity. 131 Another objection in the same vein considers God'sbeing the cause of the universe. This, in fact, better reflects theAvicennan spirit, emphasizing the relationship of cause and effectbetween God and the universe. If God were not eternally the causeof the universe, then at first he must have been its potential cause

217THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSECHAPTER FOUR216

124 De potentia, Ill, 17, ad 4.125 FA' I'd' . f h .or nstot e S lSCUSSlOn 0 t e generatIOn of matter and heavens sec, Physics

I, 4. 192a28 and De caelo I, 3. 270a13-22 respectively.126 ST la. 46, ad 3.

m De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 6. See also ST la. 46, I, obi. 10.L'H De potentia Ill, 17, obi. 9."" De potentia IIl, 17, obi. 12.1\(1 De potentia IIl, 17, ohj. 22.III De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 21.


and then its actual cause. Since nothing is a cause unless it has aneffect, the world seems to be created by God from eternity (abaetemo).132 Moreover, since God creates through his knowledge, andknowledge is related to the thing known, and since relatives aresimultaneous, it appears that God created from eternity.133

Given that God is the voluntary agent of the universe, if the universe begins to exist after not having existed, this implies a changeat least with regard to time, as well as a supposition of a time periodbefore the universe. For example, "he who plans to build a housetomorrow and not today, anticipates something tomorrow that isnon-existent today, and at least he expects that today will pass andtomorrow will come. Since time is the measure of change, this requiresa change before the universe begins to exist."134 Despite the eternityof the divine will to create the universe, if he did not create frometernity, then something must have pushed God to create the worldwhen he created it. But since there cannot be anything before creation, it appears that the world was made from eternity.135 Thisobjection concerns Avicenna's argument that if the universe beganto exist after not having existed, then one can ask questions, suchas why God did not create before, whether he could not create itbefore, or whether something arose that pushed God to create.Avicenna also asks how an instant of time can be distinguished fromanother in the non-existence of temporal things.

In responding to the objections concerning the immutability thedivine perfections, Aquinas distinguishes between the divine perfections referring to the divine actions and the effects of the divineactions. Aquinas underlines the fact that God is the voluntary agentof the universe, as he reminded us when dealing with part of thefirst argument. A voluntary agent, through its will, determines notonly the form of the effect, but also its place, time and other conditions. Consequently, although God is immutable and willed theuniverse eternally, it does not follow that the universe must exist forever (semper).136 That is, that God's will is eternal does not require

1:;, De potentia IH, 17, obj. 26.131 De potentia IH, 17, obj. 19.11+ ST la. 46, I, obj. 6; ST la. 46, I, obj. 5.I'; De potentia III, 17, obi. 13.1% De potentia In, 17, ad 6; ST la. 46, ad 10. For a similar argument sce, al

Ghazalr, The Incoherence if the Philosophers, pp. 13-17.

that God willed the universe to exist forever (semper).137 If God didnot create the world at first and created it later on, would it requirethat God move from potency to actuality? Or would it require anychange in God? Aquinas' distinction between God's action and theeffect of his action is sufficient to respond these objections. Aquinasargues that if God were to begin acting later on, or begin a newaction when the universe begins to exist, then it would require thatGod move from potency to actuality. However, God's action is eternal, because it is his very substance. Although God does not beginacting with regard to himself, he may be said to begin to act withreference to the effect. Since the effect follows the condition of theaction~in this case a voluntary action which determines not onlythe form but also the time and other properties of the effect~the

beginning of the universe after temporal non-existence does notrequire that God move from potency to actuality.138 God's will iseternal and he acts eternally, but he determines the time when theeffect begins to exist. Hence the beginning of the universe after temporal non-existence does not require that God's will be changeableor that God move from potency to actuality when the universe beginsto exist.

Aquinas also responds the objection which asks why God wouldwait to create. The objection runs as follows: if God had the powerto create the universe, and he also knew it and willed it, then thereis no reason why God would wait to create the universe. Aquinasrefers this objection to Augustine and argues that by this statementAugustine wanted to prove the co-eternity of the Son with the Fatherand the co-equality of the Son to the Father. Since the Son is ofthe same nature as the Father, this holds true. But since the universe is not of the same nature with God, there is no reason requiring that God create the universe immediately, without waiting. 139

Aquinas does not find any serious challenge in objections basedon the divine immutability with regard to the emergence of the universe existing in re. Relative terms require that both relatives shouldexist. Thus one may argue that in order for God to be Lord, theremust exist at least one subject. Aquinas maintains that if lordship is

III De potentia nI, 17, ad 9.t:JK De potentia IH, 17, ad 12.It'l De potentia nI, 17, ad 22.


"regarded as consequent to the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity." But 'beinglord' may also be taken in the sense of having power to govern frometernity. On this interpretation, in order for God to be Lord, theuniverse does not have to actually exist from eternity, except potentially.140 Similarly, on the assumption of the temporal posteriority ofthe existence of the universe, God was not always (semper) the cause,since the universe did not always actually exist. However, this doesnot mean that God was a potential cause, because God is always(semper) in act. God may be said to be a potential cause only withregard to the effect of his action, i.e., the universe. 141 Here Aquinasdoes not provide a further explanation of why God's being a potential cause with regard to the effect does not cause a problem. Buthis position may be constructed on the basis of his conception ofthe divine names. Some divine names are said eternally, some arenot. While Avicenna considers the existence of the effect in re toimply a new relation to God, hence a change in the cause, Aquinasdoes not see any trouble in the existence of the effect in re. Sincefor both of them God is not related to the universe in the usualsense, Aquinas' reply is sufficient. That is, the posterior emergenceof the effects of the divine action does not require that God be atfirst a potential cause and then an actual cause when the effectscome to exist. Otherwise, a similar problem would be posed forAvicenna's position as well. This time the problem would concernnot the beginning of the whole universe, but the beginning of particular things within the universe. The objection linked to the relation between the knowledge and the object of knowledge does notrequire that the universe should always exist. The relation betweenthe divine knowledge and things and between human knowledge andthings are opposites. While our knowledge of something requires theexistence of the object of knowledge, the divine knowledge does notrequire that what he knows exist outside the divine knowledge. 142

What applies between the divine will and the object of volition isapplicable here between divine knowledge and the object of thatknowledge.

IHI De potentia Ill, 17, ad 21.1+1 De potentia Ill, 17. ad 26.1+2 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 19.

Using the distinction between God's action and the effect of theaction, Aquinas rejects the implication of even an imaginary time orchange of time on the assumption that the universe began to existafter not having existed. The objection was that even if a voluntaryagent may delay the action without itself being changed, this impliesa change in time, and a time period before the action takes place.Aquinas maintains that unlike a particular agent acting through matter and in time, God, by creating, produces all things including time.God as the universal cause cannot be considered to be acting nowand not before. God acts eternally without any change, but the effectof his action takes place according to God's will. And a universethat begins to exist temporally after not having existed shows thedivine power more evidently.143 Even if one grants that God's willto create the universe is eternal, and God does not move frompotency to actuality when the universe begins to exist, one may askwhy God chose the moment when the universe began. Did something push God to create at that moment? In responding to thisAquinas states, in a manner similar to the preceding response, thatthis argument assumes that the agent acts in time and not as thecause of the time itself. l44

These two responses of Aquinas are not satisfactory, because Avicenna's point is not merely a question of something pushing God atthat moment to create. Aquinas' distinction between the divine actionand the effect of the divine action does not presuppose a time period.But if the agent may determine that the effect may come to existtemporally after having not existed, this assumes the existence of atime period before the effect begins. Avicenna's point is that theassumption of temporal posteriority of the universe requires the universe could begin to exist at various times. If so, why does God prefer the moment at which the universe actually begins? It amountsto saying: the assumption of temporal posteriority of the universeassumes God to be like an agent acting in independently existingtime. So, each blames the other for likening God to a temporalagent.

In ST la. 46, I, ad 6.144 De potentia In, 17, ad 13.


Countering the Third Argument

Avicenna's third argument is mainly an attempt to deduce unacceptable conclusions on the basis of the conception of time. One ofhis arguments to this effect is that time does not have a temporalbeginning. Without. the existence of temporal things there can be notime, and no two instants of time can be distinguished. If God isprior to the universe by time as well as by being-which followsfrom the assumption of temporal posteriority of the universe-thenGod cannot be absolutely prior to the universe. But he can be temporally prior to this universe. Hence the assumption that the universe began to exist after temporal non-existence is self-defeating.

Temporal posteriority of the universe may also be considered inthe following way: The universe did not exist at first, and then itexisted. This latter can be considered as a change, caused by Godas the agent creating the universe. But nothing changes unless thechanging thing and the agent causing the change alter from onestate to another. Alteration from one state to another is change. Asa result, the beginning of the universe after not having existed impliesa change before it, ad irifinitum. If there is always change, then thereis always something changeable. The objection concludes that theuniverse or something other than God has always existed. 145 Timeis always at its beginning and its end, because it is the instant whichis the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Hence, timenever begins and ends, but exists always. Since there is no time without movement and movable things, which are included in the univer~e, the universe should have always existed. 146 Another objection,whIch better captures Avicenna's contention, concerns the priorityof God to the universe. God precedes the world either by nature(natura), or by duration (duratione). If God precedes the world just asany cause precedes its effect which co-exists (coaevum) with its cause,t~en l:od prec~des the uni~erse only by nature (natura), not by duration. Then smce God eXIsts from eternity (ab aeterno) , so does the

14S ST la. 46, I, 5. The argument for the infinity of change is referred to AristotlePhySICS VIII.!, 251 a8-28. '

• 146 De potentia H!, 17, obj. 15;. ST la. 46, I, 7. This objection of Aquinas conslde.rs ~he concept~on of tlll~e bemg always at its beginning and at its end, neverbegmnmg or ceasmg to eXIst. Smce, tIme never begins nor does it end consequently, movement and movable things do not begin or cease to exist. Thus thewhole world does not have a temporal beginning. '

147 De potentia HI, 17, obj. 20; ST la. 46, I, obj. 8.

universe. If God precedes the world by duration as well as by hisnature, then there must have been a duration prior to that of theworld, such that there would be a before and an after in durationwhich is what time is. Thus, on this assumption, the universe wouldbe. preceded by time, movement, and movable things. Hence theUnIverse has not begun to be after temporal non-existence. 148

. In replying to the objection that any new change requires a changem the cause as well as in the effect, Aquinas restates the positionth~t God, t~e prime mover, is absolutely changeless. Although thepnmary subject of change is changeable, it does not begin to existthrough change, but through creation. Aquinas argues that the movement has always been there since the beginning of the existence ofmov~ble, things. But it does not exist apart from the movable things. 149

Aqumas answer does not seem to meet the expectation of Avicenna'sargument. The crucial point is that, if the effect of the divine actiondid ~ot exi~t at fi~st, then it begins to exist. From Avicenna's perspective, thIS reqUIres that some new thing should happen to Godto make God create. But Aquinas' response is, since God is the volunta:r c,au~e .of t~e universe he determines when the universe begins.Aqumas dIstmctIOn between the divine action and the effect of thedivine action defeats Avicenna's argument for the implication of twosituations in ?od. !hat is, if the universe begins to exist temporallyafter not haVIng eXIsted, there would be two situations: (l) God existswithout the universe, and (2) God exists with the universe. SinceA~cenna and Aquinas agree that God is not really related to theeXIste~ce of things in re, Aquinas' response is quite satisfactory. Thepostenor emergence of the universe does not imply a relation inGod, such that this relation would require a change in God.

Responding to the objection intended to prove that time does notbegin and cease to exist, Aquinas states that this objection is circular. If one supposes that time always exists, then one has to conclude that there is no beginning and no end of time. But if onesu~poses th.at. movement neither always existed nor will it alwayseXIst, then ~t IS n~t necessary that every instant is a beginning andan end. It IS pOSSIble, however, that there is a first moment whichIS only the beginning, and there is a last moment which is ;nly the

111l De potentia IH, 17, obj. 20; STla. 46, I, obj. 8.119 ST la. 46, I, ad 5.


end. 150 Thus if one does not take the sempiternity (aetemitas) of movement as a given, one does not have to accept that each moment isa beginning and an end in motion. Mter all, Aristotle's point in hisargument is not to show that time always existed, but rather to showthat time and movement go together. If one is taken to be always,the other must be taken in the same way.15l Avicenna's point is notthat the sempiternity of movement and time should be taken as agiven, rather his point is that if something comes to exist after nothaving existed, this implies a change and the existence of a timeperiod before its coming to exist. Granting Aquinas' response thatGod might have planned the existence of the world such that itcomes to exist at such and such time, the implication of change inGod is eliminated. However, the idea of a time before the existenceof the universe remains. From this point, one may again argue thatsince time is the measure of change, and change does not existwithout changeable things, the temporal posteriority argument is selfcontradictory.

Regarding the objection whether God preceded the world by beingonly or by being as well as by time, Aquinas states that God isbefore the world by duration. But the term 'before' indicates thepriority of eternity, not the priority of time. Aquinas' answer so faris a bit ambiguous. None of the parties debate that God is eternal.If one considers God's being and eternity separately, then it wouldbe easy to assert God's priority to the universe by both nature andduration, since God's duration is eternity. Thus, what Aquinas saysso far does not contradict Avicenna's thesis. However, what if Godis considered to be temporally prior to the world? Since God's duration is not measured by time, God is not temporally prior to theuniverse. But then, how can the temporal posteriority of the beginning of the universe be explained? The temporal posteriority of theuniverse requires assumption of a time-period before the beginningof the universe. Aquinas argues that this time before the universe isnot a real time, only an imaginary time. "We can imagine an infinitespace of time running with eternity and preceding the beginning oftime."152 Aquinas gives the example of saying, 'there is nothing beyond

1;11 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 15.151 ST la. 46, I, ad 7. See also, Aristotle, Physics VIII.!, 25IbI0-28.

the heavens.' In such a statement, the term 'beyond' indicates animaginary place. 15:J

Remarks on Arguments Conceming Sempitemiry

Aquinas' argument that while we can trace particular things to theircause, we cannot trace any disposition of the universe, including itsduration, to a cause other than the divine free will is not a convincing argument to refute Avicenna's argument for the sempiternity of the universe. That time is the measure of change is grantedby Avicenna as well as Aquinas. Change in turn occurs in changeable things, and requires a pre-existing subject. That creation is nota change is again granted by Avicenna as well as Aquinas. The existence of non-temporal things is also granted by both of them. Hencesaying that the divine will freely determines the duration of the universe does not solve the problem. If time were applicable to allthings, and were not the measure of change, then the universe couldbegin to exist temporally after not having existed. However, in thiscase, temporal posteriority would lose its distinctive feature.

From Avicenna's perspective, on Aquinas' account all things areconsidered like things subject to generation and corruption, whichare only part of the universe. If the Aristotelian definition of timeis granted by both of them, i.e., the measure of change accordingto before and after, and if it is applicable to only things in movement, then Aquinas seems to be pushing too hard, as he also follows the triple division of things into eternal, sempiternal, and temporal.

152 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 20; ST la. 46, I, ad 8. al-GhazalI adopts a similarstrategy when he discusses the issue in his Tahiifut al-Faliisifit. In his Medieval IslamicControversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Jjmii' and Ta'wfl in the Conflict between alGhaZiilz and Ibn Rushd, (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1989), lysa A. Bello discussesal-Ghazal1's and Averroes' positions concerning the sempiternity of universe. Heattempts to vindicate al-Ghazal1's position. However, his discussion is confusing anddoes not provide a clear and consistent examination of the issue. See especially,pp. 83-110.

1',3 For a similar reply to Avicenna's argument, see al-GhazaII, The Incoherence q!the Philosophers, pp. 30-36. AI-GhazalI considers this kind of time 10 be imaginaryand gives a detailed explanation of the analogy between the time bcfore thc universe and the place beyond the universe.


If time is applicable only to some of the things belonging to the universe, then it cannot be applicable to all of them. Hence, Aquinas'counter-argument for the possibility of the temporal beginning of theuniverse does not seem to successfully defeat Avicenna's argument.

Although both Aquinas and Avicenna think that God is not relatedto the universe in such a way that this relation posits anything external to God, Aquinas pursues logical consequences of this argument.Despite his position concerning the relation between God and theuniverse existing outside the divine knowledge, Avicenna argues thatif the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existed,this would imply a new relation occurring to God. Thus, it wouldrequire that God is not immutable. By distinguishing between thedivine action and the effect of the divine action, Aquinas providesa satisfactory response to this argument of Avicenna. Whereas thedivine action and will are eternal, and thus exist forever, the effectof the divine action does not have to exist forever. Consequently,the beginning of the universe after not having existed does not requirethat God change or move from potency to actuality. The distinction between the action and the effect of the action, in a sense,depends on Aquinas' argument that God is the voluntary cause ofthe universe. By his distinction between the action and the effect ofthe action, Aquinas goes in the opposite direction of Avicenna's argument. Avicenna argued that there cannot be any gap between theaction and the emergence of the effect of the action. His main reason for this argument is the inconceivability of a time before theexistence of universe, or rather the inapplicability of time to nontemporal beings.

Aquinas' distinction between a voluntary agent and a natural agentis his major counter argument. If successful, it counters the demonstrative force of Avicenna's argument for the sempiternity of the universe. By distinguishing between agents acting by nature and agentsacting by volition, Aquinas hits the core of Avicenna's theses: (I)that as a compound 'existence after non-existence' cannot traced toone single cause, and (2) that true agents and their effects co-exist.But can one grant this? In the case of a natural agent, if there isno impediment, its effect follows the existence of the agent immediately. For a voluntary agent, however, this does not have to bethe case. A voluntary agent can determine when its effect begins toexist. For example, take a man planning to do something next week.Such a planning sounds familiar to us. But one should carefully

examine the example. The plan, in the example, is carried out inthe already existing world. The man, in the example, carries out hisplan within the universe. That is, there exists time, independent ofthis man, and no matter what the realized plan is, it is a kind ofmovement. The realization of the plan is a movement of alreadyexisting conditions, or things, from one state to another, or fromhaving one form to having another. Simply speaking, the carryingout of the plan requires the existence of matter and time in thehuman case. Thus, what happens in the example is 'existence aftermovement,' but not 'existence after non-existence,' in the true sense.In Avicenna's terms, it is 'existence after relative non-existence,' butnot 'existence after absolute non-existence.'

To what extent is such planning applicable to creation of the universe by God? Can it be freed from the creaturely conditions, i.e.,the requirement of matter and time existing independently of theman in the example? If, as a voluntary agent, God planned the universe to begin to exist temporally after not having existed, does thisrequire the existence of time and matter existing independently ofcreation? I believe it does. If there is no preceding time, then theuniverse does not begin to exist temporally after not having existed.If there is time before the universe, then, according to the definitionof time, there is a changeable thing before the universe. Thus, themodel of a voluntary agent cannot be applied to creation unless oneallows for the existence of time and temporal things before the universe. Even though Aquinas does not accept such an assumption oftime and matter, the conception of a voluntary agent determiningits effect temporally after not having existed includes the assumptionof time and temporal things independent of this voluntary agent.

Aquinas acknowledges the assumption of time once. If God is saidto be prior to the universe with regard to time as well as with regardto his being, then the existence of time before the universe is assumed.Aquinas maintains that this time is only in the imagination. But ifthe time before the universe is only in the imagination, then thetemporal posteriority of the universe must be in the imagination aswell. That is, if the time preceding the universe is imaginary, thenthe posteriority of the time when the universe begins is also imaginary, because there is no time to which the world can be posterior.If the time before the universe, and the posteriority of the instantwhen the universe begins, is imaginary, then the temporal beginningof the universe does not take into account what really exists. One


may conclude that the posteriority of the universe is only in theimagination. However, this is not the conclusion Aquinas would like

to argue for.From another perspective, one can ask whether an imaginary ele

ment can be used in an argument which is designed to show thatsomething is in fact the case. That is, in the argument all the otherelements either refer to existents or their properties that exist outside the mind of the one who argues. It is agreed that God reallyexists, that the universe really exists, and that time is a property oftemporal things and part of the external world. A statement simplyexpressing an imaginary state of affairs cannot be used as part ofan argument to indicate a state of affairs in the real world. Forexample, let's imagine that John robbed Adam of a hundred dollars. From this premise, ceteris paribus, it does not follow that Johnmust be punished indeed. His punishment can be justified only inour imagination, because stealing from Adam took place only in theimagination, and we know that John has not committed robbery infact. There is no ground to punish John for robbing Adam's moneyin reality, because John did not in fact commit the crime. Thus, ifthe time after which the universe began to exist is imaginary, thenthe universe did not really begin to exist temporally after not having existed.

Conclusion qf Chapter Four

Avicenna and Aquinas have similar views on important aspects oftheir theories concerning creation. They agree that creation is theexistential dependence of the creature on the creator. Creation isout of nothing, it is not a change and there is nothing independentof God's bestowal of being. However, while the existential dependence of all things on God is the only meaning of creation forAvicenna, Aquinas distinguishes between the philosophical and theological senses of creation. For Aquinas, on philosophical grounds,only the posteriority of the universe with regard to being can beestablished. The temporal posteriority of the universe cannot bedemonstrated by rational argumentation. In contrast to Aquinas,Avicenna defends the position that the universe does not have a temporal beginning.

The difference between their positions does not have much to do

with their conceptions of God. Both of them agree on the immutability of God, and their conception of divine immutability is consistentwith their views concerning beginning of the universe, even thoughthey argue contradictory positions. The only exception to this agreement between them may be Aquinas' distinction between on the onehand those divine names that do not concern the existence of theuniverse in re at all, and those which are related to the actual existence of things, such as Creator and Lord, on the other. They agreethat God is not really related to the world. However, Avicenna arguesthat the temporal beginning of the universe after not having existedwould imply a new relation occurring to God. Rejecting Avicenna'sargument, Aquinas maintains that the posterior emergence of theuniverse does not posit a new relation requiring that God be changeable. He takes full advantage of the argument that God is not reallyrelated to the universe.

The difference in their positions regarding the question whetherthe universe must have always been concerns their conception of thethings in the universe, and the applicability of time to all things.While Avicenna takes a strict position and rejects that time is applicable to all things in the universe, Aquinas is inclined to apply timeto all of them. On Avicenna's position, simply the existence of sempiternal things would be enough to say that the universe is sempiternal.

Another difference may concern not strictly their conceptions ofGod, but their positions regarding the extent of the applicability ofhuman experience to God, or their answer to the question 'To whatextent may creaturely conditions be applied to conceiving God ordivine actions?' Perhaps Aquinas' strongest counter-argument is thata voluntary cause can will something such that it begins to existtemporally after not having existed, and God is a voluntary agentas far as the existence of the universe is concerned. Avicenna wouldargue against this and say that for such a conception of the voluntary agent, the existence of matter and time-which exist independently of the action of the agent-are essential. These cannot beeliminated so that the conception of voluntary agent can be applicable to God to explain creation without reservation.

Avicenna is, again, strict with regard to the unacceptable implications of the idea of the temporal posteriority of the beginning ofthe universe. In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas adopts a lenient attitude. He argues that the time implied in God's temporal priority to

the universe is only in the imagination.

230 CHAPTER FOUR

Aquinas' arguments for the possibility of the temporal beginningof the universe enrich the discussion. However, for a convincingargument in this respect a more fundamental modification of theAristotelian and Neoplatonic heritage is required. As long as oneclings to the definition of time in the Aristotelian sense-as the measure of movement, which is applicable to the lowest part of the universe-and to the triple division of duration, it seems very difficultto argue for the possibility of the temporal posteriority of the uni

verse as a whole.

I

CONCLUSION

I have argued that Thomas Aquinas' theories concerning God andcreation can be philosophically assessed as much as Avicenna's theories can be. This argument is based on the fact that Avicenna andAquinas have similar positions regarding human knowledge and discourse about God. Both argue that we do not know God in himself and that our knowledge of God is derived from creatures. Theyalso share the insight that perfections which are predicated of Godare not predicated of God and of creatures univocally. Avicenna'stheory of tashkrk is to some extent similar to Aquinas' theory of analogical predication. However, it is not as developed as Aquinas' theory of analogical predication so as to yield definite criteria concerningtheological statements.

Having established that Avicenna's theological statements and thoseof Aquinas are equally examinable from a philosophical perspective,I have attempted to trace a further similarity between Avicenna'sand Aquinas' teachings in chapter 2. I have shown that they havesimilar conceptions of God's simplicity, necessity, immutability, eternity and knowledge. Discussion of their conception of God throughexamining divine formal features helped us to better understand theirpositions concerning theological language. In the first chapter, Iargued that Avicenna's theory of tashkrk and Aquinas' theory of analogical predication are similar in denying that terms are predicatedof God and of creation univocally, but the similarity between theirpositions is limited. Avicenna and Aquinas follow quite divergentpaths with regard to theological language. In order to avoid thedeception of expressing God in human terms, Avicenna takes a reductive strategy in the light of the divine formal features. He considersdivine perfection properties insofar as they are modified by divineformal features, i.e., as necessary, eternal etc. By taking divine attributes only insofar as they are modified by divine formal features,which belong exclusively to God, he intends to maintain the differencebetween God and creatures and the inadequacy of human languageto talk about God. In contrast, Aquinas considers divine perfectionproperties in both ways, i.e., with and without being modified bydivine formal features. Thus although Avicenna and Aquinas have

j

232 CONCLUSION CONCLUSION 233

a similar conception of God, they have divergent pOSItiOns regarding theological language. The difference between their positionsregarding theological language influences not only their talk aboutGod, but also their theories of creation.

Discussion of their conception of divine formal features and divineknowledge was also intended to be a preliminary step in studyingtheir conception of divine creative action and their positions regarding the beginning of the universe. Given the similarity of their conception of God, one could examine their positions regarding thenature of divine creative action and the beginning of the universe.That is, using the common conception of God one could decide ifAvicenna's or Aquinas' position regarding the divine creative actionand the beginning of the universe is more coherent with this common conception.

Contrary to the widely shared interpretation of Avicenna's position, I argued that Avicenna's conception of the divine creative actionis not substantially altered in Aquinas' thought. Avicenna and Aquinasagree on basic issues in this regard, such as God's being a free creator and not needing to create other things. In fact they have similar positions even with regard to the necessity of the universe.Nevertheless, Avicenna could say only that the universe is necessary.He could, thus, address only philosophical concerns because of hisreductive strategy concerning divine perfection properties. Aquinasasserted both the contingency of the universe as well as its necessity. Thus he was able to address both philosophical and religiousconcerns. I argued that the difference between their positions despitethe fact that they accept similar premises is due to their positionsregarding theological language. By his theory of analogical predication, Aquinas was able to predicate perfections of God and of creatures without thereby violating divine simplicity. Aquinas distinguishesbetween res significata and the modus significandi of the perfections. Heargues that when we predicate perfections-which we know throughcreation--of God, we affirm of God only their res significata not theircreaturely modus significandi. Hence he could predicate perfection properties of God without being compelled to take them together withdivine formal features. It shows that Avicenna's and Aquinas' theories regarding creation are closely connected to their positions regarding theological language.

In chapter 4, I argued that Avicenna and Aquinas agree on thebasics concerning the conception of creation-creation is out of noth-

mg, IS not a movement-although they disagree about whether theuniverse has a temporal beginning. Avicenna strongly believes thatthe universe cannot have a temporal beginning. Contrary to Avicenna,Aquinas argues that whether or not the universe has a temporalbeginning cannot be established on philosophical grounds. Consequently, he argues that the view that the universe cannot have atemporal beginning-which is what Avicenna defends-cannot bedemonstrated rationally. I have argued that Aquinas' responses donot successfully refute Avicenna's arguments.

The disagreement between Avicenna and Aquinas regarding thebeginning of the universe does not have much to do with their conception of God. In this regard, one might consider Aquinas' use ofdivine will to refute Avicenna's argument for the sempiternity of theuniverse. Aquinas' major counter-argument employs God's being avoluntary agent. As I discussed Aquinas' use of divine will to explainthe posteriority of the universe heavily relies on human experienceof volition, which operates within an already existing universe.However, for the divine volition no independent universe, and henceno time, exists, such that a definite future point of time may beapplicable for planning the beginning of the universe. Yet this doesnot imply a major difference between them with regard to the natureof divine volition.

Avicenna's position regarding the beginning of the universe is moreconsistent with the Aristotelian conception of time combined withthe Neoplatonic triple division of the duration of things, i.e., eternal, sempiternal and temporal. Since both Avicenna and Aquinasadopt the Aristotelian conception of time and the Neoplatonic tripledivision of beings, Avicenna's position shows more consistency, stating that temporal posteriority is not applicable to the universe as awhole.

I,

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j

INDEX OF AUTHORS

Aertsen, Jan 201 n. 82Albert the Great 3, IIAlgazel 20 n. 41Alston, William P. 55~56, 62-63,

63 nn. 88-89, 64, 64 nn. 90~93,

65, 65 nn. 94-97, 66, 66 nn.99-101,67-68,68 n. 102, 71-72,75

Ammonius 6Anawati, G. C. II nn. 30-31,

12 n. 32, 139 n. 18Anselm 108 n. 90Aristode 2, 2 n. I, 4, 4 n. 9, 6-8, 8

n. 20, 9, 9 nn. 21-24, 39, 39 n. 35,40, 86 n. 18, 87, 87 n. 21, 88n.27, 89, 95 n. 53, 104, 106 n. 84,109 nn. 93-94,114, 114 n. Ill,117 n. 120, 134 n. 2, 163 n. 73,175 n. 15, 198 n. 68, 201,201 n. 83, 204, 216, 216 n. 125,222 n. 145, 224, 224 n. 151

Augustine 3, 9, 9 n. 25, 10, 108n. 90, 217, 219

Averroes 14 n. 36, 20 n. 41,30 n. 13, 37 n. 28, 177 n. 20,225 n. 152

Baldner, Steven E. 20 n. 42, 197n. 67, 199 nn. 73-74

el-Bizri, Nader 160 n. 67Boethius 43, 43 n. 39, 108, 108 nn.

90-91, 109, 109 nn. 91-92, 110n. 95, 112 nn. 102, 106

Brown, Patterson 105 n. 80, 106 nn.80-81, 84

Burns, Robert 81-82 n. 3Burrell, David B. ix, II n. 32, 19,

19 n. 38, 39 n. 32, 55 n. 70, 80, 80nn. 1-2, 100 n. 62, 109-10 n. 91,III n. 101, 112 n. 106, 136 n. 9,160 n. 67, 173 n. 10, 197 n. 68

Cajetan 64, 64 n. 91Carroll, William E. 20 n. 42,

197 n. 67, 199 nn. 73-74Clement 6Cunningham, Francis A 177 n. 20

Davidson, Herbert A 3 n. 4, 7 n. 18,8 nn. 18-20, 9 nn. 21-23, 10 n. 27,20 nn. 41-42, 87 nn. 20-21, 24, 88nn. 27, 30, 89 nn. 31-32, 133 n. I,215 n. 120

Davies, Brian 42 n. 36, 107 n. 85,108 n. 90, 153 n. 40, 204 n. 89

Dunphy, William 197-98 n. 68Duns Scotus 100 n. 62, 134 n. 2

al-Farabr 2, 2 n. 2, 89Frank, Richard 83 n. 9

Garcia, Laura L. 157 n. 57Gardet, Louis 13, 13 nn. 34-36, 14

n. 36, 136 n. 9Geach, P. T. 207 n. 98al-Ghazalr 3, 12 n. 32, 20 n. 41,

96 n. 54, 218 n. 136, 225 nn.152-53

Gilson, Etienne 4 n. 7, 10 n. 29, IInn. 2, 10-11, 14 n. 36, 134,197 n. 67

Gluck, Andrew L. 197-98 n. 68Goichon, A-M. 3, 3 nn. 5-6, II

nn. 31-32, 37 n. 28, 139 n. 17Goris, Harm 55, 56, 59, 59 nn.

79-82, 60, 60 nn. 83-84, 61,61 nn. 85-87, 62, 75, 109 n. 92,III n. 101, 207 n. 98, 208n. 103

Grant, Sara 206 n. 94Gundissalinus 12 n. 32

Henninger, Mark G. 201 nn. 81-82,202 nn. 84, 86-87, 204 n. 90, 206,206 n. 93, 207 ~ 97

Hibbs, Thomas 55 n. 70Hourani, George F. 175 n. 15Hyman, Arthur 134 n. 2, 198 n. 68

Iskenderoglu, Muammer 238

J anssens, J ules I 75 n. 14John of Damascus 3Judy, Albert 19, 19 nn. 39-40,

82 n. 5

j

244 INDEX OF AUTHORS

INDEX OF TOPICS

Kant, Immanuel 106 n. 80Kenny, Anthony 106 n. 80Kretzmann, Norman 47 n. 49, 108

nn. 90-91, 109 n. 91, 110 nn. 95,97, 157-58 n. 62, 160 n. 67,197 n. 68

Leaman, OliveI' 134 n. 2Lee, P. II n. 31Louth, Andrew 21 n. 43, 133 n.

MacDonald, Scott 158 n. 62Macierowski, Edward Michael I I

n. 31, 82 n. 5, 84 n. 10MacIntosh, J. J. 106 n. 81Mahdi, Muhsin 2 n. 2Marmura, Michael E. 3 n. 3,

II n. 31, 95-96 n. 54, 175 nn.14-15, 181 n. 32, 215 n. 120

Maurer, Armand II n. 30, 43 n. 39May, Gerhard 5 n. 11,6 n. 14McGinn, Bernard 39 n. 32,

173 n. 10McGinnis, Jon 96 n. 54McInerny, Ralph 64 n. 91, 68 nn.

103-104, 69, 69 nn. 105-106Miller, Barry 177 n. 20Moonan, Lawrence 43 n. 39,

124 n. 140Morris, Thomas V. 239Muckle, C. S. B. 20 n. 41Muller, Earl 20 I n. 81, 202 n. 87,

204 n. 91

O'Callaghan, John 55 n. 70O'Meara, Dominic J. 7 n. 17, 10

n. 28, 140 n. 19Ormsby, Eric L. 197 n. 68

Philo 6, 6 n. 13, 9Philoponus, John 2 n. 2, 3-7, 8

n. 18, 10, 215 n. 120Pieper,Josef 55-56,56 n. 71,57,57

nn. 72-76, 58, 58 nn. 77-78, 75Pines, S. 240Plato 2,4,4 n. 8, 5, 5 n. 11,6-7,

10, 90 n. 37Plotinus 2, 6-7, 7 n. 17, 10, 28 n. 6,

90 n. 37, 140 n. 19Proclus 2, 2 n. I, 6, 10, 186 n. 43

Pseudo-Dionysius 3, 48 n. 52, 78,158 n. 62

Rahman, Fazlur 39 n. 32, 97 n. 56,173 n. 10, 186 n. 43

Reisman, David C. 96 n. 54Rofougaran, Nicolas Louis 95 n. 53,

100 n. 62Rolnick, Philip A. 55 n. 70Rowe, William L. 157 n. 57, 179

n. 27

Sadra, Mulla 12 n. 32Sezgin, Fuat 3 n. 3Simplicius 6Smith, Gerhard 177 n. 20Sorabji, Richard 3 n. 4, 4 n. 10,

5 n. 12,6 nn. 13-16, 7 n. 18,9 nn. 24, 26, 10 n. 27, 86 n. 18,90 n. 37

Stump, Eleonore 63 n. 88, 108 nn.90-91, 109 n. 91, 110 nn. 95, 97,157 n. 57, 197 n. 68

Synesius of Cyrene 6

Taylor, Richard C. 2 n.Te Velde, Rudi A. 48 n. 52,

100 n. 62, 133 n. I, 153 n. 42Themistius 10

Van Riet, S. 87 n. 19Van Steenberghen, F. 240Verbeke, Gerard 12 n. 32,86 n. 19,

144 n. 30

Wennemann, D. J. 209 n. 105Wilhelmsen, F. D. 210 n. 110Wippel, John F. 43, 43 nn. 39-40,

45 n. 46, 51 n. 59, 134 n. 2,198 n. 68, 211 n. 114

Wisnovsky, Robert ix, 148 nn. 33-34,165 n. 77

Wolfson, H. A. 30 n. 13, 33 n. 18,37 n. 28,48 n. 51, 172 n. 6

Yates, John C. 109 n. 92

Zedler, Beatrice 11, II n. 32, 13, 13n. 33, 134, 134 nn. 2-3, 135, 135nn. 4-8, 140 n. 19, 177 n. 20

ab aetemo 215,217-18,222abad 90, 90 n. 36Abrahamic religions II n. 32, 19-20absolute non-existence 171, 198 n. 68,

227accidental causes 179actions stemming from nature 139,

139 n. 18, 149actual efficient cause 181, 183,

191-92actual universe 131, 135, 159,

161-62actuality 9,102-103,107,113,117

n. 120, 217, 219, 221, 226aevum 112-13affirmation 4, 84-85, 96, 122,

174 n. 12, 200affirmative theology 59aiJad 39aj::li' 31analogates 64 n. 91, 68-70, 78analogical predication 16-18, 20,

25-26, 37 n. 28, 39-41, 43 n. 39,51, 51 nn. 58-59, 52, 55, 55 n. 70,56, 58-59, 64 n. 91, 68, 70-71, 76,78, 81, 120, 124-26

analogy 37 n. 28,40,51,51-52n. 60, 55 n. 70, 56, 64, 64 n. 91,66-67,69, 75-76, 225 n. 153

appreciative 18, 81, 124 n. 140, 125,167

approbation 139-40, 140 n. 20'iiqil 114 n. 113, 122'aql 96 n. 56, 114 n. 113, 122artisan model 7, 10

beginning of the universe 1-2,8 n. 18, 7, 9, 15, 17-18, 79-80,112, 189, 198 n. 68, 210, 217,219, 222, 224, 229, 232-33

bi'lji'l 36Book of Causes 2 n.

causal order 25, 40coming to exist 8, 107, 170,

178 n. 22, 179, 224concept of generation 8

conceptual relation 203concomitance 140 n. 19, 141,

143-45, 159concomitants 27, 29, 31, 94, 98

n. 60, 131, 135, 140, 144-45, 149,174

Conftssions 9 n. 25, 217constituent parts 31, 35contemplation model 10contingency 61, 133, 168, 232contingency of creation 20, 162correlative 122created universe 20, 133creative action ix, 2, 10, 13, 119,

188, 232creaturely implications 81

dahr 90 n. 36, 92 n. 49, 93, 182,186 n. 43

cjariirf 87, 87 n. 20De trinitate 43, 43 n. 39Demiurge 5-6dhiit 27, 31, 32, 82 n. 4, 94,

95 n. 53, 96 n. 56, 101, 122,142-43, 145, 173, 191

discourse about God 25, 59, 72, 75,231

discursive 97 n. 56, 115-16divine actions 208, 210, 218, 229divine attributes 1-2, 19-20, 76,

122-23, 123 n. 137, 124, 231divine creative action I, 10, 12,

17-18,79, 147, 154divine essence 28 n. 6, 42, 43 n. 40,

45, 61 n. 86, 71, 98, 1l7-18 n. 120,123, 152, 154, 169, 206, 207 n. 98

divine formal features I, 17, 18 n. 37,34, 48, 50, 77, 79, 80 n. 2, 81,120-21, 124, 124 n. 140, 126-27,132, 136, 145, 165-67, 231-32

divine freedom 133, 147, 156-57,157 n. 57, 158

divine goodness 29, 156--58, 158n. 62, 159, 162, 212

divine knowledge 17,57,75,79,98,101, 123, 126, 136, 140 n. 19,145-46, 151, 153-55, 169-70, 182

j

INDEX OF TOPICS INDEX OF TOPICS246

n. 34, 191, 193, 206, 206 n. 93,20~ 208 Q 103, 220, 226, 232

divine necessity 86, 120divine perfection properties I, 18

n. 37, 34, 120-21, 123-24, 126,132, 145, 167-68, 217, 231-32

divine perfections 17, 20, 25, 29, 47,50, 56, 59-60, 62-75, 77, 84, 124,124 n. 140, 126, 145, 157 n. 57,165-67, 218

divine persons 153, 202 n. 87, 203,203 n. 87, 204 n. 89

divine properties 33, 34, 80, 120divine self-knowledge 98divine simplicity 14, 19 n. 39, 50,

71-75,81 n. 3, 99, 104, 120-21,124-26, 135, 154, 232

divine will 79, 120-21, 123,124 n. 140, 132-33, 134 n. 2, 136,136 n. 9, 137-38, 140-41, 145-47,150-51, 153-58, 158 n. 62, 159-62,164-67, 169, 190, 193, 195, 197,198 n. 68, 211-13, 216, 218, 220,225, 233

efficient cause 133, 137, 148 nn.33-34, 150, 160 n. 67, 170, 175-78,180-82, 185, 188, 191-92, 194, 196,211,214

emanation 4, 6, 99, 100 n. 62,134-35, 138, 140, 145, 147, 153,198

emanationist cosmology 13ens commune 84equivocally 50-51, 51 n. 58, 76esse sine additione I 04essence of God 35, 131-32essential cause(s) 179 n. 27, 180, 186,

189, 190, 214essential posteriority 171eternal 13, 18, 20, 48, 50, 77, 80-81,

90, 90 n. 36, 91, 93, 93 n. 50, 94,99,108-109, 109 n. 91, 110, 110n. 95,111-12,112 n. 106, 113,118,118 n. 122, 119 n. 126, 126,132-33, 135-37, 149, 155, 163-65,167-69, 185-86, 186 n. 43, 193-95,209-10, 215, 218-19, 224-26, 231,233

eternality 32, 79, 90eternity I, 2 n. 2, 8 n. 19, 18 n. 37,

50, 67, 73, 80-81, 91, 93, 100,105-106, 109-10, 110 n. 95,111-12,112 nn. 102, 106, 113, 117,

118 n. 122, 120, 124 n. 140, 126,132, 136, 150, 155, 163-68, 185,189, 209, 209 n. 105, 210, 213,215,217-18,220,222,224,231

everlasting 211ex nihilo 199, 199 n. 73ex tempOff 208-209existence after non-existence 4,

226-27existential priority 38, 92

fallacy of equivocation 51, 51 n. 58,76

final cause 7, 133, 138, 147-48, 148n. 34, 158-59, 165, 175

formal features 67, 80, I1I n. 101,120, 146-47, 149, 164, 166, 168

formal properties 18, 34, 80free choice 132, 143, 150, 159-60,

160 n. 67, 162, 164, 166-68free creator 11 n. 32, 133, 140, 143,

232

generation and corruption 9, 35, 89,95, 95 n. 54, 96, 96 n. 54, 101,107,112-13,171,179-80,185-88,190, 196, 214, 225

generosity 141-43, 145, 159Genesis 5gharatj 137, 141-42God as free creator 20, 133God as natural agent 20, 133God as the efficient cause 7, 172God's concomitants 145God's creative action 131-32, 135God's creative knowledge 57God's duration 195-96, 224God's essence 26-27, 40, 42-45, 60,

74-75, 80, 97, 97 n. 57, 99,103-104, 104n. 75,114,117n. 120, 125, 131, 138, 141-43,145, 149, 166, 194

God's eternity 89-91, 93 n. 50, 105,108, 108 nn. 90-91, I11 n. 101,112-13,118,163

God's free will 159, 162God's freedom 86, 131, 133, 141,

149, 156, 160 n. 67, 166God's goodness 156-57, 159, 160

n. 67, 162-63God's immateriality 113God's knowledge 19, 50, 56, 64, 72,

81, 93-95, 95 nn. 53-54, 96 n. 54,97, 97 n. 56, 98, 99, 99 n. 61, 100,

100 n. 62, 101, 112-16, 116 n. 120,117,117 n. 120, 118, 118 nn. 120,122,119,119 n. 126, 123-24, 126,137-38, 139 n. 16, 140 n. 20, 149,151, 154, 173, 206, 206 n. 93

God's necessity 79, 86-87, 101,105-106, 106 n. 84, 126, 156, 231

God's perfections 29, 41, 48-50, 55,62-64, 67, 75, 121, 125, 138, 147,166, 168-69, 192

God's self-knowledge 81, 94, 97-99,99 n. 61,114,116,117 n. 120,137-38, 158

God's simplicity 49, 59, 79, 81,81 n. 3,87 n. 24, 98, 101, 107,110 n. 99, 116, 121, 126, 138-39,155, 231

God's will 50, 123, 131-32, 136-39,139 n. 16, 140, 140 n. 20, 141,146, 149, 154-59, 161-64, 166-68,196, 218-19, 221

huwa huwa 27hypothetical necessity 124 n. 140,

132, 150, 161, 163, 163 n. 73,164-66, 168

ibdii' 13, 170-71, 172 n. 6irjiifa 29-30, 30 n. 13, 31-33'ijiib 84, 174 n. 12immaterial substances 91immediate cause(s) 92 n. 43, 180,

189-90, 214immutability 93, 110, 120immutability of God 9, 50, 61, 73,

75, 79-80, 86, 89, 100-101, 105,106 nn. 84-85,109-11, I11 n. 101,113, 117-18, 126, 132, 137, 155-56,160, 162-68, 184-85, 189-90, 195,204 n. 90, 210, 216-19, 229, 231

immutable 18, 48, 50, 77, 80-81, 86,94,99, 105-106, 106 n. 84, 107-13,132, 136-37, 145, 149, 155-56, 161,163-65, 167-69, 186, 189, 191, 204n. 90, 217-18, 226

imperfection 27, 54, 59-60, 63, 96,126, 143, 161

impossible 87, 187innryya 82 n. 5, 83, 83 n. 9, 88 n. 25,

174 n. 12intellect 43, 54, 77, 80, 84 n. 10, 85

n. 15, 89, 96, 96 n. 56, 97-98, 107,114,114 n. 113, 117-18 n. 120,119, 122-23, 134 n. 2, 139 n. 18,

247

140, 149, 151 n. 37, 152-53,172-73, 184-85, 186 n. 43, 200

intention 64 n. 91, 132-33, 135-36,136 n. 9, 138-39, 139 nn. 16, 18,141-42, 147-48, 159, 184 n. 39

kamiil 28, 32, 36Kitiib fi al-Khayr al-MaM 2 n. I

lawiil;iq 85lawiizim 27, 29, 31

mabda' 94, 123miihryya 36, 82 nn. 4-5, 83 n. 9, 105

n. 75Maimonides 3, 12 n. 32, 19 11. 38,

37 n. 28, 43 nn. 39-40, 47, 48 nn.51-52, 51 n. 58, 80 n. I, JOO n. 62,I11 n. 101, 134 n. 2, 197-98 n. 68,204

ma'qul 100, 114 n. 113, 122maujud 31,87, 137meaning of creation 4, 199 11. 73,

228modality of being 86, 88-89modus significandi 52-53, 63, 65, 68-69,

77, 150, 166-67, 232motion 5,8-9, 110, 155, 197,224mujarrad 84, 85 n. 16mumkin 87mushiirun ilayhi 84 n. 10Muslim theologians 3, 3 n. 3, 10,

13,95 n. 54,171 n. 2,172 n.6,181 n. 32

mustal;fl 87mutakhayyal 96

natural action 10, 18, 20, 134 n. 2,135-36, 139, 139 n. 18, 140,140 n. 19, 146-47, 149, 151-54

natural agent 135, 139 n. 18, 141,146, 150-51, 169, 226

nature of creative action ix, 1-2nature of divine creative actiofl 15,

127, 232nature of God 9nature of things 8, 106 n. 84nature of time 8, 185, 193necessary being 30, 32-33, 3 5- 36,

39 n. 32, 82, 82 n. 5, 83, g3 n. 10,84 84 n 10 85-86 87 n 24, 88nn'. 24, 27, 89, 105,' 105 ~. 80,106, 106 n. 80, 146, 178 n. 22,189

INDEX OF TOPICS INDEX OF TOPICS248

necessary emanation 20, 133,136 n. 9, 160 n. 67

necessary of being 82, 82 n. 5, 83,85, 87 n. 24, 100, 122

necessity 17, 18 n. 37, 32, 34-35, 50,67, 80, 83 n. 10, 86, 86 n. 18, 87nn. 20, 24, 88, 88 n. 25, 89, 101,105, 105 n. 80, 106 nn. 81, 84,118, 120, 124, 124 n. 140, 131,133-34, 134 n. 2, 138, 145-47,154-55, 157, 161-63, 163 n. 73,164-65, 165 n. 77, 166-67, 176,178 n. 22, 184 n. 39, 190,198 n. 68, 211-12, 232

necessity of being 33, 34, 82,82 n. 5, 83, 84 n. 10, 85

necessity of creation 153necessity of nature 13, 134-35,

136 n. 9, 151necessity of the universe 4, 131-33,

135, 143, 146-47, 150, 165-68, 232negation 28, 32-33, 33 n. 18,

43 n. 39, 44, 46-48, 48 n. 51, 50,54, 76-77, 80, 84, 93, 103, 107,Ill, 121-22, 166, 174 n. 12,199 n. 73

negative element 17,25,41,55,59,73

negative terms 4, 28 n. 6, 46-47Neoplatonic 2 n. 1, 5, 18, 20-21, 21

n. 43, 110, 112, 133, 133 n. 1, 148,230, 233

ni;::.am 100non-being 33, 88, 122, 199,

199 n. 73non-voluntary agent 148nothingness 9, 199 n. 74

omnipotent 31-32, 124omnitemporality 108, 112,

112 n. 102

participation 102-103, 116-17n. 120, 198

passive potency 211, 214perfection(s) 8, 25-26, 28, 28 nn. 6,

8, 29, 34-36, 37 n. 28, 38, 40-41,45-48, 48 nn. 51-52, 49, 49 n. 53,50-51, 51 n. 58, 52, 52 n. 60, 53,53 n. 64, 54, 55 n. 70, 56, 60, 60n. 84, 62-64, 64 n. 91, 65-78,80-81, 102, 107, 121-22, 125-26,132, 137-38, 140, 142, 148-51, 162,164-67, 185, 192, 231-32

perfection properties 8, 20, 32, 36,40, 45, 48-49, 52, 64, 66, 71, 77,80-81, 120, 125-26, 232

perfection terms 51, 51 n. 58, 53-56,59-60, 65, 68-73, 77, 120, 166

Platonic forms 98Platonic ideas 97-98positive 25-26, 28 n. 6, 29-30,

30 n. 13, 31-33, 33 n. 18, 34, 36,41-43, 43 n. 40, 44, 46, 54-55, 59,71-73, Ill, 141, 143, 158 n. 62,173-74

positive attributes 47, 76positive properties of God 32, 47possibility 9, 88, 88 n. 25, 89,

134 n. 2, 147, 160 n. 67, 167,172,176,177 n. 20,187-88,211,211 n. 114, 212-15, 215 n. 120,226, 230

possibly 9, 88posteriority 26, 37-41, 90 n. 36,

91-92, 170-71, 199, 228, 233potential efficient cause 181, 191-92,

214potentially 9, 39, 220prime matter 6, 8, 47 n. 49, 185,

187, 198priority 26, 37, 37 n. 28, 38-41, 90,

90 n. 36,91-92, 193-94, 199, 199n. 74, 222, 224

properties 25, 28-30, 30 n. 13,31-33, 33 n. 18, 34-37, 39, 41, 46,47 n. 49, 48, 49 n. 53, 74, 76, 78,80, 84-85, 96, 100 n. 62, Ill, 116n. 120, 120-22, 177 n. 20, 178, 178n. 22, 180, 192, 197, 212, 219, 228

qaJrj 141qidam 32, 90, 90 n. 36, 91-93, 93

n. 50, 185quidditative 42-45, 56quiddities 82, 102, 170, 183-84, 186,

188

ratio 60, 69-71, 74ratio propria 56, 64 n. 91, 68--69, 69

n. 106, 70-71, 73real relations 202, 202 n. 87, 203,

204 n. 90, 209reductio ad absurdum 170reductive 121reductive strategy 18, 18 n. 37, 81,

123, 126, 132, 167, 231-32relata 202 n. 87, 204-205

relation(s) 26, 29-30, 30 n. 13,31-34,48 n. 51,51 n. 60, 52, 61,64, 76-77,98-100, 100 n. 62,118-19,119 n. 126, 120-21, 123,144, 148 n. 34, 151, 157, 161-62,164-66, 169-70, 172 n. 6, 173-74,174n. 12, 175, 175n.15, 178,180-81, 183, 185, 190-92, 196-97,199 n. 73, 201, 201 nn. 81-82, 202,202 n. 87, 203, 203 n. 87, 204, 204nn. 89-90, 205-206, 206 nn. 93-94,207, 207 n. 98, 208-10, 210 n. 110,213, 216-17, 220, 223, 226, 229

relation of reason 202-203relationship 7, 9, 12 n. 32, 13, 34,

37 n. 28, 38, 41, 51, 56, 64, 70, 77,91-95, 97, 97 n. 57, 98-99, 115,124, 131, 144, 148, 157-58, 163,173, 187, 202, 208-209, 217

relative non-existence 171, 227remote causes 179res significata 52-53, 63, 65, 65 n. 96,

67-69, 69 n. 106, 70-73, 75, 77,150, 166-67, 232

rirjii 139, 140 n. 20

salb 32, 174 n. 12Samad 33~elf-necessary being 84 n. 10, 86,

88,88 n. 27,89,94,106,175-76,182

self-necessity 80, 83, 86, 88-89, 106self-subsistence 89self-subsisting form 102self-volition 131, 138, 146, 149, 155,

157-58, 158 n. 62, 163semper 90 n. 36, 211, 213, 215,

217-20sempiternal 8, 89, 93, 111-12, 146,

182 n. 34, 185-86, 186 n. 43, 188n. 48, 196-97, 211-12, 225, 229,233

sempiternity 8-9, 38, 79-80, 92n. 49, 93, 112, 118 n. 120, 169,182, 185, 186 n. 43, 187, 196--97,210--11,211 n. 114,212-13,215,224-25, 225 n. 152, 226, 233

sifat 32similarity 15, 17, 29, 31-32,40-41,

45-46, 51 n. 58, 63-64, 66--67, 76,86, 93, 103, 112, 114 n. 113, 116,201-203, 231-32

simplicity 17, 34-35, 39, 48-49, 53,67, 73, 77, 80, 82 n_ 3, 89, 96-97,

249

99, 101, 107, III n. 101, 113, 116,120, 124, 145-47, 150, 155, 158,167

substratum 30, 97-98, 186-89, 211,214-15

sufficient cause 10, 169, 215synonyms 49

tashkik 26, 37, 37 n. 28, 38-40,76-78, 16, 231

temporal beginning 1, 5-6, 18, 79,82 n. 3, 92, 169-70, 172, 172 n. 7,185-86, 188, 190, 209-10, 212-13,215-17, 222, 222 n. 146, 226-29,233

temporal non-existence 183-89,192-93, 196, 198 n. 68, 214-15,219, 222-23

temporal posteriority 13, 97 n. 57,171, 193, 196, 220-22, 224-25,227-30, 233

temporal priority 13, 38, 92,92 n. 43, 195, 229

temporal succession 116theological language 1, 15, 17-19,

25-26, 40-42, 56, 60, 62-63, 74,76, 78-79, 81, 120, 126, 131-32,147, 149, 166-68, 231-32

theological statements 26, 41-42, 59,62-63, 65, 70-71, 73-75, 78, 120,231

Theology if Aristotle 6Timaeus 4 n. 8, 6time ix, 5-9, 18, 90-92, 92 nn. 45,

49, 93, 96, 101, 108-12, 112 n. 106,113,118,118 nn. 120, 122, 119,169-70, 172 n. 7, 180, 182, 184-86,186 n. 43, 188, 190, 193--96, 198n. 68, 200, 208-209, 209 n. 105,212-13, 215-19, 221-22, 222n. 146, 223-25, 225 n. 153,226-30, 233

univocal predication 52, 53 n. 64,64 n. 91, 65, 65 n. 96, 68, 76

univocally 25, 36, 50, 51 n. 58,56, 60 n. 84, 65-66, 68, 70, 74,76-77, 125, 231

unknowability of God 55 -56, 58,61, 75

unspecified existence 103

vertically ordered 92voluntary act 132, 139, 167

INDEX OF TOPICS250

voluntary action 10, 18-19, 132-33,13S, 137-38, 140, 149, ISI-S4, 219

voluntary agent 14, 81, 136, 138,I49-S0, IS2, 169, 191, 2IS-16,218, 221, 226-27, 229, 233

wajib 87, 87 n. 20wajib al-wujud 33, 82, 82 n. Swujud 31, 36

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

TEXTS AND STUDIES

ISSN 0169-8729

8. Fakhry, M. Ethical Theories in Islam. Second expanded edition. 1994.

ISBN 90 04 09300 I9. Kemal, S. The Poetics ofAlfarabi andAvicenna. 1991. ISBN 90 04 093710

10. Alon, I. Socrates in Medieval Arabic Literature. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09349 4

11. Bos, G. Qusta ibn Liiqa sMedical Regimefor the Pilgrims to Mecca. The Risala fi

tadblr safar al-hajj. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09541 1

12. Kohlberg, E. A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work. Ibn Tawiis and his Library.

1992. ISBN 90 04 09549 713. Daiber, H. Naturwissenschaft bei den Arabern im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Briefe

des AM I-Fa1:ll Ibn al-'AmId (gest. 360/970) an 'A1:ludaddaula. Herausgegeben

mit Einleitung, kommentierter Ubersetzung und Glossar. 1993.

ISBN 90 04 09755414. Dhanani, A. The Physical Theory ofKalam. Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian

Mu'tazilI Cosmology. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09831315. Abii Ma'sar. The Abbreviation ofthe Introduction to Astrology. Together with the

Medieval Latin Translation of Adelard of Bath. Edited and Translated by Ch.

Bumett, K. Yamamoto and M. Yano. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09997 216. Sabiir Ibn Sahl. Dispensatorium Parvum (al-Aqrabadhrn al-saghlr). Analysed,

Edited and Annotated by O. Kahl. 1994. ISBN 90 0410004017. Mar6th, M. Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie. Ubersetzung aus

dem Ungarischen von Johanna Till und Gabor Kerekes. 1994.

ISBN 90 04 10008 318. Ibn AbI al-Dunya. Morality in the Guise ofDreams. A Critical Edition ofKitab al

Manam, with Introduction, by Leah Kinberg. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09818 6

19. Kiigelgen, A. von. Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Ansatze zu einer Neube

griindung des Rationalismus im Islam. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09955 720. Lameer, 1. Al-Farabr and Aristotelian Syllogistics. Greek Theory and Islamic

Practice. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09884 422. Adang, C. Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible. 1996.

ISBN 90 04 10034 223. Dallal, A.S. An Islamic Response to GreekAstronomy. Kitab Ta'drl Hay'at al-Ajl.ak

ofSadr al-Shari'a. Edited with Translation and Commentary. 1995.

ISBN 90 04 09968 924. Conrad, L.I. (ed.). The World of Ibn Tufayl. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on

I:Iayy ibn Yaqsan. 1995. ISBN 90 0410135725. Hennansen, M.K. (tr.). The Conclusive Argument from God. Shah Wall Allah of

Delhi's lfujjat Allah al-Baligha. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10298 I26. Abrahamov, B. Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur'an in the

Theology ofal-Qasim ibn Ibriihrm. Kitab al-Mustarshid. 1996.ISBN 90 04 10408 9

27. Wild, S. (ed.). The Qur'an as Text. 1996. ISBN 9004 103449

28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). Islam: Essays on Scripture. Thought and

Society. A Festschrift in Honour ofAnthony H. lohns. 1997. ISBN 9004 10692 829. Jolivet, 1. and R. Rashed (eds.). (Euvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al

Kindi. Volume 1. L'Optique et la Catoptrique, Edited by R. Rashed. 1997.ISBN 90 04 09781 3

30. Rudolph, U. Al-Miituridi und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand. 1997.ISBN 90 04 10023 7

31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition.Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy ofIbn Rushd (I 126-1 198).

Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996).ISBN 90 04 11308 8

32. Elmore, G.T. Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time. Ibn al-'Arabi's Book ofthe Fabulous Gryphon. 1999. ISBN 90 04109919

33. Abii Ma'sar. Kitiib al-milal wa-d-duwa!. Arabic text edited by K. Yamamoto with

an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Bumett. 1999.ISBN 90 04 10725 8

34. Albumasar. De Magnis Coniunctionibus (On the Great Coniunctions). Latin text

edited by Ch. Bumett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamotoand Ch. Bumett. 1999. ISBN 90 04 110747

35. Stroumsa, S. Freethinkers ofMedieval Islam. Ibn al-Rawandi, Abii Bakr al-Razi,and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 113746

36. King, D.A. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca.Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. 1999. ISBN 9004 113673

37. Bar-Asher, M.M. Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imiimi Shiism. 1999.ISBN 90 04 11495 5

38. Sayyid Jalal aI-Din Ashtiyani et al. Consciousness and Reality. Studies in Memory ofToshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 115862

39. Schmidtke, S. Theologie, Philosophie und Myslik im zwolfershiitiSchen Islam des

9.115. Jahrhunderts. Die Gedankenwelten des Ibn Abi rumhiJr al-Ahsa'i (urn838/1434-35 - nach 906/1501).2000. ISBN 9004115315

40. Griffel, F. Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zu al-Gazalis Urteil

gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen. 2000.ISBN 90 04 115668

41. Heemskerk, M.T. Sufftring in the Mu'tazilite Theology. 'Abd al_Jllbbar's Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11726 I

42. Rashed, R. and H. Bellosta. 1briihim 1bn Sinan. Logique et GeOlnetrie au xeSiecle. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11804 7

43. Tamer, G. Islamische Philosophie und die Kriseder Moderne. Das Verhiiltnis vonLeo Strauss zu Alfarabi, Avicenna und Averroes. 2001. ISBN 90 04 120297

44. Genequand, e. Alexander ofAphrodisias on the Cosmos. 200 I.ISBN 90 04 11963 9

45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam.Volume one. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12381 4Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123822

46. Swartz, M. A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzi's KitabAkhbar as-Sirat. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123768

47. Kusuba, T. and D. Pingree. Arabic Astronomy in Sanskrit. AI-BiIjandi on Tadhkira II, Chapter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124756

48. iskenderoglu, M. Fakhr aI-din al-Riizi and Thomas Aquinas on the Question oftheEternity ofthe World. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124802

49. Reisman, D.C. The making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Con

tents, and Structure ofIbn Sina's al-Muba!).al~H(The Discussions). 2002.ISBN 90 04125043

50. Behloul, S.M. Ibn Hazms Evangelienkritik. Eine methodische Untersuchung.2002. ISBN 90 04 125272

51. Charette, F. Mathematical Instrumentation in Fourteenth-Century Egypt andSyria. The Illustrated Treatise ofNajm ai-Din al-Misri. 2003.ISBN 90 04130152

52. Reisman, D.e. (ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 9004 129782

53. Kahl, O. Siibur Ibn Sah!. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04129960

54. Bumett, C., 1.p. Hogendijk, K. Plofker and M. Yano. Studies in the History oftheExact Sciences in Honour ofDavid Pingree. 2004. ISBN 9004 132023

56. McGinnis, 1. (ed.). Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval

Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2004.ISBN 90 04 139605

57. Eschraghi, A. Frilhe Saibi- und Biibi-Theologie. Die Darlegung der Beweise fUr

Mu!).ammads besonderes Prophetentum (Ar-Risiilafi Itbat an-Nubuwa al-Ijiissa).2004. ISBN 90 04 140344

58. Acar, R. Talking about God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna's and ThomasAquinas' positions. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14477 3

59. Akasoy, A. Philosophie und Mystik in der spiiten Almohadenzeit. Die Sicilianischen Fragen des Ibn Sab'jn. 2005. ISBN 90 04 145222

60. Sch6ck, C. Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik. Zum Verhiiltnis von arabischerund aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und SchluBlehre. 2005.ISBN 90 04145885

62. Mourad, S.A. Early Islam between Myth and History. AI-l:Iasan al-Basri (d.

IlOH/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship.2005. ISBN 90 04 148299

27. Wild, S. (ed.). The Qur'an as Text. 1996. ISBN 90 04 103449

28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought andSociety. A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns. 1997. ISBN 9004 106928

29. Jolivet, 1. and R. Rashed (eds.). CEuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al

Kindt. Volume 1. L'Optique et la Catoptrique. Edited by R. Rashed.1997.

ISBN 90 04 09781 3

30. Rudolph, U. Al-Miiturtdt und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand. 1997.

ISBN 90 04 10023 7

31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition.

Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198).

Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996).

ISBN 90 04113088

32. Elmore, G.T. Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time. Ibn al-'Arabj's Book of

the Fabulous Gryphon. 1999. ISBN 90 04 10991 9

33. Abu Ma'sar. Kitiib al-milal wa-d-duwal. Arabic text edited by K. Yamamoto with

an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Bumett. 1999.

ISBN 90 04 10725 8


edited by Ch. Bumett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamotoand Ch. Bumett. 1999. ISBN 90 04110747

35. Stroumsa, S. Freethinkers ofMedieval Islam. Ibn al-RawandI, Abu Bakr al-RazI,and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 113746

36. King, D.A. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca.

Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. 1999. ISBN 90 04 113673

37. Bar-Asher, M.M. Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imiimt Shiism. 1999.ISBN 90 04 11495 5

38. Sayyid Jalal ai-DIn AshtiyanI et a1. Consciousness and Reality. Studies in Memory of Toshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 115862

39. Schmidtke, S. Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik im zwolfershiitischen Islam des

9./15. Jahrhunderts. Die Gedankenwelten des Ibn AbI rumhur al·Ahsa'I (urn83811434-35 - nach 90611501). 2000. ISBN 90 04 11531 5

40. Griffel, F. Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zual-GazalIs Urteilgegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen. 2000.ISBN 90 04 115668

41. Heemskerk, M.T. Suffering in the Mu'tazilite Theology. 'Abd al-Jabbar's Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11726 1

42. Rashed, R. and H. Bellosta. 1briihlm Ibn Siniin. Logique et Geometrie au xeSiecle. 2000. ISBN 90 04 118047

43. Tamer, G. Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne. Das Verhaltnis vonLeo Strauss zu Alfarabi, Avicenna und Averroes. 2001. ISBN 900412029 7

44. Genequand, C. Alexander ofAphrodisias on the Cosmos. 2001.ISBN 90 04119639

45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval1s1am.Volume one. 2002. ISBN 9004123814Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123822

46. Swartz, M. A: . . .Akhbar as S' Medieval Cntlque of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzl's Kitab

.- .Ifat. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12376847. Kusuba, T. and. .

kira II Ch D. Pmgree. ArabIC Astronomy in Sanskrit. AI-BitjandI on Tadh-48 isken~e valPter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124756

. rog u, M. F. kh - - - .Eternity if h a r al-dm al-Razl and Thomas Aqumas on the Question ofthe

49. Reismano~ e World. 2002. ISBN 90 04124802 .

, .C. The ki .r hA'tents, and St ma ng OJ t e vlcennan Tradition. The Transmission, Con-

ISBN 90 04 %c~~~e30fIbn SIna's al-Mubaha!at (The Discussions). 2002.

50. Behlolll, S-rvt Ib2002. ISBN' n flazms Evangelienkritik. Eine methodische Untersuchung.

900412527251. Charette F , .<

, . LVlathem t' I r .. FSyria. 'the I1l a Ica mstrumentatlOn m ourteenth-Century Egypt andISBN 90 0411lstrated Treatise ofNajm aI-DIn al-MISrl. 2003.

3015252. Reisman D C

ence of the ~~i(ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Confer-53. Kahl () S-b' cenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129782

, . a ur lb S54. Burnett C J n ahl. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129960

, ·,.P Roge d"k K PI fkExact S . . . n IJ, . 0 er and M. Yano. Studies in the History oftheclences m }f,

56. McGinn' J Onour ofDavid Pingree. 2004. ISBN 9004132023IS, . (ed) It.. .

Islam. Proceed' '. n erpretmg AVlcenna: SCIence and Philosophy in MedievalISBN 9004 I mgs of the Second Conference ofthe Avicenna Study Group. 2004.

3960557. Eschraghi, A. Friihe - . _ _ _ .'

Muha1ll d 5mbl- und Babl-Theologle. DIe Darlegung der Beweise flir. ma s besond . _ _ _

2004. ISBN 9 eres Prophetentum (Ar-RIsalafi Itbat an-Nubuwa al-ljiissa).004 140344

58. Acar, It Talki bAquinas' os.n

ga Out God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna's and Thomas

59. Akasoy ; ;h~ns. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14477 3, . hllosO'Phi d M t'k' d .. Alschen" e un ys I m er spaten mohadenzeit Die Siciliani-rragen d Ib .

60. Schock C es n Sab'In. 2005. ISBN 90 04 145222, . Koranex .

und arist t I' egese, Grammatlk und Logik. Zum Verhiiltnis von arabischero e IScher U .

ISBN 9004 rtells-, Konsequenz- und SchluBlehre. 2005.145885

62. Mourad, SA Ear110H1728CE) ly 151am between Myth and History. AI-Hasan al-Basrl (d.2005. [SBN 9 and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship.

004148299

27. Wild, S. (ed.). The Qur'an as Text. 1996. ISBN 90 04 103449

28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought andSociety. A Festschrift in Honour ofAnthony H. Johns. 1997. ISBN 90 04 106928

29. Jolivet, 1. and R. Rashed (eds.). CEuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al

Kindi. Volume 1. L'Optique et la Catoptrique. Edited by R. Rashed. 1997.

ISBN 90 04 09781 3

30. Rudolph, U. Al-Miituridi und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand. 1997.

ISBN 90 04 10023 7

31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition.

Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy ofIbn Rushd (1126-1198).

Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996).

ISBN 90 04113088

32. Elmore, G.T. Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time. Ibn al-'Arabl's Book of

the Fabulous Gryphon. 1999. ISBN 90 04109919

33. Abu Ma'sar. Kitiib al-milal wa-d-duwal. Arabic text edited by K. Yamamoto with

an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Bumett. 1999.

ISBN 90 04 10725 8


edited by Ch. Bumett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamoto

and Ch. Bumett. 1999. ISBN 90 04110747

35. Stroumsa, S. Freethinkers ofMedieval Islam. Ibn al-Rawandi, Abu Bakr al-Razi,

and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11374 6

36. King, D.A. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca.

Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. 1999. ISBN 90 04113673

37. Bar-Asher, M.M. Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imiimi Shiism. 1999.ISBN 90 04 11495 5

38. Sayyid Jalal aI-Din Ashtiyani et al. Consciousness and Reality. Studies in Memo

ry of Toshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 115862

39. Schmidtke, S. Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik im zwolfershiitischen Islam des

9./15. Jahrhunderts. Die Gedankenwelten des Ibn Abi rumhur al-Ahsa'i (urn

838/1434-35 - nach 906/1501).2000. ISBN 90 04 11531 5

40. Griffel, F. Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zu al-GazalIs Urteil

gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen. 2000.ISBN 90 04 115668

41. Heemskerk, M.T. Suffering in the Mu'tazilite Theology. 'Abd al-Jabbar's Teach

ing on Pain and Divine Justice. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11726 I

42. Rashed, R. and H. Bellosta. Ibriihlm Ibn Siniin. Logique et Geometrie au xeSiecle. 2000. ISBN 90 04 118047

43. Tamer, G.Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne. Das Verhaltnis von

Leo Strauss zu Alfarabi, Avicenna und Averroes. 2001. ISBN 90 04120297

44. Genequand, C. Alexander ofAphrodisias on the Cosmos. 200 I.ISBN 90 04 119639

45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam.Volume one. 2002. ISBN 90 04123814Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123822

46. Swartz, M. A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzl's Kitab

Akhbar a~-SiIat. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12376 8

47. Kusuba, T. and D. Pingree. Arabic Astronomy in Sanskrit. AI-Bitjandi on Tadh

kira 11, Chapter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124756

48. iskenderoglu, M. Fakhr ai-din al-Riizi and Thomas Aquinas on the Question oftheEternity ofthe World. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124802

49. Reisman, D.C. The making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Con

tents, and Structure ofIbn Sina's al-Mubaha!at (The Discussions). 2002.

ISBN 90 0412504350. Behloul, S.M. Ibn lfazms Evangelienkritik. Eine methodische Untersuchung.

2002. ISBN 90 04 12527251. Charette, F. Mathematical Instrumentation in Fourteenth-Century Egypt and

Syria. The Illustrated Treatise of Najm ai-Din al-Misr!. 2003.

ISBN 90 0413015 2

52. Reisman, D.C. (ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Confer

ence of the Avicenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129782

53. Kahl, O. Siibur Ibn Sahl. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129960

54. Bumett, c., IP. Hogendijk, K. Plofker and M. Yano. Studies in the History of the

Exact Sciences in Honour ofDavid Pingree. 2004. ISBN 90.04 132023

56. McGinnis, I (ed.). Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval

Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2004.

ISBN 90 04 13960 557. Eschraghi, A. Friihe Saibi- und Biibi-Theologie. Die Darlegung der Beweise fur

Mui:lammads besonderes Prophetentum (Ar-Risiilafi Itbat an-Nubuwa al-/jii!)sa).

2004. ISBN 90 04 14034458. Acar, R. Talking about God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna's and Thomas

Aquinas' positions. 2005. ISBN 90 0414477 359. Akasoy, A. Philosophie und Mystik in der spiiten Almohadenzeit. Die Siciliani

schen Fragen des Ibn Sab'in. 2005. ISBN 90 04 145222

60. Schock, C. Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik. Zum Verhiiltnis von arabischer

und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und SchluBlehre. 2005.

ISBN 90 04 14588562. Mourad, S.A. Early Islam between Myth and History. AI-Hasan al-Basri (d.

IIOH/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship.

2005. ISBN 90 04148299

Acar Talking about God and Creation 2005.pdf

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