Academic Discipline

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986

DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President of National

University,respondents.

Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.

Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National

University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued

and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable

remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:

1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective

courses is "the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not hostile attitude to

the student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights already recorded in Rockie C. San

Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its utter contempt for the principle of due

process of law to the prejudice of petitioners;" and

3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if there

be any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend

themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).

In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant to

this Court's requirement therefor1, respondents make the claim:

1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their

own fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;"

2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was

already closed;"


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3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in

leading boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this development sometime in August,

1982, the latter had demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to the province"; that

Guzman was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National

University, et al.,"at the hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the

students involved (to) take advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to them to study;"

that Guzman "however continued to lead or actively participate in activities within the university

premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes

therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of

properties of respondent University on September 12, 1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil

Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San

Juan et al.'for damages arising from destruction of university properties

4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively participate,

contrary to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No. 65443 inwhich he was also one of the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within university

premises but without permit from university officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;"

and

5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "

Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:

1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek

enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of higher

learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who continuallydespise and villify respondent university and its officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking

enrollment in an institution that they hate.

2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all

concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.

3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be compelled

to enroll them after the end of the semester.

On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:

... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the same and to

require a REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY INJUNCTION,

enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester without prejudice

to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be subjected with their right to lawful

defense recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that

there is a pending criminal charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the


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opinion that, as above-noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding

against him, that he be allowed to resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the

petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending full cooperation with

petitioners to assure that whatever protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be

ventilated in a lawful and peaceful manner.

Petitioners' REPLY inter alia

1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already

closed), it being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so several

times before that date, all to no avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to do

so" respondents' ostensible reason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within

the school premises," although there were no existing disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo"

at the time;

2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution2justifies the conclusion that

"petitioners' right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted or limited; and

3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the permission of

the school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused to issue such permit

repeatedly sought by the students. "

On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:

... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition for

extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction as well as

the respondents' comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for petitioners to the respondents'

comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the respondents' comment as

ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty

(20) days from notice. ... .

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they

had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had

indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit

from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein"3or perpetrated acts of "vandalism,

coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of

University authority." 4Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for

malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for hisexpulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this

Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment

for poor scholastic standing.

Under the Education Act of 1982, 5the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely

choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to


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graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."6Petitioners

were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in

the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools 7that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student

except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly

promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted." 8This Court is therefore

constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute,9to declare illegal this act of respondents of

imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.

Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed

expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of incorporation, and

indispensable to the successful management of the college." 10The rules may include those governing

student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on

"every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools;11

and in this connection, the

Manual further provides that-

... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly

specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians.

Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may

deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise

specified.12

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.

And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail

proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.

The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to

petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to

satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in

writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer

the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the

evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the

evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school

authorities to hear and decide the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to re-

enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary

proceedings to which any or all of them may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein set

forth.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, CJ., Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and

Paras, JJ., concur.


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Footnotes

1 Resolution, Aug. 14, 1986.

2 In G.R. No. 65443 dated Nov. 23,1983,supra

3 Par. 3 (c), Comment; p. 11, rollo.

4 Par. 1, Memorandum of Respondents; p. 75, rollo.

5 B.P. Blg. 232, eff. Sept. 12, 1982; see Villar v. Technological

Institute, etc., 135 SCRA 706, 710, citing Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

6 Sec. 9 (2); See also, par. 107, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

7 Promulgated on the authority of the Private School Law, Act 2706.

8 Par. 145, emphasis supplied.

9 117 SCRA 581.

10 Pratt vs. Wheaton College, 40 Ill 186, cited in "The Law on Schools and Students," Dizon, A., Revised

Ed., p. 29.

11 Supra; footnote 7; See Art.XV, Sec. 8 (4), 1973 Constitution.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No.76353 September 29,1989

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU, BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA.REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHEILA DINOSO,RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ANNALIZA EVIDENTE, FRANCIS FERNANDO, ZENNY GUDITO,EDGAR LIBERATO, JULIET LIPORADA, GABRIEL MONDRAGON, JOSE MARIA PACKING,DOMINIC PETILLA, MA. SHALINA PITOY, SEVERINO RAMOS, VICTOR SANTIAGO,CAROLINA SARMIENTO, FERDINAND TORRES, RICARDO VENTIGAN and other students ofthe PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (Q.C.) similarlysituated, petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR.

JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of PSBA,ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, in his capacity as Vice- President for Admission andRegistration, MR. RUBEN ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, MR. RAMONAGAPAY, in his capacity as Director of the Office of Student Affairs and MR. ROMEO RAFER,in his capacity as Chief Security of PSBA, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PARAS, J .:

On May 2, 1988, this Court through its Second Division rendered a Decision in the instant casewhich prodded the Intervenor Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union) to file a motion forreconsideration. Its argument hinges on the pronouncement that

x x x. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required forcollege teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of thefirst semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with thestudents or with intervening teachers. Such being the case, charge of denial of dueprocess is untenable. It is time-honored principle that contracts are respected as thelaw between the contracting parties. x x x (p. 12, Decision, italics supplied).(p. 874-875, Rollo)

with the allegedly inevitable consequence of extenuating the pernicious practice of management toarbitrarily and wantonly terminate teachers simply because their contracts of employment havealready lapsed.

The motion likewise points out the fact that two of the faculty members, namely Mr. Asser (Bong)Tamayo, and Mr. Rene Encarnacion, supposedly found guilty by the Investigating Committeeheaded by Mr. Antonio M. Magtalas (p. 342, Rollo), had been issued permanent appointments (notmere temporary contracts) by no less than the President of the School himself. The appointment ofMr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo dated August 9, 1986 (p. 887, Rollo) can attest to this claim.

It is on the basis of the foregoing that We hereby amend Our previous statements on the matter.


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In a recent Decision, 1this Court had the opportunity to quite emphatically enunciate the precept thatfull-time teachers who have rendered three (3) years of satisfactory service shall be consideredpermanent (par. 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). Thus, having attained apermanent status, they cannot be removed from office except for just cause and after due process.

Now applying the same principle in the case at bar, Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo having stayed in the

Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA, for brevity) for three andone-half (3 1/2) years (in a full-time capacity) may be deemed a permanent faculty memberprovided, of course, the services rendered have been satisfactory to the school. However, becausethe investigation showed that Mr. Tamayo had participated in the unlawful demonstration, hisservices cannot be deemed satisfactory.

In the case of Mr. Rene Encarnacion, and Mr. Severino Cortes, Jr. who taught in PSBA for two andone-half (2 1/2) years and one and one-half (1 1/2) years respectively, to them a permanent statuscannot be accorded for failure to meet the minimum requirement of three (3) years set by theaforementioned Manual of Regulations. Of equal importance, at this point, is the fact that the letter ofappointment had been extended only to Mr. Tamayo and not to Mr. Encarnacion, neither to Mr.Cortes, Jr.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons adverted to hereinabove, the motion for reconsideration, exceptinsofar as We have made the aforementioned clarificatory statements about the tenure of full-timeteachers and professors, is hereby DENIED.

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete theireducation in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort torallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom ofspeech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must alwaysbe conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedomin all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedominto degenerate license.

SO ORDERED.

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.

Melencio-Herrera, J., Except for the general statement that students' enrollment is limited to persemester, I concur.

Regalado, J., took no part.

Cortes, J., Concurring and dissenting in a separate opinion.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano, JJ., Join in Mme. Justice Cortes' concurring and dissentingopinion.


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Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Like Mr. Justice Sarmiento, I am also disturbed by the ruling of the majority sustaining thedisciplinary action taken against the students for what, I consider a valid exercise of their freedom ofexpression. The circumstance that the demonstrations were attended by some disorder is not in myview sufficient justification for the curtailment of their right, much less for their punishment. And I donot agree either that the sanctions may be sustained because some of the students wereacademically deficient, for the truth is that they were denied re-enrollment not because of suchdeficiency but because of the demonstrations. Surely, freedom of expression is not only for theintelligent.

I also have my misgivings about the ruling of the Court that a student's enrollment is from semesterto semester and may be terminated at will by the school after each period. I submit that when astudent is enrolled for a particular course, the implicit understanding is that he is entitled to remain in

the school until he graduates, subject only to the usual academic, financial and other reasonablerequirements.

For these reasons, I must also dissent.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I reiterate in the strongest terms possible, my dissent in the Decision of May 2, 1988. Let it also beattached and incorporated by reference hereto.

In my opinion, the majority has ignored, by inadvertence or design, the constitutional underpinningssupporting the case.

I also hold as untenable, sarcastic, and condescending what would come down, to all intents andpurposes, as the disposition of the motion for reconsideration:

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete theireducation in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort torallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom ofspeech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must alwaysbe conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedomin all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom

into degenerate license.

1

The question, precisely, is whether or not the "rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies" 2had beenconducted with "resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence." 3The majority would have it, so itappears from the Resolution and so I would make it out therefrom, that the fact alone that thepetitioning students had held the questioned gathering en masse, they, ergo, had been guilty of"intimidation, coercion, or violence." 4In my brethren's disposition of May 2, 1988, reference wasmade on alleged "noisy demonstrations" 5but that was all. There was no mention, indeed, anyevidence, of "intimidation, coercion, or violence"6that would warrant a judicial rebuke.


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In my dissent (on the main Decision), I alluded to two cases, both landmark in character: Malabananv. Ramento7and U.S. vs. Apurado.8I turn to Ramento:

x x x If in the course of such demonstration with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable.Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They would be ineffective if during a rally they

speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympatheticaudience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into accountthe excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth.They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in theschool premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder isdiscernible.9

I also advert toApurado:

It is rather expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protestagainst grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wroughtto a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the

less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct byindividual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as seditious andtumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress ofgrievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the mostrighteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part thereinto the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did nothappen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur onsuch occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmostdiscretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct andbetween an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. 10

The foregoing are principles well-entrenched in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence. The instant

Resolution, and much to my regret, undoes all that.

It also undoes whatRamentohas so eloquently written

8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other thanthat specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of theUniversity. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision ofrespondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m."Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition,even a censure-certainly not a suspension could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondentscould and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infractionconsidering the places

where and the time when the demonstration took place there was a disruption of the classes andstoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did takea much more serious view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much toosevere. While the discretion of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized,the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept ofproportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an elementof arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this constitutionalobjection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be punishment enough. 11


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Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Like Mr. Justice Sarmiento, I am also disturbed by the ruling of the majority sustaining thedisciplinary action taken against the students for what, I consider a valid exercise of their freedom ofexpression. The circumstance that the demonstrations were attended by some disorder is not in myview sufficient justification for the curtailment of their right, much less for their punishment. And I donot agree either that the sanctions may be sustained because some of the students wereacademically deficient, for the truth is that they were denied re-enrollment not because of suchdeficiency but because of the demonstrations. Surely, freedom of expression is not only for theintelligent.

I also have my misgivings about the ruling of the Court that a student's enrollment is from semester

to semester and may be terminated at will by the school after each period. I submit that when astudent is enrolled for a particular course, the implicit understanding is that he is entitled to remain inthe school until he graduates, subject only to the usual academic, financial and other reasonablerequirements.

For these reasons, I must also dissent.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I reiterate in the strongest terms possible, my dissent in the Decision of May 2, 1988. Let it also be

attached and incorporated by reference hereto.

In my opinion, the majority has ignored, by inadvertence or design, the constitutional underpinningssupporting the case.

I also hold as untenable, sarcastic, and condescending what would come down, to all intents andpurposes, as the disposition of the motion for reconsideration:

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete theireducation in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort torallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom ofspeech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always

be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedomin all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedominto degenerate license.1

The question, precisely, is whether or not the "rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies" 2had beenconducted with "resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence." 3The majority would have it, so itappears from the Resolution and so I would make it out therefrom, that the fact alone that thepetitioning students had held the questioned gathering en masse, they, ergo, had been guilty of"intimidation, coercion, or violence." 4In my brethren's disposition of May 2, 1988, reference was


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made on alleged "noisy demonstrations" 5but that was all. There was no mention, indeed, anyevidence, of "intimidation, coercion, or violence"6that would warrant a judicial rebuke.

In my dissent (on the main Decision), I alluded to two cases, both landmark in character: Malabananv. Ramento 7and U.S. vs. Apurado.8I turn to Ramento:

x x x If in the course of such demonstration with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable.Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They would be ineffective if during a rally theyspeak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympatheticaudience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into accountthe excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth.They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in theschool premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder isdiscernible.9

I also advert to Apurado:

It is rather expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protestagainst grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wroughtto a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, theless perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct byindividual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as seditious andtumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress ofgrievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the mostrighteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part thereinto the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did nothappen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur onsuch occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmostdiscretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and

between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. 10

The foregoing are principles well-entrenched in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence. The instantResolution, and much to my regret, undoes all that.

It also undoes what Ramento has so eloquently written

8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other thanthat specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of theUniversity. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision ofrespondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m."

Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition,even a censure-certainly not a suspension could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondentscould and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction-considering the places whereand the time when the demonstration took place there was a disruption of the classes and stoppageof work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a muchmore serious view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe.While the discretion of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the ruleof reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionalitybetween the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of


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arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this constitutionalobjection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be punishment enough. 11

Footnotes

1 Labajo, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., G.R. NO. 80383, Sept. 26, 1988.

SARMIENTO'S Separate Opinion Footnotes:

1 Alcuaz, et al. v. PSBA Q.C., 3-4.

2 Supra, 3.

3 Supra, 4.

4 Supra.

5 Alcuaz, et al. v. PSBA Q.C., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988,14.

6 Alcuaz, et al. v. PSBA Q.C., supra 4.

7 No. 62270, 70, 21. 1984, 129 SCRA 359.

8 7 Phil. 422 (1907).

9 Malabanan v. Ramento, supra, 369.

10 U.S. v. Apurado, supra, 426.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990

ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON,LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO,GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES, petitioners,vs.HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th Regional Trial Court,Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC., represented by its presidentROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of Trustees, JUSTOLUKBAN, respondents.

Antonio A. Ayo Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr., for petitioners

Pedro A. Venida Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echaro for private respondents.

CORTES, J .:

Petitioners urge the Court en bancto review and reverse the doctrine laid down inAlcuaz, etal.v.Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for

one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contractbetween the student and the school is deemed terminated.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were notallowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating instudent mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests isnot, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quoseeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school,but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in theAlcuazvs.PSBAis exactly on the point at issue in this case but the authority of the schoolregarding admission of students, save as a matter of compassionate equity whenany of the petitioners would, at the least, qualify for re-enrollment, this petition ishereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.]


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A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on February 24, 1989 inthis wise:

Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas S.J., andthat really there must be a better way of treating students and teachers than themanner ruled (not suggested) by the Supreme Court, the Termination of Contract at

the end of the semester, that is.

But applicable rule in the case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court in the caseof Sophia Alcuaz, et al.vs.Philippine School of Business Administration, QuezonCity Branch (PSBA), et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988; that of the termination atthe end of the semester, reason for the critical comments of Joaquin G. Bernas andDoods Santos, who both do not agree with the ruling.

Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their failure tospecifically deny respondent's affirmative defenses that "they were given all thechances to air their grievances on February 9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also onFebruary 22, 1988 during which they were represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and

that on February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College,petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit,physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting thescheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to bepresent in their classes.

Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived their privilege tobe admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed,and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. Said formspecifically states that:

The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of studentswhose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require

withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/orwhose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficientoperation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behavein accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.

In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges which amongothers uniformly reads:

In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College and of myprivileges as student of this institution, I hereby pledge/ promiseunder oath to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laiddown by competent authorities in the College Department or School

in which I am enrolled. Specifically:

xxx xxx xxx

3. I will respect my Alma Matter the Mabini College, which I representand see to it that I conduct myself in such a manner that the collegewig not be put to a bad light;

xxx xxx xxx


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9. I will not release false or unauthorized announcement which tendto cause confusion or disrupt the normal appreciation of the college.

Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for mandamus toprosper (Sec. 3, Rule 65). It being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a studentto be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit

the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by theschool in accordance with the Supreme Court rulings in the cases of Garciavs.Faculty [Admission Committee](G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975)and Tangonon vs.Pano, et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).

WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of merit, themotion for reconsideration of the order of this Court dated August 8, 1988 is herebyDENIED.

SO ORDERED. [Rollopp. 15-16.]

Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorariwith prayer for preliminary mandatory

injunction.

The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the Court, which resolved on April 10,1989 to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition. The Court of

Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the petition and set the application for issuance of awrit of preliminary mandatory injunction for hearing. After considering the comment and hearing theinjunction application, the Court of Appeals resolved on May 22, 1989 to certify the case back to theSupreme Court considering that only pure questions of law were raised.

The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which then transferred it to the Court enbancon August 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. On September 14,1989, the Court en bancaccepted the case and required respondents to comment.

Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989. Petitioners were required to reply. Asreply, they filed a pleading entitled "Counter-Comment," to which respondents filed a rejoinderentitled "Reply to Counter-Comment To this petitioners filed a "Rejoinder to Reply."

The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.

At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the following excerpt fromAlcuaz:

It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolledfor one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for PrivateSchools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he isenrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the"written contracts" required for college teachers are for "one semester." It is thusevident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has anyexisting contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such beingthe case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honoredprinciple that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties(Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987,citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speakof.The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students


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and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, haveno power to make contracts for the parties.' (Henson vs. Intermediate AppellateCourt, et al., supra). [At 161 SCRA 17-18; Emphasis supplied.]

InAlcuaz,the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students, who werebarred from re-enrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it added that "in

the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academicdeficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when this petition was filed, should beallowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time." [At 161 SCRA 22.] Mr. Justice Sarmiento dissentedfrom the majority opinion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers inAlcuaz. The students did notmove for reconsideration. The Court en banc,to which the case had been transferred, denied themotion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 29, 1989, but added as an obiterdictum:

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students tocomplete their education in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully

respect their right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for the redress of theirgrievances and as part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, stillsuch rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully,and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all itsforms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvertfreedom into degenerate license.

The majority's failure to expressly repudiate the "termination of contract" doctrine enunciated in thedecision provoked several dissents on that issue. Although seven (7) members of theCourt *disagreed with the Second Division's dismissal of the students petition, a definitive ruling onthe issue could not have been made because no timely motion for reconsideration was filed by thestudents. (As stated above, the motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers.)

Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down inAlcuaz, insofar as it allowed schoolsto bar the readmission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract, shall bemade in this case where the issue is squarely raised by petitioners [Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5].

Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is not a simple case of a schoolrefusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal toreadmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as areaction to student mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are students of respondentschool who, after leading and participating in student protests, were denied readmission or re-enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly asexercised by students vis-a-visthe right of school officials to discipline them.

Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling inAlcuaz [Order dated August8, 1988;Rollo, pp. 1212-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students' rights andthe school's power to discipline them, to wit:

Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to education,and there is such denial when students are expelled or barred from enrollment for theexercise of their right to free speech and peaceable assembly and/or subjected todisciplinary action without abiding with the requirements of due process. Also, it is


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understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and, at times,vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.

But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . . [Order of February 24,1989; Rollo, p. 13.]

1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.

Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the rights offree speech and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or ofthe press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition thegovernment for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]

This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the 1973Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III, sec. 81, thePhilippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15,

para. 13]. Thus, as early as 1907, the Court inPeople v.Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, upheld the right tospeech and assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition. It said:

Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:

All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain byforce or outside of legal methods any of the following objects areguilty of sedition:

xxx xxx xxx

2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal

government or any public official, from freely exercising its or hisduties or the due execution of any judicial or administrative order.

But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom of speech" or "theright of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress ofgrievances" guaranteed by the express provisions of section 5 of "the Philippine Bill."

xxx xxx xxx

It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly ofthe people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on suchoccasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the

grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be thedisciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if theprosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct byindividual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as aseditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assembleand to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare andthe attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceablemanner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and mostunmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to


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The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe and reduced it to a one-weeksuspension.

The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in three other en banc decisions of theCourt.

In Villar v.Technological Institute of the Philippines,G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706,the Court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barringstudents from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its officials from acts of surveillance, blacklisting,suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But the Court allowed the non-enrollment of students who clearlyincurred marked academic deficiency, with the following caveat:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The academic freedom enjoyed by ''institutions of higher learning" includes theright to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failinggrades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, thatstandard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against

those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly andfree speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thusprejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. [At p. 711.]

InArreza v.Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 94,a case arising from almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court rejected "the infliction ofthe highly- disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of seniorstudents to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly,improper conduct could be attributed to them. [At p. 98].

In Guzman v.National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent schoolwas directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respectivecourses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection withtheir participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.

2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.

While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly,this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students.This was made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v.Des Moines CommunitySchool District,393 US 503, 514: "But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for anyreasonwhether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviormaterially disrupts classwork orinvolves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by theconstitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."

Thus, inMalabanan, the Court said:

xxx xxx xxx

8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the eventsthat transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rallywas held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather thanthe basketball court, of the (VMAS) building of the University. Moreover, it was


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continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of respondentRamento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly went on until 5:30 p.m."Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [ At pp. 370-371].

But, as stated in Guzman,the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of proceduraldue process. Thus:

. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demandsof procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed inwriting of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall havethe right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, ifdesired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall havethe right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be dulyconsidered by the investigating committee or official designated by the schoolauthorities to hear and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].

Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As statedin Malabanan, "[i]f the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction

imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes." [At p. 371].

3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.

Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have escalated notonly because of political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging controversyover increases in tuition fees. But the over-eager hands of some school authorities were noteffectively tied down by the ruling inMalabanan. Instead of suspending or expelling student leaderswho fell into disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of the same stratagem was adopted bythe latter: refusing the students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to, their allegedmisconduct of "illegal assembly" in leading or participating in student mass actions directed againstthe school. Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due to "academic deficiency."

4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student.

The Court, inAlcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it must berepeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinarycontract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution toeducation and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educationalinstitutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].

Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual ofRegulations for Private Schools, which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a school, it isunderstood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester for collegiate courses," which the CourtinAlcuazconstrued as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his

contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.

The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merelyclarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools whereintuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of thedownpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student doesnot complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks,he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials


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for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and OtherFees, which in its totality provides:

137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for theentire school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semesterfor collegiate courses. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing,

within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid thepertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than onemonth may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if hewithdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the secondweek of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. Thestudent may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after thesecond week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiablereason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including thelast month of attendance.

Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled foronly one semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on thesound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to beenrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:

Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university upon meetingits specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the caseof academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student ispresumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is expected tocomplete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.

This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Actof 1982." Section 9 of this act provides:

Sec. 9.Rights of Students in School.In addition to other rights, and subject to the

limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shallenjoy the following rights:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existingcurricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, exceptin cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinaryregulations.

xxx xxx xxx

5.Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students' Rights.

Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that "respondent Mabini College isfree to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyedby the school" [Rollo, p. 16]. To support this conclusion, he cited the cases of Garcia v.The Faculty

Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA277, and Tangonan v.Pano,G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where the Courtemphasized the institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a majorcomponent of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.


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These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the issue was whether a female laystudent has a clear legal right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theologicalstudies leading to a degree. InTangonan, the issue was whether a nursing student, who wasadmitted on probation and who has failed in her nursing subjects, may compel her school to readmither for enrollment.

Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal statement in Villarthat the right ofan institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate againststudents who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there win bea violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711]

6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.

In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private respondents cite the recent casesof Capitol Medical Center, Inc.v.Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989, and Licupv.University of San Carlos,G.R. No. 85839, October 19, 1989, both decided by the First Division ofthe Court.

We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions dissimilar from the issues in thepresent case.

In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close down theschool because of problems emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its faculty. TheCourt ruled that the students had no clear legal right to demand the reopening of the school.

On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not the students were affordedprocedural due process before disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court stated:

The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that they weredeprived of due process of law and that the investigation conducted was far from

impartial and fair. On the contrary, what appear from the record is that the chargesagainst petitioners were adequately established in an appropriate investigation. Theimputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record. . . .

Moreover, Licup, far from adopting the "termination of contract" theory inAlcuaz, impliedly rejected it,to wit:

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, theUSC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom andin the process has the concommitant right to see to it that this freedom is not

jeopardized.

True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fairopportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a studentcommits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academicstandard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review thediscretion of university authorities. (Emphasis supplied.)

7. The Instant Case.


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To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989, quotingfrom their answer filed in the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) haveincurred failing grades, to wit:

a) Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause thesubmission of Form 137 which is a pre-requisite to his re- enrollment and to his

continuing as a student of Mabini;

b) Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has incomplete gradesin four (4) subjects as well as no grades in two (2) subjects;

c) Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) incomplete grades;

d) Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take CMT 1 1 to 22.He is already enrolled at Ago Foundation;

e) Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;

f) Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;

g) George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove the incompletegrade in one (1) subject;

h) Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete grades infive (5) more objects and has no grade in one (1) subject. [Rollo, p. 79.]

Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, that:

a) Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted in the Answer.)

b) Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non- readmission. (The Answerindicates only 8 of the 13 as with deficiencies.)

c) Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.

d) The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognaterights of free speech and peaceable assembly, particularly a February 1988 studentrally. (The crux of the matter, as shown even in the Answer.)

e) There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (Ineffect, admitted in the Answer; evenAlcuazrequired due process.)

f) Respondents admit students with worse deficienciesa clear case ofdiscrimination against petitioners for their role in the student rally. (An equalprotection question.)


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g) Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence whichthey can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-half school-yearsin itself punishment enough. [Rollo, p. 86].

Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano, LourdesBanares, Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused re-enrollment without

just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.

On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the mannerexpressed inGuzman,before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from thepleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mereafterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student massactions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners.Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken againstthem undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process butalso constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.

Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some have only one or two failures, namely,

Rex Magana, Elvin Agura, Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly, their failures cannot beconsidered marked academic deficiency within the context of the Court's decision in Villar.

Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon,George (Jorge) Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents' enumeration whetherthe failures were incurred in only one semester or through the course of several semesters of studyin the school. Neither are the academic standards of respondent school, from which we can gaugewhether or not these students are academically deficient, alleged by respondents. Thus, while theprerogative of schools to set academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm respondentschool's action as to petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon and Torres because of insufficient information.

With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation,such fact alone, if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent school.

However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been takenagainst petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's rulingin Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection withthe February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must becommensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth inGuzman,it must be imposed only afterthe requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from theManual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shallbe imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rulesand regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted."

But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have

become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment andwho have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have alreadybeen more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed whenthey led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in thedisruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purposeand would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials ofrespondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of

Appeals and before the trial court.


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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 andFebruary 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmitand to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its takingthe appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon andDaniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school'sprescribed academic standards.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Medialdea andRegalado, JJ., concur.

Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Like Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla, I had concurred in the majority opinion inAlcuaz, et al.,vs.Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, 2 May 1988, 161 SCRA 7.

But, as I had expressed in my vote on the Motion for Reconsideration in the said Alcuaz case

"Except for the general statement that students' enrollment is limited to per semester, I concur."

In other words, I agree with Mme. Justice Cortes that the "termination of contract doctrine" should beoverturned for being a doctrinal error. It is now clear (it was quoted out of context before) thatparagraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Public Schools falls under Section VII on Tuition andOther Fees and is intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid oninstallment basis. It cannot be construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only onesemester.

As to the power of discipline, my view still is that schools should retain that prerogative, with thecaveat that the penalty they impose be proportionate to the offense committed.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concurred in the majority opinion inAlcuaz, et al.vs.Philippine School of Business Administration,et al.,G.R. No. 76353, 2 May 1988, 161 SCRA 7 including therefore that portion of the opinion whichheld that under par. 137, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, a college student in a privateschool is enrolled only for one (1) semester and that after each semester "the school cannot becompelled to enter into another contract with said students . . . ."


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However, after carefully considering the decision penned by Madame Justice Cortes in the case atbar, I am inclined to agree with her that "the contract between the school and students is not anordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by theConstitution to education . . . " (p. 15, Decision).

It would indeed appear that, consistent with this constitutional priority given to education, par. 107 of

the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools should be underscored. It provides that every studenthas the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements andreasonable regulations; . . . and that "the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollmentfor theentire period he is expected to complete the course,without prejudice to his right to transfer."

It should be stressed, however, that this right of students to enroll is not designed to leave schoolscompletely helpless to deny enrollment or re- enrollment. For, par. 107itself of the Manual ofRegulations for Private Schools still recognizes the right of the school to refuse enrollment in case ofacademic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations of the school.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I have always held that schools are not free to penalize, by administrative sanction or outrightexpulsion, students on account alone of the fact that they had taken part in mass actions orassemblies. 1

Students, as all persons, enjoy freedom of speech and assembly, right granted by the Constitution,and one nobody may abridge. The opinion of the majority reaffirms this fundamental principle.

This case also clarifies the true import of Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for PrivateSchools, i.e., that it is intended merely to enable schools to collect fees for the entire semesteralthough the student may not have completed the semester. But in no way may learning institutionsuse the provision as an excuse to dismiss students after one semester on the ground of terminationof contract.

The "termination of contract" theory espoused byAlcuaz v.Philippine School of BusinessAdministration2has indeed allowed schools to circumvent the guarantees of the Constitution bydenying "erring" students of their right to enroll, when the single "error" committed by the studentswas to participate in political activities. As I said, our students have as much right to disagree whether against school policies or government programs, and whether in or out of the schoolcompoundand no prior or subsequent penalty may be inflicted on account of such acts alone.

To be sure, the school may punish students for breach of discipline, as, say, for breaking chairs orwindow panes or for disrupting classes in the course of a demonstration, but they may be penalizedfor those actions alone and not because of the content of their speech or the vociferousness withwhich it was said .3Moreover, violations of school discipline must be judged on a case to case basisand measured depending on gravity before school authorities may legitimately act. I do not think that

the fact that a demonstration has disrupted ongoing classes is a ground for penalizing studentstaking part therein because a demonstration, from its very nature, is likely to disrupt classes. 4Theschool must convincingly show that the demonstrators had deliberately turned to lawlessness, say,by barricading the school gate or the classroom entrances or otherwise prevented non-demonstrating students or members of the faculty from attending a class or publishing one bythreats or intimidation. Only in that sense may school heads validly invoke "disruption of classes."

As far as discipline is concerned, this Court has laid down guidelines for proper school action.In Malabanan v.Ramento,as in the present case, we held that the punishment must fit the crime,


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and in Guzman v.National University,5we ruled that before any penalty may be imposed, thestudents concerned should be allowed to be heard by themselves or representatives. In all cases,the courts should be waryand the school authorities must themselves convince the judge thatpunishment meted out is due to a real injury done to the school and not for the fact that the studentshad simply expressed their constitutional right to disagree.

As to failing grades, I agree that, as we held in Villar v.Technological Institute of thePhilippines, 6academic deficiency is a legal basis for, among other things, expulsion. However, asVillar warned, educational institutions must set standard "to determine under what circumstancesfailing grades suffice for the expulsion of students, 7and that such standards "should be followedmeticulously," 8and that they "cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercisetheir constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech." 9What this decision makes plainis that the school must pre-set the ground rules for either suspension or expulsion of students byreason of falling marks which must be observed with reasonable uniformity. The school can not useit to spring surprises on students with failing grades, who also happen to be politically active in thecampus, after the authorities had long tolerated their poor performance. In this case, our courts mustalso exercise caution that, as "disruption of classes", resort to "failing grades" is not done to evadethe constitutional mandates.

I take note of the increasing practice by school heads to simply bar students from enrollment for ahost of excuses as a result of their exercise of constitutional rights. I am gratified that the majorityhas put an end to this practice.

I concur fully with Mme. Justice Irene Cortes'ponencia.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Like Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla, I had concurred in the majority opinion inAlcuaz, et al.,vs.Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, 2 May 1988, 161 SCRA 7.

But, as I had expressed in my vote on the Motion for Reconsideration in the said Alcuaz case"Except for the general statement that students' enrollment is limited to per semester, I concur."

In other words, I agree with Mme. Justice Cortes that the "termination of contract doctrine" should beoverturned for being a doctrinal error. It is now clear (it was quoted out of context before) thatparagraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Public Schools falls under Section VII on Tuition andOther Fees and is intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid oninstallment basis. It cannot be construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only onesemester.

As to the power of discipline, my view still is that schools should retain that prerogative, with thecaveat that the penalty they impose be proportionate to the offense committed.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concurred in the majority opinion inAlcuaz, et al.vs.Philippine School of Business Administration,et al.,G.R. No. 76353, 2 May 1988, 161 SCRA 7 including therefore that portion of the opinion which


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held that under par. 137, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, a college student in a privateschool is enrolled only for one (1) semester and that after each semester "the school cannot becompelled to enter into another contract with said students . . . ."

However, after carefully considering the decision penned by Madame Justice Cortes in the case atbar, I am inclined to agree with her that "the contract between the school and students is not an

ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by theConstitution to education . . . " (p. 15, Decision).

It would indeed appear that, consistent with this constitutional priority given to education, par. 107 ofthe Manual of Regulations for Private Schools should be underscored. It provides that every studenthas the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements andreasonable regulations; . . . and that "the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollmentfor theentire period he is expected to complete the course,without prejudice to his right to transfer."

It should be stressed, however, that this right of students to enroll is not designed to leave schoolscompletely helpless to deny enrollment or re- enrollment. For, par. 107itself of the Manual ofRegulations for Private Schools still recognizes the right of the school to refuse enrollment in case of

academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations of the school.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I have always held that schools are not free to penalize, by administrative sanction or outrightexpulsion, students on account alone of the fact that they had taken part in mass actions orassemblies. 1

Students, as all persons, enjoy freedom of speech and assembly, right granted by the Constitution,and one nobody may abridge. The opinion of the majority reaffirms this fundamental principle.

This case also clarifies the true import of Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private

Schools, i.e., that it is intended merely to enable schools to collect fees for the entire semesteralthough the student may not have completed the semester. But in no way may learning institutionsuse the provision as an excuse to dismiss students after one semester on the ground of terminationof contract.

The "termination of contract" theory espoused byAlcuaz v.Philippine School of BusinessAdministration2has indeed allowed schools to circumvent the guarantees of the Constitution bydenying "erring" students of their right to enroll, when the single "error" committed by the studentswas to participate in political activities. As I said, our students have as much right to disagree whether against school policies or government programs, and whether in or out of the schoolcompoundand no prior or subsequent penalty may be inflicted on account of such acts alone.

To be sure, the school may punish students for breach of discipline, as, say, for breaking chairs or

window panes or for disrupting classes in the course of a demonstration, but they may be penalizedfor those actions alone and not because of the content of their speech or the vociferousness withwhich it was said .3Moreover, violations of school discipline must be judged on a case to case basisand measured depending on gravity before school authorities may legitimately act. I do not think thatthe fact that a demonstration has disrupted ongoing classes is a ground for penalizing studentstaking part therein because a demonstration, from its very nature, is likely to disrupt classes. 4Theschool must convincingly show that the demonstrators had deliberately turned to lawlessness, say,by barricading the school gate or the classroom entrances or otherwise prevented non-


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demonstrating students or members of the faculty from attending a class or publishing one bythreats or intimidation. Only in that sense may school heads validly invoke "disruption of classes."

As far as discipline is concerned, this Court has laid down guidelines for proper school action.In Malabanan v.Ramento,as in the present case, we held that the punishment must fit the crime,and in Guzman v.National University,5we ruled that before any penalty may be imposed, the

students concerned should be allowed to be heard by themselves or representatives. In all cases,the courts should be waryand the school authorities must themselves convince the judge thatpunishment meted out is due to a real injury done to the school and not for the fact that the studentshad simply expressed their constitutional right to disagree.

As to failing grades, I agree that, as we held in Villar v.Technological Institute of thePhilippines, 6academic deficiency is a legal basis for, among other things, expulsion. However, asVillar warned, educational institutions must set standard "to determine under what circumstancesfailing grades suffice for the expulsion of students, 7and that such standards "should be followedmeticulously," 8and that they "cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercisetheir constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech." 9What this decision makes plainis that the school must pre-set the ground rules for either suspension or expulsion of students byreason of falling marks which must be observed with reasonable uniformity. The school can not useit to spring surprises on students with failing grades, who also happen to be politically active in thecampus, after the authorities had long tolerated their poor performance. In this case, our courts mustalso exercise caution that, as "disruption of classes", resort to "failing grades" is not done to evadethe constitutional mandates.

I take note of the increasing practice by school heads to simply bar students from enrollment for ahost of excuses as a result of their exercise of constitutional rights. I am gratified that the majorityhas put an end to this practice.

I concur fully with Mme. Justice Irene Cortes'ponencia.

Footnotes

* Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, Mr. Justice Narvasa, Mme. Justice Herrera, Mr. JusticeCruz, Mr. Justice Feliciano, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, and Mme. Justice Cortes

1 SeeAlcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration, No. 76353, May 2,1988, 161 SCRA 7, Sarmiento, J., Dissenting.

2 Supra.

3 Malabanan v. Ramento No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359

4 SeeUS v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422 (1907).

5 No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699.

6 No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706.

7 Supra 711.


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